NAVARRETE, CHERRYL/JMC College of Law

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta 

G.R. No. L-68635. May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA,
AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled
"EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

FACTS: 

Eva Illustre wrote letters to several Supreme Court justices which contained a stance of dangling
threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution. In October 1986, the Supreme Court issued
a resolution stating that just “because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean
that it is an "unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded". Following the resolution, Illustre then
again wrote letters to several justices with similar content, noting that the respective 4-page minute but
extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit deliberately unsigned that exposed
their lack of judicial integrity. 

After having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Illustre filed on December 1986 an
Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan. Several justices of the Supreme Court were charged with
having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution, as
well as several Court of Appeals justices on their unjust resolution. Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez
and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used their power and
influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of this Court into promulgating
their "unjust” extended Minute Resolution.

Illustre’s counsel Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the
press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on December 1986, without any copy furnished
this Court nor the members who were charged. Soon, Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioner's
Complaint. Afterwards, a resolution as issued by the Supreme Court ordering Atty. Laureta and
petitioner Illustre to show cause why they should not be disciplinary sanctioned and held in contempt
respectively for their acts. Illustre then answered, praying that the contempt proceedings against her be
dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity"
of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in character and were never
meant for anybody; (3) if her statements in those letters were really contemptuous, the Court "should
have immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her; she instituted the complaint before the
Tanodbayan "in my honest behalf that I lost my case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of
merit or of its own merits; (5) Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before
the latter body, she has "established not only probable cause but has also proved the collective
culpability (of the Justices concerned) as charge. Atty. Laureta at the same time answered: (1) he is not
respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from calling her
intended press conference and from circulating copies of her complaint "not only  in the performance of
duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president of Manila III  Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and as a professional lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics; (3) he did not prepare
respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices.

ISSUES:
 (1) Whether or not Atty. Laureta has liability for besmirching acts against the Courts.
(2) Whether or not Atty. Laureta is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an
attorney and Officer of the Court.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The Supreme Court found the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty.
Laureta unsatisfactory. Their reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed
to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. In the exercise of forbearance by  the
Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having
read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness
and unfairness of their accusations.

The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. It must act to preserve its honor
and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession. They are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do
with respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices. In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June
25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta, the same phrases were incanted: the promptitude with which the
Resolution of 14 May 1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the
entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given due course is concerned. Those same
terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by Ilustre. Atty. Laureta's obsession to
receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second letters. Also, the reports received by the
members of the Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the
editors of the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was
heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint. Such bolstered the Supreme
Court’s disagreement with the respondents.

As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should
be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal E times should be
reminded him that '(a) lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from
doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct
towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client pursuits in such wrong doing the
lawyer should terminate their relation. As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize
that the cardinal principle he would grossly impair and violate is that of the independence of the
judiciary, which the members of the bar are called upon to defend and preserve. The independence of
the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule
of law. Also, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve atrial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, he was
suspended until further orders.

(2) Yes. The Supreme Court held that the argument premised on lack of hearing and due
process, is not impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. Atty. Laureta was
given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to
dispose action. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel
before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said
body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise.

Furthermore, the copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was
furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Upon the delivery at
the residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision. If,
indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely
severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. To note
also is Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the
Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would  not have
been pinpointed at all. The logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s
allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing
of the sort.

The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts
in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as
manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being
subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a
favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year. Hence, motion was denied, he was suspended
from practice.

QUESTION:

What does DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR mean? When can the doctrine be applied?

ANSWER:

Res ipsa loquitur is Latin, and when translated directly means the thing speaks for
itself. With res ipsa loquitur, the breach is so apparent that there is a presumption of the breach of duty
and the plaintiff does not need to provide extensive evidence, if any, of the breach. Thus, the negligence
speaks for itself.

The principle or doctrine applies to both judges and lawyers, in the following cases:

1. Judges had been dismissed from the service without need for a formal investigation because
based on records, the gross misconduct or inefficiency of the judges clearly appears. (Uy vs
Mercado, 154 SCRA 567)
2. On the basis of the lawyer’s comment or answer to show-cause order of the SC , it appears
that the lawyer has so conducted himself in a manner which exhibits his blatant disrespect
to the court, or his want of good moral character or his violation of the attorney’s oath, the
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred without need of a trial-type proceeding. (Prudential
Bank vs. Castro 155 SCRA 604). Grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to
a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. (In re:
Wenceslao Laureta, G.R. No. L-68635, May 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 570)