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FINALS IN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

I.

The crime committed was direct assault and slight physical injuries.

Under the law, there are two kinds of Direct Assault, the second form in which the case
at bar falls states that without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force, or by
seriously intimidating or seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on the occasion of such
performance is guilty of Direct Assault.

In the case at bar, Margarito is a person in authority engage in the performance of his
duty therefore Manny committed Direct Assault since he boxed Margarito, a police
officer. Manny also committed slight physical injuries because Mario and Margarito were
injured which caused to be hospitalized for nine days.

Thus, when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance
during the same period is guilty of slight physical injuries.

II.

a.) No the charge was incorrect.

Under the law, the elements of arson are the following; there is an intentional burning
and what is burnt is a house or dwelling. In the case at bar there was no actual burning
but on only an attempt to burn the house. There is no part of the house that is burned,
none could truthfully or successfully maintain that the offender had performed all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony of arson as a consequence because
the element of burning is still missing and the result was no more than an attempt to
commit the offense.

b.) The crime committed is simply arson.


The law states that when the crime intended to be committed is arson and somebody
dies as a result thereof, the crime is simply arson and the act resulting in the death of
that person is not even an independent crime of homicide, it being absorbed.

III.

IV.

There is a crime committed by A when he killed the dog of B.

Under the law, it is unlawful for any person to torture an animal or even kill an animal. There is
a special law created in which it punishes those persons who kills/tortures an animal. A can be
liable of the punishment provided by the special law which is, upon conviction by final judgment,
be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than two (2) years or a
fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court.

Moreover, if the violation is committed by a juridical person, the officer responsible therefor
shall serve the imprisonment when imposed. If the violation is committed by an alien, he or she
shall be immediately deported after service of sentence without any further proceedings.

V.

A. B and C are both guilty of robbery with homicide and rape as an aggravating
circumstance. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that when the crime of rape and homicide co-
exist in the commission of robbery, the crime committed is one of robbery with homicide and
rape, with rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance only. As to A, he is guilty to
the crime of robbery with homicide.

Although he remained outside of the house as a look out and only knew of the robbery only, but
not of the killing and of the rape, A is still guilty of robbery with homicide. Having been made a
look out, he could not have tried to prevent the killings however the crime of robbery attended
with homicide cannot be separated because they are merged in the composite, integrated
whole.

However, his case is not aggravated with the rape and is thus merely liable for the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
B. No, my answer would not be the same. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the offender is to commit robbery, with homicide or the killing perpetrated only by
reason of the robbery.

Moreover if the original intention was to kill the owner of the house and the robbery and rape
only ensued after the killing, then the crime is not a special complex crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated with rape. The crime would be instead two separate crimes of homicide or
murder and theft.

"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

C. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,


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sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. 64 

VI. A.

No he should be charged with rape.

Under the law, to be charge with forcible abduction the following elements should be present,
the person who is kidnapped must be a woman. It is immaterial whether she is a widow, a
married woman, or virgin, for all these three classes are comprised within the generic terms
“woman”; b) the crime must be committed against her; c) it must be committed with unchaste
designs, that is, with the intention of lying with the woman.

However, If the purpose of the abduction is to rape the victim, the forcible abduction will be
absorbed

B. The accused can be liable of reclusion perpetua.

VII.
A. The crime committed was falsification of public documents by private individuals.

Under the law provides that, any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange
or any other kind of commercial document.

B. AA commit the crime of Grave Coercion.


Under the law grave coercion is present by compelling another, by means of violence, threats
or intimidation, to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. In this case AA’s
father was coerced or forced by AA to sign a document by threatening him.

VIII.

A. Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words
that raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive
malice, legal malice, or implied malice.

On the other hand, malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may
denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express
malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice.

B. The rule on privilege communications had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but
in the Bill of Rights of the constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. In one
case, the Court ruled that publication which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional
right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in
the statute punishing libels.

C. 1. Yes. The contention of L is meritorious. News reporting is qualifiedly privileged


communication. In this kind of communication, the imputation is not actionable in the absence of
malice as an element of libel.

C. 2. Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the penalty for libel is one degree higher if it is
published through the internet or computer system.
IX.

A. In both rebellion and sedition, there must be a public uprising. While in rebellion there
must be taking up of arms against the government; in sedition, it is sufficient that the uprising is
tumultuous.

While in sedition, the purpose of the offender may be political or social, in rebellion, it is always
political.

B. In this case, the court rejected the first two options. The rejection of both options shapes
and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect
of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

X.

In the case of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution’s theory must fail. The rationale remains
the same. All crimes whether punishable under special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes themselves.

XI.

A. The crime violated is abortion. The law provides Abortion is defined as the willful killing
of the foetus in the uterus, or the violent expulsion of the foetus from the maternal womb which
results in the death of the foetus.

B. Yes, my answer will still be the same because even if the foetus already acquired human
form and about six months old when it was expelled from the womb but did not have its own life
independent of its mother, or even if alive but could not subsist by itself outside the maternal
womb, the crime committed is abortion.

C. The crime committed is only physical injury. Under the law if abortion is not intended and
the foetus does not die, in spite of the violence intentionally exerted, the crime may only be
physical injuries.
XII.

Although it is an obligation on the part of the wife to submit herself to the sexual desire of the
husband, the same could not be had without the full and free consent of the wife. In the present
case, the rape committed by the husband is in the concept of a marital rape.

Under R.A. No. 8353, a man who penetrates his wife without the consent of the latter of against
the latter’s will commits sexual violence upon her. Under the said Act, it is acknowledged that
rape, in a form of sexual violence, exists within the marriage.

Thus, in the case at bar, the husband’s allegation is not proper and he is thus guilty of marital
rape.

XIII.

No, the contention of the accused is not tenable.

Although it is true that the element of detention or locking up is lacking since the lock of the
houses were broken, the accused is still guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Considering that Mary was a minor, the accused is still guilty of kidnapping because he
fraudulently convinced Mary to go with him to get money.

Moreover, Mary likewise did not dare to escape or leave the house where she was detained
because the accused threatened her that he is a sultan and that he has body guards watching
her. Thus, Mary got scared and her fear left her with not doing anything or daring to leave the
house despite the locks being broken.

XIV.

A. The three classification of estafa according to the means by which fraud is committed
are the following:

• Estafa committed with abuse of confidence;

• Estafa committed by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts

• Estafa committed through fraudulent means B. No, the charge of estafa is not proper.
The crime committed in the case at bar is theft. Under the law the juridical possession was not
transferred by delivery because there was no agreement by which the accused could exercise a
better right of possession over the money received than the owner herself, or had any right to
dispose of said object in a manner binding on the owner.

XV.

If I were the Judge I would rule that the accused instead of being held liable for the two
separate crimes as alleged by the prosecutor, I would hold the accused liable of the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with physical injuries.

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