OFF

T policing

Policing is what the police do to ensure compliance with the law

Osse 7 – Head of Amnesty International’s Police and Human Rights Programme. Anneke Osse,
now Independent Consultant on Police and Human Rights for a range of organizations,
including the UN and international NGOs, and Honorary Fellow at the University of Exeter,
Understanding Policing, 2007,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/HRELibrary/sec010112007eng.pdf
The term policing is used with many different meanings in mind; most notably it is referred to as the process of
‘ensuring compliance with the law’ in all its aspects. It should be apparent that ensuring such compliance can never be achieved by the police

alone. Policing may indeed encompass more agencies and entities than just the police and is
sometimes even taken as a social process involving civil society at large rather than a professional duty carried out by a State agency.

However, such an interpretation of the concept of ‘policing’ may create unnecessary

confusion , underlined by the fact that the term is not always easy to translate in other languages. We will therefore use a
simple definition and define policing as ‘ what the police do to ensure compliance with
the law ’.

Violation they don’t modify what police do to comply with the law – reduces policing
with the federal intelligence surveillance court.

Prefer it for limits---any other interpretation makes everything policing

Wisler 9 – PhD, Founder & Director of Coginta which has managed, designed, and
implemented police restructuring programs for many countries; & Professor of Administration
of Justice-TSU
Edited by Dominique Wisler, standing member of security sector reform rosters of experts of
the United Nations Departement of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Development
Program, and the Swiss Foreign Office, former professor in political sociology at the University
of Geneva, he has published widely in scientific reviews, and overseen police and Ministry of
Interior restructuring programs in countries including Afghanistan, Chad, Sudan, Iraq, Turkey,
Mozambique, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Occupied Territories of Palestine and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, member of advisory committees of academic associations
(South Asia Association of Criminology), academic journals (Police Practice and Research. An
International Journal), and Editor of the Working Paper Series of the International Police
Executive Symposium, DCAF and Coginta, and Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe, Professor of
Administration of Justice in the Barbara Jordan-Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs at Texas
Southern University, Community Policing: International Patterns and Comparative Perspectives,
CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group): Boca Raton, FL, 2009, Foreword, pp. xi-xii
On a slightly critical note here, it is not clear that a bottom-up form of social control should be called policing.
That widens the conception of what constitutes policing so broadly that policing itself
becomes undefined . A more distinct language, which incorporates, but also differentiates, state-
provided policing from informal social control , could use the language of security as a field of action populated
by many actors having different powers, legal status, and goals.
 OFF
Amicus CP

The United States federal government should create a security-cleared staff of special
advocates to challenge Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act applications in criminal
court, expand the permanent staff of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court special
advocates, and authorize these advocates to intervene in any case they deem
necessary with any arguments they deem relevant. And Require that the FISA court
request and consult Amicus for EVERY FISA application.
The CP creates a robust adversarial process without incorporating defense counsel.
Patrick Walsh 16, Senior Instructor, Legal Division, United States Department of Homeland
Security Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law,
2016, “Foreign Intelligence, Criminal Prosecutions, and Special Advocates Symposium Issue: The
Fragile Fortress: Judicial Independence in the 21st Century,” University of Memphis Law
Review, vol. 47, no. 4, 2017/2016, pp. 1011–1046
IV. Foreign Intelligence in Criminal Cases

The next step to ensuring the i ntelligence c ommunity pursues only appropriate collection programs
is to create a panel of cleared defense counsel who can act as special advocates to litigate
pretrial FISA motions . Having a handful of amicus curiae cleared to appear before the FISC in
some limited proceedings has value , but the greater need is to have meaningful
representation at the trial level for defendants that will have foreign intelligence evidence
presented against them. Robust procedures have been developed over time to allow
defendants a meaningful ability to challenge the evidence against them in criminal [*1041] cases.
But, the procedures are significantly modified to the defendant's detriment in cases
involving foreign intelligence . These modifications contribute to a structure that will permit
the i ntelligence c ommunity and the FISC to again pursue programs outside of their mandate .
The resulting diminishment to a true adversarial process will hamper judicial
independence .

Special advocates at the trial level can restore each defendant's right to challenge the
introduction of evidence against her and to ensure that intelligence collection programs are
legal and appropriate . This section will outline how these special advocates should be created and what authority they should
have.

A. Creation of the Federal Public Defender's Office of the FISA Special Advocate

The first step in providing defendants a meaningful ability to challenge the evidence being
used against them is to create a staff of defense counsel that (1) have the appropriate
clearance to review FISA applications and affidavits and (2) can legally represent defendants in
criminal cases all over the country. This can be accomplished by creating a national office of the FISA
Special Advocate that litigates FISA-related pretrial motions for defendants . This national level
organization would function as the counterpart to the Litigation Section of the Office of Intelligence in the National Security Division of the
Department of Justice. The Litigation Section assists federal prosecutors across the country in responding to pretrial motions of defendants in
FISA cases. These experts add value to each case and bring a wealth of experience to help ensure that the court benefits from an experienced
advocate who is highly educated in this specialized area of the law. The Office of FISA Special Advocate can do the same.

Disclosures to defense counsel cause leaks because defense counsel work closely with
surveillance targets, turning the case---special advocates avoid this.
Matthew Howell 18, J.D., Temple University Beasley School of Law, 2018, “ALLEVIATING THE
POWER OF SECRET EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF NO FLY AND SELECTEE LIST DETERMINATIONS
AND REDRESS PROCEEDINGS,” 90 Temp. L. Rev. Online 1, 2018, Lexis

A nother solution involves a model that would allow litigants' attorneys to have access to
certain classified information , even if disclosure of that information were not possible.
Attorneys in this setting would need to receive security clearances at the necessary levels to be able to
review any information, and protective orders would be issued to prevent any disclosure by the attorney. This would also require that defense
counsel be permitted to attend the hearing in which classified information is discussed. Obtaining security clearances could follow a similar path
as under CIPA, where one security [*27] clearance permits the attorney to review documents at all levels of classification. The protective order
would likely be necessary because the TSA is generally unwilling to release any information to the public. An unseemly side effect of this system
is that a client would still not have access to information, and his attorney would be barred from disclosing any information to him.

If an attorney cannot discuss any of the potential classified information with her
client, then it will remain difficult to mount a viable defense because strategy will be
limited . This situation would also place attorneys in a difficult ethical dilemma , because an
attorney would be forced to refuse disclosure of information while also crafting a strategy
based on that classified information. It would appear that the implementation of any strategy
could lead to an inadvertent disclosure . As one author notes:

There is no simple resolution of this ethical dilemma. Perhaps, the only viable result of the
appropriate balancing of the defendant's constitutional rights against the government's national security concerns may be to provide

access to the information to security cleared defense counsel who is not permitted to share
the information with his client.

One way to resolve this ethics problem is to remove the adversary nature of the defense
counsel from the proceeding and instead implement an independent counsel that is paid for by
the government . Similar to the security-cleared defense counsel mentioned previously, this
independent counsel would possess proper security clearance and could "view and challenge
[the] classified evidence on behalf of his client." The client would retain his own attorney, but
the compensatory counsel acts as a substitute advocate during in camera hearings to
determine whether or not classified information is pertinent to the defense's case and should therefore be disclosed. This setting would work in
a similar manner to the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC), which reviews the deportation of resident aliens in cases involving secret
evidence, often involving terrorism claims. In that setting, special attorneys receive security clearance to [*28] access classified information
and those attorneys agree to represent permanent resident aliens when looking at the information. Attorneys with clearance in the ATRC are
prohibited from disclosing any information to the client or to any attorney representing the client in the matter, subject to fines and
imprisonment.

The development of either security-cleared attorneys or a compensatory counsel system would rectify
many of the issues in applying the Mathews test to watch list proceedings. Attorneys who are able to be present
during in camera proceedings could question contentions made by the government or
point out factual errors that have led to watch-list placement. Additionally, these attorneys are much
more likely to zealously advocate for their client's interests , at least more so than a judge or
prosecutor would under a statute like CIPA. However, the notion of state secrets continues to loom over the proceedings even if there
is sufficient counsel for a litigant in a No Fly List proceeding. Indeed, the assertion of state secrets, or of national security, may force a judge's
hand in determining that disclosure of information is not proper in a specific case.

The mere prospect of leaks from the AFF wrecks five eyes
Ellen Nakashima 3/12, two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter covering intelligence and
national security matters for The Washington Post, “FISA policy changes that address issues
unearthed in review of Carter Page wiretap are a modest step forward, analysts say: The Senate
is expected to pass the reform package, which drew bipartisan support,” The Washington Post
(Online), 03/12/2020, ProQuest

Nicholas Lewin, a former federal terrorism prosecutor, said the issue was a difficult one "as there are fundamental values
on both sides of the scale — liberty and security."

allowing such disclosure would

Baker, a former Justice Department attorney who handled FISA applications, cautioned that

have "a substantial negative impact " on the usefulness of FISA as a counterintelligence
tool and would pose a "greater national security risk " to the nation.

" Foreign partners and sensitive human sources located overseas would be quite reticent
to either share information with the FBI or allow information they generated to be used in FISA
applications," he said, "because they would be quite concerned about the prospect that some
defense attorney down the road could see that information."

Solves Russian nuclear miscalculation

James Rogers 14, co-founder and a Senior Editor of European Geostrategy, Lecturer in
European Security in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence
College in Tartu, “The geopolitics of the Atlantic Alliance,” European Geostrategy, 6-8-2014,
http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/06/geopolitics-atlantic-alliance/ via WebArchive
But NATO is only part of the story; incidentally, so is the EU – a project kick-started with the Schuman Declaration of 1950 to reconcile West
Germany and France after the horrors of occupation and war. What
is important is that all of these institutions are,
in one way or another, part of a wider geopolitical constellation enabled and underpinned
by the military, industrial and financial power of the UK and US. After all, the Euro-Atlantic
structures are capped by a range of mutual UK-US intelligence sharing treaties, including the
BRUSA Agreement and the UKUSA Agreement, both of which predate NATO. The former was inaugurated in 1943 during the height of the

Second World War, while the latter was founded in 1946. These agreements facilitated the creation of the so-called
Five Eyes’ intelligence network , recently brought to prominence by the leaks of the notorious Edward Snowden. The ‘Five
Eyes’ includes the UK and US, along with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Each
of the five English-speaking countries
takes responsibility for monitoring signals intelligence in different parts of the world, with the UK-based
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the US-based National Security Agency (NSA) operating as the hubs for the exchange
and processing of knowledge and information. Other trusted nations, like Belgium, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, also gain
access to this network on an ad-hoc basis.

But UK-US cooperation goes further than intelligence sharing. Although both allies had already signed up to the
North Atlantic Treaty – and thus NATO ’s Article Five – there was nevertheless concern that, should push come to shove (for example, in the
event of a general European war), one side of the Atlantic would not help the other. While the British were somewhat worried about the US
commitment, some mainland European allies questioned – in the event of nuclear escalation with the Russians – whether Washington really
would risk the sacrifice New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles for Amsterdam, Oslo or Paris. The US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, signed in
1958, was one step in solving that problem. Although it did not contain any formal declaration of solidarity, Washington and London
nevertheless agreed to the first step of a mutual defence pact that remains, paradoxically, even deeper than that provided by NATO. The
reason for this is because the treaty began the process of binding together the UK’s strategic nuclear forces with those of the US.

Of course, it is well-known that the British, Canadians and Americans came to work closely with one another during the Second World War to
generate a viable atomic bomb, first under the aegis of the British-led ‘Tube Alloys’ programme and later in the much larger American-led
‘Manhattan Project’. This resulted in the ‘Gadget’, which was detonated over the deserts of New Mexico with a mighty flash in 1945, ushering
in the ‘Atomic Age’ – possibly the defining moment of the twentieth century (and even, all time). After the war, however, and despite initially
agreeing with the UK to continue nuclear cooperation, the US sought a nuclear monopoly, shutting London (and Ottawa) out of bilateral nuclear
development through the McMahon Act of 1946. The British were furious, and set about pursuing a new atomic weapons project of their own,
using the knowledge gleaned by their scientists working on the Manhattan Project during the war. The UK succeeded in developing its own
‘Gadget’ in 1952, unleashing it off the Australian coast, thus becoming the world’s third nuclear power (Russia exploded its first device in 1949).
This was followed five years later by the successful test of a British hydrogen bomb.

In developing a full-scale nuclear capability, London’s real objective was not only the acquisition of the means to inflict massive and
unacceptable damage on any enemy. Additionally, the British were also seeking a geopolitical outcome: the UK understood that Europe was
becoming an increasingly contested space in a geopolitical context, not least as the Cold War took hold and intensified. London realised that
Russia’s growing power, augmented by its many satellite states, annexed during the Second World War, could only be ‘balanced’ by drawing
together the strength of the democracies on either side of the North Atlantic into one cohesive bloc. Moreover, the UK understood that by the
late 1950s, better means of delivery were needed for its own nuclear weapons: the Vulcans, Victors and Valiants – the Royal AirForce’s strategic
bombers – were already starting to become obsolete. Russia was starting to develop powerful new ballistic missiles with intercontinental reach;
and for Britain to develop an effective response by itself would be extremely costly. London looked to Washington for help.

But this would require even deeper UK-US nuclear collaboration. At first, however, the US sensed an opportunity to regain its nuclear
monopoly, at least within the West. The US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, wanted to render the UK dependent on his country’s own
capabilities: Washington therefore tried to force London into accepting a dual-use policy, i.e. that the US would retain a veto over Britain’s
capacity for deployment. The British, however, realised that this would diminish their influence, both in Washington, but particularly in relation
to their European allies, meaning they wanted to hold onto their own nuclear autonomy. The opportunity for a breakthrough came with the
Nassau Agreement in 1962, effectively the second step in UK-US mutual defence. After tough negotiations, and after a quiet stroll between the
British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and American President, John F. Kennedy, a deal was struck whereby the US would lease the UK its
own delivery system – Polaris missiles – which the British would cap with their own thermonuclear warheads. These would then be carried by a
new generation of Royal Navy nuclear submarines, powered by reactors modelled on American designs.

Apart from the enormous cost savings for the British, the ability to fire Polaris missiles was critical. Although any enemy with sufficiently

surveillance systems would still be able to detect the speed and trajectory of any
sophisticated air

missiles in the event of a nuclear exchange (meaning it might realise who was firing them), it would not be able to
readily determine whether the missiles were British or American in origin. That is to say, if
the UK was attacked by Russia and
London initiated a nuclear response , Moscow would not know whether it was being hit by the
UK or the US (or both). This forced the Russians – as well as others – to factor uncertainty into their own
nuclear warfighting and deterrence doctrines, making the cost of miscalculation ever
greater , and the British-American ability to deter thus even . In effect stronger , it ensured that the
Atlantic Alliance gained a material as well as an ideological tether, to keep the two sides together, even in the event of a European conflict in
which the North American side did not really want to become involved.

Today, while Polaris has been replaced by the even-more lethal Trident, the UK-US backed geopolitical constellation
known as the Atlantic Alliance is very much still alive . Of course, many other European countries continue to believe
that their political and economic links with Washington will ensure the Americans shall come to their aid in the event of any future hostilities,

and they may be right. The US knows that European security is vital , but only London has the capability to act as the final
insurance policy for other Europeans. In short, it – and only it – retains the physical capacity to ultimately oblige the US to become involved in
any general European conflict. And because of Britain’s close geographic proximity to mainland Europe and the fact that British geostrategy is
decidedly liberal – in other words, to prevent the continent falling under a universal tyrant – the UK’s intervention is practically guarenteed
should a surrounding great power make a bid for European hegemony.

So, due to the de-facto binding together of the British and American intelligence-gathering capabilities and nuclear deterrents, the enormous
material resources of the US (and Canada) will likely always be at the disposal of the UK. Conversely, as the US continues to ‘pivot’ or
‘rebalance’ to the Indo-Pacific, for similar reasons – albeit reversed – Washington will automatically acquire the means to compel London, and
by extension, other European capitals, into any conflict it may get drawn into in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, so
long as the UK and US
continue to cooperate with one another with intelligence gathering and sharing and nuclear
deterrence, the Atlantic Alliance will retain its strategic relevance , irrespective of its
geostrategic focus. If other European countries are serious about supporting the Atlantic Alliance, they would do well to increase their
military spending. This will help London and Washington should the international situation turn more volatile in the twenty-first century,

providing them with the means to continue to assert the Pax Atlantica and thus maintain a durable peace .
 OFF
Elections DA

Biden wins now – but it will be close --- battleground states key
Max Greenwood 8/26/2020, Reporter from the Hill citing polls and political analyst. 8-26-
2020. "Poll finds Biden leading in battle ground state, but race tightening". TheHill.
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/513734-poll-biden-leads-trump-by-3-points-in-six-
battleground-states
Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden is leading President Trump across six key
battleground states with less than three months to go before Election Day, according to a new
CNBC/Change Research poll released on Wednesday.

Biden holds a three-point lead overall in the critical states of Arizona, Florida, Michigan, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
Biden holds
a lead in all six states, but it is just one point in North Carolina, two points in Arizona and
three points in both Florida and Pennsylvania.
The former vice president has a five-point lead in Wisconsin, and a six-point lead in Michigan.

Biden trailed Trump by a single point in North Carolina in the CNBC/Change Research poll released earlier this
month, but now leads 48 percent to 47 percent.

Former President Barack Obama is the only Democrat to win he presidential race in North Carolina in recent years, doing so in 2008 before
losing in 2012.

In Florida, a state Trump cannot afford to lose, the president has narrowed the gap with Biden in the poll.
Biden led by six points earlier this month, but now has just a three-point edge.
In Arizona, a state no Democrat has won in the presidential race since 1996, Biden leads Trump 49 percent to 47 percent.

Trump won the presidency in 2016 by shocking Democrats with wins in Pennsylvania, Michigan
and Wisconsin. He was the first Republican to win he first two states since 1988, and the first to win Wisconsin since 1984.

is close in all three states , though the new polls showing a tighter contest in Pennsylvania
The race

and Wisconsin.
in Michigan, Biden leads 50 percent to 44 percent; in Pennsylvania he’s up 49 percent to 46
percent; and in Wisconsin, Biden leads 49 percent to 44 percent, gaining 2 points in his support since
earlier this month.

The poll was fielded in the days immediately following the Democratic National Convention last week and provides one of the first snapshots of
Biden’s post-convention support. Nationally, he received a slight bump, widening his lead over Trump to 8 points from 6 points earlier this
month.

Biden’s speech on the final night of the convention received generally positive reviews, according
to the poll, with 71 percent
of likely battleground state voters and 70 percent of likely national voters who watched it
reporting a positive reaction.
The poll shows some positive battleground state trends for Trump, however.
In the six battlegrounds, the number of voters who expressed serious concern about the ongoing coronavirus pandemic ticked downward by 4
points, while approval of Trump’s handling of the outbreak rose by 3 points .
His overall job approval in the battleground states, meanwhile, ticked up to 48 percent, a 2-point increase
from earlier this month.

The plan makes Trump look credible beyond the First Step ACT – that wins him the
election
Chung 19 – vice president for Criminal Justice Reform at American Progress
Ed, 6/7. “Do 2020 candidates care about criminal justice?”
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/06/07/2020-candidates-should-make-criminal-
justice-central-campaigns/1289640001/
Last month, criminal justice reform became an issue in the 2020 presidential elections in a manner befitting the Trump
era: through a series of tweets from the president on Memorial Day insulting his potential Democratic rivals.

He then
Trump first declared that anyone associated with the 1994 Crime Bill, the sweeping legislation known for exacerbating mass incarceration, was “unelectable.”

pronounced himself to be “responsible for criminal justice reform” because he signed the FIRST
STEP Act into law, even though some of the most ardent supporters of the federal sentencing and prison reform bill say the legislation is
but an incremental step .
Trump is, of course, no reformer. One can look at his actions before he became president when he publicly campaigned for the execution of the
wrongfully accused, and later convicted, Central Park Five. Or consider that his first Attorney General was Jeff Sessions, who rolled back virtually
every meaningful reform effort from the previous administration.

Candidates aren't talking about criminal justice

Rather, Trump is an opportunist who is taking advantage of the void left by the current crop of candidates who
have failed to discuss criminal justice reform on the campaign trail in a meaningful way . Senator Cory Booker of New
Jersey has been by far the most vocal about the need to reform the system, and Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota published an op-ed describing some of her policy ideas. Other candidates

have weighed in on single issues. But by and large, criminal justice reform has been cabined off to a question at the CNN
Town Halls about whether people who are currently incarcerated should have the right to vote (answer: they should).
The lack of engagement on this issue by 2020 candidates is shown starkly in an interactive piece that The Washington Post published in April.
The Post listed 15 broad topics — such as healthcare, economic inequality, and climate change along with criminal justice — and measured the
candidates’ share of words on social media posts about each of the topics. Of the 15 issue areas, 13 had at least two candidates devote a
double-digit percentage of their social media posts to the topic. The only two issues that did not meet this low threshold were infrastructure
and criminal justice.

These numbers likely have changed since April. But overall, those running for the highest office in the country are
underestimating the importance to the electorate of reforming the criminal justice
system . Just look at recent polling from the battleground state of Ohio which shows that 64% of Ohioans
overall — including 78% of Democrats and 68% of independents — believe that the criminal justice system needs significant
improvement. Moreover, 70% of Democrats and 60% of independents believe too many people are in prison, while only 24% and 26% respectively think there are too few or
about the right number or people incarcerated.
Against that backdrop it remains unclear why so few candidates are talking about criminal justice reform. Perhaps they don’t consider mass
incarceration to be a crisis, even though there are nearly 7 million people locked up in prisons and jails across the country or otherwise
supervised by the system. For context, that’s the size of Los Angeles and Houston combined.

Or maybe candidates think the criminal justice system grew “naturally” because more people committed crimes, but they do not realize that
national crime rates are near historic lows and the system’s expansion is the result of deliberate policy choices to criminalize more behavior and
to do it in a harsher fashion.

Criminal justice should be central for candidates

It could be that candidates don’t talk about criminal justice because they don’t see the
connection with other traditionally “major” policy areas, like the economy . But mass
incarceration has been a key driver of poverty that has led to depressed physical, mental, and
social outcomes especially for children, and especially African American children, growing up in distressed communities. Thus, criminal justice reform
can and should be considered an important tool for social mobility.
Perhaps candidates are listening to the wrong people — or at least defining relevant stakeholders too narrowly. The conventional approach has
been for politicians to consult mainly with judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement on public safety and criminal justice matters. But
candidates must recognize and learn from victims and survivors, people who have been incarcerated, and their families. The expertise of those
who have been impacted by the system must be valued as much as, if not more than, those who work to maintain it.

Criminal justice reform must be integral to the candidacy of anyone running for elected office
instead of merely a wedge for Trump to exploit. Candidates need to develop substantive policy
platforms and cast a vision for how they are going to address the crisis of mass incarceration. It’s an issue voters care about
and one for which candidates will be held accountable if they take it for granted.

Trump re-election triggers every catastrophic impact and makes damage irreversible
Starr 19 – professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton, Pulitzer Prize winner
Paul, May. “Trump’s Second Term.”
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/05/trump-2020-second-term/585994/
Three areas—climate
change, the risk of a renewed global arms race, and control of the Supreme Court
—illustrate the historic significance of the 2020 election. The first two problems will become much
harder to address as time goes on. The third one stands to remake our constitutional democracy
and undermine the capacity for future change.
In short, the biggest
difference between electing Trump in 2016 and reelecting Trump in 2020 would be
irreversibility . Climate policy is now the most obvious example. For a long time, even many of the people who
acknowledged the reality of climate change thought of it as a slow process that did not demand immediate action. But today, amid extreme

weather events and worsening scientific forecasts, the costs of our delay are clearly mounting , as are the
associated dangers. To have a chance at keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius—the
objective of the Paris climate agreement—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that by 2030, CO2 emissions must
drop some 45 percent from 2010 levels. Instead of declining, however, they are rising.
In his first term, Trump has announced plans to cancel existing climate reforms, such as higher fuel-efficiency standards and limits on emissions
from new coal-fired power plants, and he has pledged to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement. His reelection would put
off a national commitment to decarbonization until at least the second half of the 2020s, while
encouraging other countries to do nothing as well. And change that is delayed becomes more
economically and politically difficult. According to the Global Carbon Project, if decarbonization had begun globally in 2000, an
emissions reduction of about 2 percent a year would have been sufficient to stay below 2 degrees Celsius of warming. Now it will need to be
approximately 5 percent a year. If we wait another decade, it will be about 9 percent. In the United States, the economic
disruption
and popular resistance sure to arise from such an abrupt transition may be more than our political
system can bear. No one knows, moreover, when the world might hit irreversible tipping points
such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which would likely doom us to a catastrophic
sea-level rise.
The 2020 election will also
determine whether the U.S. continues on a course that all but guarantees
another kind of runaway global change—a stepped-up arms race, and with it a heightened
risk of nuclear accidents and nuclear war . Trump’s “America first” doctrine, attacks on
America’s alliances, and unilateral withdrawal from arms-control treaties have made the world
far more dangerous. After pulling the United States out of the Iran nuclear agreement (in so doing, badly damaging America’s
reputation as both an ally and a negotiating partner), Trump failed to secure from North Korea anything approaching the Iran deal’s terms,
leaving Kim Jong Un not only unchecked but with increased international standing. Many world leaders are hoping that
Trump’s presidency is a blip—that he will lose in 2020 , and that his successor will renew America’s commitments to
its allies and to the principles of multilateralism and nonproliferation. If he is reelected, however, several countries

may opt to pursue nuclear weapons , especially those in regions that have relied on
American security guarantees, such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

At stake is the global nonproliferation regime that the United States and other countries have maintained over the
past several decades to persuade nonnuclear powers to stay that way. That this regime has largely succeeded is a tribute to a combination of
tactics, including U.S. bilateral and alliance-based defense commitments to nonnuclear countries, punishments and incentives, and pledges by
the U.S. and Russia—as the world’s leading nuclear powers—to make dramatic cuts to their own arsenals.

In his first term, Trump has begun to undermine the nonproliferation regime and dismantle the remaining arms-
control treaties between Washington and Moscow. In October, he announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. While the Russian violations of the treaty that Trump cited
are inexcusable, he has made no effort to hold Russia to its obligations—to the contrary, by destroying the treaty, he has let Russia off the hook.
What’s more, he has displayed no interest in extending New START, which since 2011 has limited the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and
the United States. If the treaty is allowed to expire, 2021 will mark the first year since 1972 without a legally binding agreement in place to
control and reduce the deadliest arsenals ever created.

The prospect of a new nuclear arms race is suddenly very real. With the end of verifiable limits on American and
Russian nuclear weapons, both countries will lose the right to inspect each other’s arsenal, and will face greater uncertainty about each other’s
capabilities and intentions. Already, rhetoric has taken an ominous turn: After Trump suspended U.S. participation in the INF Treaty on February
2, Vladimir Putin quickly followed suit and promised a “symmetrical response” to new American weapons. Trump replied a few days later in his
State of the Union address, threatening to “outspend and out-innovate all others by far” in weapons development.

The treaties signed by the United States and Russia beginning in the 1980s have resulted in the elimination of nearly 90 percent of their nuclear
weapons; the end of the Cold War seemed to confirm that those weapons had limited military utility. Now—as the U.S. and Russia abandon
their commitment to arms control, and Trump’s “America first” approach causes countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia to question the
durability of U.S. security guarantees—the stage is being set for more states to go nuclear and for the U.S. and Russia to ramp up weapons
development. This breathtaking historical reversal would, like global warming, likely feed on itself, becoming more and more difficult to undo.

Finally, a
second term for Trump would entrench changes at home, perhaps the most durable of
which involves the Supreme Court. With a full eight years, he would probably have the opportunity to replace two more
justices: Ruth Bader Ginsburg will be 87 at the beginning of the next presidential term, and Stephen Breyer will be 82. Whether you regard the
prospect of four Trump-appointed justices as a good or a bad thing will depend on your politics and preferences—but there is no denying that
the impact on the nation’s highest court would be momentous.

Not since Richard Nixon has a president named four new Supreme Court justices, and not since Franklin D. Roosevelt has one had the
opportunity to alter the Court’s ideological balance so decisively. In Nixon’s time, conservatives did not approach court vacancies with a clear
conception of their judicial objectives or with carefully vetted candidates; both Nixon and Gerald Ford appointed justices who ended up on the
Court’s liberal wing. Since then, however, the conservative movement has built a formidable legal network designed to ensure that future
judicial vacancies would not be squandered.

The justices nominated by recent Republican presidents reflect this shift. But because the Court’s conservative majorities have remained slim, a
series of Republican appointees—Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and most recently John Roberts—have, by occasionally breaking
ranks, held the Court back from a full-scale reversal of liberal principles and precedents. With a 7–2 rather than a 5–4 majority, however, the
Court’s conservatives could no longer be checked by a lone swing vote.

Much of the public discussion about the Court’s future focuses on Roe v. Wadeand other decisions expanding rights, protecting free speech, or
mandating separation of Church and state. Much less public attention
has been paid to conservative activists’
interest in reversing precedents that since the New Deal era have enabled the federal
government to regulate labor and the economy. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, conservative justices regularly
struck down laws and regulations such as limits on work hours. Only in 1937, after ruling major New Deal programs unconstitutional, did the
Court uphold a state minimum-wage law. In the decades that followed, the
Court invoked the Constitution’s commerce
clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, as the basis for upholding laws regulating virtually any
activity affecting the economy. A great deal of federal law, from labor standards to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to health and environmental regulation, rests on that foundation.

But the Court’s conservative majority has recently been chipping away at the expansive
interpretation of the commerce clause, and some jurists on the right want to return to the pre-1937
era, thereby sharply limiting the government’s regulatory powers . In 2012, the Court’s five conservative justices held
that the Affordable Care Act’s penalty for failing to obtain insurance—the so-called individual mandate—was not justified by the commerce
clause. In a sweeping dissent from the majority’s opinion, four of those justices voted to strike down the entire ACA for that reason. The law
survived only because the fifth conservative, Chief Justice Roberts, held that the mandate was a constitutional exercise of the government’s
taxing power.

If the Court had included seven conservative justices in 2012, it would almost certainly have declared the ACA null and void. This is the fate
awaiting much existing social and economic legislation and regulation if Trump is reelected. And that’s to say nothing of future legislation such
as measures to limit climate change, which might well be struck down by a Court adhering to an originalist interpretation of our 18th-century
Constitution.

Democracy is always a gamble, but ordinarily the stakes involve short-term wins and losses.
Much more hangs in the balance next year.

With a second term, Trump’s presidency would go from an aberration to a turning point in
American history . But it would not usher in an era marked by stability . The effects of
climate change and the risks associated with another nuclear arms race are bound to be
convulsive . And Trump’s reelection would leave the country contending with both dangers under
the worst possible conditions, deeply alienated from friends abroad and deeply divided at
home. The Supreme Court, furthermore, would be far out of line with public opinion and at the center of political conflict, much as the Court
was in the 1930s before it relented on the key policies of the New Deal.
 OFF
Agent Counterplan

The Supreme Court of the United States should rule in the next available test case that
restrictions prosecutions predicated on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance on the
grounds that evidence whose underlying application is kept secret from security-
cleared defense counsel constitutes an unconstitutional intrusion on the 4 th
Amendment right to privacy.

The CP’s expansive understanding of what constitutes an ‘unlawful intrusion’ is key to

revitalize the 4th Amendment for the 21st Century—The Court’s current approach is
much too narrow
Ducich 18, Stefan. Associate, Cybersecurity & Privacy Practice Group - Willkie Farr & Gallagher
LLP. "These Walls Can Talk: Securing Digital Privacy in the Smart Home under the Fourth
Amendment." Duke Law & Technology Review, 16, 2017-2018, p. I-299. HeinOnline.
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is again at a junction where relatively new, but pervasive, technologies demand a course-correction. The
business model of smart devices amounts to private surveillance, and society has accepted this to the extent that it improves services through
interconnectivity.151 Yet, these devices have a range of intelligence, and each smart object represents a vector for remote access by black hat
hackers and government agents alike.1 55 Without
an affirmative recognition by the Court that the data-rich
smart home is secured by the Fourth Amendment, privacy rights in the United States are
vulnerable to digital abuses by the state. As the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
suggests, the privacy standard guaranteed by the Amendment must focus on unlawful
intrusion , not the mechanism by which the intrusion is or may be perfected.1 56 The method of
this protection has evolved from an in rem focus on trespass, to the in personam reasonable
expectation of privacy, and back to a hybrid approach defined by the physicality of the
intrusion. The trespass approach re-instituted in Jones, however, fails to account for the
potentially remote nature of government incursions at issue with the loT and consequently, "is
ill-suited to the digital age . 15 The Fourth Amendment uses the language and concepts of
property law to articulate the scope of the right protected, and it secures that right to privacy
through exclusion from certain enumerated objects. The Court, therefore, must reject the
overly-narrow approach of Jones in favor of a right to exclude that better accounts for
the digital capabilities of twenty-first century surveillance. Moreover, doing so will have the
added benefit of bolstering the reasonable expectation of digital privacy by presuming an
objective unreasonableness in any warrantless penetration by the state into the smart home.
Digital privacy is ripe for the Court's attention, and the Court should use this opportunity to
"define anew . . . the extent of such protection" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment in the
age of the IoT.158
Judicial reassertion of independence in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution is
key to rule of law, SOP, and Constitutional rights
Litman 19 – Law Prof at UMich
Leah Litman, Assistant professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School, Federal
Officials Should Be Accountable for Their Wrongdoing, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/government-accountability-needs-come-
courts/598477/

Other justices over the centuries have agreed . In 1971, Justice John Marshall Harlan explained why the
federal courts, in particular, were uniquely suited to remedy constitutional wrongs by executive
officers: “It would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary is powerless to
vindicate social policies which, by virtue in their inclusion in the
accord a damages remedy to

Constitution , are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the

popular will.”

Constitution’s system of separated powers gave the federal courts

Harlan understood that the

an important role to play in righting government wrongs, including relative to other

branches of the federal government. The Constitution sought to restrain the impulses of the majority—
impulses that are often
reflected in the branches that are most subject to majority will, and particularly
the presidency. The Constitution therefore gave to the federal courts , the branch of government that is less
subject to majority will, the power to restrain the excesses of the majority when those excesses hurt people.

But in the past few decades, the Court’s understanding of the judicial power has
changed . Instead of recognizing that federal courts have the power to remedy
constitutional wrongs committed by rogue executive officers, the Court has come to
believe that it is up to Congress or the executive branch to decide whether rogue executive
officers will ever be accountable to people they harm. The Court has reasoned that in the absence
of a statute authorizing victims to sue the officers who wronged them, the courts lack the power to
afford the victims any relief.

These more recent decisions fail to appreciate the special role of the courts within the
system of separated powers that Harlan, Marshall, and Story recognized are part of the Constitution. The
Constitution is an instrument that restrains the popular will and majoritarian impulses. But as an institution,
Congress is supposed to represent the popular will, at least relative to the federal courts. It is not up to Congress,
and it should not be up to Congress , whether constitutional guarantees are
enforceable . That falls to the federal courts.
The expansion of officials’ immunity is significant not just because of what it says about
America’s constitutional structure , but because of its effect on underlying
constitutional rights such as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and, consequently, the
people whose lives are shaped by these rights. The Fourth Amendment prevents unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the Fifth Amendment prevents government officials from depriving persons of life or liberty
without due process of law—or, at least, they are supposed to prevent those things. But if there are
no remedies for violations of constitutional rights , then it’s not clear that there are
constitutional rights either.

Key to global democracy—Lynchpin of the world order

Patton 19 – Resident Fellow at Stanford, quoting Larry Diamond, Prof. of Poli Sci-Stanford, and
others
Jill Patton, citing Diamond and other scholars, An Existential Moment for Democracy? As
American leadership falters, scholars say, autocrats are on the rise., December 2019,
https://stanfordmag.org/contents/an-existential-moment-for-democracy

Don’t get too comfortable, warns Stanford political scientist Larry Diamond, ’73, MA ’78, PhD ’80. In his new book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy
from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, Diamond describes how liberty
is under assault in the
United States and abroad, following more than a decade in which democracies globally have
weakened or failed. And he asserts that without dramatic and immediate efforts to arrest the trend,
democracy as a system of government is in peril.
“Not all democracies do a good job of defending liberty, but all the political systems that protect liberty are democracies,” writes Diamond, a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, who has studied and supported the world’s
democracies for 45 years as a scholar and an adviser to civic leaders, dissidents, human rights advocates and transition teams in 70 countries.
“What saves citizens from the knock on the door in the dead of night, from the risk of being silenced or removed, is a
constitution, a robust body of laws, an independent judiciary to enforce them, and a culture that insists
on free elections, human rights, and human dignity.”
Glance around the world and you’ll see the danger signs: A prime minister in Great Britain trying to suspend
Parliament. Political polarization sweeping South Korea and Israel. An anti-immigrant, pro-Russian presidential candidate gaining popularity in
France, and ultranationalism reemerging in Germany. An American president getting cozy with dictators. And democratic norms crumbling from
Zambia to the Philippines.

As recently as 2006, sixty-two percent of all nations were democracies—either in basic form, with functional, free elections, or the more
complex variety (what Diamond refers to as liberal democracies), characterized by a broad commitment to individual rights, laws applied
equally to all, protections for minority groups and vigorous checks on government power. By 2017, the proportion had dropped to 51 percent.
“We are looking at a situation, at best, of tremendous danger and fragility,” Diamond says. He recalls the
1930s , when fascism took root across the world. “It’s not that yet, but if we allow complacency
to prevail in our thinking and our political postures, that’s where we could wind up.”

In the past, America has played a critical role on the global stage as a model for developing
democracies , a crusader for human rights and a bulwark against the spread of
authoritarian regimes . Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright once called America “the indispensable nation” for its moral
leadership. But unlike ever before , scholars say, America’s commitment to democracy is

flagging . At the same time, China and Russia are stepping vigorously into the void to
promote an entirely different approach —one featuring strong central leaders hostile to
diversity and dissent . The risk , Diamond says, is a century defined by the rise of the autocrat .
THE WINDS OF FREEDOM

When did American democracy begin? Some argue it was 1776, when the colonies declared independence from England.
Others say 1789, the year the new government adopted its constitution. It could have been 1865, with the abolition of slavery, or 1920, with
women’s suffrage. Diamond contends it was 1965, when Congress passed the Voting Rights Act and presidential
elections could plausibly be considered “free and fair.”

The American experiment set off waves of democratic expansion and contraction. Western Europe
rounded out the first wave during the 1800s, before Nazi Germany and imperial Japan brought about a nadir in the 1930s. Democracy
expanded again in the mid-20th century, returning to Western Europe, growing in Latin America, and taking hold in Japan and Turkey. A

sustained upswing came in the mid-1970s with the democratization of Portugal, Spain and Greece, and more growth in
Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s. The third boom peaked in the mid-2000s, by which time democracy
had become the dominant system in every part of the world except the Middle East.

“Wehave experienced an absolute transformation of our world’s polities in the direction of

more democratic processes over the last 50 to 75 years,” says Jeremy Weinstein, a political science professor and
director of the Stanford global studies division. “And recessions always seem to follow these transformations. We’ve got to remember that
people are better off and more free than they’ve ever been in human history.”
And yet, Weinstein says, Diamond is “right to raise the alarm” about democracy’s recent decline—it
poses great risks to the world order .

“We have had a system of international governance since World War II that reflects the
ascendance of a set of commitments to individual rights and protections rooted in the U.N. system,
emerging over time because the United States—full of its imperfections—has been a
more benevolent power internationally than most empires historically,” says Weinstein,
who served as deputy to the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2013 to 2015.

“A world without U.S. leadership and without an international architecture that’s rooted in
things like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a very different universe , and not one I’m sure most
people would want to live in.”
WHY POPULISTS ARE SO POPULAR

Everywhere Diamond looks, momentum seems to be gathering around authoritarian populists :

charismatic leaders who capitalize on discontent, sow distrust in the system and then consolidate power. Even though most people living in a
democratic system claim to prefer it, many believe their governments are not working for them, which opens the door for populists to emerge.

Globalization may be partly to blame:In an increasingly interconnected world, governing has gotten trickier. “If you have a constant flow of
capital, people and trade goods, it’s harder to figure out what to do in your own country,” says political science professor Anna Grzymala-Busse,
who directs the Global Populisms Project at the Freeman Spogli Institute. The increasing interdependence of the world’s economies also limits
the impact of any one nation’s policies. As mainstream politicians struggle to solve “national” problems that are, in actuality, intertwined with
the actions and economies of other countries, voters can start to view them as inept.

Even though most people living in a democratic system claim to prefer it, many believe their governments are not working for them, which
opens the door for populists to emerge.

Globalization has stoked nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment among citizens who fear not only the economic but also the cultural
changes that can accompany such shifts. There again, Grzymala-Busse says, populists have stepped in, defining “the people” of a country
narrowly and subjugating minority interests. “Populist movements have this very corrosive impact on democracy,” she says.

Former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez was a case in point. He first campaigned on the idea of bringing power to the people and, in his
early years, enabled by $100-per-barrel oil prices that filled the Venezuelan treasury, he introduced reforms that improved living conditions for
much of the country’s populace. Those programs led to political successes that allowed him to extend his power. During his 14 years as
president, from 1999 to 2013, Chavez rewrote the constitution, ended presidential term limits, fired the judiciary, and usurped power over
every branch of government and the military. Once considered a stable democracy, Venezuela has been reclassified as an authori-tarian
regime, a condition that remains in effect under President Nicolás Maduro. Meanwhile, populist movements have advanced in Turkey, Bolivia,
Hungary and Poland.

“When you look at all this stuff, on balance,” Diamond says, “it’s not a period of good, uplifting, edifying news about democracy in the world.”

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: DEATH BY 1,000 CUTS?

In the United States, political rights and civil liberties have declined gradually over the past eight years, according to Freedom House, a U.S.-
based watchdog organization that monitors the practice of democracy globally.

“The great challenges facing U.S. democracy did not commence with the inauguration of President Donald Trump,” the organization’s
president, Mike Abramowitz, observes in the 2019 Freedom in the World report. “Intensifying political polarization, declining economic
mobility, the outside influence of special interests, and the diminished influence of fact-based reporting in favor of bellicose partisan media
were all problems afflicting the health of American democracy well before 2017.” He notes that the George W. Bush administration infringed on
individual rights with its surveillance programs that collected people’s personal data in bulk, and he characterized the Obama administration’s
crackdown on press leaks

as “overzealous.”

But, Abramowitz says, “there remains little question that President Trump exerts an influence on American politics that is straining our core
values and testing the stability of our constitutional system. No president in living memory has shown less respect for its tenets, norms and
principles.” Albright has called Trump “the first anti-democratic president in modern U.S. history.”

Some 86 percent of American voters think democracy is a good or very good system, and 78 percent say democracy is always “preferable to any
other kind of government,” according to a 2017 survey by the nonpartisan Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. But according to a 2019 poll co-
led by Diamond, only 30 percent believe American democracy works well. And when Democracy Fund researchers probed further, they found
that 24 percent of Americans feel positively about the idea of “a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections.”
Eighteen percent support the idea of military rule.

Those attitudes pair badly with America’s political polarization and a hollowing out of the civic sector. “Basically, a lot of the former associations
or civic networks that maintained ties between citizens and elected officials have eroded,” says Didi Kuo, associate director for research at
Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. She points to shrinking participation in volunteer organizations and
churches, the disintegration of labor unions, the decline of local and state media, and the weakening of local and state party organizations.

“The way that affects people’s perceptions is that [they believe] there’s not much they can do about political outcomes around them,” Kuo
says. The result can be paralysis, or at least complacency.

What if the slide away from democracy continues? What if America weren’t a democracy?
The World Justice Project, a nongovernmental organization that assesses the rule of law in 126 countries, is technically agnostic about the
political system a country uses. Instead, it studies whether a government is accountable, just and transparent, and whether it offers its citizens
effective, accessible dispute resolution. William Neukom, LLB ’67, WJP’s founder and CEO, observes that after having collected 10 years of data,
researchers can say that liberal constitutional democracies are the most likely to have a robust rule of law.

“Liberal democracy is great—and it’s complicated,” Neukom says. When the organization’s researchers dive into their country-by-country
analyses, each of which includes a thousand extended in-home interviews, they’re better able to understand why Denmark has the best rule of
law in the world, Venezuela is at the bottom, and the United States ranks 20th. In the interviews, citizens describe experiences they’ve had with
police officers, government officials and the courts, and the impact of those experiences on their lives. WJP’s 2019 Rule of Law Index shows
middling to low scores for the United States on legislative corruption, labor rights, regulatory delays and discrimination (broadly speaking and in
the courts).

What worries many scholars is that America’s commitment to its ideals seems to be
weakening just as the democratic order is being threatened by an assertive and
influential global superpower—China. “We’re no longer in this unipolar moment where the U.S. is ascendant, its
norms and values are being broadcast, and it has this attractive, influential role,” Weinstein says. “ There’s competition for that

mantle. That’s really new .”

The turning point was China’s 2013 presidential election.

What worries many scholars is that America’s commitment to its ideals seems to be weakening just as the democratic order is being threatened
by an assertive and influential global superpower—China.

“Xi
Jinping’s presidency represents a break with previous Chinese leaders toward the
overpromotion of the China model of authoritarian state capitalism , with a heavy
emphasis on authoritarian as a better model ,” Diamond says. It also signals a break from the
peaceful transfer of power—the Chinese legislature amended its constitution last year to eliminate term limits for the presidency.
China’s menace comes in part from its economic strength. Authoritarian leaders in, say, Uganda or Cambodia, can point to the success of
China’s model for economic development as an excuse to sacrifice civil liberties in their quest to build a strong state.

“Of course, there’s no evidence that that kind of repression”—of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang or protesters in Hong Kong—“was necessary for
China’s economic growth,” Diamond says. “There’s lots of evidence that the democracies of Africa are growing more rapidly than the
dictatorships of Africa, but none of that matters. The leaders are looking for something to legitimize their concentration of power and their
crackdown on opposition and dissent.”

Russian mischief is also chipping away at the strength of Western democracies. The German Marshall Fund, a U.S. think tank, has tracked 420
instances of Russian interference—through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, political subversion, economic coercion and malign finance
(such as money laundering)—in 43 countries since 2000. More than 50 of those campaigns targeted the United States, among them the effort
to undermine the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Meanwhile, Diamond notes, Russian trolls and bots were tweeting pro-Brexit messages from
thousands of fake accounts.

But Diamond’s gaze is primarily trained on China. “There is no problem in international affairs—other than climate change, and this is not
irrelevant to climate change—that I worry about more than the U.S.-China relationship,” he says. He recommends a U.S. posture of
“constructive vigilance” that includes cooperation on climate change and humanitarian crises, respect for the Chinese people, assertive defense
against intellectual property theft and “careful restraint so we don’t stumble into a military conflict.”

GETTING PEOPLE TALKING

"Living through the Vietnam

and Watergate era taught me two lifelong lessons,” Diamond writes. “That
political polarization and intolerance could prove poisonous to democracy, and that the
instruments of democracy—elections, the media, the congress, the courts —could restore its health .”
One way to improve democracy anywhere would be to engage citizens in deliberating with one another more extensively before elections.
James Fishkin, a professor of communication and director of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, has used a process called deliberative
polling 108 times in 28 countries since 1994 as a way to help governments find democratic solutions to controversial issues. The method
convenes a representative, randomly selected group of constituents who prepare discussions using the same set of facts reviewed by a range of
policy experts. In the end, a confidential questionnaire gathers their opinions.

“Right now, democracy is under threat because it’s not plausibly connected to the will of the people,” Fishkin says. Deliberative polling seeks to
“create good conditions for the people to decide what they really want in an evidence-based and reason-based way that is weighing competing
alternatives.” Key to the method is breaking out into small “deliberating microcosms,” he adds. “Once people feel their voice matters, they’ll do
all the hard work to think through the complexities of the issues.”

Most recently, Fishkin and Diamond paired up on America in One Room, a deliberative poll hosted in Dallas in September. The event gathered
526 registered U.S. voters to consider together five topics at issue in the 2020 presidential election: health care, immigration, the environment,
the economy and foreign policy. After spending four days together in small-group discussions, participants didn’t report changing their minds all
that much, but they said they had a better understanding of why others felt the way they did.

And yet, before-and-after surveys showed the conversations had a moderating influence on voters on certain issues. “Democratic support
receded for a $15 federal minimum wage and for ‘Medicare for all,’ ” the New York Times reported in its coverage of the event. “Republican
support grew for rejoining the Paris climate agreement and for protecting from deportation immigrants brought to the United States as
children.” Plus the gathering appeared to improve enthusiasm for democracy—at the end of the four days, the proportion of participants who
said they believe American democracy works well doubled, to 60 percent.

Another way to improve the character of America’s democracy, says Diamond, is ranked-choice voting, an approach being explored by several
states that encourages moderation, coalition building and civility in politics. Instead of choosing one candidate, voters rank contenders in order
of preference. If no one wins a majority, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is cut, and those votes are redistributed among the
remaining contenders. Eventually, a majority winner emerges. The process creates incentives for politicians to appeal to broader
constituencies, lessens the power of extremists, and opens up the field for third-party candidates. “I think if you change the incentive
structure,” Diamond says, “you will gradually change the politics.”

His other recommendations run the gamut, from rooting out gerrymandering and expand-ing voting rights to retiring the Electoral College. He
also suggests reforming campaign finance and lobbying, and fixing congressional rules that gum up representatives’ ability to work together.

A CLOUDY FUTURE AND AN OPPORTUNITY

Ian Morris, a Stanford classics professor, a historian and an archaeologist, says one of the most basic assumptions underlying how people
organize themselves is whether we believe that people are all more or less the same or fundamentally different. The first assumption favors
democracy; the second, hierarchy. The notion that some people are inherently superior, more godlike and, thus, rightly more powerful allowed
monarchs, despots and craven emperors to subjugate people for most of the past 10,000 years, save for a limited democratic experiment in
Greece 2,500 years ago and modern democracies of the past 200 years.

In other words, as systems of government go, democracy is an outlier. In fact, Morris predicts the end of democracy—perhaps in this century.
He envisions its replacement by a ruling class of financially savvy, meritocratic technocrats. “Is it reasonable to think that the 19th- and 20th-
century model of democracy is still going to be the most efficient and effective way of running a community 100 years from now?”

Down the line, relatively soon, Morris expects we’ll think it’s “crazy” to assume we might know better than our phones do. The machines will be
the “godlike kings” we submit to. “Democracy and decision-making are going to look wildly different even within my lifetime,” Morris says.

Still, the sun hasn’t set on the era of free will. And if Diamond tilts his head at the right angle, he can imagine a silver lining among the gathering
storm clouds: We have a chance to see what the world is like without U.S. leadership, and that may inspire a call to action.

“Democracies are not gifts or miracles ,” he writes. “They are painstakingly built forms of government,
and none of them are invincible if citizens succumb to cynicism and complacency in perilous times.”
 OFF
Surveillance capitalism feeds on human experience and behavioral data – the aff’s
attempt to maintain surveillance and make it more effective modernizes Marxism
while leaving us singing in our chains of classism
Zuboff 19, Shoshana Zuboff is an American author and scholar. She is the author of the books
In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power and The Support Economy:
Why Corporations Are Failing Individuals and the Next Episode of Capitalism, co-authored with
James, “The Age of Surveillance Captialism”, Hachette Book Group, January 2019,
Maxminhttps://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/shoshana-zuboff/the-age-of-surveillance-
capitalism/9781610395694/ //JK
Surveillance capitalism unilaterally claims human experience as free raw material for translation
into behavioral data. Although some of these data are applied to product or service improvement, the rest are declared as a proprietary behavioral
surplus, fed into advanced manufacturing processes known as “machine intelligence,” and fabricated into prediction products that anticipate what you will do now,
soon, and later. Finally, these prediction products are traded in a new kind of marketplace for behavioral predictions that I call behavioral futures markets.

Surveillance capitalists have grown immensely wealthy from these trading operations, for many
companies are eager to lay bets on our future behavior. As we shall see in the coming chapters, the competitive dynamics of
these new markets drive surveillance capitalists to acquire ever-more-predictive sources
of behavioral surplus: our voices, personalities, and emotions. Eventually, surveillance
capitalists discovered that the most-predictive behavioral data come from intervening in the
state of play in order to nudge, coax, tune, and herd behavior toward profitable outcomes . Competitive
pressures produced this shift, in which automated machine processes not only know our behavior but also shape our behavior at scale. With this

reorientation from knowledge to power, it is no longer enough to automate information flows

about us; the goal now is to automate us. In this phase of surveillance capitalism’s evolution, the means of
production are subordinated to an increasingly complex and comprehensive “means of
behavioral modification.” In this way, surveillance capitalism births a new species of power that
I call instrumentarianism . Instrumentarian power knows and shapes human behavior toward others’ ends. Instead of armaments and armies,
it works its will through the automated medium of an increasingly ubiquitous computational
architecture of “smart” networked devices, things, and spaces. In the coming chapters we will follow the growth and
dissemination of these operations and the instrumentarian power that sustains them. Indeed, it has become difficult to escape this

bold market project, whose tentacles reach from the gentle herding of innocent Pokémon Go players to eat, drink, and purchase in
the restaurants, bars, fast-food joints, and shops that pay to play in its behavioral futures markets to the ruthless expropriation of surplus from Facebook profiles for
the purposes of shaping individual behavior, whether it’s buying pimple cream at 5:45 P.M. on Friday, clicking “yes” on an offer of new running shoes as the

Just as industrial capitalism was driven

endorphins race through your brain after your long Sunday morning run, or voting next week.

to the continuous intensification of the means of production, so surveillance capitalists and

their market players are now locked into the continuous intensification of the means of
behavioral modification and the gathering might of instrumentarian power . Surveillance
capitalism runs contrary to the early digital dream, consigning the Aware Home to ancient history. Instead, it strips away the
illusion that the networked form has some kind of indigenous moral content, that being “connected”

is somehow intrinsically pro-social, innately inclusive, or naturally tending toward the

democratization of knowledge . Digital connection is now a means to others’ commercial ends. At its core, surveillance
capitalism is parasitic and self-referential. It revives Karl Marx’s old image of capitalism as
a vampire that feeds on labor, but with an unexpected turn. Instead of labor, surveillance
capitalism feeds on every aspect of every human’s experience. Google invented and perfected surveillance capitalism in
much the same way that a century ago General Motors invented and perfected managerial capitalism. Google was the pioneer of surveillance capitalism in thought
and practice, the deep pocket for research and development, and the trailblazer in experimentation and implementation, but it is no longer the only actor on this

path. Surveillance capitalism quickly spread to Facebook and later to Microsoft. Evidence suggests that Amazon has
veered in this direction, and it is a constant challenge to Apple, both as an external threat and as a source of internal debate and conflict. As the pioneer of

surveillance capitalism, Google launched an unprecedented market operation into the unmapped spaces

of the internet, where it faced few impediments from law or competitors, like an invasive
species in a landscape free of natural predators. Its leaders drove the systemic coherence of
their businesses at a breakneck pace that neither public institutions nor individuals could follow .
Google also benefited from historical events when a national security apparatus galvanized by the attacks of 9/11 was inclined to nurture, mimic, shelter, and

Surveillance capitalists
appropriate surveillance capitalism’s emergent capabilities for the sake of total knowledge and its promise of certainty.

quickly realized that they could do anything they wanted, and they did. They dressed in the
fashions of advocacy and emancipation, appealing to and exploiting contemporary anxieties,
while the real action was hidden offstage. Theirs was an invisibility cloak woven in equal measure to the rhetoric of the empowering
web, the ability to move swiftly, the confidence of vast revenue streams, and the wild, undefended nature of the territory they would conquer and claim. They were
protected by the inherent illegibility of the automated processes that they rule, the ignorance that these processes breed, and the sense of inevitability that they

Surveillance capitalism is no longer confined to the competitive dramas of the large

foster.

internet companies, where behavioral futures markets were first aimed at online advertising.
Its mechanisms and economic imperatives have become the default model for most internet-
based businesses. Eventually, competitive pressure drove expansion into the offline world, where the same foundational mechanisms that expropriate
your online browsing, likes, and clicks are trained on your run in the park, breakfast conversation, or hunt for a parking space. Today’s prediction products are
traded in behavioral futures markets that extend beyond targeted online ads to many other sectors, including insurance, retail, finance, and an ever-widening range
of goods and services companies determined to participate in these new and profitable markets. Whether it’s a “smart” home device, what the insurance
companies call “behavioral underwriting,” or any one of thousands of other transactions, we now pay for our own domination. Surveillance capitalism’s

products and services are not the objects of a value exchange . They do not establish constructive producer-consumer
reciprocities. Instead, they are the “hooks” that lure users into their extractive operations in which

our personal experiences are scraped and packaged as the means to others’ ends. We are not
surveillance capitalism’s “customers.” Although the saying tells us “If it’s free, then you are the product,” that is also incorrect. We are the sources of

surveillance capitalism’s crucial surplus : the objects of a technologically advanced and

increasingly inescapable raw-material-extraction operation. Surveillance capitalism’s actual
customers are the enterprises that trade in its markets for future behavior . This logic turns ordinary life into
the daily renewal of a twenty-first-century Faustian compact. “ Faustian” because it is nearly impossible to tear ourselves

away, despite the fact that what we must give in return will destroy life as we have known it .
Consider that the internet has become essential for social participation, that the internet is now saturated with commerce, and

that commerce is now subordinated to surveillance capitalism. Our dependency is at the heart
of the commercial surveillance project, in which our felt needs for effective life vie against the
inclination to resist its bold incursions. This conflict produces a psychic numbing that inures us to the realities of being tracked, parsed,
mined, and modified. It disposes us to rationalize the situation in resigned cynicism, create excuses that operate like defense mechanisms (“I have nothing to hide”),

surveillance capitalism
or find other ways to stick our heads in the sand, choosing ignorance out of frustration and helplessness. 12 In this way,

imposes a fundamentally illegitimate choice that twenty-first-century individuals should not

have to make, and its normalization leaves us singing in our chains . 13 Surveillance capitalism operates through
unprecedented asymmetries in knowledge and the power that accrues to knowledge. Surveillance capitalists know everything about us, whereas their operations
are designed to be unknowable to us. They accumulate vast domains of new knowledge from us, but not for us.
They predict our futures for the sake of others’ gain, not ours. As long as surveillance capitalism
and its behavioral futures markets are allowed to thrive, ownership of the new means of
behavioral modification eclipses ownership of the means of production as the fountainhead of
capitalist wealth and power in the twenty-first century. These facts and their consequences for our individual lives, our
societies, our democracies, and our emerging information civilization are examined in detail in the coming chapters. The evidence and reasoning

employed here suggest that surveillance capitalism is a rogue force driven by novel economic
imperatives that disregard social norms and nullify the elemental rights associated with
individual autonomy that are essential to the very possibility of a democratic society . Just as industrial
civilization flourished at the expense of nature and now threatens to cost us the Earth, an information civilization shaped by surveillance capitalism

and its new instrumentarian power will thrive at the expense of human nature and will
threaten to cost us our humanity. The industrial legacy of climate chaos fills us with dismay,
remorse, and fear. As surveillance capitalism becomes the dominant form of information
capitalism in our time, what fresh legacy of damage and regret will be mourned by future
generations? By the time you read these words, the reach of this new form will have grown as more sectors, firms, startups, app developers, and investors
mobilize around this one plausible version of information capitalism. This mobilization and the resistance it engenders will

define a key battleground upon which the possibility of a human future at the new frontier of
power will be contested.

Capitalism causes inevitable crises, inequality, and dehumanization—the alternative is

a class-based critique of the system—pedagogical spaces are the crucial staging
ground for keeping socialism on the horizon
McLaren, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof,
and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘4
(Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,”
Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)
For well over two decades we have witnessed the jubilant liberal and conservative pronouncements of the demise of socialism. Concomitantly,
history's presumed failure to defang existing capitalist relations has been read by many self-identified
‘radicals’ as an advertisement for capitalism's inevitability. As a result, the chorus refrain ‘There Is No
Alternative’, sung by liberals and conservatives, has been buttressed by the symphony of post-Marxist
voices recommending that we give socialism a decent burial and move on. Within this context, to speak of the
promise of Marx and socialism may appear anachronistic, even naïve, especially since the post-al intellectual vanguard has presumably
demonstrated the folly of doing so. Yet we stubbornly believe that the chants of T.I.N.A. must be combated for they offer as a fait accompli,

should refuse to accept —namely the triumph of capitalism and its

something which progressive Leftists

political bedfellow neo-liberalism, which have worked together to naturalize suffering, undermine
collective struggle, and obliterate hope. We concur with Amin (1998), who claims that such chants must be
defied and revealed as absurd and criminal, and who puts the challenge we face in no uncertain terms: humanity may
let itself be led by capitalism's logic to a fate of collective suicide or it may pave the way for
an alternative humanist project of global socialism. The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his
original critique of capitalism are present and flourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that
exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx's day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global
capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world
increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who languish in dehumanizing
conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a
rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly
equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed
the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8
billion people—almost half of the world's
population—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as
250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-
employed. These are the concrete realities of our time—realities that require a vigorous class analysis ,
an unrelenting critique of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what
Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by
the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along
with Lenin's corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately
needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of
Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification;
nonetheless Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held
true to this day. Marx's enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While
capitalism's cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx's description of capitalism as the sorcerer's dark power is even
more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather
than jettisoning Marx, decentering the
role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage
Marx's oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and ,
most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin's call for a
collective socialist vision necessitates, as we have argued, moving beyond the particularism and liberal
pluralism that informs the ‘politics of difference.’ It also requires challenging the questionable

assumptions that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, pedagogy
and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent understanding of the

systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy
approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx's notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material
interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory , for the manner in which we choose to

interpret and explore the social world, the concepts and frameworks we use to express our sociopolitical

understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational
practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class
struggle as the basis for political transformation implies something quite different than constructing a sense of
political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare's assertion that a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence
of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41). The task for progressives today is to
seize the moment and plant the seeds for a political agenda that is grounded in historical
possibilities and informed by a vision committed to overcoming exploitative conditions. These seeds, we would argue, must be
derived from the tree of radical political economy. For the vast majority of people today—people of all ‘racial
classifications or identities, all genders and sexual orientations’—the common frame of
reference arcing across ‘difference’, the ‘concerns and aspirations that are most widely shared are those that are rooted in the
common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy’ (Reed, 2000, p. xxvii).
While post-Marxist advocates of the politics of ‘difference’ suggest that such a stance is outdated,
we would argue that the categories which they have employed to analyze ‘the social’ are now losing their
usefulness, particularly in light of actual contemporary ‘social movements.’ All over the globe, there are large anti-
capitalist movements afoot. In February 2002, chants of ‘Another World Is Possible’ became the theme of protests in Porto Allegre. It
seems that those people struggling in the streets haven’t read about T.I.N.A., the end of grand narratives
of emancipation, or the decentering of capitalism. It seems as though the struggle for basic survival and some
semblance of human dignity in the mean streets of the dystopian metropoles doesn’t permit much time or opportunity to read the heady
proclamations emanating from seminar rooms. As E. P. Thompson (1978, p. 11) once remarked, sometimes ‘experience walks in without
knocking at the door, and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide.’ This, of course,
does not mean that socialism will inevitably come about, yet a sense of its nascent promise
animates current social movements. Indeed, noted historian Howard Zinn (2000, p. 20) recently pointed out that after
years of single-issue organizing (i.e. the politics of difference), the WTO and other anti-corporate capitalist
protests signaled a turning point in the ‘history of movements of recent decades,’ for it was the issue of
‘class’ that more than anything ‘bound everyone together.’ History, to paraphrase Thompson (1978, p. 25) doesn’t seem to
be following Theory's script. Our vision is informed by Marx's historical materialism and his revolutionary socialist humanism, which must not
be conflated with liberal humanism. For left politics and pedagogy, a
socialist humanist vision remains crucial, whose
fundamental features
include the creative potential of people to challenge collectively the
circumstances that they inherit. This variant of humanism seeks to give expression to the pain, sorrow and degradation of the
oppressed, those who labor under the ominous and ghastly cloak of ‘globalized’ capital. It calls for the transformation of those conditions that
have prevented the bulk of humankind from fulfilling its potential. It
vests its hope for change in the development of
critical consciousness and social agents who make history , although not always in conditions of their choosing. The
political goal of socialist humanism is, however, ‘not a resting in difference’ but rather ‘the emancipation of difference at the level of human
mutuality and reciprocity.’ This would be a step forward for the ‘discovery or creation of our real differences which can only in the end be
explored in reciprocal ways’ (Eagleton, 1996, p. 120). Above all else, theenduring relevance of a radical socialist
pedagogy and politics is the centrality it accords to the interrogation of capitalism. We can no longer
afford to remain indifferent to the horror and savagery committed by capitalist's barbaric machinations. We need to recognize
that capitalist democracy is unrescuably contradictory in its own self-constitution. Capitalism and
democracy cannot be translated into one another without profound efforts at manufacturing empty idealism. Committed Leftists
must unrelentingly cultivate a democratic socialist vision that refuses to forget the ‘wretched of the earth,’ the
children of the damned and the victims of the culture of silence—a task which requires more than abstruse convolutions and striking ironic
poses in the agnostic arena of signifying practices. Leftists
must illuminate the little shops of horror that lurk beneath ‘globalization’s’
shiny façade; they must challenge the true ‘evils’ that are manifest in the tentacles of global capitalism's reach.
And, more than this, Leftists must search for the cracks in the edifice of globalized capitalism and shine

light on those fissures that give birth to alternatives. Socialism today, undoubtedly, runs against the
grain of received wisdom, but its vision of a vastly improved and freer arrangement of social
relations beckons on the horizon. Its unwritten text is nascent in the present even as it exists among the
fragments of history and the shards of distant memories. Its potential remains untapped and its promise needs to be redeemed.
 Russia advantage
1. Plan flaw – in the brief for the DOJ from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court the uses of FISA, prosecutions have results (since we actually prosecute
people based off FISA) but when you search “Policing”, there are ZERO
RESULTS! It’s from the DOJ itself. Means you vote neg on presumption because
the aff doesn’t do anything since FISA doesn’t engage with “policing” people.
screenshots captured by Justin Sayoto – but if you want to confirm for yourself, click the link
and ctrl+F search for “policing”

DOJ N/D https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/082102appeal.html ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT. p. 87.
 2. Hybrid wars are designed not to escalate
Alexander Lanoszka 18, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at City, University
of London and Non-Resident Fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute, 5-24-2018, "Stop
Calling Every Potential Act Of Russian Aggression ‘Hybrid Warfare’," Medium,
https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/stop-calling-every-potential-act-of-russian-
aggression-hybrid-warfare-e980b3b888a9
Hybrid warfare is thus not a new form of conducting war or engaging in coercion nor is it a
particularly proficient tactic as waging hybrid warfare carries with it significant risk. After all, a bluff lies at the heart of this
type of strategy. By resorting to using ‘little green men’ in Crimea — that is, the use of soldiers bearing no markings or insignia
that indicate their origin —  Russia showed itself averse to military escalation. It had to disguise its aggression in such a
. Had Russia been so powerful to do
way that would pre-emptively confuse those audiences that could put together a robust response

what it pleased with immunity, it might not have gone through the theatrics associated with
hybrid warfare. That is why the best response to the tactics that make up this aggressive
strategy involves force. Any hesitation in the face of the uncertainty created by the aggressor allows hybrid warfare to succeed. Grey zones only
exist if they are allowed to be grey. To be sure, force need not mean violence: if agitators appear to be fomenting local unrest or spreading inflammatory

The manner that

propaganda at the behest of an adversary, then they should be apprehended and, when appropriate, returned to their origin.

Poland recently dealt with two alleged instances of Russian hybrid tactics is
instructive . Rather than being cowed by Russia’s military strength, Polish intelligence agencies
identified the individuals seeking to incite hatred between Poles and Ukrainians before banning
them from the country. Similarly, the Baltic countries have already exercised scenarios in which
their national guards retake sites from ‘little green men.’ Failing to undertake these basic steps would only invite more
brazen efforts of aggression. Gratuitous invocations of ‘hybrid warfare’ not only creates uncertainty over what the term really means, but could also cloud our
judgement as to what can be done about instances of actual hybrid warfare. Electoral interference is simply electoral interference. Killing a former spy abroad is

If hybrid warfare is used to refer to any sort of provocation, then the

extraterritorial (and extrajudicial) murder.

result could be a misunderstanding of the broader strategic context in which such aggressive
behaviour takes place and of the manner in which to deal with this behaviour . After all,
hybrid warfare is not necessarily a strategy of the powerful. If anything, it is an
admission of weakness.

3. Status quo solves---Certification for the Attorney general is required

 4. Trump makes politicization inevitable
Morell et al. 4/28, Michael Morell was the deputy director and twice acting director of the
CIA from 2010 to 2013; Avril Haines was deputy director of the CIA from 2013 to 2015 and
deputy national security advisor from 2015 to 2017; David S. Cohen was deputy director of the
CIA from 2015 to 2017 and undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial
intelligence from 2011 to 2015, “Trump’s Politicization of U.S. Intelligence Agencies Could End
in Disaster,” Foreign Policy, 4-28-2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/trump-cia-
intimidation-politicization-us-intelligence-agencies-could-end-in-disaster/
Last week, U.S. Sen. Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, published an op-ed in the Washington Post
outlining his growing concern about the politicization of the intelligence community. Warner wrote: “Efforts
by this president to
intimidate … U.S. intelligence services may be politically advantageous in the short term, but
over time the consequences for our country will be disastrous .”
We share Warner’s concerns.

Analytical objectivity—intelligence officials writing and saying what they believe to be the truth without consideration for policy or politics—is
fundamental to U.S. national security. Simply put, good policy decisions require fact-based, objective, and rigorous analysis.

Politicized intel ligence , by contrast, simply reinforces preexisting beliefs , depriving leaders of
a foundation for developing sound policy . That is why intelligence analysts are trained, from the very outset of their
careers, in presenting objective analysis, and why the intelligence community has institutional safeguards, including ombudsmen and inspectors
general, to push back against pressure that leads to bias and politicization of intelligence analysis. Trump has repeatedly pressured the
intelligence community to present analytic judgments consistent with his views.

Every
president since the creation of the U.S. intelligence community after World War II has
supported this principle—until Donald Trump . Trump has repeatedly pressured the
intelligence community to present analytic judgments consistent with his views , rather
than those of its expert analysts.

He has done this via public rebukes , as he did after the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment before Congress, attacking his
team’s testimony that Iran, at that time, was living up to its commitments under the 2015 nuclear agreement and that North Korea was unlikely
to ever give up its nuclear weapons. His response was to tell his own intelligence experts to “go back to school.” He took the same
tack in Helsinki in 2018, when he told the world that he believed Russian President Vladimir Putin over his own intelligence agencies
on the issue of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

And he has demonstrated this attitude through his actions . Most significantly, as Warner noted, Trump has
removed intelligence leaders for doing their jobs when it didn’t serve his political
agenda . Most recently, he fired the intelligence community’s chief watchdog, I nspector G eneral
Michael Atkinson , simply because Atkinson followed the law that required him to inform

Congress of a whistleblower complaint (that later led to the president’s impeachment by the House of Representatives
and the Senate trial that acquitted him).

The firing of Atkinson simply added to the growing number of intelligence officials who have
been pushed out due to their perceived lack of loyalty to this president and their unwillingness
to act on the basis of political pressure —a list that includes a director of national intelligence,
an acting director of national intelligence, the principal deputy director of national intelligence,
the acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and many others.
 Intel gathering
1. Backlash won’t derail surveillance
Jeet Heer 19, national affairs correspondent at The Nation and the author of In Love with Art:
Francoise Mouly’s Adventures in Comics with Art Spiegelman (2013) and Sweet Lechery:
Reviews, Essays and Profiles (2014), “William Barr’s Partisan Smears Hide a Real FBI Scandal,”
Nation, 12-11-2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/barr-ig-horowitz-fbi/

Enjoying bipartisan support , the surveillance state is unlikely to be shaken by the

Horowitz report even as it generates partisan controversies . Right-wingers like Barr are
upset that the Trump campaign was targeted , but they don’t have a wider critique of the
surveillance state when used against anyone but high-profile Republicans . Democrats ,
meanwhile, have been focusing on how the report dismantles Trump’s “deep state”
narrative . Less attention has been given to the systematic abuse documented in the
Horowitz report, except by civil libertarians like Julian Sanchez.

Part of the price America is paying for Trump’s presidency is that the controversies swirling
around the White House obscure deeper and more systematic problems . The fact that the
true lesson of the Horowitz report is being neglected is an all too typical sign of the times .

2. Leaks are inevitable – plan is not uniquely key to stop because attorneys will
circumvent for the defendant.
3. No cyber war or retaliation
Jasmine Rodet 18, Master’s Degree in Cyber Security, Strategy, and Diplomacy from the
University of New South Wales, Cyber Security Program Manager at Fortescue Metals Group,
“The Threat of Cyber War is Exaggerated”, 11/11/2018, linkedin.com/pulse/threat-cyber-war-
exaggerated-jasmine-rodet/
For the regular person on the street, the term ‘cyber war’ is more likely to bring to mind the 1983 movie “WarGames” and the doomsday
articles that appear regularly in the media about the ‘cyber battlefield’ and an impending World
War III. This essay argues that the threat of cyber war is exaggerated and although it can, by definition, be stated
that we are already in a state of cyber war, the impact on states is negligible compared to conventional war domains.
The argument is presented in 3 steps. The first step is to define cyber war and cyber weapons, referencing scholars and experts in the area of conventional war and the cyber domain. The
second step is to explore who has been exaggerating the threat of cyber war and what their motivations might be. The third is to explore the evidence and quantify the probability and impact
that cyberwar has had on states to date.

‘Cyber war’ is a term often used interchangeably in media with cyber-crime, cyber-attacks, cyber-conflict and cyber-incidents, creating confusion amongst the public and scholars alike.
Clausewitz (1989, 75), in his book, On War, defines war as ‘an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’. Rid (2012, 7) on the other interprets Clausewitz use of ‘force’ as meaning
‘violent’ force. According to Rid, if an act is not potentially violent, it is not an act of war. However, Stone (2013, 107) describes ‘cyber war’ as a politically motivated act of force, not necessarily
lethal and not necessarily attributable. The definition by Powers and Jablonski states more simply that cyber war is the utilisation of digital networks for geopolitical purposes (Nocetti 2016,
464). Neither of the latter two definitions requires violence to qualify as cyber war. Under these definitions, the Stuxnet cyber-incident in 2010 and the Estonia incident in 2007 would
constitute an act of cyber war, and as such we could say that nations have been at cyber war in the past and are likely to continue to engage in cyber war in years to come.
For this essay, I will use Stones definition to argue that even though states may engage in cyber war, the concept of cyber war is exaggerated. It

seems that cyber war is deliberately exaggerated in the media and by politicians for financial
and political gains. There are countless examples in the media and in politics of the exaggeration of the threat of cyber war and the
language used plays a big factor in creating a sense of fear in the community.

The Four Corners report, Hacked, is a classic example where the reporter, Andrew Fowler describes the current situation in Australia as ‘… a secret war where the body count is climbing every
day’ (Fowler 2013). The documentary reveals nothing violent or lethal about cyber incidents. The documentary is actually about hackers working from locations overseas, having targeted key
Federal Government departments and major corporations in Australia.

In another example, NATO may be interpreted as exaggerating the threat of Cyber War when they invited Charlie Millar to present at their Conference for Cyber Conflict at the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2017. Millar is an independent security evaluator, and his presentation was titled ‘Kim Jong-il and me: How to build a cyber army to attack
the US’. He later presented similar content at Def Con 2018. His presentation described the steps he would take to mount a cyber war, including the types of people he would engage, how
much he would pay them, what his strategy would be and how much it would cost in total.

Who stands to gain from the exaggeration and hype? Logically, one
group would be those that gain financially from
the sale of cyber protective services and software. According to Valerino, 57% of technical experts surveyed said that
we are currently in a cyber arms race and 43% said that the worst-case scenarios are inevitable (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). Translate this into
sales and Gartner projects worldwide security spending will reach $96 Billion in 2018, up 8 Percent from 2017 and to top $113 billion by 2020
(Gartner 2017).

Additionally, there may be political motivations to exaggerate the threat of cyber war. Cyberspace is
not well understood by the general public and fear is natural. In the US’s cyber security debate, observers have noted there is a tendency for
policymakers, military
leaders, and media, among others, to use frightening ‘cyber-doom scenarios’ when
making a case for action on cyber security (Dunn 2008, 2).
There is some evidence to suggest that more recently in the political arena; we may be maturing in our understanding of the real threat of cyber war. The Tallinn Manual, an academic, non-
binding study on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare, was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It
was first published in 2013 with the title ‘The Tallinn Manual on the International Law of Cyber War’. In 2017, it was re-released with the revised title ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law of Cyber Operations’. The change in title from ‘war’ to ‘operations’ signifies a more moderate use of language from NATO and is an acknowledgement that cyber incidents generally fall
below the threshold at which International Law would declare them to be a formal act of war. Experience over the 4 short years from 2013 to 2017 has demonstrated that cyber incidents tend
to have a low-level impact on the target state. As the book’s authors put it ‘the focus of the original Manual was on the most severe cyber operations, those that violate the prohibition of the
use of force in international relations, entitle states to exercise the right of self-defence, and/or occur during armed conflict’ while the new version ‘adds a legal analysis of the more common
cyber incidents that states encounter on a day-to-day basis and that fall below the thresholds of the use of force or armed conflict’ (Leetaru 2017).

To get a better sense if cyber war is exaggerated, we must also consider the probability of cyber war in the future. The probability of cyber war should be weighed up against the probability of
conventional war. Where tensions are already high, for example, between North Korea and the US or Russia and Estonia, I would argue that cyber war is more likely than conventional war.
This is due to factors including; cyber warfare is less costly than conventional warfare, states are less rational in their decision space in the cyber realm, states find cyber attribution very
difficult to achieve so attacks can be undertaken covertly and cyber war is considered ‘a challenge’ and central to the hackers’ ethos (Junio 2013, 128). Further, Sanger describes in his book,
The Perfect Weapon, cyber weapons (such as cyber vandalism, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), intrusions and advanced persistent threat (APT)) as the ‘perfect weapons’ for the following
reasons;

They are cheap: When compared to Nuclear weapons, there are only a handful of nations globally that can afford the technology to create a nuclear weapon.

They are easily accessible: Unlike a Nuclear bomb that requires uranium, a highly protected metal, in the production process, a cyber weapon can be created with minimal investment and
highly available IT infrastructure.

They can be dialled-up or dialled-down relatively easily. A ballistic missile, the force of the explosion cannot be adjusted as easily as a DDOS attack. A DDOS attack can be adjusted to last an
hour, a few days or a few weeks.

They have a huge range in how they are used: Sabotage as with Stuxnet, Espionage as with the Chinese industrial spying on the US, North Korea’s infiltration of Sony, the Iranians attack on Las
Vegas Sands Corp. casino operators.

low-level cyber conflicts to undermine

The significant factor is that cyber weapons can and are being used every day for discrete,

and disrupt rivals, but historically it has not progressed to open conflict, nor has it warranted a military

response (Sanger 2018). Additionally, massive cyber operations would necessarily impact the
civilian population and violate the immunity of non-combatants. The conditions of war dictate
that this is “taboo” and to date, rival states have shown restraint in their use of cyber
weapons for this reason (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). It appears that the threat that cyber weapons
represent to national security is overstated and the threat of cyber war is overstated .
The US and likely other highly networked nations appear reticent about using cyber weapons for significant
cyber conflict given their vulnerabilities . Ironically, NSA programs such as PRISM have made the US more of a target given the
sheer volume of sensitive information stored in one place. Regardless of US defences, there is no way to make this information completely
secure from intrusion, and as such, the very act of storing the information makes them more vulnerable.

Rid (2012) is among some academics who argue that cyber war has never and will likely never eventuate . The benefits of
being on this side of the debate mean that public funding can be allocated away from offensive cyber security initiatives to other, potentially
more important initiatives, such as public health and housing. The government is constantly under pressure to prioritise public spending and it
is imperative that they have realistic, accurate projections regarding the risk of cyber war, the probability and the impact, to allow them to
focus spending on the most important areas.

4. No spread AND no impact

Jonas Schneider 20. Senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, held post-doctoral
fellowships at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin and at
the CSS and worked as a research associate at the Institute for Security Policy at the University
of Kiel, holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Kiel. 2020. “Chapter 26 Nuclear
Proliferation and International Security.” Understanding Global Politics: Actors and Themes in
International Affairs, edited by Klaus Larres and Ruth Wittlinger, Routledge, pp. 409–425.

Other analysts have sounded a much less alarmist tone, however. Some scholars even suggested that a n Iranian bomb held great
potential for stabilising an unbalanced and volatile Middle East (Waltz, 2012). Closer to the mainstream of
Western strategic discourse, various experts have argued that despite the risks of proliferation, nuclear weapons,
and the deterrent they provide should get (more) credit for contribut ing, in combination with other factors, to
what has been labelled ‘the Long Peace’ among the great powers since 1945 (Gaddis, 1999, p. 268–271;
Gavin, 2012a, p. 164; Acton 2010, pp. 16–17). Still others have contended that because nuclear prolif eration is such a
rare phenomenon, and since robust nonprolif eration measures tend to be disrupt ive, the net
destabilising effect of new nuclear countries is quite small and, therefore, manageable
(Mueller 2010, pp. 95–99; Hymans 2013, pp. 293–296).

The question of whether nuclear proliferation has stabilising or destabilising effects is not just fascinating for scholars of the nuclear age, but
also highly consequential for practical policy issues. For in order to debate the merits of particular policy choices – such as preventive military
strikes against nuclear facilities, grand bargains with potential proliferators or complete nuclear disarmament – we need to understand first
how the spread of nuclear weapons impacts regional and global security.

The chapter proceeds in three steps. The first section provides the foundation for the other parts by summarising what we know about
empirical patterns of proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons for statecraft. The second section then engages the literature on the
consequences of proliferation, focusing in particular on how proliferation has influenced international stability. The final section explores
whether some states have been more affected than others, and what measures these states have taken to prevent proliferation, or at least
mitigate its negative consequences.

Patterns of nuclear proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons

Nuclear proliferation is commonly defined as the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not previously have them. Within a broader
conceptual framework that is rarely used by scholars, yet popular in the arms control community, this diffusion of nuclear weapons to
additional states is labelled horizontal proliferation. It is conceptually accompanied by the notion of vertical proliferation, which refers to
qualitative improvements and increases in the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of existing nuclear weapon states. In accordance
with the typical usage of the term in the scholarly debate, this chapter focuses only on how the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons
affects international stability.

One important empirical pattern that has shaped how nuclear proliferation is understood concerns the way in which nuclear weapons have

spread. The word ‘spread’ appears to suggest that the established nuclear powers have provide d
other interested nations with (at least a few) operational nuclear warheads. Yet such
transfers have never been undertaken. Certainly, states that sought nuclear weapons have
often received significant assistance from other nations (Schofield, 2014; Fuhrmann, 2012), sometimes in the form
of highly sensitive tech nologies (Kroenig, 2010). Nonetheless, since all these transfers remained well below the
weapons threshold , nations seeking nuclear weapons always had to build them indigenously. Hence, in reality, the
spread of nuclear weapons has meant that merely the ambition to possess a nuclear arsenal
has spread to additional states, each of which then had to pursue that goal primarily through indigenous efforts.

Importantly, since a state’s national efforts to turn its desire for nuclear weapons into reality
naturally span several (and sometimes many) years , nuclear prolif eration must be conceived of as a
process , as opposed to just a single step (Meyer, 1986). This point is reinforced by the fact that 29 out of 39 states that have
embarked upon that path (Müller and Schmidt, 2010, p. 157; Mikoyan, 2012; Santoro, 2017) have not acquired a
nuclear arsenal . Hence, a lot of nuclear proliferation activity has been undertaken by nations that did not ultimately become nuclear
weapon states. Three patterns explain this situation.

First, owing not just to the technological , but also the institutional and managerial challenges of the
task, some nations simply failed in their efforts to build the bomb (Hymans, 2012; Braut-Hegghammer, 2016). Second, a
few countries have chosen a nuclear ‘hedging’ strategy, intentionally confining their efforts to developing the technological capability to build
an arsenal quickly while refraining from exercising that option (Narang, 2016–17, p. 134). Third, several
states have
undertake n a ‘nuclear reversal’ , abandoning their nuclear weapons activities before developing nuclear
explosive devices (Müller and Schmidt, 2010).

5. Prolif is declining and has no impact

Dr. John Mueller 18, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “Nuclear Weapons
Don’t Matter”, Foreign Affairs, November / December 2018,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter
THE ATOMIC OBSESSION

Over the decades, the atomic obsession has taken various forms, focus ing on an endless array of worst-case
scenarios : bolts from the blue, accidental wars , lost arms races , proliferation spirals , nuclear
terrorism. The common feature among all these disasters is that none of them has ever materialized . Either we

are the luckiest people in history or the risks have been overstated .
The cartoonist and inventor Rube Goldberg received a Pulitzer Prize for a 1947 cartoon showing a huge atomic bomb teetering on a cliff
between "world control" and "world destruction." In 1950, the historian John Lewis Gaddis has noted, no U.S. official could imagine "that there
would be no World War" or that the superpowers, "soon to have tens of thousands of thermonuclear weapons pointed at one another, would
agree tacitly never to use any of them." And in 1951, the great philosopher Bertrand Russell put the matter simply:

Before the end of the present century, unless something quite unforeseeable occurs, one of three possibilities will have been realized. These
three are: —

1. The end of human life, perhaps of all life on our planet.

2. A reversion to barbarism after a catastrophic diminution of the population of the globe.

3. A unification of the world under a single government, possessing a monopoly of all the major weapons of war.

The novelist and scientist C. P. Snow proclaimed it a "certainty" in 1960 that several nuclear weapons would go off within ten years, and the
strategist Herman Kahn declared it "most unlikely" that the world could live with an uncontrolled arms race for decades. In 1979, the dean of
realism, Hans Morgenthau, proclaimed the world to be moving "ineluctably" toward a strategic nuclear war and assured us that nothing could
be done to prevent it.

A 1982 essay by the author Jonathan Schell asserted that the stakes were nothing less than the fate of the earth and concluded that soon "we
will make our choice." Schell continued: "Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and believe, we will awaken to the
truth of our peril . . . and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons." In the spirit of the times, the following year, a chart-topping pop
song traced the dangers of accidental nuclear war, and the year after, Brown University students passed a referendum demanding that the
university health service stockpile suicide pills for immediate dispensation to survivors in the event of a nuclear attack.

Disasters were certainly possible, and a healthy appreciation of the dangers nuclear weapons posed eventually led to the development and
spread of best practices in strategy and safety. But prudence
in controlling tail-end risks sometimes evolved into
near hysteria . Nuclear exchanges were assumed to be easy to start , hard to stop, and certain to end up
destroying life on earth.

Nuclear proliferation has been a perennial source of fear. During the 1960 U.S. presidential campaign, John F.
Kennedy predicted that there might be "ten, 15, or 20" countries with a nuclear capability by the next
election, and similar declarations continue. And since 9/11, nuclear terrorism has been the nightmare of choice.

Ever since the dropping of the bomb, in short, Armageddon and apocalypse have been thought to be looming just over the horizon. Such

fears and anxieties were understandable, especially at first. But they haven't been borne out by the lived record
of the nuclear era.
WHAT ABOUT THAT LONG PEACE?

Fine, one might concede. In retrospect, perhaps the risks were exaggerated. But at least there is a retrospect — which there might not have
been without nuclear weapons, since they staved off a third world war, right?

Actually, no. Nuclear strategy — a theoretical and nonexperimental enterprise — has been built on a grand counterfactual: the notion that
without the prospect of nuclear devastation hanging over its head, the postwar world would have collapsed into a major conflict yet again. But
this turns out to be just a story, and less history than fable.

The nuclear-deterrence-saved-the-world theory is predicated on the notion that policymakers after 1945 were so stupid, incompetent, or
reckless that, but for visions of mushroom clouds, they would have plunged the great powers back into war. But the catastrophic destruction
they experienced in their recent war (one they had tried to avoid) proved more than enough to teach that lesson on its own, and there is little
reason to believe that nuclear weapons were needed as reinforcement.

Moreover, the Soviet Union never seriously considered any sort of direct military aggression against the United States or Western Europe. After
examining the documentation extensively, the historian Vojtech Mastny concluded that the strategy of nuclear deterrence was "irrelevant to
deterring a major war that the enemy did not wish to launch in the first place." He added: "All Warsaw Pact scenarios presumed a war started
by NATO." In 1987, George Kennan, the architect of containment himself, had agreed, writing in these pages, "I have never believed that [Soviet
leaders] have seen it as in their interests to overrun Western Europe militarily, or that they would have launched an attack on that region
generally even if the so-called nuclear deterrent had not existed."

Moscow's global game plan stressed revolutionary upheaval and subversion from within, not Hitlerian conquest. Given Russia's calamitous
experience with two world wars, a third was the last thing Soviet policymakers wanted, so nuclear deterrence was largely irrelevant to postwar
stability. Nor has anyone ever come up with a compelling or even plausible rationale for using such weapons in conflicts short of total war —
because there simply aren't many targets that can't be attacked as effectively with conventional weapons.
Nuclear weapons have also proved useless in conventional or guerrilla warfare, lousy at compellence (think Saddam Hussein refusing to leave
Kuwait), and not very good at deterrence (think the Yom Kippur War or Argentina's seizure of the Falklands). There are circumstances in which
such weapons would come in handy — say, in dealing with a super-aggressive, risk-acceptant fanatic leading a major country. But that has
always been a remote possibility. The actual contribution of nuclear weapons to postwar stability, therefore, has been purely theoretical —
extra insurance against an unlikely calamity.

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM?

Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it's game over — which is why
any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war.

breaks down on close examination. Not only has the world

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it

already survived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the craziest mass
murderers in history ( Stalin and Mao ), but prolif eration has slowed down rather than
sped up over time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered
obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so . This is because nuc lear weapon s
turn out to be difficult and expensive to acquire and strategically provocative to possess.

They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan
and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan's
prestige be increased if it became nuclear? Did China's status improve when it went nuclear —
or when its economy grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current
British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved?

Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects . Proliferation is
incredibly dangerous and necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to
dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea seems to be that once a
country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the
local bully out of fear.

Except, of course, that in three-quarters of a century, the United States has never been able to get anything close to that obedience from
anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It is far more likely that a
nuclear
rogue's threats would cause its rivals to join together against the provocateur — just as
countries around the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam 's invasion of Kuwait by closing
ranks to oppose , rather than acquiescing in, his effort at domination.

6. No nuke terror NOR retal

---Technical barriers, op costs, organizational schisms, deterrence
Christopher McIntosh & Ian Storey 18. McIntosh is visiting assistant professor of political
studies at Bard College; Storey is a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and
Humanities at Bard College. 06/01/2018. “Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the
Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 289–300.
When looked at in isolation, each of the three areas of potential loss presents significant disincentives for immediate attack. In combination—as
they would be considered in practice—the higher strategic value of available alternatives appears decisive. In other words, even if one reads
our analysis as affirming the importance of nuclear acquisition, when considering competing options and the dangers that attach to any
detonation attempt, nuclear attack is highly unlikely. Strategic Opportunity Costs Future opportunities available for “using” a nuclear weapon
are effectively foreclosed depending on the aggressiveness of the option a group chooses. The two-by-two matrix of nuclear strategies in Figure
1 is only a rough guide encompassing many possible permutations in the nuclear sphere. The
organization always retains
non-nuclear options , even once they acquire nuc lear weapon s . As evidenced by the Cold War and in
Kargil, the stability-instability paradox holds empirical weight. Nuclear acquisition by two opposing actors does not
necessarily foreclose conventional and/or asymmetric attacks (Cohen 2013; Kapur 2005). Given the unique relationship
between a state and terrorist organization, we can expect similar and even exacerbated levels of instability. This can expand even beyond
aggression. Remaining options range all the way from the pacific—pursuing negotiations, cooption, entrance into the legitimate political arena
(for example, Sinn Fein)—to heightened conventional attacks and the usage of non-nuclear forms of WMDs. This last point is worth

emphasizing. Even in the remote case where an actor successfully acquires a nuc lear weapon
and primarily seeks raw numbers of casualties —whether due to outbidding or audience costs—
other forms of WMDs are likely to be more appealing . As Aum Shinrikyo indicates, this is
particularly the case for the group that overcomes the inevitable political and technological
hurdles (Nehorayoff et al. 2016, 36–37). For these groups, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons ( CBRW ) are
considerably easier to acquire , use , and stockpile . This is especially true when considered over
time , rather than a single operation.18 While there are certainly downsides to CBRWs vis-à-vis
nuclear weapons (delivery may paradoxically be easier and the maintenance risks comparatively smaller), they are
undoubtedly easier to procure and produce (Zanders 1999). More importantly, CBRWs are
perceived as easier to produce and thus likely to be viewed by targets as iterable . Unlike a
nuclear attack, CBRW threats are more credible because a single CBRW attack can likely
precipitate an indefinite number of follow-ups . In addition to the problem of iterability, a terrorist
organization must always worry about the possible ratchet effect of an attack—a problem Neumann and
Smith (2005, 588– 90) refer
to as the “escalation trap.” A terrorist organization is different than a state
at war because it manipulates other actors primarily through punishment . Campaigns are a
communicative activity designed to convince the public and the leaders that the status quo is unsustainable. The message is that the costs of
continuing the target state’s policy (such as the United States in Lebanon, France in Algeria, or the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland) will

eventually outweigh the benefits. Once an organization conducts a nuclear attack, it lacks options for an
encore . Not even the most nightmarish scenarios involve an indefinite supply of weapons. If
a single attack plus the threat of one or two others does not induce capitulation, the
organization might unwittingly harden the target state ’s resolve . The attack could raise the
bar such that any future non-nuclear attack constitutes a lessening of costs vis-à-vis the status quo.
There are also heavy opportunity costs involved in pursuing , developing, and maintaining a
nuclear capacity, let alone actually deploying and delivering it. As Weiss puts it, “even if a terror
group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure
needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the
group at risk of attack . Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to
deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to
engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects ” (Weiss 2015, 82).
Organizational Survival Terrorist organizations are not monolithic entities, nor are they wholly self-sufficient actors. Historically speaking, these
groups consider the public reception of their attacks in a complex manner. As Al Qaeda, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of the
1970s, the IRA, and anarchist groups of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries all demonstrate, these groups’ thinking about public reception
is nuanced and complex, regardless of time or place. We focus on two types of audiences that would be affected by decisions to attack: those
internal to the group itself, and their own broader public. While many claim that terrorists are undeterrable, the argument misconstrues the
relational dynamics between a terrorist organization, target state, international community, and the internal dynamics of the organization itself
(Talmadge 2007). It is undoubtedly the case that deterring a terrorist organization in the traditional sense is difficult (Whiteneck 2005;
Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). Many lack a recognized territorial base, work on the fringes of the global economy, and are internally structured
to be difficult to combat directly. Nearly all possess some permutation of these factors. Combined with the symbolic importance of even
relatively small terror attacks—especially given the role of international media—physically denying a group the ability to conduct attacks is
uniquely challenging. It is minimally a vastly different proposition than precluding a state’s ability to successfully invade its neighbor or conduct
ongoing missile strikes.19 Despite these concerns, there are important reasons deterrence can and empirically does work in the case of terrorist
organizations. This is especially possible when the state-terrorist relationship is not zero-sum and the target retains some influence over the
realization of the group’s eventual goals (e.g., by denying the group access to territory or withholding international recognition) (Trager and
Zagorcheva 2006, 88–89). Nuclear attack presents two significant threats to the organization’s continued existence: internal threats of
disintegration and external threats to their continued operations and survival. Terrorist organizations are not unitary, homogenous
organizations. This is especially true for groups possessing the size and competence likely necessary for operational nuclear capacity. As many
have noted, the terrorist organizations of the present are vastly different from those Marxist- Leninist groups that terrorized Europe and the
United States in the 1970s and early 1980s. There is a well theorized psychological value of the organization to individual terrorists themselves
(Post 1998), but there is more to the organizational valuation of survival than captured in this atomistic picture. Modern, large-scale terrorist
organizations are typically heavily intertwined with the social fabric of the groups from which they originate (Cronin 2006; Hoffman 2013).
Beyond significant networks of financial connections, accounts, and moguls (Hamas, for example, draws funding from a massive international
system of mosque-centered charities, while the IRA’s extensive connections to the Irish diaspora in the United States were well documented),
many terrorist organizations build extensive networks of sub-organizations that tie them to the communities in which they are based.
Hezbollah, like the IRA, is internally divided between a military arm and a political arm and has run an extensive network of community schools,
medical care centers, and religious outreach groups. Together they are designed to embed the organization in the social life of (predominantly
southern) Lebanon’s Muslim population and provide Hezbollah with fresh recruits (Parkinson 2013). The group’s persistence as a dominant
political force in southern Lebanon nearly two decades after the initial Israeli decision to withdraw demonstrates terrorist organizations grow to
exceed their initial military objectives. The spread of Al Qaeda and its affiliates has followed a similar path. Maintaining the continued support
of these multiple audiences is therefore a crucial consideration for these organizations. While these audiences could conceivably be more
casualty-acceptant than the individuals deciding the group’s operations, the broader public will usually moderate extreme behavior. The
literature assessing so-called “radical- ization” and violence by individual actors emphasizes that there isn’t a one-to-one relationship between
ideological extremism and acceptance of extraordinary violence in pursuit of those goals (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014; Jurecic and Wittes
2016). It
is important to resist the assumption that a politically extreme ideology automatically
corresponds to shared assumptions regarding casualty-acceptance. Some argue that the move toward
“mass-casualty” terrorism obviates these concerns. Aside from the fact that the trend line is
either flat or receding in terms of the death toll of individual attacks (even if campaigns themselves might
be becoming deadlier), there is an orders of magnitude distinction in casualties between a nuclear
attack and even the 2001 attack in the U nited S tates. While the psychological restraints on nuclear
use among states do not translate precisely to this context, there is good reason to believe that
transgressing the longstanding nuclear taboo would have dramatic and negative effects on
broader public support . In an urban environment, the media would inevitably capture the attack and
its gruesome after-effects in photography or video. This imagery would be inconceivable, ubiquitous,
and inescapable. Even if supporters accept a highly retributive mentality , or as Hamid (2015) argues
about the Islamic State, actively accept the potential of death , this would pose a severe problem for all
but the most extreme supporters.20 Beyond these supporters, a nuclear attack affects the
internal dynamics of the terrorist organization in multiple ways. There could be divisiveness
regarding the most effective use of the weapon. This would be magnified by the scale of the opportunities
and perceived opportunity costs. Such debates have the potential to splinter the organization as a
whole (Cronin 2009, 100–02). Factional conflict in terrorist organizations appears frequently over questions of goals and tactics (Crenshaw

1981; Chai 1993). A decision to attack with a nuclear weapon risks considerable internal alienation
over a variety of issues—targeting decisions, method of attack, campaign goals, potential
deaths of supporters, and the domestic and international response (Mathew and Shambaugh 2005, 621–22).
Finally, a nuclear attack would exponentially raise the threat to each individual who composes the extended organization. Post-nuclear
attack, the greatest strengths of a terrorist organization—its lack of material territory,
economy, or overt institutions and reliance on individuals—could turn into its greatest
weaknesses (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). Currently, a wealthy financier found to have ties to a
terrorist group would be monitored for intelligence, arrested, and brought up on criminal charges. Post-nuclear
attack, the consequences would be immediate and rather worse . Externally, in a world post-
nuclear attack, international coop eration would be instant and deep . One of the only international treaties to
even define a terrorist in international law post-2001 has been the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (Edwards 2005). A nuclear attack
would be far outside the norm of international politics. It would disrupt the dominance of state-actors and likely
stimulate unparalleled cooperation to apprehend the responsible parties to prevent future attacks. Moreover, many large terrorist
organizations require (some) tacit acquiescence by a host state. Even those with hostile host states have territory where they remain relatively
unaffected by local governments (Korteweg 2008). Post-nuclear attack, these host states face an enormous incentive to find the actors
responsible before the target state does. After an attack, regimes would find it difficult to claim that they “didn’t know” or “couldn’t stop
them.” Claims of corruption or ineffective institutions would be unlikely to find much sympathy. Faced with potential organizational extinction
itself, a host state/government will likely be much less committed to the survival of the terrorist group. This is likely to vary significantly from
how they might otherwise behave after a more conventional attack. For these states, there would be a real fear of “Talibanization” and ruthless
attempts at regime change post-attack. From
the perspective of the group, it would know that it could be
facing a unified international community and the removal of tacit state support. It would take a
particularly confident leadership to presume it could continue to function post-attack
without massive disruptions. Most strategic actors are risk-averse when facing the potential of
complete elimination . There is little reason to believe terrorist group s would act any
differently.

7. No means or motive.
John Mueller 18, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research
Scientist at Ohio State University, November/December, "Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter,"
Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-
matter
As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist
terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice,

however, terror ist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less
progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series
of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work . This includes trusting foreign
collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile
material ; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop ; and moving a
cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation . And all of this has to be done
while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such
activities . Terrorists are unlikely to get a bomb from a generous, like-minded nuclear patron,
because no country wants to run the risk of be ing blamed (and punished) for a terrorist’s
nuclear crimes. Nor are they likely to be able to steal one. Notes Stephen Younger, the former head of nuclear weapons
All nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very
research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory: “

seriously.” The grand mistake of the Cold War was to infer desperate intent from apparent
capacity. For the war on terrorism, it has been to infer desperate capacity from apparent intent.