William Hasker God, Time, and Knowledge CORNELL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London[Copy © 0 by Corel Uiersey ‘A igh served. Exp frequen in evi, dt bok, ‘par tee must mtb ere in afr witht emis a weg fom he publi For inmate Fie phe 8p by Comal Unive rs, Lary of Congres Calg Cart Nembe he Pred he Unie Se of Aree nro: Libary f Cans lin frie oper ot eat pao eb The paper hi bo i i ead mens te ui fo emmen n daty fte Coo Prati Cains [fr Bok Lange fie Calo Lien Ree dicated to Robert and KevinContents Preface “The Historical Matrix Augustine 2 Borthies 6 Aguinas & Ottham 12 Molina 15 Middle Knowledge The Clanal Theory 20 ‘The Modern Theory 25 ‘Objections to Midile Knowledge 29 2 Refuaton of Mile Knowle 99 Simple Foreknowledge “The Theory of Simple Forehnowlede 55 ‘The Uselrnes of Simple Forcknowldae 59 “Two Arguments for Incompaiilsm “Two Arguments Some Objections eo the Arguments 79 “The Second Argument Revisited 7 Hard and Sof Facts The Compile Seategy 77 2vin) Contents ar and Sot Fae a1 Applying the Distinction 91 Counterfictual Power over the Past 96 ike vers Plantings 97 Poster Entiment Principles 109 (Can the Power Extent Principles Be Proved? 111 einging About the Past 6 Mavrodes on Preventing the Pst 147 (Can We Change the Past? 19 (Gan We Aff the Past? 136 ‘What Docs le Mean to Bring About the Pas 129 ‘Wha Is the Meaning of Fee Wil? 36 Is “God Is Timeless” Ineligible? uae Formulating Timeesness 4s Objections to Timeewnes 38 1s God Timeles? m ‘Timelemes and God's Knowledge ofthe Future 172 melernese ancl Metaphysics 177 Steking a Balance 180 God and the Open Future 186 (God's Knowledge of the Future 8p Providence, Prayer, and Prophecy 19e Doce God Take Risks? 197 Conclusion 205 Indes 207 Preface This book explores some gusstons concerning divine know gen telaon to tine and human fee wil. The piosopiel Eetion ofthese qusons + undenisbl, an Eset wl be ome acer evident inthe following page. The eligous nd thong imporane ofthe ses seldom nid, Bt think th sspet of te ater soften noe given the atenion it deserves {Tram ghe fethemore, the fcologcal Seating of some come thon tews onthe topics ion miseonsracd ‘nce hae ted wo povide arly comprehensive restment of some pec ofthe tpi, tay be wel 0 mention somethings Ahh book Socs nord. ist ol, this work of pilosphied ‘umnesuhr than phospbia schol. The rt caper oc iste, provide a ret sore sve, bt only 0 pro= ‘idea proper cone for th cotemporary dcson: ede {eich St erigal hstoncal ino mst bok cewhee. And of Surse T hive ade no atempe cove all of the history Smporant figures. Even wher commenting on the more reece ‘ein, [hve by no means mentioned every import book rare, though I hope Ihave considered thse which are most fceant to my own fine of argument Proceeding the same en ec opine oe that have done le wo spy the relevance of separ exees for my a+x1 Prefice ments or vice versa. Clearly, for those who approach the fstes from within a context of faith, exegetical questions cannot beige noted, but an exploration ofthis dimension ofthe subjece woud ‘exceed both the limits of this book and the competence of the suthor. ‘Although argue in these pages for a definite position, I do not consider that any one postion, including my own, comes any- ‘where close to being obviously definitive and correct, At he same time, all ofthe postions on these matters which have been et braced by serious thinkers sem to me to mest respectful com sideration. Nevertheless, at east two important classes of positions Inavenot been considered. Those views which hold tha, for exam- ple, the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom isan ultimate, humanly inesolvable paradox are omitted because ofa simple but, for me, decisive consieraton: once we admit that both of two mutually inconsistent propositions can be true, I simply do not know how to go about doing philosophy. And views based on acompatibilit or "ste determinist” view of| fice willare also agely ignored. Thies not because Tzegard such conception of fee will untenable, though Ido tend to think so. Bu if one takes 2 compatbilist view of free wil, most of the problems considered here ae rather readily resolved and a whole battery of new problems arses to take cei places; thus book that considered those problems 38 well would be approximately twice 2 long 3 his one The writing ofa book such a this would be unthinkable apart from the contributions ofa gzest many other philosophers. Many of these debts are acknowledged in the footnotes, but I wish 10 include here 2 mote personal word of appreciation 10 several fiends. Thomas Talbott nd David Basinger have both contib= ‘ted immensely through personal discssions and the exchange of Tewers and papers over the past several eats, Allred J. Freddoso has asiste in several waye—through occasional personal conver= sations through a mutual exchange of published and unpublished papers, by giving me an advance copy of his important introdue- tion and transhation of Molina, and fly by writing remarkably tailed, generous, and helpfl reviewer's report on this book for Prcfice Ls ‘Cornell University Pres, and giving me permission to quot from itin revising the book. Alvin Plantinga has contibuted greatly to my philosophical growth in many ways; perhaps his most impor- fant contribution #0 this book came through his 1978 National Endowment forthe Himaniies Seminar, “Evil and Foundational ism,” which lai the foundation for sich understanding 2s 1 possess of che counterfctls of freedom and the modern theory of middle knowledge. And lat but by no means least there is George Mavrodes, whose corespondence with me about the topics ofthis book, cated on over several years, is about equal in its combined length co the book itself; And without ithe book would not hve been written, Wrasse Haseen Hansington, Indians[e] The Historical Matrix 1k scems probable that whenever theistic belie encounters or engenders 2 eaiion of philosophical reflection, questions will fase about the relation between divine knovedge and power and human freedom, The Stois wrestled with such problems, and Cicero framed what may have been the firs argument for the incompatibility of foreknowledge and free wil, n the form of an argument agzinst divination. The Jewish and Moslem traditions have contobuted thei share of reflection on these mater. But the fullest and richest development ofthese questions has occurred in the Chistian theological tradition, beginning 3t least as eatly as ‘Origen and reaching climax inthe debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ‘According co Anthony Kenny, “ninetenth- and ewenteebcen tury treatments ofthese matters have added very ile tothe work ‘of earliee philosophers and theologians." Ie iso be hoped tht this Js not seiely tag; ft were, there would be litle excuse forthe spate of recent writings on the subject, including Kenny's own, ot for this book. Ibeiewe, infact, that che insights and techniques of contemporary analytic philosophy offr the opporenity for gen- "Anehony Kena, The Ga of te Psp (Oxford: Oxlrd Unieriy re Io) BB21 God, Time, and Knowledge tine and importane gains inthe understanding of these topics; in this sense, philosophy docs make progress, though here as clse- ‘where consensis and the ukimate resoltion of disagreements re- mains an elusive goal. Iedoes seem tobe tre, however, tht all of the major altemative postions on the underlying issues had been Formulated by about the en of the sixteenth century; recent dis- cussion may have added t our understanding of these options, but ‘thas contributed no major new ones. ‘These major theoretical options, with their context inthe tac ‘ion of cheiste refleeion, form the framework or matrix within which contemporary discussion must find ite place, So i seems fitting that a work such 3 dis one, a book of argument athe than scholarship, should nevertheless begin by establishing thi frame- ‘work, in the process acknowledging severl ofthe giants on whose shoulders we hope to stand. Five major figures have been selected for brie weatment here; each played a major role in the develop ment ofthe tadition, and berween them they aticlate moe ofthe major aleematives with which we mast deal? Augustine Augustine of Hippo (354-430) has the dstinetion of having c= cupied, and perhaps created, three distines postions tha are rel vant 10 our topic, In the early book On Fre Will he discusses the classical problem of foreknowledge and fre wil, and offers some answers that sll resonate today odin... sll donot see why these two things God's fore knowledge of out sins, and our fre choice i sinning —ate not opposed to one another. ‘Auusie Why then do you think that our fre choc is oppo to Goals Forcknowledge? fit beau it foreknowledge, or because itis Goss forcknowedac? E, Rather bec i God's 2 exces sey of he blr medica developmen gen ip Casi Iorore, ate Casings Te Col sy far es! Pt. ogy NR Ce Come yr “The Historical Matix ts A Wells you frcknew that someone was ging 0 sn, would i ot be mecenry that he shoud in? Surly ie woud be necessary tat be should sin, fort would not be foreknowledge, s 1 id not freknow a cain AA. Therefor, fie neceary tht what God foreknows mst haps en not because tt God's foreknowledge, but simply because foreknowledge orf what He Frcknew were noe cert would eno foreknowledge. EE Lagree but why are you making thet pins? A. Because Tam not mistaken you would nox neces compe ‘man to sin ho you freknow was going 1 sins hough without Aoube he wil sin, for oterwise you would ot foreknow tha cai bo, Ando jot thene hwo me not oppored, hat you know by your Forchnowledge what another going todo ofhis own wl 50 Go, while compeling po one to sn, nevertcles foresees those ‘wh wil sin of thir own veltion.® Here Augustine deploys two of che clascal arguments for the compasibiity of foreknowledge and free will—or, as we shall say henceforth, for compatibilism: Knowledge as uch does not com- pel, and human beings are able to foreknow the fee actions of thers without removing ther freedom. Nevertheless, there r= ‘mains the implication, accepted by both Evodius and Augustine, thar fa person's sn is foreknown, whether by God or by another person, st is necessary thatthe person should sn the necessity Involved hete, however, is held not to be incompatible with fee will. “The second major postion occupied-—and in this case, we can say confidently, ereated—by Augustine, isthe doctrine that God is timelesaly ecrnal and has timeless knowledge of temporal event.” In his famous words from the Covfesions 34 Auta on Pe Hine. Cat Maton Spo (Challe, Vi: Une of Vipin Poe) BE 3, chap Bp F-04 ‘Since Augie scp the seal view thas Knowle 2 uch must be cera ore to be Ene, dvs SongoshPetwec arn ko end Coss with ep tc coray "Serra af the Gr popes bd wht might edie ra doce of seme tnenece Bu ta vse temporal vos song ‘Sher ty tobe bona Ga ater The Couto ne ie [Enmar wih comprehise dine kowlaige of temporal es Snetasal God, Time, and Knowledge [Nor dost Thou by time, proce time: ee shoulest Thow not fprevede al ies Be Thou prsedet ll hinge pat. by te sab= limit of an everprsen ete, and supasest al Fue becase ‘hey ate tre, and when they come, they sal be pas but Thow tnt the Same, and Thy years fal nt. Thy years either come nor go ‘whereas our both come and go, hat they all may come. Thy yeas Stand together, becuse they do stand: nor are departing tras out by coming yen fr they pass not aay, bu our sal al be, when they shall no more be. Thy year ate one day and Thy day i noe aly, but Today, seeing Thy Tony gives noe pace unto to ‘morrow, for neithr doth replace yesterday. Thy Tony, ster ity ‘What may puzzle usis that this conception, destined eo play such 1 momentous roe in the controversy aver divine foreknowledge, ‘vas 0 far a8 we can ell never employed to this end by Augustine Fimselé Ic may be that Augustine was filly satisfied with the answers he had given in On Free Wil and thus fle no need for farther illumination on this topic. And on the other hand it is possible thatthe conection between divine eternity and the fore= ‘knowledge problem, which seems so evident since t was made by Boethius isin ite neither evidene nor inevitable, My favorite solution to the puzle, however, goes in another ditetion: I sur- ‘mise that by the time Augustine wrote the Cowon his commit- ‘ment to belief in free will n anything approaching the libertarian sense had been sufficiently weakened chat he was no longer dis- posed to fel che foreknowledge problem as presing one. [eis acknowledged that Augustine reached 2 turning. point in his thought about grace and fce wil in the fst of his eo books To Simplisn—On Various Questons® OF this book he said in his etraons, “In answering this question [concerning Romans 9:10~ 29] Ihave tied hard to maintain the fre choieeof che human wil, Ti Gk pis am Eo Poy ew Yor Rn Wie mest ofcourse be wary of redng modern deans of vaio shi sep por co Reve any eh ‘Ee ehan were thane e ened Ter le an Efe go Bae PM: Wo. The Historical Matix ts but the grace of God prevailed."® Evidence forthe effet of tis change on Augustine’ thinking about foreknowledge will be {raven from a passage in The City of Godin which he once again fsddreses that topic. The occasion is an argument of Cicero’ gains foreknowledge,” which Augustine summarizes as follows: “What is then, that Ciceo fared nthe presence of fare ‘hinge? Doubles i was thr—tha fall tare things have been foreknown, they wl happen inthe order in which hey have been foreknown ad if they comet passin this orer there sa ean ‘order of thing foreknown by God andi erin order of things ‘hen certain onde of cause, foe nosing can happen which snot preceded by some eicent enue, Hue if there eran onder of ‘ses according to which everything happens which does happen, hen by fie, s2yshe all things happen which do happen. Bat ih ‘eso, then is there noting our oxy powe, and there io sich thing at feedom of wil nd if we grant that, says be, the whale economy of homan if subverted Augustine replies ‘We aser both tit God knows ll shing before they comet pst zd that we doby ou re wil whatsoever we kao sd elo be one by us ony becuse we wile = Buti des not llow that, ‘hough there is for God cre order of all use, there must therfore be nothing depending onthe fre eerie of our own til, for our wills hemes se included in hat onde € eauce ‘which cern to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for Thumm vis are ao causes of human ations: and He who fore- ew al the eats of things would certainly among those eases sot have be ignorant of ou wil.” [Note Augustine's assertion that “we do by our fee will what soever we know and fel 19 be done by us only becuse we willie" no concem is evinced here about pri, determining psyokalagzl Ch gone und in Deiat, Bh a. {They ofa ty Sat putt, Mates Dds New York: anlar Howe 0). bes np. 8 IS.6) God, Time, and Knowledge causes, and the statement is strongly suggestive of what would now be termed a “soft determinist" conception office will Even more revealing, however, is Augustine's response to. Cicero's charge that, given foreknowledge, there is "2 certuin order of ‘uses according to which everything happens which docs hap- per.” In responding to thi claim, with ite powerfil evocation of determinism, Augustine does not say, a¢'2 modern libertarian ‘would say, that the fee will fanctions as an uneaused or ndeter ined cause and tht the “order of causes is thus not dtermin- iste, Nor does he object to Cicero's assumption that it + only through such 2 deterministic order that God could foreknow the farure. What be sas, rather, is that the wil is incadd ithe order ‘of causes, Buta “fre wil” that can be part ofa deterministic order ‘of causes is surely a soft determinist fee will not one that i rein the libertarian sense. Augustine's answer to Cicero isa ther cleat statement of theological determinism, Boethius Augustine's influence on subsequent theology and philosophy was immense, but his deterministic postion on grace and fre will ddd not become normative in any Branch of the church un the Reformation, So the problem of foreknowledge and fre will r= ‘mained on the agenda, and Boceius (4f0~524) ook the important step of viewing, and indeed resolving, the ise in terms of A= szustin's conception of divine eternity. For che defition of eter pity, we turn to The Cowoltion of Phiorphy Now, ctemity i the complete possesion of ends ie enjoyed sone simultancous sole thir will apps lester from 2 come Parison with tempor things. For whatever sheng in re pro feeds im the presen from sms pst fis freaking visting in time iso consitued 35 10 embrace the whole pan of Me at once, buts har not yet geeped tommorrow whe i has sled tnt yesterday In this of today you sre ling inno more han Nesting. tanstory moment... What righ called eer forknomlee sono The Historical Matix U7 ‘ali dat which grasp and posesss simultaneously the entire Funes of sn unnting if, a Me wick lacks noting of he are nd hs lost mohing ofthe esting pst, Such Being mast nee “ani always be te whole sf unehangigly present oie, and the ininy ef changing dine must be as one present before him. He states che implications for God's knowledge: Since he, every judgment comprehend the objects of ts thought according tts own natre, snd since God has an ver preset an ‘eral ie, His knowledge 0, surpassing every torpor move- ‘ent, emacs he simplicy of own eset an, mbes, Infinite lenge of pata fare, views eit ts ow simple com prchesion all things a i hey were taking pce in the preset {ou will weigh the freight wih which God dicen things, You will sigly extcem ito be the knowledge of a never fang Instant rather than foreknowledge ofthe "fase" I should there fore rather be clled provision dan prevision beens, placed high shove all lowiy thing, looks out over all 8 fom the lest ‘mountaintop. Bocthius also addresses the “necessity” that, according to AU gusting, ataches to anything that is foreknown, either by God or by human beings, He distinguishes two kinds af necesiy (One i simple: fr intancs, se necessary that ll men are mort ‘The others condom for astance, f yu telly know that a man fs walking, he must be walling. For what 2 man eely knows ‘rane bother than rs known tbe. Bt the condiina ind ‘of necessity By no means impli the simple hind. Therefore fe act, wher cferredto the divine tion, become neceary in the conditional sense beau God's Knowledge provides tha cond tins om the othe and, viewed by themselves, they do not lose he perfect freedom oftheir nature. Without dou, the, all things which God foreknowr do come ops, but erin of hem proceed From fe wl "Boe, ‘The Castine Pip, Jame). Bachan (New Yor rede Ungar sb rose 6 pp 8-83 "td pe Fes1 God, Time, and Knowledge ‘The point, [take iis, this: Once we have distinguished condi- tional necessity from simple necessity (what Aquinas was to call absolute” necessity), is evident that only the later is inconsi=| tent with Fce will es clea, furthermore, from our owe ease, that present knovledge does not imply simple necessiey: If know that, {you are walking, this does not imply that your walking i neces Te might, however, be thought that frcknowledige implies simple necessity—for instance, because (as Cicero and the ate A izstine agree) foreknowledge require a"certxn order of eases." But given divine timelessness, foreknowledge is previssly what we do not have Aquinas ‘Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), 25 is well known, embraced the Boethian doctrine of divine timelessness, and by doing so he con- tsibuted greatly to its cominsed popularity down to the present He is noted here, however, eather for his statement of one ofthe objetons to God's knowledge of fatuce contingent things: By 2 ‘mote penetrating statement ofthe argument for incomparibiism, heals brought about new insight into the character ofthe answer provided by the doctrine of timelessness, To st the stage for this, ‘ve return briefly to Euodivs's satement of dhe argument for in- ‘compatibili, 2 statement that i typical of many others: “But [ would like to know - how itis that [sns} do not have to be, ‘when He forcknovs that they will be.""” Now this argument i ‘not completly stated, bu ic may seem reasonable to suppose that it san instance ofthe form: Necesuily, if God knows tat P, then God knows that P ‘Therefore, necessity P. Bur of course, this argument is invalid, which may lead us co suppose that Augustine could, and should, have deale with it even rote swmmarily than he aceually did. Now, 1m by no means Angin oF, 3, ap. “The Historical Matix to certain that the argument is correctly and petspicuously repre- ented by the form suggested above, though ie does undeniably leave self open to this interpretation. Sel it may reasonably be doused whether the foreknowledge problem has been done jus- tice to by murmuring "Sleigh’s fllacy” and turing back to the baseball scores. Ifyou do dovbs this, then you ae ready for Thom'sFormula~ ion of the argument, which sas an objection toh claim that God knows fare contingent things Every conditional proposition of which he antecedent abaoltly necstary. muse havea absolutely neesiy consuent. For the tnscedent it the consequent a8 principle sr the cones: fn from necessary princes ony «necessary conlsion cn fo low, are proved in Por But thir 2 roe conditional propos ‘on, fGol eta his hing wl wil fr the nosed of Goi only of re things. Now the atccodent of ti asoltly necessary, Beats itis eternal, and bectse Is signed 3 pst. “Therefore the comequent i abo abcltelynecexry. Thee, whatever God knows ncssaty ands se hnowledge of Go not of cosingent ching Here the missing ingredient for Evodis's argument is supplied, namely, the fact that God's Knowledge is elf absolutely (sim ply) necessary, "becuse i is etmal, and because is signified as past.” Given this, the form ofthe argument becomes: [Necesaily, if God has known that P, then. [Necesatily God has known chit P. Therefore, nsessaily P ‘Thomas has thereby formated a rally powerfel argument for incompatibsm, one that ests his mete tothe limit.” Thoma Agi, Sime Then ater the Engh Dominican rnc ie Lando Bares Ou & Washbourne, is eta 1,08 Torn ecle Boceson of vejeson se ANP, “The Faas ‘Onna Pao Tine al ese (OutrOstrd Unter Pres ‘oat pTwel God, Time, and Knowledge In responding to this objection Thomas first mensions and then sets aside several unsatistctory answers, bute finally replies When the antecedent contains anything belonging oan ac ofthe so the consequent met be aken not ast nel bt etn the soul: forthe extence Of ing i tel different rom the ‘existence of thing in the sol. For example, when ay, What he oul waders imatrialhsi tobeundestood Hat sina teva ie in theo, not ai iin el Likes f ny {Gol ke anti, wil be the consequent mast be undestod 3 ‘tie subject to the divine Enowledge, hatin a ew i te pret feiity. And dhs i is necessary. as also i the antecedent Cetin tht, wile iy mat meal be, a8 the Phage faye in Peer i Further light i shed by his answer tothe next objection: ‘Things reduced vo actin me, are known by us sacesively i tine, ue by God fre Knows) in teri, which above ime, Whence 10 us they cannot be certain, forsich a8 we kaow fate com tinge things a such: but (hey ae certain) to God alone, whoxe ‘uneranding in femity above time. Just x he who goes along the ond, doe nt se these who come fc him wheres be whe sees the whole oud fom height, ses at once all waveling bythe vray Hance whats known by us must be necestry even 2 i 0 ‘self for what fru contingent in ise, ennot be Known by os ‘Wheres whats known by God must be necessary aeconing the rode in which they are sbjcr othe divine knowledge, a aleady Ststed, bat not absolutly s considered ithe ow ese” ‘The answer, then, goes something lke this: What God knows i necessary, simply and absolutely necessary, a iis known by God for its know by God as present, and everything tha is preset is necessary—by the time something i itis then ao late fo it not £9 be! Bue this ofcourse, does not remove either the freedom of 3 fice action or the contingency of a contingent event. What would ineefere with Feedors and contingency would be a necessity ofthe mid, 1141 Reply 08, 2. tbe 1 Repiy Oo, The Historical Matix ta action or event as they ate coming wo be—or, a8 Thomas says, “in their own causes,” Now, certain and infalible foreknowledge on cour par would imply sucha prior necessity ofan occurrence, and so ‘Thomas, unlike Augustine, denis dat we ever do have advance knowledge of what i truly contingent ‘Whether Thomas's position on this matter is coherent and cor- rect romains, of cours, a debatable question. Ifthe reader will be patiene fo the next 150 pages or so, the matter wil be addessed. ‘What can be said ac cis point, however, i that Thomas has rise ‘oth the argument for incompacibilism and the response in terms of divine etemity to new heights of precision and penetetion ‘Before leaving Thoma, ie may be of interest to consider briehy cone of his rejected answers to the objection discussed above. He Some ty that hs antecedent, Gol eth coningn 8b tre ot pecesary, Dut contingent because although # past, ll Imports relation to the fare This however doesnot remove ne cssity fom i for whatever bas Bad relation vo the Sure, must, Ive ad it although the future sometimes doesnot follow. 2" Ie would be most interesting to know who sid this because its ‘ot dificult to seein this reply an anticipation ofthe Ockhamist solution to the foreknowledge problem, 4 solution that will oc cupy us inthe next section and indeed repestely throughout thi ‘book. God's knowledge does indeed lie inthe past, the reply states, bu it does nor pareake of the necessity tha attaches tothe pas in general, because “it imports relation to the future.” As we have Teamed to say, facts about God's past knowledge are “soe faces” aout the past and nor “hard fats.” Unfortunately, Thomas's son for rejecting this reply is not as clearly stated as che reply ite" But ii, I think, of considerable interest o note that Givin Normore ces Robert Grote apd Peer Lambada avg hl ‘sews mir oh, 0 poe ht Aas bd ei ob em ig are Conn.) St fatrd m scneour he lowing icepetaono ihe chi “Wiaiver| tas had cao ote fr tt av hd snag he fare omensal God, Time, and Knowledge “Thomas was aware ofthis solution, and ad considered and te- jected i Ockham, William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349) may have given more sus- ‘ined atention, ad almost certainly devoted more hterar effort, to the problem of free will and foreknowledge than any of the calor thinkers we have coasidered.® Yer inthe view of many contemporary philosophers his important contribution tothe topic Js focused ina single ides, or perhaps in a pair of closely related fdas, To se che stage for this contribution, eecall for 2 moment the powerful objection to God's knowledge offre contingents ‘which was formulated by Aquinas and discussed in the ls section. By introducing the notion that the pas, ae such, i necessary, ‘Thomas transformed what might have appeared to be a civilly fillacious argument into a formidable objection to his position. ‘Thomas is abe finaly eo rebut the objection only by appealing to his doctrine that God, and God's Knowledge, are timeless ete= nl 'Now, Thomas's argument was if anything even more formid- able for William of Ockham than for Thomas himself, because (Ockham rejected the notion of divine timelessness. He did not, however, reject the notion of che pas as beng necessary rather, he slstinguished a special sort of necessity that pertains to the past “esp ilo” take whatever id etn th fate” ob nine tile of Some srt, expan ot tele. hopy ot at [Sows cctranc of hc teow phen Hic eco tn dhs a warded oe eed aur ven hugh {are may cual tra ot erty than apes a ey ye Sr Eg Bk oe ht ra the Ca won he ‘pros of wheter hr Cas door do al Eris hoer) Tobe srs ‘Benen tse guotina ron of knee, wher Seo ham, then th alr hero corepond ano cs But Ags ents ‘Sec Will Octo, Psa, Gals Feil, ad Fe Contin fous tre. Marlyn MeCord Ae and Novtun Kr New Yon AP Fete: Canary Cr, 1), “The Historical Matix [a called by him necessity per acide, “accidental necessity." But fiven this, i Tooks as though the argument [Necesarily, sf God has known that P, then [Necesarily, God has known the P. ‘Therefore, necestaily P. Js going to be, not only valid, but also sound. And if so, then incompatiblsm is eriamphant and the divine foreknowledge of facure contingents is impossible ‘Oedhanw’s reply is both ingenious and subtle, He writes: ‘Some propositions are about the preset regard oth her word Ing and hee subject ater (can von cena en). Whete sch [proposion| are concerned, ite universally tre a every ‘eve proposition about de presets [crtespondng ota nce sary one about the pastmeg, "Socrates acted,” "Soerten sali,” Socrates jt,” and the ke ‘Othe proposition are sbout he prcsnt regards chee wording ‘only and are equivalently ost the fitoe since hr uth depends ‘on the truth of propenitone about he ute. Whee sch propos tions] are concer the rule that every tre proposition abo the present has coresponding to it] a neces one aboot the pas ‘The idea that a “true proposition about the present has corre- sponding to ita necessary one about the pst” is further clarified when Ockham says, "IE ‘Socrates is seated’ is true at some time, ‘Socrates war seated’ will be necessary ever aterwads,"= The necessity ofthe ater proposition is ofcourse necessity per aidens, accidental necessity. But, and this isthe important point, not al Presenttense propositions generate or correspond to accidentally 2ha exelent recension oss ton oud in A) Freon, Aci Ney on apc mn Sod of ep 93 [>The ec is “acide” bec, unlike the nce f he chs of de ele opening he Foner oti +ul God, Time, and Knowledge necessary propositions about che past. Consider for instance, the following proposition: “The bride-to-be is eying on her wedding des.” This proposition, chough grammatically present tense sat leas in part ofthe sore Ockham would describe as “equvalenely bout the future"; since it implies that the young woman in| {question will in fice become a bride, its truth "depends on the ‘uch ofa fate [proposton),” and thus “iis noe required that a ‘necessary proposition about the past correspond to the tue propo- sition about the present." So the proposition "The bride-to-be ‘vas trying on er wedding dress” wil ot be necesary per aiden: beginning from the time of the trying on.° ‘But now that we have this apparatus in place, the application to the foreknowledge problem is strsightforward. In the ese where UE Pinon py af oihoming anon ‘si “The Historical Matix la forbidden to call the Dominicans Calvinists, while che Dominicans vere told that they must not call the Jensits Pelagians." Tes at least ironic, and perhaps significant, chat the theory of middle Knowledge, which was then under suspicion because it conceded too much to fre will, should now be viewed with concern by 2 number of philosophers because t comes too close to detemin- copa, Onan Sues 34 am ola in ‘iam ly Sex om ts corr sl pong “foram exten evesew fat comoeny ee Froow' odacion 2 atin, Oy De Few[2] Middle Knowledge nning cis st of problems with the issue of middle knowh. elge may seem an eccentric choice. As we have seen, the theory of ‘middle knowledge wa the last of the msjor postions on these iaaves to make its appearance. Ie has never been lowe to a majority ‘pinion, and even today it commands only a relatively small group of adherens. Furthermore, 2 dzece stack on middle knowledge may be redundant. The theory of middle knowledge, in all its historical forms, presuppores the compatiblity of divine fore- knowledge and laman Freedom, 20 suecessfil argument for i= compaiblism, iFone ean be mounted, would ender superfluous & separate refutation of middle knowledge All this etre, yet middle knowledge as much to recommend asa stating point For one ching, che complexities ofthis dheory lend i sn almost iresistibe philosophical fascination, With regard to edundancy, it is cleae that in controversy as heated as this ne it is a mort and not a defect to assemble multiple independent arguments forthe same conchision; a single argument, even if apparently unimpeachable, i too likely to be treated with suspic ‘ion when it contravenes strong inclinations. Furthermore, the theory of middle knowledge, though dependent on the eth of compauilism, also serves to strengthen compatitlsm in a lest to ways. For one thing, i offers an account of how God is able vo Middle Knowldge le know future free actions, and the account of thi given by middle knowledges fee of some ofthe difficulties for instance, etoae- tive causation—that plague other accounts of the matter. Mote important, middle knowledge provides the key toa unigusly pow= ‘erful conception of the operation of divine providence, almost certainly the strongsst view of providence thats possible short of ‘complete theological determinism. In contrast with this, ic wil be argued in the next chapter that foreknowledge without middle knowledge—simple foreknowledge—docs not offer the beneis for the doctrine of providence that ite adherents have sought £9 derive fom it In view ofthis iteould be argued that a good many theists who are not explicit adherens of middle knowledge neve cetheless hold to 2 conception of divine providence that implicitly ‘commits them to this theory.) And if this isso, refutation of middle knowledge substantially weakens the doctrine of fore Knowledge by removing one oft principal motivations. Finally, it should be noted that a structural possibilty exists (ot to my knowledge exploited by anyone as. yet) of combining middle Iknoviledge with the theory of divin imeessness, hus gaining the benefits of mide knowledge forthe doctrine of providence with- fut incurring the difficulties of foreknowledge. In view of these considerations, 2 refutation of middie knowledge which is inde~ pendent of the foreknowledge ise can hardy be considered s- perfuoas. (Our procedure inthis chapeer willbe a follows: Fist shall ‘consider the doctrine as it emerged inthe sixteothecentiry con= ‘woversy and mention briefly some ofthe arguments pro and con that were put forward at that time. The, we shall turn to the modern form of the doctrine as it has been revived—or rather, reinvented*—by Alvin Plantings, Finally, a setes of objections to this theory will be considered, leading wp to one that I consider decisive "nig point so asd Ringer, "Middle Rood and Csi Ctin| ‘Though Relig Ster 2 (os trea. “Wlaninga developed hs ew independ wn Amory Kenny who mel ou 9 bi the snny hewn en nd te cea they ‘le Knowledge Se Plana “Soe Pro”InjnsE omt si et ‘i Inwage, ede, Abe Pag, rfl vals (Dore Rl, 98)1 God, Tine, and Knowledge “The Classical Theory “The theory of middle knowledge bold that, foreach possible fice ecature that might exis, and for exch possible situation in cehuch coca exeate might make a fee choice here i aera, howe to God prior to and independent of any decision on God's fre concerning what definite choice that creature would freely rirte if placed in that situation. In effect, middle knowledge ex- Tends the doctrine of divine foreknowledge to include knowledge ‘he outcome of choices that might ave een made bur in Fac “Gn casual consideration, midale knowledge may appear 10 be simply an obvious implication of divine ompiscince: Wf God noes everything, how could he fil to know shi? And by the wae token, it may seem relatively innocuous. Both impressions however a mistaken. Middle knowledge isnot 2 staightor~ svar implication of omniscence, because it snot evident that he Tras postulated by this theory exist to be known. In oxdinary foreknowledge i may be argued, what God knows isthe agents rena devs todo one thing or anodher. But with repaed t0 2 Situation thse never in ft arises, no decision is ever made, and. hone exists for God go know. And if the decision in question apposed to be a fie decison, then al of the circumstances of the mBPGinclaing the agents character and prior inclinations) are SShsstent with any of dhe possible choices that might be made Locking the agents aca! making of the choice, then, there is rothing that disambiguate the situation and makes i¢ true that Tome one ofthe options ithe one that wuld b selected. This line ‘tasgumentindieates the single most important objection thatthe proponent of middle knowledge must seck to answer. Thc he very sume feature that makes mide knowledge prob= lematie (wz, that God can know the outcome of choices that are hover actualy made) also makes it extraordinarily use for theo Toeleal purposes. Consider the fllowing counteract: “It A eure in circumstances, she would do X." According 9 middle nowledge, God knows the truth of this whether or not A ever ually & placed in circumstances C; indeed, God knows this “Mhucher or not A even exists 30 that bis knowledge about this Mid Knowledge ts ily need of ny f Ca dion soa eon fd providence. But this, of eure, make sch knowledge de foe God 10 38 in ding whether orn to cate Aya Be docs eet er, whether not plac ein Greumtances C. As Moline sy Godin ice Bw bys knee shige Could: rhe ol ce hwo sd itl may oer srr fl gen compe compen od poe ie igh ocr thins dy wat Cel IN ce swe proton lc onder Sow ‘Stnpenon kttoiscwn ie wit wool make et ey Sth Saesdsuch an smoun of vie ence gen such and {ek cpp, pts ot center nd ht SSVI Seay desing alte tne he ay 1 do te Sept he hn pyri spn nd i ‘phen (er: Ovnd Unvay Pp Pears2] God, Time, and Knowledge exactly those outcomes that in fact oecur—though, ¢0 be sure, Some of them may not be the outcomes he would most prefer. The clement of ik is ently eliminated "Ar ove have already seen, the chief ificulty thatthe proponent ‘of middle knovledge must confront isthe contention that the truths God is alleged to know, commonty called “counterictals Of fredom,” do not exist to be known. Most ofthe arguments for Countefactals of freedom seem to depend on general consiera+ tions of philosophical plausibility, but in the medieval controversy there were also arguments based on Seriprute. A favorit text for this purposes found in [Samuel 23, which recouns an incident n the troubled relationship of David with King Saul Davi, eut~ rently in occupation ofthe city of Keil, consults Yahweh by fncars of the ephod about the rumors that Saul intends to attack the cy: wi Saul come down, a thy srvan as heal? © Lown the God offal {beseech the, ll hy servants” And the LD si, "He ‘Silcome down." Then sid David, "Will he men of Kelas ender me and my en i he Kan of Sol?" And the Low si "they wl sarender you.” (Samuel 311-12, RSV) ‘The advocates of middle knowledge took this passage 25 evi dence that God knew the following two propositions to be eu (0). 1eDavidstayod in Keilah, Saul would besiege the sty {G)_ te David stayed in Keiah and Sal Besiged the city, the tmen of Keilh would sureender David to Sa ‘But (given the assumption tha Saul and the men of Keil would fact ely in performing the speed accion), these two propos ‘ons ate counterfatoals of eedom, and the incident aa whole is { deamatie demonstation ofthe existence and practical efficacy of ‘middle knowledge, ‘Buc this argument is hardly compelling. As Anthony Kenny or my dscns page ly ely on RL ML Ads, “Mile Kee ae BeRe Prete of Eek" Aon Paonia Quy (97 Tope Sesto Ray The Gn he Pps, fp. 0-83 Midate Knowledge i points out, the ephod seems to have been a yee-no device hardly Possessing the subdety required to distinguish between various possible condtionals that might have been asserced in answer to David's questions. Kenny. indeed, suggests that we may under stand material conditions here,* but that scems hardly likey, since on that constrial both conditonals would be erue simpy in virtue ofthe fact chat eeir antecedents ae false, Mach more pais ible candidates are given by Robert Adams (@) David stayed in Keilah, Saul woul potty besiege the iy (#) IF Dav saved in Keilah and Sal bsiged the city, the men of Keil would probly surrender Davi to Saul ‘As Adams poins out, “(3 and () are enough for David vo at on, ithe i prudent, but they will not satisfy the partisans of middle knowledge."© The prospects for a scriptral proof of middle knowledge, cherefore, da not scem promising ‘But of course, the argument just given shows only that the responses to David’s questions need not be taken 3 sserting cone terfcwals of fredom, not that they cannot be so understood. And there ate not lacking situations in everyday fe in which t sens plausible that we ae taking counterfactual offeeedom to be toe. Plantinga, for example, says he believes that “If Bob Adanie were to offer to take me climbing a Tahquite Rock the next ime come to California, I would gladly (and freely) accept"? And Adams notes hat “there doesnot normaly seem wo be any uncertainty at alabou wha butcher for example, woul fae done had asked hi to sell me a pound of ground beet, akhough we suppose te would have ad et wil m the mates" So the discussion of examples sems to end ina sand-of. iil, the proponent of middle knowledge needs to addres the question mentioned eatie: How is it possible for counterfacuals of fee= ean, The Gl of he Pooper. ‘Ada. ie Rute pe re aber Ann Tomb a ne, Aea God, Tim, and Knowledge dom to he me? What isthe truth maker for dese propositions? At {his point the advocate of midale knowledge is presented with an Sfersaive opportunity, but one that iis imperative for her £0 fesit The opportunity is simply to claim that counteriatuas of| freedom are tru in vine of the character and psychological tendencies ifthe agents named in them, The attractiveness of this x evident that in neatly all of the eases where we are dspoved to acepe such ounterfactoals a tue, the epistemic grounds for ovr acceptance ‘Would be found precisely in our knowledge of such psychological faew—Saul bescging Keil, Adam's compliant butcher, and Plantinga climbing Tsbuite Rock ae all ces in point. But the sweaknes ofthe suggestion becomes apparent when the following (question 1 asked: Are the psychological facts aboot the agent, gether with a description ofthe situation, plus relevant psycho= Joga! Isws, supposed to ental that she agent would respond 35 indieated? I the answer is ye, then the counterfactual may be me Dat ie isnot + counterfactual of fedom: the agent snot then free in the relevant (libertarian) sense.” In the other and the answer is fo, then how can those psychological fits provide good grounds for the assertion that che agent definitely weald (as opposed, say, £0 very probably would) respond in that way? ‘rota the bes line for the proponent of mide knowledge 0 take heres the one suggested by Suarez: When a counterfactual of Feeedom is true, itis simply animate fice about the fe agent in (question that, i placed inthe indicated circumstances, she would ice as the counterfactual states; this fict requires no analysis oF metaphysical grounding in terms of farther, noncowmtefactal Miter of afairs (Or, i€ the agent in question does not actully ‘hist eas face about a particular een that, fe were instantiated icant fn et ne sentence esses an a ur Gein ces vf ee ee eat ttn pa Teoma i Etcetera ‘ctype an dan of fede. Bu 2c of hh so a ra ie ERESCEE sw ence soa Middle Knowledge Las and its instantiation were placed in such circumstances, the in- Stantston would acts stated.) Adams, commenting on this, ys, ‘do not think I have any conception -. of the sort of property that Suiver aserbes to possible agen with respect 0 thet act under posible conditions. Nor do I think that Ihave ny ‘other primitive understanding of wha ie would be forthe relevant subjunctive conditional to be rae." Nevertheless, he admits that ‘Sudter's view on this sof the “least clearly unsatisfactory type” because “Its very dificult refute someone who claims to have a primitive understanding which I seem noe to have." ‘The Modern Theory ‘The modern theory of middle knowledge" differs from he classical version in virte ofthe application to dhe counterfatuals| ‘of freedom ofthe powerful possible-worlds semantics or couter factual developed by Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, and John L Pollock. '# The ental des ofthis semantic i that a counterfactual is tue if some possible world in which the antecedent and the consequent are Both true is more similar co the actual world than Sny in which the antecedent fs true and the consequent fle. “Thos (a) above is correctly analyzed 38 (9) The actual world fe more similar to some possible world in which David stays in Kea and Sal besicges the cry "Adams, “Mile Kae” pe "ie bic rare forthe cr theory of mie knoe Alin Pe sing Te Nee of ety (Ono Onrd avery Pr 14), 9. TRS fC Roa Sa a Lapa Phy (Oxford: Bnd, tf Dad Less, Col (C- ge Harerd Unverty Pre srs Jb ack, Sine Rai If Dordc DR, 190 snl b moe, howeter that some cote ‘ary sens of mie owtege have tacos abt ta Smt, el i camp rt ine enya ‘Smuts app teatro ecm) oreo nyse mpl cond ‘Sa tne cna ndererminc pena commanto) "Stok sacs se the ent nor a a compare sty bors hats posible world only change fo he nt wai 0 [Mismatch oil ue fee Sse Revoingp. ‘eag) alld’ ajumenrsee be sree, bo tbe ferene betwee ‘So mane iron sien for poppe eal ona © ‘Slay the more aa ering1 God, Time, and Knowledge {han to any pore world in which David stays in Kh tn Saul does noe besiege the city!* [Ac this point ie will be well to gota bit clearer about the exact positions both of the advacste and of the opponent of middle Knowledge, Fitst ofall it may be noted thatthe term “eounterfac tual,” though customary and convenient, i not strictly accurate as | designation ofthe propositions in question. tn some cases (name Ty, those whore antecedents God decides to actualize) both the antecedent and the consequent ofthe conditions will bene, and fo not couverfactoal at all A better term, therefore, would bey 38 ‘Adams suggests, “deliberative conditonals.” Having said that however, we shall continue to refer to them as “counterfactuals of freedom.” ‘But just what kind of conditionals ate these? Both Lewis and Polloce distinguish “would” condtionals from “might” condi- tional; the “might” conditional coresponding to (1) would be (am) IF David stayed in Ki, Saul might bessge the cry. ‘But Pollock goes further and distinguishes thee diferent kinds of “woul” conditions these distinctions ae no explicily made by Lewis. There ate “simple subjuncives™ these are the eonlition- sik most frequently, and most naturally, expressed by English sen- fences of the form “If were the ease that , it would be the case thar Q” Second, these are "even if” conditinals, of the form “Even iit were che cate chat P, ie woud stil) be the case that Q. "These are the condtionals Nelson Goodman calls “semi-ictuals” they are asterted when their consequents are believed o be tue, whereas their antecedents may or may aot be tue, and thee force fs to deny thatthe truth ofthe antecedent would bring about the falsity of the consequent, Finally, there are “necessiation cond tions"; according to Pollack, “the notion of accssttion that | fam trying to analyze here is that of the truth of one statement “binging it about” that another statement i tue," 50 an appro- aa "Mile Kae" p12 ‘ste Pony Sui Rola bp, 2, Four Kind of Condon, TE pp a-ae Pollock sys Peps th tery econ ppp Midale Knowledge ia priate formula might be “Rs being the case tht P would bring it about that 0." "Now, into which of these categories do we place the counterie- twals of freedom? Evidently they cannot be "might" conditionals “Even if” conditional ae tre only in (some of) those possible worlds in which thei consequents are tue, but the truth of the counterfactual of freedom mst be knovn to God quite indepen- ‘ently of whether or not their consequents are trae in the actal ‘world, Pollock shows chats simple subjunctive is equivalent tothe Alisjunction of a necersitation conditional and an “even i condi tional. If chen, we were to equate counteefaculs of feeedom with simple subjunctive, it would follow that im those eases whete the necessitation conditional is false the counterfactual of freedom ‘would be equivalent to an “even i conditional, which we have sen tobe impossible. Soithe counterfactual of feedom ate to be found among the varieties discussed by Pollock, they must be necesitation condtionals. As be says, “All counterfactual cond tonals express necesitation.""7 "Now that we have clarified the nature ofthe counterfsctals of freedom, how exactly shall we charactrie the view taken of such counteractals by the opponents of middle knowledge? There seem to be three alternatives: One may deny that such propositions txst at all; one may concede thet existence but deny tht they possess trath-vahues or one may hold thatallsuch propositions are false. The denial that there are svch propositions as counterfactual of freedom does not seem to have much to recommend i, 38 Plankings s8ys, he may conceivably be wrong in believing that s€ ‘Adams were to invite him eo dim Tahguite Rock ke would a cept, but it would be passing strange to deny that thee is such 3 proposition a the one he claims to believe, think, infact, tht thie view may best be understood as arising from an exigency: if one thinks (asthe second view holds) chat there is no way to assign “efor on Fhe in mind re, But hat ee unable nd be ee ig all does vr deny ay ng Enea ocaton that comary 15.32. neem ony nap he ne res coh ‘Sealy coped by fom fertile te ‘Gin anne ta 2) i aea) God, Time, and Knowledge rth-values to counterfactuals of feedom, and ifame is also con= ‘Vince that every proposition must be either true or false, then one js ily forced to deny that there are sch proposiions—eht is, fone is forced to deny that the relevant Sentences express any propo~ ‘Sons ae all “The second view, according to which counterfctuals of fiee- dom lack truth-vaes, probably arses from the refletion that theres no way to assign the tuth-vales because (where the con- Sequent expresses fee choice to be made in hypothetical cicum= Stances) there i in principle no way of knowing whether the com Sequent would be tre ifthe antecedent were eae, This, however, overlooks the possibility that we might beable ro know whether the counterfactual sere without knowing this, ‘But how i this possible? The general relationship between counterfacuals and Hoestaran fice wills something that sll needs to be worked out. (Indeed, itis eeally the central theme of the present discussion.) Butan extremely plausible view to take isthe Following: A situation in which an agent makes a ibertaran fice choice wit respect to doing or not doing something is situation Sn which che agent might do tae thing but also might refeain from doing it, Suppose that A, if she found herself in citewmstances C, would freely decide whether or not to do X. Then both of the following counterfctls wll be true: (6) IEA were in C, she might do X: {G) IFA were in Gabe ight reftsin from doing X But if this i 90 then there is no tue counterfactual of freedom with respec to A's doing X in C: For (6 is inconsistent with (@) IFA were in C, she wonld retain fom doing X. Likewise, (9) s inconsistent with 6) IEA were in C, she would do X. I propositions like (6) and (7) properly characterize a situation of libertarian fee choice, thon all counterfactual of freedom are fale. Middle Knowledge Lo Inthe ensuing discussion, this dhe position which we shal s- sme the opponent of middle knowledge © be asserting and de- fending (Objections to Middle Knowledge [Now that the opposition between proponents and opponents of riddle knowledge hasbeen delicate, how ean we make progress fon resolving the issue? As noted, proponents seem willing 9 rest their ease on general considerations of plausibby, perhaps but- {uessed by allusions tothe alleged theological necessity of the doc- trine. Opponents can do the same, ofcourse, and many do, but it the discussion is to be advanced, more substancial arguments are needed. And, in fact, such argument are available. In this section thee brief arguments against the theory willbe spelled ont, and in the next somewhat more detailed argument will be developed. The first objection to be considered is one We have already al- luded co: What, if anything, sth ground of the truth ofthe coun= terfacuals of freedom? leis important to see cat the question here Js metaphysical, not epistemological. The question isnot, How can we low that a counterfacial of freedom is erae? Kemay be hat ‘we cannot know this, except pethaps in a very few cases, and although itis claimes that Gad knows them, iis not clear that the fiend of connterfactuls (or any other thst for that mater is requied to explain how eis that God knows what he knows. The ‘question, rather, i What mabe the counterfictuls true what | the ground of their ruth? As Adams says, “I do not understand ‘what it would be for [counterierals of eedom] to be tru.”"* In replying to this Plantings finds this notion ofa requzement tae there be something that "grounds" the wath ofa proposition to be obscure. But insofar as the requirement oes hold, he chinks the counterfactual of feedom are no worse off with respect 1 it than are other propositions whose credentials ae unimpeachable ‘Suppose, then, sha yesterday I fely performed some aon Wha was ors tat grounded or Founded my doing sot wasnt Adan, “Mile Kole” p16wo] God, Time, and Knowledge cued todo by anything ce; nothing relevant ails that 1 did so ‘So what gronde he truth of the proposition ngueton? Perhaps yon wl sy that whit grounds tah jst hatin at Tid A, ‘Bc hist much fan answer: and at any rte the same kind of tnwer avalbein the cae of Carle. For wht grounds the ith ‘ofthe counteract, we may sy in eatin face Carley is uch ‘hati he bid been offered 2835200 bbe, he would have fly ‘This answer of Plantings’ appears to be an endorsement ofthe view already attributed to Sudeex: When a counterfactual of fee= dom is true, ie simply an olkimate fice about the fice agent in ‘question that, if placed in the indeatedcicumstaness, she would fact as the counterfctul sates; this fact requires no analysis oF “grounding” in term of fureher, noncounterfctal states of af fais I seems to me, hostever, thac there is something seriously ‘rrong about this answer In order to bring this out, I Want eo ery sind formulate a cerain intuition—an intuition that, I believe, n= derles Adams's objection even though Adams docs not explicly Formulate it.The intuition this: In order For a (contingen) cond tiogal state of afr to obtain, is obtaining must be grounded in Some categorical state of airs, More colloquially, taths about what would be theca...” must be grounded in truths about ‘hat in fat the ene. This rirement seems clay to be satis Fd for the more familiar types of conditinals. The truth of 2 rateral conditional is grounded either in the wath of is conse- ‘quent, oF the fality of iss antecedent, or both?” More inter ‘tingly, the tcuth of causal conditional, and oftheir associated ‘counterfactual, are grounded inthe natures, cass] powers, ner fet tendencies, and the like, of che natural entities described in| them. The lack af anything like this a a basis forthe counteric- nap to Robrt M, Adon” p74 Panga ee alae to am camp Goon Pe Nemo Ney pe 7 ‘Sout Panne ew ely pi by he epee on papel Tie Nae Ney Bet dy “Samsung da wheres nates cal powers may eos | coeliac ei, oe mao Middle Knowledge to talk of freedom seems to me to be 2 serious problem for the ‘theory Perhaps tis worthwhile to repeat here that the grounding cannot be found n the character, prychologiealtendencien, and the ike of the agent. This point i, in effect, conceded by the defenders of riddle knowledge; they recognive that such paychological facts ate insufficient asa basis for the counterfctsls, And yet there isthe following point: I visually every case where we sem have plausible examples of me counefcuae of fedom, the plow is grounded ‘precy in such psychological fact as thee, (Again we reall Sal be= Seging Kelah, Plantingn climbing Tahquity Rock, and Adams's Dutcher selling him 2 pound of hamburger.) And this, 1 think, ‘ought to make us very suspicions of those examples. the basis for the plausibility ofthe examples i i all eases found in something that has no tendency to show that the examples ae correct—no tendency, that is, to show thatthe propositions in question reilly tre true counterfactuale of feedom=*—then the examples lose all force as suppor forthe theory. And without the examples, dhereis| very litle in sight that even looks lke supporting evidence. = ‘he comin inl rounds nore wate of is camp a ‘ey cme owes ats ene oy eg, trem pst aur ail owe “ts it he pt ot he leer ot wanda! posse word soa or tance ona For "uly amd atthe aries mone pombe wes veh eh Semana conspire quan of tua he onc {iotshoppnte eon wh he codon qos ae tnt Tate ‘Eoninpent ih tndad pe were soman ar sant conde ‘mals respons eter, then Molise omy tr popes | {ewatee cpie of aang ral with topes to cond! ee {ogenfodscon to as be Molin Ox Ds Foe ne Pat Va he Crm) an Alfed | Fredo [sc NV: Conall Une Pr ‘ota 2) "Nac, fever, ht ich papcolgil fc might very well prowde rounding fr cdma ach hy aneing hone pen coed ‘Spee genes wo pray et "Siang ye Surly there se many noe id many creates ch at ats ht wea ae io of henl God, Time, and Knowledge ‘The second dificuly tobe considered—one, so far a | know, not noticed in the literature to date—eoncerns the modal stars of ‘ounterfactuals of freedom. To do the job required of them, these Counterfacaals ust be logically contingent—but I shall argue that, based on the assumptions of che theory of counterfactual logit, certain crucial counterfactsals should be regarded rather 3¢ nocessiry triths indeed they are er at all26 “The examples of counterfactuals considered so far (8. “IC David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city") are in 2 certuin way notoriously incomplete. The antecedent specifies a Single craial fact but leaves unstated many other facts about the situation which would undoubtedly be relevant to Sauls deci sion-—facts about Sauls character and state of ming, but also fats bout the strengel and readiness of Sauls own military forces, about other threats to the kingdom, and so on. Now, it cannot Seriously be supposed that the counterfactuals God considers in deciding about his own activity in cettion and providence are incomplete in this vay. Surely, the antecedents ofthe conltionals| The considers must include everthing that might conceivably be relevant co Sat’ deciding one way othe other. In order to have Some grasp om this sor of counterfactual, suggest that we chink in terms of inii-spmentcurterfacals, in which the antecedent spec~ ies a omplee inital segment of porble aor yp toa given point in ime, and the consequent an event that may oF not take place at that time, (OF course, the antecedent will include any relevant Causal laws that have held up unl chat cime in that possible ‘Selden ofeach coer of feedon” ("plo Rob Mt Rate The ame to as However, vse The su ef ch ‘Smet but Ga stn rvs Go aon eon tn [Stn way ut honane, fr tet pare hae ne such con ttn ‘Ser choc they mip be ed upon fo make=or, nko they do ave tem, ‘Telnet a to grown wed sl coor “Sonata enn salySld tate exec of dam ae cone ‘aint inte or oh ie rr, feefonatan Kran Te Ps of (ot aowing Ge Wook uM 8), pp. ate). Buen se {te tn No nial coon, pon a wha cane "ty arde hy tee the notion ofan tl seme” of 3 pombe wold wea te dstson btw hd ean softs he sr | Middle Knowledge tn world.) [Fnow we symbolize such counteeFactuals using a capital lester fllowed by an asterisk to stand fr he antecedent, then the iniilsegment countertacual corresponding t0 (2) would be: (40) AT Saul besiege Kea, where “AM represents a proposition specifying the entice inital segment of the possible World envisaged by God as the one in ‘which Saul makes his decision, The contrary counterfactual then ‘would be (22) AY Sl doesnot besiege Kel If, 25 we have been assuming all along, (t) s tue, then (1) also willbe true, and (1) fle, ‘The interesting question, however, is whether (1) i 3 contingent cor a mec tuth, Clestly, the theory of middle knowledge = ‘quires that tbe contingent: if on the contrary itis necessary, hen Soul's decision is onsiled by a complete statement of antecedent conditions and his action isnot fee. 10) in fc, i tobe evaluated inte same way 8 any other counterfactual proposition: To assert (fo) is in efece to assere that some world in which “A” is tue and Saul besieges Kesh is more similar othe actual world than any in which “A°" is tue and Stel docs not do this. But, we may ask if (1o) is contingent, then under what possible circumstances would itbe false? The answer is that (10) might be false ifthe actual world ‘were different chan i is; wha is crucial isthe similarity of envis- aged possible worlds o the actal world, and so ifthe actual would were a diferent world (in ways we need nor atempe to specify) than the one which sin et acta, i might cura out tac the world specified in (r2) would be more similar to that world than isthe ‘world specified in (10), in which case (11) would be ere and (10) fake ‘But this, T want to say, violates the fundamental idea that under- lies the possble-worlds semantics for counterfictuls. For why exactly i ie that counterfactual are to be evalted in terms of ‘comparative similarity of posble worlds wo dhe acwal word? The answer to this is crucially related to the incompleteness, notedul God, Time, and Knowledge above, whith attaches tothe antecedents ofthe counterfacuas we tse in everyday discourse. We simply donot have che resources 10 specify in the antecedents of our counterGcwal everything that might be relevant to the occurence ofthe consequent, and even ‘when we ate clear in our own minds what the cicumstanees should be, we often do not take the trouble to state them. The hotion of similarity to dhe actual world, chen, removes what would otherwise be the ambiguity of our counterfactuals by specifying how the unstated conditions are so be understood: We are to think of the actual world as being modified as litle as possible so 28 to fccommodate the counterfactual antecedent. Thus, David Lewis states tha che point of his “system of spheres representing m= parative similarity of worlds” s "to rle out of consideration many fof the various ways the antecedent could hold, especialy the more bizare ways." He also says ‘A coumtericul § C+ is rca wor if and only 9 olde a ertin Qoworas but certainly noe all worlds mae. "If Aa re dn el hey would pple oer” trae or Ese, she ese nay be) at our words quite without regard those posible words Ivhore kangaroos walk around on catches, and sy peight eae Say, Those worl ar oo fa awsy fom ours Whats mean by the countrfice ht, ting Being pty dha they are—che Seavey of erutches for kangaroos being prey mich a acualy {the kangaroos inability to ne ertces being prey ench a cally and so nif kangaroos had noe they would tople So the point of the notion of comparative similarity berween possible words sto place finite on che works tha ate eleva for the evaluation of 2 given counterfactual. But of course, (00) is leeady maximally Lmited in this way, i already includes every ‘thing abous te envisaged world up unt the ime when Saul makes hs decision. With raed to niial-segmentcounterfcrls, then comparative similarity has no work ef o do. Ask yourself this (question: In evaluating (10), why should it make + difference Pee Company 9 Mile Knowledge Las whether the actual worlds asitis, or isa world differen in various ‘ways from cis one? Afterall, A” were actual, then neiier"oue™ cial world nor that other one would be acwal—so why should the truth of (10) depend in any way on which of those worlds is actual as things now stand? This contrast sharply with thesia tion as regards Lewis's kangaroos: If, for instance, we lived in a ‘world in which a large and active Animal Friendship League was assiduously providing prosthecic devices for “handicapped” ani mals, then we would "il in” dhese conditions a6 se evaluate his counterfactual and would very likely jodge ito be fle. But with inigasegment counterfacuale chere ix just no room for this to happen: there are no spaces lef tobe fled in, The situation, then, as fllows: The theory of middle know ‘edge is obliged to hold that some iniia-segment counterfactual fare logically contingent. But in order to-do this, the theory most apply to hese counterfactual the notion of comparative similarity tothe actual world, and { have argued that this notion has no legitimate application here—which isto s4y, the notion i mip pled. The correct conchasion to be drawn from counterfctl Togie, then is that if inital-segment counterfacuas are tre tll they ate tsue in all worlds and thos are neesrly true. Bat this conclusion i fatal to middle knowledge. ‘There is another, closely rated point, one that connects his second argument withthe fist one given. Plantinga admits chat "We can't look to similarity, among possible worlds, as explaining counterfacuality, or 35 founding ot grounding it. (Indeed, any founding of grounding inthe neighbothood goes in the opposite Alirection.)" This means that (in some cases 2¢ leat) of 890 ‘worlds W and W’, one is more similar tothe actual world preily Because shares countericals with the act world—i tot the case that, because one of thse worlds is more similar tothe accal ‘world in other respects, certzin counterfesals are tue, But this, 2 1 have argued above, violates the reason for introducing the com- paraive-similaiy notion inthe fre place—that reason being, 26 ‘explained by Lewis, to secure that counterfatals are evalated in ‘worlds sufficiently simular tothe actual world i noncuntrital ely Rober M. Adam” 7hx) God, Time, and Knowledge respects. How can Plantinga justify elying on the principles of ‘Counterfactual logic when atthe same time he undercuts the ration- tle for accepting those same principles? “The third (and final) objection ofthis group is one that was discovered independently by Robert Adams and Anthony Ken- hy.2" This dificuly arias 36 we bring together the account given ‘ofthe eruth-conditions for counterfactual and the use God is said to make of them. As Kenny sas, “Ifieis tobe posible for God to know which world he i actaaizng, then his middle knowledge must be logically prior to his decision to actualize; whereas if mide dle knowledge isto have an object, the acwalization must already n place." Let's spell this out bit moe, We will suppose, contrary to the argument the preceding section, that some inital-segmentcoun= terfactoals (nantly, chose whose consequents involve Geely ‘chosen actions) are contingently tru. Their eth, according to the thcory, depends on the similarity of various possible worlds tothe actual world, and this ie depends on which world isthe actual world. But, which word is acral depends, im part atleast, on God's decision about what to creat: Iis only by deciding to create that God scles which word sacral, and therefore which coun- terfactaals are tue. So rather than the counterfictals providing _guiance for God's decision aboue what to create, the fact is that their truth is determined only as 8 conssquence of that very dec- lantnga's answer to this spelled out in his reply to Adams In order forthe tr ofthe countrfactals to be “available” to God ashe makes his creative decisions, i need not be already sted in very respest which world is the actual world. What needs to be sealed, in order forthe truth of «given counterfactual tobe deter- ‘minate and knowable, is only thatthe actual world isa member of the set of words in which tha particular counterfctal is tue Now, wy shouldn't his be the case, even prior to God's decision about which parcular world to actuaize? Why shouléa’e it be the have Se Ram “Mite Rooweie“ Prt Key Th Ga i Pi iAP cede Ppt, p2 Mide Knowiedge tar ‘ase nother words, tht the same counterfamals of eden are te i al the worlds God could aaualizé® Why shoulda’ the truth ofthe ‘ounterfactasls of freedom be “cumerfumaly independent of the ‘arious courses of ation God could have taken”? If his 8 $0, then the tath ofthe counterfactual seted prior to God's dec som about which world co stale, andthe Adsme-Kenny objec tion collapses.” so enble the theory to wont Hest nn nn Ie ear ari) [HC rtd Ada apd here woo be ‘oa hn ers a wn Gt tae eaves) sabe. or apps) wa have ben ef Gn Td rete oie eur We cn lige God een fallows ‘0d than moral ei sod mould be bor fo have more mot good Ban Sele Bienen (9 ol ty ‘oer hat) ware col pete aller hs exon ii waon br cing Asm a Ere Chap fo Reb Rate 30) 11h mgt teint oom elongation pothesis, (8) would be tru if God created fee ceatres bu ae ihe did 0% ect eg So hun Si ee pth ronpect of tol god) Foes Cl, oti bck on doc ress ‘wal Set xen, cm rly ym ld deed or cee [Sim an Eve fri had ceed thm the ol ae eo woe more ‘han oral go.” But hi consis he apposten af se xp wich Sate wero fe cs) ee She eae Sie ee mora ma shot ert eect bec seme pablo th fr ea ‘ord wh hte ave feces sl would beer ke + wei ie Itost fee creatrely decom ae bad ones C Middle Knowledge p14). Pan Ep, however kamovedby ter we hve aeady not he sn oe site err re ot re amra1 God, Time, and Knowledge le must be acknowledged that this reply slices as a formal answer to the objection, but I think it leaves us with a freer, major problem, How are wet expla ee alleged fact that the same ‘countefactuals of ffeedom are tre in all the worlds God could sctuslize? These counterfacruals, according to the theory, ae not necessary truths. Their truth, furthermore, is not due t0 God's decison; on the contrary, they constitute an absolute inion which worlds God is able to actalize. For example: There ae possible Worlds, plenty of them, in which eis ere that, if God had created [Adam and placed him in Eden just as he did in the acwal world, ‘Adam would frcely have refrained from sinning. (We wil symbok- ine this inia-aegment counterfactual as "E" > Adam refrains from sinning.”) Now, why didn't God actuaize one of tho "worlds in preference to this one? The answers, that infact the trae counterfactoal, the one tre in ll the worlds God could acuaize, {is "E> Adam sins." Buc why is this counterfacval true? Not because of God's decision, and not because af any noncounterfac~ tual truths about the centres God has created. We wil se inthe next section that a very feof these counterfacuas ate sid to be true in vreue of che fee choices made by created beings, but even if this answer proves tenable, it ean account only fora tiny propor tion of the whole, So me are confronted with ths vast array of countefactals— probably, thousands or even millions for each acral or possible Fee ereature—almost ll of which simply aye me ‘without any explanation whatever ofthis fat being given, Is this not 3 deeply puzzling, even balling state of airs? The three objections in this scion have been developed inde pendently, yet on close inepecton they reveal a common theme. ‘The frst objection complained about the lack of 2 ground forthe teuth of counterfactuals in nonbypothetcal, noncounterfactul r= ality, The reply is that no such ground is needed. The sceond ‘objection points eu that if this sso, chen te rationale isc from tinder the principles of counterfactual logic on which the theory relies thus making such reliance dubious at best. In the third ob= Jetion, dhe groundlessnes of counterfactual reappears a higher level, not concerned this time merely with individual counterfa tuals but rather with the whole vast aay of them, all allegedly te in al the worlds God could have actualized, and tue wichout ¥ Middle Knowledge bo there being any ground for this ether inthe nature and actions of God, or in the natures of eeated beings, oF (except for a tiny fraction) inthe choices of created fee agents, Without doubt, see are here confronted with something deeply miysterious—but this the mystery of God's creation, or simply the mysteriousness of misguided philosophical theory? ‘A Refutation of Middle Knowledge We turn now to final, and slightly more complex, argument” In his argument we shall ot, as previously, argue dell against the counterfserals of fedom. Instead, we shall concede, provi- Sonally, that there are ue counterfactuals of feedom and ask bout them the question suggested in the lst section: Who or what Js it GF anything) that brings abou? chat these propositions are In order to give the discussion a touch of concreteness, imagine the following situation: Elizabeth, a doctoral stadent in antheopol ‘ogy, i in the concluding phase of her course work and is begin- fing to make plans for her disertation field eesearch. Her advisor has been asked to make a recommendation fora foundation grant to be awarded for observation of a recently discovered tribe in New Guinea. This assignment offers exciting prospects for new ic es min gh 0 the cis th fm he {fe proponent of ml ledge maybe epee wi the na [cif obvi fo the that compra sniinty wou Boa ‘Sodium uuson ine gene elem peel em ‘onan. estos that eng df een aes thet soe rt tack ta elas» poo de fhe teary Pxopbe ‘Sisnce, Tate plloehs ie smile] wh ep nan oe {oe mpion of comer enol hve he psn cond we eS o snysyemate soar fh seman SS wal Fake “A Ruan of Mile Rowe, “Site cone of aging shin employed ere ad cbewkere toughowt the {he concept ofa oymmtrl reson of dependence of what bros sont ‘nthe ston or ever tht bangs about te spe ngustion ra eB Nae 30 (8:wl God, Time, and Knowledge iscoveries ut would also involve considerable hardship and per- Sonal risk, The advisor asks himself whether Elizabeth would Choose to undertake this study, or whether she would prefer 10 Continue with ner preset plans eo study a relatively placid group ff South Sea islanders. He wonders, in other words, which ofthe following two coonterfictals of feedom is tre: (12) IP Bbcabeh were offered de grant, she would accep (in symbols, O— 4), (13) IeElabeth weve ofered the gran, she would not accep it (o= a). Now, Elzabeths advisor may find himself unable to decide which counterfactual strc, oF he may rach the wrong conchi- son about this, But according co the theory of mille knowledge, fone of the two counterfacoals i true, and God, if no one else, knows which one. For the sake of our discussion, se willasume it is (12) thats rue rather than (13; we shall assume, moreover that Elizabeth is in fact offered the grant and she aceeps itll this, however, is merely preparstory to raising the question already suggested: Who or what ie that brings st about chat this proposition Inthe previous section we have considered the restons why it ennot be God who brings it about that counteracuas of freedom te true; we shall not rehearse those reasons here, The answer to this question thats infact given by the ends of middle knowl Cele i that iis the agen named inthe counterfictual who brings it Shout thatthe counterfactual is re. More precisely, isthe agent ‘who brings thie about those posible words in which the antecedent te Ie this claim, then, that will be the principal subject of discussion throughout this section. "Howr might it be possible forthe agent to bring it about that a given counterfactual of fredom is tue? Ie would seem that the fnly possible way fr the agen to do this isto perform the action Specified inthe consequent ofthe counterfactual under the condi- ris ew {have head satin cso by Png kw af 0 swt source nny cet sabe waa a we labo Be ‘Eesing te come fo le Kavoedg hi sm mr ae Middle Knowledge La ons stated in the antecedent. That is to say: Inthe case of = genuinely fee action, the only way 10 insure the acton’s being dane is to do it [believe the proponents of middle knowledge accep this, which s why they claim that the agent brings about che truth ofthe counterfactual only those possible world in shih he scent iste. I nother words an scepted principle that (14) 1s in an agents power to bring it about data given ‘counteracualofficedom is tue, ony its uth would be broughe about by the agen’ performing the action spec- ifed in the consequent ofthe conditional under che condi- tions specifi inthe antecedent Batis it posible forthe agent to bring about the erath of counterfactual of treedom in ths way? What is equired feist be the ease that a particular evene brings i about tit a proposition is true? It seems initially plausible that (45) ICE brings it about that “Q" sera, then “Q” would be ‘ue if Eeccured and would be fei E didnot occur (CE occurs) + Q and ~(E vecurs) + =) sso aoe aa Sesto aber ano ict tba ye Siac ar etunennchec gente21 God, Time, and Knowledge rolled a7 or an 8.) ln each ese the problem arses because the event in question sa token of type of event such thatthe occurrence of any event of that eype (omeone's knocking on the door, your tolling» or better on yous las ball) would bring about the ruth ‘ofthe proposition in question, With this in mind, we evise (15) 35 Tellows (6) ICE brings it sou hae “Q" terse, then Bis token ofan ceventype T sch that (ome taken of T occurs) + Qand Some token of T occurs) > ~Q. and E's the fist token of T which occur If then we add the simplifying assumpzon tha if E were not to ‘cur, no other roken of T would occur, we ge (15) a8 a special ‘ase, When, on the other hand, we have an event and 3 proposition ‘such tha the conditions specified in (rs) and (6) ae not satisfied, ‘re wll say thatthe euth ofthe proposition i independent of the event in question ‘Applying this to our example, what we need to know i whether Elizabeth brings about the ruth of the counterfactual of freedom *"O-+ A” by accepting the grant, or whether es tuth i independent ‘of er action, in the sense just specified. In order to determine this, ‘we need to know whether the following propositions are true: (7) Ezabeth were eo aceep the grat, ic would be eruc that O- Alie, A= (0-04), (08) WElzaech were not 1 accep he grant, i would e te that O— A (ne, “A> (0 A} “There ean be no question about the truth of (17): if both “O” and “A” are tue inthe actual world, the counterfactal willbe rue. Ie might seem equally obvious chat (18) i lb: If Elizabeth does not sccept the grant, how can ie be ere that, if offered it, she would fsccept i? This, however, is a mistake. If (28) seems tous to be ‘obvibuiy false, we are probably misreading (18) a8 (49) IP Bhzabeth were wo reece the grant, it would be tue that OA ie, (08 ~A) > (0 AY) rT Midle Knowhdge Las ‘This is indeed obviously fs, but i is not the same as (1); the antecedent of (18) says, mot thit Elizabeth ejects the offer, ut merely that she doesnot accept i. It is consistent both wth her rejecting the offer, and with the ofer's never having been made I she rejects it, then "O-—> A” must be fale, but ifn offers made, "OA" wal sil be rue, So now we have to evaluat the cou verfactal (20) IPBlzabech doesnot accepe the oe i wil be Beaute she rejected (re. A> (O&A) (21) Elizabeth does noc accep the afer, i wil be besa the fer was not made (Le, A=» (0 & ~A). 1 (20) i tr, (18) wl be false, but (21) is tue, soi (48, How shall we decide his question? According to our semantics for counterfaesals, the question sbout (20) and (2t) comes down to this: fea worldin which Elizabeth reeived the ofer and rejected it more oF les similar eo the actoal world (in which the offer was accepted) than a world in which the offer wat neither made nor accepted? ‘One's first thought might be that the world specified in (2), which difers from the actual world with respect to Elizabeth's cceptance ofthe off, more similar tothe actual world than the ‘world speciied in (21), which difers with respect both to the making of the offer and to its acceptance. I 50, however, then one's irs thought (ss So often the ease in matters connterfatl) ‘would have overlooked important considerations, To see why. consider the fllowing example: Ihave been hard at work making 2 poste announcing an upcoming event, and just as the postr is nearly completed I knock over my ink bot, spilling ink on the Poster and forcing me to stare all ver agnn, As Ido this, pause From cursing my chimsiness long enough to wonder what it would have been like not to have had my poster rained inthis way. Two possibiiies occur to me: I might have tefiained from knocking {Tata maton) rh) poet my emp ne ‘ould sell ec hive sy Scone sate, Nope empha betad Sem ai gly omen se popesa“) God, Time, and Knowledge ‘over the ink bottle inthe first place, or, I might have knocked i ‘over just I didn the actual wood, but instead of pling any nk, the botle spontaneously righted tsefand come wo rest again ins ‘original portion. I then wonder which of these somarios would have occurred if had not gotten che ink spilled on my poste. 1am wondesing, in other words, which ofthe Following countertic- tual i rae (22) Ifmojnk had boon spied on my pote, ie would have Been because did nor knock over my ink tle (=~S —» (= K& =5). (23). Ifnoink had been spilled on my poster, it would have Been beste I knocked over my ik bowls but no ink spilled Cs a9), | purale over this for afew moments, but my question is quickly answered along the same lines already suggested for (20) and (21), ‘The (22)-world would have differed from the actual world with respect both to the bottl’s being knocked over and the ink’ spill Jing, whereas the (23)-world diflers from itonlyin the Iter re= spect. So the (23)-world is more simile tothe actual world than ‘he (23)-world iis 23) chat eee and not (23), and I elze tae ry poster bad not been ruined, the reason for this would have been, not that I was careful about my ink borte, bur chat afer 1 knocked over the bowl it miraculously sighted self wichour spill ing any ink. And tht makes me fs ile better abot my eim= (OF course this is absurd, bu why ist absurd? What exactly is ‘wrong with the reasoning that led me to conclude that (23) ere {atherthan (23)? The anewer seems to be tix: Inthe actual world ‘certain counterfactual are true, among them (24) IFT were to knock my inksborle ia sueh-and-uch a way, ‘he bot would fll ver and spi nk on my poste, “This counterfictul is true in the actual world (as events have shown), and i also tre inthe (23)-world, but notin the (23)- ¥ Middle Knowledge Las ‘orld, And in weighing the comparative similarity to che actual ‘world of the (22)-world and the (23)-world, the truth in the (@2)-world of che counterfactual (24) counts fa more heavily than the slightly grester similarity of the (23)-world with respec co ‘eal content. So a6 we thought all along, itis (22) that is true rather than (23), ‘Buc of course exactly similar considerations apply in the case of| (20) and (2). In ehe actual word, itis cue that (42) Ue Elinabeth wore oferod the grant she would accepe i. “This counterfactual tue inthe actual world, and also in the (1)= world, bu notin the (20)-woeld. Andina compacson of the later two worlds, the rath of the counterfactual (12) outweighs the slight difereace with respect to similarity in factual content, 30 thatthe (21)-world is indeed more similar to the actual world than the (20)-world, and ii (21) that iste rather than (20). Te might be uggested thatthe reason (24) is decisive with respect to the decision between (22) and (23) is that (2) i backed by laws ‘of nature; counterfactual of freedom such a5 (12) donot have sch backing and are therefore not decisive with regard tothe choice (for example) berween (20) and (21). Bu this rally will not do For one thing, Plantingahimsel's prey clearly committed to the view that, in deciding the comparative similarity of possible Wrorlds, counterfactuals outweigh diflerences in matters of fict whether or no they are backed by laws of nature.”? And there are reasons that make every dificult eo justify weighting counterfa tale of freedom less hei than les of matre. First, dete is che contention, noted in the lst section, that the same counterfacuals fof freedom are tre in all the worlds Gad ean actualize and com seiute absolute limitations on God's power to bring about states of afsirs (Lawes of mature, clearly, do nat limi God's power inthis ‘way: he could have created a world in which different laws ob- tained) The proponent of middle knowledge, however, may object to “take thi ese ups of be argument given in The Nabe of Ns,1 God, Time, and Knowledge this piece of reasoning. He may point out that, although God can- ‘not control which counterfactuls of freedom are tru, the human legs in question—the agents named in the countertactals—do Ihave conteol over this, since itis they who, by making the choices that they do bring about that those counterfactual are tue. Now. fof course, whether oF not the agent brings about the wuth ofthe ‘counterfactual s the very point ise inthe present discussion. In view ofthis, one might tend to consider it question-begging (0 introduce this poin on cite side at this stage ofthe argument: Bat the proponent of middle knowledge may fc this snfsr to him. The claim thatthe agent brings about che erat of counteric- twals of Freedom is, he points out, an integral pare of his postion, ‘ne that he should be permitted to appeal to dnt and less iis ‘efited by his opponent. Suppote we concede this point and agree to evaluate the immediate point in queston—the question, that i, whether ie (20) or (21) chat is rue—in the light of the claim thatthe agent decides which ofthe coumterfcrals about her factions are tue. How will this affect the outcome of the discus ‘A natural view to take would seem to be tht this point made by ‘he proponent of middle knowledge tends to balance off, and thas torneuttalize, the last point made i the previous paragraph, There it was pointed out that God has control over which laws of nature obtain, but not over which counterfaetal of freedom are true “The eeoinder i that human beings have control over some coun terfacteals of freedom, but not over natural laws. 38 woul em tobe the eas, these considerations weight about equally on ether ‘in acincs me of bersing the gun (in my “Reto of Mie Kowaige) by ang tat tce Cala conor wh cum fans af esiy fey ae ts see do we (Hikes Rear of Mie Koel", 20. Bath be, 10 pts his Tope for ‘mong th remiss of my argument. What shoe tt Es andr th po rahe proponent col heath he seme feo) fm my Sac of whe coum fee prot a en wre he Bren of pol named by he mt sd de ere ho Yr Middle Knowledge le side ofthe argument, the upshot would seem to be chat we cannot decide, on the basis ofthese considerations alone, whether coun- terfactuals of feedom are more fondamental than lws of nature, ‘oF vice versa Ifanything, what secs to be suggested i thatthe ‘90 are roughly ata party. I'we wish fora more definitive answer toe question, we must look further. [Now what is at issue is whether ic is counterfictals backed by laws of ature or counterfietal of fcedomn that have countcrex- samples in possible worlds “closer” tothe actual world. le rele ‘ant in this connection that we now know with viru cereinty that the fundamental laws of nature are probabilistic rather than strictly deterministic, chu, che countefacaals backed bythe laws of nature (suchas [24) ain fict would probably conditions rather than qrue necesstation conditonals. Surely, however, necessit- tion conditional (such ay the counterfactual of feedom are supe posed tobe) have to be weighted more heavily than “would-proba- bly” conditional in determining the relative closeness of possible worlds, There i also the important poin tat God, according t0 (Christian belief, can and does work miracles. If this is so, then some counterfactual backed by las of mature have counterexam pls inthe actual world sel, and therefore also in posible works 25 close to the actual world as you pleas. In view of all this, che ‘counterfactual of freedom seem t> be considerably more funda- ‘mental, with espet to explaining why dings ae they ae, than the laws of nate fron, they are more fundamental than par= ticular facts such a0 that Elizabeth is offered the grant." ‘Fenn commenting onthe en fh eure enn th ale “A Refs of Me Knowledge is that te argument ea ave cane of my um he "he proponents frie know et ool id tah oh of eourcetal of csdom Gd he woe cone {Shen word he asin of ete ated akon, On PN {ot ik ny cone of do al ava of my wn caning ety af sma herr om ‘cence ftom pmlc th eo shoul be cred by te propents of ‘ue Enowlige te para conn rely Fen eed et {0 be sronger hn ware ts wold nox cre sor airy ‘Sit docrmning the eve sary of pore wri, comer ‘al of fdom surwegh ptr et sch hur Eke sole the“) God, Time, and Knowledge But i (21) 6 true, then sos (18) and (nce [17] i also tr) it follows thatthe truth of the counterfactual "OA" i indepen- dene of whether or noe Elizabeth actually acceps the grant. (le rot toe if she rj the gran, bur tat i another matter.) And it ako follows (by [16) that Elizabeth's acceptance ofthe offer does tot bring it sbou thatthe counterfactual "O—> A etre. And in feneral, it snot rae thatthe cath ofa counterfictual of freedom s brought about by the agent. Fan hating ngen ed in ot 4 tow sams to commit him ool Epa toy do, adn ne fi the ify be dosnt em spel fram by no means convined ths he condi ave dean sto stony bees spot gen athe ot pode cogent earn baling thre cc or ya te ‘ns age wth dh they ae to pron Gee) ely eset “Sm nie o Avan Png fr a cxemely rnin objection thi {Tal ot werk ne tune thecal spp shy” Spon che ena word tise tat) OA, ert int (3) O29, spon ‘here that Eesha ec Wechen ‘elven eb ese ep And mn nm ny roth oa ty ce uy Sciacca sb cell the pr bee she wat tor ofr sion dat "“O"» “A iste, ad shen fet ret the grant ee koe the {ch hae thangs were deen tat ay, Ehesbeth would ace the pan toy emt be sos wb she awe usury whe ust a swe edly seminal Change ould ke that al her eke oppor ri ‘oc nelle show so ht she dc oe scp ce he eae ‘ithe pening ot her ec willbe pospoed dt iwc ern te Fopontonsnog shined te gr eto mod rooms ‘hough °O"> A be) Supposing ths tobe the cave, we then tk, IE tren pth rat, woul be bane "OF" es ue ber an “O. a ower lb af abe wero pith woul eas he meanest Srv dlr shanty te th acl wel wih she races and nt [SSuse commerical “0 = A world tet So all wn eat Elcotcth rns abt oush of «seach buy shih the orl eae dors Yr Middle Knowledge lo Does the conclusion we have reached constiute a serious prob- Jem for middle knovledge? Perhaps not. David Basinger has r= cently argued thatthe proponent of middle knowledge need not find should not hold tha the eruth ofthe counterfactual of freedom js brought about by the agent” To be sue, the view chat che truth fof these counterfietals is broughe about by God must also be excluded, forthe reasons already discussed. Rather, these counter factuals simply ave nue without their eruch having been brought about either by God a by anyone cle. "Who responsible forthe ‘rath of [the counterfctals of fred] inthe acta world? The answer is that no one i responsible." This proposal, however, creates serious dificutes for mide knowledge. On the proposed view, Fleabeth snot responsible for the fice hat, ifshe were offered the grant, she would accept it (ie for the tuth ofthe counterfactual "O~» A"). Nor, we may a= sume, is she responsible for the truth ofthe antecedent —that i, for the ft that she e offered the grant. Buti she is responsible for rcither ofthese things, itis difficult see how she ean be responsi ble for accepting the grant—a conclusion that is entirely «n= sweleome to the proponents of middle knovledge ‘But there is another, even more fundamental, difficulty, We have learned chat Elizabeth does not bring it about thatthe coun terfacoal "O— A is tue, What effect, iF 2ny, does this have on the question of what i in he power when the grant offer is made? In order to investigate this, we need what I call power nto prinple, principles that state that an agents possesing the power to perform 3 certain kind of action ental thatthe agent also pos estes the power to perform another kindof action. More will be ‘sid about power entailment principles in chapter 6 bat a principle that will suffice for our present purposes i (PEP) Its in As power to bring it about that P, and “P” entails "Qi" and "Qi Be, then st isi A's power to bring ie about that Q ‘2-Divne Omnis and Human Freda AM Knowle Pepe sig” Fah and Piya 990 “ios1 God, Time, and Knowledge Aide thought wil show this pinple ob corm 1°" etal ("weno be the cn that Panes tia oe hot IF (ised tw, then te eanet pees had to's bait bing abot at (Seething ‘injowr power tring about tat yous snr een though you comply ck he power to gst te snc ial) Buf "Qe tate, rn pone for you to Bring i hour tha Punls i saopoable for you to rig sbou cit Uappoach your hour wih he intense of ging Your Scovbal ony todcover that you do not haves dtl Ulos ‘Sin my power fo ring taboo tha ou tae Sooke by imtllng one myself or having onc itd—ie natn my poser tang your door.) How dow tpn ppy to the marin and? node to proccd ew make he stumpon, which is matoned byt Neary of idle Knowledge, tut of ny pai of counertictuas Such (1) and (3) one oth ter yh pst the ‘Ejucton of tie two men tv, toe ral posse rors, Gres his ssunpton, we veh lowing areca ts (25) Ut Blzabeth is offered the grant nd acepe it, tis tra hat O-- A (O&A) > (0 A). (26) I Elzabeth is offered the grat and eet i, ti ere hat 0 =4(0& =A) > (0 ~A), ‘That is to say, Elzabet’s acceptance or teection of the grant tna the truth ofthe corresponding counterfactual of freedom.” “ci anion Mali Die onc 5) te ae (a) PG tereore,P—> sept at a) td (ane dered witht recut the mt {hn moet text But (f) ay onion sone acme Lew nim a wo com ery odo pk te complsy cele he no esrngth after ut tse the ouierstl CP 8 "(Cam tmp 39. Lews pgs semansn which (A) would not hl rh en, Ei tery a) etd Tete ter tlio hte © be oud in be dations made by Middle Knowledge Ta Now we ae ready to consider what isin Elizabeth's power when the offers made. Fist ofall etn her power co ace the grant? One would suppose that itis, since in Fact she seal doce 50. And (PEP) places no obstacle in the way ofthis conclusion. Her accepting the offer entail the tuth ofthe counterfactual" A," bt thar counterfactual is infact eue, ad s0 the question of wheth- crits in her power to bring abou is tuth does not ate, But now let us ask, does she have it inher poster to rjc the rant? Her rejecting the gran ental that the eonterfatu A" be tue, but ths counterfactual i infact alse. So according ‘0 (PEP}—she can have the power to reject che grant only fii in her power to bring it sbout tht this counterfactual i tru, IF she does not have cis power, chen she lacks power to reject the gant. ‘And now the situation becomes serous, We have sen that i would be in Elizabeth's power to bring it about that the counter= factual "O > ~A" is ee only if the truth of this counterfactual ‘would be brought about by her rejecting the offer. But we have ako seen that the tuth of 2 counterfactual of freedom is not brought about in this way. I fllows that Elizabeth does not haveit in her power to bring it about that O—> ~A, and lacking this, she also—by (PEP)—lacks the power to reject che ole. is time o summarize. In cis setion we are investigating the ‘question, Who ox what brings it about thatthe counterfactuals of | freedom ate true? We frst considered the possibility that its the agent named inthe counterfactual who does this—in terms of out ‘xample, hat Elizabeth by acepting the grant offer brings about that OA. Ie turns out, however that thie counteract i true independently of whether or not she accepts the offer: Ie would be true ifshe were o accepe the offer, andi would also be true were she not to accept the offer. To be sue, ie would not be tru if she ere 10 ree the offer, bu this tens out not to be relevant i she did nor accep the offer, this would be becuse the offer was never ‘made and not because i was made and she rejected it. Bat since the Pelloc terwen various kind of jontive ional (A) a fr singe ‘bet spdabe for "een condone bara wlan so the coe {Gea of eam se nessa soa for ee cena (8) lai (See Pll, Suction chap 3 (8 them, nt te Counties2) God, Time, and Knowledge counterfactual is true independently of whether or not she accepts the offer, it cannot be the ease that she brings about the rath ofthe ‘counterfactual by her acceptance ofthe grant ‘We then went on to consider what Elizabeth has it in her power to-do when the grant is offered to het. Clearly, she has it in bet power to accept the grant, and she demonstrates ths by doing so. But does she also have che power to reject the grant? Of pasiculae importance her is the fact that (given the ruth of the theory of tml Knowledge) her ejection ofthe grane entails the auth of| the counterfactual "O> ~A." But this counterfactual is not tue, foi ean be in her power to reject the grant nly ifit is also her power to bring about the truth ofthis counterfactual. But we have [ready seen that this is impossible. She could have the power to ‘bring sbout the truth ofthe counterfactual "O —» ~A" only ifs truth could be brought about by her rejection ofthe offer, but we have sen thatthe agent cit in this way bring about the truth of 2 counterfactual of freedom, So i notin her power to reject the rant “The conclusion to be drawn from this is chat the concession made eatlit—that some counterfctals of freedom ae rue—as warranted, Ie turns out from our consideration ofthe case of Flizabeth that insofar as such counterfctuals ae me, they are not counterfactual of fvdom Ifthe counterfactual “O> A" stro, i js notin Elizabeth's power t reject the oer, and shes not free in the raquired sense. And, on the other hand, iasfat as an agent frenuinely fie, there ae no true counterfactual stating what the gent would defintely do under various possible circumstances. ‘And so the theory of middle knowledge is seen to be untenable: ‘Thee ane mote coerfutualsof reed yr [3] Simple Foreknowledge This chapter isin the mature of an interlude, The preceding chapter dale with the possibilty of middle knowledge; the next several chapters willbe occupied with the logisl possibilty of | ‘comprehensive divine foreknowledge in a world containing fee choices. Bu theres another important question about forcknov- fedge which has received mach less attention than it deserves— namely, what would be the use of foreknowledge if i existed? Why, in other words, is foreknowledge important? This isthe topic for the present chapter. ‘One answiee to our question which comes readily to mind isthe following: That God as foreknowledge of all things whatever is aninescapable implication of divine omicente—and, since omnis tence i recognized as an essential atibute of the theistic God, what is at stake in the foreknowledge controversy i nothing lest than theism itself. This answer, however, wll not withstand in- vestigation. It is clear thr there are versions of the doctrine of vine ommiscience which are compatible with God's having less than complete knowledge of fare events: this would be the case, for instance, sf certain propositions about the futute lack trith- valees, and similar result follows if omniscience is defined by saying that an omniscient being is one that knows everything that itis logically possible o know. Now, theists who fel strongly4) God, Time, and Knowledge about the necessity of foreknowledge may be les than enthusiastic bout these sorts of definition of omniscience—bat if this isso, the ‘efnition of omtniscience is tse in part a rut ofthe importance ascribed tothe foreknovledge ise; icannoc therefore, be used ro ‘explain that importance "believe thatthe importance attached to foreknowledge finds its explanation in cereain aspects of theism which are more “r= Tipious” and closer to the actual experince and concerns of re ligious persons, than are the somewhat aid topics with which philosophers of religion usually concern themselves, Iria pat of heist eigions suchas Jodaism and Christianity that certain per= Sons, speaking in God's name and with hi authori, fell the “atic But (fe may be asked) if Gd does not knew what i going to happen, how ean he tell the prophets what to say about it? Further ‘more, theistic religions make extensive claims—elaims that are xperientially important to reigioes persons—about God's pro- ‘idental guidance and contea of worldly affairs. And many smes| these aime seem f0 “cach out i terms of the doctrine of fore= knowledge: Since God aleady knows everything that going t0 hhappen—especally, perhaps, he knows of some severe testing I am going to have ta face-—he hat already arranged things S0 28 (0 work out inthe best posible way, say. by developing my charac- ter to meet the anticipated challenge, and perhaps by prearranging ‘other circumstances $038 to provide a solution for otherwise une Surmountable diffuses" OF 3 pice with this, though perhaps Tess common in practice, isthe belie that answer Jo prayer can be understood along these same lines—that God, knowing before= hand that one of his children will ack in faith fora certain blessing, may prearrnge things long in advance (perhaps even 35 early 36 the inal stae ofthe entire universe) in such a way that, in the natural course of ehings and without further dec vine interven- tion, the desived answer wil el Prayer, providence, and prophecy these are mates of intense concer to many ordinary religious believes, chough they re less common in the books af philosophers. But then, some of the "Form extensive declopet of hse pe, se David Bangs, “Mile ‘grape nd Chesed Chan Tg Res She 3:0} 38 Lg Simple Forcknowledge bss philosophers are themselves religious believers, and if seems to these philosophers that vital religious concerns are at stake inthe foreknowledge controversy, they may see compaibiism asa post tion tobe defended tothe lat ditch. AA this is entirely understandable, and it sheds light om the intensity with which the foreknowledge issue is pursued. But 1 ‘vant to say, nevertheles, that al of cis misguided-—dhat the doctrine of divine foreknowledge, in its most widely held form, i fof mo importance whatever forthe religiously significant concerns about prayer, providence and prophecy. If am right about this, ‘hen compatiilist and incompatbilist alike en reuen to thee dis fassion with lighter hearts and lowered pulse rates. They will continue, and rightly s0, to pour thee best pilosophical efforts into a fscinatng logical and conceptual problem. Bt they need ‘no fea that central religious interest willbe vitally affected by the ‘way the controversy comes ou ‘The Theory of Simple Foreknowledge ‘Whar as bean sid above doc nt apply tall versions ofthe tate in forcnowlege. Ie doesnot apply to version of theism ‘which are straightorwardy deteministic® but neither dest ap- Bly co the theory of middle Knowledge. Rather, i relies on the Fefutaton of middle knowlege given inthe previous chaper— nd on the oer hand, pilsopiers unconvinced by those 5 tents may welcome che present chapter ae demonstration of how essential middle knowledge ely i. This chapter i con cerned wih single orbnowlede, foreknowledge that embraces ll tual fice dies, including thos tht ae yee be made, but nt se Teh te pa ap Pel po ab te Bay Sniee’ Tiel encpin sateen broad {ets Sco loa si ol ple yw LR ie er,so God, Time, and Knowledge (es in middle knowledge) those choices that might have Ben made Tt in face never ate Tes possible tobe 3 bit more precise about the nature of simple foreknowledge by asking the following question: Just how ii that God is able co know futute events? Ie seems clear chat the notion of 4 mere accidental correlation between God's belies about the fir ture and the actual events sehen they oceur is inadequate here Evidently, one way God could know the facure is by knowing the ‘tual antecedent that wil lead tothe future evens in question; this ‘iew is open to soe determinists but not ro libertarians. Another ‘vay is given by the theory of middle knowledge: God, by know ing both the conditions in which a choice would be made and the relevant counterfactual of freedom, knows inflibly which choice would be made under those circumstances. But if a has been argved, there are no tue counterfacuals of freedom, this posi ity also is climinated, Ie seems, the, thatthe only way left forthe adherent of simple foreknowledge is 0 claim that God dvealy Ibnows the acmal future event that God's belie about the mater in {question i somchow brought abou hy the fur even self. Thus, sidvocites of foreknowledge speak of God a having “direct vision” (ofthe future a iin 3 crystal ball ora telescope.® This of course involves something, very much lke reroactive causation; the 2d- vocate of simple foreknowledge, if she i wise, will cheetilly ‘admit this and challenge her opponent to prove that retroactive “ausiton is impossible. Ie may be tempting to suppose chat this lke means thatthe fature mo in some way aleay exis other Wise, hove could it have elects in the present (and past)? But perhaps this temptation can be resisted. The inference will hold only if we assume that causes must exist at the ime at which thei cllccs ate produced, and proponents of foreknowledge and reeo- Sctive cusition may decline to accept this, They may rather main ‘tin, pending proof to the contrary, tha he facure event can have effects in the present eventhough doesnot ye eis Fore cll compro, sce Stephen T Davi, Lap ad he Ne of ‘Gal Grand Rapa Nh Eada 6p rhe elope, sonata Elvan The Proof Wal naps Debts Merl ep posh. Shou! bed ht Edward fn ds osu oth wy mig ‘Eedoowice) . J Simple Foreknowledge Lo ‘What sort of understanding of providence can emerge from this conception of foreknowledge? In order to make this question con- ‘rete, lee’ consider an example suggested by Basinger concerning 2 young woman deciding which of two mien to marty. If she is ‘devout, she wil wer ikely seek divine guidance on the matter: out ‘question is, what sort of guidance mighe be available? To begin ‘vith, God will have full and complete knowledge of the physical and personality characteristics ofeach ofthe three people involve, including hopes, ambitions, and commitments, latent fears and cravings and the like. He knovs, inshore, 2 great deal more dhan ‘even the wisest and best informed marriage counselor could hope to find out. All ofthis, however, comes from God's preset know! ‘eige, whereas our question concems what benefit can be derived from God's knowledge ofthe fuare. What diference,ifany, does this make to the sor of guidance God is able to ive? Tn seeking to ansver this question, it may be helpful to remind ‘ourselves how i would be answered from the wandpoin of middle knowledge. IfGod has middle knowledge, he as no need to base his guidance onthe potential for happiness and success of the two ‘envisioned marriages. Rather, he knows in full detail exactly what ‘would happen tothe young woman if she mie either of these men or ifshe refused both of them. The guidance, inthis es, is ‘aed on fll and complete knowledge “The situation if God has simple foreknowledge, however, is ‘quite different. An immediate, and stiking, result, i that God amet use his foreknowledge in guiding the young woman about hher marriage decison, For the future situation which God forc- knows is, of course + stution in which she aleady is marvied to ‘one of the ro men (or, perhaps, to neither)—and since the deci Son's actually havi Ben made i presupposed by God's knowledge of the future, he cannot possibly wse that knowledge in deciding hhow to influewe that decision. And in general, iis clea that God's oreknowledge cannot be used either to bring shout the gccurrence ‘of foreknown event or to preven uch an event from occurring. For what God foreknovs isnot certain antecedents whic, unless imerfered with in some way, will ead the occurrence of he event rather, tthe evo tel hat is Foreknown as occuring, and ies contradictory 0 suppose that an event is brown to occur but#1 God, Time, and Knowledge then alo is prevented fiom accurting. In the logical order of depen dence of events, one might say, by the "ime" God knows some thing will happen, is “too late” ether to rig abou is happening for to prevent it fot happening. God's guidance of the young. ‘woman with respect to her marriage must be independent of God's Knowledge of her acrual future. ‘What may seem to be porsibe, however, i hiss God, because Ihe frcknovs that a certain event wil ceue, may preaeange other cos in the scuation in such a way as to produce the best overall result, Such “prearrangement” is really what is involved in the concrete applications of foreknowledge mentioned earlier In prophecy, God prearanges the annourconent of the foreknown {vent this announcement may serve any ofa number of purposes, Including the accreditation of God's spokesman (when the proph- coy ie filed) 26 walla influencing hearers of the prophecy to conduct themselves in the ways God intend for them In answer sng prayers, God can prearrnge rcumstances in such a way that ‘when the prayer is made (as he knows it will be), the answer comes, ot asa result of any immediate intervention by God at chat ‘moment, but a a consequence ofthe circumstances that have been prearranged months or millenia before. The general case of prov ‘dence differs from tis only in that the foreknown event for which the circumstances are prearranged is not specified 35a prayer that will t some future time be offered. And to return to out example, although God cannot ase his foreknowledge of the young worn an’s marriage decision to influence that decision itself would sem that he may use it fo arrange other aspects inthe situation in such a way a to improve the outcome of the choice she actually rakes, “To make thie still more concrete let ws consider an actl exam= ple, Ins fimous Woeld War Il bade the Allied armies were en- fired by the Germans at Dunkirk in June 1940. The military balance heavily favored dhe Germans, ad the situation ofthe AIL lied forces was desperate. However, unusually calm weather on the English Channel and fog that inbited dive bombing by the LLufewatfe made possible the evacuation by sea of most of the Allied troops with far fewer losses than could have been expected fee assume (8 many of es would) that the Allied cause was just 7 Simple Foreknowlodge Lo and that God desired an Allied victory inthe war, we can interpret these event along the following lines! God, having foreknowledge ofthe encirclement, prearranged the causal factors that would de- termine the weather at the time of the evacuation, thus making possible the relatively favorable outcome instead ofthe anni tion or mass surrender of che Allied forces. This example, I be- live, gives 4 fair pieote of che way in which simple Forckaowh ‘edge can be incorporated into an understanding of providence. ‘The Uselessness of Simple Forcknowledge 1 now argue that this conception of divine providence is in- coherent and that, in fact, simple foreknowledge is eel wees for the doctrine of providence. Let us begin with a distinction concerning the way God knows the future. The distinction have in mind i beewen knowing proportions about the future and Knowing the concrete evans of the fuare—that s the actual sac time proces that will acer. The distinction may be lastated by the story of King Czoesus, who upon consulting the Delphic Ora- cle a tld, “Ifyou eros the Halys River, a great empire will be destroyed.” He knew, let us assume, the tuth of this proposition, but he was not aeqoained with the comet coeus that would make the proposition erue—in particular, he did not know tha the that empire that was to be destroyed ws his own, "Now, it isnot tobe thought of tht, n knowing the fature, God knows merely the truth of certsin propositions. All accounts of God's knowledge stress that past and future events ae for God wo le vivid or comple in ther epistic presence than those that are presently occuring. (This sa lest one ofthe points made by the {yal ball and telescope metaphors.) God, we may say, not only knows thet 2 given proposition about the futuee is ere; be also knows in the fillet detail exactly how itis trae, down to the rinuest fact chat might romain forever inaccessible to even the ‘mort assiduous human investigator, We may, say, then, that sf God has simple foreknowledge, he knows the conte events ofthe Faure, and not merely propositions about che fotre ‘With this in mind, let us recur to the example ofthe young woman's marrage. God, we may assume, knows the truth ofthe@) God, Time, and Knowledge proposition “One year hence Susan will be martied to Kenneth” Bathe not only knows tat this is tue, be knows in fll dail howe its erue—he knows, n other words, the fll complex pattern of| ‘mutual interactions that wall consiute Susan and Kenneth's mat- ried life together one year hence (Les call this pattern, the con- ‘rete event of Susan and Kenneth’ marrage, Mf.) Now, let ss suppose that God, on the basis ofthis foreknowledge, ats inthe present in some way s038 to improve the eventual hsppines ofthe Inarsigge—for example, he infloences Kenneth to work on over= coming his tendency toward impatience so as to become a more sympathetic and understanding husband. Ics evident, given the ‘What emerges from all this is that the account of divine provie dence given above, an account of how God's management ofthe Worlds facilitated by simple foreknowledge, i incoherent. But this is so, why has the point been so largely overlooked? My ‘conjecture is thatthe reson for this i hat the implications of God's foreknowledge of concrete evens ate not seen. We are in= clined to think, albeit unconsciously, of God's foreknowledge along the lines ofthe limived foreknowledge we ourelvessome- times have, when we see certain events coming that are nt on Lingent upon anything we may choose to do or to refitin from doing. In such cases the actions that we take in view of out fore- sight lead to no paradox. Bue if we could foresce everthing, then for us, 3 for God, it would be too late 1 do anything about i have argued that the notion of divine providence based on simple foreknowledge i incoherent. But there is yot a fnal que tion that may be asked about this: Just where, in particular, does the incoherence aise? For the incompasblis, the answer may appear simple; whats incoherent simply the notion that God ean have comprehensive foreknowledge of fee human actions. The discussion inthis chapter, however, docs not presuppose ithe compacbilism or incompatibiism about foreknowledge. It should bbe noted, furthermore, that the demonstration given of ine coherence given above does not depend at any essential pont on the tema be that hi eaing dos no apt 0 tha wpe proce i any. tung ete cal ion each a ey he ‘Slateoquna wharves Rowert ta wel cl ext ont af mo pt he doce of pov. F Simple Foreknowledge la sssumption that human beings have libertarian fre will. So we rive atthe following, rather striking, esl: Whether or no hee fr creatures endowed wih ibenarian ee will sips hat Cod shoul use a foreknowledge devived from the actual ocurenae of fre ‘vents to determine hs own pio action in the provident governance of | the worl I simple foreknowledge did exis, it would be useless.[4] Two Arguments for Incompatibilism ‘The modern controversy over the compattilty of divine fore= knowledge and human freedom, begun in the 10s by Nelon Pike and A. N. Prior, has so fir filed to reach 2 satisfactory conclusion." Ie is not immediatly apparent why the issue should be 0 difficul to resolve. There do not appear tobe any systematic Aitferences in philosophical style or methodology between the op- posing sides which might explain thei dieing conclusions. Nor flocs the issue scem to be one that marks the siference between ‘major competing word-views—like, for example, che contiover- sies over scientific determinism or mind-body dais. Teis dear tha differences concerning religious belie play a role in sustaining the controversy, but just what that role is i less lear. There are theists and nonthcists on both sides of the issue ‘And incompaubiism is hardly a potent weapon aginst theism, since itis evident that there ae versions of theism which can ‘oexist happily with it. Toe sue, there ae aso theists to whom these versions of theism are unacceptable, and for those theists ocknlge snd Newey” Fath Pip» (89 ats. Se FNebon ie ‘Dice Omics nd Volunary Reon Plead Rr delegate AN. Por The Formals of Orme,” Phony 12 shoe Fr “Two Argument for Incompatbiism, Los religious belief may be 3 powerfal motive for resistance to incom- patiblism. Bue i would be unjust both tothe participants in the tiscussion and to che quality of thee arguments to suggest that che teontroversy is kept alive only by religious dogms ‘What does seem to be true, however, is that the sues of re- ligiou belie which are involved have strongly motivated the de- velopment of more and more complex positions on both sides of| the debate, And in view ofthis complexity iis unlikely thar any simple, straightforward argument will be able by itself. move the controversy toward reoltion, Such an argument might capture ‘effectively what one side perceives asthe grounds for positon, bot in view of the complexity of the discussion it 8 ot likely to convince thoxe who need fo be convinced Theliev, therefore, that a illuminating treatment of this topic sus take a more subtle and dalcricl pproach, The sim must be to strip sway, one by one, the complexities tat envelop the con- troversy in order lay bare the core disagreements. Formal argi- ments will have their rle to play inthis, but only a 2 part of 2 larger process that seeks to lucite the total philosophical context ‘within which the argoments must function, But what oe the core cisagrecments—zhe cental points on which the controversy at ase will hinge? The only sure way #0 answer thisisto le the controversy take ts course and thus discov tr empiricilly which isoes emerge as primary. I offer, however, ome conjectures about this, based on my own reading of the discussion to thi point, Fist, T suggest that che power enalment ripe, discussed extensively in chapter 6, wil play a central role fn future discussions ofthe top. These principles are alled upon 2 a eruial juncture inthe bext argument for incompaibilisn, and 4 compatiblist who scceeds in refuting them will have advanced her cause significantly. Second, and perhaps more findamentl, there is che matter ofthe meen of the past—or, if one prefers, its Gity or unaerabilty. In any case, the notion thatthe past is somehow fundamentally diferent than dhe faut, with respect. the possibilities for human action, i deeply entrenched in ordinary Tangwage and common sense, as well tin much philosophy. But all false, and atleast one professed libertarian? deny this. And«1 God, Time, and Knowledge among those who concede that in sme sence the past is necessary, fixed, or inaterable, the interpretations placed on this and the implications deawn from it vary considerably. Third, and most basic of all thin controversy leds us to the question ofthe nate of Jie will For though libertarianism i a presupposition ofthe con- troversy, it tums out, I believe, thatthe difference between con- patiblss and incompacblies in the inal analysis a difference in the meanings attached to free wil and fre choice. Bur all chi, if correct, must be shown to be so by the Future development ofthe discussion. Inthe meantime, we shall proceed 4s follows: The next section begins with aclaiiaton ofthe no= tion of re wil presupposed inthe present discussion and proceeds to set out two arguments for incompatiblsm. We then turn to 4 consideration of some of the simpler abjections to incompatibil- {sm ad the chapter concludes witha reformulation ofthe second ‘incompaibilistargument. The most formidable replies to thi a= fgument ae tated in the next theee chapters ‘Two Arguments I's incumbent on the incompatiblst to make clear what i s that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with. The notin office will involved here i nicely expressed by David Basinger when he Says tha when a person efecto perform an action, she “has iin her power to choose to perform A or choose not to perforin A. Bath A and vot A could actully ocur, which wil actually occur has ra yet been deeming." For a formal definition of this notion, we have the following: (FW) Nis fice t T with respect o performing A =k isin N's power at to perform A, and itis in N's power at Tto refrain from performing A Some comments may help to clarify this definition. It should be noted that the power in question is the power t pov partir oa F “Two Arguments for Incompabilsm le «under given circumstances, and nota generalized power vo perform aets of certain kind. (Ths, if Thomas has the sill to perform on the parallel bars, but at Ty his arms are ted behind his back, ee shall say chat he leks the power st T, to perform on the parallel bars.) In general. ifiis in N's power at To perform A, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or redder N's performing A aT. Here "prevent" applies especialy to circumstances that are causally incompatible with N's perform ing A at T, and “preclude” to circumstances that ae loply n= compatible with N's doing so. (The tied hands preven! Thomas ftom performing on the parallel bars; he speed from marrying aiwina at T by the fae that at tha time she is already marvied to someone ele." 'A farther point tht should be noted is the following: The as- rips of powers to finite agents alays sje tthe pouiliy of Interference. IF bump your elbow wile you ate shaving and cates yu to cut yourself, this docs not show that, om that ocesion, you lacked the power to shave without eating yourself, You had the power, but my interference prevented is exercise. (This assumes thar my bumping your arm is not cwllyinvitale—iF i were, then you would lack the power in question under those cecum stances ? 'As has become costomary, the sguments for incompatibilim will be presented in terms ofa specfe example, the ress from which can chen be generalize. But philosophers who have become weary of Jones's interminable projeet of mowing his lawn will rejoice to Fearn that anew example isin the offing: our concern will be with Clarence, an aficionado of cheese omelets, and with the ‘question, Will Clarence have such an omelet for breakfast tomo row morning, or won't he? “The Gest argument begins by assuming that Clarence wil, in “wo ca ym The me he enn fea Fd a an only he hn J wih eps fF Fre expan ‘ed ce tna “Fear counrenmpes” (Se Haty G Fenny, “Alure Poses tnd Moral Reson.” oma of Piophy (9 tp 99) Bat ‘Bretton of spi st wut for ane ci,al God, Time, and Knowledge fact, have a cheese omelet tomorrow momning, and it argues that CCarence's eating that omelet is necessary, hence not a matter of five choice, The argument goes ike this (Ax) Necessarily, God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese: omelet tomorrow morning. (Premise the neces oF the pt) (Aa) Necessarily, f God has alvays believed tht certain hing ‘will happen then that hing wll happen, (Premise: vine inflitaey) (3) Therefore, necessarily, Claence will have cheese omelet tomoeeow. (From 12) ‘This argument has impressive merit. Iti complete, with no supprescd premiscr, and 3s concise 35 one could asks validity ‘beyond reasonable doubs, and twill be sound fay incompatibil- jst argument for this conclusion is sound. Yet its very conciseness works agains its usefulness ae 3 too for analyzing the controversy ‘The purpose of the argument, afer all, is to say something about fice will and therefore abost what Clarence has iin his power to sdo-but these topics ar present in argument (A) only by implies tion. Alo, the frst premise makes assumptions about the elation ‘of Gods knowledge to events in time, and these asumpions need to be made explicit so they can be examined. But che most serious deficiency of argument (A) concems the modal operator in the ist premise, "Necessarily here does not refer to logical necessity, asi ‘does in the second premise: it snot lsimed that God has the biel jn question inal possible words. Rather, ‘necessarily’ inthe first premise refers tothe “necessity ofthe past God's having eld this bei snow necessary because thas lend happened. And itis this necessity that a Were, transmitted across the enlment stated in the second premise so 38 to appear again nthe conclsion, Bu it ie clear that thie notion, the ides ofthe necessity of che past. is one ‘ofthe moet crucial and ificul elements inthe entire controversy ‘Any argument that sto ehrow light on che dispute must do more ‘with this notion than bald asser i ‘With these considerations in mind, le us try another argument: Two Arguments for Incompaibitian [6 (1) Tes now ere that Clarence wil havea chess omelet for breast comorzow. (Premise) (@.) tes impossible that God shold at any time belive whats fake, oF fl wo believe anything that i rc, (Premise ce vine omriscene) (Bx) Therefore, God has always belived that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for break tomorrow. (From 1.) (Ba) If Got has always belived » ceeain thing i is notin anyone's power bring i about tha God hae not ays believed hat ching (Premise: the unalerbiley ofthe pst) (9) Therefore, itis notin Carnes power to bring about that God has not alays believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. (From 54) (6) leis not possible frit to be tue both that God has aways bcieved that Clarence would have 2 cheee omelet for breakfist, and that he does notin Ect have one. (From 2) (G7) Therefore, is no in Catenc’s power to refisin rom having 2 cheese omelet for breakline tomorrow. (From 56) So Clarence’ ving the omelet comorsow i not an ac oF Gee choi No doubt this argument could be expanded sil farther sill, it ‘an serve as 2 bass for analysis. It does meet the objections eased against argument (A): It speaks explicidy about what it isin CClaence's poster to do, it makes explicit the conception of divine fomniscience which the argument assumes, and it deals with the necessity (or unalerabiley) of the past in 3 way that is at east somewhat less opaque chan (A).* ‘wt eed ta agus (A) nd (8), hog enemy abot dvne forklaie krexpy ot ble On yc aa“ ‘tow at Thc Pease“ tev mT ta )&P* No, che ey fered (An) apenas aed (both re lw sah Gols pst ble ean yr ot But mee tha Go's pt neta a P ‘Soman aie toy shal aca ert pp st te ‘itr Bu four precy wht he spun ng oa ‘Sal ot do sly ime en proneel God, Time, nd Knowledge Some Objections to the Arguments ‘At this point we will consider some of the commoner, and simpler, objections to these incompatible arguments and will flko add some further clarifying remarks about the anguments| themselves, First, we consider an objection that is eased rather frequently: Sometianes we ourselves know what another peson i going to do (say, in ansiipating 2 fiends reaction to some sia tion that has arisen), and we do mot suppore that oor knowing this is incompatible withthe person's ating frely—so why suppose such an incompatibility when i is God who knows? “The short answer this is chat arguments (A) and (B) do not proceed from God's knowledge a 2 premise but fom God's be Tice and no-one supposes that « human being’ believing some- thing necessitates the eath of whac is believed. But there may be ‘more co the objection than this. If Sosa, his wife, knows that Clarence will have an omelet for breakfast tomorrow, it must be tmue not only tha she believes his but ako that she has adequate tvidene for her belief (she knows about his addiction to cheese ‘omelets, he came home yesterday witha new hunk of sharp ched dda, and s0 on). And (it may be supposed) this justin evidence ims be sufficient to exclade the possibility that Clarence will not ave an omelet; otherwise, she could not be said ro know that he will. in general, however, this need not be ere. We often ascribe knowledge in sitations where the justifying evidence is insul- ent to warrant absolute certainty. And surely this is one of those “tuations: whatever evidence Susan may have i surely compatible with its being posible that Clarence will decide not to have an omelet tomorronr, and therefore with its being a mater of fee choice whether he has one or not. If, on the other hand, the re ‘uirement for knowledge is suengehened to absoluce certainty, then iti perfectly plausible to suppose that we never do have Jenowledge of future fee ations.” 2s Jonathan L; Keanig sy, “Toi tat God i erly orient inp tat God slay cen sa venting woh He bene nd {df me toma be cesin nthe rei soe of mach more than or ows foe en sts” (The Posty fa Alt iowing Gn New York: St. Mines, neh» gy Two Arguments for Incompatibiisn in Another important point about arguments (A) and (B) is that neither one raises the question of how God is able to know future actions. One might argue that God can do this only if sufficient ‘causal conditions of the ations already exist: dhus, a world in hich such knowledge is possible for God is of necessity a deter ‘inistic one. Such an argument might possibly be sound, but is major premise is exceedingly difficlt o establish, Altemative c- counts of God's knowledge of future actions are avaliable, ac- ounts that do not involve the presence of suficient causal condi tions. As we have seen in the last wo chapters, God's knowledge fof the future aight result by eetoactve exuaton from the actual Faure events—and, there i sls the theory of middle knowledge to be considered. The tsk of disposing ofthese alteative ac counts of God's knowledge is formidable enough to. make the suggested argument unattractive. Bu, to repeat the point, neither (A) nor @B) relies on assumptions about how God is able to know what he knows ‘Another objection that deserves at least passing mention is che following: ‘The incompatiblst claims that if God foreknows 2 person's ation, then that action isnot free. But if God forcknowe ‘that some person will ely choose a certain action, what follows i that the action will be done frely, which isthe reverse of the conclusion desired by the incompatibilist. I mention this argument ‘because Ihave heatd i used by eputable philosophers, bute quite transparently begs the question. Cerainly, "God believes that N will fely do A" enils"N wil do A freely.” But arguments (A) and (B) claim that this same premise als entails "N will do A of necessity.” Now the ew entalment doce not cancel the ol, nor does this maneuver do anything to undermine either (A) or (B). So unless some independent refutation of (A) and (B) is possible, sdding the premise that A is done feey simply leaves ws with an inconsistent premise and with two incompatible conclusions, both ‘ali derived, (la gener, whenever tis elaimed tht “P" enti "Q." one can erly assere that “P & ~Q" entails "~Q,”" but eis has no tendency whatever to show that "P” does no entail “Q.") ‘ull another objection claims that incompadiiim wrongly 3s- sumes that God's prior knowledge of whats person wil do causes the subsequent action, But if | know (or instance) that you arenl God, Time, and Knowledge walking across the street, this does not cae you to walk across the Strect, so why assume itis differne with God? This serve enough, but chose examination wil reveal dhat ncither (A) nor (B) makes the claim that God's knowledge (or belie) causes the event that he knows. They merely assert that i is impossible that God should believe that an event wil happen and yet the event not accu, And this is certainly tue, Bue what # anything, causes Clarence €0 eat the omelet is left aa problem for farther study (I should be noted flbo that both (AJ a [B] are consistent with the assumption that God!’ bli i caused retroacively by the future action,)® ‘But this answer may be insficiene. Some pilosophers, atleast, sccm strongly inclined think that ifthe feure ation i self the awe of God's bli. chen the belie eannot create a problem with respect to the action’ ing fee.” Now, iis certainly true that. if the ation cases the bli, cannor also be the case that the belie ‘auses the action, (The causal relation is asymmetrical.) The mis take, however, lies inthe assumpeion that its only by causing the action thatthe belief can be relevant othe action’ fieedom. But as Jonathan Edwards pointed out, foreknowledge can perfectly well show an action to be necessary even its not the foreknowledge that makes it necessary." And there is another point here, also noted by Edwards: The fice that a facure event has an aieady txising effet shows the occurrence ofthat event to be necessary, ‘thee or not the effect in question invelves God's belie. For tis Compare th ftlowng fn AN. Por “Fors condos propo sah Tet has come to God's noice that X wl be then X el be dost ‘ef ath ofr omteyingmcay im ace 1 18 ‘Secge tf aed coud ty bong ser Smee foveh ie the fra cima be te ne iia he ar beng ee ‘Spl wy ths s0 Adin er nebo vay tis becuse X we (Gueiean below tl bya ha ce nh ean more than ‘Sethe Xs ue coming to asi eyo prevent, ine es ely hal ‘Sheen which ppt old not hee ("The Foals of Oo Seno. hecorling fo Bruce Reichenbach “We ca ay ring shot he reich (Gel foe othe gna oi foiecing car rpang bone. That ‘estan fr homo free beer ith eae o lence xing tic ome exe wae Cees bang sbose CHaksren Omiscnce Fath sn nap «987 939) "sokanEatde om fte Wdepls: Bobb Meri 99) p “Two Arguments fr Icompatibiem In lealy absurd to suppote that a present fact exists which isthe effect of some future event, yet that fre event may or may not ‘cur! (This point I note in passing, shouldbe atended t0 By the suthors of stories about time travel) “The Second Argument Revisited So far the incompatible arguments—(B) in paticular—have proved able to withstand the chllenges raised agains them. But in fone respect these arguments ate misleading. Both (A) and (1) conclude to 3 denial of Hbertaran fre will fat, however, tively few incompasbilss accep this conclusion. Rather, incom- patiblss tend to adopt modified conceptions of omniscience 5035 to avord the deterministic outcome, One such conception simply denies thar propositions describing future contingent evens cat be true; tis means that the fist premise of each arguments rejected. Another atemative, to be explored in later chapters, st maintain that God's knowledge is timeless rather than temporal. Bt the alternative most serviceable for present purposes isto hold chat God's omnisience entails hi knowing, no ll ere propositions ‘whatsoever, but only those tha ies logically posible for im to know. With this conception in place, we can construct variant form of argument (B) 3 follows (C2) eis now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breair tomorrow. (Premise) (C2) tes imposible that God shoulda anytime believe what i fas, or fil to believe any tue proposition such hac his knowing tha proposition a that time is lopially posible (remix divine omniscience) (C3) God hae aways belived that Clarence wil have a cheese fomeles tomorrow. (Assumption for indinet proof) (C4) IF God fas always beieved cern thing, fe notin anyon’s power to bring sbout tht God has not aways believed that ting, (Premise: the nalsrbity af the pst) (Cs) Therefore, i noe in Chareness power to bring ie about i, p36mi God, Time, and Knowledge that God has not always believed that be would have a ‘hecte omelet for breakfist. (tom 3.4) (€6) eis not possible for tobe true bch that Gs has always beloved that Clarence would have a cheese omelet fOr ‘breakfast, and dat he doesnot in fact have one. (From 2) (C2 Therefor, itt notin Clarence’ power to refain from having cheese omelet for breaktat tomorrow. (From 56) So latenc's eating the ome tomorow sno act. of fce choice (CA) Chatence wil 4 feely when he cats the omelet for break fist tomorrow. (Premise) (Co) Therefore, ii noe the ease chat God has always believed tha Chience will have a chese omelet for beakstto- morro (From 3-8, induce roo!) “This argument represents more faithfully than (B) the acral thinking of most incompasbliss. But i also suggests what may be a promising strategy for resolving the entre controversy. 1 submit that compatibists and incompasibiists alike oughe to be able to agree on the definition of ommnicience given by (C2) a8 4 Framework for the discussion. (C2), after al, des nor affirm or presuppose that there are eruths that are logically impossible for God to know, but by leaving that possibility open it achieves a generality that ie lacking in (Ba). And on the other hand, com= puibilsts presumably do not want ro claim that there ae euths ‘that God knows in spite o its being logically impossible for him to know ther! So T would suggest that compatbilist and incom- patibilst begin by ageecing 10 accep (C2) 25» common definition ‘of omniscence. They wil then proceed o resolve their diferences with regard to the validity of the incompatibilis arguments (B) znd (C)—which, to be sure, may not be an easy thing to do! But ‘once this as been done, essentially complete agreement will ave boon reached there wil be no occasion, in view ofthe prior ageee- ment 10 (C2), for any further dspotes about the meaning of “om ‘What remains, then, is to examine the most important answers sven by compatiliss tothe arguments for incompatibilism. To that tas we now tur, [es ) Hard and Soft Facts ‘The distinction between hard and soft fics sully introduced Jn the context of dhe controversy over free will and divine foe= knowledge, but the ned fr the distinction is by no means limited to this.! Consider the following three propositions (0), event £ occurs a Ty then “E will occur at Ty" is tue a any previous tie T (2). Some proposiions about the Fstare ae such hat ii now in someone's power to determine whether or not they ate (9) No propositions about the pase are such that i is now in somone’s power eo determine whether of not they are true. (When I say thi cis i someone's power to detcr- ‘mine whether or nota proposition tre, mean that, si is tug, eis in someone's power to bring about that tis ale, and ifs false, iii someone's power to bring it shout that este) Propositions (1) through (3) can easily seem to generate a conte sition. Suppose, for example, that Joba had a exp ofa for hanch 'Mtch fhe mel inh bape draws om Had Fas and Theo am, Nourse 4959 wel om awe Nee {9 ath ad Pip» (98) ates1 God, Time, nd Knowledge It flows, according to (1), that “John will ave cup of tea for lunch” was tre a any arbiteay chosen past ime—for instance, it ‘was tate at 6:00 thie morning. So now we have (@)_ ea ue 6:0 this morning thst John would havea cup ot ts for lunch But from this it follows, according to (3), that (9) Iewas notin anyone's power 26:01 this morning to deter~ imine whether oe not John would have + up of tes fo Inch ‘And since the same reasoning canbe followed for any time prior to Tanck, and indeed for any arbitrarily chosen action oF event, it follows that (2) fle; what is tue instead S| (6) No proposition sever sch that its im anyone's power to determine whether oF not is tee. ‘This, of coure, i the problem of logical deteminism or faalism, and itis cleat what must be done to solve: [Fone acepts both (1) tnd (3), then one must explicate the phrase “propositions about the past" a such a way that (4) does not qualiy 2 being “about the pst," so chat che inference from (4) 10 (5 isblocked. Thats to say: ‘Wenced to beable to classify (4 252 sft fact about the past ather than ae hard fet So the distinction betwen hard and sot facts is needed for the solution ofthe problem of logical fatalism. Buc ofcourse this sime Aistinction is often invoked to resolve the problem of theological faalsm, What needs to be clearly seen, however, i that this is 2 row problem and not the same problem over again. To salve the problem of logical falsm, it suffices that (4) be eased 2 a soft face rather than a hard fac, but thie snot enough co avoid thealog- ical fatalism. For philosophers concermed with theological ftlism ‘ypielly accept not only (1-3) but aso (0) Wevene B occurs at T, then “God Believes that E will coeur at Ty” tue at any previous time Ty Hard and Soft Facts tn ‘And from this, together with the fact that John as tea for banc, it fellows that (W) God beieved ato this monning tht John would have a cup of tea fr lane And from this, together with (3), it would seem to follow that (9). Tewas notin yone's power a 401 thie morning vo deter- mine whether or not God believed a8 60 this morning that John would have 3 cup of tea for neh ‘But, given thar God is essentially inflible, God's having believed thie a 600 entails John’s drinking the cup of tea, so that () entails (5). And by the process of generalization, we ative once again at ‘he fatalisticconelsson (6. Soto avoid theological Fain, it ‘essential that not only (4) but also (8) be classified a soft fics But can this be done? That i the question such eis the task of| the present chapter ro investigate. Firs, I shall take 2 general over- view ofthe suategy followed by the compatible in classifying facts about God's past elie as soft fact, Then, [shall provide 3 careful and detailed explication ofthe distinction between hard and Soft facts. Finally, [shall apply the dstncion 3¢ see have exph- ‘ated itt facts about God's past beliefs, with the aim of determin ing whether such faces are hard oF sof-—eoncrete or silly putty ‘The Compatibilst Strategy ‘As we attempr to grasp the compatibiis’s strategy inthis dis- ‘cussion, itis imporeant to sce that he docs recognize, in general that fics about the past are beyond our contrl. According to Alvin Plantinga, for instance, there is animportae asymmetry between pst and ure, This asymmetry Const in pti the fc thatthe past outde our cond in ‘way in withthe frre snot, Although I now have the power to ‘ase my arm donot ave the power to bring i about ha eased -ny am five mines ago. Although snow hin my power 0 thik sbout Views, not now within my power eo bring about