G.R. No.

L-43760 August 21, 1976

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), petitioner 
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
CO., INC., respondents.

 A certification by the Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel, states that

respondent National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) is the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.
 They disregard the objection raised by petitioner, the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU).
 In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429
votes as against 414 of petitioner Union.
 Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor
Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor
union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent.
 There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face
therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above
applicable rule.
 Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied
Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled
ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were
seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Director.
 The respondent answered that - Under such a view, the ruling in the Allied Workers
Association case (Case law - PRECEDENT) that arose during the period when it was
the Industrial Peace Act, that was in effect and not the present law, no longer possesses
relevance. It cannot and should not be applied. It is not controlling. There was no abuse
of discretion then, much less a grave one.

This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent Director, not to mention the
decisive fact appearing in the Petition itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were
intended for the petitioner Union,"6 thus rendering clear that it would on its own showing obtain
only 424 votes as against 429 for respondent Union. certiorari does not lie.

 What is of the essence of the certification process, every labor organization is given the
opportunity in a free and honest election. Petitioner cannot complain. It was given that
opportunity. It lost in a fair election.
 It obtained a majority of the valid votes cast. So our law Prescribes.: "It is a well-settled
rule that a representative will be certified even though less than a majority of all the
employees in the unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that the union be
designated by a majority of the valid ballots, and this is so even though only a small
proportion of the eligible voters participates
 To insist on the absolute majority where there are various unions and where the
possibility of invalid ballots may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate that goal. For the
probability of a long drawn-out, protracted process is not easy to dismiss.
 The Respondent Director cannot be presumed to be at fault in not applying the
doctrine/case.
 This certification election is governed therefore, as was made clear, by the present
Labor Code and the Rules issued thereunder. Absent a showing that such rules and
regulations -are violative of the Code, this Court cannot ignore their existence.

StatCon #3 Page 1
  He took into consideration only the "valid votes" as was required by the Rules. He had
no choice as long as they remain in force.

ISSUE: WON Carmelo Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in not applying the case
law/precedent (Allied Case)?

HELD: NO. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by
Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on February 3, 1975, the
present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as May 1, 1974. This
Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules.

American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose
duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction
of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need
be cited to support it." 18 There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement
in Molina v. Rafferty," 19 a 1918 decision: "Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby." 20 Since
then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions . 21 As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU).

StatCon #3 Page 2
[G.R. No. L-50320 : July 31, 1981.]
PHILIPPINE APPAREL WORKERS UNION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE APPAREL, INC.

 In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement on

July 31,1976.
 Petitioner submitted to the respondent company a set of bargaining proposals dated
June 2, 1976. Negotiations were held thereafter between the parties;
 But because of an impasse, the complainant (petitioner herein) filed on September 15,
1976 a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties therein be
assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties
nevertheless continued their negotiations.
 On September 3, 1977, the parties concluded and signed a collective bargaining
agreement which, among other things, provided for a 3-stage wage increase for all rank
and file employees.
o Basic daily wage to increase 0.80 in the first year and 0.50 centavos on the last
two years (of all employees).
 Meanwhile, on April 21, 1977, P.D. 1123 was enacted to take effect on May 1, 1977
providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by P.D. 525. This
increase was implemented effective May 1, 1977 by the respondent company, as shown
by Memorandum No. 6-77 of the respondent company’s General Manager to all
employees dated April 23, 1977.
 The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement.
 The respondent company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage
increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of said
decree, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month. In effect, the
payment of the additional P60 covers both the requirements of the decree and the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily.
 Respondent company asserts that since there was already a meeting of the minds
between the parties as early as April 2, 1977 about the wage increases which were
made retroactive to April 1, 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the
Rules Implementing P.D. 1123.
o “Section 1. Coverage. — These rules shall apply to all employers except the
following:
o “(k) Those that have granted in addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at least
P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those
who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference.”
 On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the living allowance under P.D. 1123
(originally P.D. 525) is distinct and separate from the negotiated wage increase of P0.80
daily.
 In fact, it adds, when the CBA was signed by the parties on September 3, 1977, the
respondent company was fully aware of the effectivity of P.D. 1123 and had already
been paying the increased allowance provided therein
 Hence, the respondent company acted in bad faith when it refused to pay the negotiated
wage increase in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the respondent
company is guilty of unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: WON respondent should pay, in addition to PD 1123, the increase based on the
CBA?
HELD: YES. The act of Respondent constitutes unfair labor practice.

StatCon #3 Page 3
There is nothing in the records to indicate that the negotiated wage increases were granted or
paid before May, 1977. Hence, it cannot be said that the respondent Company falls within the
exceptions provided for in paragraph cranad(k) of the rules implementing P.D. 1123. At the time
the said P.D. took effect, there was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of the
said increase. There was therefore no grant of said increases as yet, despite the contrary
opinion expressed in the letter of Undersecretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong.

Consequently, its refusal to implement the P0.80 wage increase for the first year of the CBA
constitutes a violation thereof and makes the respondent company guilty of unfair labor practice.

The respondent company is also guilty of bad faith when it signed the CBA on September 3,
1977 without in any way letting the petitioner union know that it was going to apply part of the
allowances being paid under P.D. 1123 to the wage increases provided for in the CBA.

What was the intention of the parties relative to the wage increases? A cursory reading of the
CBA indicates that the benefits provided therein are not exclusive of other benefits, as may be
gleaned from the provisions of its Section 4, Article XIV [p. 42 of the CBA at p. 6, NLRC rec.],
which speaks of “any other benefits or privileges which are not expressly provided in this
Agreement, even if now accorded or hereafter accorded to the employees and workers, shall be
deemed purely acts of grace . cra .”

It is also conceded that the Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as
used in its rules implementing P.D. 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to P.D.
1123 should be given weight. However, when it is based on misrepresentations as to the
existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied. At any rate, the
opinion of then Undersecretary Inciong about the matter is based on the wrong premise that
there was already an agreement (“If as you said management and labor agreed on April 2, 1977
. cra .”, p. 33, NLRC rec.). There is no such agreement perfected on April 2, 1977.

Dispositive portion: CERTIORARI GRANTED, PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS HEREBY

DIRECTED TO PAY, IN ADDITION TO THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN
P.D. 1123, THE NEGOTIATED WAGE INCREASE OF P0.80 DAILY EFFECTIVE APRIL 1,
1977 AS WELL AS ALL OTHER WAGE INCREASES EMBODIED IN THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, TO ALL COVERED EMPLOYEES.

StatCon #3 Page 4
G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU), petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and INSULAR BANK OF
ASIA AND AMERICA, respondents.

 Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay
before the NLRC in Manila.
 On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-
entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint for payment of holiday pay.
 Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the
order of Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by paying their holiday pay up to and including
January, 1976.

 On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the Secretary of Labor
interpreting the above-quoted rule, pertinent portions of which reads:

The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include
payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.

Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate
controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees, The new determining rule is this: If
the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum
wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already
paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary
on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid
legal holidays. ..." (emphasis supplied).

 Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing
Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction No. 9, stopped the payment of
holiday pay to an its employees.

 A motion for writ of execution was filed.

 Respondent filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of execution alleging, among
others, that: (a) its refusal to pay the corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance
with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, is based on
and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules implementing P. D.
850; and (b) that the said award is already repealed by P.D. 850 which took effect on
December 16, 1975, and by said Policy Instruction No. 9 of the Department of Labor,
considering that its monthly paid employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and
their monthly pay is uniform from January to December, and that no deductions are
made from the monthly salaries of its employees on account of holidays in months
where they occur.

ISSUE: WON the decision or issuance of the Secretary of Labor is valid; hence, no holiday pay
will be received by the petitioners

HELD: Petitioners are entitled to the holiday pay.

WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing
rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since

StatCon #3 Page 5
in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended
them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion

 It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is
clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
 In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of
holiday pay are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion
from the benefits.
 In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically
state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law
clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.
 This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code,
which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor
of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a
valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its
language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by
Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations.

Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF

PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER RICARTE
T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY REINSTATED.

StatCon #3 Page 6
G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

 The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring
all employers in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses
and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration.
 Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through
counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding
overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective
monthly premium contributions, and submitting,
o "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term
'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on
Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the
words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages".
 Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President
and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

 Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is
not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the
Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute,
a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.

ISSUE: WON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to
the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act”

HELD:

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation
and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or
gives a statement of policy; it merely interprets a pre-existing law.

Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation"
contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as
follows: .
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or
overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make,
although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:

StatCon #3 Page 7
 (f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in
excess of P500.00 received during the month.

We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the
System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the
monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should
be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the
Official Gazette for its effectivity.

It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its
Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old
law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation"
paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be
included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in
previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the
wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not
whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer
does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered
compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees.
While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted
meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law,
such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid
that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning
for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically
defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792
amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of
this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear
mandate of the new law.

Dispositive portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

StatCon #3 Page 8
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

This case involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive
and Legislative Departments.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we
will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
1. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
2. Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
3. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they
be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments?

 Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of

Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino.
 The said appointment made by the President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano
Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both
Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since the
appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval.
 Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.

ISSUE: WON the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA is
valid.
HELD: Yes, (Discussion by Father Bernas, the amicus curiae, Davide, et al) It is, therefore,
clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

CONSTI ART VII - Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress

StatCon #3 Page 9
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

With particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner"
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there
are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same
Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.

Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to
be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they
are, hereby DISMISSED

StatCon #3 Page 10
G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

 In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946.
 After paying the amount (Php802), he instituted an action in Manila Court of First
Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the
reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
 The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected.
The defendant appealed.
 It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

 CONSTI of United States

o First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges
up to 1862
o Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the
salaries of "civil officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per cent.
Revenue officers, construed it as including the compensation of all judges; but
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the Secretary of the
Treasury a letter of protest

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
diminution.

HELD: Yes. The imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a
diminution thereof.
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all
diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to
prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the
judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the Constitution.

It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the
independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is
power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and
the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all
salaries of government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the
judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because the tax is general on all receiving the
same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal
measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of
the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems,
quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result:
Judges compensation is thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax
law. Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few judges
might falter; the great majority will not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in
the judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases against the Executive or the Congress
believe that the judicature has not yielded to their pressure?

StatCon #3 Page 11
Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his
salary to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act
of the President, his salary would not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against
diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like
manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the
judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of
affairs.

OZAETA., J., dissenting:

The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief Justice and each associate Justice,
respectively, of the Supreme Court were the same salaries ]which they were receiving at the
time the Constitution was framed and adopted and on which they were paying income tax under
the existing income tax law. It seems clear to us that for them to receive the same salaries,
subject to the same tax, after the adoption of the Constitution as before does not involve any
diminution at all.

It seems likewise clear that when the framers of the Constitution fixed those salaries, they must
have taken into consideration that the recipients were paying income tax thereon. There was no
necessity to provide expressly that said salaries shall be subject to income tax because they
knew that already so provided. On the other hand, if exemption from any tax on said salaries
had been intended, it would have been specifically to so provide, instead of merely saying that
the compensation as fixed "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

30% tax issue - To this we reply that if such a vindictive measure is ever resorted to (which we
cannot imagine), we shall be the first ones to vote to strike it down as a palpable violation of the
Constitution. There is no parity between such hypothetical law and the general income tax law
invoked by the defendant in this case. We believe that an income tax law applicable only
against the salaries of judges and not against those or all other income earners may be
successfully assailed as being in contravention not only of the provision against diminution of
the salaries of judges but also of the uniformity of the rule of taxation as well as of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. So the danger apprehended by the majority is not real but
surely imaginary.

StatCon #3 Page 12
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

 This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance in Manila declaring
section 13 of RA No. 590 unconstitutional and ordering the appellant Saturnino David
as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor Endencia and to Justice
Fernando Jugo the income tax collected on their salary.
 When the SC held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers exempt from salary tax
because the collection thereof was a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is
prohibited by the Constitution, the Congress thereafter promulgated RA No. 590,
authorizing and legalizing the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the
arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised,
brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277,
that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so
violates the Constitution.

We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of
whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional

HELD: NO. It is Unconstitutional.

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duly of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional. Section 13, RA No.
590 is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase found in
section 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution which refers to the salaries of judicial officers. This act
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature may not
legally provide therein that a statue be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thus the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of RA No. 590.

Dispositive portion:
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
no pronouncement as to costs.

StatCon #3 Page 13
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto
vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no
legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.

StatCon #3 Page 14
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.,

petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME
COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

 Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from
making deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries.
 According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers
is a violation of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
o “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”.

 In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries
are being decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis.

 In particular, since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section
6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers
was to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries.
o Section 6.No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

 The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of
taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. While the question has been resolved, the
Court decided to settle the legal issues through a judicial pronouncement.

ISSUE: Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES

HELD:
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable.

Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax

This payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of
their salaries during their continuance in office. Further, the deletion of the grant of exemption
from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary was a way of ensuring the equality of
the three branches of government.

Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of the framers was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all income earners.

The course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of Section 10,
Article VIII further clarified the issue:

StatCon #3 Page 15
Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased”
and that the word “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted, was accepted.

Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by putting a period after “decreased”, it is

with the understanding that the salaries of justices are subject to tax. He cited that this is based
on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which states that no salary of any
public officer shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Dencia vs David
were not applicable anymore.

Dispositive portion: Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people,
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the
burden of general income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

StatCon #3 Page 16
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

 The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
 In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church.
 The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic/public duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President.
In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The
said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part remained unsold.

 The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

 He alleged that the provisions of Section 23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution
were violated in the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage stamps. It was
provided therein that, ‘No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces
or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.’

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the principle of separation of
church and state
HELD: NO.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our
country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the
estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development.

Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for

religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the

StatCon #3 Page 17
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.

The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist to this country.

There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue
postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a
poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court
resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.

StatCon #3 Page 18
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

 Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette.
 Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees, Letter of instructions, General Orders, Executive
Orders, Letters of Implementation, and Administrative orders which they claimed had not
been published as required by Law.
 The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon approval.
 The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of
the decrees.
 The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest
that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which
are not.
 The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the
clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

HELD:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the laws.

(April 24, 1985)

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

StatCon #3 Page 19
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

(December 29, 1986)

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon
to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

StatCon #3 Page 20