is ET OF OLtimeia DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ADHIMISTRATIVE HEARINGS 441 4” Street, NW Washington, DC 20001-2714 200 NOV19 P 237 TEL: (202) 442-9094 FAX: (202) 442.9451 AMANDA C. BROADNAX Appellant/Claimant v, Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Appellee/Employer FINAL ORDER 1. INTRODUCTION Appellant/Claimant Amanda C, Broadnax appealed a District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (“DOES”) Claims Examiner’s Determination (“Determination”) disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits. The issue on appeal is whether Claimant quit her job with Appellee/Employer United States Department of Transportation “voluntarily without good cause connected with the work,” as that term is defined under the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act, D.C. Official Code § 51-110(a), and 7 District of Columbia Municipal Regulations (“DCMR”) 311. This administrative court issued a Scheduling Order and Notice of In-Person Hearing on October 8, 2010, setting the hearing for October 22, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. At Claimant's request and for good cause shown I continued the hearing to November 5, 2010, at 9:30 a.m, Claimant represented herself at the hearing, and testified on her own behalf. Employer was represented at the hearing by P. Nichole McWhorter, Esquire. No witnesses testified for Employer.‘Case No.: 2010-DOBS-02246 During the hearing, Claimant’s Exhibits 100, 101, 103, 104, 119-121, 123, 126, 128, 133, 138, 141, 142, 144, 148-154, and 157, and Employer's Exhibits 200-211 were admitted into evidence at the hearing. I considered court records marked for identification as Exhibits 300 and 301 in making a determination concerning jurisdiction, I. FINDINGS OF FACT ‘The Determination was mailed to the parties on September 21, 2010. Exhibit 300. Claimant filed an appeal of the Determination on October 5, 2010. Exhibit 301 Claimant worked for Employer as Program Assistant in the Federal Highway Administration's Office of the Chief Counsel, Administrative and Technology Law Division, from March 16, 2008, until April 26, 2010. Claimant was assigned to assist four attorneys in the Division, including Grace Reidy, Esquire. On September 16, 2008, Claimant was placed on leave restriction. ‘The leave restriction meant that Claimant had to follow certain procedures and provide certain documentation when requesting leave. Claimant and Ms, Reidy were in frequent conflict concerning Claimant's attendance and the quality of her performance. Beginning in March 2009, Ms. Reidy started to yell and scream at Claimant when they discussed work issues, telling Claimant, “You are barking up the wrong tree.” Claimant told Ms. Reidy later that she believed that Ms. Reidy was indirectly calling her a dog. Exhibit 128. Claimant then went to Ms. Reidy’s supervisor, Wil Bacchus, to ask him to intervene on her behalf with Ms. Reidy. Mr. Bacchus, who had heard about the argument from Ms, Reidy, told Claimant that Ms. Reidy had told him that Claimant had been disrespectful to her. Mr, Bacchus did not arrange for a meeting with Claimant, nor did he intervene further to improve Claimant and Ms. Reidy’s relationship.Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 Claimant was on maternity leave from March to July 2009. In August 2009, Ms. Reidy sent emails to the entire staff accusing Claimant of taking her computer. The office had been undergoing a renovation, and everyone’s computers had been placed in a conference room. Claimant confirmed with Employer's information technology staff that the computer she had taken to her new workspace was actually assigned to her, and both Claimant and Mr. Bacchus formed Ms. Reidy that Claimant had possession of the correct computer. Ms. Reidy nonetheless repeated to another employee that Claimant had stolen the computer. Exhibit 128, On October 27, 2009, Claimant and Ms. Reidy had another discussion about Claimant's performance in which Ms. Reidy screamed at Claimant. Exhibits 123 and 126, When Claimant left Ms. Reidy’s office to speak to another employee, Ms. Reidy followed her, and yelled at her in front of the other employee while standing very close to Claimant. Claimant interpreted Ms. Reidy’s actions as threatening, and complained to Mr. Bacchus, who again did not intervene. Id. In the next few days, Ms. Reidy accused Claimant of not completing an important assignment, although Claimant had, in fact, completed the assignment, and had photographs to prove that she had done so, Exhibit 119. Claimant was so upset that she contacted a counselor at Employer's Employee Assistance Program to obtain mental health counseling. Exhibit 157. On October 28, 2009, Claimant sent an email to Thomas Holian, Deputy Chief Counsel, asking to meet with him regarding Ms. Reidy’s treatment of her. Exhibit 126. Mr. Holian and Sheryl Williams, another lawyer in the Division, met with Claimant on November 2, 2009, and listened while she described Ms. Reidy’s behavior, and her unsuccessful requests for help from Mr, Bacchus. Exhibit 127. Claimant described how stressful her working conditions had become because of Ms, Reidy, and asked Mr. Holian to detail her to another Division for a “cooling off period.”Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 While Claimant was waiting to see if Mr. Holian could find a detail for her, Ms. Reidy continued to make disparaging comments to others about her performance, including that Claimant “was not competent enough” to copy documents. Claimant's stress level continued to rise, and she met with Mr. Holian on November 6, 2009, December 9, 2009, January 21, 2010, and January 27, 2010. Mr. Bacchus retired on December 31, 2009, and Ms. Reidy became acting supervisor. Ms. Reidy told Claimant that she wanted to “get rid” of her, and warned Claimant, “I’m not Wil {Bacchus}” in a manner Claimant believed to be threatening. In January, Mr. Holian informed Claimant that she would be detailed to Employer's Office of Real Estate Services beginning February 1, 2010. Mr. Holian informed Claimant that Ms. Reidy would remain her supervisor while Claimant was on the detail, and that she should continue to submit all leave requests to her. On January 27, 2010, Claimant gave Mr. Holian a lengthy memorandum that specified 20 incidents since October 2008 in which Claimant thought Ms. Reidy was “abusing her power” by screaming at her, questioning her ability to parent, and ridiculing her in front of other employees. Exhibit 128. Ms. Reidy also charged Claimant with six hours of Absence Without Leave (“AWOL”) for incidents that occurred in January 2010. Claimant did not agree that she should be charged AWOL, and stated so in the memorandum she gave Mr, Holian. Id. Claimant filed an EEOC complaint on January 28, 2010, and requested mediation with the management of her Division, Ultimately, Claimant declined to participate in mediation because she learned that Employer had designated Ms. Reidy as the Agency Official who would participate in mediation on behalf of Employer. In addition, during her detail, Claimant tried to get another job, so she would not have to return to the Office of the Chief Counsel. In February, Claimant, who was a college student, contacted the director of a program specifically for college 4.Case No.: 2010-DOBS-02246 students to express interest in participating in the program. Exhibits 101 and 103. On March 25, 2010, Claimant met with Employer's Director of Human Resources to tell him how successful she believed her detail was and to attempt to either extend the detail beyond its April expiration date, or to find another permanent assignment. The Director of Human Resources promised to meet with Claimant again, but did not do so, None of Claimant’s other attempts to transfer from the Office of the Chief Counsel were successful During March, Ms. Reidy continued to interact with Claimant in a manner Claimant thought was unnecessarily aggressive, hostile, and threatening. Ms. Reidy demanded that Claimant sign a blank performance review form, after telling Claimant that she would be rated as “not meeting expectations,” and rejected Claimant's request that another employee attend the performance review meeting between Claimant and Ms. Reidy. Claimant was also concerned, given Ms. Reidy’s earlier threats to “get rid of” Claimant, that Ms. Reidy would sabotage Claimant's attempts to obtain another job with Employer. Claimant also tried to obtain Ms. Reidy’s signature on documents relating to training that had been approved by a previous supervisor, but Ms. Reidy refused to sign the documents. On March 23, 2010, Employer gave Claimant a written proposal, authored by Ms. Reidy, to suspend her without pay for seven days because it contended that Claimant failed to follow instructions regarding complying with her leave restriction, had been AWOL five times, and had been discourteous and unprofessional to Ms. Reidy on three occasions. Exhibit 204. After the conflict with Ms. Reidy concerning her performance review on March 18, 2010, Claimant sought medical treatment from her obstetrician-gynecologist, who determined that Claimant's chest pains and difficulty breathing were likely the result of severe anxiety inCase No.: 2010-DOES-02246 anticipation of the end of her detail and return to the Office of the Chief Counsel on April 1, 2010. Claimant’s doctor referred her to Smita H. Patel, M.D., a psychiatrist. Exhibits 153 and 154. On March 26, 2010, Claimant consulted Dr. Patel. Dr. Patel’s assessment was that Claimant was incapacitated by stress, and could not work from that day until at least April 5, 2010. Exhibit 149, Claimant gave Employer the medical certification of incapacity from Dr. Patel, and requested leave for the recommended period of time. Exhibit 148. A few days later, Dr. Patel gave Claimant another medical certification of incapacity to work until April 9, 2010. Exhibit 151. After seeing Claimant again, Dr. Patel gave Claimant another medical certification of incapacity to work until July 5, 2010. Exhibit 151. On April 13, 2010, Claimant submitted all these certifications to Employer when she applied for Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave, Exhibit 150, as well as a more detailed description of her symptoms and diagnosis that connected them specifically with Claimant's working conditions from a licensed psychotherapist, Marijean Berry, PhD., to whom she had been referred by Employer's EAP program. Exhibit 152. Claimant responded to the March 23, 2010, proposal to suspend her for seven days in writing on April 3, 2010. Exhibit 206. By Memorandum dated April 19, 2010, Mr. Holian upheld all three charges in the proposed suspension, but reduced the suspension period to five days without pay. Exhibit 207. Claimant's suspension was to begin on April 26, 2010. Id. On April 21, 2010, Sheryl Williams, Assistant Chief Counsel, met with Claimant about her request for FMLA leave, Although Claimant knew that Ms. Williams was now the supervisor to whom she would report upon her return to the Office of the Chief Counsel, Ms. Reidy was still in the same Division, Ms. Williams told Claimant that she was “tentatively approving” her leave request, “conditioned upon the results of you obtaining the opinion of & -6-‘Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 second health care provider designated by the Agency conceming the soundness of the information contained in [the medical certifications}.” Exhibit 210. When Claimant asked Ms. Williams if it was routine for the Agency to require examination by its own physician before deciding whether to approve a request for FMLA leave, Ms. Williams told Claimant that it was not routine. Ms. Williams also told Claimant that, since Claimant had not had sufficient leave to cover her absences from the office from April 5-8, 2010, she would be assessed AWOL for that time period. Id By email dated April 25, 2010, Claimant resigned from her job, “{dJue to the work conditions I have been subjected to.” Exhibit 207, Ill. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ‘According to D.C. Official Code § 51-111(), any party may file an appeal from a Claims Examiner's Determination within 15 calendar days after the mailing of the determination to the party’s last-known address or, in the absence of such a mailing, within 15 calendar days of actual delivery of the determination. In this case, the Claims Examiner mailed the Determination to the parties on September 25, 2010. Claimant filed her appeal on October 1, 2010, within the statutory deadline, and jurisdiction is established. D.C. Official Code § 51-111(). ‘An unemployed individual who meets certain statutory eligibility requirements is ordinarily qualified to receive unemployment benefits. D.C. Official Code § 51-109. There are several exceptions to the general rule of eligibility. D.C. Official Code § 51-110. For example, iff an employee voluntarily leaves his or her most recent work without good eause connected with the work, the employee is disqualified from receiving benefits. D.C. Official Code § 51-110(a).Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 ‘An employee's leaving work is presumed to be involuntary. 7 DCMR 311.3; Wright v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 560 A.2d 509, 511 (D.C. 1989). The presumption is overcome if the “claimant acknowledges that the leaving was voluntary or the employer presents evidence sufficient to support a finding by the Director that the leaving was voluntary.” 7 DCMR 311.3; ‘see Coalition for the Homeless v, D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 653 A.2d 374, 376 (D.C. 1995). A leaving is “voluntary” if it is “voluntary in fact, within the ordinary meaning of the word ‘voluntary. 7 DCMR 311.2; see Cruz v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 633 A.24 66, 69-70 (D.C. 1993). Although the employer bears the burdens of production and persuasion on the issue of the voluntariness of an employee’s leaving, see OAH Rule 2820.3 and Green v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 870, 873 (D.C. 1985), testimony or documentary evidence offered by the employee may prove the employer's case. See 7 DCMR 311.3. Once an employee seeking unemployment benefits acknowledges, or an employer establishes, that a leaving was voluntary, then the employee bears the burden of proving that the voluntary leaving arose from “good cause connected with the work.” 7 DCMR 311.4; Perkins v. DC. Dep't of Employment Servs., 482 A.2d 401 (D.C. 1984). Claimant in this case acknowledges that she left her job voluntarily, several days after being told by a supervisor that she would have to submit to a medical examination by a physician of Employer's choosing. Claimant did not testify or imply that she had actually been fired or that Employer’s communications with her (notably Ms. Reidy’s statement that she wanted to “get rid of” Claimant) had given him reason to think his job was in immediate jeopardy. See 7 DCMR 311.8. Claimant did testify that she felt she was resigning under duress, but none of the evidence concerning the comments made to Claimant is evidence of a “threat of imminent termination.” See Bowen v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 486 A.2d 694, 697 (D.C. 1985) -8-‘Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 (resignation was voluntary when claimant was told he would be fired but was not told when, and ‘was permitted to continue working in the meantime). Because Claimant voluntarily left her position with Employer, she will be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits unless the record shows that her reason for leaving constitutes “good cause connected with the work.” See 7 DCMR 311.4. Applicable regulations express the “good cause” standard as a question: ““[W]hat would a reasonable and prudent person in the labor market do in the same cireumstances?” 7 DCMR 311.5. The regulations also provide examples of reasons that are considered “good cause” for an employee's voluntary decision to quit a job: (2) Racial discrimination or harassment; (b) Sexual discrimination or harassment; (©) Failure to provide remuneration for employee services; (@) Working in unsafe locations or under unsafe conditions; (c) Illness or disability caused or aggravated by the work; Provided, that the claimant has previously supplied the employer with a medical statement; and (® Transportation problems arising from the relocation of the employer, a change in the primary work site, or transfer of the employee to a different work site; Provided, that adequate, economical, and reasonably distanced transportation facilities are not available, 7 DCMR 311.7. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has noted that this list is “ponexclusive” and that the critical inquiry remains how a “reasonable and prudent person in the job market” would respond to the situation. Gunty v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 524 A.2d 1192, 1199 (D.C. 1987). Regulations issued under the Act also provide examples of reasons that are not “good cause connected with the work” in a voluntary quit case:‘Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 (a) Refusal to obey reasonable employer rules; (b) Minor reduction in wages; (©) Transfer from one type of work to another which is reasonable and necessary; (@) Marriage or divorce resulting in a change of residence; (©) General dissatisfaction with work; (8 Resignation in order to attend school or training; and (g Personal or domestic responsibilities. 7 DCMR 311.6. ‘The facts of this case do not fit cleanly into any of the examples of “good cause” or “not good cause” mentioned in the regulations, Ms. Reidy’s expressed dissatisfaction Claimant's performance and do not constitute either of the enumerated examples of harassment, but might be perceived by some employees as triggering more than a mere “dissatisfaction with work.” See 7 DCMR 311.7(a) and (b); 7 DCMR 311.6(¢). In Gunty, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that unenumerated forms of harassment, such as a supervisor's repeatedly assigning meaningless tasks or shouting at an employee, might also meet the general standard of “good cause connected with the work” in a voluntary quit case. Gumty, 524 A.2d at 1199. And in Cruz, the Court found that a claimant’s allegations of “difficulties with fellow- employees” at least raised “material issues of fact” under the good cause standard. Cruz, 633 A2d at 72. Based on the evidence in the record, I find that Claimant’s decision to quit on April 26, 2010, was the response of a “reasonable and prudent person in the labor market.” A reasonable employee in the labor market has an “obligation to preserve [his or her] her employment relationship.” See Freeman v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 568 A.2d 1091, 1093 (D.C. 1990). That obligation may sometimes require an employee to treat even a blunt or rude “shape -10-Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 up or ship out” message as a wake-up call for self-improvement rather than an invitation to resign. See Thomas v. D.C. Dep't of Labor, 409 A.2d 164, 173 (D.C. 1979) (a reasonable worker given a shape up or ship out message “should remain on the job (as the employer anticipates he would) and try to improve his performance”). However, the uncontroverted evidence here was that Ms. Reidy's behavior towards Claimant went far beyond what could reasonably be expected from a supervisor, and that, though Claimant tried every avenue open to her to obtain a different assignment, Employer was not willing to separate her permanently from Ms. Reidy’s scope of influence, if not actual supervision. Although at the time Claimant quit Ms. Williams was her supervisor, Ms. Reidy’s behavior in the past, particularly the incident in which she accused Claimant of stealing her computer even after Claimant and Mr, Holian confirmed that the computer was actually assigned to Claimant, is some evidence that Ms. Reidy did not let the facts stand in the way of her accusations regarding Claimant. Moreover, there is evidence in the record that, in discussing Claimant’s attendance problems with her, Ms. Reidy made disparaging comments about Claimant’s ability as a parent. Taken as a whole, the evidence in this record of Ms. Reidy’s behavior that demonstrates that she harbored a degree of personal animus against Claimant that went well beyond what might be understandable frustration in supervising a recalcitrant subordinate. It is important to note that Employer’s decision not to present any witnesses at the hearing, but to rely exclusively on documents, significantly eased Claimant’s task to persuade ime of the credibility of her characterization of Ms. Reidy’s behavior. Claimant’s testimony was cogent, specific, and detailed, and was corroborated by contemporaneously-created documents. None of the documents presented by Employer rebutted, and most did not even address, -1l-Case No.: 2010-DOBS-02246 Claimant’s main contentions concerning Ms. Reidy’s behavior towards her, and her anticipation that the behavior would continue once Claimant returned from her detail to the Office of the Chief Counsel. Employer's argument that Claimant actually quit because she did not wish to serve the five-day suspension imposed by Mr. Holian’s memorandum of April 19, 2010, is not persuasive for several reasons. First, Claimant denied that she had received a copy of the memorandum, or even knew of Mr. Holian’s decision, and Employer did not rebut that credible testimony. The evidence was that, at and around the date of the memorandum, Claimant was not at work, and ‘was concentrating her efforts on obtaining approval for her FMLA leave application. Second, Claimant denied that the proposal to suspend her for five days had anything to do with her decision to quit, Third, the evidence was that at the time immediately before she quit, Claimant ‘was attempting to obtain approval for unpaid FMLA leave of four months” duration. Nothing in Employer's evidence or legal arguments explained why the prospect of a suspension of five days without pay would have motivated Claimant to quit, when she was prepared to forgo income for a much longer period of time. Fourth, nothing in Claimant’s resignation email even mentions the proposed discipline as a reason for Claimant’s decision to quit. Fifth, the proposed discipline was predicated only upon incidents that involved Claimant's attendance. Claimant's testimony about the incidents in which Ms. Reidy criticized how she completed tasks, made negative comments about her parenting skills, accused her of stealing a computer, and told others she was not competent enough even to copy documents was the focus of her case, Claimant stated several times that she was concerned that Ms, Reidy’s characterization of her performance, not her complaints about attendance, would prevent her from finding an assignment outside the Office of the Chief Counsel, Notably, there is no evidence in the record that Employer ever -12-Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 disciplined Claimant for poor performance or stealing, casting some doubt on the reasonableness of Ms. Reidy’s view of Claimant's behavior. The evidence also does not support a conclusion that Claimant quit strictly for medical reasons, Claimant denied that her various medical providers advised her to quit, although she admitted that they had all suggested that she consider it as one option to deal with her issues at work. While it is true that, at the time Claimant quit her job, she was experiencing, according to her treating physicians, symptoms of severe depression, the weight of the evidence is that the depression itself was merely a manifestation of Claimant's inability to prevent or escape from the verbal abuse heaped on her by Ms. Reidy. Again, Employer's failure to present any witnesses who could have testified about the relationship between Claimant and Ms. Reidy, any efforts made by Employer to improve their relationship or separate them, and any other evidence that would have put Ms. Reidy’s behavior and attitude towards Claimant's execution of her professional duties in a different context than what it appeared on this record, compels me to accept Claimant's credible evidence. T conclude that Claimant quit not because she experienced general job dissatisfaction, see 7 DCMR 311.6(e), was given medical advice that she must do so, or because she was facing imminent disciplinary action, but because she was subjected to particular verbal abuse and harassment by MsReidy. The record demonstrates that Employer's temporarily detailing Claimant to another assignment did not solve this problem, since Ms. Reidy remained her immediate supervisor almost until the day Claimant quit. Claimant made every effort to avoid having to retum to an environment in which she would have to work in proximity to Ms. Reidy, and Employer did nothing to assist in that effort Because I find that a “reasonable and prudent person in the labor market” would have quit under these circumstances, I reverse the decision of -13-Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 the Claims Examiner. See 7 DCMR 311.5 and Gunty, 524 A.2d at 1199, Claimant is qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits. D.C. Official Code § 51-110(a). Iv. ORDER Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this matter, it is, this 19th day of November, 2010: ORDERED, that the Determination of the Claims Examiner that Appellant/Claimant Amanda C. Broadnax is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits is REVERSED; it is further ORDERED, that Appellant/Claimant Amanda C. Broadnax is QUALIFIED to receive unemployment compensation benefits; it is further ORDERED, that the appeal rights of any person aggrieved by this Order are stated wa ‘Alabella W. Teal Administrative Law Judge below. -14-‘Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 PETITION FOR REVIEW (APPEAL RIGHTS) THIS ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER. IF YOU WISH TO APPEAL THIS ORDER, YOU HAVE 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE DATE IT IS MAILED TO YOU TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS. Pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 2-1831.16(c)-(e), any party suffering a legal wrong or adversely affected or aggrieved by this Order may obtain judicial review by filing an original and six copies of a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at the following address: Clerk District of Columbia Court of Appeals 430 E Street, NW, Room 115 Washington, DC 20001 ‘The petition for review (and required copies) may be mailed or delivered in person to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, and must be received by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within 30 calendar days of the mailing date of this Order, pursuant to D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2). ‘There is a fee of $100 for filing a petition for review, Persons who are unable to pay the filing fee may file a Motion and Affidavit to proceed without the payment of the filing fee. Such motion and affidavit should be filed with the petition for review. Information on petitions for review to the Court of Appeals can be found in Title IIT of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which are available in the Office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or online at www.deappeals.gov. If you are a member of the United States Armed Forces on active duty, you may have certain rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 50 U.S.C.S. Appx. §501 ef seq. If you qualify for these rights and you have LOST this case because you were not present, you MAY be able to have this case reopened. If you think you may qualify under this law, you must notify this court promptly to ensure that your rights are protected. -15-Case No.: 2010-DOES-02246 Certificate of Service: By First Class Mail (Postage Paid): By Interagency Mail: Amanda C. Broadnax Dorothy Jones 4737 First Street, SW, #A Department of Employment Services Washington, DC 20032 609 H Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 United States Department of Transportation clo TALX UCeXpress P.O. Box 66945 Saint Louis, MO 63166-6945 United States Department of Transportation Attn: P, Nichole McWhorter, Esquire 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Room E84-121 Washington, DC 20590 Thereby certify that on Mouamber Lj 7 6 2010, I caused this document to be served on the above-named parties and DOES at the addresses and by the means stated, -16-