(Gilbert - Rozman) - Strategic Culture in South Korea

South Korean Strategic Thought
toward Asia
STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Gilbert Rozman, Series Editor
Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia

Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson
Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia

Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson
Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea
and the United States
By Gilbert Rozman
South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia

Edited by Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee
Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia

By Gilbert Rozman (forthcoming)
South Korean Strategic
Thought toward Asia
Edited by
Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun,
and
Shin-wha Lee
SOUTH KOREAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT TOWARD ASIA
Copyright © Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, Shin-wha Lee, 2008.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published in 2008 by
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ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7555–3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
South Korean strategic thought toward Asia / edited by Gilbert
Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee.
p. cm.—(Strategic thought in Northeast Asia)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1–4039–7555–8
1. Korea (South)—Foreign relations—East Asia. 2. East Asia—
Foreign relations—Korea (South) 3. Korean reunification question
(1945–) 4. Korea (South)—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation)
5. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—Korea (South) I. Rozman,
Gilbert. II. Hyon, In-t’aek, 1954– III. Yi, Sin-hwa, 1965–
JZ1747.A55S68 2008
355⬘.03305195—dc22 2007041540
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: May 2008
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Printed in the United States of America.
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Overview 1
Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee
Chronology
2 South Korean Strategic Thought toward
Asia in the 1980s 33
Kyudok Hong
3 Strategic Thought toward Asia in the
Kim Young-sam Era 55
In-Taek Hyun
Kim Dae-jung Era 77
Scott Snyder
Roh Moo-hyun Era 101
Seong-Ho Sheen
Geography
6 South Korean Strategic Thought on Reunification 129
Jong-Yun Bae and Gilbert Rozman
7 South Korean Strategic Thought toward China 153
Jae Ho Chung
8 South Korean Strategic Thought toward Japan 179
Gilbert Rozman
vi ● Contents
9 South Korean Strategic Thought toward Russia 203

Gilbert Rozman
10 South Korean Strategic Thought toward
Regionalism 225
Shin-wha Lee
List of Contributors 249

Index 251
Acknowledgments
T
he editors are grateful to the Princeton Institute of International
and Regional Studies (PIIRS) and the Ilmin Institute of
International Relations of Korea University for supporting this
project from its inception through publication. The initial meeting at
Princeton also received support from the Korean Economic Institute
(KEI) and the East Asian Studies Program of Princeton University.
Many experts on Korea commented on the project during its various
stages in 2005–07. Some attended the initial workshop where broad
themes were raised and others joined later meetings where draft chap-
ters were presented. We are grateful to all of them and, especially, to the
contributors to this volume, whose comments on other chapters helped
in the preparation of the overview. Special thanks go to Kim Dongjung
for the onerous task of making the transliteration from Korean consistent
as well as research assistance.
Finally, we want to thank Anthony Wahl at Palgrave for his continuous
support.
Gilbert Rozman
In-Taek Hyun
Shin-wha Lee
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CHAPTER 1
Overview
Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun,
and Shin-wha Lee
T
he simple days of choosing sides and depending exclusively on
one patron are over for the states of Northeast Asia as for other
states that were consequential in the polarized cold war era. The
transition in this region began, albeit slowly, with China’s emergence as
a third, if lesser pole, after its decisions in 1971–72 to abandon autarchy
and in 1982 to seek equidistance between the superpowers. By the mid-
1980s Japan’s new insistence on becoming a regional leader with some
autonomy from the United States gave more impetus to the transition.
Greatly accelerating it were Moscow’s moves to end the cold war
followed by a dramatic rise in Beijing’s clout in the 1990s. In addition,
from 1993 North Korea became an object of regional attention and
competition, demonstrating its independent ability to affect regional
affairs. At the center of the region, tethered to the United States and
newly attentive to its brethren in North Korea, South Korea squarely
faces the challenge of a rapidly changing balance of great powers amidst
lingering strategic dilemmas. This puts a premium on leadership that
adroitly analyzes the forces of change and plans how best to serve the
national interest. Strategic thinking in Seoul over a quarter century
from the waning days of the cold war to the uncertain state of the North
Korean nuclear crisis opens a window on Northeast Asia’s dynamic
transformation.
Of the countries of Northeast Asia, South Korea has made the most
far-reaching shift in strategic thinking since the end of the cold war.
2 ● Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, Shin-wha Lee
Terms such as “nordpolitik,” “cooperative security,” “globalization,”

“diplomatic diversification,” “new diplomacy,” “Sunshine Policy,”
“Northeast Asian era,” “Northeast Asia central state,” and “regional
balancer,” offer testimony to the search in progress for a new framework
for relations with the other five states active in the region. Some of these
refer to sustained policy initiatives, others to rhetorical thrusts that met
fierce opposition. The “three R’s” of “reunification,” “regionalism,” and
historical “revisionism” weighing heavily on many Northeast Asian
states are most pronounced in discussions of how the South should deal
with its neighbors. Yet, criticisms point to a fourth “R” “realism” that
sets a standard to be reached for clear-minded calculations about rela-
tive threats and the policy choices that would best counter them. If
there has been no shortage of boldness, our assessment of strategic
thinking must consider prudence as well. Below we examine how
well goals articulate with the means available, how adequately they
respond to the shifting regional currents, and how consistent the ideas
introduced for realizing them are.
Both the global and the domestic system have changed dramatically
since the 1980s. South Koreans seized the opportunity of China’s spec-
tacular rise in power, responded to Russia’s sharp fluctuation as a force
in this region and the world, nervously eyed Japan’s abruptly shifting
fortunes and approach to reentering Asia, and were jolted by the ups
and downs in perceptions of the North Korean threat. Changes also can
be traced to sudden adjustments in U.S. strategy toward the region as its
targets shifted from the end of the cold war to the shock leading to the
war against terror. Domestically, democratization, the impact of South
Korea’s economic miracle, and pride from new international standing
seen vividly in the 1988 Seoul Olympics all provided background for
electoral results bringing new types of leaders to the powerful post of
president. Amid a deepening rift between progressives and conserva-
tives over foreign policy, especially over handling North Korea and the
United States, public opinion and the mass media acquired newfound
importance in this shifting environment for strategic thinking.
We divide the twenty-five years under five presidents into four
periods. The Chun Doo-hwan era remained a period of cold war with
limited options, and we group it with the Roh Tae-woo era in showing
how the limitations of the cold war era were cast aside, as leaders antic-
ipated its end and started to explore more f lexible foreign policies. This
period must be judged, above all, for nordpolitik, combining a new
approach to great power relations with a change in thinking on how
to pursue reunification, to the point of introducing the notion of
Overview ● 3
cooperative security. The second period is the time of Kim Young-sam,

who, as another conservative, did not make major changes of direction
although he gave globalization (segyehwa) precedence, gave voice to the
notion of diplomatic diversification (oigyo dabyonhwa) as part of his
“new diplomacy” (shin oigyo), and in the first nuclear crisis over North
Korea was tested on how he handled the more complex post–cold war
environment. Then came the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung, who
linked peninsular and great power relations as he sought to make South
Korea the driving force in the region. Finally, Roh Moo-hyun took
office, maintaining engagement of the North but facing a more compli-
cated great power environment with bolder moves to jump-start regional
integration and challenge the United States and Japan, provocatively
proclaiming the Northeast Asian era and his state as the Northeast
Asian central state (Dongbukka jungshim gukka) and the Northeast
Asian balancer (Dongbukka gyunhyong ja) before he conducted a summit
in Pyongyang as his final legacy. Even as conservative Lee Myung-bak
built an insurmountable lead in the race to succeed him, Roh rushed to
commit South Korea to far-reaching measures for economic integration
with North Korea and joint pursuit of a peace regime despite nervous-
ness in other states about how well these moves would be coordinated
with their priorities, including denuclearization. Each president
colorfully announced far-reaching initiatives while struggling to weigh
diverse, often conf licting, priorities as strategic challenges occurred
often over the past quarter century.
Priorities in Strategic Thinking

There is no mystery to the strong aspirations for strategic autonomy,
gaining maneuverability in international relations. Korean history is
filled with stories of dependency: the buzzword for it is sadae, referring
originally to the relationship with China over half a millennium in the
Josun era that avoided outright subjugation but left no doubt about
Korea’s subordinate status and need to serve, ritually at least, the
superior state in a tributary relationship. This is followed by an image
of completely losing sovereignty to Japan in 1910. South Korea then
experienced the inescapable embrace of the United States following
World War II that lingered long past the time of the Korean War as the
threat of a repeat attack by North Korea was slow to abate and the cold
war left insurmountable barriers. While the period we examine from
the mid-1980s gave rise to fluctuating hopes that a new era of diplomatic
f lexibility had dawned, the Northeast Asian regional environment with
its abrupt shifts in the power balance and in prospects for stability has
not made it easy to realize them. Normalization of relations with Russia
and China diversified South Korea’s strategic options, but neither coun-
try fits into a regional order under the United States. Interest in a thaw
or even reunification with the North has led to revamping the South’s
strategic calculus, but tensions persist. The enduring reality in relations
with other states is far less autonomy than is desired. Leaders still strug-
gle with the large gap between their unquestioned preferences and the
realistic choices now available. They may shuffle the priorities attached
to other states active in the region, but only within tight limits.
Compared to the other five players in Northeast Asian geopolitics,
South Korea has the least flexibility. The United States operates from a
distance with an unmatched array of assets, enjoying maximum f lexi-
bility, while the South requires this alliance in the face of North Korea’s
refusal to relax its military posture. China is the rising world power,
better able than almost any major country to withstand U.S. pressure
and treated with deference in almost all of Northeast and Southeast
Asia except Japan. It has considerable f lexibility on the Korean penin-
sula; yet South Korea must rely on it to engage North Korea and increas-
ingly for continued economic growth. Russia has the nuclear weapons
and energy resources to chart its own course, and Moscow has refo-
cused on ties with Pyongyang as one way to increase its inf luence.
While Seoul is not particularly dependent on Russia, prudence dictates
that it be careful not to give offense. Japan has the industrial clout and
unqualified U.S. backing to seek its own path in East Asia. Although
South Korean economic and strategic reliance on Japan is diminishing,
relations are still asymmetrical. Finally, even North Korea arguably has
more freedom of action since it is only weakly integrated into the world
economy and keeps its own people isolated and impoverished. While
Seoul is unlikely to drop its engagement strategy, Pyongyang has yet to
become entwined in a web of interdependency with any state that would
tie its hands. As a middle power buffeted by four assertive great powers
and one autonomous, militarized state, South Korea is limited in the
options at its disposal and by the damage it could cause to itself should
it put at risk vital bilateral relationships.
In this complex, evolving environment, South Korea’s foremost
challenge is to prioritize relations among the other five states active
in the region. The United States tops the list of partners, as it did during
the cold war, but drawing increasing attention is North Korea, where
the pull of brotherhood and the threat of destabilization coexist, fol-
lowed by China, where ties have rapidly expanded with relatively little
Overview ● 5
discussion of its possible future regional hegemony. Russia has lost

considerable ground as a priority from the ominous presence of the
Soviet Union during the cold war, while Japan’s role had appeared to be
rising for a time but lately has been falling as an economic and security
inf luence. Worthy strategic thinking must weigh the pros and cons of
upgrading relations with each of these countries and try to achieve an
equilibrium that maximizes national interests. With uncertainty about
North Korea’s intentions and no appealing alternative, South Korea has
clearly kept alliance ties with the United States as its first priority, even
as it debates how much dependency has declined. It has made reconcili-
ation with North Korea its second focus, unable to avoid turning its
attention there whether from alarm or obligation. China’s importance
keeps rising with economic ties leading the way. In turn, Japan has
fallen to fourth among priorities, even if its economic and security
salience is still substantial. That leaves Russia as a distant fifth, drop-
ping from the Soviet Union’s cold war impact through the 1990s, but
beginning by 2007 to revive as a serious factor.
In a divided nation and one under the threat of renewed instability if
not outright combat, South Korea naturally starts its strategic thinking
with North Korea. In choosing among priorities, it faces coordination
with other states to settle on a suitable combination between reassuring
the regime in Pyongyang about the benefits from engagement and
maintaining vigilance or even pressure so that it would understand the
costs of confrontation. This has an economic component of using the
superior economic prowess of the South as well as of the international
community to entice the North without strengthening a regime that
might take this as an opportunity for reinforcing its oppression at home
and confrontation tactics to the outside. It also has a security compo-
nent of forging a common front to resist the potential danger from the
North, including the development of nuclear weapons, leaving no doubt
about the South’s resolve to reduce the North’s threat capacity while
offering reciprocal, confidence-building measures to guide the way
forward. Finding suitable strategies for managing the North’s military
danger and encouraging its international engagement have been a per-
sistent headache for strategic thinkers in Seoul. Such strategies must
have a major regional component, brought to the forefront through the
Six-Party Talks organized in Beijing to deal with the nuclear crisis,
especially by the shift on February 13, 2007 toward a multilateral
approach offering inducements to the North, but keeping in reserve
possible application of sanctions already approved by the United Nations
Security Council and other joint measures.
Also critical to prioritizing goals in East Asia is figuring out how to

make effective use of the alliance framework into which the South is
enmeshed (the U.S. alliance and the trilateral U.S.-led system including
Japan), at a time of rising calls for a multilateral regional framework. To
some this appears as a sharp dichotomy between traditional bilateralism
and emergent regionalism, but the Six-Party Talks have raised the
possibility of a more nuanced duality: a lasting multilateral framework
is arising, even as a reinvigorated U.S.-Japan military alliance is beck-
oning to an ambivalent South Korea. Calls for regionalism in Northeast
Asia as well as East Asia have security implications. If the focus were
placed on an East Asian Community (EAC) without the United States,
ties with China would no doubt intensify. If, however, emphasis turned
to a network of bilateral alliances radiating from the United States and
draped in assertive rhetoric about universal values, then the South
would cast its lot with a maritime coalition termed by Japanese Foreign
Minister Aso Taro the “arc of freedom and prosperity.” In 2007 both
options remained alive as the Six-Party Talks drew Washington and
Beijing closer not only in search of denuclearization in North Korea but
also in developing working groups that could lead to a third path toward
regional cooperation. Each president has had to find a way to construct
multilateralism on the foundation of the alliance with the United States,
considering the U.S. role and response in choosing among alternative
approaches to regionalism as well as to North Korea.
South Korea’s strategic priorities were clear in the cold war, but
subsequently they became hotly disputed. For close to four decades, the
Korean War and possible recurrence amidst the environment of the cold
war established a little-contested consensus that the foremost priority is
to ensure military support against North Korea and its likely backers.
Given its continued potential threat and lingering competition with it
for advantage in any reunification process, some still weigh this priority
above all others, valuing the alliance factor. Second in priority (an off-
shoot of the first to gain defensive strength and meet the challenge of
competition) is to maintain rapid economic growth. Even now, as the
South’s economy is heading toward per capita GNP of $20,000, there
remains a widespread sense of precariousness about the breadth of the
export economy and the prospect of becoming sandwiched between
competitive manufacturing in Japan at the high-tech end and in China’s
rising mid-level technologies, underlining the strategic significance of
the economic factor. A third priority is confidence-building measures,
in principle aimed at reunification but treated by many as serving
other more urgent goals such as stability on the peninsula and a peace
Overview ● 7
dividend for the economy. Indeed, a fourth priority of normalizing

Korea after distortions in the twentieth century broadly refers not only
to reunification but also to achieving a national identity and social fab-
ric correcting effects of the unnatural state of division and unprincipled
acts of dictatorial governments. This includes preparing to lead regional
efforts to deal with North Korea whenever conditions permit. There is
also a fifth priority to move beyond a sense of subordination and thus
overcome distortions associated with a national identity focused on
victimization.
Across the political spectrum priorities are viewed differently. South
Koreans are deeply divided between conservatives, who long ruled, and
progressives, who have held power since 1998. Their split extends to
foreign relations, as each side was quick to denounce the other’s moves,
especially in handling North Korea. Thus, when placed in the context
of international debates over security in the region, the differences in
thinking within the South are pronounced, but not necessarily along
lines that outside observers might expect. Whereas many conservatives
elsewhere stress that the rise of China is a threat and all should take part
in its containment, South Koreans overwhelmingly agree on engaging
China, albeit not on how to balance ties with it and the United States.
Similarly, the evaluations of Japan share much in common, blaming it
and warning against its revisionist tendencies, although there are nota-
ble differences on the appropriate strategic response. As Russia reasserts
its claim to inf luence in the region, we also see less variation in South
Korean perceptions than in views found in Washington and Tokyo. In
the case of United States and North Korea, however, the extremes are
more prominent. Variations in evaluations of the United States for most
are less pronounced than many may expect, but a diametrical contrast
exists between the two ends of the political spectrum. The main issue
for the vast majority is not whether to end the alliance, but under what
circumstances would it be advisable to increase the South’s flexibility.
Finally, in the context of the Sunshine Policy or its follow-up and the
Six-Party Talks, if South Koreans clash over how much reciprocity is
required in overtures to the North, they largely agree on prioritizing
incentives through dialogue rather than pressure. The desired direction
of security in Northeast Asia is mostly shared: toward multilateralism,
a balance of power, a continued U.S. alliance and regional presence, and
room for maneuver with decreasing dependence on any one state.
The various priorities have had different significance over time
and across the political spectrum. Progressives fault conservatives for
overrating the alliance factor and misreading the economic factor, while
the latter fault so-called appeasement policies for naively pursuing

one-sided, unconditional engagement with the North without essential
confidence-building measures and at the same time exaggerating the
meaning of normalizing Korea and prospects for self-reliant defense
( jaju gukbang). In the early years of the Kim Young-sam era, “new
diplomacy” combined all of these themes with stress on international-
ization to complement alliance and regional cooperation to accompany
diversified foreign relations and a future orientation to better ties with
the North. A decade later, Roh Moo-hyun had shifted the weight in
pursuit of closer ties to the North, “normalization” of South Korea by
revisiting its postwar development, and balancing powers as part of
Northeast Asian regionalization. The stakes were rising as North Korea
tested a nuclear weapon and many in South Korea doubted Roh’s bold
moves as a threat to national security as the North’s belligerent rhetoric
continued and the United States, even while exploring compromise in
the Six-Party Talks, sought more restraint in Seoul.
Korean foreign policy elites cannot escape a sense of frustration over
what has happened since the Sunshine Policy was launched. After
appearing to be at the center of diplomacy, especially in managing inter-
Korean relations as it orchestrated four-power support for its efforts, the
South found the strategic climate tightening after 2001. Especially the
nuclear crisis from 2002 narrowed its options. The most important test
of strategic thinking has been the challenge of dealing with what have
become the two main “adversaries”—ally and brother nation. After the
start of the Six-Party Talks, prospects for multilateral coordination have
been in f lux with the possibility that the February 13 Joint Agreement
will require vigilant strategic responses, involving not only Pyongyang
and Washington but also the other three participants. Having lost some
of the centrality visible in the Sunshine Policy, Seoul must look in many
directions to adjust to its region.
It now does so in the context of invigorated Six-Party Talks and asso-
ciated working groups as well as emboldened North Korean diplomacy.
The North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the shift in the U.S.
posture that led to the Joint Agreement, and the completion of the first
phase of that agreement in the summer emboldened progressives under
Roh Moo-hyun as his summit with Kim Jong-il signified a daring push
for Seoul to regain the initiative. Yet, they also alarmed many conserva-
tives under the leadership of Lee Myong-bak chosen on August 19 as
the candidate of the Grand National Party (GNP), who warned that
Seoul would really be handing the initiative to Pyongyang while under-
mining the Six-Party Talks if Roh persisted. When Lee was elected on
Overview ● 9
December 19 with domestic economic issues foremost on voters’ minds,

he gave priority to rebuilding ties with the United States and Japan,
even as he pledged to keep engaging North Korea, subject to more stress
on reciprocity and on progress in denuclearization.
Turning Points in Strategic Thinking

Twice in the past half century circumstances congealed for South
Korean leaders to launch far-reaching initiatives in policies toward Asia,
and in 2007 we observe the sort of f lux that may signal that a third
opportunity is about to emerge. Undoubtedly, the end of the cold war
stands as a critical turning point for South Korea’s opportunities and
strategic responses, but we would date the turning point back to 1988
and trace its roots to the early 1980s. The period 1998–2000 indisput-
ably stands as a second turning point, again made possible by develop-
ments earlier in the decade as well as a fortuitous combination of
circumstances at that time. Given the extraordinary f lux in foreign
policy in 2005–07 with a possibility that in 2008 major adjustments
will follow under a new president, we would be remiss in not taking
particular note of this period as a potential third turning point that
could also leave a lasting mark. As we review the chronology of strategic
thinking over a quarter of a century, we focus attention on these transi-
tional moments.
In the cold war era, South Korean strategic thinking was dominated
by two themes: vigilance and dependency. The threat of attack or
subversion by North Korea demanded vigilance, while the necessity to
station large numbers of American forces and support U.S. strategic
objectives led to dependency. Increasingly, from the end of the cold war
we observe two more strategic themes, initiative and coordination, even
as the other two remained. Shifts in the foreign policy of Moscow and
Beijing gave Seoul an opportunity to show its initiative even as the chal-
lenge was growing to maintain coordination with the Washington and
then with Tokyo as well. Without undermining its earlier principles,
Seoul could explore ways to escape the past confines that had narrowed
its prospects.
Looking back to the early years of the Chun Doo-hwan era, we see a
president with low popularity and legitimacy eager to make his mark in
foreign affairs given a great boost by support from the leaders of the
United States and then Japan, as well as by the economic successes of
his country. Newfound confidence came just as Seoul was named host
of the 1988 Summer Olympics. Networking opportunities to socialist
states raised hopes for economic and political normalization.

Democratization through the presidential election in December 1987
boosted the legitimacy of Roh Tae-woo as the leader who could pursue
such opportunities even as the unorthodox manner of his selection by
Chun left him urgently in need of foreign policy successes. Meanwhile,
the United States and Soviet Union were achieving one breakthrough
after another in their relations, and China was opening its economy
rapidly with increasing interest in investment and trade with a neighbor
whose development complemented its own. A convergence of domestic
and international factors created near ideal conditions for new strategic
thinking symbolized by the nordpolitik policy.
The new direction established in 1988 became the driving force for
normalization in 1991 with the Soviet Union, and 1992 with China as
well as economic integration with China that kept accelerating. Instead
of relying solely on U.S. military support and U.S. and Japanese coop-
eration as the bulwark of economic growth, South Korea diversified its
options. It greatly increased its scope for diplomatic f lexibility and dras-
tically reoriented its economy with substantial strategic implications.
After long cold-war confinement on the margins of continental Asia,
Seoul burst into the continental spotlight with an abrupt turn in its
strategic options. Olympics diplomacy raised China’s profile, setting
a new direction that would lead Seoul to look beyond the United
States toward a second significant inf luence, which by the end of Roh
Tae-woo’s term was considerable.
From 1994 to 1999, Korean strategic thought wavered. Multiple
options appeared. While North Korea looked threatening as it pursued
nuclear weapons in 1993–94 and launched a new missile in 1998, South
Koreans became much less concerned about it as a threat when its
pitiable famine conditions in 1995–96 were revealed after its alliance
support had been greatly undermined by Moscow and Beijing’s shifts in
policy and withdrawal of massive subsidies. In addition, while the U.S.
alliance remained the backbone of national security, the deals cut by
the Clinton administration with North Korea in 1994 and 1999 gave
the green signal to the South to intensify newly rising engagement
efforts. The situation was changing in relations with other powers
too. While the 1998 breakthrough with Japan achieved through Kim
Dae-jung’s visit to Tokyo provided the most dramatic news after normal-
ization at the beginning of the decade with former adversaries, the
widening gap in strategic thinking about regional issues including
North Korea as well as the emotional fallout due to provocations over
history from Japan left the foundation for strategic consensus weaker
Overview ● 11
than what seemed to be the case with China. The Sunshine Policy
gathered steam against the background of this shifting strategic calculus.
Another turning point was reached amidst new international circum-
stances enveloping the Korean peninsula.
With the Kim Dae-jung presidency, there was new intensity to
Seoul’s initiatives and its multisided coordination. A two-year exhila-
rating ride put it at the center of regional diplomacy, but also left it on
a treacherously winding path that could not be navigated by itself.
When Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush, and Koizumi Junichiro succes-
sively took office as leaders set on transforming the foreign policies of
their countries and Kim Jong-il revealed that North Korea was not
nearly as transformed as some in Seoul had expected, the path forward
appeared blocked. Leaders keen on engagement were tested for their
patience and ability to work with other states while facing the danger of
overreaching and leaving their country exposed with little inf luence. If
Kim Dae-jung’s one-sided approach to Kim Jong-il, such as the secret
payment of about $500 million in return for holding a summit, left an
unbalanced legacy, Roh Moo-hyun’s troubled ties with the United
States and Japan and often unconditional moves to the North were
more damaging.
In 1998–2000 Kim Dae-jung steered his country toward a new out-
look on each of the three R’s. Engaging the North on the apparent path
to reunification, promoting a vision for regionalism, and promising not
to play the historical “card” in the hope that historical revisionism
would disappear were hallmarks of Kim’s leadership. Above all, his
Sunshine Policy substituted the goal of vigorous engagement for the
purpose of peaceful coexistence in place of the earlier objective of uni-
fication through containment, then absorption of the North, and other
interim ideas. It became the aim of South Korean leaders to pursue
normalization of ties with the North and to urge the United States and
Japan to do the same, while also pressing private enterprises to develop
ties with the North through separation of economics from politics. This
dramatic shift resulted in the historic North-South summit of June 15,
2000, and it set the tone for the approach toward North Korea under
Roh Moo-hyun too, although new tensions over nuclear weapons and
intensive negotiations among many states tested him differently. We
treat 1998 as a strategic divide, whose significance was made possible by
the earlier strategic breakthrough in 1991–92 through normalization of
relations with Moscow and Beijing, but we also recognize in 2005–07 a
decisive strategic test, with high stakes beyond any faced in these earlier
milestones. The end of the cold war, the emergence of North Korea as a
target for diplomacy, and the deepening of the second nuclear crisis,
each posed realist challenges. Old thinking would not suffice nor would
falling back on one or more of the three R’s for one group or another’s
emotional gratification as real dangers and shifts in power demanded
urgent responses.
In the maneuvering associated with the third watershed event—
represented by the February 13, 2007, deal at the Six-Party Talks—Roh
Moo-hyun, who had risked relations with Japan and the United States
by his independent moves and outspoken comments, had to choose
between synchronized moves to keep the pressure on the North or
unilateral overtures to establish his legacy in the final year of his
presidency. Having coordinated with China to keep the process going
forward and also discussed with Russia triangular economic integration
with the North should security improve, Roh was impatient to advance
ties with the North. Throughout his tenure, responses to the nuclear
crisis stood as the centerpiece in strategic thinking about Asia. With
this new stage in the crisis of a more dangerous, nuclear-armed North
Korea and a more promising multilateral framework, Roh faced his ulti-
mate test, but not one fundamentally different from what he had faced
since 2003. As the United States doubted his resolve and Japan did not
hide its intention just to wait for the election of his successor, Roh des-
perately focused on Pyongyang in the hope of winning its cooperation
for a last-minute summit that might propel the Six-Party Talks forward
and salvage his legacy through the election of a progressive as his
successor. His renewed partisanship further alienated part of the South
Korean public and media, failing the test of rallying the country behind
a strategic, realist approach to its foreign policy. Yet, he rested his hopes
on the summit, first scheduled for August 28–30, and then, following
heavy f looding in North Korea, postponed to October 2–4, 2007.
While progressives mainly approved this as the accomplishment of a
visionary, conservatives suspected that it was a naive move of despera-
tion that would have to be handled with caution if North Korea
continued to fail to reform, to denuclearize, and to permit even gradual
improvements in its human rights.
Roh never found a countervailing force to check South Korean
reliance on the United States. His allies in the Uri Party, having swept
the April 2004 National Assembly elections with a big majority, con-
templated China replacing U.S. inf luence in the region, but the Goguryo
historical claims by Chinese academics that were revealed that summer
dimmed the image of that country as aloof from the controversies swirl-
ing about South Korea’s search for historical vindication and resurgent
Overview ● 13
national identity. The United States and Japan stuck closely together, as
Roh alienated his country within the triangle, and in the Six-Party
Talks, Sino-U.S. consensus from late 2006 left South Korea on the
periphery. Only by maneuvering for leverage with Pyongyang did Roh
hope to raise his country’s voice, and he rested his prospects on a last-
ditch summit with Kim Jong-il. Many in South Korea expected little
impact on nuclear disarmament from the summit, charging that it had
more to do with the December elections and North Korea’s desire to
keep a progressive in office and prevent a conservative from replacing
him, but they also accepted the need for further engagement as long as
the concessions were not one-sided.
The Transition from Chun Doo-hwan to Roh Tae-Woo

Three fundamental transformations occurred from the early 1980s to
the early 1990s in South Korea’s position in Northeast Asia. First, for-
eign policy shifted from a military dictatorship’s narrowly purposeful
pursuit of regime support and rapid growth in exports to a democratic
nation’s exploration of national identity with varied regional options.
Second, the regional economic environment rapidly switched from a
supplicant’s plea for assistance from more established economies focus-
ing on Japan, to a confident host of the Summer Olympics projecting its
own economic vitality into newly accessible surrounding areas strug-
gling to establish their own market systems and opening to the outside
world. Finally, the regional security environment lost its cold war
frostiness, creating an inviting playing field for South Korean diplo-
macy without removing the inherent tensions of an armed standoff in
a divided country, one side of which had the demeanor of a failed,
abandoned state desperate for regime survival.
Chun consolidated power under the weight of a “moral debt” for his
brutal betrayal of popular aspirations and of an economic downturn
that could undercut his rule. He needed the United States for legiti-
macy and Japan for economic recovery. For a time, South Korea was
deepening its dependency in a polarized environment. Yet, stabilizing
his control, Chun capitalized on the dominant inf luence of these two
states in Southeast Asia to make a breakout tour of the region, focusing
on energy security and resource acquisition and proclaiming “South-
South cooperation.” The South clearly pulled far ahead of the North in
their strategic and economic competition. Preparations for the Asian
Games in 1986 and the first truly global Olympics since 1976 after two
successive boycotts opened the door to business-like contacts with
China and the Soviet Union. In short, a firm foundation was built for
bold diplomacy aimed at regional reordering. The United States was
more tolerant of separate initiatives as confidence in Mikhail Gorbachev
grew, Japan was more eager for support as it contemplated regional
leadership initiatives, and China as well as the Soviet Union had more
need of a new economic partner. Chun could capitalize on his country’s
new opportunities.
Eagerness for new economic opportunities drove Korean business
groups and a supportive state to look to the continent. As the “Han river
economic miracle” continued to integrate Korea’s economy with those
of its two principal partners, the United States and Japan, at the high
end of the economic scale, a country just entering the ranks of the
advanced capitalist nations found great advantage in integrating with
China above all at the low end of the scale. Great optimism about pros-
pects followed by a stunning rise in trade as early as the second half of
the 1980s kept raising the profile of China. Chun viewed China mainly
for its economic prospects, but Roh Tae-woo broadened the vision to
include normalization of relations and a new regional, political environ-
ment for facing North Korea, adding to the sense that 1988 was South
Korea’s strategic turning point.
After decades of unchecked rulers cultivating anticommunist nation-
alism, the success of the democratic movement left uncertain how
skeptical young people and pragmatic diplomats eager to explore ties
with communist-led states would now adjust. Resentment among young
people over the U.S. failure to condemn Chun Doo-hwan for the
Gwangju massacre and to provide support for the democracy movement
contributed to the search for other partners. Yet, under Roh Tae-woo,
there was no sharp break with past foreign policy. Even Chun would
have welcomed nordpolitik and the necessary shift toward coexistence
with the North, while conservative elites stayed close to the United
States and reminded Japan of the distrust it could engender by moving
independently toward a deal with North Korea. The new continental
strategy kept the old maritime ties as a given, coordinating closely with
Washington even as the pace of change accelerated. Yet, Roh did not
need the United States as much as his predecessors had; he listened to
China’s advice in offering to coexist with North Korea and took a fresh
look around.
Roh’s July 7, 1988 roadmap for regional transformation symbolized
the turning point in strategic thinking. It envisioned three stages: first,
overall opening to socialist countries; second, normalization with China
and the Soviet Union; and third, a summit with North Korea. Economic
Overview ● 15
power would become the means to political breakthroughs. The United

States’ reconciliation with the Soviet Union and China’s all-out advance
into the global economy made this turnabout possible. In the 1989
Sino-Soviet normalization, China’s growing need for regional partners
due to its isolation after June 4, and the collapse of the socialist bloc all
served Roh’s objectives. Public debate on foreign policy was minimal.
He did not have to worry about moral revulsion over China’s brutality
or abandonment of Taiwan as a partner. He could conduct secret
diplomacy through the Korean CIA to Moscow and through corporate
leaders with close personal ties to Beijing. Although no summit with
Kim Il-sung ensued, he was able to achieve simultaneous entry into the
United Nations of the two Koreas, and direct talks that in 1991 pro-
duced the Basic Agreement. A new psyche arose of Seoul at the center,
bringing a diverse region together while democratizing and entering the
club of developed, market economies.
Roh was an unpopular president targeted by progressives and
conservatives alike and never able to escape the shadow of being Chun’s
heir, winning due to Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung splitting most
of the vote, and becoming enmeshed in scandal as part of a legacy
of corruption. He lacked charisma and appeared weak. His inability to
rally the public behind new strategic goals left the two extremes of
the political spectrum little inclined to seek reconciliation in the fol-
lowing years. Yet, the fact that he may not be appreciated does not
diminish his strategic accomplishments. Perhaps, the times made the
man, as he seized opportunities to transform South Korea’s place in
Northeast Asia.
The Kim Young-sam Period

The euphoria of dual normalization, bringing abandonment of North
Korea by its principal military partner and economic integration with
the world’s fastest growing manufacturing juggernaut, left unclear what
strategic goals should follow. Kim Young-sam took office with the
intention to consolidate what already had been accomplished, but that
did not exclude bold plans combining globalization, diplomatic diversi-
fication, and some overtures to North Korea. His approach was well
suited to the harmonious image of entering the post–cold war and post–
Soviet Union era. Yet, he did not have the luxury of regional stability.
North Korea provoked the first nuclear crisis in 1993, and Kim’s strategic
thinking had to concentrate on how to respond while working with
others.
Kim’s ties to the Clinton administration advanced unevenly. It took

the nuclear crisis to remove the danger of a U.S. troop pullout from
the peninsula. Intense pressure for trade and financial liberalization
subsided only slowly, but the Asian financial crisis left Kim scrambling
to meet IMF requirements that were much more resented. As U.S. talks
proceeded with North Korea over the crisis, Kim made demands that
added to the tensions. Resentment at being stuck with most of the bill
for the Agreed Framework further rankled South Korean leaders. U.S.
agreement to accept China as one of four parties in new talks involving
the Koreas was approved with reluctance after the North Korean
demand for bilateral talks with the United States met joint rejection
by Seoul and Washington The makeshift character of U.S. regional
policies only compounded a lack of consistency in Kim Young-sam’s
approaches to the various countries involved.
Responses to North Korea helped to sort out Seoul’s options for
diversification of diplomatic ties. Russia seemed irrelevant and resentful
at its exclusion from crisis talks and construction of nuclear reactors
promised to the North. Its failure to start repaying South Korean loans
followed by the suspension of further loans left a bad aftertaste only
aggravated by Seoul’s loss of interest. The crisis suggested that Russia
had no further role to play, having lost its influence over the North and
lost its way economically and even in foreign policy. Japan did not seem
to be a player in the crisis either, as hopes for a new era in relations,
fueled by non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders more forthcom-
ing with apologies, met similar frustrations to hopes that had been
placed on Russia to inf luence the North. Kim Young-sam’s testy
responses to perceived affronts related to historical issues and lack of
coordination of humanitarian rice assistance to North Korea even went
so far as a desire to teach Japan a lesson, seen in the united front with
Jiang Zemin at a news conference in Seoul where both blamed Japan for
its attitude toward history. Happening just as U.S.-Japan ties were
strengthening and tensions were mounting between China and both of
these states, this hardly served a strategic purpose. Kim’s sudden about-
face in the fall of 1997 in turning in desperation to Japan to extend
large amounts of credit and allow the South to avoid the clutches of
the IMF ended in failure when it might have dramatically upgraded
relations. Diversification of foreign relations increasingly focused on
China, where economic ties were booming.
Kim articulated appealing and promising concepts, but he found it
hard to put them into practice. Seoul was buffeted by forces beyond its
control and for which it was little prepared. It tried to enlist China’s
Overview ● 17
help in influencing North Korea during the first nuclear crisis, but
China refused to become involved, unwilling to pressure the North
even if the United States contemplated an attack on its nuclear facilities.
After the Agreed Framework was reached as the North sank deeply into
famine without sign of yielding on reform, Seoul again was stymied on
how to move forward. Yet, now that Beijing in the four-party talks had
appeared to join Washington and Seoul in a line-up of three versus one
to prod Pyongyang to open its doors, Kim had more reason to expand
cooperation.
In the mid-1990s, it also became clear that new divides would delay
the pursuit of regionalism in Northeast Asia; the United States and
China were struggling anew over Taiwan’s quest for independence, and
Sino-Japanese relations had begun a sharp descent over nationalism.
Cautious diplomacy from Seoul could not ameliorate these tensions,
but at least it was not doing any harm, as others made earnest efforts to
reverse the tide. The establishment of ASEAN 1 3 bringing Seoul
together with Tokyo and Beijing in a new forum kept alive hopes for
multisided diplomacy to supplement the U.S. alliance.
The Kim Dae-jung Period

Just when South Korea seemed to be at its nadir with few diplomatic
options and a financial crisis that left it at the mercy of the international
community, Kim Dae-jung took the reins of power and went on the
offense. He made use of an unusual alignment of reconciling forces.
The United States and North Korea were seeking common ground: the
Perry mission in 1999 succeeded in reaching an agreement on a freeze
in missile tests as part of a new effort to stabilize and even normalize
relations. Chinese and Japanese leaders were trying before the setback
from Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998 and even more afterward to
put relations back on a forward-looking track, finding the new venue of
ASEAN 1 3 to serve their purposes but having some need for a third
party to serve as intermediary. Seizing these opportunities, Kim Dae-
jung set a policy course supported by a fundamentally different strategic
calculus. He realized considerable success for more than two years, but
his own overeagerness and a suddenly altered external environment for
which his approach was unsuited led to a regional impasse.
Kim Dae-jung entered office relying on the United States and Japan
in order to meet the demands of the IMF to resolve the financial crisis.
Yet, as recovery became evident, his passion for the Sunshine Policy led
him to turn to China, which more than the United States accepted
earnest engagement between the two Koreas, seen in the June 15, 2000,
summit’s use of the expression “self-reliant, peaceful unification.” In
contrast to previous presidents who stuck closely to their sole ally, he
made China as well as the United States one of Seoul’s overarching
policy priorities. From late 1999, this move led Beijing to broker the
arrangements for an historic summit, and a follow-up attempt in 2001
to bypass the new Bush administration’s reluctance aimed to keep ties
with Pyongyang moving forward. Beijing proved hesitant to become so
involved, insisting that it lacked leverage on Pyongyang. If Kim hinted
at further upgrading strategic ties with Beijing, even suggesting in Hong
Kong starting a security forum with it amid rumors that new military
relations would become institutionalized beyond naval port calls and
mutual visits of defense ministers, he pulled back in the face of obvious
concern in Washington. The reality of regional security is that South
Korea cannot bypass its alliance partner.
Kim Dae-jung fell short of success at political reconciliation inside
South Korea, although he came from a different background than his
predecessors, regionally and as a representative of progressive forces. In
fact, through his secret generosity to Kim Jong-il in order to realize the
summit and the exuberant enthusiasm toward the North that he showed
little interest in controlling, he energized the progressive camp without
calming the concerns of the conservatives, especially its foreign policy
elite. In a position of great autonomous power, he did not take care to
steer the process he had unleashed, as his own popularity slipped and
his lame-duck status started early.
Recognizing that rallying all of the powers active in the region was
the best basis for pursuing reconciliation with the North, Kim did a
better job of this than any president of South Korea had done. But
beginning in 2001, he found it difficult to manage Bush’s suspicions of
his Sunshine Policy, Koizumi’s neglect of historical reassurances, and
Putin’s vigorous wooing of Kim Jong-il through three summits in three
years. No longer able to coordinate regional actors, he also had little
hope of reinvigorating inter-Korean engagement. Having devoted so
much energy to winning the trust of Kim Jong-il and failing at that, he
was unsuccessful in clarifying a balanced approach to reunification
with restraint.
The secret funding to North Korea in 2000 may have been kept from
the Clinton administration and not deterred its own follow-up engage-
ment of the North, but when it came into the open along with the
one-sided impact of the Gumgang mountain tourism dollars f lowing to
the North, there was a breach of trust in the alliance despite its continued
Overview ● 19
importance as the anchor in facing the North’s inclination to brink-

manship. In turn, although in 2002 Koizumi was making his own
overtures, a fundamental divide was widening between Seoul and Tokyo
in dealing with Kim Jong-il. Kim Dae-jung’s reliance on Beijing was
growing. His encouragement of Putin’s North Korean gambit and
regional policies also did not preserve a favorable great power balance.
However difficult the final years of his presidency were for steering a
stable course, he left a legacy of frustration raising hopes that Seoul
could steer the region while managing Pyongyang without clarity about
the direction that should be carefully followed in coordinating the
various powers.
The Roh Moo-hyun Period

Roh came to office more eager to boost his generation of eager backers
than to achieve political reconciliation with conservatives. His was a
partisan administration that grew more so after a failed impeachment
attempt against him led to the stunning electoral success of his favored
Uri party in the April 2004 National Assembly elections. Above all, in
his pursuit of North Korea without at times insisting on reciprocity, he
split public reactions and the political establishment, undermining
prospects for consensus. Yet, he faced an external environment that
made it hard to navigate between Bush’s unilateralism and Kim Jong-il’s
determination to play his “nuclear card” to its fullest extent.
Roh’s overreaction to Japan in 2005 was a blow to the proven strat-
egy of building closer ties with all of the regional powers as the starting
point in dealing with the North. Unable to reestablish trust with
Koizumi or his successors Abe Shinzo and Fukuda Yasuo, Roh thereaf-
ter lacked a full-fledged regional strategy. His moves toward the North
generally occurred in isolation from those of other states, reducing their
effectiveness. In the summer of 2005 and the first months of 2007,
there was a greater level of coordination with better results as the United
States changed directions and explored a compromise approach, but
Roh’s impatience soon showed again as he tried to seize the initiative
with Kim Jong-il.
The boldest strategic concept raised by Roh was his call, most often
attributed to a speech on February 24, 2005, for South Korea to become
a “balancer” in Northeast Asia. There was much debate on his motives
and the degree that this was a realistic move in the circumstances
facing the country. Those who found merit in the term suggested that
it is rooted in discussions among Roh’s advisors from the second half
of 2004 in search of a future vision and in ref lections on more than a

hundred years of Korean history marked by frictions among great
powers striving for hegemony in which the peninsula served as a pawn
in their efforts. In contrast, critics charged that it was based on an
inf lated view of South Korea’s national power as if it could assume an
intermediary role between the United States and China as they have
trouble finding common ground for a new order in Northeast Asia.
In fact, hasty mention of the term without clarification followed by
desperate e-mail requests to get scholars and officials to explain the
concept suggests that Roh was unprepared and even unprofessional in
provoking other states with no sign of strategic advantage. Having
been seen as contributing to a downturn in relations with Japan as well
as the United States, the term was little used after the first half of
2005; yet, an aftertaste endured. With poor coordination over the
Six-Party Talks and a boycott of Koizumi over his historical transgres-
sions, the image stuck of Roh as impatient to make Seoul an autonomous
force. In its daring, his rhetoric could be regarded as the biggest strate-
gic gambit, exceeding nordpolitik and the Sunshine Policy in reaching
beyond alliance ties and making shaky assumptions about Pyongyang’s
willingness to change.
Not to be out of step with other states, Roh suspended rice and fertil-
izer assistance to the North after its provocative actions in the second
half of 2006 led to United Nations Security Council votes in favor of
sanctions. When the February 2007 deal was reached, Roh rushed to
reinvigorate inter-Korean talks while facing the challenge of resuming
humanitarian aid and economic assistance in a manner that would keep
pressure on the North to denuclearize while also enticing it toward
reunification. The timing would test relations with the United States
and Japan, both wary of hasty rewards that could take the pressure off
the North, and China and Russia, both eager to offer ample incentives
to the North to keep it engaged in talks and compromise moves. In
advance of the presidential elections in December 2007, Roh was impa-
tient to lock in an inter-Korean reconciliation process, angling for a
summit to revive the momentum established with the summit of 2000.
Yet, unilateral moves could be disruptive of the multilateral coordina-
tion needed for the Six-Party Talks to advance, of alliance ties with
the United States, and of relations with Japan at the other end of the
spectrum in its doubts about the new deal and its reluctance to resume
assistance to the North. After plans for the summit were made public in
early August, there was much discussion of what Roh intended to offer
and the strategic wisdom of this initiative so close to the date of the
Overview ● 21
presidential election and in the shadow of critical watersheds in Phase 2

of the implementation of the Joint Agreement.
A persistent problem was balancing the alliance with the United
States and reunification moves toward the North. Having aroused
anti-Americanism in his election in 2002 and caused dismay by his
trial balloons before taking office, Roh found it difficult to stay in
synch with Bush in the context of the Six-Party Talks: in late 2004 and
the first months of 2005, as Bush failed to turn toward a more moder-
ate approach, Roh proved unreliable; from the fall of 2005 through
the spring of 2006, he was insufficiently insistent on tough conditional-
ity for engagement of Kim Jong-il, arousing distrust; and after the
February 13 Joint Agreement, he showed impatience without necessar-
ily recognizing his country’s limits in leading Northeast Asia or striving
to build consensus. After the February 2007 Joint Agreement, the fore-
most challenge was to walk a tightrope between five versus one to keep
the Six-Party Talks focused on denuclearization, essential for the United
States, Japan, and even China, and six building a cooperative future
together, required to show North Korea the benefits of normalization in
its foreign relations and of economic and energy assistance. When Kim
Jong-il delayed shutting down his nuclear reactor in the spring of 2007,
Roh withheld shipments of rice. This met his obligations as part of five
versus one. Yet, when Kim agreed to test runs on the two rail lines
crossing the DMZ, Roh sent substantial materials to reinvigorate light
industry in the North, raising doubts among those insistent on main-
taining the pressure on Kim. Roh’s toughest challenges were still to
come as more deadlines loomed for the North to fulfill its obligations
and rewards for holding an inter-Korean summit might not speed denu-
clearization, as Roh suggested, but instead might take the pressure off a
state bent on staying nuclear. Lee Myung-bak and the GNP appealed to
Roh, if he was determined to go ahead with the summit, to concentrate
on humanitarian issues and supportive steps toward denuclearization
through the Six-Party Talks, and not to try to commit his successor to
massive economic assistance without sufficient conditionality or to
lower the South’s guard with claims of peace at hand before confidence-
building measures are undertaken.
In February 2007, five working groups of the Six-Party Talks began
to function, and after completion of the first phase of the Joint
Agreement, these groups gained more momentum in August. Roh’s
approach was put to a stern test, again putting a premium on far-
sighted strategic thinking. One working group focused on denuclear-
ization and another on economic assistance and energy for the North,
not easily kept in synch. A third group faced with forging a lasting
multilateral security framework for the region would have to await
progress in the two normalization groups of the United States and
Japan, respectively, meeting with North Korea. As the driving force in
the assistance group and also active in ministerial-level meetings and
planning a summit with the North, the South would need to time its
moves carefully to realize strategic advantage. Its actions have serious
consequences for relations with the United States and Japan and for
managing the North at a critical moment for the entire region. The
sharp split between progressives and conservatives, exacerbated in a
time of campaigning for president, did not bode well for reaching
consensus and following a measured strategic approach. But after his
election victory Lee Myung-bak made clear that he would lead his
country by supporting further engagement with the North dependent
on its willingness to denuclearize and based on increased coordination
with the United States.
The United States as a Factor in South Korean

Strategic Thinking toward Asia
If no ally of the United States has, over a long time span, been more
limited in its foreign policy options than South Korea, it may be that no
ally has had so little rapport with the United States in recent years.
European allies had each other as well as multiple options through their
own ties to the Soviet Union and powers around the world, as seen
in independent diplomacy toward China before the Sino-U.S. break-
through in 1972. Japan grew strong enough economically and could
cite both constitutional limitations and formidable leftist opposition to
restrain U.S. pressure. South Korea’s dependency went deeper: the
nature of the North Korean threat, the presence of large numbers of
U.S. forces deployed along a tense border, the dearth of options in deal-
ing with China and the Soviet Union until the 1990s, and the legacy of
suspicion toward Japan despite its existence as the only real option in
the region. More recently, North Korea’s decision to play for high stakes
with its “nuclear card” has again limited the South’s prospects for
operating independently of the United States. Even as Seoul struggles to
gain more leverage, the need for a secure alliance continues to place
severe limits on its choices.
Oddly, relations between the leaders of South Korea and the United
States usually remained troubled in comparison to other ties with allies.
Presidents of South Korea were not successful in projecting a personal
Overview ● 23
image before the American public. They did not gain the stature of
some of Japan’s prime ministers as valued partners. Moreover, in spite of
the greater attention given to problems in U.S.-Japanese relations related
to the trade gap, the problems complicating U.S.-South Korean relations
were more damaging to bilateral trust. Some past troubles could be
traced to the fact that one was democratic, the other a dictatorship.
Others ref lected different assessments of how best to meet the North
Korean threat. The trade gap became an issue, albeit on a smaller scale
than the U.S. gap with Japan. Additionally, contrasts in negotiating
style left one side or the other upset; even when an agreement was
reached the aftertaste could reduce trust and complicate the next phase
of negotiations. Apart from a few years at wide intervals, the objective
need for a strong overall alliance and close formal military ties pre-
sented a facade that hid what were troubled diplomatic dealings. Koreans
were quick to perceive more victimization; Americans paying attention
saw exaggerated nationalism.
When relations seemed to be at their best, short-term factors operated,
which could actually obscure deepening long-term divisions. One such
situation existed in the early 1980s when Ronald Reagan and the U.S.
ambassador embraced Chun Doo-hwan so fully that Korean opponents
of his renewed military dictatorship, including the massacre of many
students at Gwangju in 1980, doubted America’s support for the values
of democracy and human rights. Ignoring the opposition leaders,
including Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, the United States nar-
rowly defined bilateral relations as opposition to the Soviet Union as
well as North Korea without preparing for a political transition in the
South. This United States’ failure to develop a regional strategy beyond
anti-Soviet containment brought a temporary upswing in ties between
leaders at the cost of long-term trust between peoples, arousing anti-
American sentiment.
The end of the cold war produced a second upswing in relations, as
both ideology and engagement in Asia drew the two countries closer.
Yet, even diligent diplomacy was insufficient in the face of more open
anti-Americanism directed in part at Roh Tae-woo, who as a military
man could not escape association with his predecessor. With China
orchestrating a shift in the South’s approach to North Korea toward
peaceful coexistence and joint entry into the United Nations in 1991
(prerequisites for normalization of ties with China), even U.S. support
for nordpolitik aimed at reconciliation with communist countries and
those that had just broken free would not suffice to keep strategies
toward Asia heading in the same direction. Just as the democratization
movement in 1986–87 exposed the shortsightedness of the Reagan

approach, the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993–94 demonstrated
that the George H.W. Bush approach was inadequate. In this crisis
during the first years of Bill Clinton’s presidency, Kim Young-sam’s
insistent demands that the United States hand over position papers in
advance of U.S.-North Korean talks and that he be given a veto over its
policy strained diplomatic management by professionals on both sides.
Along with American pressure to open its economy rapidly—later
blamed by South Koreans as one cause of the 1997 financial crisis—,
lack of clarity over security interests hobbled cooperation.
The third example of apparent improvement in U.S.-South Korean
relations came in 1998–2000 when Bill Clinton and Kim Dae-jung
rallied around common objectives, especially the Sunshine Policy. With
each facing hostile conservative opposition at home toward engaging
North Korea, they reinforced each other’s decisions to move boldly
ahead. If the North Korean Taepodong missile test in August 1998
aroused some division that took the Perry process about a year to over-
come, and the June 2000 summit raised doubts in Washington about
whether Kim was moving too fast, Clinton and the State Department’s
top leadership lionized Kim Dae-jung and his achievements. This too
proved short-lived, not only because George W. Bush’s suspicions of
Kim abruptly changed the American approach but also due to one-sided
concessions to the North that inadequately tested its intentions. This
third “honeymoon” in bilateral relations was no more sustainable than
the previous two. The nuclear crisis that erupted in 2002 may have been
avoided by more continuity in American policy and sensitivity to
multilateralism, but there is ample reason to conclude that the rush
for reconciliation on the peninsula with U.S. blessing required some
corrective.
Even when Washington and Seoul drew closer around a common
regional policy, the results proved unsatisfactory. The attention of the
United States to South Korea’s long-term trends and interests was inad-
equate, and South Korean leadership failed to recognize the need to
reassure the American political elite with its values and concerns rather
than just to cater to the predilections of the current president. For
Washington, Seoul was never a high priority as attention easily turned
elsewhere, such as the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in
2003. Even for Seoul, building lasting trust with its only ally did not
achieve sufficient priority, especially in the Roh Moo-hyun era. In the
background, behind the search for new South Korean strategic think-
ing toward Asia loomed a critical but often troubled and asymmetrical
Overview ● 25
alliance with a superpower that was more concerned with the major
powers in the region. Problems in strategizing about the alliance became
more apparent as the South’s options grew more diverse and as ties to
the North were changing.
After the election of Lee Myung-bak, his advisors left no doubt
about the increased priority for relations with the United States made
easier by the latter’s conciliatory posture in the Six-Party Talks as
long as the North proceeded with denuclearization. They called for a
“trust-based alliance,” a “values-based alliance” based on joint support
for democracy and a market economy, and a “peace-building alliance”
targeting both the Korean peninsula and the world. A binational “wise-
men’s group” began planning for an early summit after the inauguration
and a leap forward in strategic coordination as well as a better atmo-
sphere for ratification of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that was
concluded in the spring of 2007. With Fukuda and Lee eager to repair
ties between their countries, prospects for triangular cooperation were
also improving.
Forces of Change in Strategic Thinking

The past quarter century has seen both conservative and progressive
leaders in Seoul seek ways to gain leverage in regional relations. If the
latter were more insistent on breaking free of dependency, even the
former found it advantageous to add more options. Japan became an
alternative source of funds, but it was too associated with historical mis-
conduct and with U.S. foreign policy, to be taken seriously in the search
for more diversity. In the fall of 1997, it missed a rare opportunity in the
financial crisis to become a kind of savior in place of the IMF, and after
1998, it hastened its own slippage despite the breakthrough agreement
with Kim Dae-jung by stubbornly putting historical issues in the fore-
ground. North Korea too had a chance of dealing directly with the
South in ways that could have bypassed the United States; however it
kept insisting that the latter was its real target on political and security
matters, relegating the former to a humanitarian role and limited
economic and cultural ties incapable of giving it a leadership role. Only
China emerged as a serious alternative to dependency on the United
States, but this occurred gradually and is too limited to allow for
balanced relations.
China’s significance has been rising for two decades. It has become
the number one economic partner of South Korea and is pulling further
ahead of other partners. In the nuclear crisis, China has agreed to take
a central role, sharing leadership in dealing with North Korea with the
United States and encouraging South Koreans to value its similar
approach as well as essential contribution. In the pursuit of regionalism,
as in ASEAN 1 3 where the United States is absent, China gained an
equal status with Japan as a partner and then proceeded to take region-
alism more seriously and make South Korea more reliant on its initia-
tives and more in sympathy with its thinking. The continued rise of
China promises to add further balance to Seoul’s calculations on great
power connections for realizing regional goals; yet, as long as Pyongyang
keeps relying on military pressure to make its weight felt, strategic
thinking in Seoul is likely to be focused on Washington. In addition, by
making Goguryo an historical flashpoint with ramifications for future
reunification diplomacy, China has aroused distrust that is likely to
linger.
The outcome of the nuclear crisis could have far-reaching conse-
quences for South Korean strategic rethinking. If the North were to
remain a nuclear state and be accepted in the region, some in the South
might be inclined to make some accommodation that could lessen
reliance on the United States. Yet, should the Six-Party Talks break
down and leave the North more isolated and disruptive as a pariah state,
the adjustment could well be to draw closer to the United States. Finally,
if a multilateral approach continues to gain momentum with the pros-
pect of a mixture of carrots and sticks to keep the North in line as the
Six-Party Talks kept going, then interest in regionalism, working closely
with all of the others, might be enhanced. The nuclear issue has been a
powerful force since 1993 affecting strategic thinking, and it is likely to
remain so in the near future.
We should not neglect soft power as a factor that could exert impact
on strategic thinking too. The Korean wave phenomenon of popular
culture drawing rave interest in the region bodes well for South Korea’s
potential to become a magnet for its neighbors. Its political leaders
might also take advantage of the fact that Japan’s narrow historical out-
look and often excessive reaction to China’s rise as well as China’s
authoritarian image and potential to arouse fears of hegemony put South
Korea in the enviable spot of being the least suspect of the core states in
Northeast Asia. Skillful diplomacy may allow it scope to capitalize on
its superior image.
Finally, it is necessary to recognize the importance of presidential
elections in shaping strategic thought. Replacement of an uncompro-
mising progressive such as Roh Moo-hyun with a strong conservative
voice is clearly bound to produce major changes in a state deeply divided
Overview ● 27
in worldview. The turning points in 1988 and 1998 can be traced in part
to shifts in the type of political leadership governing the country, and
another shift in 2008 can be expected, especially if the Six-Party Talks
reach an impasse. Within limits imposed by the region’s geopolitical
realities, Seoul has room to make critical choices for altering its strategic
environment.
Lessons for Strategic Thinking

Strategic thinking poses a unique challenge for South Korea for the
following reasons. First, it is the world’s only divided country where a
single nationality with strong historical roots as a unified state has long
faced a danger of devastating inter-Korean war. This confuses the mean-
ing of nationalism and leads to rapid shifts in views of reunification.
Second, South Korea has an unparalleled location at the crossroads of
four great powers, each with an assertive position about its place in the
region and deep sensitivities about any loss of inf luence on the penin-
sula. Its situation is ripe for strategic maneuvering by others and, as its
own claims to power have risen, by itself too. Third, South Korea, in
1950–53 and again from 2002, found itself on the front line in a polar-
ized world. In the first case, the rules for the cold war were being tested,
and in the second, the rules for nuclear weapons possession and the
prevention of proliferation were on the line in a new war against terror-
ism and threats with WMD. Fourth, because strategic thinking becomes
intertwined with historical legacies and territorial claims, the fact that
Northeast Asian states are burdened with consciousness of deep divi-
sion over Japan’s conduct in the first half of the twentieth century and
some further distrust over the legacy of communism in the second half
makes South Korea’s task more difficult. Historical symbols such as the
Yasukuni Shrine contribute to emotionalism at home and elsewhere in
Asia that can obstruct forward-looking strategic calculations.
We draw the following six lessons from the quarter century of
strategizing in South Korea about Northeast Asia. First, political
reconciliation at home is a cornerstone for a clear, consistent strategy.
Regional, generational, and institutional divisions—all a residue of the
cold war divides that were left to fester—have not been bridged, as each
new president with the immense power vested in this office brusquely
sets a distinct course while stumbling in forging a broad coalition.
Overcoming the divides left through the cold war looms as one of the
principal challenges, especially difficult in a nation still split by the
DMZ, for improved strategic foresight.
Second, successive experiences since nordpolitik demonstrate that

reentering Asia in the fullest sense, including reconciliation with Japan,
is a critical precondition for a well-conceived strategic approach to
reunification. This means reconciling the special alliance ties to the
United States with the geographical realities of a state sandwiched
between three great powers of Asia. Given Japan’s incomplete reentry
into Asia, China’s uncertain leadership aspirations in the region, and
Russia’s unrealized longing for recognition as a full member of the club,
South Korea cannot expect smooth or quick resolution of its own quest
for clarity about how it fits into the evolving Northeast Asia regional
complex.
Third, however unchallenged reunification remains as a long-term
goal, strategic thinking requires that it be approached with sober recog-
nition of the hurdles ahead. It must be kept in context, putting security
concerns first and striving in various ways for synchronization of the
different lines of engagement toward the North in light of reciprocal
actions and region-wide developments.
Fourth, for the near future at least, the alliance with the United
States stands as the foundation for relations with North Korea and a
significant factor in shaping ties with others in Northeast Asia. This
foundation should not be undermined, although the United States also
must not be given a veto regardless of the circumstances. When U.S.
policy fails to suit South Korean national interests, quiet means of
registering dissatisfaction are preferable. If initiatives might damage
U.S. ties, cautious restraint in how to proceed is sensible. The alliance
must change, inevitably losing some of its significance, but it would
be nothing short of strategic shortsightedness to undercut it when its
role remains essential.
Fifth, South Korea must keep its eyes on the East Asian core triangle,
managing the Sino-Japanese rivalry as the pivotal third party but atten-
tive to the limitations of a middle power caught between two assertive
great powers. As the heir to the Sinocentric legacy and a country that
stresses “respect” and censorship in coverage of critical foreign affairs
themes, China’s sensitivity to criticism suggests prudence in dealing
with it. As the successor to imperial Japan’s colonial rule and a country
inclined toward “revisionist” talk about its past role in Asia, Japan’s
insensitivity also demands prudence on matters of considerable emo-
tional appeal to South Koreans. Shaping this triangle will not be easy,
but it is becoming increasingly important.
Finally, we recognize the enduring appeal of championing regional-
ism, building consensus toward multilateralism. This is likely to be a
Overview ● 29
priority for any president of South Korea, given the presence of four
assertive great powers and the complicated problems of achieving recon-
ciliation, let alone, reunification on the peninsula. Strategic thinking
will no doubt incorporate this objective, but doing so without succumb-
ing to idealism over how to proceed means keeping the above five
objectives clearly in mind.
Given these daunting challenges, Lee Myung-bak is starting by
advocating a “creative, pragmatic diplomacy-security policy.” In order
to achieve the long-standing goal of “peace and stability” on the peninsula,
his basic plan is “denuclearization, opening (liberalizing North Korea’s
economy), and then upgrading its per capita income to $3,000 over ten
years.” At the same time as global standards are applied to the North,
the foremost priority will be to strengthen the “strategic alliance” with
the United States, highlighting its usefulness for the national interest.
Another objective is to develop a “greater Asian diplomacy,” leading to
the expansion of an “Asian cooperative network” based on open region-
alism. As a starting point, reconciliation is sought with Japan on the
basis of renewed and deeper trilateral cooperation involving the United
States. A new energy diplomacy is also planned, including an “energy
frontier strategy” to secure future resources. This pragmatism toward
Russia and Central Asia, however, may conf lict with an emphasis on
“liberal-democratic” values. In recognition of culture as an “indelible
component” of his foreign policy, Lee aspires to build a “soft, strong
power,” especially combining culture and technology into a “creative
industry.” Despite these ambitious goals, Lee’s foreign policies will be
tested by how he positions his country among the four powers and his
implementation of North Korean policy. Realistically, his success
depends heavily on what strategic choice the North makes and on
regional dynamics mostly beyond his control.
Chronology
CHAPTER 2
South Korean Strategic

Thought toward Asia in the 1980s
Kyudok Hong
T
he most common explanation for the foreign policy of a small or
middle-ranked state during the cold war rests on the concept of
power: powerful states secure the compliance of small states
through the use of coercion as well as rewards.1 David Vital explains
that since there is a disparity of military strength between the great and
small powers, it is inevitable for the latter to sacrifice their autonomy in
making foreign policy. Most realist scholars share Vital’s view that
“conflict with a great power is ultimately a conflict over autonomy,” 2
but there is a tendency to underestimate the possibility of a small state
being able to shape its own policy independent of external pressure.
The basic assumption on the capabilities of small states was not changed
by neorealists during the 1980s, who also treated systemic conditions
as the fundamental determinant of their behavior and tended to
neglect the impact of domestic sociopolitical structure upon the foreign
policymaking process and the role of top leaders in making strategic
choices.
Analyzing key foreign policy decisions of South Korea during the
1980s and looking back to the context in the 1960s–70s provide us with
pertinent cases for understanding how leaders of a small/middle state
can inf luence the great powers and how they search for strategic alter-
natives when the great power’s interests no longer converge with theirs.
This requires us to identify the main characteristics of South Korea’s
foreign policymaking and also the strategic thinking of the leaders who
34 ● Kyudok Hong
responded to both domestic and international challenges. South Korea’s

two leaders of the late cold war period, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh
Tae-woo, operated in the shadow of Park Chung-hee’s longstanding
rule; so we also look back to his legacy. Through comparisons, we take
note not only of positive outcomes from their strategic choices but also
strategic failures.
This study addresses several thematic questions: 1) which was more
important, economic growth, or changes in the international system, in
shaping Korean strategic thought? 2) in what ways did South Korea
enhance its capability and mitigate the asymmetry between larger
powers, including through linkages between economics and politics?
3) what was the domestic context for unification proposals posed by
Chun and Roh, and how did they inf luence strategic thought toward
neighboring states? and 4) how did changes in the South Korea-U.S.
alliance relationship affect the strategic thought of Korean leaders
toward the region? Among the strategic choices made by leaders in
Seoul, this study emphasizes nordpolitik, the comprehensive, successful
strategy of Roh best approached through three dimensions; security,
economics, and domestic politics. We ask: was it as successful as
claimed? If not, why not? And, in this connection, how did it influence
the leaders of North Korea in calculating their own strategic choices?
Decision-Making Authority and

Comparisons of Three Leaders
South Korean foreign policy may appear straightforward because few
people are involved in policy formulation; yet there are challenges in
explaining what kinds of strategic considerations decision makers made
and why. While pursuing the strategic goals of legitimacy, national
security, and economic development,3 Korean elites based their legiti-
macy upon what was considered a Confucian code of “making their
country wealthy and militarily strong” (buguk kangbyong) as set forth by
Park Chung-hee and faithfully followed by his successors. The fact that
he came to power through a military coup had direct implications for
conducting foreign policy, as did the professional background as mili-
tary officers of his two successors, who also were extremely sensitive in
justifying their hold on power. They had to keep reminding people how
dangerous the threat from the North was, and how keeping close ties
with the United States under their leadership would bring benefits by
improving economic conditions. Particularly Chun and Roh, as rookie
politicians, needed to prove that they could achieve strategic goals
Strategic Thought in the 1980s ● 35
through bold foreign policy initiatives and positive results in areas

where Park had not succeeded.
The foreign policy decision-making process was consistent with
structures in which a strong leader makes every key decision in a monar-
chical manner. These were leaders “who have both the ability to commit
or withhold the resources of the government in foreign affairs; and the
power or authority to prevent other entities within government from
overtly reversing their position without significant costs.”4 In the
1960s–70s, Park Chung-hee held the power to commit the resources of
the nation that could not readily be reversed and to stif le opposition
with an iron hand. He was “a predominant leader,” whose personal
beliefs as well as desire to reach consensus were major factors that
restricted diverse perspectives and open expression of disagreement.5
For the past thirty years, however, South Korea’s policy structure
and process has been changing fundamentally. Public opinion became
an important component of domestic power as democracy advanced.
The opposition groups were rapidly strengthened during the Chun
period and their power was hardly controllable by the time Roh became
the president in 1987, facing violent demands for open democracy and a
more f lexible unification policy. He desperately needed new approaches
to preempt their progressive demands and quell their criticism. Despite
the fact that the bureaucracy had developed greatly in manpower and
professional capability, as a former military officer, he preferred to con-
duct foreign policy in a secretive manner through his royal advisors
without relying on the regular channels. The most useful category for
the South Korean policymaking process may be the “royal court” model,
in which foreign policymaking is highly centralized in a monarchical
mode, dominated by the head of government and his key advisors. 6
Under Park, only a handful of qualified professionals worked relent-
lessly to serve him and there existed no room for bargaining or compro-
mise with the bureaucracy. No one dared to challenge a presidential
decision. In contrast, Chun and Roh were totally dependent upon a
professional advisory group who were in charge of foreign and national
security affairs. Unlike Park, Chun could not overcome his tarnished
image throughout his seven years in office after brutally suppressing the
Gwangju uprising in the process of gaining his post. Being handpicked
by Chun as his successor in the 1987 presidential election, Roh’s popu-
larity was extremely low from the beginning. Chun and Roh exerted all
of their power to assist their key advisors and officials to implement
certain policies. Organizational constraints began to appear in making
key decisions.
36 ● Kyudok Hong
The issue of strategic autonomy has always been sensitive for Koreans.
The role of the United States and the pro-Korean American leaders was
critical, particularly in the early Park period when he made decisions to
normalize relations with Japan and send troops to Vietnam. However,
after Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine in 1969, rising mistrust and
inflexibility on the part of the Korean government made it much more
difficult for the United States to support Korea as in the past. Jimmy
Carter could have attempted to weaken the Park government (or to
embrace Park), but instead he chose a course of open criticism and
warnings that only irritated it. The United States could still make itself
felt in the South Korean political process but not necessarily in ways
that enabled it to achieve specific goals, and certainly not in a matter of
regime legitimacy to which the South Korean authorities attached vital
political importance.7 The confidence between Washington and Seoul
was miraculously restored, however, when Ronald Reagan began to
change U.S. policy. He invited Chun as the first foreign leader to visit
him in the White House and gave him the legitimacy to win the presi-
dential election in February 1981. Chun’s total confidence in Reagan
enabled the United States to regain its political influence; yet his
dilemma was that he could not remain passive within the U.S. sphere
of inf luence when changes in international and national conditions
required breaking out of this preoccupation. Chun and Roh were wary
of repeating the strategic mistakes of Park in relying exclusively on the
United States. Despite a revitalized partnership, radical elements within
Korean society began to use anti-American sentiment as a tool to oppose
Chun and his authoritarian manner of rule.
The decision-maker’s policy choices and strategic thinking were
shaped by personal characteristics. Henry Kissinger postulates that
leadership types are formed by at least three factors: leaders’ experience
during their rise to eminence, the structure in which they operate, and
the values of their society.8 He distinguishes between three contempo-
rary leadership types: the bureaucratic-pragmatic type, of which the
American elite is the main example; the ideological type, seen in com-
munist states such as the Soviet Union; and the charismatic-revolutionary
type, often found in new nations. It is difficult, however, to categorize
Park, Chun, and Roh into one of these types. Their foreign policies
centered, above all, on the United States; Park was a hybrid “charismatic-
pragmatic,” Chun was closer to the charismatic type, and Roh may best
be labeled as an “opportunistic-pragmatic” leader.
Park Chung-hee successfully executed the first coup in Korea’s mod-
ern history on May 16, 1961. To obtain support from the United States,
he expressed strong anticommunist sentiments and sought an image as

a practical, pro-American leader. Park repeatedly delivered a message of
readiness to fight against communist forces in Vietnam in order to
assist the U.S. war efforts. Moreover, he distanced himself from
President Syngman Rhee by showing his f lexibility in dealing with
Japan. Although Park faced widespread anti-Japanese sentiments at
home, he made a bold decision to normalize relations, knowing that his
choice would be welcomed as a step toward forging an anticommunist
alliance between Japan and Korea. Yet, he skillfully used anti-Japanese
feelings in extracting economic concessions whenever he found it neces-
sary to strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis Japan.
Park was the type of leader who had strongly held views of the world
and used incoming information to support his predispositions, choos-
ing advisors who defined problems as he did and who were generally
enthusiastic about his ideas. Policymaking under the Chun government
was often conducted in a “corporativist” manner, according to Ahn
Byung-Joon, meaning, “a type of organization where its members try to
cooperate and unite for certain purposes; one of its characteristics is
that such cooperation takes place within the organization itself because
its hierarchy of command is very strict.” 9 The decision to request a
$6 billion loan from Japan ref lects Chun’s leadership style. His advisors
argued that Seoul is entitled to such aid by virtue of its contribution to
Japan’s security. If they expected that such a request could cause strain
between two neighbors, they had to implement the decision, since Chun
strongly believed that showing his toughness would pay off. Roh was
more sensitive to the opinions of others and to incoming information
in the wake of the successful democratization movement. As chairman
of the Olympic Committee and minister of sports, he knew how to
compromise with those who cast votes. He also showed great interest in
collecting sufficient information and intelligence from many different
sources before making a decision. Individuals with experience and
knowledge in foreign and economic affairs had good access to him. Roh
was not regarded as a decisive leader and he often shifted direction as
opportunities arose, but people believe that without his softness and
ambiguity he would never have had a chance to be nominated as the
official candidate to succeed Chun. All of his colleagues who had shown
strong personalities and leadership qualities were ousted by Chun in the
process of power competition. For Roh Chun was a lifetime companion
since his youth at the military academy, about whom he always had
mixed feelings, prompting a desire to overcome him by achieving a
success in foreign policy, particularly in inter-Korean affairs.
38 ● Kyudok Hong
As for Kissinger’s other two factors shaping leadership types, South

Korea’s particular domestic environment ensured an ideological con-
text. The three presidents tried hard to portray themselves as pragma-
tists but their pragmatism was heavily blended with the ideology of
anticommunism. In addition, social values in Korea were changing
rapidly from the period of sending troops to Vietnam, when no serious
student opposition materialized, to the early 1980s, when Chun failed
to persuade the public of the rationale of sending his special forces to
Lebanon at the request of the United States. After the Gwangju massacre,
anti-Americanism was growing fast and Chun decided not to provoke
public animosity against his government. Despite his charisma, Chun’s
once forceful role in foreign policy slipped after experiencing the
Rangoon bombing and the downing of K AL 007 over Soviet air space
in 1983, as he grew more tentative.
Paranoia related to excessive fear of abandonment by the United
States may have affected strategic thinking too. After experiencing the
withdrawal of some American forces from Korea, Park repeatedly men-
tioned changing South Korea’s foreign policy orientation from depen-
dence on the United States to self-reliance or independence. His strong
doubts about United States staying power in East Asia contributed to
South Korea’s brief but serious effort to develop its own nuclear capabil-
ity. Experiencing Kim Il-sung’s frequent attempts at intimidation also
left a deep impact on leaders who had spent their professional career in
the military before turning to politics. Although they proposed various
ideas to Pyongyang for reducing tensions, they never trusted its sincer-
ity and were frustrated by repeated failures. Despite the rhetoric of
peaceful coexistence, they turned to a strategy of isolating the North by
normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist
countries. Chun and Roh aimed to win the cold war with Pyongyang by
using South Korea’s rising economic power. Having barely survived the
Rangoon bombing by North Korean agents, Chun resented the regime
responsible for killing many of his cabinet members. Although he made
various proposals to improve relations, he did not believe in the possi-
bility of North Korea accepting his legitimacy. A “good neighbor policy”
toward its communist patrons could, however, cause a diplomatic coup
to regain public support and marginalize its inf luence.
Changing Dynamics of the International System

and Korea’s Economic Rise
The most important change during the cold war era was the realignment
among the major powers in East Asia resulting from the development of
relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the one

hand and the United States and Japan on the other. This gave South
Korea an opportunity to seek strategic alternatives. Its first step was to
propose Red Cross talks with North Korea on August 12, 1971 in order
to reduce tensions and promote communications. Considering the
people’s desire to unite their families separated after the Korean War,
this could instantly gain popular support, and it was a well-calculated
tactical response to the move by Pyongyang six days earlier to include
all political parties and social organizations in discussions of peace and
unification. Seoul’s step-by-step approach, starting from nonpolitical
moves, was much safer than Pyongyang’s position focusing on politico-
military issues first. After mutual visits of high officials, the two sides
finally agreed on a Joint Statement of July 4, 1972, which consisted of
three principles: 1) independence and exclusion of external powers;
2) nonuse of force; and 3) national unity transcending differences in
ideas, ideologies, and systems. This momentous historical event raised
high expectations for unification.
The North-South dialogue served Park’s political interests. He
hinted that a fundamental restructuring of South Korea’s political
system might be necessary in order to carry out the dialogue with
Kim Il-sung. Actually, the first principle, “the exclusion of external
powers,” was totally inconsistent with Seoul’s long-standing position,
but its concession induced Pyongyang to sign the agreement as a
platform for demanding an early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.
Park exploited the new development, using the need for strong leader-
ship for managing instability as the main justification for the Yushin
(Revitalized Reform) on October 17, 1972, in which he proclaimed
martial law and prolonged his presidency indefinitely by using extra-
constitutional measures.
Park’s initiative toward North Korea was equally aimed at Washington,
which had enthusiastically welcomed North-South talks in 1971 in the
hope that they would reduce tension on the peninsula. Park argued that
his government would be able to continue the talks with Pyongyang
more easily and confidently if his modernization program was fully
implemented in a speedy manner. Approximately two-thirds of the aid
program awaited congressional approval when substantive talks between
the two Koreas started in October 1972.10
The second course of action taken by Seoul was to seek official
contacts with the PRC and the Soviet Union, hoping that these
communist powers might succeed in persuading the North Korean
government to accept a formula of cross-recognition of the two Koreas
by the major powers. Seoul’s proposal on June 23, 1973 included the
40 ● Kyudok Hong
following: 1) not to oppose North Korea’s participation in international

organizations; 2) not to object to the North’s admission into the UN
together with the South; and 3) to open its door to all the nations of the
world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. In fact,
these points merely acknowledged a fait accompli since North Korea
had already been admitted into the World Health Organization in May
1973 and had succeeded in establishing official relations with as many
as twelve states including Sweden, Finland, and Norway. What was
new, however, was the bold proposal for the simultaneous entry of both
Koreas into the UN as full-f ledged members, ref lecting an assessment
that reunification remained but a distant goal. However, Pyongyang
instantly rejected this proposal on the ground that it made the division
of Korea permanent. The open-door policy produced no tangible results
but some communist countries including the Soviet Union showed
interest in the idea of a two-Korea policy.
Fully recognizing the rift between Beijing and Moscow, Seoul con-
sidered that Moscow would be interested in countering Beijing’s anti-
Soviet encirclement campaign in East Asia by stretching a conciliatory
hand toward it. In fact, Moscow carefully began to allow nongovern-
mental contacts and indirect trade with South Korea. In many venues,
Soviet delegations did not conceal their interest in a two-Korea policy,
while the PRC, due to its close ties to Pyongyang, heavily criticized
Seoul’s open-door policy.
Seoul’s third course was to pursue strategic autonomy. As soon as
Nixon announced a partial withdrawal of ground forces, Park attempted
to develop Korea’s own nuclear capability and tried to increase its own
defense capabilities by emphasizing self-reliance and military modern-
ization. But his clandestine efforts to become a nuclear power state were
frustrated, and personal diplomacy to influence pro-Korean U.S. con-
gressmen and other officials strained the alliance further. The resultant
lobbying scandal significantly undermined Seoul’s ability to conduct
effective diplomacy. The anxiety felt by South Korean leaders during
the Nixon and early Carter administrations gave rise to the realization
that U.S.-South Korean relations should not depend heavily upon a
particular U.S. administration. In order not to repeat Park’s strategic
mistakes, his successors should prepare for the contingency that U.S.
security assistance might not be available. Under Chun, a reevaluation
of the perennial dependence on the United States was undertaken in
light of rapidly changing international circumstances.
An important change noticed increasingly in the 1980s was South
Korea’s remarkable economic growth, which compelled its leaders to
look far beyond the United States as well as Japan for exchange and
cooperation. Seoul was able to expand its horizon to the Middle East,
Southeast Asia, Western Europe, South America, and Africa. It needed
export markets, manpower outlets, investment sources, and resources
for industrial use and consumption. It also sought opportunities for
economic exchange with the Soviet Union and China, as it was reduc-
ing its heavy economic dependence on the United States. The export-
led industrialization and economic modernization strategy came with
the assumption that rapid economic dynamism would translate into
increased prestige on the international arena. Rising economic power
became an effective source of legitimizing the rule of Chun and Roh as
well as Park. Chun successfully managed the economic difficulties after
Park’s death, securing a stable supply of natural resources and crude oil,
diversifying trade partners, and forging ties of economic and technical
cooperation with many countries through his economic diplomacy.
Later, Roh skillfully used economic resources to achieve foreign-policy
objectives by increasing contacts with the Soviet Union, Eastern
European countries, and finally China.
The rapid economic expansion has been the source of self-confidence
and assertiveness among the South Korean people in general and offi-
cials in particular. Korea became an important emerging market and
was treated as a crucial partner for its purchasing power and techno-
logical skills. By the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and the PRC realized
that South Korea could be a contributing factor in transforming their
own economies.11 Depicted as one of Asia’s rising “four small dragons,”
Korea was able to take advantage of changes in the international system
in which “low politics” were gaining more attention at the expense of
“high politics.” The Roh government believed that security require-
ments would be reduced by these new associations with the socialist
governments, removing the military threat from both the Soviet Union
and the PRC. Transcending his military past, Roh became a true believer
in “transnationalism,” preaching that economic exchanges would reduce
long-held prejudices.
Key Strategic Decisions under Park Chung-hee

Park made two important early strategic choices: sending troops to
Vietnam and normalizing relations with Japan. The policies achieved
remarkable success and laid the foundation for his successor to reach
out to the world by breaking out of the foreign policy preoccupation
with the United States. Park spent four years persuading policymakers
42 ● Kyudok Hong
in the United States before he finally won approval from Lyndon

Johnson for sending combat forces to Vietnam.12 He understood the
possibilities for using this to support his economic development plans,
military modernization, and new diplomatic movement.13
A divided state like Korea apparently has fewer options than do other
small states in competing for patron powers, but U.S. dependence on its
contribution in Vietnam strengthened its bargaining position. Many
now agree that successful avoidance of a balance-of-payments crisis
through export-oriented industrialization in the early 1970s was due to
Park’s early decision on participation in Vietnam. Sending troops for
eight and half years proved helpful in mobilizing a surplus for invest-
ment and avoiding an oversupply of labor that might slow the pace of
development. It is hard to imagine such economic success without
considering the impact of Park’s decision to join the war; however, once
the United States changed its policy, Park had to change too.
The initiative to normalize relations with Japan was no less critical
in laying a foundation for Korean foreign policy in the 1980s. The
United States was eager for early reconciliation between its two “client
states.” Not only would cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo solidify
its alliances against communist expansion in Northeast Asia, but it
would also lessen the U.S. defense burden in the region. However, Park,
who once served as a Japanese army officer, had difficulty reducing
anti-Japanese sentiments that deeply penetrated the society after his
predecessor Rhee Syngman deliberately drummed up emotions as part
of a calculated policy to stabilize his insecure regime.
One of his motives for normalization was to stabilize South Korea eco-
nomically. The military government established an economic planning
board and announced an outline of a Five-Year Economic Development
Plan for 1962–66, but it did not have the resources to implement this
plan. It was hard to convince the United States to offer more aid because
Park had failed to fulfill commitments to return the government to
civilian control. The normalization opened Korea to Japanese investment,
and over the next seven years the Japanese loaned an additional $581.3
million, largely as commercial credit. It gave momentum to efforts to
expand foreign relations beyond the United States and also reduced to
some extent the heavy economic dependence on one country.14
Key Strategic Decisions under Chun Doo-hwan

As president-elect, Reagan invited Chun Doo-hwan to Washington in
February 1981, signifying a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy.
It was a diplomatic coup for Chun since he was not only deeply involved
in the Gwangju atrocities of May 1980, but had also ordered the arrest
of prominent political figures including Kim Dae-jung on charges of
sedition. In total, he dismissed or arrested about 8,000 civil servants,
executives of state corporations, and journalists on charges of corrup-
tion and shut down 172 journals and newspapers.15 The image of mili-
tary dictator was bolstered when he forced Choi Kyu-hah to resign the
presidency in order to be elected without opposition by the National
Conference for Unification on August 27, 1980.
Chun’s efforts to win international support on the world stage to
boost his image as a capable leader benefited from the renewed cold war
after Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Reagan wanted to
check Soviet expansionism and restore American leadership, seeing
South Korea as central to building a loose grouping of friendly powers
in East Asia.16 Reagan’s support gave Koreans more self-confidence and
even a sense of autonomy. Reagan recognized the strategic value of the
Korean peninsula and confirmed that the United States had no plans to
withdraw ground troops, showing that he placed security and loyalty
ahead of other considerations, including human rights. This gave Chun
confidence to pursue foreign policy in other directions, beginning with
Pyongyang. Chun delivered a simple, clear message that he would be
ready to meet Kim Il-sung anytime, anywhere to discuss unification
and humanitarian concerns.
Chun soon launched a propaganda campaign toward nonhostile
communist countries and nonaligned states, mobilizing the Korean
business community to promote the country’s strategic interests over-
seas. South-South cooperation with resource-rich countries could not
have been possible without their active contribution. They were ready
to gamble in high-risk areas as the “second engine” for “Korea’s eco-
nomic take off.”17 When North Korea failed to win endorsement at the
foreign ministers’ conference of the nonaligned countries in New Delhi,
it was a huge victory for Chun. Chun’s two-week tour of the ASEAN
countries in the summer of 1981 also represented a diplomatic coup. His
hosts in all five countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
and the Philippines—endorsed not only his proposal for mutual visits
and dialogue between the heads of the two Koreas but also the long-
standing position on simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the
United Nations. Affirming joint pursuit of common strategic interests,
the summits paved the way for expansion of economic and technical
cooperation. ASEAN had emerged as a vital source of natural resources,
completely meeting the domestic requirements for tin, rubber, and palm
44 ● Kyudok Hong
oil. In addition, the ASEAN countries, which accounted for 76 percent

of total timber imports, 49 percent of copper ore, 45 percent of tita-
nium, and 35.2 percent of raw sugar, pledged that the supply of these
resources and crude oil would not be interrupted. In return, South
Korea pledged to provide technical know-how and trained manpower in
such sectors as construction, development of energy resources, manu-
facturing, and processing. Chun and ASEAN leaders agreed to promote
joint ventures, particularly in resource-based industries, and to increase
cooperation in fishing and marine transportation. Considering the chronic
trade deficit with ASEAN—$348 million in 1980—, these were
beneficial moves.18
Pyongyang also dispatched its own delegation headed by Vice
Premier Kye Ung-tae to the region after Chun’s successful visit, but it
failed. This demonstrated the strategic importance of economic capac-
ity in conducting foreign policy. Chun’s “South-South Cooperation”
initiative gave him a political victory at home, showing too that his
regime was capable of functioning smoothly without social or political
disturbances during his prolonged absence.
South Korea’s growing ability to win support in the Third World was
demonstrated in September 1981, when the International Olympic
Committee chose Seoul rather than Nagoya, Japan as the site of the
1988 Summer Olympic Games. U.S. backing was a significant factor in
winning votes from many countries, but Pyongyang did its best to
prevent the Games from coming to Seoul. After a Korean commercial
airliner carrying 109 passengers was blown out of the sky in 1987 in a
terrorist bombing, even officials at Olympic headquarters in Lausanne
began to doubt the wisdom of their choice. North Korea also master-
minded a boycott of the Games, and when this failed demanded to
cohost. The International Olympic Committee eventually offered it a
share in hosting five sports. Pyongyang insisted on a minimum of
eight and never replied to the IOC’s final offer.19 With Seoul also chosen
to host the Asian Games of 1986, Chun was able to use these decisions
to expand Seoul’s inf luence abroad and solidify his grip on power
at home.
In January 1982 South Korea launched a diplomatic offensive focused
on reunification policy. In his New Year’s policy statement to the
National Assembly on January 22, Chun unveiled a comprehensive pro-
posal for forming a Consultative Conference for National Reunification
(CCNR) consisting of representatives of North and South Korea with
the aim of drafting a constitution for a unified Korea, the conclusion of
a provisional agreement on basic relations between the two Korean
states, and the establishment of resident liaison missions in each other’s

capitals. Chun also reiterated his 1981 proposals for a summit meeting.
Chun responded strategically to the North’s diplomatic offensive aimed
at exploiting Seoul’s vulnerability in the aftermath of Park’s assassina-
tion. After Pyongyang proposed the Democratic Confederated Republic
of Koryo (DCRK) as the “most realistic and shortest way to realize
Korea’s reunification based on the three principles of independence,
peaceful reunification, and great national unity,” Chun countered with
a call for a CCNR, saying that the North and South should aim at
promoting mutual confidence and trust before normalizing relations.
North Korea dismissed Chun’s proposal on January 26, 1981 on the
grounds that a peaceful solution would not occur while U.S. ground
forces remain on the peninsula and Chun was not a legitimate leader by
failing Korea’s democracy. 20 However, Seoul continued to unveil a
twenty-point practical action plan for promoting inter-Korean coopera-
tion on February 1, 1981. Interestingly, some of the proposals such as
the opening of a Seoul-Pyongyang highway, the joint development of
Mt. Gumgang, exchange of mail between separated families, the dis-
patch of a single team to international sports competitions, and removal
of military facilities in the DMZ, eventually were adopted. While Chun
was under no illusion that the new proposals would be accepted, he
earned high marks from abroad as he also gained confidence in an area
where Park had not succeeded in leaving much of a legacy. Having no
political experience or skills at first, Chun rapidly acquired them and
moved with surprising speed to develop his political base with such
achievements. 21
Nordpolitik under Roh Tae-woo

After his election, Roh Tae-woo made it clear that he would pursue the
goals of international prestige and unification more vigorously, recog-
nizing the global trend in which the dramatic economic dynamism of
the 1980s led to pragmatism and abandonment of the ideological blind-
ers of the previous era. Roh presented his foreign policy agenda in a
series of statements and policy initiatives during the first year of his
presidency in 1988. Although he was elected by popular vote, he still
had a hard time distancing himself from his predecessor who was
criticized not only by opposition leaders but also by the general public
now given its voice. Handpicked by Chun, Roh needed to prove himself
capable of leading the country in the new democratic era. As his prede-
cessors, Roh chose foreign policy as the arena for proving his ability,
46 ● Kyudok Hong
pledging to double his efforts to outperform his predecessors in order to

silence those harsh critics at home. In the process, he departed from
Chun’s strong anticommunist stand in foreign policy.
Roh’s f lexibility contributed to arrangements whereby North Korea
joined the United Nations together with South Korea in 1991 and the
two signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and
Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North, the first
historical document laying down the basic framework for inter-Korean
relations in 1991. 22 A favorable external environment also provided him
with an opportunity to achieve remarkable success in establishing polit-
ical ties with the Soviet Union and the PRC. Mikhail Gorbachev’s new
overtures toward the Asia-Pacific from 1986 and the Chinese leaders’
new operational image under Deng Xiaoping opened the door to his
success.
As Roh assumed the presidency, Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was in
full swing. He had achieved path-breaking consensus with Ronald
Reagan and was well on the way to ending the cold war in Europe in
1989. In 1988–89 his attention toward Northeast Asia intensified, lead-
ing to normalization with China but no breakthrough with Japan. At
last, glasnost was making possible open discussion of Korean affairs,
bringing into the open reform views sympathetic to South Korea and
questioning of the huge costs and negative consequences of relying on
North Korea. By putting priority on political ties with Moscow, Roh
could take advantage of this reform thinking and on the impasse that
resulted when the momentum with China was stalled after June 4, 1989
when it was necessary to keep a distance from a state subject to interna-
tional sanctions. With Moscow hesitant about Beijing, and Tokyo rather
uncompromising to Moscow, Roh made his country the regional diplo-
matic partner with which Gorbachev could get quick results. As
perestroika imperiled the Soviet economic system and the revenues vital
to its leader’s prospects, Roh offered vital financial support in return for
diplomatic ties. For a few years, the success of nordpolitik as a South
Korean strategic achievement led many to contrast it to Japan’s strategic
failure with Moscow and Beijing’s inability to advance beyond normal-
ization as Moscow tilted to the West.
Given its weak position with Washington and Moscow, Beijing
turned to Seoul as the most important partner in its new strategy of
improving regional relations. Once having normalized ties with Moscow
and shown moderation to Pyongyang in ways that curried favor with
China’s leaders, Roh could complete political normalization with
Beijing. When Deng Xiaoping at the beginning of 1992 decided to open
China’s borders to investment and trade with a desire to encourage

growth in North and Northeast China as well as the Southeast already
in the throes of transformation, South Korea was ideally situated.
Exceptional economic complementarity became a lever for another
major achievement of Roh’s nordpolitik.
The Security Dimension

It was a huge challenge for Roh, as host of the 1988 Olympic Games, to
conduct a successful world sports event without interruption from
North Korea. He did not want to see a boycott by the communist coun-
tries for political reasons as had occurred in 1984 at the Los Angeles
Games. At least three things were needed. First, U.S. support of Seoul’s
efforts to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula had to be maintained,
enhancing cooperation to prevent a potential terrorist attack. Second,
the Soviet Union and the PRC needed to be encouraged not to boycott
and to do their best to encourage North Korea to take part or, at least,
not to spoil the event. Roh expected that if he managed the Games
smoothly South Korea might proceed to establish official relations with
the Soviet Union and China. Third, Seoul must not give Pyongyang an
excuse; therefore, it made clear that it had no intention of isolating
Pyongyang. In his inaugural address and on other occasions, he stressed
that the North is no longer a target of competition, but a partner in
building a community together for a better future. 23 He used the con-
cept of cooperative security in order to persuade Pyongyang and other
target countries and called for establishing a multilateral security forum
of six-parties and adoption of a nonaggression principle in his speech on
July 7, 1988 and in his UN speech on October 1, 1988. Such ideas
appeared to be too progressive or naïve to most Korean conservatives at
the time. Lacking details, his suggestion for security cooperation did
not attract serious responses from neighboring powers.
The Economic Dimension

Economic considerations were important in Roh’s nordpolitik strategy.
In 1980, the South’s economy suffered a setback for the first time since
the early 1960s, and strategists began to show concern about heavy
reliance on two major trading partners, the United States and Japan. In
search of diversification of trading partners, Seoul worked hard to pen-
etrate markets in Europe and the Middle East. Yet, interest was growing
in the China market for various reasons. By the time Roh became
48 ● Kyudok Hong
president, there was worry that increasing wages already were surpass-
ing productivity gains. Renewed labor disputes could cause large wage
hikes, hurting the competitive position of Korean manufacturers and
putting a brake on the country’s export-dependent economic growth
as it triggered joblessness in the affected factories. 24 Less expensive
and fairly productive Chinese labor could allow Korean manufacturers
to restructure their production operations. At the time, the business
community had keen interest in opening ties with China and other
communist countries, where they could shift the production of such
basic commodities as textiles.
The Soviet Union and China also were interested in expanding
economic ties. Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech on the importance of
the Asia-Pacific in Vladivostok in 1986, and intensified his appeal for
improving relations in the region, including South Korea, in Krasnoyarsk
in 1988. When Roh finally met Gorbachev in San Francisco in June
1990, the Soviet Union requested a loan of $5 billion as a condition for
forging diplomatic relations. 25 Seoul compromised with an offer of
$3 billion, using its economic clout for the strategic goal of establishing
formal relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.
Economic ties with China expanded more quickly. Already in 1988
South Korea had become China’s fourth largest trading partner. In
1991 China signaled a change of policy by shifting its position to
support simultaneous entry into the United Nations, opting for Seoul’s
two-Korea policy over Pyongyang’s long-standing insistence on a one-
Korea policy. China calculated that this change of policy would not
only assure Seoul’s economic support, but also provide diplomatic lever-
age in dealing with North Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.
During Roh’s tenure 631 cases of direct investment in China totaled
over $600 million as trade skyrocketed to $4.2 billion during the
first half of 1993. 26 Roh also correctly calculated that China would
need Korea in order to counter the dominance of Japan, but it was the
South’s proven ability to meet China’s economic needs that led to formal
political ties.
The Domestic Political Dimension

Democratization imposed new requirements on the political process
including unification policy. Public apprehension at the prospect of a
nuclear-armed North Korea also pushed Roh to step up efforts to seek
rapprochement. Raising the idea of nordpolitik as a candidate, Roh had
pledged that during his five-year tenure, he could establish official
relations with China. He promised to open the “Era of the West Coast”
in which residents of areas generally left behind in development could
benefit from economic cooperation. Nordpolitik continued to draw
attention as it became a center of debate at the next local elections held
in April 1988. Roh’s rosy prognosis and the optimism found in many
commentaries at the time served, however, to strengthen the power of
many long outside of the political mainstream. They called themselves
friends of the minjung (masses) and tested the government’s stance on
freedom of speech and freedom of travel to North Korea. 27 They criti-
cized the government’s inconsistent unification policy on the grounds
that prohibiting individual contacts and arresting them on charges of
sedition are contradictory to the spirit of the proposal made by Roh on
July 7, 1988. Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, famous dissident leader, and former
lawmaker So Kyung-won went to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il-sung
on March 1989 in protest against Roh. Student activist Yim Su-kyung,
who represented Hanchongryon (Federation of Korean University
Student Organizations), also visited Pyongyang through a third country
in order to participate in the Pyongyang Festival. She instantly became
a national hero in North Korea, inspiring anti-Roh demonstrations on
university campuses throughout the South. As North Korea exploited
their visits, conservatives in the South became increasingly alarmed by
threatening transgressions of radicals. Roh had to respond to the con-
servative reaction by postponing the revision of the National Security
Law and canceling scheduled inter-Korean athletic meetings. As these
episodes indicate, Roh adopted his policy without consensus, and he
did not follow up with institutional changes and legal adjustments.
Successful hosting of the Olympic Games, establishing diplomatic
relations with communist bloc members, joint entry into the United
Nations, and signing the Basic Agreement with Pyongyang were indeed
great propaganda victories for Roh, but his popularity did not improve
as expected. On the contrary, his policies were challenged more seri-
ously by both the radical left and the conservative right. With the
Declaration of July 7, 1988, President Roh pledged not to oppose par-
ticipation of North Korea in the international arena. This decree served
as a variation on West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s ostpolitik and
as a successor to Park’s June 23, 1973 Declaration. However, Park did
not show any respect to Pyongyang since his statement referred to North
Korea as a puppet regime and he hastened to add that, “the taking of
these measures does not signify our recognition of North Korea as a
state.” 28 Roh’s announcement of nordpolitik contained six major points.
The first three concerned inter-Korea relations: promoting exchanges,
50 ● Kyudok Hong
attempting to reunite families, and opening trade contacts. The remain-

ing three were external in nature: approving external ties between its
allies and North Korea, abandoning North-South diplomatic competi-
tion, and supporting cross-recognition. This entailed increased U.S.
and Japanese contacts with North Korea along with increased contacts
by South Korea with China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European
countries.
Roh was concerned with convincing Pyongyang that he was different
from his predecessors and could deliver on his proposals. Park Chul-un,
Roh’s special advisor in charge of nordpolitik, acknowledged that prior
policy had failed largely because it aimed at isolating Pyongyang and
that, in contrast, Roh would keep sending a message that nordpolitik
would assist Pyongyang in being recognized by the United States and
Japan. Roh and his advisors reminded Pyongyang that their final desti-
nation was North Korea, not the Soviet Union and China, as efforts to
improve ties to those states intensified.
Roh declared nordpolitik to be a new détente to replace old tactics of
containment, when he devised it as a tool to improve relations with the
three socialist states of Northeast Asia. What kind of strategic assump-
tions enabled this radical change? At least several underlying motiva-
tions were present. First and foremost, Seoul believed that new relations
with the Soviet Union and PRC would pressure Pyongyang and bring
more favorable conditions for dealing with it. Second, they would be
regarded as a diplomatic coup and would certainly help Roh’s standing
in domestic politics. In April 1988, his party lost in the local elections,
and he focused on foreign policy to reverse his weak position. Third,
diplomatic breakthroughs would have a quelling effect on street dem-
onstrations and social discontent. In the year Roh became president,
student demonstrations intensified both in frequency and in the number
of participants, as protestors appealed to anti-Americanism and the
need to investigate former President Chun’s wrongdoings. Fourth, it
would help stabilize the peninsula if the Soviet Union and the PRC
exerted inf luence in shifting Pyongyang’s aggressive but isolationist
attitude to a more cooperative one. Fifth, diversifying the Republic of
Korea’s (ROK) economic ties would reduce the heavy dependence on
the United States and Japan, while giving business new markets and a
chance to use less expensive labor for reducing production costs. Sixth,
Roh would fulfill his campaign promise to spread development by forg-
ing links across the Yellow Sea. Finally, Roh believed that Seoul could
work with the United States in forging a multilateral security system in
Northeast Asia, assuming that the United States would not oppose his
initiative since it was encouraging Russia and China to get further

involved in the global market economy.
Conclusion
Park’s stunning success in transforming a war-torn state into one of the
fast-growing newly industrialized countries during his eighteen-year
tenure resulted from key strategic decisions, including normalization
with Japan. His vision and disciplined governing style gave many
Koreans confidence, but he did not understand the way American poli-
tics operated and failed to adapt to a changing environment as he kept
trying to pressure the United States with emotional pleas and unauthor-
ized ways of lobbying. His greed for power blinded him as he became
isolated from new information. His decisions to develop a clandestine
nuclear weapons program and to impose the Yushin Constitution by
exploiting détente with Pyongyang were examples of strategic failure.
Chun worked closely with Amb. Richard L. Walker for five years in
a favorable atmosphere resulting from Reagan’s strategic priority for
South Korea. He bolstered ties with Southeast Asian states and non-
aligned countries, restoring momentum to the economy. He also secured
substantial new assistance from Japan as political ties were upgraded.
Under Chun, contacts with China began to develop, serving economic
ends but also laying the foundation for political gains. Yet, after
achieving great success in South-South relations, Chun extended his
tour to other countries that seemed unnecessary. Burma was not on the
list of original destinations, but he later included it with insufficient
regard to the safety of his delegation since it had good relations with
Pyongyang and Chun was preoccupied with winning in the diplomatic
competition.
Roh’s strategic decision to use the Olympic Games and the peace
offensive of July 7, 1988 as springboards to expand official relations
with Eastern European communist countries was a great success. In the
eyes of the world, nordpolitik was the crowning achievement of South
Korean strategic thinking over half a century. It brought Seoul diplo-
matic relations with Moscow and Beijing, furthered extraordinary eco-
nomic linkages with China that sustained economic development over
the next two decades, and established the foundation for multilateral
diplomacy long desired by the political elite. Yet, in dealing with
Pyongyang, Roh failed to manage the pace of his diplomatic drive by
giving an overall impression to the world that he was acting hastily.
After a series of success, it seemed that he did not care how his victory
52 ● Kyudok Hong
affected Pyongyang. Despite his repeated pledge not to isolate North

Korea, he was largely unable to create an environment in which
Pyongyang felt less threatened. It was beyond his ability to push the
United States and Japan to recognize Pyongyang in a reciprocal manner.
Lastly, by rushing to sign the Basic Agreement with the North in 1991,
Roh failed to demand full disclosure of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal or
an investigation into past activities and suspicious sites.
As we look back to the factors most important for formulating South
Korean strategic thought, we find that both changes in the interna-
tional system and national conditions enabled Korean leaders to initiate
their assertive diplomatic drive to break out from the foreign policy
preoccupation with the United States. The United States loomed large
in South Korea’s overall foreign relations, but full support from the
Reagan administration to Chun and South Korea’s rapid economic
growth allowed Korean leaders to look beyond it as well as Japan in
searching for new markets and business opportunities. Following Park
Chung-hee, Chun and Roh elevated the goal of economic development
to the supreme national objective. Much of their foreign policy was
linked to that goal and maximum resources were put into producing
meaningful results. Chun and Roh were strong, capable leaders who
knew how to mobilize economic and human resources in launching
their diplomatic initiatives.
South Korea’s successful execution of its nordpolitik during the late
1980s clearly showed that it could not be done without the combination
of economic dynamism, democratization, shifting strategic concerns,
and public diplomacy efforts. There are many countries that made
significant economic gains during the cold war period. However, as a
consequence of South Korea’s successful nordpolitik, Pyongyang took
the risky step of developing its own nuclear weapons in the hope that
they would open the way to a long-term strategic relationship with
Washington.
Notes
1. This chapter treats South Korea as a small state during the cold war era,
while the rest of the book, concentrating on later periods, regards it as a
middle power. As its economy grew rapidly along with its rising military
budget, a transition in power may be recognized.
2. David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 5; David Vital,
The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power and Great Power Conflict
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 3–4.
3. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 8.
4. Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign
Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 33 (December 1989), p. 363.
5. Gregory F.T. Winn, Korean Foreign Policy Decision Making: Progress and
Structure (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975), p. 21.
6. Wilfrid L. Kohl, “The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and
U.S.-European Relation: Patterns of Policy making,” World Politics,
Vol. 28 (October 1975), pp. 1–43.
7. Gerald L. Curtis and Sungjoo Han, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 222.
8. Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in
J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in
Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 261–76.
9. Ahn Byung-Joon, “A Comparison of the Foreign Policy Making Process in
the Republic of Korea and the U.S. after the Vietnam War,” Social Science
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1980), pp. 7–23.
10. Charles Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign
Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1979), p. 30.
11. In 1989, the Soviets were hoping that South Korean construction firms
might participate in the building of a giant trade center in Nakhodka and
that the South would generate 50 percent of the financing for this project
and fund other infrastructure projects. See Dan C. Sanford, South Korea
and the Socialist Countries: The Politics of Trade (London: Macmillan,
1990), pp. 18–22.
12. The Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 702–03.
13. Sungjoo Han, “South Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam Conf lict: An
Analysis of the U.S.-Korean Alliance,” Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter 1978),
pp. 893–912; Kyudok Hong, Unequal Partners: ROK-U.S. Relations during
the Vietnam War (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South
Carolina, 1991).
14. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems, pp. 151–53.
15. Harold C. Hinton, Korea under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic (New
York: Praeger, 1983), p. 53.
16. Gerald L. Curtis and Sungjoo Han, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance,
p. 223.
17. Dan C. Sanford, South Korea and the Socialist Countries, p. 24.
18. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems, pp. 225–28.
19. Charles Whelan, “Let the Games Begin,” in Donald Kirk and Choe Sang
Hun, eds., Korea Witness: 135 Years of War, Crisis and News in the Land of
the Morning Calm (Seoul: Eun Hang Namu, 2006), p. 309.
20. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems, p. 164.
21. Harold C. Hinton, Korea under New Leadership, p. 93.
54 ● Kyudok Hong
22. Hong Yung Lee, “South Korea in 1991: Unprecedented Opportunity,

Increasing Challenge,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1992), p. 64.
23. “We Can Do It: Inaugural Address, February 25, 1988; A Single National
Community: Special Declaration in the Interest of National Self-Respect,
Unification and Prosperity,” July 7, 1988.
24. Okonogi Masao, “South Korea’s Experiment in Democracy,” James Cotton
ed., Korea under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratization, Northern Policy, and Inter-
Korean Relations. (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 20.
25. Mark Clifford, “Gambleon Glasnost,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 7, 1991, p. 44.
26. George T. Yu, “China’s Response to Changing Developments on the
Korean Peninsula,” in Tong Whan Park, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas:
A New Triangle (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1998), pp. 260–61.
27. Dan C. Sanford, South Korea and the Socialist Countries, pp. 62–63.
28. Park Chung Hee, Toward Peaceful Unification (Seoul: Kwangmyong
Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 78–79.
CHAPTER 3
Strategic Thought toward

Asia in the Kim Young-sam Era
In-Taek Hyun
T
he Kim Young-sam government came into office in February
1993 on the heels of two major developments: 1) the global end
of the cold war, culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and 2) genuine democratization in South Korea, as seen in the
election of Kim as the first civilian president. In coping with an unset-
tled external strategic environment and a transformed domestic politi-
cal environment, the munmin jongbu (civilian government) pursued
new goals imbued with new strategic thinking. Beyond these factors,
North Korea affected the conceptualization and implementation of
South Korea’s foreign and national security policies in an entirely new
fashion. The perennial dilemma over how to deal with the North took
a dramatic turn owing to its pursuit of nuclear weapons and the impact
on other states. With the convergence of these three factors, South
Korea’s strategic environment was transformed significantly.
Kim Young-sam and those helping to set policy faced great uncer-
tainty and could not fall back on precedent as occurred in the cold war
or respond to a consistent trend in world events as happened with the
end of the cold war leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now,
they had to respond to f lux in relations with four great powers. For the
first time in forty years, U.S.-North Korean ties vacillated between two
extremes. Images of South Korean economic importance also changed
rapidly from confidence in becoming an advanced economy gaining on
Japan and benefiting from China’s rapid growth to alarm in the Asian
56 ● In-Taek Hyun
financial crisis. Russian ties grew less important, but in 1996–97

Moscow began to assert itself again. As we trace the strategic thinking
in South Korea of this period, we also look for factors that played the
largest role in shaping it.
This chapter proceeds first by examining what the Kim government
meant by its “new look” at the North and whether it was able to success-
fully accomplish key objectives, and second, by assessing the external
determinants of Kim’s strategic thinking, focusing on three variables:
the North Korean nuclear conundrum, the changing U.S.-South Korean
strategic relationship, and the transformed great power environment in
Northeast Asia. The final section of the chapter analyzes South Korea’s
relations with neighboring countries during Kim Young-sam’s years in
power.
New Korea, New Strategy

As the first genuine democratic president in South Korea, Kim Young-
sam made a vision of a “New Korea” (shinhanguk) the key platform of
his government. He indicated that the regime would become strongly
reformist, including comprehensive political, economic, and military
initiatives. Kim’s reform measures included: 1) the creation of a strong
civilian government through dissolution of the Hanahoi (a private group
of elite Korean Military Academy graduates who had occupied key
military posts during the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics), whose
members included presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, and
dismissal of its members from key posts in the military; 2) the enact-
ment of the Public Servants’ Ethics Law under which high-ranking gov-
ernment officials and National Assemblymen had to make public their
assets; 3) the introduction of the so-called real-name financial transac-
tion system; and 4) the amendment of laws regarding political funding,
political parties, and election procedures. A civilian government with
legitimacy and new political strength enabled Kim to pursue “stability
through reform” rather than “reform within stability.”1 Reforms encom-
passed not only domestic political measures but also foreign policy
initiatives, notably in South-North relations but also in dealing with
the great powers.
Even in the area of security, Kim attempted to depart fundamentally
from previous policies. In his inaugural address he declared, “to
President Kim Il-sung I say this: We must be genuinely willing to
cooperate with each other . . . No alliance can supercede the aspirations
enshrined in fostering closer national ties.” 2 He added, “No ideology or
Strategic Thought in Kim Young-sam Era ● 57
political belief can bring greater happiness than national kinship. If you
really care about the Korean people and desire genuine reconciliation
and unification between our brethren in the South and North, we can
meet at any time and in any place to discuss this dream.”3 Emphasizing
minjok or same ethnicity and national heritage, the new president clearly
showed his desire to transform South-North relations. The first visible
measure of the new policy came two weeks later with the announce-
ment of the unilateral repatriation of the former North Korean guerrilla
Li In-mo.4 This symbolic gesture drew heavy criticism from many South
Korean conservatives, but in search of a breakthrough in long-frozen
inter-Korean relations following a strategy session led by Unification
Minister Han Wan-sang, Kim boldly decided to send him back.5 The
new approach proved short-lived. One day after the announcement of
Li’s repatriation, North Korea on March 12 withdrew from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The nuclear crisis would subsequently
dominate foreign policy in the region; it could have sounded a death
knell to the South’s new liberal approach toward the North, but Kim
persevered for a time and later would find an opportunity to take the
initiative again.
Despite the crisis atmosphere, Kim delivered a speech entitled “The
Pacific Era and Korea’s New Diplomacy,” at the Pacific Basin Economic
Council meeting in Seoul on May 22, 1993. He proposed a roadmap for
the post–cold war era, outlining a far-reaching strategy that had been
designed by Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo. The five principles of
Korea’s New Diplomacy were: 1) globalism; 2) diversification; 3) multi-
dimensionalism; 4) regional cooperation; and 5) future orientation. 6
Through these principles, Kim attempted to forge a new era as part of
what many claimed to be a “New World Order.” It was an ambitious
plan for the “internationalization of Korean society”; however, the
nuclear crisis deprived the Kim government of the opportunity to pur-
sue it energetically. Diversification and regional cooperation could still
go forward with the countries of Northeast Asia as the focus, while
globalism centered on the United States.
In response to the challenges posed by the crisis, Kim’s vision focused
on ties with the great powers. In 1995 he began to emphasize segyehwa
(globalization), delivering a New Year’s Message to the Nation, which
explained that “the new era requires us to march out into the world if
we are to build a brighter future for the nation. This is why we have
made the hard decision to globalize . . . Only through globalization will
our nation be able to extend its sphere of activity throughout the world
and play a pivotal international role.” 7 On January 21, Kim proceeded
58 ● In-Taek Hyun
to establish the Globalization Promotion Commission (Segyehwa chujin

wiwonhoi).
Segyehwa, was an overarching concept for the nation’s development
into one of the “central states” ( jungshim gukka) of the world. It would
reveal Korea’s unique way of reaching the level of the most advanced
nations, becoming “the self-styled hallmark and the self-designated
litmus test of Kim Young-sam’s government.”8 It included the globaliza-
tion of every aspect of Korean society—politics, the economy, education,
local autonomy, environment, and of course, South-North relations and
foreign policy. After reforms in Kim’s first years aimed at abolishing
vestiges of the old regime and associated wrongdoing, segyehwa was
meant to give additional momentum to a bold reform agenda. If mea-
sures in the earlier phase were directed toward correcting past mistakes,
segyehwa was future oriented, intended to bring about a new economic
structure and advanced society. However, while overall reform measures
were relatively successful in establishing new institutions, segyehwa only
produced mixed results. The concept proved to be too broad and omni-
directional. Moreover, its down side, such as rapid liberalization in the
financial sector and failure of economic reform and welfare policy
including a social safety net, led to the virtual collapse of the South
Korean economy in the fall of 1997.9 The process of overcoming the
financial crisis was painful, even if, ironically, it may have brought
about the expansion of globalization. In other words, the failure of
globalization, which led to the financial crisis, actually compelled South
Korea to understand more fully the forces of globalization, including
more room for regionalism in Northeast Asia.10
In contrast to the cold war period, relations with each of the neighbor-
ing states were in flux. After the breakthrough with Moscow under Roh
Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam faced a declining state with a disappearing
toehold in North Korea and no obvious regional partner, especially after
negotiations with Japan failed in September 1992 and ties with China
were allowed to wither. Few found strategic advantage in bolstering
Seoul’s new cooperation with Moscow, given the latter’s weakened posi-
tion. In contrast, the momentum in relations with China kept building,
driven not only by a surge in trade and investment but also by increasing
recognition of China’s vital role in influencing the behavior of North
Korea. Yet, given the tensions in Sino-U.S. relations, new troubles between
China and Japan, and China’s continued political ties to the North, South
Korea had to take care not to place so much weight on it that other rela-
tions might be affected. Most uncertain in this period were ties to Japan,
caught between political and strategic upgrading on the one hand, and
emotional rekindling of historical issues on the other. In comparison to

the cold war era, matters of regional balance tested strategic thinking.
The First Nuclear Crisis and the

Agreed Framework
On March 12, 1993, even before Kim had completely announced his
foreign policy initiatives and the equally new Clinton Administration
had put in place key foreign policy officials, North Korea announced its
intention to pull out of the NPT,11 seriously undermining Northeast
Asian peace and security and the stability of the Korean peninsula. In
order to defuse the tension and resolve the problem, the United States
and North Korea, for the first time, held face-to-face talks in Geneva,
which on July 19 reached an agreement, recognizing “the desirability of
the DPRK’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) intentions to
replace its graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities
with light-water moderated reactors”12 and the full and impartial appli-
cation of IAEA safeguards. By early 1994, however, it became clear that
there was no progress. Senior U.S. officials began to mention “sanctions”
against the North, as the North began to remove 8,000 nuclear fuel rods
from its reactors without the IAEA’s approval. Against this backdrop,
former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to meet with North
Korean leader Kim Il-sung on June 15, 1994 and successfully concluded
a deal whereby the North would freeze its nuclear program and resume
high-level talks. With talks set for July 8 and a planned summit between
the South and the North to occur on July 25, the crisis seemed to be
contained. However, on July 8, Kim Il-sung suddenly died of a heart
attack at the age of eighty-two. After a delay the two sides signed the
Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994,13 as the United States declared
its willingness to improve bilateral political and economic ties with the
North, commensurate with their continued cooperation to resolve the
nuclear issue and to make progress on other issues of concern.14
During this process, on April 28, 1994, North Korea proposed to the
United States to hold talks to discuss replacing the Armistice Agreement
with a peace treaty, and it tried to nullify the armistice by withdrawing
its officers on resident duty at the truce village after notifying the
United Nations Command of its decision. It continued to emphasize
that the most important part of the Agreed Framework was to sign a
permanent peace treaty with the United States, its only dialogue partner.
South Koreans felt marginalized by this North Korean strategy and
were not altogether confident about the U.S. response.
60 ● In-Taek Hyun
Even though this historic agreement appeared to be a turning point

for the North Korean nuclear issue, there was mounting criticism in
South Korea that the agreement did not clarify past nuclear activities of
North Korea since it only stipulated a “freeze.” A more serious problem
for South Koreans was that the agreement was made between the United
States and North Korea, and South Korea was not a direct party. The
North continuously tried to exclude South Korea in nuclear discussions,
avoiding dialogue. The nascent spirit of Washington-Pyongyang détente
was posing new and serious challenges to Seoul, which had taken the
U.S.-South Korean alliance for granted. To this time, the South’s policy
toward the North was based on “the principle of direct parties” in which
all outstanding problems on the Korean peninsula, including the North
Korean nuclear issue, should be dealt with directly by the South and the
North. The 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and
Exchanges and Cooperation (known as the Basic Agreement between
South and North) was a prime example.15 The prospect of North Korea
signing a peace treaty with the United States without South Korea hav-
ing a direct role shocked many in the South to take a fresh look at the
country’s strategic options. Even if the Clinton administration assured
the South Korean government that it had no intention to negotiate
directly with the North without the South’s participation, South Korea’s
fears did not subside. The question seemed to be when and how the
United States and North Korea would normalize relations, rather than
if they would do so.
On April 16, 1996, Presidents Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton met
on Jeju Island and proposed four-way talks between the United States,
South Korea, China, and North Korea to discuss a permanent peace
mechanism on the Korean peninsula, military confidence building, and
economic cooperation between the South and the North. The proposal
had two important elements: first, Seoul and Washington opposed a
peace treaty only between the United States and North Korea; and
second, it allowed the United States and North Korea to have direct
talks within the four-party framework. For South Koreans, this consti-
tuted a major departure not only for South-North relations but also for
U.S.-South Korean ties, requiring adjustments in addition to factoring
in North Korea’s overtures to the United States. There would also be
implications for ties with China and later with Japan and Russia.
Despite its diplomatic success and aggressive foreign policy, North
Korea suffered severely from food shortage and economic difficulties
during the period 1995–97. It became clear that North Korea could not
find its way out of the quandary on its own since its dire food situation
stemmed not only from natural disasters but also from gross structural
problems in the economy.16 North Korean watchers became more
attentive to the prospects of regime collapse. One expert argued that
“the only question is whether North Korea will change suddenly and
abruptly or gradually and incrementally. In either case, Korea will be
unified.”17 Ref lecting such thinking, some policymakers in the United
States and South Korea began to contemplate scenarios that would
require emergency assistance. Unlike proponents of a hard-landing,
however, those who anticipated a soft-landing policy argued that the
Korean peninsula could be stabilized by pacifying the North, which
feared unification by absorption or the complete collapse of the regime.
Some argued that “Pyongyang is also moving away from self-imposed
isolation and edging toward becoming a full member of the world
community.”18
The United States at that time clearly adopted a soft-landing policy,
as many realists argued that this was the only way to avoid a worst-case
scenario. If a hard-landing materialized, it might drive North Korea to
resort to military conf lict or a major war that would then result in
unimaginable political and social disaster on the Korean peninsula.
Accordingly, it was argued that the United States should favor the sta-
tus quo unless North Korea possessed nuclear weapons. While Clinton
faced strong criticism from Republicans who stressed that the Agreed
Framework was flawed, its backers argued that it could at least give
policymakers “the premium attached to buying time.”19 In turn the
South Korean government was oscillating from a hard-line position to a
moderate one, sending mixed messages to the North. But in the end,
Kim Young-sam in his Liberation Day speech on August 15, 1996,
announced that the South did not want instability and isolation of the
North and that it would not seek a hasty German-style unification.
This was the turning point for strategic thinking in the final period of
his presidency.
In contrast to the following two presidencies, this period was marked
by a great deal of ambivalence about the soft-landing policy adopted
toward the North. Many North Korean watchers in South Korea called
into question whether the North could succeed in its economic reform
without parallel structural reforms, arguing that only comprehensive
reforms (including key political changes) could ensure regime survival.
Moreover, neither a closed but stable system nor reform through open-
ness could be feasible for long as an option. 20 The soft-landing policy
posed a classical dilemma for the two Koreas. For the South, it meant
that while it desired a peaceful resolution of the Korean problem, it was
62 ● In-Taek Hyun
not willing to prop up the Stalinist regime. For the North, it also posed
a catch-22 since Kim Jong-il wanted to ensure regime survival but
without any enduring structural reforms.
Throughout the Kim Young-sam era, South Korea had to cope with
major changes in South-North relations and South Korea-U.S. relations
as well as a rapidly shifting environment in the balance of power in
Northeast Asia. The South found itself in a reactive state, as North
Korea carefully calculated the timing of its brinkmanship and achieved
many of its goals. In turn, many in the South believed that it was too
passive and complained of the absence of a concrete and consistent
strategy to cope with pressures from the North coupled with policy
discord with the United States. The United States may have underesti-
mated North Korea’s intentions, expecting either that the regime would
collapse through mounting economic troubles or decide that incentives
provided by the United States would suffice to solve the nuclear prolif-
eration problem. North Korea’s real intention may instead have been to
take whatever incentives it could get through its brinkmanship, while
acquiring the status of a nuclear-weapons state and using this in pursuit
of its longstanding goal to unify the Korean peninsula in its favor.
Overall, the nuclear situation was symptomatic of intractable policy
options that seemed to worsen over time. In these circumstances, Seoul
considered alternatives to its reactive posture, including a strategy of
soliciting China to play a more active role.
Post–Cold War Developments in the ROK-U.S.

Alliance and Northeast Asia
During the Kim Young-sam era, ROK-U.S. relations evolved dramati-
cally owing to the North Korean nuclear situation and the evolution in
South Korean politics. Right after the cold war, the Pentagon submitted
a report known as the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI) to the U.S.
Congress, which called for a phased reduction of U.S. forces in the
South. 21 The first phase (1990–92) would be accomplished with the
reduction of about 7,000 of the 45,000 troops, but the second and third
phases were suspended as North Korea’s nuclear development program
raised tensions on the peninsula. Although the shock that South Koreans
felt was much less than in 1976, when the Carter Administration tried
to withdraw its forces from South Korea in spite of the South’s vehement
opposition, many South Koreans came to believe that even though they
were allies with shared goals and interests, U.S. policy had been driven
by unilateral decisions, raising concern that many more U.S. troops

could be withdrawn even in the face of South Korean opposition.
In February 1995, the Nye Report highlighted a new strategy for the
East Asia Pacific region, reaffirming a commitment to maintain a stable
forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000
for the foreseeable future. Even though the troop level in South Korea
would remain nearly as it was, the underlying assumption was that the
U.S.-South Korean alliance should be redefined in order to respond to
new challenges: how the alliance could be maintained if North Korea
ceased to exist or if it no longer posed a major threat to peace and
stability on the Korean peninsula. According to a joint study by R AND
and the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA), even in the
postunification phase, the two countries would need to maintain an
alliance with each other as a force for regional security. They would
not want to cease their alliance relationship even if it became primarily
political with only a limited military footprint. Depending on what
kind of external threat Korea would confront and its domestic political
environment, the alliance might develop into a regional arrangement
rather than a strictly bilateral one. Clearly, regional issues and the
possibility of a multilateral security arrangement including the United
States were now coming under consideration. Already Koreanization
had advanced with the transfer of peacetime operational control over
Korean combat forces on December 1, 1994, 22 but U.S. operational
control over the combined forces remained a symbol of dependency
and a source of anti-Americanism as the wartime arrangement was not
changed.
Changing South Korea’s perception of North Korea’s military threats
also impacted strategic thinking during the Kim Young-sam era. Since
the Korean War, South Korea’s sense of insecurity has been largely
defined by the nature of the threat from the North. Despite South
Korea’s rapid economic growth, its defense spending as a percentage of
GDP has continued to decline since the 1990s whereas North Korea’s
defense spending has remained relatively unchanged at around 25 per-
cent. In order to enhance its defense capabilities, South Korea adopted
a more self-reliant posture as a long-term goal. Park Chung-hee pursued
“a survival strategy,” which ref lected North Korea’s military superiority
in the 1960s and 1970s. Chun Doo-hwan pursued “a parity strategy” in
order to catch up with the North. As sustained economic growth made
more money available for defense and North Korea suffered severe
economic dislocation, South Korea came to believe by the early 1990s
64 ● In-Taek Hyun
that its military capability was no longer inferior even though North
Korea continued to field a significantly higher number of combat
troops, long-range artillery, ballistic missiles, and so on. Recognizing
the changing conventional military balance, it pursued “a stable deter-
rence strategy,” in the early 1990s. 23 Thus, perceptions of North Korea’s
military threat changed. The North Korean nuclear program became
an additional military threat, but political and economic difficulties
proved more significant as many began to worry more about insecurity
from the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime than about the
military threat, including the nuclear program.
Security norms also changed greatly. Owing largely to democratiza-
tion, civil society became increasingly involved in defense matters.
“Security pluralism” or lively discussions by diverse civil groups on
security matters began to be full-blown in the Kim Young-sam era.
Changing security norms and increasing pluralism in society affected
especially defense spending policy, as a level of 6 percent of GNP dur-
ing the late 1970s and the early 1980s fell to 3 percent of GNP in the
mid-1990s, although spending continuously increased in absolute terms.
Cost sharing for U.S. forces was climbing steadily to $360 million in
1997 from only $40 million in 1989. 24 South Korea was able to have
both guns and butter as it looked anew at its strategic environment. 25
For the first time, the military buildup no longer was a top priority as
the Kim Young-sam government emphasized robust social development,
infrastructure, and welfare programs. The military factor in interna-
tional relations had diminished as attention turned to cooperation with
neighboring states, but it later gained ground again.
In the first part of Kim Young-sam’s tenure, U.S.-Japanese relations
were troubled by trade tensions, but at the end they focused on upgrad-
ing alliance ties. China’s rising military budget, arms imports from
Russia, and assertive moves toward Taiwan led to this shift. Although
there was some increase in South Korean military cooperation with
Japan in this period, Kim was notably absent in this pursuit of new
defense guidelines. In 1996 China and Russia declared their strategic
partnership, making clear their joint appeal for multipolarity as Russia
looked for ways to boost its voice in Asia. Again, the response from
Kim Young-sam was muted; he was not inclined to get drawn into the
new security maneuvering in Northeast Asia apart from keeping the
focus on North Korea. In contrast, when the opportunity arose to join
China and Japan in establishing an economic regional linkage through
ASEAN 1 3, South Korea eagerly joined. Alert to rapidly changing
currents in the regional environment, South Korea at times tried to stay
aloof, at other times felt obliged to react but without a consistent

approach, and in general was shifting toward more multilateralism and
efforts to engage North Korea.
Strategic Thinking toward China, Japan,

Russia, and Regionalism
China
Nordpolitik (Bukbang jongchaek) that was begun under the government
of Roh Tae-woo (1988–93) opened new horizons in South Korea’s diplo-
macy. Through this foreign policy initiative, South Korea successfully
normalized its diplomatic relations with socialist countries including
Hungary in 1989, the former Soviet Union in 1991, and China in 1992.
Even though it was a “revolutionary” diplomatic initiative from South
Korea’s viewpoint at that time, it was basically a status quo policy
designed to stabilize the Korean peninsula through coexistence with,
but not containment against, North Korea. In order to achieve this
goal, planners believed that South Korea should first normalize ties
with China and Russia and then move to North Korea. Reconciliation
and cooperation with North Korea through the Basic Agreement was
the climax of nordpolitik. Notwithstanding the success of this policy,
however, the Basic Agreement, as noted above, did not result in funda-
mental change in inter-Korean relations. Despite setbacks in South-
North relations, the strategic vision and goals of nordpolitik were, in the
main, successfully accomplished. South Korea’s relations with China
and Russia improved greatly, extending to economic cooperation.
Strategic thinking in the Kim Young-sam period sought to capitalize on
this achievement, focusing more on China with its stunning growth in
trade and investment opportunities rather than on Russia mired in
recession and chaotic conditions.
Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Seoul on November 13,
1995 became a major turning point for South Korea-China relations.
Even though their relationship had been renewed through diplomatic
normalization, China continued to pursue a two-track policy in which
it emphasized “political relations with North Korea and economic rela-
tions with South Korea.” Jiang’s visit, however, was interpreted by
South Korean policymakers as signaling that China would no longer
stick to this principle. It would improve not only economic relations
but also security relations with the South. In a summit meeting at
Chong Wa Dae, he agreed that inter-Korean problems should be solved
66 ● In-Taek Hyun
through dialogue between South and North. He also pledged that

China would take an active role in ensuring that the North’s nuclear
issue would be solved in a peaceful manner. Indeed, at the press confer-
ence, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China may
ignore its treaty with North Korea that calls for China’s automatic
involvement in an armed conf lict if it should occur on the Korean
peninsula. 26
Together with the visits of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng on
October 31, 1994 and Chairman of the National People’s Congress
Qiao Shi on April 18, 1995, Jiang’s visit meant that the three highest
ranked figures in China visited South Korea in rapid succession. China
supported South Korea’s efforts to solve the nuclear issue through the
four-party talks and expressed its willingness to play “a constructive
role,” if all parties agreed. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, in his
meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Gong Ro-myung, sup-
ported South Korea’s position to introduce a Security Council resolution
condemning North Korean agents’ armed infiltration by submarine into
South Korea. 27 This resolution denouncing the infiltration as a military
provocation against the ROK was adopted on September 23, 1996.
Despite the fact that China improved its relations with South Korea
on every front, it continued to maintain its security treaty with North
Korea. Moreover, China increased its economic support to North Korea
and announced that it would provide 500,000 tons of grain annually
from 1996 to 2000, when a North Korean delegation visited Beijing in
May 1996. 28 While total trade between China and South Korea was
climbing precipitously, reaching $17 billion in 1995 with expectations
of much higher figures in each coming year, North Korea-China
trade only amounted to $600 million. North Korea’s trade was decreas-
ing continuously from 1991. In 1997, the total trade volume was just
$1.98 billion. 29 This is only one form of evidence that China’s Korea
policy was moving from a Pyongyang-only one-Korea policy, to a de
facto two-Koreas policy, and finally to a Seoul-centered one-and-a half
Koreas policy.30
Within a short period of time after diplomatic normalization, China
became a new locus of South Korea’s strategic thinking. The label
“good, friendly, and cooperative relations” was applied during the Kim
era.31 In addition, China began to play a “constructive role” in the North
Korean nuclear crisis; however South Korea was for the first time faced
with the dilemma of how to respond to conflict between China and its
ally, the United States. During the March 1996 Taiwan crisis, after
China launched missiles into international waters and the United States
“intervened” by dispatching two aircraft carriers ostensibly on routine

training, South Koreans had to consider their country’s national inter-
est. The Taiwan Strait crisis strained not only Sino-American relations
but also Sino-Japanese relations. Japan was very critical of China’s
military intimidation, and Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro soon issued a joint declaration on security, which contained a
reference to Japan’s extended military role, that is, “in the areas sur-
rounding Japan.”32 While the phrase “areas surrounding Japan” did not
specify Taiwan, China became suspicious of the wording and kept
asking whether this was the intention, only to receive contradictory
responses from officials in Japan. For South Korean strategic thinkers
and experts, the Taiwan crisis posed a new security challenge. Before its
normalization with China, South Korea’s defense policy toward the
Taiwan Strait was rather simple and clear: it opposed any military
provocation by China, however in 1996 South Korea had to balance ties
with its major ally (the United States), new ties with an Asian giant
(China), and decades-long ties with a former ally (Taiwan). China’s act
was perceived as a military provocation, but for South Korea, the
question was: how could it signal its displeasure vis-à-vis China’s pro-
vocative behavior without impairing Sino-Korea relations. It responded
to the situation cautiously, saying that it supported the “one China”
policy, but clearly opposed military escalation in the strait.
Japan
Over nearly thirty years from the time of normalization of diplomatic
relations in 1965, four controversial issues cast a shadow on ties between
South Korea and Japan: 1) historical and territorial issues; 2) Japan’s
rearmament, often seen as militarization; 3) Japan-North Korean rela-
tions; and 4) economic cooperation, particularly the expanding trade
imbalance. In particular, past history and territorial issues were the
most contentious factor, arousing the South Korean public and an
official reaction as well. The Kim Young-sam era was no exception. The
relationship with Japan under the Kim government had its ups and
downs as tensions heightened or decreased owing largely to the magni-
tude of the salient historical dispute. Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi
visited Seoul on January 1992 in order to enhance the bilateral relation-
ship even though there were no crucial, pending issues; however, he
unexpectedly faced a highly critical Korean public when the comfort
women issue came to the forefront. As a result, the summit meeting
with Roh Tae-woo ended without any fruitful outcome. This, in turn,
68 ● In-Taek Hyun
led to a round of “Korea bashing” in Japan, especially among the left-

leaning political and policy community.33 When Kim Young-sam took
office, he first had to deal with this controversial issue.
South Korea-Japan relations during the Kim era can be divided into
two phases. During the first phase, roughly Kim’s first three years,
bilateral relations were relatively good, since new leaders in both coun-
tries, that is to say, Kim and non-LDP prime ministers in Japan, made
unprecedented approaches to each other. Facilitating these overtures,
Japan’s leadership demonstrated unusual sensitivity on historical issues.
During the second phase, however, the earlier cautious enthusiasm for
closer ties was transformed into anger and frustration in South Korea,
since, under LDP control, the Japanese government’s stance on historical
and territorial issues grew more conservative.
At the outset, Kim’s administration enunciated a new vision for a
significant improvement in relations with Japan just when Hosokawa
Morihiro, the first non-LDP prime minister, was showing interest in
establishing a new relationship with South Korea. At their summit in
Kyongju on November 6, 1993, Hosokawa apologized for the atrocities
committed during Japan’s colonial rule, saying, “We deeply repent our
wrongdoings, and we again apologize for the intolerable pains which
the Koreans suffered.”34 Based on this renewed recognition of the past,
they agreed to expand bilateral economic cooperation. On March 24–26,
1994, Kim visited Japan to hold a second summit with Hosokawa, and
they reaffirmed their close cooperation on the North Korean nuclear
issue. It was not long before, on July 23–24, a new prime minister
Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan Socialist Party visited Seoul to discuss
the situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia after the
death of Kim Il-sung as well as the future of Japan’s relations with both
sides of the peninsula.
The Kim government and the two non-LDP leaders attempted to
establish a future-oriented relationship based on renewed understand-
ing on the past and close cooperation on major security and economic
issues; however, historical and territorial issues have always been the
Achilles heel of South Korea-Japan relations. Even Murayama was not
free from them, but under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro Japan
turned more conservative. In February 1996 Foreign Minister Ikeda
Yukihiko claimed at a press conference that Dokdo (Takeshima) was
“clearly part of Japan.”35 Kim was greatly upset and ordered his admin-
istration to deal sternly with Japan on this matter, canceling the visit
of Diet politicians. The territorial issue overrode all other positive
developments, including the decision to cohost the 2002 World Cup.
In the midst of these controversies, however, South Korea and Japan

began to expand incrementally their security relationship. In the early
1990s security policymakers in the South Korean government felt the
necessity of engaging Japan in a “security dialogue,” if not “security
cooperation” (a term that would suggest substantial military-to-military
ties and exceed what South Korean defense officials were prepared to
accept). In 1994 the South Korean defense minister officially visited
Japan for the first time, which led to annual exchange visits of defense
ministers, high-ranking officers’ visits, port calls for naval cadets, and
student exchange programs between army and naval colleges. 36 Security
relations began to develop to the degree that de facto security coopera-
tion existed. However, the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation in 1997, which were a milestone for the U.S.-Japan alli-
ance, became a contentious issue between the two countries. The phrase,
“situations in areas surrounding Japan,” implicitly included a contin-
gency on the Korean peninsula. Alarmists pointed to Japan’s expanded
role, which could eventually lead to its remilitarization, even if there
were some positive assessments that, given the fact that these specific
guidelines operated within the rigid framework of the U.S.-Japan secu-
rity treaty, there was more to gain than fear.37 From the South Korean
perspective, if action were to proceed on the basis of this phrase, prior
consultation with Japan would ensue. Even though this point was not
publicized, there was mutual understanding.
The development of Japan-North Korea relations also contributed to
renewed South Korean concern over its own security and the situation
on the Korean peninsula. While positively assessing Japan’s role in the
nuclear crisis, South Koreans remained very sensitive about possible
Japanese attempts to pursue a “two-Koreas policy.” They watched as
delegates of Japan’s three–party ruling coalition, including Watanabe
Michio of the LDP, visited Pyongyang and agreed to the resumption of
normalization talks on March 30, 1995. This recalled the Kanemaru
Shin visit of 1990 with its worrisome signs of an independent initiative
that could complicate South Korean diplomacy with the North. Again
it appeared that Japan felt the need to make its own space for negotiat-
ing directly with North Korea without sufficient regard for what others
were doing, in this case when four parties (the U.S., China, and the two
Koreas) were engaged in negotiations over proceeding to a peace regime
and Japan was excluded because it was not a direct party to the Korean
War armistice. However, Japan believed that it had its own agenda,
including the abductions issue that would later become its preoccupa-
tion. The Japan-North Korea talks, however, were seen in South Korea
70 ● In-Taek Hyun
as Japan’s hasty attempt at bridging the gap.38 In his summit meeting

with Hashimoto in January 1997, Kim Young-sam expressed concern
that these talks might complicate the ongoing four-party talks, and
Tokyo agreed to proceed slowly.39 Clearly, Japan’s involvement in
peninsula security drew mixed responses from South Korea.
Despite the lingering caution over history issues, in the final year of
the second phase in the Kim administration, economic issues rose to the
fore and raised the strategic stakes in dealing with Japan. From early
1997, the South Korean economy began to suffer from multiple prob-
lems, including a slow recovery from an economic slowdown, failures in
major businesses, and a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. These
problems were accelerated after the outbreak of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997. In order to avoid a complete economic meltdown, South
Korea had to ask the IMF for a bailout loan to stabilize the economy
after failing to recognize the seriousness of the problem even a month
before. At the time of the economic crisis, Korea-Japan relations were
still not fully restored to their level of the early Kim era. Japan’s devalu-
ation of the yen was seen as one of the causes of the collapse of the won,
and the refusal of Japanese banks to roll over South Korean debt in
December 1997 was the specific trigger that led to South Korea’s
currency crisis.40 One day before Korea went to the IMF, Korea’s new
finance minister requested a rapid infusion of cash, but Japan thought
at the time that it was too late to provide emergency assistance. At any
rate, Japan’s response was also partially shaped by South Korea’s ill
management of its relationship with Japan. Above all, the financial
crisis was the end result of South Korea’s “casino capitalism,” or crony
capitalism,41 however, South Korea at that time was desperate. For the
Korean public, Japan’s inability to come to Korea’s assistance at a time
of national emergency distanced their country from the prospect of a
“virtual alliance.”42 Japan’s contribution could have restored the bilat-
eral political relationship in the short-run and worked as a catalyst for a
future-oriented strategic relationship.
Russia
Shortly before Kim’s election victory, Boris Yeltsin came to Seoul,
revealing secret documents on how the Soviet Union abetted North
Korea in starting the Korean War. Yet, instead of accelerating the
advance in relations that had begun under Gorbachev and continued
after Russia replaced the Soviet Union, it proved to be the culmination
of this process. Seeing that no interest was being paid on the loans that
had led to normalization, South Korea stopped providing further loans

to the anger of Russians who sought the full sum that had been prom-
ised. Although Kim made one visit to Moscow during his tenure, it was
of little consequence. The first nuclear crisis gave Koreans the impres-
sion that Russia was irrelevant in relations with North Korea, and the
further deterioration of the Russian economy lowered interest in trade or
investment. When the Asian financial crisis occurred, risky investment
grew even less tenable. As Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov in 1996–97
began to steer Russia toward stronger ties with China and a renewal of
ties with North Korea, this did not draw much interest in Seoul. Strategic
thinking about Russia had become only an afterthought.
Regionalism
The mid-1990s were not a time of much attention to regionalism. When
Japan showed interest in taking the lead in some sort of regionalism or
a localized variant of sub-regionalism, South Korea was not responsive,
even when better ties with Japan and regular summits were on its
agenda. When the idea for ASEAN 1 3 arose, it was accepted with little
expectation that this would become a counterweight to APEC or a
launching pad for the 13 group. Yet, at the end of Kim Young-sam’s
tenure as the financial crisis brought tense talks over the role of the IMF
in rescuing the South Korean economy, thinking was in flux. Even if no
deal was reached with Japan to avoid IMF dependency, possibly linked
to its proposal for creating an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), and rap-
idly growing economic integration with China had not yet led to plans
for regional institutions, the seeds of regionalism began to sprout in this
fertile environment.
Conclusion
The Kim Young-sam era began with high hopes for building a new
Korea but ended with deep despair. Key components of the “New Korea”
strategy—a Korea that was more democratic, outward looking, and
competitive—offered an attractive agenda, but the Kim government
did not properly handle changing domestic political and international
environments. Five main implications can be drawn from this analysis.
First, Kim’s strategic vision of the five principles of new diplomacy,
segyehwa, and the concept of the “central state,” had promise, but were
not fully pursued with sufficient vigor. The North Korean nuclear crisis
did not allow the government to fully implement these concepts, while
72 ● In-Taek Hyun
segyehwa and the central state lacked sophistication in their expression

and also a concrete action plan. In place of strategic foresight, these
became platforms for political slogans.
Second, unexpectedly, the North Korean nuclear issue became South
Korea’s top security agenda. Compared to the Roh Tae-woo government,
which pursued nordpolitik and signed the Basic Agreement, the Kim gov-
ernment was obliged to be reactive in its relations with the North owing
to the nuclear issue. In addition, the Agreed Framework was signed
between the United States and the North, and the impetus for four-party
talks came from the United States. Thus, the key principle that major
issues in the inter-Korean relationship should be solved between the two
direct parties was weakened considerably. Despite limited diplomatic
space, Kim tried to cope, employing various strategies, including a linkage
strategy to persuade the North through incentives and coercive diplo-
macy to pressure it along with the United States. While these policies
were not a failure since they led to the Agreed Framework, neither can
they be seen as a success. At the end of Kim Young-sam’s tenure, there
remained great uncertainty on how to proceed. In these circumstances
South Korea continued to strengthen its military capabilities. Its conven-
tional forces provided a fairly stable deterrent capacity against the North,
although perceptions of a state seemingly on the verge of collapse led to a
decision not to pursue a hard-landing approach, just as the Roh Tae-woo
government did not pursue a containment strategy vis-à-vis the North
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Third, the alliance with the United States was reinforced as a pillar
of South Korea’s security policy, but changing circumstances raised
more questions about how it should be adjusted. In the early 1990s, the
United States laid the foundation for a limited withdrawal of its troops
from South Korea but the North Korean nuclear issue prevented more
than the first phase of reductions. The Nye report reaffirming the con-
tinuation of the deployment of these troops was one of the most visible
achievements in the Kim Young-sam era in international relations, even
if it was fostered by external circumstances more than bilateral strategic
understanding. As a result, the longer-term issue of the viability of a
U.S. military presence in South Korea continued to be debated in Seoul
even after the end of the Kim government.
Fourth, the legacy of nordpolitik remained the key element in South
Korea’s policy toward its neighbors, China and Russia. South Korea-
China relations enjoyed a sharp boost from the late 1980s and China
became one of the most important countries in terms of South Korea’s
foreign relations and economic ties during the Kim Young-sam era.
South Korea-Russia relations also were changing, although ties did not
improve as significantly as both sides had initially hoped. Relations
with Japan started off on a positive note but were quickly overtaken by
a series of disputes over history and the outbreak of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997.
The Kim Young-sam government’s overall track record is a mixed
one. The obvious failures of the government’s economic policies led to
a rapid downturn in South Korea’s economy and also contributed to a
sea-change in South Korean politics with the election of Kim Dae-jung
in December 1997. The North Korean nuclear crisis was defused
through the Agreed Framework, but acrimony between Seoul and
Washington also intensified during the Kim Young-sam era. Yet,
reforms in the South Korean military, greater transparency in the finan-
cial sector, and the institutionalization of a robust civil society were key
achievements that were either introduced or strengthened. Ultimately,
however, the growing gap between thoughtful strategic visions and
calibrated policy options coupled with inconsistent policy objectives
contribute to our conclusion that shortcomings outweighed achievements
in this era.
The years 1993–97 proved to be a transitional period in Northeast
Asia and in the strategic thinking of South Korea. There were new
heights of optimism about rising leverage in regional relations and eco-
nomic accomplishment and new depths of pessimism about helplessness
in the first nuclear crisis and the Asian financial crisis. During moments
of increased hope, there was talk of breakthroughs with North Korea
and Japan and of positive transformation in relations with the United
States, China, and Russia. Yet, other times saw spreading despair over
North Korea’s belligerence, Japan’s historical revisionism, and United
States inclination to unilateralism or globalization. Kim Young-sam
lacked a steady hand in assessing the limits of South Korean power and
the promise of persistently bolstering ties with each of the great powers.
Public opinion was missing any clear direction and was left mystified by
the financial crisis and uncertainty in regional affairs that prevailed by
the end of his presidency.
Notes
1. Soong-Hoom Kil, “Political Reforms of the Kim Young Sam Government,”
Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 419–31.
2. This is my translation. The English version distributed to the press was:
“None of these nations can have more reasons to care and share than we
do—for we are members of the same ethnic family.”
74 ● In-Taek Hyun
3. The Korea Times, February 26, 1993.

4. At the time seventy-six years old, Li had been captured by the South during
the Korean War while engaged in guerilla activities in Mt. Chiri. He
was released in 1959 but was again imprisoned in 1961 on charges of spy-
ing for the North. After spending thirty-four years in prison, he was finally
freed in 1988.
5. Korea Times, March 11, 1993.
6. Han Sung-Joo, “Fundamentals of Korea’s New Diplomacy,” Korea and
World Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 227–45.
7. The Korea Times, January 2, 1995.
8. Samuel S. Kim, “East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses,”
Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), p. 29.
9. Barry K. Gills and Dong-Sook S. Gills, “South Korea and Globalization: The
Rise to Globalism?” Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), pp. 199–228.
10. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 217–18.
11. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical:
The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004).
12. The Korea Times, July 21, 1993.
13. The Agreed Framework included: 1) replacing the DPRK’s graphite-
moderated reactors and related facilities with two light-water reactors;
2) full normalization of political and economic relations; 3) a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula; and 4) strengthening the international nuclear nonpro-
liferation regime. The United States promised to provide North Korea
with 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually through KEDO to ease economic
sanctions against North Korea and improve diplomatic relations and to
prepare to set up a liaison office in Pyongyang.
14. A strategy of enlargement and engagement replaced the doctrine of
containment that drove U.S. foreign policy during the cold war. Anthony
Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 39 (September
1993), p. 3.
15. According to the Basic Agreement, the South and the North recognized
each other’s sovereignty and agreed on a nonnuclear Korean peninsula
coupled with an arms control regime. This was the first concrete agree-
ment that the two had signed to assure peace and stability on the peninsula,
and it stipulated that they would endeavor “together” to transform the cur-
rent armistice into a peace mechanism. Not only had the North failed to
comply with these provisions, it was pressing the United States to ignore
them too.
16. Lee Young-sun, “Bukhan gyongjaenan oe kujojok bunsok gwa gaehyok
ganungsong,” Sasang, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 47–70.
17. Kyung-Won Kim, “No Way Out: North Korea’s Impending Collapse,”
Harvard International Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 71.
18. Richard Nelson and Kenneth Weisbrode, “Interim Arrangement for North
Korea: Are They Secure?” The Bulletin of the Atlantic Council, Vol. 5,
No. 12 (December 30, 1994), p. 2.
19. Chung-Min Lee, “Rethinking Military Dynamics in the Korean Peninsula,”
paper presented at the conference, “Northeast Asian Conventional
Net Assessment” (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, August
1996), p. 6.
20. In-Taek Hyun and Masao Okonogi, “Coping with the North Korea Nuclear
Nightmare,” in In-Taek Hyun and Masao Okonogi, eds., Korea and Japan:
Searching For Harmony and Cooperation in a Changing Era (Seoul: The
Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 232.
21. U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific
Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Defense, April 18, 1990).
22. ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1994–1995
(Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 1995), p. 122.
23. Hyun In-Taek, “Hanguk oe daeoi anbo hwangyong byonhwa e daehan
daiung jonryak yongu,” in Kim Dong-sung, Hyun In-Taek, Kim Se-jung,
Han Sung-joo, and Lee Shung-guen, Shin gukka jonryak oe mosaek (Seoul:
Sekyung, 1993).
24. See ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1994–1998
(Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 1995–1999).
25. Chung-in Moon and In-Taek Hyun, “Muddling through Security, Growth
and Welfare: The Political Economy of Defense Spending in South Korea,”
in Steve Chan and Alex Mints, eds., Defense, Welfare and Growth (New
York, NY: Routledge, 1992), pp. 137–62.
26. The Korea Times, November 15, 1995.
27. The Korea Times, September 25, 1996.
28. Yonhap yonkam, 1997, p. 698.
29. Yonhap yonkam, 1998, p. 664.
30. Xiaoxong Yi, “Dynamics of China’s South Korea Policy: Assertive
Nationalism, Beijing’s Changing Strategic Evaluation of the United States,
and the North Korea Factor,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2000),
pp. 71–102.
31. This was China’s way of describing the bilateral relationship. In the Kim
Dae-jung era the relationship was upgraded to a “cooperative partnership.”
Korea Herald, November 13, 1998.
32. U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Completion of the Review
of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” New York,
September 23, 1997.
33. Hyun In-Taek “Hanil gwangye,” in Chung Il-young, ed., Hanguk oigyo
banseki oe jaejomyong (Seoul: Namam Publishing, 1993), p. 255.
34. The Korea Times, November 7, 1993.
35. The Korea Times, February 10, 1996.
36. The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1997–1998, p. 80.
76 ● In-Taek Hyun
37. Lee Jung-hoon, “Miil bangwi jichim hyopryok gwa Dongbuka oe saeroun
anbo jilso,” Jonryak yongu, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1998), pp. 96–110.
38. Seoul shinmun, March 30, 1995.
39. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an
Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 123.
40. Michael J. Green, “Japan and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,” Korea
and World Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 213; and Michael J.
Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 137–39.
41. Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986);
Richard W. Mansbach and Dong Won Suh, “A Tumultuous Season:
Globalization and the Korean Case,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 22, No. 2
(1998), pp. 243–68.
42. Ralph A. Cossa, “Peace on the Peninsula: How to Get There from Here,”
in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a
“Virtual Alliance” (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 1999), pp. 175–99.
CHAPTER 4
Strategic Thought toward Asia

in the Kim Dae-jung Era
Scott Snyder
K
im Dae-jung’s election as president of the ROK in 1997 marked
the first time that South Korea had experienced a peaceful
democratic transition from the ruling to the opposition party,
and represented a dramatic transition in strategic thought toward North
Korea and East Asia. This transition was catalyzed by a financial crisis
that brought to its knees a rapidly growing Korean economy in the
weeks before the December 1997 presidential elections, exposing serious
weaknesses in government and corporate financial management and
suddenly placing a South Korea that had proudly achieved Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) status and a
$10,000 per year per capita GDP at the mercy of international debt-
holders and the IMF. The urgency of the crisis and the fiscal and
corporate governance failures that it represented initially dominated all
agendas and severely limited Kim Dae-jung’s strategic choices. Its
resolution became a prerequisite for management of all other policy
issues.
Beyond the financial crisis, the international and regional security
environment when the Kim Dae-jung administration took power pro-
vided sufficient stability and convergence of views among major powers
for him to pursue his long-standing strategic vision for inter-Korean
reconciliation. The North Korean food crisis of 1996 had led to internal
changes within the country that opened the way for possible economic
reforms. The crisis had already changed South Korean perceptions of
78 ● Scott Snyder
the North from security threat to a poor, distant relation that faced
extreme humanitarian need. Kim Jong-il’s public emergence as North
Korea’s paramount leader following a three-year transition on the heels
of Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 satisfied concerns about North Korea’s
near-term stability. A framework for stable U.S.-DPRK relations existed
based on the Geneva Agreed Framework that had ended the first nuclear
crisis in 1994. North Korea had reluctantly accepted provision of a
South Korean-model light water reactor under the auspices of the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), although
American intelligence about a suspected covert nuclear weapons devel-
opment site at Gumchang-ri raised serious questions through 1998
about North Korea’s willingness to implement its commitments to
foreswear nuclear weapons development.
The U.S.-China relationship during the second Clinton administra-
tion was on a more stable track under a policy focused on “engagement”
and designed to deepen China’s integration into the international
community, normalize Sino-U.S. trade relations, and most urgently,
complete negotiations to bring China into the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Steady growth in Sino-South Korean economic relations
continued on the foundations of the 1992 normalization as China’s
primary policy focus toward the Korean peninsula shifted from the
objective of maintaining an equidistant relationship with the two sides
to a focus on ensuring North Korean stability in the context of its food
crisis while learning from South Korea’s model of economic develop-
ment. There had been modest improvement in ROK-Japan contacts and
nascent security cooperation with both Japan and the United States in
dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, despite longstanding
disagreements over Japan’s handling of history-related issues. Russia
was distant and preoccupied with its own economic difficulties as Kim
Dae-jung took office early in 1998.
Kim Dae-jung provided critical leadership to overcome the financial
crisis while holding to his vision for comprehensive inter-Korean recon-
ciliation and the establishment of peace and prosperity in Northeast
Asia. His core strategic choices were consistently articulated from the
outset of his administration, despite the immediate challenges posed by
South Korea’s financial crisis. Kim was helped in the implementation of
his foreign policies by his positive international reputation and relation-
ships forged as a leader of the antiauthoritarian democratization move-
ment in South Korea for over three decades. Yet, Kim’s international
reputation and his focus on inter-Korean reconciliation arguably dis-
tracted him from the need to address regional divisions within South
Strategic Thought in Kim Dae-jung Era ● 79
Korean politics, including resentment deriving from changes in the

longstanding regionally based (discriminatory) selection preferences for
bureaucratic advancement that accompanied the transition in power.
Kim’s Sunshine Policy was based on a process of reconciliation in
which South Korea was a leader rather than simply an object of great
power gamesmanship in Northeast Asia. It recognized the need for the
ROK to maintain positive relationships with all of its neighbors as part
of the management of an inter-Korean reconciliation process. In impor-
tant respects, these initiatives represented a clear break from the strate-
gic choices of Kim’s predecessors, constituting a national policy that for
the first time placed a cooperative vision of inter-Korean reconciliation
and peaceful coexistence above the imperatives of the cold war and
ongoing competition for legitimacy on the Korean peninsula. Moon
Chung-in argues that the Sunshine Policy, or what he terms the
“DJ Doctrine,” has as its basis six central operating principles: 1) it is
characterized by taking the strategic offensive; 2) it pursues “f lexible
dualism” predicated on major changes in the sequential order of inter-
Korean interactions; 3) it simultaneously pursues engagement and
security through military deterrence; 4) it emphasizes international
collaboration; 5) it requires domestic consensus; and 6) it pursues de
facto “pseudo-unification.”1 The Sunshine Policy in its articulation and
implementation led to the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, a symbolic
breakthrough in inter-Korean relations that opened the way for
renewed institutionalization of inter-Korean economic and humanitarian
exchanges, cultural cooperation, and institutionalization of a ministerial
dialogue. However, the joint declaration failed to address fundamental
security issues between the two Koreas.
Ultimately, the inter-Korean summit itself was incomplete in its
effects, hobbled by two significant changes that constrained efforts to
implement Kim’s policy vision in the second half of his administration.
The first was a dramatic reversal in South Korea’s international envi-
ronment and relations with the United States and Japan. U.S. policy
toward North Korea changed in the direction of a more skeptical, even
confrontational, approach compared to that of the Clinton administra-
tion. The renewal of Japan-ROK tensions as a result of controversies
over history-related issues such as the approval of the Japanese govern-
ment of a textbook that whitewashed Japan’s aggression during the
Pacific War undermined significant improvements that Kim Dae-jung
had initiated during his first meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi
Keizo in 1998. Renewed tensions with Japan over history and textbook
issues served to halt and in some cases reverse Kim Dae-jung’s
80 ● Scott Snyder
reconciliation with Korea’s neighbors as part of his endeavors toward

broader regional cooperation.
The second major factor that hampered the implementation of Kim
Dae-jung’s strategic choices was neglect of pressing domestic policy
matters in South Korea, partially deriving from his intense focus on
achieving progress and gaining international support for inter-Korean
reconciliation. Failure to gain bipartisan support for the inter-Korean
summit led to increasing domestic conflict, known as Nam-Nam galdung
(South-South conflict) over aspects of policy toward North Korea that
ultimately led to serious divisions over its implementation. In addition,
revelations following the end of Kim’s term that the inter-Korean sum-
mit had been accompanied by payments of as much as $500 million of
illegally transferred funds to the North tarnished his achievements and
raised serious questions about the principles, costs of implementation,
and results of the Sunshine Policy.
This chapter focuses in detail on the strategic thinking of the Kim
Dae-jung administration in five key areas: implementation of the
Sunshine Policy, management of ROK-Japan reconciliation, develop-
ment of Sino-South Korean relations, promotion of regional cooperation
in Northeast Asia, and handling of issues in the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Attention is given to the contribution of both international and domestic
factors in the implementation of these policies. In each case, Kim Dae-
jung made substantial progress under a permissive international environ-
ment, but faced difficulties in the second stage of his administration due
to changes in both the international and domestic environment. In
tracing this pattern, the chapter provides data for further consideration
regarding the relative influence of individual leadership, institutional
constraints, and international structural conditions on South Korea’s
strategic thought and the prospects for providing leadership as a middle
power at the nexus of regional great powers.
The Sunshine Policy and Strategic Thought

in the Kim Dae-jung Administration
Kim Dae-jung came to office with a clearly determined set of objectives
that represented a new ordering of strategic priorities compared with
those of past Korean presidents. Over the course of more than three
decades, Kim had developed a vision for addressing the problem of
Korea’s division and how to achieve national reconciliation, the issue
that he had identified as the core strategic issue facing Korea since divi-
sion into North and South in 1945. This resulted in a different set of
priorities from those of his predecessors, who had viewed strategy within
the context of an ongoing zero-sum competition for legitimacy with the
North and through the lens of cold war dependence on alliance with the
United States. In the post–cold war context, Kim’s vision was no longer
out of reach since the level of international confrontation among Korea’s
neighbors had been eased by the end of the cold war and the fruits of
nordpolitik. The changed international context meant that Seoul could
pursue inter-Korean reconciliation without having to face a strategic
crossroads in its relationship with Washington; however Kim’s formula-
tion did presume that Seoul should be in the driver’s seat for gradual
inter-Korean reconciliation, with the interested powers—including the
United States—pursuing supporting roles.
While the Sunshine Policy was, arguably, a natural extension of
nordpolitik, Kim had in mind a more cooperative means of achieving
the core objective than encirclement as the vehicle by which to induce
change. He sought dialogue as the basis for building trust between the
two Koreas that would gradually lead the North to seek reform and
integration with the outside world. His formula for unification was not
based on a core strategy of winning the competition for legitimacy on
the Korean peninsula. Instead, it focused on winning the North over
through dialogue, cooperation, and persuasion to remove confrontation
and open up possibilities for reform and pursuit of codevelopment with
assistance from the South. Kim publicly ruled out unification by absorp-
tion as a possible end point, instead seeking a gradual process marked
by negotiation, cooperation, and integration over the course of a long
period of time through the mutually negotiated establishment of a
Korean federation. In its initial stages, Kim’s approach was very much
akin to Willy Brandt’s ostpolitik toward the former East Germany, and
his timeline would require decades before unification. Ironically, the
Korean financial crisis served to bolster such an approach by eliminat-
ing unification-by-absorption as a realistic possibility. It helped to pro-
duce a consensus among the South Korean public for engagement as a
meaningful way of reducing tensions and promoting cooperation with
North Korea.
The resolution of the Korean financial crisis became the prerequi-
site for Kim Dae-jung to pursue his vision for inter-Korean reconcilia-
tion and for ending the cold war in Northeast Asia through the
development of cooperative security and economic relationships with
Korea at the center. Within two years, the South Korean economy
under Kim’s administration had attracted record amounts of inward
foreign direct investment, managed significant financial restructuring
82 ● Scott Snyder
for debt-burdened Korean companies, promoted corporate governance

reforms that drew to the Korean market significant portfolio invest-
ment, recovered Korean export-led manufacturing growth, placed
Korea on a path to early payment of debt obligations, and begun to
build a war chest of foreign reserves designed to ward off currency
speculation by assuring that South Korea would have enough reserves
to cover its debt obligations. Yet, the financial crisis did not mean a
complete deferral of Kim’s dream of inter-Korean reconciliation. At his
inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, he announced a dramatic
policy shift in the form of the Sunshine Policy, opening the way for the
reestablishment of inter-Korean ties. Kim laid out the following
principles: first, “we will not tolerate any military provocation of any
kind”; second, “we do not have any intention to undermine or absorb
North Korea”; and third, “we will actively pursue reconciliation and
cooperation between the South and the North.” 2
In its initial stages, the focus of the Sunshine Policy was on the
“separation of economy from politics,” the utilization of private sector
led economic interaction as an entry point for efforts to build political
trust and, eventually, the basis for political cooperation between the
two Koreas. As Kim explained in his address to a joint session of
Congress during his first official visit to the United States as president,
“We are going to promote cooperation in a wide range of areas under
the principle of separation of politics and economics . . . We hope such
an approach gives North Korea psychological room to open its mind—
and its doors.”3 The Hyundai Corporation chairman Chung Ju-young,
who was born in North Korea, played an important role in securing the
rights to development of the Mt. Gumgang area as a recreation zone for
South Korean tourists. Kim Dae-jung’s close advisor and “architect” of
the Sunshine Policy, Lim Dong-won, had worked at the Kim Dae-jung
Peace Foundation after serving as a career bureaucrat through the early
1990s, at which time he lost a critical internal policy battle over how to
engage the North following the signing of the Basic Agreement late in
the Roh Tae-woo administration. Lim remained in key positions
throughout Kim’s administration, first as a senior advisor at the Blue
House, and later as head of the National Intelligence Service and
Ministry of National Unification, the two branches of the South Korean
bureaucracy most deeply involved in managing relations with the
North.
Kim Dae-jung was deeply aware of the need to synchronize the
relationship between the international and inter-Korean aspects of
confidence building, as was clearly illustrated in a May 5, 1999 CNN
interview in which he listed five tasks to be undertaken as part of a

reconciliation process with North Korea: 1) inter-Korean confrontation
and distrust must be converted into reconciliation and cooperation;
2) the United States and Japan must improve their relations with North
Korea; 3) the world community must create favorable conditions for
North Korea to join it; 4) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and
nuclear weapons must be controlled and eliminated; and 5) a ceasefire
regime should be replaced by a permanent peace regime. Together these
steps would lead to a peaceful framework for Korean unification.4 The
sequencing of steps laid out by Kim showed an awareness of the impor-
tance of keeping international and peninsular confidence building in
synch, laying the conditions for institutionalization of a permanent
peace regime for the Korean nation.
One of the early points of contention in the political argument
regarding the Sunshine Policy revolved around the extent to which
there should be reciprocity in inter-Korean economic exchanges, and
whether incentives to North Korea constituted a “reward” for North
Korean bad behavior. This argument revealed different perspectives in
South Korean strategic thought toward the North. The position of the
South Korean government, as articulated by Foreign Minister Hong
Soon-young, was as follows:
The greatest criticism of engagement is that it is merely giving without

taking. However, aside from purely humanitarian assistance, there is no
such thing as one-way, indefinite giving in international relations. We
have a clear purpose in trying to engage the North. But, “giving” and
“taking” do not necessarily have to occur at the same time. There can be
a time delay. The emphasis now is on giving, so as to demonstrate the
goodness of our intentions to the North and to get engagement on track.
Over time, however, engagement will be a give-and-take process.5
As time passed and South Korea gave more and more to the North,
South Korean public support for engagement tended to revolve around
the question of how the North was responding to magnanimity, but
with an emphasis on a relatively loose form of reciprocity in view of the
North’s strained circumstances. The Sunshine Policy also drew support
from mainstream media outlets and many progressive NGOs who had a
vested interest in supporting Kim Dae-jung’s approach. Public opinion
became a critical factor in determining the pace, substance, and
sustainability of the engagement process. 6
Although there were intense arguments within South Korea over the
Sunshine Policy as it unfolded, the “liberal” and “realist” rationales for
84 ● Scott Snyder
pursuing such a policy had converged. This explains why the public
ultimately supported engagement of the North on a bipartisan basis,
but strongly disagreed amongst themselves over its terms. Kim Dae-
jung himself almost always presented a liberal rationale for pursuing it,
arguing that the leadership in Pyongyang has finally recognized the
“true intentions” of the Sunshine Policy and has decided that it is pos-
sible to trust South Korea. According to this rationale, unconditional
giving is essential for showing good faith, and eventually North Korea
will also respond in good faith as trust has been built between the two
sides. The realist rationale was that engagement would induce economic
dependency and thereby defang the North. This line of argumentation
appealed to most conservatives, but was almost never used by the ROK
government, no doubt partially in recognition that such a rationale
would only intensify North Korean mistrust and hesitancy to engage
with South Korea. Although Kim’s policies built on past South Korean
efforts, including nordpolitik, the liberal justification for engagement
was provocative to South Korean conservative elites who suspected that
such arguments might be used to promote progressive ideology that
would revolutionize South Korean politics and undermine national
security.
Despite bipartisan support for engagement, the partisan debate over
rationales for engagement—and the failure of Kim Dae-jung to over-
come partisanship in his pursuit of the North—led to the internal
cleavages within the South that ultimately posed one of the most serious
threats to the Sunshine Policy itself.7 To a certain extent, Kim had man-
aged to bridge the political divide through a coalition with perennial
political powerbroker Kim Jong-pil, head of the United Liberal
Democratic party who became Kim Dae-jung’s prime minister. Yet, this
coalition was clearly built on self-interest rather than ideology.
The timing of the bombshell announcement of the summit itself
took place less than seventy-two hours prior to the April 2000 National
Assembly elections, leading opposition members of the GNP to believe
that Kim was playing the “summit card” as a way to maximize the
domestic political impact of the visit for partisan purposes. As a result
of perceptions that the summit announcement was an instrument of
politics, it became impossible for opposition party members to consider
joining the inter-Korean summit. In the end, Kim’s failure to bring
along any member of the opposition GNP as part of his delegation to
Pyongyang illustrated the failure to build bipartisan support for his
initiative to engage North Korea. Although there was a euphoric mood
among many at the time of the summit on June 13–15, 2000, between
Kim Dae-jung and Chairman of the Central Defense Commission Kim

Jong-il, and in response to the North-South Joint Declaration, many
conservatives were concerned that the public was dropping its guard.
The summit succeeded in reestablishing a range of cultural and
economic exchanges and regularizing inter-Korean ministerial and
economic-focused meetings along with regular meetings in a highly
controlled environment among divided families from North and South
Korea, but the most serious trust-building measures were not on the
agenda. As time passed, it became apparent that the North’s insistence
on cash infusions was a prerequisite for most cultural exchanges to
proceed.
Based on momentum gained from the June summit, Kim focused
almost single-mindedly on building international support for inter-
Korean reconciliation, a factor that further fueled partisan opposition
at home. To the extent that he failed to resolve tough domestic issues
such as labor-management difficulties, the effects of growing personal
credit card debt, the failure to deepen democratization, or the need to
implement reforms in the public health system to separate the roles of
physicians and pharmacists, domestic public opinion turned against
Kim for spending too much time on international and North-South
affairs. The perception grew that the inter-Korean summit had become
a staging ground for a campaign to win the Nobel Peace Prize rather
than a vehicle for achieving true reconciliation even as it distracted Kim
from effective governance.
The inter-Korean summit led to a brief flurry of activity between the
United States and the DPRK at the end of the Clinton administration
in what looked like an effort to retake the initiative from Kim Dae-
jung. In October 2000, there was an exchange of high-level visits,
including a welcome to the DPRK’s highest-ranking military officer,
Cho Myong-rok, at the White House and a trip by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang for the highest-level discussions ever
involving the United States and the DPRK. Kim Jong-il joined her in a
joint communiqué agreeing to discussions regarding North Korea’s
missile program, but these discussions floundered along with hopes of a
Clinton visit to Pyongyang in the context of the drawn out 2000 U.S.
election imbroglio.
George W. Bush had a different perspective on engaging North
Korea that was ultimately fatal to the Sunshine Policy. Some members
of his administration were deeply skeptical of the Agreed Framework,
and rumors spread that perhaps the DPRK was not keeping up its end
of the deal by pursuing covertly means to achieve a nuclear weapons
86 ● Scott Snyder
program. Most career diplomats and observers of the incoming admini-

stration did not understand how deeply held the core perceptions of
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were regarding the DPRK and
Kim Jong-il, who was perceived as a dictator who had failed to take care
of his people. Even members of the Department of State who had been
directly involved with Korean policy presumed that politics would not
necessarily affect policy, and that the Bush administration would pur-
sue the core of Clinton’s approach to North Korea, but perhaps with a
harsher rhetorical edge. Kim Dae-jung concluded that a quick trip to
Washington and personal appeal to Bush might be helpful. Kim believed
in the legitimacy of his vision of reconciliation with the North and in
his own capacity to convince Bush to follow the Sunshine Policy. After
all, South Korean-led reconciliation would also serve to bring Pyongyang
into a more normal relationship with the rest of the world. That
logic had worked at the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) held in Seoul in
the fall of 2000, where Kim had successfully persuaded most of the
European Union to support the Sunshine Policy by normalizing rela-
tions with North Korea. Soon thereafter, Kim had been selected for the
Nobel Peace Prize, further boosting his confidence and standing. In
March 2001, however, his approach turned out to be sorely mistaken.
Despite positive meetings with Secretary Powell, who had publicly
signaled prior to Kim’s meeting with the president that the Clinton
administration’s core policies might be continued, Bush publicly
expressed his skepticism toward Kim Jong-il, even as he promised to
conduct a policy review. Thus began the unraveling of the positive
international environment that Kim had tried to create. Even more than
the effects of 9/11, Bush’s rebuff of Kim Dae-jung (and his vision) sig-
naled a turning point in coordination on policy toward the North. It
frustrated Kim’s effort to use international support to pressure Kim
Jong-il to come to Seoul for a follow-up summit. There would be no
further strategic breakthrough in the implementation of the Sunshine
Policy.
Reconciliation with Japan and Strategic Thought

Kim attempted to make a major breakthrough in relations with Japan
during his initial visit to Tokyo in October 1998. In light of Japan’s
imperialist aggression, Kim’s decision to set aside the past should Japan
do likewise and create a foundation for better relations was a significant
effort to address longstanding problems. This statesmanship was
based on a strategic decision to set aside “face” in favor of constructive,
future-oriented ties, but new obstacles arose in the latter half of Kim’s
term from South Korean public opinion in response to a hardening of
the position of the government of Japan on historical issues
During Kim’s summit with Obuchi Keizo, the two leaders put
historical differences aside, creating the basis for more cooperative dip-
lomatic relations. With Obuchi’s expression of “remorseful repentance
and heartfelt apology” for Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, the two focused
in the Joint Korea-Japan Declaration of a New Partnership for the
21st Century on building a “future-oriented relationship based on a
spirit of reconciliation and friendship.” They agreed to enhanced
exchanges and dialogue, working together to secure the post–cold war
world order, promote international economic cooperation, and address
various global issues, while agreeing to encourage North Korea to “take
a more constructive posture through dialogues for peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula.” Kim expressed appreciation for Japan’s loans
and other economic assistance to overcome the financial crisis. Both
acknowledged the need to conclude a South Korea-Japan fisheries agree-
ment, a treaty on the avoidance of double taxation, and an environmental
policy dialogue, while pledging to cooperate in cohosting the 2002
World Cup. 8
After returning to Seoul, Kim made it clear that he would be vigilant
against future statements by Japan’s leadership that contravened the
spirit of the Joint Declaration as he followed through on commitments
to open the Korean market in stages to Japanese cultural products such
as films, concerts, and music that had long been restricted. This decla-
ration paved the way for the development of more active ties between
the two governments, including the promotion of regular exchanges
among military institutions. This step toward reconciliation was par-
ticularly helpful in the context of American efforts to coordinate policies
toward North Korea under the auspices of Special Coordinator for
Policy toward North Korea William Perry. Due to the improvement in
the Japan-ROK relationship, it was possible to establish the high-level
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in early 1999
initially led by Perry, South Korean National Security Advisor Lim
Dong-won, and senior Japanese representative Kato Ryozo.
The Joint Japan-Korea Declaration established a stable framework
through which it was possible to promote coordination and to deal with
problems that arose, as when Prime Minister Mori quickly apologized
for insensitive remarks when he had referred to Japan as a “divine
nation” in May 2000, and Japanese public statements claiming Dokdo/
Takeshima were downplayed by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign
88 ● Scott Snyder
Affairs during the fall of 2000. Yet, in early 2001, the Japanese Ministry
of Education indicated that it would approve a revisionist textbook that
whitewashed Japanese atrocities during World War II. In response, the
National Assembly passed a resolution condemning the history book,
but South Korean public opinion demanded stronger actions at a time
when Kim’s popularity in South Korea was under siege. Although Kim
tried to play down the textbook row by expressing his disappointment
with the government of Japan while attempting to preserve the frame-
work for a positive relationship, the public’s reaction resulted in the
suspension of many local-level and nongovernmental exchanges with
Japan, even leading to the temporary recall of the ambassador to Japan
Choi Sang-yong in protest. In the end, the textbook in question was
actually adopted by less than 1 percent of all school districts, but South
Korean public sensitivities pressed the government to take more strin-
gent steps than had been anticipated.9 The South Korean government
continued to take measures to protest the adoption of the history text-
book issue with the newly chosen Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro,
but his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001, introduced yet
another challenge to the 1998 understanding. In his National Liberation
Day speech on August 15, Kim asserted that “History does not only
concern the past, but also things present and things yet to come,” back-
tracking from prior efforts to put the history issue aside based on an
emerging assessment in Seoul that Japan had not been sincere in its
pledges to implement the 1998 Joint Declaration.10
Kim Dae-jung faced a different international environment after
Koizumi became Japan’s leader in combination with the policies of the
newly elected Bush administration. Despite temporary optimism in the
summer of 2002 when Bush appeared to be ready to resume dialogue
with North Korea and when Koizumi announced that he would travel
to Pyongyang, in Kim’s final months in office, Bush was accusing the
North of violating its agreement and preparing for unilateral action in
the shadow of his war plans for Iraq, while Japanese were becoming
highly aroused over Kim Jong-il’s admitted abductions of their fellow
citizens. These developments brought to an end Kim Dae-jung’s engage-
ment with North Korea. As U.S. and Japanese policies came into rough
alignment, the South’s engagement efforts were the odd man out. All
that Kim Dae-jung could do was to keep expressing his hope for a policy
reversal by the United States—and cooperation with Japan—that would
be necessary to move forward in inter-Korean relations.
Kim had taken tremendous political risks to establish a stable frame-
work for relations with Japan, but in the end he was frustrated with the
perceived failure on its part to respond correctly to overcome historical

grievances. Even after he stepped down from the presidency, Kim
expressed his desire for Japan to come to terms with its own history in
very direct terms during a program held on May 23, 2005, at the
University of Tokyo. “Japanese people must not look away from the
historical issues that Japan has with Korea and China but instead should
deal with it head on. You should admit the wrongs that were done as we
also hope for a new start (in the relations),” Kim admonished his audi-
ence.11 Unfortunately, Kim’s presentation was overshadowed by news of
Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi’s decision to snub Koizumi during her visit
to Japan in response to his public statement that justified his continued
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.12 Kim’s efforts to promote forward-
looking relations with Japan were based primarily on his perception of
what would be necessary to gain international support for inter-Korean
reconciliation, not for the inherent value of these bilateral ties for
regional stability.
Sino-South Korean Relations and Strategic Thought

In order to position South Korea to play a leading role in inter-Korean
reconciliation, Kim Dae-jung understood that support from China
would be particularly important. Nordpolitik had achieved the objective
of normalization of diplomatic relations with China, and Kim Young-
sam’s joint proposal with Bill Clinton to establish four-party talks had
laid the groundwork for multilateral cooperation with China on issues
related to North Korea. In addition, Sino-South Korean bilateral trade
grew at double-digit rates throughout the 1990s and South Korean
firms increasingly saw China as an attractive destination for foreign
investment to take advantage of cheaper labor costs. China was attrac-
tive politically too, as a means of achieving more equal relations with
the United States. Following trips to Washington and Tokyo, Kim Dae-
jung visited Beijing in November 1998 as the next step in consolidating
an expanded partnership through a joint communiqué entitled “Sino-
ROK Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century.” Building on
improving Sino-ROK relations, Kim Dae-jung’s emphasis was to reas-
sure the North that this would not be detrimental to it, while Jiang
Zemin underscored Beijing’s willingness to play an active, constructive
role in supporting inter-Korean relations.13 China supported the
Sunshine Policy and reaffirmed that maintenance of peace and stability
on the Korean peninsula was the core of its policy. It welcomed efforts
to enhance mutual trust through inter-Korean dialogue and pledged to
90 ● Scott Snyder
promote reconciliation. In October 2000 this “cooperative partnership”

was elevated to an all-around cooperative partnership during Zhu
Rongji’s state visit to South Korea in conjunction with the ASEM
meetings.14 In light of the inter-Korean summit developments, China
signaled its willingness to further expand its cooperation with South
Korea to include political cooperation.
Kim Dae-jung’s strategic thinking toward China had two direct
inf luences that were both welcomed in Beijing. First, the Sunshine
Policy helped China avoid conf lict in relations with the two Koreas
since a fundamental premise underlying reconciliation is that it removes
the basis for a competitive relationship between Pyongyang and Seoul
and also the need to choose between the two. Second, a prerequisite of
the Sunshine Policy was the need for a benign international security
environment, thus prioritizing regional stability as an important condi-
tion for promoting inter-Korean reconciliation. Given China’s priority
for continued economic development, this brought Chinese and South
Korean foreign policies into alignment and created room for political
cooperation and multilateral consultations on security issues involving
the North. An indirect benefit that became a subject of discussion after
the inter-Korean summit and drew China’s close attention was the
possibility that independent efforts of the two Koreas in pursuit of
reunification might have the effect of diminishing the strength of the
U.S.-South Korean military alliance and eventually pushing U.S. forces
off the peninsula. Kim Dae-jung was, of course, careful not to suggest
this, given his desire for both China and the United States to give their
full support to his initiatives.
Ironically, Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Beijing and the consolidation of
improved Sino-South Korean relations, almost at the same time as Jiang
Zemin’s November 1998 visit to Japan, may have inadvertently contrib-
uted to strains in Sino-Japanese relations. If Jiang had visited Tokyo as
originally scheduled in August of 1998 (that visit was delayed due to the
impact of serious flooding in China), Kim would not have already
visited Tokyo and Beijing and established a bar for reconciliation with
Tokyo that Beijing was not willing to meet. Likewise, South Korea’s
steady improvement of relations with China came in the context of
volatility in the U.S.-China relationship, for example, Zhu Rongji’s
difficult visit to Washington in 1998 failed to yield a breakthrough
in negotiations over China’s WTO membership, and the accidental
bombing of China’s Embassy in Belgrade early in 1999 unleashed vitu-
perative Chinese criticisms of the United States, but none of these
f luctuations in relations with Japan and the United States had spillover
effects in Sino-ROK relations. In fact, one American scholar observed

during this period that the success of Sino-South Korean economic
engagement might be a model on how to gain strategic benefits of
cooperation with China on issues related to North Korea.15
Regionalism and Strategic Thought

Another component of Kim Dae-jung’s international relations strategy
was a vision for regional cooperation in East Asia. This cooperation
would be stimulated directly by the “dismantling of the cold war
structure” on the Korean peninsula, making it a transit corridor within
Asia rather than the end of the line. Interest in regional reconciliation,
therefore, was directly connected with the concept of national recon-
ciliation, as the dividing lines that marked the Korean peninsula, and
therefore East Asia, would disintegrate in favor of a major expansion of
economic prosperity derived from new opportunities for regional eco-
nomic growth. This regional perspective served to expand international
support for Kim’s policy toward North Korea as well as to promote his
aspirations for a leadership role in regional and international affairs. At
his first ASEAN 1 3 meeting, Kim proposed the formation of an
East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), consisting of intellectuals from
the ASEAN 1 3 countries to suggest how “to nurture East Asia into
a single community of cooperation.”16 Approval meant that he was
assigned the job of preparing the vision group’s statement, which
became the basis for the East Asian Study Group (EASG) that fol-
lowed, a working group of government officials at the level of directors-
general, and for initiatives that established the East Asian Summit
(EAS) and the goal of an East Asian Community (EAC) after Kim
Dae-jung left office.
Regional cooperation was conducive to visualization of a peaceful
region that is a prerequisite for the achievement of inter-Korean recon-
ciliation. When Kim proposed the EAVG, he recognized that progress
would require positive relations with Japan and China (as well as the
United States). He supported the establishment of the “1 3” meeting
among Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leaders on the sidelines of
the ASEAN 1 3 meeting from 1999 as a way to spur greater coopera-
tion in Northeast Asia. In support of these initiatives, South Koreans
have actively encouraged a range of functional cooperative activities,
including ongoing research by economic organizations on how to
promote three-way economic relations, active South Korean interest in
the formation of a China-South Korea-Japan free trade agreement
92 ● Scott Snyder
(FTA), cooperation in the area of information technology, and the

establishment of a regular trilateral meeting among environmental
ministers from the three countries. All of these initiatives were designed
to dampen the major-power rivalries that had proved to be so costly to
Korea at the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, formation of a
regional security community in Northeast Asia would conform to real-
ist logic for a middle power such as South Korea surrounded by great
powers. Any cooperative body encompassing Northeast Asia would give
it an equal place at the table with larger powers and an opportunity to
influence regional discussions that otherwise would minimize its role.
Seoul was the venue for the second ASEM in the year 2000, providing
an opportunity for Kim to host twenty-four world leaders. Coming just
a few months after the inter-Korean summit, it served Kim’s candidacy
for the Nobel Peace Prize as well as his interest in having European
countries normalize relations with North Korea as a way of promoting
its integration into the international community.
Kim personally promoted the vision of a unified Korean peninsula as
the gateway for expanded Asian cooperation with Europe through a
reconnected railway from Busan through North Korea to Vladivostok
and then the Trans-Siberian Railway and on to the terminus at Rotterdam,
which he termed the “iron silk railroad” between Europe and Asia.
Government studies projected that this railway to Europe would save
time and money from current sea transportation to Europe. Kim’s
administration also stimulated interest in regional energy cooperation,
promoting oil and gas pipelines from Siberia and the Russian Far East
to South Korea. According to these schemes, North Korea could receive
energy assistance and transit fees for pipelines crossing its territory
without running huge risks that might otherwise come from opening
up the country. This idea encouraged Russia to become more involved
while reducing North Korean anxieties.
Kim Dae-jung committed South Korean peacekeepers to the stabili-
zation of East Timor following unrest there, barely convincing the
South Korean National Assembly to support the operation. In its waning
days, his administration promoted the concept of South Korea as a
financial, logistics, and economic hub for Northeast Asia, an idea that
the successor Roh Moo-hyun administration took and promoted as its
own. Riding the boost in national confidence derived from the South
Korean national performance in the jointly hosted World Cup in the
final year of his administration, Kim touted a hope that the South
Korean economy could become one of the top four economies in the
world, matching South Korea’s semi-final performance in World Cup

competition. Grandiose thinking was characteristic of his presidency to
positive strategic effect at times, but by the end of his tenure suggesting
an unwillingness to stick to ideas that were strategic.
One threat to the promotion of a Korea-centered regionalism is that
despite South Korea’s heavy trade dependence and highly interdepen-
dent export-driven economy, the psychology of national protection still
remains strong. South Korean labor responded with skepticism to the
forces of globalization, including penetration of the South Korean
economy by foreign capital and investment, and the Korean labor cul-
ture of entitlement, protected by regular rounds of strikes and intimida-
tion, and characterized by significant demands for wages and a voice
in management, runs the risk of making the price of Korean-made
manufactures uncompetitive in the international markets. This tension
between the export dependence of the chaebol and the demands of labor
was brought under control in the context of the financial crisis at the
beginning of the Kim Dae-jung administration, but as time went on
and South Korea experienced economic recovery, it became increasingly
difficult to gain cooperation from labor to participate in a dialogue as
part of the tripartite committee, including representatives from labor,
management, and government. The irony was that Kim’s power and
public support diminished, due to scandals that even reached into his
family, as South Korea gradually recovered from the financial crisis and
the situation returned to business as usual. Extended strikes imperiled
its export performance, and public discontent grew in the aftermath of
the financial crisis on perceptions that the politically sensitive gap
between rich and poor had widened and charges of mismanagement of
the economy.
A second threat to regionalism emerged as Japan’s relations with
South Korea and China started to deteriorate in the second half of
Kim Dae-jung’s presidency. In addition, the Bush administration was
distinctly uninterested in Asian regionalism, and became distracted and
obsessed following 9/11 with the war on terror to the exclusion of all
other matters. With its greater skepticism communicated especially to
Japan, the momentum for Asian regionalism and prospects for American
support for inter-Korean rapprochement were slipping away, and this
reverberated in Koizumi’s decisions to ally closely with Bush. Even prior
to 9/11, Japanese officials had noticed that senior officials in the Bush
administration were applying a policy toward North and South Korea
of “benign neglect,” and this only intensified.
94 ● Scott Snyder
The U.S.-South Korean Alliance and

Strategic Thought
At the time of Kim Dae-jung’s election in December 1997, the immediate
priority of the United States was to confirm Kim’s commitment to
implementing the IMF-led reforms deemed necessary to respond to the
Korean financial crisis. Treasury Undersecretary David Lipton was
dispatched to Seoul immediately following the election for a crucial
meeting with Kim, where Kim signed a deal referred to by some as
“IMF Plus,” in which South Korea would receive necessary loans and
financial assistance in return for drastic liberalization of the economy,
including opening the financial sector to outside investment. Clinton
also welcomed the Sunshine Policy as an approach supportive of the
Agreed Framework and a basis on which it would be possible to
strengthen inter-Korean contacts in support of South Korea’s leading
role in the light water reactor project. It put South Korean policy more
in line with the Clinton approach to North Korea than had been that of
his predecessor Kim Young-sam. Yet, the U.S. position in late 1998 was
in flux, combining the provision of food aid to stabilize the North’s
economy with suspicions that North Korea had violated the Agreed
Framework by developing a suspect nuclear site at Gumchang-ri and the
fallout from the North Korean launch of a multistage Taepodong rocket
over the Sea of Japan that dramatized North Korea’s growing ballistic
missile capabilities. These incidents had eroded confidence in the U.S.
Congress in Clinton’s approach to the extent that the Congress called
for a review of U.S. policy toward the North. In response, Clinton
appointed former Defense Secretary William Perry as Special Coordinator
for Policy toward North Korea. Perry engaged in consultations with
South Korean and Japanese counterparts, including Kim Dae-jung, and
came to the conclusion that greater policy coordination was needed
among the United States, South Korea, and Japan to reinforce efforts to
draw North Korea out and integrate it with the outside world.
Kim was able to convince the United States, through the Perry
process, to synchronize its policy with the Sunshine Policy and to try
engagement with North Korea instead of escalating confrontation. In
response to U.S. concerns, South Korea accepted the principle that
nuclear and missile issues must be managed as part of a negotiated
engagement process—indeed, it became clear these issues had to be
resolved in some fashion before it would be possible for an engagement
process to go forward to any significant degree. Kim’s recognition that
the success of inter-Korean engagement was inextricably related to the
international context—backed by strong coordination that had the

effect of further limiting Pyongyang’s alternatives—gave him the con-
fidence to seek support for the DPRK to normalize its relationships
with Japan and the United States. In turn, U.S. efforts to resolve doubts
about the Gumchang-ri site through inspections in return for additional
food aid and to gain from DPRK a moratorium on future missile tests
were essential for the Sunshine Policy to go forward.
A major issue that arose in the context of the inter-Korean summit
was how the U.S.-ROK security alliance may be affected by the South’s
reconciliation with North Korea. Kim’s vision of multilateral security
cooperation ultimately envisioned the “dismantlement of the cold war
structure” on the Korean peninsula, but whether such a vision requires
the dissolution of the alliance relationship or simply its refashioning for
broader purposes—perhaps as a platform for pursuing enhanced
multilateral security dialogue—is an issue that has remained unclear
and sharply contested in South Korea’s own political discourse. Despite
this debate, Kim consistently argued that a continued U.S. troop
presence would be desirable even in the context of a unified Korean
peninsula.
Kim often recounted his private conversations with Kim Jong-il on
the future of the U.S. troop presence, noting that the latter did not
contradict his assertions that the U.S. troop presence was useful as a
vehicle for ensuring regional stability where major powers have histori-
cally striven against each other for supremacy with negative effects for
Korea. Despite North Korean public statements opposing the U.S.
troop presence, there have been private hints over the past decade that
it does not necessarily oppose U.S. forward deployments in Asia—as
long as the DPRK is not their primary target. However, the inter-Korean
summit brought to the fore within South Korea serious issues relating
to the U.S.-ROK security relationship. Many NGOs and citizen groups
interpreted the advent of inter-Korean rapprochement as precisely the
moment when the purpose and structure of the U.S. force presence
should be publicly questioned, although most of the grievances raised
have far more to do with the perceived need for adjustments arising
from changes in the South rather than from any change in the North’s
behavior or intentions. A number of incidents involving the U.S. forces
and a shift in South Korean public opinion toward the U.S. military
presence following the summit reinforced the longstanding need
to address local irritations and inconveniences resulting from the
configuration of these forces. Some questioned whether the Kim Dae-
jung administration paid sufficient attention to these issues following
96 ● Scott Snyder
his visit to Pyongyang, although he eventually made clear statements

in support of a continued presence for these forces even beyond
unification.
Kim remained an active supporter of the alliance despite the negative
turn in U.S. views of North Korea with the advent of the Bush admini-
stration. In fact, he had built his vision of inter-Korean reconciliation
squarely on the assumption that U.S. reconciliation with North Korea
must also occur. Even after his failure to persuade Bush to back his
policy in March 2001 left his policy at an impasse, Kim never chose to
take actions in opposition to the United States or to pursue ties with the
North outside of the context of U.S.-ROK alliance coordination.
Following 9/11, Kim continued to support the United States in the war
on terror even while recognizing that the supportive international envi-
ronment for inter-Korean reconciliation was eroding. Kim’s strategic
thinking never envisioned sustainable inter-Korean reconciliation in
the absence of full U.S. support.
Conclusion
Under Kim Dae-jung South Korea drastically refashioned strategic
thinking regarding how to approach relations with the North as well
as how to put forward a hopeful vision for regional reconciliation
and cooperation with Japan, and by extension for East Asian regional-
ism. This vision of inter-Korean reconciliation and East Asian coop-
eration remained firmly based on alliance coordination with a United
States that espoused the same liberal vision of cooperation and integra-
tion in East Asia. Kim made significant progress in achieving these
objectives during the first half of his administration, overcoming a
severe financial crisis, providing a positive framework for a future-
oriented relationship with Japan, establishing a constructive partnership
based on rapid expansion of economic opportunities with China, pro-
moting a vision of regional community building through sponsorship
of the EAVG, and coordinating effectively with an American admini-
stration that sympathized with Kim’s liberal vision of international
community-building.
During the second half of his presidency, however, the international
environment for Kim Dae-jung’s vision of reconciliation on the Korean
peninsula and in East Asia deteriorated. Relations with the Bush admini-
stration suffered in the face of significant differences in worldview; yet
Kim himself remained committed to bridging differences in the context
of alliance management. At the same time, the emergence of history
textbook and territorial issues under Koizumi served to unravel the

framework for South Korean-Japanese cooperation that had been set
during Kim’s historic summit meeting with Obuchi. The war on terror
and eventually, the revelation that North Korea indeed had begun to
pursue a covert nuclear program brought the implementation of the
Sunshine Policy to a standstill, although inter-Korean dialogue and
economic cooperation remained in place.
Following the inter-Korean summit, domestic support for Kim’s
vision also proved to be limited. His neglect of critical domestic policy
issues resulting from his single-minded priority on reconciliation and
his failure to establish a bipartisan basis upon which to pursue the sum-
mit interacted with popular frustration that domestic politics remained
unresponsive to rising expectations for performance. The South Korean
public itself was increasingly discontent and divided, as the inter-Korean
summit raised a whole host of questions related to the North that
brought to the surface longstanding divisions within society. This
polarization coincided with the deepening of democracy and freedom of
expression, not only affecting every aspect of relations with North Korea
but also having a direct inf luence on popular perceptions of the U.S.-
South Korean alliance.
Although both the international environment and domestic politics
proved to be key variables in determining the parameters of South
Korean strategic thought and limits on its implementation, it is impor-
tant to note the role of a single leader, that is, Kim himself, in remaking
South Korea’s strategic orientation and objectives. His personal leader-
ship clearly made a difference in the way South Korea defined and
pursued its strategic objectives—with both positive and negative rami-
fications for South Korean strategic thought. To some extent, he was
ahead of his time in attempting to shape matters rather than reacting to
a global and regional context that accepted the status quo represented
by a divided Korean peninsula, as he single-mindedly focused on the
conditions necessary to achieve reconciliation. But his greatest strengths
as a national leader also carried with them the seeds of failure. As a pro-
democracy activist, Kim failed to gain bipartisan support for his central
policy initiative, pursuing it in such a single-minded, top-down fashion
that it appeared he had placed personal ambition for a Nobel Peace
Prize above South Korea’s national security needs and substituted
expediency and bribery for a principled stance toward advance work
conducive to a summit.
It is also important to recognize the role of South Korea’s middle
power status in Northeast Asia as a factor influencing strategic thinking.
98 ● Scott Snyder
On the one hand, South Korean economic influence as an industrial-

ized nation in the late 1990s had grown sufficiently that even Chinese
leaders went to Seoul to discover the secrets of its economic success.
Even after the financial crisis it was not long before South Korea again
demonstrated its economic inf luence. Moreover, its political inf luence,
although less than that of the great powers active in the region, was not
negligible. Under Kim South Korea attempted to maximize its interna-
tional standing, especially through efforts to convince the world to
support inter-Korean reconciliation and economic opening in North
Korea. However, in the context of Northeast Asia, South Korean politi-
cal inf luence remained limited and contingent on the actions of its
larger neighbors. Repeatedly, in 2001–02 Kim Dae-jung confronted the
limits of this inf luence. Especially after his string of successes in 1998–
2000 in dealing with each of the powers and with North Korea, the
sharp turnaround proved deeply frustrating. The task of expanding
South Korea’s strategic freedom of action in ways that it could set the
international agenda decisively rather than remain in a reactive position
vis-à-vis its larger and more inf luential neighbors remained a tantaliz-
ing objective that ultimately proved to be beyond Kim’s—and South
Korea’s—grasp.
Notes
1. The author would like to acknowledge the support of Stanford University’s
Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, where he conducted this research
as a visiting Pantech Fellow during 2005–06.
2. Chung-in Moon, “Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy
and the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, eds.,
Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 35–56.
3. The New York Times, February 23, 1998, p. 8.
4. Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung, “Address to a Joint Session of
Congress,” June 10, 1998.
5. See Koh Yu Hwan, “Cooperation Between North and South for Establishing
Peace Regime in the Korean Peninsula,” presented at Dongguk University
100th Anniversary International Conference on “The DMZ’s Ecology and
Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” May 2–4, 2005, Seoul, South Korea, p. 48.
See also, “Kim Daejung’s Live Interview with CNN,” The Korea Times,
May 5, 1999. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov,
June 4, 2006.
6. See Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hong Soon-young, “Changing
Dynamics in Northeast Asia and the Republic of Korea’s Engagement Policy
Toward North Korea,” The XXVIIth Williamsburg Conference, Jeju

Island, ROK, May 7, 1999, published by The Asia Society, 1999, p. 20.
7. For more on the ups and downs of South Korean public opinion and its
relationship to inter-Korean relations during the Kim Dae Jung adminis-
tration, see Scott Snyder, “The End of History, the Rise of Ideology, and
the Future of Democracy on the Korean Peninsula,” Journal of East Asian
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), pp. 199–224.
8. For further detail on political divisions in South Korea, their history, and
their effects, see Hahm Chaibong, “The Two Koreas: A House Divided,”
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 57.
9. “Unofficial ‘Text’ of Joint Declaration,” The Korea Times, October 8, 1998.
Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov, June 4, 2006.
10. “ROK Envoy to Japan Notes Japanese Government Cannot Avert
Responsibility for Textbooks,” Yonhap News Agency, April 13, 2001, and
“Anti-Japanese Sentiment Revived by Japan’s Approval of Textbook,”
April 15, 2001. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov,
June 4, 2006.
11. “ROK President Expresses Disappointment With Japan in Liberation
Day Speech,” Yonhap News Agency, August 15, 2001. Accessed via Open
Source Center, www.opensource.gov, June 4, 2006.
12. “Ex-South Korean President Urges Japan to Face History,” Kyodo World
Service, May 23, 2005. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.
gov, June 4, 2006.
13. The Washington Post, May 25, 2005, p. 23.
14. “ROK-China Partnership Not Intended to Isolate NK,” The Korea Times,
November 12, 1998.
15. Piao Jianyi, “China’s Policy toward the ROK: An All-Around Cooperative
Partnership,” unpublished paper sent via communication with author,
January 2006.
16. See Victor D. Cha, “Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean
Security,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 73–95.
17. As quoted in Paul Kelly, “The mega-tiger is now our main game,” The
Australian, March 8, 2000. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.
opensource.gov, June 4, 2006.
CHAPTER 5
Strategic Thought toward

Asia in the Roh Moo-hyun Era
Seong-Ho Sheen
T
his chapter examines South Korean strategic thinking under
Roh Moo-hyun and how it was implemented in dealing with
key issues in East Asia: North Korea’s nuclear weapons develop-
ment, the rise of China, the unresolved history issue with Japan, and
alliance restructuring with the United States. Formulating a national
security strategy requires defining a nation’s most important priorities,
how much they are wanted, what are the sources of possible threats,
what means are available, alternative time frames and costs.1 Each
country’s national security strategy is shaped by: political objectives;
diplomatic, economic, and military resources; historical experience;
geography; culture and ideology; the political system; military technol-
ogy; and so on. 2 Inheriting the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung and
the fallout of the nuclear standoff centering on the Bush administration
and Kim Jong-il’s regime, Roh faced a difficult strategic environment.
Under Roh South Korea initiated a systemic, strategic approach to
national security. High on his agenda was the goal of building a
transparent decision-making process within the government in place of
independent directives from the president or insider politics. Rather
than resorting to behind-the-scenes discussions with only a handful of
advisors, Roh established committees under the presidential office com-
prised of experts from the government, the private sector, and academia
to conduct open discussions and debate the policy agenda. The national
security strategy was to be formulated through the involvement of these
102 ● Seong-Ho Sheen
experts. For this, Roh expanded and strengthened the National Security
Council (NSC) Advisor’s office, recruiting dozens of new members.
Previously this office was a one-man post of advisor to the president.
Under Roh, a staff was added from various sectors of the government,
including the foreign and defense ministries, and from academia, and
placed under a powerful director, who had daily consultations with the
president. In March 2004 a year after Roh took office, the NSC office
published a national security guideline, presenting a comprehensive
strategic vision. Entitled “Peace, Prosperity and National Security:
Security Policy Initiative of the Participatory Government,” this was
the first ever official document on South Korea’s national security
strategy by the presidential office.3 It provides an important insight into
Roh’s strategic thinking toward East Asia and the world, as do the
details on the Blue House web site fully covering all of the presidential
speeches, cabinet meeting records, policy briefings, and so forth.
South Korea’s strategy under Roh represents new thinking in foreign
policy toward Asia and the world. He was elected as the sixteenth
president of South Korea in December 2002, winning a tight race by
appealing to popular anti-American sentiment. In his campaign, he
portrayed himself as more independent of American inf luence than his
opponent, Lee Hoi-chang, a conservative from the GNP. His approach
attracted young and progressive voters who at the time were staging
large-scale anti-American demonstrations over the death of two school-
girls in an accident involving an American military vehicle. Roh
promised that, once elected, he would demand more equal relations
with the United States. Thus, his election signaled a drastic departure
from the traditional foreign policy and strategic thinking centered on
the importance of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, raising the stakes in
thinking on Asia.
Instead of emphasizing a strong bilateral relationship with the United
States, Roh called for building a peaceful and prosperous Northeast
Asian community as one of his three most important goals.4 By “estab-
lishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula,” he expected economic
prosperity in Northeast Asia to follow. South Korea would assume a
central role as “a Northeast Asian hub” between China and Japan. Also
part of Roh’s thinking was a plan to build an “Advanced, Self-Reliant
National Defense” capability.5 In pursing these goals Roh put as the
priority inter-Korean reconciliation, including peaceful resolution of
the North Korean nuclear issue. The government would seek “coopera-
tive self-reliant defense” and “balanced and pragmatic diplomacy.”6
Building a self-defense capability and readjusting the alliance were
Strategic Thought in Roh Moo-hyun Era ● 103
recognized as preconditions as well as costs that South Korea had to

bear in order to achieve its long-term strategic goals.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea

and Nuclear Development
Building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula became an urgent
policy goal.7 Indeed, peace on the peninsula and prosperity in Northeast
Asia became the two pillars of Roh’s national strategy. Given North
Korea’s nuclear development, peace on the peninsula was the more
immediate task, requiring pursuit of two intertwined goals: inter-
Korean reconciliation and peaceful resolution of the North Korean
nuclear issue. North Korea’s nuclear problem could and should be solved
only by peaceful engagement with positive incentives rather than
pressure through the threat or use of punishment. The two goals, in
turn, were important steps toward ultimate unification of the two
Koreas, which would then play a role of peacemaker/balancer in
Northeast Asia.
North Korea’s nuclear development presented a serious challenge.
After the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and
North Korea, true peace on the peninsula seemed finally within reach,
especially under Kim Dae-jung when the two Koreas held their first
ever summit in 2000. Bill Clinton almost went to Pyongyang after
North Korean Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok’s visit to Washington in
October 2000 followed by Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit
to Pyongyang in the same month. However ties between Washington
and Pyongyang began to unravel with the arrival of the Bush admini-
stration in 2001, to the extent that North Korea denounced Bush’s “axis
of evil” speech as “little short of declaring war.”8 The nuclear standoff
between North Korea and the United States was in full swing during
the last month of Roh’s election campaign. After the United States con-
fronted it over a secret uranium enrichment program in October 2002,
the North turned off all the monitoring equipment at its nuclear facility
at Yongbyon and expelled IAEA inspectors in December. During his
campaign, Roh made the nuclear issue a focal point by arguing that
Korea is at the crossroads between war and peace,9 warning that his
opponent could lead the nation into a war with his hard-line approach
toward the North. He emphasized that only diplomacy could prevent
war and lead to a peaceful solution. The following month, Pyongyang
announced its withdrawal from the NPT and insisted that only bilateral
talks with the United States could resolve the conf lict, restarting the
nuclear reactor in February right before Roh’s inauguration. With Bush

refusing to hold bilateral talks with the North and ratcheting up the
pressure unilaterally, Roh took office at the height of a full-blown crisis
over which South Koreans felt they had little say.
In dealing with the nuclear crisis, Roh adopted three principles: no
nuclear North Korea, peaceful resolution through dialogue, and South
Korea plays a leading role in the process.10 On occasion he emphasized
that the South would not allow the North to become a nuclear power,
asking the North during the campaign to stop its nuclear program as
soon as possible.11 In his inauguration speech, Roh declared that North
Korea’s nuclear development should not be allowed, insisting that it had
a choice between economic prosperity and total isolation, depending on
whether it would give up the nuclear program.12 Yet, Roh was reluctant
to force Pyongyang to make the hard decision. Along with no nuclear
North Korea, Roh favored dialogue and opposed pressure, making it
clear that any kind of military tension should be avoided.13 This empha-
sis on peace was translated into strong opposition to any policy that
might heighten tension with the North. Roh once said, “the U.S. wants
us to join it in severing dialogue and exchanges with North Korea and
put pressure on the North . . . We, however, think it is more favorable for
us to adopt a strategy of dialogue and engage North Korea concurrently.”14
Roh continued the Sunshine Policy through economic cooperation and
humanitarian aid, giving the North Korean regime little need to worry
about isolation.
From the beginning, Roh made it clear that he would continue the
policies of his predecessor, praising him for contributing to peace on the
Korean peninsula and repeating the position that Seoul does not want
the collapse of the North Korean regime.15 He kept on Unification
Minister Jeong Se-hyun, the only member of Kim Dae-jung’s cabinet to
retain his post. The appointment of Lee Jong-seok as a key figure in the
NSC and later as Unification Minister was seen as another indication of
Roh’s drive for inter-Korean reconciliation. A North Korea specialist by
training, Lee had been Roh’s close aide during the presidential cam-
paign and a staunch advocate of engagement with the North since the
Kim Dae-jung administration.16 Accordingly, Roh aggressively pursed a
policy of institutionalizing peace through inter-Korean reconciliation,
as the two governments discussed a wide range of economic cooperation
through multiple rounds of ministerial talks. They agreed to expand
the Mt. Gumgang tour, using the first ever land route across the demili-
tarized zone (DMZ). Pyongyang finally allowed Seoul to build a special
economic zone in Gaesung, in which South Korean entrepreneurs hired
over ten thousand North Korean laborers to work along with one thou-
sand South Koreans in manufacturing facilities. South Korea surpassed
Japan to become the second largest trading partner for North Korea
after China, as trade levels rose steadily, reaching $1 billion in 2005.
Annually, it provided the North with large amounts of food, fertilizer,
cement, and medicine for humanitarian assistance; the total value from
1996 had climbed to $2 billion in 2007.17 Despite continued North
Korean nuclear defiance and its steadfast refusal to discuss the nuclear
issue with Seoul, inter-Korean reconciliation was surprisingly unaf-
fected. Roh appeared to hope that expanded economic aid and exchanges
would earn Kim Jong-il’s trust and bring reform to his impoverished
people, while expecting that reconciliation would provide Seoul with
leverage in the nuclear negotiations. Yet, this engagement effort was not
well received by Washington, which saw it as excusing, if not rewarding,
Pyongyang’s bad behavior.
It was no secret that Washington, which sought to apply more pres-
sure on Pyongyang, and Seoul had a serious disagreement over how to
deal with the North’s nuclear programs.18 Along with his reconciliation
efforts, Roh tends to see North Korea as a subject of sympathy. During
his campaign, Roh said that confronting and pressing North Korea
would only cause more tension and crisis on the peninsula.19 In a 2005
interview with CNN, Roh told a reporter that the United States needs
the courage to drop its bigger sword first to persuade North Korea to
give up its small knife. 20 In early 2006 he warned that any hard-line
approach in Washington would create serious policy tension with South
Korea. As the situation deteriorated in the second half of 2006, the gap
between Washington and Seoul on how to deal with the North grew
even starker. In an interview about the North’s missile test in July 2006,
Unification Minister Lee told reporters that failed U.S. policy is the
biggest factor causing North Korea’s belligerent behavior. 21 Speaking
months later of the North’s nuclear test in the National Assembly, Prime
Minister Hahn Myoung-sook said that U.S. pressure and financial
sanctions could be a factor that led to the test. 22 In contrast, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said that the Mt. Gumgang
tour “seems to be designed to give money to the North Korean
authorities.” 23 After the November APEC meeting, the New York Times
reported that the gap between the two governments over North Korea
was as wide as the Pacific Ocean. 24
Repeatedly Roh tried hard to persuade Bush to take a more concilia-
tory approach toward Kim Jong-il. Since the gap between Washington
and Pyongyang was so big, Seoul was determined to take a leading role
in the nuclear negotiations by brokering a deal between the two con-

fronting parties. Roh figured that Seoul’s engagement with Pyongyang
and alliance partnership with Washington put it in a strategic position
to act as an intermediary. He hoped that his engagement efforts would
earn Seoul enough leverage/trust from Pyongyang to be recognized as
an honest broker. In the Six-Party Talks Roh’s administration asked
both parties to make equal concessions. While emphasizing patience, it
proposed that the two engage in a step-by-step approach. In May 2006,
Roh even appeared to defend the North’s nuclear development by saying
that it is mainly for self-defense, and not aggression. 25 He went on to
say North Korea might have reason enough to pursue a nuclear program,
implying that the U.S. hard-line is the main reason why it does not give
up the program.
South Korea’s soft position toward North Korea suffered a severe
blow with North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, and Roh signaled
a change, saying his government may have no choice but to reconsider
engagement. 26 Under criticism for a slow reaction to the international
call for sanctions, Roh defended himself, saying that South Korea’s
decision to stop the promised delivery of rice and fertilizer after the July
2006 missile test was, in fact, a sanction against Pyongyang. 27 Seoul
supported UN Security Council resolution 1718, which called for strong
sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear program by the international
community. Furthermore, it said “yes” on the UN resolution condemn-
ing North Korea’s human rights violations, after previously not wanting
to discuss the issue and refusing to participate in UN votes on it in fear
of antagonizing Pyongyang. In the second half of 2006, Roh showed
signs of increased coordination with the international efforts aimed at
pressuring the North to change course.
Roh, however, was reluctant to join in forceful implementation of
sanctions against Pyongyang. At their meeting in Hanoi during the
APEC summit, Bush again failed to persuade Roh to participate in the
U.S. led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) directed against North
Korea’s possible transfer of WMD and related materials. 28 Instead,
Seoul repeated its concern that any effort to intercept a North Korean
vessel could lead to a military conflict in the area around the peninsula.
It also did not take long after the nuclear test for Seoul to signal that it
would continue its engagement policy toward the North. Despite sour-
ing public opinion, Roh made sure that Mt. Gumgang tourism and the
Gaesung Industrial Complex manufacturing would continue. In the
face of domestic criticism against continuing economic support for
the North Korean regime, Roh defended it as a cost for peace on the
peninsula as well as a long-term investment for unification. 29 After the

departure of Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok amidst harsh domestic
criticism of the engagement policy, newly appointed Lee Jae-jung
pledged to expand inter-Korean exchanges in spite of North Korea’s
nuclear test, saying in his first speech, “We should make strenuous
efforts to further develop inter-Korean projects. That’s what the Ministry
of Unification is required to do at this critical period.’’30
South Korea’s reluctance to take more forceful sanctions against the
North comes from fear of regime collapse as well as nationalist senti-
ment. Despite the rhetoric in favor of national unification and Roh’s
drive for reconciliation, actual unification of the two Koreas was defined
as a long-term process. Speaking of three priorities in inter-Korean rela-
tions, Roh defined unification as last after safety and peace; political
unification would only come after a long, gradual period of economic
and cultural integration, he said. Sudden unification by absorption
after regime collapse in Pyongyang was regarded as a disaster, econom-
ically as well as politically. Instead, Roh strongly urged that any kind of
war should not be allowed in this process.31
South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and the nuclear issue
is perceived by many as lacking strategic thinking for the following
three reasons. First, its emphasis on carrots caused serious tension with
Washington without exerting much inf luence on U.S. behavior. Second,
Pyongyang tends to take Seoul’s goodwill for granted so that the latter’s
investment in reconciliation does not provide any leverage. Third,
efforts by Roh to take a leading role in the nuclear negotiations did not
work as Kim Jong-il tried to bypass him. Former national security
advisor and architect of the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-Jung, Lim
Dong-won criticized the Roh administration’s misunderstanding of the
North Korean nuclear issue, arguing that it can be solved only by the
United States, whose central role cannot be replaced. It was wrong for
Roh to try to assume a leading role in this from the beginning, Lim
said,32 and to continue its peace offensive even as the North went from
a “nuclear want-to-be” to a de facto nuclear state. After the nuclear test,
Seoul suggested a grand bargain among the six party nations to build a
peace regime on the Korean peninsula, as if this would satisfy the
North’s concern for regime survival and lead to eventual dismantlement
of its nuclear program; however the United States would not be interested
in a peace regime without resolving the nuclear issue first.
The government’s position was not well received by the South Korean
public, who had become increasingly critical of North Korea’s nuclear
brinkmanship. According to a survey after the nuclear test, 63.9 percent
of the public thought that the government’s engagement policy had

failed.33 Another poll showed a sharp increase in negative views on
North-South economic cooperation; 72.2 percent expressing this as
54.4 percent answered that economic engagement benefits only North
Korea and 17.8 percent no benefit for either Korea. Compared to previ-
ous years, the negative view on South Korea’s engagement policy was up
30 percent. As for the future, 48.7 percent of those polled thought that
the South should stop economic engagement with the North at once,
while only 5.7 percent said it should continue regardless of the test,
24.4 percent said it should continue in a limited fashion, and 12.2 per-
cent supported only humanitarian assistance.34 In spite of increased
exchanges and reconciliation efforts under Roh, many South Koreans
remain unconvinced of North Korean intentions. According to a survey
in 2007, more than half (51.3 percent) still think that North Korea may
start another war on the peninsula, and a larger majority (79.5 percent)
also said that South Korea should limit its engagement with the North
while only 17.8 percent supported continuation.35
Yet, when the U.S. position shifted in the early 2007 toward direct
bilateral talks with the North, there was more agreement on synchro-
nizing Seoul’s rewards with Pyongyang’s conduct in meeting the agreed
deadlines of the Six-Party Talks.36 The North Korean nuclear crisis
took a dramatic turn with the February 13, 2007 Joint Agreement, as
Pyongyang returned to the Six-Party Talks, agreeing to shut down and
later disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility in return for a resumption of
economic aid and normalization of relations with the United States in a
grand bargain to be carried out through five working groups and mul-
tiple stages. For this, Washington pursued bilateral talks with Pyongyang
and displayed more f lexibility on the terms of the negotiations. The
South Korean government welcomed the agreement, taking credit for
making it possible as a result of its patient efforts to bridge the uncom-
promising positions of the two adversaries. South Koreans had long
been skeptical of the way the United States was handling the crisis
and reacted positively to the agreement that reinvigorated diplomacy
and enlivened Roh’s engagement efforts. In the presidential election
campaign of 2007, the conservative candidates also accepted the Joint
Agreement and announced their own plans for further engagement,
albeit with more stress or reciprocity than they attributed to Roh.
Many South Koreans, however, remained doubtful that the North
would completely abandon its nuclear weapons program, expecting that
the agreement would break down if not in its first phase then in the
second when more stringent demands would be placed on the North to
list all of its nuclear programs and fissile materials and to proceed to the
disablement of its reactors. In a survey after North Korea allowed the
IAEA inspectors to return to Yongbyon nuclear facility as the first step
of the February agreement, still 74.0 percent of the public doubted the
North Korean promise of nuclear dismantlement and only 23.1 percent
said they trusted North Koreans.37
Embracing the Joint Agreement and then the delayed completion of
Phase 1, South Korean leaders continued to entice the North both when
the U.S. delegate Chris Hill optimistically supported rewards, as in the
delivery of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by the South in the summer,
and when Hill preferred more caution until the North made clear that
it would meet its obligations. While Roh apparently had assured Bush
that Seoul would refrain from rewarding Pyongyang beyond what was
promised in the agreement and Bush had indicated that Washington
would pursue the deal in good faith, tensions soon began to resurface.
As Phase 1 was being completed in the summer of 2007, Pyongyang
made a sudden proposal to hold a second summit with the South. The
Roh government quickly accepted the request and vowed to make it
successful for both the Six-Party Talks and North-South reconciliation.
Roh said the summit would accelerate the Six-Party process, promising
for this to accelerate economic aid and exchanges.38 Indeed, during the
summit meeting with Kim Jong-il, Roh did not raise the nuclear issue
on the central agenda. Instead, the two leaders focused on how to
expand inter-Korean economic engagement and ease military tensions.
They agreed to accelerate and expand the Gaesung Industrial Complex,
to build a new industrial park near Haeju, to start tours to Gaesung city
and Baekdu Mountain, to rebuild a highway from Gaesung to
Pyongyang, to create joint fishing areas in the troubled waters around
the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, and so on. As for the
nuclear issue, the joint statement vaguely mentioned that the two sides
will work together for smooth implementation of the Joint Statement
and Joint Agreement.39 Roh later explained that the nuclear issue was
already being resolved by the Six-Party Talks; so that there was no need
for further discussion during the summit. Indeed, he stressed establish-
ing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula with a declaration of the
end of the Korean War through a summit among four parties: the
United States, China, and the two Koreas. The peace regime would
accelerate peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue as the two issues are
closely related, said Roh.40
While it was not clear whether the North would disable its nuclear
reactors in Yongbyon and report a complete list of its nuclear assets,
Roh’s haste to achieve progress in inter-Korean ties again raised concerns

in Washington. While welcoming the second Inter-Korean summit, the
United States emphasized that the Six-Party Talks are the “real center of
diplomatic gravity” and the summit should, in no way, detract from
them.41 Despite Bush’s about-face in the Six-Party Talks, Roh still had
not won credit for finding a strategic balance in dealing with his
country’s only ally on the most serious foreign policy issue facing the
South. During his last interview with CNN as president, Roh recalled
his differences with Bush over how to deal with North Korea, saying
that his government objected to U.S. consideration of stronger mea-
sures including use of armed force and extreme sanctions.42 In December
2007 Chris Hill reported progress in disabling the nuclear facilities in
Yongbyon but remained cautious on how complete would be the North’s
declaration of its nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment and
plutonium already extracted. At the same time, Pyongyang insisted that
Washington now had to show progress in deleting it from the list of
states sponsoring terrorism and lifting the sanctions under the Trading
with the Enemy Act. Despite continued signs of a cooperative spirit
between Washington and Pyongyang, it remained to be seen whether
Kim Jong-il had made a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons.
Roh had tried hard to put an end to this ongoing nuclear saga with
his last-minute peace drive at the inter-Korean summit; however, no
resolution would come before the end of his term in February 2008.
Prosperity in Northeast Asia: A Hub and a Balancer

While peace on the Korean peninsula is more about the security interests
of South Korea, Northeast Asian prosperity is more about its economic
interests. If peace was defined as more urgent, prosperity loomed large
as well as a mid- to long-term challenge that no longer was assured in a
rapidly globalizing economy facing China’s rise as a manufacturing
giant and Japan’s revival as a technological leader. Despite historical
animosity and geopolitical rivalry, Northeast Asia is regarded as the
future center of prosperity in the world, where an economic community
should be established. Already the combined economy of China, Japan,
and South Korea occupies 20 percent of the world GDP with almost
50 percent of total world foreign currency reserve as of 2007.43 The
population of the three countries is more than four times that of Europe.
At the center of the region is the Korean peninsula, which has been
and should again be a bridge between China and Japan, the continental
and the sea power.44 South Korea can become a center of economic
integration in Northeast Asia by establishing FTAs with Japan, the

United States, and China, and the government aspires for it to become
a financial and transportation hub of the region, taking advantage of its
geographic position. Roh anticipates that by becoming an economic as
well as a political hub of regional prosperity, South Korea, especially
Seoul, would transform itself from a periphery to the center of regional
geopolitics.45 Reaching an agreement with Bush in April 2007 on an
FTA with the United States, he set in motion initiatives across the
region to keep pace with additional FTAs.
Building a prosperous Northeast Asian community has a political
and security dimension as well. This objective ref lects South Korea’s
desire to become a more active player in Northeast Asian geopolitics,
which has been dominated by China and Japan as well as the United
States. A country’s strategy is not created in a vacuum. The new approach
under Roh represents a unique worldview of the president and his staff,
but it also has a deep historical and ideological background in Korea’s
political development. Koreans are deeply conscious of their country’s
past vulnerability that led to outside invasions over the centuries. No
matter how strong Korea has become, it has remained no more than a
middle power in comparison to its big neighbors. Today, Koreans often
declare themselves a peace-loving nation in an effort to put a positive
spin on their self-perception as an innocent victim of invasion by outside
powers. In a public speech, Roh talked about Korea’s bitter experience
with neighboring countries in the late nineteenth century. “A century
ago, Korea tried China, Japan, and Russia as well as the United States
as an ally to defend itself from imperial power politics in the region. But
nothing worked, and Korea had become a colony in the end.”46 This
obsession with the past and strong attachment to independence appears
to be an important factor in explaining South Korea’s ambitious but
“rather idiosyncratic” military project to development a “self-reliant
defense posture”—and the corollary of possessing a strong domestic
arms industry—a national goal since the late 1970s.47 This explains
why it continues to increase the defense budget to upgrade its military
despite dramatic changes in the threat perception toward North Korea
in a more positive direction.
Under Roh, a strong self-defense capability was viewed as a priority
for South Korea’s national strategy not only to survive in the rough
world of Northeast Asian geopolitics, but also to become a balancer in
the region. In March 2005, Roh surprised many observers by saying,
“depending on South Korea’s choice, the Northeast Asian balance of
power will be determined. Korea would play a balancer role to promote
peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula.”48

A few days earlier, in his speech at the Korean Air Force Academy’s
commencement, Roh said that South Korea would not be involved in
any Northeast Asian conflict against its will,49 and he emphasized that
it would make every effort to build a self-reliant defense capability. As a
Northeast Asian balancer, it could be a facilitator of peace in the region,
and mediate future conf licts or regional rivalries using its strategic
position. Speaking of this balancer role, Roh made it clear that
South Korea’s military should contribute to the peace and prosperity of
Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula.50
South Korea’s new strategic goal of becoming a balancer in Northeast
Asia soon raised suspicions about its intentions, including deepening
ties with China that led it to distance itself from the traditional alliance
with the United States.51 Since normalizing bilateral relations in 1992,
South Korea’s trade with China exploded at an annual rate of more than
20 percent, reaching $118 billion in 2006, 52 after China became its top
investment destination in 2002 and its top trading partner in 2004,
replacing the United States in each case. During his first visit to Beijing
in July 2003, Roh emphatically called for unity with China in efforts to
usher in a new era of peace and prosperity as, in his own words, “the age
of Northeast Asia is arriving. On center stage are China and Korea.”53
Recently, China’s growing inf luence was best demonstrated by its medi-
ation of the North Korean nuclear crisis, in which Seoul and Beijing
largely shared the same approach. While Washington argued for more
pressure on Pyongyang, the two suggested that more carrots be offered.
They seemed to have a common interest in preventing North Korea
from sudden collapse, which they perceived as a disaster. As for Japan,
Beijing and Seoul expressed the same concern over Japan’s effort to revi-
talize its military role in the region. In the face of Koizumi’s visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine, both governments issued strong statements criticizing
Japan and cancelled meetings with the Japanese leader.
Some suggested that South Korea’s growing affinity with China
could make it reconsider its traditional alliance with the United States.54
The controversy surrounding the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. forces in
Korea showed the South’s delicate position between Beijing and
Washington. As part of alliance restructuring, the United States asked
that the South acknowledge the U.S. right to use its forces stationed in
Korea for contingencies beyond the peninsula. Critics in Seoul argued
that allowing “strategic f lexibility” would put South Korea at odds with
China in case of a confrontation over the Taiwan issue,55 warning that
U.S. force transformation on the Korean peninsula for rapid deployment
was really a long-term strategy to contain China’s rise in the region.

Seoul’s active cooperation in this process would antagonize its top eco-
nomic partner. In early March 2005, Roh declared, “I clearly state that
the U.S. forces in Korea should not be involved in disputes in Northeast
Asia without our consent,” adding, “Our people will not get entangled
in regional disputes against our will in the future.”56 This was under-
stood as a rejection of the U.S. military transformation effort in the
region, leading some to worry that the concept of balancer would, in
practice, mean a departure from the U.S.-South Korean alliance in
quest of building a new partnership with China.57
Nevertheless, there is no reason at present to expect that China will
replace the United States as an ally, even if we should assume that
Beijing will enjoy more inf luence on Seoul with deepening integration
of the two economies. Given warming relations and great potential for
economic cooperation, some expect that in the long term Seoul will
develop a closer and stronger relationship with Beijing than with
Washington. Yet, others doubt that, for the foreseeable future, South
Koreans will have enough trust in Chinese intentions on security
matters concerning the Korean peninsula. The question still remains
whether the two former enemies during the Korean War will be able to
achieve a full political partnership in Northeast Asia. Some point out
that South Korea is not sure about China’s ultimate intentions toward
unification and the Korean peninsula.58 Indeed, a survey showed that
many South Koreans thought that China would pose the biggest threat
to Korea in ten years (37.7 percent), followed by Japan (23.6 percent),
North Korea (20.7 percent), and the United States (14.8 percent).59
It is clear that even in the vision of becoming a Northeast Asian
balancer, South Koreans are not envisioning any kind of alliance with
China. Strategic thinking about this concept treats a balancer as gain-
ing independence from foreign inf luence, not as replacing one big
brother with another. Indeed, before the 1880s, it was China that played
the role of hegemonic power in the region for more than one thousand
years. Despite the cultural affinity and rapidly increasing economic
integration with China, Koreans are suspicious of Chinese ambitions in
the region. The dispute over the history of Korea’s ancient kingdom of
Goguryo after controversial writings in Northeast China is just one
example of the potential conf lict between the two peoples. In 2004
many were angered when South Korean news media reported that a
government-run academy of social sciences had argued that this king-
dom was one of the local Chinese regimes at the time. The South Korean
government responded that it would exhaust all diplomatic means to
correct this incorrect history if it is, indeed, the official position of the
Chinese government. When this issue flared again in 2006, it estab-
lished the Northeast Asian History Foundation to promote objective
research on the ancient history of this disputed region. This issue has
raised doubts over China’s territorial aspirations as well as its acceptance
of aspects of a united Korea’s national identity.
Despite his claim that South Korea was becoming a balancer, Roh’s
response to Japan ref lects the deep suspicion and strong antagonism of
the South Korean nation, which is still unable to separate its regional
strategy from the strong nationalist tendency associated with memories
of its colonial experience and expressed in its recurring sensitivity to
Japan’s approach to history. In the midst of substantial economic ties
since diplomatic normalization in 1965 and improved cultural and
security cooperation since the 1990s, disputes over Japan’s colonial past
in Korea have been a recurring theme in bilateral relations. The Roh
government proved to be no exception. Following his predecessor, Roh
emphasized future-oriented relations with Japan in his first visit to
Japan in 2003, but in 2005, the past returned with a vengeance to over-
whelm the future.
Shimane prefecture’s declaration of “Takeshima Day,” which
challenged South Korean sovereignty over the island it knows as Dokdo,
was followed in April 2005 by Japan’s adoption of a new school text-
book that grossly omits recognition of Japanese wrongdoing in the era
of colonization and war, insulting South Koreans. Roh reacted strongly,
vowing to make every effort to correct the wrong approach by the
Japanese government even at the risk of “diplomatic war.”60 Koizumi’s
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in August only made the situation worse as
the Korean government called off all summit meetings between the two
leaders. This ongoing dispute over history has provided a useful staple
for Korean nationalism, regardless of the fallout that may complicate
strategic decisions at a time of regional instability or in conditions of
Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership. When Abe Shinzo became
prime minister, he agreed to leave unstated whether he intended to visit
the Yasukuni Shrine, and thus was accepted in Beijing and Seoul in his
inaugural foreign travel in October 2006. In 2007, stormy relations
with Japan appeared to be calming down. For the first time in years, no
cabinet member visited the Yasukuni Shrine in August. Instead, in the
summer of 2007 the United States House of Representatives passed a
resolution critical of the Japanese government for not officially recog-
nizing its responsibility for organizing the wartime “comfort women,”
most of whom were Koreans.61
As for Russia, Roh agreed to upgrade bilateral ties from a “construc-

tive and mutually supplementary partnership” to a “comprehensive
partnership of mutual trust” in his visit to Moscow in September 2004.
Roh sought Vladimir Putin’s help in persuading Kim Jong-il to cooperate
in the Six-Party Talks, while also agreeing to promote economic ties,
especially in energy and technological cooperation. Bilateral trade
has been rising, reaching almost $10 billion in 2006, well below the
$78 billion figure for Japan, let alone the booming commerce with
China. Rising oil prices and increasing competition for energy provide
South Koreans with added incentives to seek closer cooperation with
Russia as it plans to make new supplies available in Asia.
With Russia considered a secondary actor in the region, perceptions
of a balancer or other intermediary role focus on the growing rivalry
between China and Japan, not between China and the United States.
Unsure of their intentions, South Koreans increasingly assume that a
position of neutrality between the two neighbors would be in their best
national interest. This leads to the prospect of taking advantage of the
rivalry, playing off the two big neighbors, one against another. This
presumes a power rivalry where the two would each court the favor of
South Korea, providing it with useful leverage. Yet, since 2005, many
detect a tilt toward China, linked to protests over the history issue with
Japan. Although it is justified as furthering a different reform strategy
in favor of middle powers, South Korea’s opposition since 2005 against
Japan’s bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is
shared with China. 62
Many question whether South Korea has overreached in considering
a balancing strategy between the two neighbors. First, it underestimates
the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Tokyo. As much as
they see each other as a potential threat, Beijing and Tokyo also under-
stand that an intense rivalry is not in either’s best interest. As soon as
Koizumi stepped down, China quickly held a summit with the new
prime minister Abe and then showed restraint in the following months,
even when the comfort women issue flared over Abe’s insensitive
remarks, in preparation for a visit by Wen Jiabao to Beijing in April
2007. Second, critics pointed out that Japan is the most important ally
of the United States. South Korea’s neutral position vis-à-vis Japan goes
against the U.S. desire of building a strong U.S.-Japan-Korea alliance
axis in East Asia, 63 and it could pose a direct challenge to U.S. security
interests in the region.
Critics charge that there is a more fundamental problem in strategic
thinking that regards the role of balancer as feasible for South Korea in
the regional environment it faces. Citing the example of Great Britain

in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, experts doubt that the
South’s military capacity is strong enough to become a balancer between
two Asian giants.64 Certainly there is a gap between South Korea and
its two big neighbors in terms of national wealth and power. Japan
enjoys superior technology in a wide array of weapons systems, while
China possesses an arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, just to mention
two obvious differences. Even those optimistic that Seoul can amplify
its voice in the region are inclined to foresee this largely in the context
of either agreement on managing North Korea’s reintegration into the
region or, further ahead, unification of Korea with continuing economic
development that would make the country a power to be reckoned with
in Northeast Asia. A close aide to the President suggested that a unified
Korea would follow a path of neutrality between the continental power
and the sea power, a powerful Switzerland of Asia with a population
70 million strong and a booming economy.65 Naturally, given uncer-
tainties about the status of North Korea and the assertiveness of the
powers in the region, many South Koreans doubt the feasibility of Roh’s
bold thinking.
Later, the Roh government changed the balancer rhetoric into talk of
a Northeast Asian multilateral security regime, seen as promoting coop-
eration and integration. According to Roh, the existing alliance system
cannot resolve bilateral confrontations—China-Japan, Russia-Japan,
and Korea-Japan—in the region. It was assumed that Seoul would take
a leading role in this process, bridging the different positions of all
major powers through its “balanced diplomacy,” as an impartial partner
for all.66 Roh tried to link the inter-Korean summit and the Northeast
Asian peace mechanism, saying that establishing a peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula could both reinforce and benefit from the multilat-
eral security efforts in the region, and hoping that the Six-Party Talks
would develop into a permanent mechanism for regional multilateral
security.67
As for building an economic hub, Roh announced a new plan to
build a “Global Transport Network” instead of a “Northeast Asian
Hub” by the end of 2006. Despite the more comprehensive title, the
change was seen as an admission that the South could not compete with
the Chinese counterpart of Shanghai and its hinterland. 68 Having long
criticized Roh’s plan as too ambitious and unrealistic, many saw this as
another example of ignoring strategic prudence. The idea of South
Korea (or a unified Korea) becoming a hub of Northeast Asia, econom-
ically as well as politically, was practically dead by the time the lame
duck Roh administration was ready to consider its final legacy. Ironically,
the FTA agreement with Bush, arguably Roh’s foremost nemesis, was
likely to stand instead as the principal accomplishment of Roh’s economic
strategizing.
Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense:

ROK-U.S. Alliance Restructuring
To achieve its strategic objective of peace on the peninsula and prosperity
in Northeast Asia, the Roh government pursued a somewhat ambiva-
lent, if not contradictory, policy towards the United States and the
alliance relationship. While continuing to recognize the United States
as the most important ally for deterrence and security against a North
Korean attack, Roh also believed that South Korea should develop a
truly independent defense capability apart from its ally. Building a self-
reliant capability was regarded as a necessary condition for South Korea
to take a leading role in resolving the nuclear issue and to become a
balancer in Northeast Asia.
From the very beginning of his presidency Roh expressed a strong
interest in building a self-defense capability, raising suspicions that he
sought the dissolution of the alliance, even if that might take some
time. On his first meeting with the top generals in South Korea, he
caught them by surprise with an abrupt question about whether such a
self-reliant force could be developed. Since then, at every major military
ceremony, Roh has returned to this theme. For example, in March 2005
at the Korean Air Force Academy, he declared that the military should
build a “self-defense capability” along with close cooperation with the
United States. He told the graduates, “We have sufficient power to
defend ourselves. We have nurtured mighty national armed forces
that absolutely no one can challenge.” Within a decade, he added, “we
should be able to develop our military into one with full command of
operations.”69
In the fall of 2005, the Ministry of National Defense revealed its
plan for achieving a self-defense posture by 2020, calling for substantial
increases in the defense budget by 11 percent a year for the next ten
years. South Korea would build key strategic weapons systems includ-
ing Aegis class destroyers, submarines, and air-borne early warning
systems.70 Roh agreed to take over ten military missions that had been
previously assigned to the United States by 2008.71 As one military
expert observed, “for all its talk of ‘cooperative’ self-reliant defense, Seoul
is also becoming much more independently minded and self-assertive
in both security policy and its alliance arrangements with the United
States.” 72
Among the controversies over self-reliant defense, no other issue
caused as much tension as the transfer of wartime operational control
from the United States. With its new focus on the war on terror and
military transformation around the world, the United States wanted to
downsize its large ground forces and transfer some of its missions. In
2003, the two governments started a series of talks on restructuring the
alliance. The talks included moving the Yongsan garrison out of down-
town Seoul to Osan-Pyongtaek, consolidating forty-three American
bases into sixteen, withdrawing 12,000 U.S. soldiers from a force of
37,000 between 2004–08, as well as transferring some military missions
from the United States to South Korea. In addition, Seoul was soon
insisting on wartime operations control, as many questions arose about
timing and feasibility as well as the political implications.
Since the Korean War, such wartime control has been exercised by a
commander of the U.S. forces in Korea, who doubled as UN commander.
This decision was the outcome of asymmetrical military capabilities in
the two allies. It was regarded as useful for South Korea’s national
security, since it was understood to cement the U.S. commitment to
intervene in case of a North Korean invasion.73 In the early 1990s,
there had been talk of returning the wartime operational command to
South Korea with its growing military capability.74 Under Kim Young-
sam peacetime operational control was returned to in 1994, but the
first nuclear crisis with North Korea postponed discussion of wartime
control indefinitely. Despite the second crisis, in 2003 Roh raised the
issue anew. He argued that the old agreement giving the Americans
wartime control over South Korean troops was anachronistic, some-
thing of which South Koreans today should feel ashamed, adding that
“To say that we South Koreans are not capable of defending ourselves
from North Korea is to talk nonsense. It’s shameful. I hope we kick the
habit of feeling insecure unless we have layers of guarantee that the
Americans will intervene automatically in case of war.” 75 In a meeting
between the two militaries in 2005, the two governments agreed to
discuss concrete measures. One commentator noted that the return of
wartime operational control would mean dissolution of the structure
where a U.S. commander presides as the top military decision-maker,
and no U.S. commander would take an order from a South Korean
officer.76 The only solution would be to separate the combined com-
mand into two independent commands in which each country would
exercise operational control over its own military, but that could have
serious military as well as political implications. At a minimum the
current alliance structure, which is the most closely integrated form,
would become much looser with the two militaries operating as sepa-
rate forces. The United States might feel less obligated to defend South
Korea. It would force the South Korean military to develop a more
coherent strategy to defend itself, serving Roh’s goal of creating an
irreversible momentum to build South Korea’s self-reliant defense
capability.
North Korea’s nuclear test suddenly changed the dynamics. When
Washington officially welcomed Seoul’s proposal and suggested speedy
transfer by 2008, Seoul decided to take more time. Finally, the two
agreed to complete the wartime operation control transfer some time
between 2009 and 2012.77 Yet the South Korean public expressed its
concern that the transfer would weaken the U.S. military commitment,
and many military experts thought that the transfer was still premature
given the huge disparity between the United States and South Korea in
their military capability.
Some suspected that Roh’s desire to be more self-reliant in defense
meant more autonomy from U.S. inf luence as was shown in the case of
the controversy over the strategic f lexibility of the U.S. forces in Korea.
As discussed earlier, the U.S. plan of transforming relocated bases into
launching pads for regional operations beyond the Korean peninsula
caused controversy, with many worrying that the new regional mission
of American forces would put South Korea in a difficult position.
Yet, after intense public and governmental debate, in January 2006 the
two governments announced a joint statement allowing the strategic
f lexibility of United States forces in Korea.78
In early 2006 the Roh government launched new strategic consulta-
tions with the United States. In their first meeting between the two
foreign ministers in Washington, the two governments emphasized
nurturing and protecting common values, such as respect for democ-
racy, human rights, and the rule of law as the basis of the alliance. The
two also agreed that they would have regular high-level meetings to
resolve pressing regional and global challenges.79 This represented a
major development for South Korea’s approach to the alliance, which so
far has exclusively focused on the Korean peninsula. This broadening
scope showed South Korea’s willingness to play a more active role in the
global agenda of the United States. Indeed, despite widespread antiwar
sentiment among Koreans, the South Korean government had sent
3,600 troops to Iraq, making it the third largest coalition force after the
United States and Great Britain and kept its forces there even when
others were withdrawing in 2006–07.
In April 2007, Seoul and Washington agreed to an FTA after a year
of tough negotiations with ratification pending on each side. Along
with dispatching troops to Iraq, the FTA was seen as one of the most
concrete proofs of South Korea’s commitment to the alliance, as Roh
argued that it had been successfully restructured and was ready for a
mutually beneficial relationship for the next fifty years. 80 Indeed,
despite earlier anti-American sentiment and its support of North-South
reconciliation, public opinion became more conservative regarding the
alliance by the end of Roh’s administration. According to a survey
in 2007, more people (12.8 percent) thought that South Korea
should strengthen the alliance than in 2002 (6.3 percent), and more
(55.3 percent) answered that the current alliance should remain unchanged
than in 2002 (50.1 percent). Negative views had declined from 42.1 to
30.4 percent. 81
Conclusion
South Korea’s strategy under Roh represents new thinking in relations
with East Asia; however, its bold and innovative character seems to be
driven more by traditional nationalist sentiment than by realistic
assessment of the security environment surrounding the Korean penin-
sula. First, South Korea is taking advantage of the U.S. military
restructuring on the peninsula to aggressively pursue a more national-
istic, self-reliant, and autonomous security and defense policy. Roh’s
emphasis on a self-reliant defense capability was welcomed in the broad
context of Washington’s global military transformation. As Washington
strives to reduce its military presence on the Korean peninsula for a
new global strategy, Seoul has no choice but to take increasing respon-
sibility for its own defense. The U.S.-Japan alliance is going through
the same restructuring in which Japan is taking more responsibility for
its self-defense. The problem is that Roh’s approach treats the return of
wartime operational control as about national pride and sovereignty
more than anything else, and acts as if it can be done quickly regardless
of cost and of regional conditions of instability. Many questioned
whether it was necessary for the South Korean government to rush.
Even though Roh on various occasions defended his commitment to
the alliance, his tendency to stir nationalist sentiment sends mixed sig-
nals to Americans about South Korea’s intentions towards the alliance,
handling of the North Korean nuclear issue, and long-term role in

responding to the rivalry between China and Japan and uncertainties
over China’s rise.
Second, plans for making South Korea a hub of prosperity in
Northeast Asia and a balancer were also hampered by nationalist
sentiments with strong antagonism toward Japan. As long as South
Korea sees Japan and its past through a nationalist framework, true
reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo will remain difficult. South
Korea’s neutrality between Japan and China will be seen as only rhetoric.
South Korea’s persistent antagonism toward Japan creates another
dilemma. Since the early 1950s, Japan has been and will remain the
most important ally for the United States in East Asia. Unless Seoul
wants to dissolve its alliance with the United States, it will be the odd
man out in the ever-growing ties between Washington and Tokyo. Even
Roh later explained that South Korea’s balancer role would be based on
its strong alliance with the United States, as he at least tacitly acknowl-
edged the need for a continuing presence of U.S. forces after unification
as a necessary “comprehensive deterrence capability” in “maintaining
the balance of power in the region” even after the North Korean threat
is ended. 82
Third, the biggest victim of South Korea’s nationalist approach is its
handling of North Korea and its nuclear development. Despite its rhet-
oric against allowing North Korea’s nuclear weapons, it has repeatedly
shown itself reticent to respond to the North’s nuclear provocations.
Officials exhibited an almost mysterious optimism toward North
Korean intentions, as if the weapons are only for defensive purposes or,
as the unification minister told reporters, due to the North’s poverty.83
The South’s repeated compromises with Kim Jong-il aroused serious
mistrust in the United States and Japan.
Fourth, China has become the biggest beneficiary of South Korea’s
nationalist approach in East Asia strategy. Whether intended or not, the
consequence of all of the major strategic decisions of the Roh adminis-
tration has been to strengthen China’s hand in dealing with Japan and
the United States and in solidifying it as the central actor in the Six-Party
Talks. While the Bush and Koizumi administrations also made deci-
sions that served to boost China’s regional role, this does not relieve
Roh of the responsibility of thinking strategically about the evolution
of Northeast Asia and recognizing the value of managing China’s rise in
the context of multilateral relations.
South Korea’s new strategic thinking is driven by growing confi-
dence among the leadership after its success in economic and political
development. A changing power structure in Northeast Asia with the

rise of China is another main driver in this thinking. Yet, to become a
facilitator of peace in the region and cooperation between China and
Japan, South Korea had reason to avoid the sort of assertiveness that
was produced by Roh’s ambitious moves, such as for a self-reliant
defense and to become Northeast Asia’s balancer. Roh’s new strategic
thinking overlooked the reality of international politics surrounding
the Korean peninsula, such as the seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear
development, growing geopolitical rivalries, or the asymmetrical nature
of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Arguably, this resulted not just from
the difficult environment in the region, but also from wishful thinking
of an idealistic president and strong nationalist sentiments of former
student activists who became his principal aides.
South Korean strategic thinking faces difficult challenges in the
transition from Roh to Lee Myung-bak in 2008. After its nuclear test,
North Korea may be even more insistent on its position in inter-Korean
talks and the later phases of the Six-Party Talks following the Joint
Agreement. Differences between Seoul and Washington over how to
deal with North Korea are likely to create further ripple effects on the
alliance. Instead of becoming an active mediator between Pyongyang
and Washington as well as between Tokyo and Beijing, Seoul may
become more isolated in nuclear diplomacy and even in the geopolitics
of Northeast Asia. As bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang
continue, Seoul may have trouble making its voice heard. Moreover,
rising Chinese influence in the region may pose a new dilemma as Seoul
continues to depend on U.S. military protection.
Harsh realities such as the above have strengthened the conservative
opposition’s support for the old strategy of seeking refuge in the U.S.
alliance. Notwithstanding the appeal of a stronger self-defense posture
and a more autonomous role in Northeast Asia, they are inclined to
shift South Korea back to where it left off: promoting and taking full
advantage of the alliance. Yet, the failure of the Bush administration’s
foreign policy on a global scale may make it impossible to go back.
Japan’s nationalist orientation may also complicate rebalancing regional
ties. With China ascendant in its multilateral diplomacy and economic
rise, U.S.-Chinese cooperation on handling North Korea may set limits
on what South Korea can achieve. Overreaching in strategic thinking in
one period does not create the luxury of nostalgia about strategic
thinking of another era. The next South Korean president will face an
environment that is already greatly changed and must be addressed with
new thinking.
Notes
1. David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies,
Vol., 23, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 67–97.
2. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The
Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), pp. 1–23.
3. ROK National Security Council (NSC), Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka
anbo (Seoul: NSC, March 1, 2004).
4. The other two governing goals are democracy with people’s participation
and equal and balanced development. “Gukjung mokpyo,” Blue House
Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/
government/goal.html accessed on December 6, 2006).
5. The Ministry of National Defense, Participatory Government Defense Policy
2003 (Seoul, July 11, 2003), pp. 3–5.
6. ROK NSC, Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo.
7. “12 gukjung gwaje,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://
www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/government/agenda_01.php?m=1 accessed on
December 6, 2006).
8. PBS, Frontline: Kim’s Nuclear Gamble, April 10, 2003 (http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/etc/cron.html accessed on January 2,
2007).
9. “Kija hoikyunmoon, December 15, 2002,” Blue House Briefing (Office
of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/popup_
archive_print.php? accessed on December 9, 2006).
10. ROK NSC, Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo, p. 31.
11. “Woisin kija kandamhoi, December 4, 2002,” Blue House Briefing (Office
of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/popup_
archive_print.php? accessed on December 6, 2006).
12. “Je16dae daetongryong chuimsa,” in Roh Moo-hyun daetongryong yonsul
munjip 2003.2.25–2004.1.31 (Seoul: Office of the President).
13. Ibid.
14. Yonhap News, March 3, 2004.
15. “Speech at the Heritage Foundation Seminar,” Blue House Briefing (Office
of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/archive_
view.php?meta_id=pre_speech&id=53d7e852915352938ef0841d accessed
on December 6, 2006).
16. Lee was a close aid to Lim Dong-won, an architect of the Sunshine
Policy and a key foreign policy advisor to Kim Dae-jung in the previous
administration.
17. Ministry of Unification, ROK, Monthly Report Inter-Korean Exchanges &
Cooperation, October 2007 (http://59.25.110.6/unikorea/2007_10/index.
html, accessed on December 14, 2007).
18. JoongAng ilbo, October 30, 2005.
19. “Press Conference Speech,” December 15, 2002.
20. “CNN hoikyun” (September 16, 2005) Office of the President. ROK.
21. Dong-A ilbo, July 24, 2006, p. A5.
22. Chosun ilbo, October 12, 2006, p. A5.
23. JoongAng ilbo, October 19 2006.
24. The New York Times, November 19, 2006.
25. “Meeting with Korean Military Veteran,” May 29, 2006, Office of the
President, ROK.
26. Dong-A ilbo, October 10, 2006, p. A5.
27. Chosun ilbo, September 16, 2006.
28. The Washington Post, November 19, 2006.
29. “Kun juyo jihwikwan kwaui daehwa, June 16, 2006,” Blue House
Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/
archivepopup_archive_print.php?m=1 accessed on February 23, 2007).
30. The Korea Times, December 11, 2006.
31. “Kun juyo jihwikwan kwaui daehwa, June 16, 2006.”
32. Ohmynews, December 14, 2006 (http://www.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/
article_view.asp?at_code=379810&bri_code=E00053 accessed on December
15, 2006).
33. Chosun ilbo, October 10, 2006.
34. Ibid., October 31, 2006 (http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/
2006/10/31/2006103160234.html accessed on April 23, 2007).
35. Korea Gallup Survey, June 23, 2007.
36. On January 16 Chris Hill met his counterpart Kim Kyekwan in Berlin for
bilateral talks. Yonhop News, January 17, 2007.
37. JoongAng ilbo, June 30, 2007.
38. Roh Moo-hyun, “Speech to the August 15 Independence Day Ceremony”
(Seoul, Office of the President, August 15, 2007)
39. “North-South Summit Joint Declaration,” October 4, 2007 (http://
dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/ accessed on December 10, 2007).
40. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the 51st Meeting of the Standing
Committee of National Unification Advisory Council, November 1, 2007
(ht t p://w w w.pre sident.go.k r/c wd / k r/v ip_ speeche s/v ie w.php?&id=
53d7e192729c75ddd16e6449 accessed on November 18, 2007).
41. Daily Press Briefing by Shaun Mccormack, a spokesman for the State
Department, August 9, 2007 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/aug/
90598.htm accessed on August 13, 2007).
42. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Interview with CNN,” December 8, 2007 (http://
english.president.go.k r/c wd/en/a rchive/a rchive _view.php?meta _id=
for_your_info&navi=issues&id=2585189b608eeb55fdbf7c6c accessed on
December 10, 2007).
43. According to the IMF in 2007, China tops the world list with $1.333 billion
followed by Japan with $924 billion, Taiwan fourth with $266 billion, and
South Korea fifth with $255 billion.
44. Roh, “Inauguration Speech,” February 25, 2003.
45. Roh, Moo-hyun, “History, Nationalism and Community,” Global Asia,

Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2007) (http://globalasia.org/articles/issue2/iss2_1.
html accessed on December 14, 2007).
46. Roh, March 8, 2005.
47. Richard A. Bitzinger and Mikyoung Kim, “Why Do Small States Produce
Arms?: The Case of South Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 197–201.
48. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Graduation Ceremony of Korea Third
Military Academy” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 22, 2005).
49. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Graduation Ceremony of Korean Air
Force Academy” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 8, 2005).
50. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Graduation Ceremony of Korea Third
Military Academy” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 22, 2005).
51. JoongAng ilbo, June 1, 2005.
52. Trade with China brought a $20 billion surplus in contrast to a $22 billion
deficit with Japan. Park Hyun-jung, “2006nyun daejung mooyok hukja
kamso wonin” KIEP Report, March 21, 2007.
53. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Students of Tsinghua University” (Office
of the President, July 9, 2003).
54. Chosun ilbo, May 19, 2005.
55. JoongAng ilbo, March 12, 2005, p. 30.
56. Ohmynews, March 8, 2005 (http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/
article_view.asp?at_code=241437 accessed on March 9, 2005).
57. Chosun ilbo, April 19, 2005, p. A6.
58. Scott Snyder, “South Korea’s Squeeze Play,” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), p. 103.
59. JoongAng ilbo, March 19, 2006.
60. Roh Moo-hyun, “A Letter to Korean People with Regard to Korea-Japan
Relations,” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 23, 2005).
61. Chosun ilbo, August 1, 2007, p. A08.
62. Yonhap News, May 10, 2005. In a meeting with the UN Secretary General,
Roh said UNSC membership requires moral legitimacy.
63. Chosun ilbo, editorial, November 19, 2006.
64. Financial News, June 8, 2005; Seoul shinmun, April 15, 2005.
65. Bae Ki-chan, Korea, Dasi sang jon oe giroe soda (Seoul: Wisdom House,
2005), pp. 419–35.
66. “Chamyo jungbu 4nyon pyonggwa sunjin Hanguk jonryak,” Blue House
Briefing (Office of the President, March 21, 2007, http://www.president.
go.k r/c wd/k r/hotissue/4years _ appraisa l/archive_view.php?meta _id=
4ye a r s _ appr a i sa l& id= a57881a8d 36 4 69685392f a7c & c ate gor y=252
accessed on August 19, 2007).
67. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Opening Address to 2007 Hangyorae-Pusan
International Symposium on Northeast Asian Peace and Prosperity,”
November 13, 2007, Blue House Briefing (http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/
kr/archive/archive_view.php?meta_id=speech&id=82ad77d98e93a3d026
dae6a0 accessed on November 18, 2007).
68. Munhwa ilbo, December 18, 2006.
69. Ohmynews, March 8, 2005.
70. ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Press Release on National Defense
Reform 2020,” September 13, 2005. To complete the plan South Korea
would have to spend $621 billion.
71. Kathleen T. Rhem, “U.S. to Transfer 10 Missions to South Korean
Military,” American Forces Press Service, November 19, 2003.
72. Richard Bitzinger, Transforming the US Military: Implications for the Asia-
Pacific (Sydney: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2006),
pp. 27–30.
73. ROK Ministry of National Defense, ROK-US Alliance and USFK (Seoul:
MND, 2002), pp. 50–62.
74. Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance for The Next
Century (Santa Monica: R AND, 1995).
75. International Herald Tribune, August 10, 2006 (http://www.iht.com/
articles/2006/08/10/news/korea.php accessed on December 27, 2006).
76. Chosun ilbo, October 2, 2005.
77. The Korea Herald, October 25, 2006.
78. Yonhap News, January 19, 2006.
79. The U.S. Department of States, Press Release, “United States and the
Republic of Korea Launch Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership,”
January 19, 2006.
80. Blue House Briefing, March 21, 2007.
81. Hankook ilbo, June 8, 2007.
82. JoongAng ilbo, February 15, 2004.
83. Dong-A ilbo, January 3, 2007.
Geography
CHAPTER 6

on Reunification
Jong-Yun Bae and Gilbert Rozman
D
iscussions of the Korean peninsula veer between two extremes:
1) North Korea is bound to collapse with or without outside
pressure, and however unprepared South Korea may be, it will
take charge of a chaotic process of putting the North back together as
part of a united state and 2) the North Korean regime firmly controls
the land north of the 38th parallel and shows no sign of letting go no
matter how much lip service is paid to reunification. These two ways of
thinking share the conclusion that there is little point in strategic plan-
ning for a staged merger of the two sides of the peninsula, taking into
account bilateral and multilateral diplomacy along with coordination of
the public and private sectors. Until the second half of the 1990s when
thinking about reunification started to go forward gradually based on
two standing governments finding ways to compromise, few doubted
the validity of one or the other view. The Sunshine Policy raised hopes,
and, nine years later the February 13, 2007 agreement at the Six-Party
Talks has intensified interest in negotiated, gradual integration of the
peninsula. A review of how discussion of this theme has proceeded,
incorporating various types of inter-peninsula cooperation, can shed
light on how South Koreans have reasoned about this issue and are
prone to link it to developments in the Six-Party Talks.
Prospects for reunification starting with coexistence between South
and North Korea remain highly uncertain. Despite wishful thinking
among some advocates of “peaceful coexistence,” from every indication,
130 ● Jong-Yun Bae and Gilbert Rozman
the communist regime in charge of the North has no intention of sub-

mitting its people to the awakening that would come through any of the
usual processes of integration and mutual exposure to the reality of the
other. In this chapter we trace how the South Korean government has
approached the issue of reunification, considering the North only as an
object of strategic thinking and a force whose behavior and rhetoric
provide the feedback that causes the South to change course. Looking
successively at the various administrations in South Korea, we describe
their evolving strategies toward reunification. In the process, we also
recognize the realities that inf luence their choices and impose limits on
how far they can press their case. On the surface, preparing for the
nebulous goal of reunification may seem like nothing more than wish-
ful thinking, but it has exerted an increasing impact on a wide range of
strategizing about how to proceed not only in relations with the North
but in dealing with the United States, China, Russia, and even Japan. It
is an important component of regional policy, as seen in the inter-Korean
summit of October 2–4 2007.
Outside observers have tended to visualize reunification through
the prism of the North’s collapse or as a mirage blurred by the spell of
the Sunshine Policy. Writing in the mid-1990s, Nicholas Eberstadt
detailed policy arenas—demographics, employment, health, educa-
tion, and so on—where action would have to be taken should the North
disband its system and accept peaceful reunification essentially on the
South’s terms. The challenge was framed in terms of assimilating the
North’s population into the existing society in the South, however
the North’s disintegration occurred.1 Along the same lines, in the late
1990s, Japanese led in contemplating how neighboring states would
respond to this kind of process, assessing the strategic implications and
how economic assistance should be provided or relations with South
Korea might be affected. 2 The inter-Korean summit in June 2000,
however, stimulated a different manner of thinking, focused on step-
by-step, negotiated integration. In the midst of the second nuclear crisis,
doubts about the North’s collapse or any path to voluntary absorption
further intensified. Many acknowledged that predictions of collapse
and assimilation are a fallacy of wishful thinking that assumes a com-
bination of highly improbable conditions. Instead of indulging in this
sort of delusion, analysts would be better off turning their attention to
a functional approach to unification by consensus, starting with grad-
ual economic integration.3 Thinking along these lines has spread in
South Korea. It has become a driving force in foreign policy, at times
becoming interlinked with three other forces: boosting economic
Strategic Thought on Reunification ● 131
development in a country obsessed with this as the path to competitive

national power, expanding national inf luence amidst four competing
great powers, and achieving historical justice against “villainous”
Japan.
An extreme view that combined demonizing the North with insis-
tence on defeating and absorbing it was fading in the face of no practi-
cal way of accomplishing this as well as growing concern about the high
cost of proceeding in this way. With the end of the cold war, the logic
of reconciliation with the help of a coalition of great powers swayed
many. After the leap of faith in 2000 that the North was now a reliable
partner for rapid reunification prepared to build confidence through
ever-closer contacts, this other extreme view also was discredited.
Thinking in South Korea about reunification settled on some sort of
confederation with expanded ties over multiple stages lasting for decades
and an essential role for outside powers. Even with this emerging con-
sensus, questions persist about what realistically may work in a rapidly
changing international environment.
Having long retained the ideal of “absorbing” the North as conve-
nient for domestic and international politics, South Korean leaders were
gradually slipping into a compromise mode of accepting coexistence as
the only feasible strategy. After the end of a quarter century of military
dictatorships, this reality became openly acknowledged and ever more
the basis of official pronouncements and policy initiatives. Under Roh
Moo-hyun as well as Kim Dae-jung this was the official position, but
only after the Joint Agreement in the Six-Party Talks that led to acceler-
ated North-South dialogue did it become the focus.
As the nuclear crisis has unfolded, observers have often been per-
plexed by the responses in South Korea. An ally of the United States
and a prosperous democracy, the South seemed inexplicably concilia-
tory toward the North. Compared with the staunch anticommunism of
its military dictators to 1987 and the hostile response to the North in
the first nuclear crisis in 1993–94, perceived empathetic engagement
elicits skeptical reactions, blaming leftist leadership and emotional
nationalism. Some harbor the hope that Lee Myung-bak, as a new
president in 2008, or a breakdown in the Six-Party Talks leaving a
nuclear-armed, isolated North could at last cause a sober awakening.
Omitted in such assessments, however, is serious ref lection on how
South Korean reasoning about reunification has evolved and what it
may tell us about likely responses to new developments. To fill this
gap, we present a chronology of government strategic thinking on this
issue, taking care at each stage to note realities that stood in the way of
its realization. Over time we find a gradual shift from absorption to

coexistence, reinforced by increasing assistance to the North, as well as
reliance on other states to forge a favorable regional framework. While
under Roh Moo-hyun this lowered vigilance about possible sobering
actions of the North, we do not attempt to prejudge in the complex
negotiations ahead to what degree a new South Korean administration
may impose strict conditions on assistance and ensure that the time-
table for integration linked to the goal of reunification awaits a full set
of reforms.
If reunification serves as an unassailable symbol, this does not mean
that it stands in the way of cautious preparations for coexistence. For
few South Koreans is it a priority. Instead, debates center on alternative
strategies for coexistence with elements of gradual integration that are
expected to advance haltingly and may even be reversed at times. In
the aftermath of the 2000 summit, discussion has focused on how to
balance economic assistance and security requirements, how much reci-
procity from the North is needed, and to what extent do the wishes of
the United States matter. Paying lip service to the long-term goal of
reunification does not mean ignoring the need to make choices now. In
the inter-Korean summit of Roh and Kim Jong-il these choices became
more immediate.
Perceptions of North Korea play a role in government strategizing on
how to proceed. Is it at last serious about reform? Does it still pose a
dangerous security threat? How do U.S. relations affect the readiness of
the Kim Jong-il leadership to work with South Korea? In the shadow of
the nuclear crisis in 2002–07 it was impossible to divorce the impact
of aid to the North from calculations about how the crisis would be
resolved. With the North playing its nuclear card and the United States
insisting on pressure as a means to bring the North to the negotiating
table and later on delaying rewards until no doubt was left about denu-
clearization, debates on incremental moves toward reunification could
not be kept separate. The environment forged by U.S. relations with
North Korea and its backers also mattered. U.S. policy changes toward
China and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s had opened the way
to the South’s early overtures to the North. U.S.-Soviet agreements
from the late 1980s further encouraged engagement of the North.
Synchronization faded under George W. Bush, especially when Roh
Moo-hyun at times proceeded with the North in defiance of the United
States, but with the Joint Agreement, Roh received more encourage-
ment from both Bush and Kim Jong-il. He then intensified engagement
offers to Kim, resulting in the dramatic October summit.
The Origins of Cooperative Reunification

Thinking in the Cold War
The legacy of the Korean War and the belligerent path taken by North
Korea with backing from the Soviet Union or China favored tense com-
petition over forward-looking cooperation. Arising in the occupation era
before the war, claims of being the only lawful government in Korea set
the tone.4 Through the time of Rhee Syngman, competing logics of legit-
imacy left little room to search for common ground. Park Chung-hee
likewise started by emphasizing anticommunism as the basis of his
regime’s legitimacy. This did not exclude, however, later paying lip service
to ideas for cooperation that might be manipulated for political or propa-
ganda benefit. From 1961 to 1979 his approach to this issue reflected the
anticommunist predilections of a military administration intent on
mobilizing the population for high-speed economic modernization under
a developmental state. His “industrialization first, unification later” (son
gonsol, hu tongil )5 set the tone for postponing serious consideration of
how to engage the North. Yet, as early as 1960, Kim Il-sung had proposed
a federation unification system (yonbangje), and on June 23, 1973, he
went further by presenting a program setting forth what that could mean,
having already acknowledged that the South would not try to conquer the
North.6 As the international environment changed, Park, in turn, estab-
lished a National Unification Board in 1969 giving a more formal cast to
relations. In the midst of Sino-U.S. reconciliation and U.S.-Soviet detente,
he approved a South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, elucidat-
ing three principles for national unification—autonomy, peace, and
solidarity of the Korean nation—, and he made clear that he would not
oppose both sides entering the United Nations.7 This became the back-
bone for subsequent initiatives toward the North. At a time when barriers
were falling in Northeast Asia, there were stirrings in South Korea too
about how talks with the North might lead at least to a framework for
coexistence. If terrorist attacks from the North had not undercut support,
the growing balance between the two economically developing states
might well have encouraged the South’s leadership to become more vocal
in advocating such ideas. After all, interest was growing in opening ties
with China and Russia. After being obliged by the United States to aban-
don a clandestine nuclear weapons program, strategic thinkers in the
South could anticipate escaping one-sided dependency on a single power
only by finding a path to coexistence on the peninsula. Given the gnawing
dissatisfaction with Park’s abusive use of power, such escapist thinking
offered an appealing outlet.
On November 10, 1980, Kim Il-sung called for a Founding Formula

for the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (Koryo minjujuoe yonbang
gonghwaguk), and on January 22, 1982, Chun Doo-hwan responded
with his formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification
(minjok hwahap minju tongil bangan). South Korea matched the North
with its own high-sounding proclamations that, at a minimum, paid lip
service to the goal of reunification through joint endeavors. The ideal
of reunification was kept alive, even if it seemed far-fetched in the
absence of trust and of great power relations that offered support. Yet,
suddenly in the mid-80s, hopes accelerated for multilateral diplomacy
in a rapidly shifting global environment, raising for the first time the
prospect of approaching the North through shaping a conducive regional
context.
Chun Doo-hwan’s administration found the pull from China’s
reform and opening to the outside compelling and could have been
expected—as he strengthened ties to the United States and Japan—to
seek better ties with North Korea too. Indeed, many proposals were
presented for informal, nongovernmental ties. However, the terrorist
attack by North Korean agents in 1983 in Burma against the South
Korean leadership set the process back, as did Chun’s efforts to win
support from Ronald Reagan, who was warning of a new cold war in
which North Korea had an active role. Despite some systemization of
North-South relations and the beginning of exchanges, including an
agreement on meetings of separated families, the results were meager.
Yet, with Seoul preparing to host the 1988 Olympics and eager for
China and the Soviet Union to participate as well as to make use of the
opportunity to advance bilateral relations, a new mood arose for creat-
ing a positive environment in order to achieve reunification. Public
consciousness in the South about finding a cooperative path toward
reunification grew along with the Olympic spirit of bringing nations
together. The very fact that the Olympic Games proceeded successfully
affirmed the government’s declaration of victory over the North Korean
terrorists, contributing to optimism that now the North would have no
alternative but to switch to a cooperative strategy.
The Roh Tae-woo Approach to Reunification

A new attitude toward the North arose from the widening contrast
between the two Koreas as well as the sense that the international envi-
ronment was now favorable. As the North fell deeper into economic
crisis and isolation, the South was riding a wave of global admiration
for its continued economic dynamism and forging new diplomatic ties.
Suddenly, the possibility of unification on favorable terms had arisen,
but Roh Tae-woo decided to play down this prospect by stressing
instead gradual steps toward functional integration. In the spurt of
accelerated bilateral and regional diplomacy, Roh endorsed hopes for
coexistence. He seized the spotlight on April 21, 1988, to proclaim a
foreign policy known as nordpolitik, boldly calling for opening the cur-
tain across the 38th parallel for the sake of peaceful reunification, and
on July 7 he issued the Special Declaration for National Self-existence,
Unification, and Prosperity. 8 Another milestone was the September 11,
1989, introduction of the Korean National Community Unification
Formula (Han minjok gongdongche tongil bangan), including the sug-
gestion that a Korean Commonwealth be formed as an interim stage.9
After declaring that in North-South relations competition had been
replaced by an era of cooperation, Roh announced this formula, calling
for wide-ranging contacts involving academics, opinion leaders, and
economic circles. Compared to the North Korean proposal for a Korean
federation (Koryo yonbang je) in one quick step, this was a more con-
crete, realistic appeal for the two nations to draw closer together. It has
served as a basis ever since for efforts to expand contacts in order to
narrow the gap between two nations that have taken sharply different
paths for more than sixty years.10 It also stimulated much freer discus-
sion in South Korea of the North and how to deal with it, allowing
doves and even sympathizers to register views that once would have
brought their arrest. Yet, some controls remained, and anticommunist
themes persisted in schools.
The period 1989 to 1992 is marked by two unprecedented develop-
ments. First, the two sides agreed to promote reunification after
acknowledging common elements in the mutual proposals of the South
for confederation and the North for federation at a lower stage.11 This
produced a spurt of meetings, including a deal that permitted both to
join the United Nations on September 17, 1991. Second, the end of the
cold war spurred efforts by Moscow, Tokyo, and Beijing, each on its
own, to work out a formula with Pyongyang to further the normalization
process on the peninsula while aiming to strengthen its own inf luence
over North-South relations. Although Roh had set this process in
motion, the North’s increasing isolation not only intensified pressure
on it to negotiate but also raised the potential for defiant actions. Much
was accomplished in changing consciousness of the North among South
Koreans. More open discussion of this long-sensitive topic allowed
information to freely circulate, as contacts grew more frequent.
In this period the South felt ever more superior to its adversary, the
North. Its economy was booming. Global observers lauded it as an East
Asian economic miracle, while the North’s economy went into a tail-
spin. Democratization had boosted political legitimation, marked by
rising respect from Western leaders and social scientists, as the discred-
ited communist system was being abandoned in most of the world apart
from the North. Diplomatically, its successes were the mirror opposite
of the North’s growing isolation. In these circumstances, proposals for
reunification inevitably smacked of sugarcoating the North’s defeat
with face-saving measures as it abandoned all that it held dear. When
stress was placed on an era of cooperation replacing one of competition
for the sake of peaceful unification, it was assumed that the competi-
tion had ended in victory for the South. When German reunification in
1990 led many to envision the possibility of a similar breakthrough on
the Korean peninsula, confidence was rising not in a takeover but in
series of stages, marked by expanding contacts and exchanges, which
would give the South increasing opportunities to guide the North in
functional integration.12
While Roh brought the reunification issue to the fore, it was not
long before he was viewed as a transitional figure, tarnished by his
links to the prior military dictatorship and losing political ground to
various opposition forces claiming to be the representatives of true
democracy. In these circumstances he found foreign policy to be the
easiest outlet, but the more he succeeded in Moscow and Beijing, the
more Pyongyang suspected that his goal was to pressure it into submis-
sion. Yet, Pyongyang also made moves that raised hopes in Seoul. Its
overtures toward the United States, Japan, and other capitalist coun-
tries, legal reforms to attract foreign capital, and renewed inter-Korean
dialogue, all whetted the appetite of many South Koreans. This created
doubts whether Roh was really doing all that he could to end the cold
war on the peninsula. In June 1988 only 33 percent of respondents
thought that unification was possible, but by August 1991 the figure
had risen to 81 percent.13 Many expected German-style absorption
of the North, even if there were lingering worries about a possible
attack by the North along with continuing distrust that it was really
changing.14
The main achievement of the Roh period was the Agreement on
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation (Basic
Agreement) signed with North Korea in December 1991. There were
also a Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
and an agreement on the establishment of joint commissions, as each
side formally accepted the official titles of the other. Rather than a
relationship between states, they recognized each other as parts of a
single country temporarily in the process of unification.15 Having
resolved to treat their ties as a special relationship, they could proceed
with plans symbolically to join together, as with sports teams at inter-
national events, and to organize more two-way meetings. An important
turning point for the South Korean state was the change of the National
Unification Board into the Ministry of Unification, an office that
quickly gained considerable power over all matters connected to the
North. From 1991, funds began to be allocated for inter-Korean coop-
eration, but the North was not yet convinced that such ties would not
spring a trap spelling the regime’s demise, as it kept its eyes fixed on
somehow normalizing relations with the United States.
The Kim Young-sam Approach to Reunification

Kim Young-sam presided over a transitional period when policy toward
North Korea changed often. At first he stepped up efforts to engage the
North, declaring at his inauguration that nation takes precedence over
any alliance.16 Instead of crowing about victory in the cross-peninsula
struggle, he disavowed arrogance in favor of friendship and charity,
insisting that the days of competition were over. Yet, within weeks of
taking office, he faced a newly belligerent North that declared it was
pulling out of the NPT and was intent on bypassing Seoul as it focused
on negotiations with Washington.17 Although this led to some harden-
ing in the South’s position, contacts continued, even leading to plans
for a summit with Kim Il-sung, but his death in 1994 complicated
matters. Instead of taking this as well as the Agreed Framework reached
with the United States as reason to respond positively to South Korean
overtures, the North took affront at the absence of a delegation at Kim
Il-sung’s funeral by suspending talks and keeping matters on hold for
three years in the course of a leadership transition to Kim Jong-il.18
Indeed, at this important juncture, Kim Young-sam went to Russia and
brought home the historical records that cast the blame for the Korean
War on Kim Il-sung, vilifying him rather than paying respect. As many
in the South pondered whether the regime in the North would collapse
in the midst of severe famine and succession uncertainties, Kim Young-
sam had little chance to make headway in this relationship. Yet, he
again softened his line, setting forth negative assurances in 1996 to gain
the trust of the untried and still reclusive Kim Jong-il. Altering the
terms in which discussions about reunification proceeded, he declared
that the South would not take advantage of the North’s troubles, isolate
it, or seek unification through absorption.19
Seoul could proceed confidently since, ever more, the world recog-
nized that it had already won the competition between systems, but
it had to guard against a backlash in the proud North Korean regime, 20
as had earlier occurred toward Roh Tae-woo’s overtures. Kim Young-
sam had found more ways to lend support to engagement based on
coexistence, reaffirming his stress on cooperation, while appealing to
establish long-term exchanges and a gradual, negotiated unification. At
the war-end anniversary celebration on August 15, 1994, he announced
a three-stage unification program: reconciliation and cooperation, com-
monwealth, and a final unification stage. 21 Then on August 15 in 1996
and 1997, he made clear the South’s willingness to provide economic
assistance to help solve the North’s economic crisis. The severity of the
North’s situation reinforced the notion that not only would it be
extremely painful to try to absorb the South but also the two sides could
not solve their problems by themselves. The KEDO agreement and the
launch of four-party talks fueled growing awareness of the need for
multilateralism and pursuit of a peace treaty; yet, the North declined to
proceed from its weak position.
The fact that Kim Young-sam enjoyed legitimacy as an elected
civilian president as well as the economic clout and diplomatic multidi-
rectionality of a state in excellent international standing made it easier
to proceed from confidence. In the period of the first nuclear crisis,
signs were visible of growing independence from the United States. At
the November 1993 summit with Bill Clinton, Kim pressed for a “com-
prehensive solution” based on “a thorough and broad approach” to the
North. 22 Yet, such an approach was undercut by the North’s warning in
the crisis that Seoul could be turned into a sea of fire, 23 and by its
ungrateful handling of aid, as in insistence that an arriving South
Korean ship f ly a North Korean f lag. A backlash at home, along with
loss of public confidence in his leadership, caused Kim Young-sam to
pause in his engagement efforts. The war scare as well as the North’s
early insistence on excluding the South in the four-party talks had
driven home the message that the alliance with the United States
remained vital to the country’s security. Even so, the legacy of livelier
exchanges and humanitarian assistance further transformed the con-
sciousness of South Koreans. As public opinion was gaining importance,
Kim’s restraint toward the North along with the impact of his shift
toward engagement and economic assistance left a foundation for a
successor who might decide to go further in building trust. If even a
conservative president could explore improved ties with the North,

despite its provocations, a progressive might go much further.
The international environment was changing rapidly between 1993
and 1998, as both Washington and Beijing were growing more confi-
dent. If the former under Bill Clinton remained firmly astride the global
system, it was increasingly cognizant of the security complexities in
Northeast Asia. China’s rise as well as the North’s belligerence had led
it to expand alliance ties with Japan. Yet, after China’s warning salvoes
against Taiwan’s independence moves and the response of U.S. aircraft
carriers, Jiang Zemin went to Washington to forge a strategic partner-
ship. At odds with the United States over financial globalization, Japan
began looking to East Asian regional ties rather than APEC. In this
continuing flux, South Koreans could again envision space for active
diplomacy.
The Kim Dae-jung Approach to Reunification

While recognizing anew the importance of international relations in
dealings with the North, Kim Dae-jung put increased stress on bilateral
dialogue, marking a turning point in South Korean foreign policy. He
took advantage of the improved international environment following
the Agreed Framework of 1994, which was reinforced by the 1999 Perry
process that put U.S.-North Korean relations on a more positive footing.
By 1997 it was clear that the North would not soon collapse; Kim
Jong-il established himself as the successor to his father, and the worst
of the famine did not bring unrest. In 1998 Kim Dae-jung’s policies
quickly proved that the Asian financial crisis, which erupted on the eve
of his election, would not set back South Korea for long. In these cir-
cumstances, he made it clear that his state would benefit from a stable
North Korea engaged in reform and opening to the outside rather than
a North torn by crisis. He strove to gain the trust of Kim Jong-il to
alleviate any suspicions, 24 turning the emphasis away from a “unifica-
tion policy” to a “policy to the North” that stressed coexistence. In his
inauguration speech he disavowed unification through absorption or
use of force. 25 In a Berlin speech in March 2000, he went further, for
the first time making preservation of the North’s security a subject of
discussion. 26 He announced the principle of separating politics and
economics, offering, irrespective of political problems, to go ahead
with economic exchanges to revive the North’s economy while helping
it to strengthen cooperation with international society. Intent on saving
face for the North, he eschewed the term assistance, calling for
“reconciliation and cooperation” for mutual benefit.27 Many of these

overtures were not new—even the “sunshine concept” had been used by
Kim Young-sam—, 28 but Kim Dae-jung proved to be persuasive as he
pressed consistently forward even in the face of negative changes in the
domestic and foreign environment. He was able to keep public opinion
largely in favor of this approach, despite provocative moves by the
North such as the August 1998 missile launch and the June 1999 attack
on South Korean ships in the West Sea that threatened to derail the
process. 29
Kim Dae-jung’s summits with the four concerned powers furthered
his cross-peninsula strategy. Meetings with Bill Clinton in June and
November 1998, where Kim embraced globalization and showed vigor
in overcoming the financial crisis, helped win acceptance for the
Sunshine Policy and bring the Perry process into being. The favorable
response in Japan to the October 1998 summit that reached break-
throughs on history and culture as well as advancing security and
economic ties facilitated Japan’s shift from a hard line adopted after the
North’s missile launch toward the forward-looking Murayama mission
in December 1999 to restart negotiations aimed at normalization. A
November 1998 summit with China raised prospects for coordination
in engaging the North that proved critical in the first half of 2000, as
China reinvigorated its diplomacy with that state. Finally, in May 1999
Russia became the last of the powers to support Kim Dae-jung’s
Sunshine Policy. After all, Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov with
increased support from Boris Yeltsin, who had been angered by U.S.-led
NATO attacks in Serbia, was keen to rebuild ties with North Korea as
a means for boosting Russia’s inf luence.
Recognizing an enormous gap between the economies of the North
and South and the irreconcilable nature of the two systems, Kim Dae-
jung was content with a long-term strategy proceeding toward de facto
rather than de jure reunification.30 The South would cooperate in
achieving a soft landing in the North, promoting balanced development
of the national economy. Already in April 1998 “mutualism” meant that
the South prepared to supply fertilizer in exchange for family reunions.
It provided rice in the form of loans, not assistance. Calling leaders on
the other side by their official titles was another form of respect visible
at the June 15, 2000 summit. Formal recognition of each other’s exis-
tence was facilitated by submitting the major economic agreements
reached at the summit for parliamentary ratification on each side. The
fact that the top leaders of both Koreas were signatories and that formal
processes were observed was a significant departure from the earlier
North-South Joint Communiqué in 1972 and the Basic Agreement in

1991. This time the initiative was fully in the hands of the two Koreas
and agreements were followed by action. In 1998, fourteen of forty South
Korean laws restricting communications with the North were removed,
and from that year the scale of exchanges and economic assistance to
the North grew rapidly.31
If public support for engagement varied from a high of 98 percent
when it was announced at Kim’s inauguration and 90 percent soon after
the North-South summit to from one-half to two-thirds when problems
arose, overall support was maintained during Kim Dae-jung’s tenure.
Many South Koreans were satisfied with peace without unification,
hoping to avoid the full costs by making more modest payments of
assistance,32 but in the year 2000, a Kim Jung-il boom and a North
Korea boom showed widespread receptivity to a surge in nationalist
sympathy. In conservative circles too the summit produced ideological
confusion, as many welcomed an atmosphere of reduced tensions even
as they showed concern about rising gullibility, especially among young
people, about the North’s intentions and Kim Dae-jung’s lack of condi-
tionality in rewarding the North. Already from late 1998 Hyundai’s
Chung Ju-young gained Kim’s approval for his personal “cash-cow”
diplomacy. When near the end of his tenure it was revealed that Kim
had made an undisclosed side-payment of about $500 million to Kim
Jong-il in order to realize the summit, doubts mounted that relations
had not been developed on the basis of reciprocity and mutual trust,
adding to concerns that the North’s intentions were still opaque and
that Kim Dae-jung’s strategy would be unlikely to hold the interna-
tional coalition behind the Sunshine Policy together. Ever since that
time, domestic controversy between conservatives and progressives has
been rising.
This window of opportunity lasted until Bush took office, shifting
U.S. strategy, first casting doubt on his willingness to continue sup-
porting Kim’s Sunshine Policy and then after the terror attack on 9/11,
demonizing the North and talking of preemptive attacks. 33 In his final
two years Kim Dae-jung found that he had little leverage with his ally
and little to offer Kim Jong-il to sustain the momentum from their
summit. Without much popularity at home or support abroad, the best
he could do was to proceed on the basis of the agreements already
reached, continuing supervised family reunions, pressing ahead with
the Gaesung Industrial Complex, and skirting security matters because
the North only focused on the United States as the key to its survival
and economic revival.
The Roh Moo-hyun Approach to Reunification

In contrast to Kim Dae-jung’s explicit focus on North Korean policy,
Roh Moo-hyun gave priority to nuclear policy in which the North is the
main object along with the United States.34 Kim downplayed unifica-
tion as a policy that could give the appearance of absorption and instead
emphasized coexistence with multiple means of cooperation and even
integration, but also strong reassurances against Seoul using economic
and international superiority to pressure Pyongyang to bend to its will.
Roh went further by presenting himself as protector of the North in the
face of pressure for it to abandon its nuclear weapons program without
sufficient compensation and security to offer it the means to face grad-
ual reunification with confidence. Compared to the nuclear crisis in the
Kim Young-sam era, Roh insisted on an active role for his government,
often taking an independent stance in appealing to both sides on how
to narrow their differences. He treated the crisis as both a threat to all
of his plans for the South’s diplomacy and an opportunity to reach a
settlement that would jump-start North-South relations. Carrying on
Kim Dae-jung’s ideas, he acted boldly and not always with the care
appropriate to the much more difficult environment South Korea faced.
Roh proceeded as if the 1994 model could be revived, overcoming
misunderstanding and distrust on both sides, and he was reluctant to
accept the limits on his role as a mediator. Catering to anti-American
sentiment in his campaign, surrounding himself with advisors and
politicians of the 386 generation who distrusted the United States, and
using the rhetoric of autonomy, Roh did not gain the trust of the Bush
administration, whose unilateralism complicated matters.
As the crisis grew more serious, the policy gap widened, with Bush
and Koizumi’s drift toward sanctions to pressure Kim Jong-il prior to
Bush’s about-face in late 2006. In lieu of raising the banner of reunifi-
cation, Roh stressed the rewards from integration with economic recon-
struction of the North a prime objective. Gradually the outline of a
kind of Marshall Plan for the North became clear, proposed even before
Roh’s inauguration.35 It eventually included energy supplies, especially
an electricity plan unveiled in June 2005, a transportation network
both across the 38th parallel and through Russia into the heart of
Europe, industrial parks taking the showcase Gaesung project as the
first of many, mining and agricultural initiatives, and many more pro-
posals to revive the North’s economy. Not only was little of this tied to
insistence on serious economic reforms, but increasingly it became
divorced from denuclearization. When the United States, after the Joint
Statement of September 2005, imposed financial sanctions for counter-

feiting and was blamed by the North and many others for halting the
momentum of the Six-Party Talks, Roh attempted to proceed directly
with the North, making benefits unconditional on the North’s return
to the talks. Yet, with his focus on the United States, Kim Jong-il raised
the threat potential rather than boosting bilateral integration.
It is important to keep in mind the three ingredients of a successful
engagement strategy to the North: direct encouragement of expanded
ties under the banner of cross-peninsula balance on the way to reunifi-
cation without sacrificing demand for reciprocity; great power conver-
gence in support of both North and South proceeding on the basis of
relative equality toward reunification, but never forgetting that the
South is the generous benefactor in this process; and consensus among
the South Korean people in pursuit of the North as they trust their
leaders to set conditions that prove the North’s sincerity. Roh required
too little reciprocity, he failed to coordinate well with the great powers,
and he dismissed the need for national consensus. In the shadow of the
nuclear crisis, he found the North too focused on making the United
States pay a price in security for its hard line, Bush too focused on
pressuring the North into submission, and the South Korean public
sympathetic to his engagement goals but too divided on how he pursued
them to give him much credibility. Roh was not in step with the United
States and Japan on the PSI and on human rights concerns, failing even
to convey understanding for these moves important to many in the
international community. Instead, his dichotomy of standing up for
self-reliance ( jaju) and resisting outside pressure (oise) oversimplified
what was at stake and how to manage important bilateral relations. This
was how matters stood before a new environment emerged in 2007.
Already in the summer of 2005 there were signs that Roh could
benefit from a new environment in the Six-Party Talks. His peace and
prosperity policy acquired new meaning after the September 19 Joint
Statement, which was praised as setting forth the general principles on
a regional level from which inter-Korean relations should proceed. He
showed determination to proceed toward an action plan in order to
implement these principles, even if it meant defiance of U.S. insistence
on keeping pressure on the North, which was refusing to return to the
Six-Party Talks until the United States dropped the newly imposed
financial sanctions. Thus, his cabinet became bolder in specifying plans
for economic cooperation with the North—a veritable economic devel-
opment program ranging from agriculture to mining to multiple indus-
trial parks. Roh was ready to open the cross-border railroad linking
Seoul and Pyongyang. Yet, the North’s hesitancy to lower its military
readiness scuttled this plan in 2006, followed by its decision to raise the
stakes through multiple missile launches in July 2006 and finally a
nuclear test in October 2006. For a time it appeared that Roh was
isolating his country by persisting with engagement, although humani-
tarian assistance was suspended, but agreement on United Nations
Security Council sanctions proved to be but a prelude to concerted
diplomacy offering the North a way forward. Careful not to reward the
North before a new agreement was reached and it began meeting its
commitments, Roh, nonetheless, made clear that he was preparing a big
package of incentives, many of which were justified as a down payment
on costs that would have to be incurred eventually during the course of
reunification.36
Reunification Prospects after the

February 13, 2007 Agreement
The establishment of five working groups at the third session of the
fifth round of Six-Party Talks placed reunification in a wide-ranging
context. One group brought together the United States and North
Korea to discuss normalization. Given the North’s priority on dealing
with this issue, it had clearly become a prerequisite for addressing reuni-
fication. As long as South Korea enjoyed normal relations with all of the
region’s powers and a favored place in the international community, the
North refused to deal with it from isolation. Ever since the Roh Tae-woo
period, Seoul recognized the need for cross-normalization, and Roh
Moo-hyun grasped this reality by focusing on the U.S. approach to the
nuclear crisis as the key to what had become a triangular framework for
peninsular progress. At last, progress in U.S.-North Korean talks opened
the door for his initiatives, even if in the inter-Korean summit of
October 2007 he left Washington wary that instead of the promised
synergy with the Six-Party Talks Roh would undermine them.
A second working group led by China was no less critical to resolu-
tion of the nuclear crisis. Its object was denuclearization. Although all
six states had a role, the demands came from the United States, the
focus was on the North’s fulfillment of its promises, and China stood
poised to back up U.S. pressure while also taking care to satisfy the
North that action-for-action would be achieved, synchronizing progress
in the first and second working group. As part of this group, the South
could coordinate its rewards to the North with that government’s
cooperation on nuclear issues. Yet, before it had become clear whether
the North would fully declare its nuclear assets and how it would meet
its commitment to “disable” its reactor, Roh’s “creative and comprehen-
sive approach” raised the danger that the North could get benefits that
would make it immune from economic sanctions without actually
denuclearizing.
A third working group led by South Korea brought all six parties
together to plan for economic and energy assistance to North Korea.
Given the priority of rebuilding the economy of the North in the initial
stage of reunification, this group would be laying the groundwork for
integrating the infrastructure on the peninsula as well as forming a base
for industrial production networks. The stakes were high for both sides
of Korea to make sure that China’s economy did not subsume that of
the North, but in Pyongyang there was also determination to achieve
energy independence and leverage to prevent Seoul from gaining such
economic control that it could steer moves toward reunification in its
favor. Given his past moves, many South Koreans, especially conserva-
tives, feared that Roh would be inclined to be too generous without
adhering to the consensus of other states. His enthusiasm for establish-
ing an “inter-Korean economic community” might boost the North’s
confidence in the benefits ahead, even as it remained cautious about
liberalization based on market forces, but it would not necessarily work
in favor of linkage.
Two complementary organizations would become the principal legacy
of the Roh period in setting the path toward reunification. The first are
ministerial consultations, which had a checkered history of steps for-
ward mixed with interruptions from the 1990s, but were poised for
acceleration after Roh met Kim Jong-il. Here Seoul could try out its
proposals for exchanges, cultural cooperation, investment, and general
improvement in the climate of inter-Korean ties. It only had to win
approval of Pyongyang, although if it moved too fast it could alienate
those who feared one-sided benefits would take the pressure off
Pyongyang to denuclearize. The October 2–4 summit gave impetus to
intergovernmental cooperation, perhaps tying down Roh’s successor
with promises of large-scale financial assistance and plans for multiple,
vast projects to rebuild the infrastructure and industrial base of the
North. GNP opponents warned, however, that the next president would
not be bound by Roh’s moves.
The second organization that could emerge are four-party talks to
establish a peace regime, forging with the help of the United States and
China a framework for security on the peninsula that would be essential
for moving forward with integration in all respects. While Bush had
encouraged peace talks since the end of 2006, there was concern that a
formal proclamation that the Korean War was ended might precede the
important confidence-building measures necessary to reassure the
South Korean people and other countries. The concept of peace would
ring hollow without denuclearization and arms control measures.
Through the spring of 2007 delays over the transfer of North Korean
funds that had been frozen left in doubt how the February 13 agree-
ment would be realized. Inside South Korea the focus turned to intense
infighting within both the conservative and the progressive camps over
who would be the candidates in the presidential race in the fall.
Questions about the overall strategic direction, especially relations with
the United States and North Korea, became linked to soul-searching
about what kind of a country South Korea is and where it is heading. In
a search for the broad framework for proceeding, Roh railed against the
disastrous impact of electing a conservative, while leading voices on the
conservative side blamed Roh for plunging the country into the trouble
it faced. In the background were assumptions about national identity
related to policy toward the North. National identity becomes a con-
tested term in any struggle for reunification. If the North may call for
far-reaching as well as symbolic political decisions on the assumption
that one nation already exists and it urgently needs to realize its essence,
citizens of the South are prone to differentiate sharply between the
political as well as material culture of the two Koreas and postpone
political moves that would force superficial integration until a common
sense of national purpose and norms of citizenship have reached both
sides. Fearful of a rush to political judgment based on zero-sum reason-
ing, the South is likely to emphasize a win-win situation as staged
integration of the economies, societies, and cultures takes place. The
North is unlikely to agree. The struggle over national identity may well
precede other struggles in what is bound to be a difficult and highly
contested process in pursuit of the elusive goal of reunification.
Conclusion
Under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, anticommunism that
aimed to contain and best the North in a tense cold war environment
left reunification to appear mostly as a symbol of unfulfilled aspirations
whose expression could provide a public relations advantage. With Roh
Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam a shift occurred from competition to
cooperation in which the South could gain a great advantage and steer
the North toward reform and entry into the global community with
reunification to come in stages of transformation coupled with absorp-

tion. Kim Dae-jung could not guarantee a union of equals, but he could
emphasize support for the North’s diplomatic and economic resuscitation
that would considerably equalize the playing field. Although Roh
Moo-hyun had little choice but to concentrate on managing the nuclear
crisis, he followed Kim Dae-jung in reassuring the North about its
equality in a gradual process aimed at eventual reunification.
The North’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006, which emboldened the
conservative critics of Roh’s failed “appeasement,” and the February 13,
2007 agreement reenergizing Roh’s ties with the North as proof that the
United States pull back from “unilateralism” will work, left a divide in
South Korean strategic thinking in an election year. Critics charged
that Roh’s “radical reunification policy” was emboldening the North’s
nuclear adventurism and undercutting the coalition necessary to keep
the pressure on to reform as well as end its threatening posture. In
contrast, supporters of engagement gave Roh some credit for working
bilaterally and in the Six-Party Talks to change U.S. policy, while keep-
ing the North aware of the incentives that follow from its willingness to
compromise. As the South led one working group on economic and
energy assistance to the North and talk turned to a “peace regime” and
to accelerated work through inter-Korean ministerial consultations, the
reunification theme was rising in importance in 2007 after five years of
being overshadowed in the crisis atmosphere. Yet, the crisis remained
far from resolved, and it still held the key to any breakthrough that
would allow reunification to become more than a symbol of goodwill.
In the second half of 2007 the critical tests for realizing the Joint
Agreement were only just becoming the center of attention. Phase 2
would test not only North Korean-U.S. relations, but also South Korea’s
intermediate role in ending the crisis.
Disputes over the 2007 inter-Korean summit demonstrate that it will
not be easy in the near future to resolve the nuclear crisis or demarcate
a path to reconciliation. Although most South Koreans were positively
inclined to another summit, political strife persisted over whether: it
should be held on the eve of the presidential election or delayed; the
range of subjects should be limited to keep security concerns in the
forefront or made quite broad even if the security posture of the South
might in some way be jeopardized; a vigorous economic agenda would
win the North’s trust or reduce pressure on it to accept denuclearization
as well as complicate coordination in the Six-Party Talks; and the next
administration should be bound by the results or be free to find its own
way. In general, South Koreans want to conduct summits periodically,
institutionalizing them as a path toward peace, while the North Korean

regime seems narrowly focused on seeking gifts in order to reconstruct
its economy or keen on splitting the other parties and diluting pressure
for its denuclearization. At the same time, the South sought to convince
the United States that a summit was useful in resolving the nuclear
issue and advancing peace in the face of skepticism it might spoil the
carefully balanced arrangements defined in the February 13 agreement.
Amidst election-time political rancor, most accepted the desirability of
some sort of engagement and that the October 4 Declaration charted
the way forward to cross-peninsular ties through economic integration
and a peace regime. Follow-up moves, such as opening freight rail ser-
vice across the DMZ to Gaesung and preparing for tours of Mt. Baekdu,
suggested its impact. Roh supporters accepted the logic that if economic
benefits to the North are accelerated or guaranteed, military tensions
and antagonism between the two Koreas would be reduced. They noted
that areas with vital military bases of the North would be opened to the
South for economic reasons. Since Kim Jong-il had not mentioned the
issue of United States armed forces in Korea during the summit, they
surmised that he had adopted a pragmatic approach at least with regard
to inter-Korean relations.
The logic of their strategic thinking was as follows. First, since Roh
Moo-hyun after Kim Dae-jung had succeeded in holding an inter-Korean
summit, future South Korean governments would make it a policy to
institutionalize these meetings and deepen engagement. Second, the
inter-Korean summit shifts the center of activism in dealing with issues
on the peninsula to the two Korean states, and in the future this would
become an indispensable mechanism for dealing with matters that arise.
Third, although North Korean nuclear issues remain to be addressed,
the agreement that there should be an end to the Korean War with the
conclusion of a peace treaty is an important advance that South Korean
leaders would continue to press. For progressives, Roh’s success in the
final months of 2007 in regaining the initiative and advancing inter-
Korean ties promises to be an enduring strategic contribution.
Conservative critics reject these arguments. They see Kim Jong-il
emboldened by Roh’s “payment of tribute” and intent on using the
South to drive a wedge into the coalition seeking denuclearization. This
means that the North would be less compromising with future leaders
in the South and drive a harder bargain in defiance of its pledges in the
Six-Party Talks. In their view, Roh has made it more difficult to achieve
coordination with the United States and others and has complicated the
process of implementing engagement moves with the North by paying
so little attention to conditionality. Already at the end of 2007 delays

were evident in fulfillment of the pledge of a full declaration as part of
Phase 2, while doubts were intensifying about the prospects for realiza-
tion of Phase 3 in 2008. The final verdict on how to judge Roh’s strategic
thinking would depend heavily on how the Six-Party Talks proceeded.
He was counting heavily on Kim Jong-il’s moderate, pragmatic inten-
tions to rescue his place in history, while the United States, despite its
new eagerness for cooperation with the North, doubted that Roh’s
actions struck the right balance to serve this objective. Supporters of
Lee Myung-bak, ready to work more closely with the United States,
now faced the difficult challenge of timing continued assistance with
the North to realize joint objectives with their ally and with the other
states in the region.
Notes
1. Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
2. Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, eds., Japan and Korean Unification
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999).
3. Samuel S. Kim, “The Mirage of a United Korea,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 2006 (http://www.feer.com/articles1/2006/0611/p009.
html accessed February 15, 2007).
4. Rhee strongly denied the existence of North Korea based on the United
Nations 3rd General Assembly, “Resolution 195(III)—The Problem of the
Independence of Korea,” December 12, 1948, pp. 25–27.
5. This policy to win the competition with the North was revealed in Park’s
New Year’s address on January 18, 1966. Office of President of ROK, Park
Chung-hee daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vol. 2 (Seoul: Office of President of
ROK, 1973), pp. 31–32.
6. Rodong shinmun, August 15, 1960. In 1973 Kim Il-sung proposed “Five
Principles for National Reunification.”
7. Ministry of Unification (http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp). For Park’s
call for a good neighbor and friendship policy and his end to opposition
against the North becoming a member of the United Nations, see Tongilbu
30nyonsa, 1969–1999 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1999), p. 54.
8. Office of President of ROK, Roh Tae-woo daetongryong yonsol munjip,
Vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1990).
9. http://likms.assembly.go.kr/kms_data/record/data1/147/147za0001b.
PDF#page=1 accessed March 29, 2007; also Tongilbu 30nyonsa, 1969–
1999, pp. 68–72.
10. Korea Institute for National Unification, Minjok gongdongche tongil bangan
oe eronchegae wa silchon bangan (Seoul: Korea Institute for National
Unification, 1994).
11. Rodong shinmun, January 1, 1991.

12. See the results of surveys by the Ministry of Information, Chosun ilbo,
June 25, 1992. Also see, Kim Kyung-ung, “Tongil oe sahoi munhwajok
jopkun: Nambukhan sahoi munhwa gyoryu wa tonghap banghyang mosaek,”
Hanguk jongchi hakhoibo, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1995), pp. 421–43; and Yu
Young-ok, “Nambukhan ijilsung gukbok ul wihan simrisahoijok jomang,”
Hanguk jongchi hakhoibo, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1997), pp. 173–201.
13. See the results of the annual survey. Dong-A ilbo, April 1, 1990.
14. Over 70 percent of South Koreans expressed anxiety in the poll of the
Ministry of Information. Chosun ilbo, June 20, 1990. Later polls also
showed distrust of the North, Segye ilbo, February 24, 1992.
15. In the preamble of the Basic Agreement, the two Koreas agreed to express
their relationship as a “special one constituted temporarily in the process
of unification,” http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp accessed March 29,
2007.
16. Office of President of ROK, Kim Young-sam daetongryong yonsol munjip,
Vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1994).
17. Chosun jungang tongsinsa (Korean Central News Agency of DPRK),
February 25, 1995.
18. North Korea repeatedly censured the South Korean government as “an
immoral savage” for preventing a delegation from attending the funeral.
Jungang bangsong (North Korea), July 15, July 16, and July 21, 1994. See,
Jugan Bukhan donghyang, Vol. 185 (July 10–16, 1994) and Vol. 186
(July 17–23, 1994).
19. See the Kim Young-sam’s addresses on Independence Day, August 15, 1996
and August 15, 1997. Office of President of ROK, Kim Young-sam daeton-
gryong yonsol munjip, Vols. 4, 5 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1997,
1998).
20. Park Kyun-young, “Daebuk jongchaek oe saeroun jopkun,” Gukjae jongchi
nonchong, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1998), pp. 92–94.
21. See the appendixes of the Tongil baekso 1997 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification,
1997); and Korea Institute for National Unification, Minjok gongdongche
tongil bangan oe eronchegae wa silchon bangan (Seoul: Korea Institute for
National Unification, 1994).
22. Chosun ilbo, November 25, 1993.
23. In a meeting of the two Koreas, the North Korean Park Young-su menaced
the delegates from the South with the statement, “Seoul could be a sea of
fire,” which changed the South’s attitude to a hard-line. See Chosun ilbo,
March 20, 1994
24. Rodong shinmun, February 4, 1999 and March 15, 2000; on September 27,
1999, Baek Nam Soon, the foreign minister of North Korea also criticized
the Sunshine Policy as a wicked policy aimed at unification by absorbing
the North.
25. Kim Dae-jung daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of President
of ROK, 1999), p. 65.
26. Ibid., pp. 152–59.

27. Tongil baekso 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1999), Ch. 2.
28. Han Wan-sang, the first unification minister under Kim Young-sam used
the concept in 1993 (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/kms_data/record/
data1/161/161za0006b.PDF#page=1 accessed March 26, 2007.
29. After the North’s missile launching in August 1998, most South Koreans
did not recognize it as a failure of the Sunshine Policy, which 70.9 percent
supported (Hankyoreh, November 8, 1998), and later in the year 56.3 per-
cent did (The Korea Economic Daily, December 22, 1998). Even after the
military clash between the two Korean navies in June 1999, over 65 percent
supported the policy (Seoul shinmun, October 8, 1999).
30. Chung-in Moon, “Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy
and the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg,
eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 35–56.
31. Tongil baekso 2003 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2003), Ch. 3.
32. Kookmin ilbo, February 27, 1998; Seoul shinmun, May 2, 1998; Hankook
ilbo, August 20, 1998; Dong-A ilbo, June 17, 2000; Maeil business shinmun,
August 18, 2000.
33. In spite of the North Korean foreign ministry’s expression of strong
opposition against terrorism (Chosun jungang tongsinsa [Korean Central
News Agency of DPRK], September 12, 2001), Bush included the North
in the “axis of evil,” and it was listed in the annual terrorism report,
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (Washington, DC: Department of State
Publication, 2003), p. 80.
34. Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo (Seoul: Office of National Security
Council, 2004), pp. 32–37.
35. On January 24, 2003, Chung Dong-young, who served as Unification
Minister from July 1, 2004 to February 9, 2006, attending the 33rd World
Economic Forum as special envoy of president-elect Roh Moo-hyun, said
that Roh had been preparing a reconstruction plan, that is, a Marshall
Plan for the North, Maeil Business shinmum, January 24, 2003.
36. Roh conceptualized these costs as an investment for the future, which
would be returned as the united Korean economy f lourished. (See the
“100 Minutes Discussion” on MBC-TV on September 28, 2006, http://
www.imbc.com/broad/tv/culture/toron/vod/index.html accessed March 29,
2007).
CHAPTER 7

toward China
Jae Ho Chung
T
he principal assumption behind any systematic effort to explore
Korea’s strategic thought is to conceive of Korea as a rational
state, defined as a state that possesses the attribute of transitivity
or an ability to order its preferences and opt for a solution that is interest-
maximizing and, at the same time, cost-minimizing. Presupposing
Korea—or any other country for that matter—solely as a rational actor
may invite fierce debates but, for analytical purposes, we may, at the
least, assume that we can reconstruct the process of such reasoning in
an ex post facto manner.1
Having taken for granted that Korea is a rational state, we may pro-
ceed to delineate the boundary of its core interests and corresponding
costs. As with most other countries, Korea’s core interests can be seen as
three-fold: survival (national security), development (economic growth),
and vision (prestige imperative). 2 To the extent that maintaining
national security through internal balancing (i.e., increasing self- defense
capabilities) is deemed crucial, the cost of spending huge sums of money
on defense even at the expense of economic growth is regarded as accept-
able. To the extent that preserving national security through external
balancing (i.e., allying with other countries) is deemed necessary, the
expense of increased dependency on other states may be considered
acceptable. To the extent that sustaining economic growth is deemed
crucial, on the other hand, external balancing is preferred to internal
balancing even at the cost of reduced sovereignty.3
154 ● Jae Ho Chung
When the imperatives of security and development are attained to a

considerable degree, the third component of national interest—namely,
prestige—may enter the equation. In fact, it is in the nature of all sovereign
states, as of human beings, to aspire for higher prestige and self-esteem.4
Once the prestige imperative is sought, however, pay-offs for each of the
options listed above become radically transformed. That is to say, to
the extent that prestige becomes the top priority, rational states would be
inclined to value independence and sovereignty and, therefore, to reduce
dependency, in security or economic terms, on other states.
Equally important is the set of factors that may change the perimeter
of one’s strategic thought by introducing new variables. Generally
speaking, two such categories can be conceived of. One refers to
exogenous factors—that is, changes in the “environments” external to
the state, including the structure of the global and/or regional systems
and international atmosphere—such as the demise of the cold war and
the ascendancy of China. The other denotes endogenous ones, that is,
intrastate sources of change such as democratic transition, economic
crises, political coalitional changes, and public opinion swings.5
The key questions that this chapter seeks to answer are as follow:
1) has there been contemporary strategic thinking on the part of South
Korea toward China that we can discern?6 2) If there has, when did it
start and under what circumstances? and 3) how has South Korea’s stra-
tegic thinking vis-à-vis China evolved over the years? In response to
these questions, the following arguments are posed. First, there have
indeed been discernible threads of strategic thinking on the part of
South Korea toward China. Second, initially, the seeds of Seoul’s
strategic thinking toward China were planted under the initiatives of
Park Chung-hee during the early 1970s in the midst of the U.S.-China
rapprochement and the June 23 Announcement. Third, in the period of
three decades since then, Korea’s strategic thought toward China has
experienced ebbs and flows but, with the diplomatic normalization in
1992 and the “rise” of China, has become increasingly more concrete
and manifest. These arguments are set forth in six sections, structured
temporally describing strategic thought toward China and its constraints
during the administrations of Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, Roh
Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun, and a
concluding section.
The Reign of Park Chung-hee: Planting the Seeds

In the aftermath of World War II, the traditional China-Korea relation-
ship was reformulated as two pairs of dyads—namely, ROK-ROC and
Strategic Thought toward China ● 155
DPRK-PRC relations. The impact of the Korean War (1950–53) was

such that China maintained a special relationship with North Korea,
one that was often dubbed as “brotherhood sealed in blood,” whereas
South Korea sustained an amicable relationship with Taiwan under the
auspices of the United States’ hub and spoke system of alliances in
East Asia.7
During the 1950s under Rhee Syngman’s rule, U.S.-China relations,
Sino-South Korean relations, and inter-Korean relations were so highly
antagonistic that there was virtually no room for Seoul’s strategic think-
ing toward Beijing. The present danger of North Korean aggression and
the cold war confrontation were such that the security imperative pre-
vented South Korea from having second thoughts about its alliance
with the United States against the communist threat at large.
Accordingly, heavy dependence on the United States for security and
development—and the corresponding cost of limited sovereignty—were
simply taken for granted.
The highly antagonistic relationship between China and South
Korea had continued throughout the 1960s, with the occasional armi-
stice meetings at Panmunjom providing the only venue of close encoun-
ters. When two Chinese pilots defected to South Korea with their AN-2
reconnaissance plane in 1961, Seoul simply chose not to communicate
with Beijing and immediately sent the pilots and the plane to Taiwan,
which South Korea then recognized as the sole legitimate government
of China. 8 On the other hand, China often detained South Korean fish-
ing vessels and their crew for up to twelve years, charging that the boats
had intruded into Chinese territorial waters. South Korea then had no
channel or means to negotiate with China for their return.9
International strategic environments changed dramatically during
the early 1970s, manifested in China’s accession to the United Nations
and the rapprochement between China on one hand and the United
States and Japan on the other. Keenly aware of China’s potential influ-
ence over North Korea, Seoul began to think strategically that improv-
ing relations with Beijing would help reduce the tension and maintain
peace on the peninsula. That is, for South Korea’s security equation, the
China factor began to weigh in. In 1971, Foreign Minister Kim Yong-
sik commented that “[I]t is the policy of my government to approach
the question of normalizing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union
and the People’s Republic of China with f lexibility and sincerity.”10
According to Seoul’s internal position as of 1972, it would not take an
antagonistic posture unless Beijing chose to do so first.11
China also posed a challenge to South Korea’s development impera-
tive. As China adopted a policy of discriminating against those Japanese
and American corporations with close commercial ties in South Korea

and Taiwan, grave concerns were voiced with regard to long-term impli-
cations of the “China fever” in the United States and Japan for South
Korea’s economy.12 Seoul’s strategy was to face the challenge head-on.
In 1972, South Korea amended Article 2 of its foreign trade laws so as
to permit trading with communist countries other than North Korea
and Cuba.13 According to a survey in early 1972, as many as 38 percent
of the National Assembly members were in support of diplomatic nor-
malization with Communist China.14 The South Korean media were
also playing the tune that Seoul should remain alert in security terms
but keep its diplomatic options open as far as China was concerned.15
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry sought hard to open windows of
contact with China by permitting its diplomats to meet with their
Chinese counterparts. Seoul even secretly designated the five embassies
in Washington, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Tokyo, and the consulate
general in Hong Kong as key points of contact with mainland China.
Most importantly, expanding Seoul’s political relations with Taipei
beyond what it had already maintained was tacitly discouraged.16
The essence of Park’s strategic thinking was encapsulated in the
June 23, 1973 Announcement, which radically altered South Korea’s
foreign policy posture by abandoning the long-held Hallstein Principles
and thereby opening its door to all countries including China and the
Soviet Union. In March 1973, South Korea suggested that China should
participate in negotiations for delineating the boundaries of the conti-
nental shelf in the Yellow Sea and, for the first time, referred to Beijing
as the People’s Republic of China, a proposal that was quietly turned
down by China.17 In September 1974, South Korea lifted the ban on
postal exchanges with communist countries, and China promptly
responded by allowing Korean-Chinese to exchange letters with their
relatives in South Korea through the International Red Cross. At the
United Nations General Assembly, China also began to refer to South
Korea as the Republic of Korea.18
Little overt development occurred during 1975–77 due to several
factors.19 Above all, this was the period of extreme political uncertainty
in China surrounding the death of Mao, the fall of the Gang of Four,
and the ensuing struggle for succession at the Zhongnanhai.
Furthermore, regional strategic environments were in flux as a major
communist victory was scored in Indochina with the fall of Saigon. In
1975, Kim Il-sung allegedly proposed in vain to Mao Zedong that
North Korea and China undertake a joint military action to regain
South Korea and Taiwan. 20
After the dust of succession politics settled in Beijing, the two sides
resumed the minuet of 1972–74. Yet, the fall of Saigon led to South
Korea’s reduced confidence in the U.S. defense shield against North
Korea. Despite Washington’s effort to provide reassurance, Park Chung-
hee went for a clandestine nuclear program to build a reprocessing plant
that would produce plutonium, only to be squashed by Washington. 21
Then, there came the “Carter chill” by which all U.S. ground combat
forces were to be withdrawn from South Korea in four to five years from
1977. 22 While the specifics of Park’s strategic thinking toward China
still remain veiled, it is interesting to note that many of his administra-
tion’s overtures toward China were concentrated in this last phase of his
rule, concomitant to Seoul’s bumpy relationship with Washington.
On November 1, 1978, Kim Kyung-won, special assistant to Park for
international security affairs, made remarks at the Hong Kong Press
Club that South Korea hoped to improve its relations with China. On
November 17, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin made it clear that “the
government will not prohibit any commercial activities with commu-
nist countries, with which it does not have diplomatic relations.” 23
While this only reiterated the 1972 amendment of the foreign trade
regulations, the statement was synchronized with China’s much publi-
cized “opening” to the outside world. One month later on December 18,
1978, China’s Minister of Foreign Trade, Li Qiang, mentioned in an
interview in Hong Kong that China might consider having trade with
South Korea and Israel, signaling some success for South Korean
efforts. 24
Chun Doo-hwan’s Rule: Active Trading Diplomacy

Available evidence suggests that Chun Doo-hwan showed strong inter-
est in improving relations with China, as well as with the Soviet Union.
During his tenure he appears to have been particularly interested in
developing close economic ties with China. In Washington in 1981,
Chun commented, “[I]f the People’s Republic of China is a friend of the
United States, I think I can extend the logic and say a friend of a friend
is less of a threat to us.” 25 Deputy Prime Minister Shin Byung-hyun
remarked in his work report to the National Assembly in November
1981 that “while no direct trade is currently being conducted with
China, the situation will improve in that direction.” 26 China’s weighted
emphasis on expanding economic cooperation with the outside world at
large coincided with South Korea’s search for export markets and for
peace on the peninsula. Seoul was more than prepared to respond with
alacrity to any overtures Beijing might make. Then, two fortuitous win-
dows of opportunities—the hijacking incident in 1983 and the Kunsan
torpedo boat incident in 1985—enabled Seoul and Beijing to engage in
direct contact for the first time. 27 These incidents led to official nego-
tiations between the two countries and produced in the process an
institutional derivative, that is, Seoul and Beijing managed to open
telex communication, a temporary hotline via Tokyo, and an emergency-
only hotline via Hong Kong, respectively. 28
Exchanges could have developed beyond economic ties had it not
been for the two tragic events—the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner
in September 1983 and North Korea’s Rangoon bombing in October
1984—that poured cold water on Seoul’s efforts for rapprochement
with communist neighbors. 29 Yet, sports diplomacy worked as a crucial
catalyst for rapprochement. Mutual invitations and attendance at the
Seoul Asian Games, the Seoul Olympic Games, and the Beijing Asian
Games in 1986, 1988, and 1990, respectively, paved the way for closer
relations.30
Available evidence suggests that Chun relayed a message to Deng
Xiaoping in August 1985 through Takeyuri, head of the Japanese
Komeito Party, proposing the development of bilateral trade.31 It was
also during Chun’s tenure that the Inter-agency Commission on the
Promotion of Northern Policy (Bukbang jongchaek chujin bonbu)—
targeting China and the Soviet Union—was established in 1985. It is
not clear, however, if these measures were based on any systematic
thread of strategic thinking concerning Korea’s overall security interests
as opposed to simply pursuing all-round trading diplomacy.
By 1987, many seasoned observers predicted that Sino-South Korean
economic relations would further expand, although the same could not
be said of diplomatic normalization. Despite their low profile during
this earlier period, designed mostly to shield them from criticism by
North Korea and Taiwan, Sino-South Korean economic relations had
already reached a point where any move in the reverse direction would
be clearly not in the interest of either party. As its trade constituted
2.3 percent of China’s overall trade in 1986, South Korea became
China’s seventh largest trading partner.
Whereas the Chun Doo-hwan administration skillfully utilized the
hijacking incident and the Kunsan torpedo boat incident in expanding
economic exchanges with China, though mostly indirect and nongov-
ernmental in nature, certain limits were clearly imposed. In retrospect,
Chun appears to have been more strongly committed to the consolida-
tion of South Korea’s traditional alliance relationship with the United
States. This was understandable considering that his rise to power had
been indebted to the military coup d’etat and bloody suppression of the
Gwangju uprising and, therefore, America’s formal endorsement of his
rule was deemed indispensable.32 His strategic thought toward China
was rudimentary at best and largely in pursuit of diversification of the
export market.
Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik: The Normalization Drive

Succeeding Chun in February 1988, Roh Tae-woo was perhaps the most
important figure in South Korea’s rapprochement and normalization
with China.33 Popularly elected, Roh was not as constrained as Chun by
considerations of his legitimacy as perceived by the United States. As a
matter of fact, his administration aspired to adjust Seoul’s U.S.-centered
diplomacy and seek omnidirectional foreign relations. In his inaugural
address, Roh commented on his vision (i.e., prestige imperative) as fol-
lows: “[A] new beginning [is here], an era of hope, which will see Korea,
once a peripheral country in East Asia, take a central position in the
international community.” He went further by saying that “[W]e will
broaden the channel of international cooperation with the continental
countries with which we have had no exchanges . . . Such a northward
diplomacy should also lead to the gateway of unification.” 34
Roh’s strategic thinking was epitomized by two documents. One
refers to the July 7 Special Announcement in 1988: that Seoul would
seek normalization of relations with Pyongyang’s allies and not object
to Pyongyang’s diplomatic normalization with Seoul’s allies.35 The
other denotes an article written by Roh’s key aide, Park Chul-un, which
laid down three principal reasons for nordpolitik: 1) to attain an inter-
national environment favorable to unification; 2) to take a prominent
role in the region and the world; and 3) to help the nation economically
as well.36 The security imperative was largely missing due to Seoul’s soft
stance toward Pyongyang and, instead, two prestige imperatives—
unification and status—were enunciated.
While nordpolitik was targeted at socialist countries at large, Roh’s
proclivity toward China was almost a preoccupation. During his presi-
dential campaign in late 1987, Roh had already addressed the mainland
as China. In the immediate aftermath of the election, on December 24,
1987, Roh expressed his wish that South Korea could normalize relations
with China during his tenure.37 According to a report, Roh even sent a
secret envoy, former Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, to Hong Kong to
relay his wish to pay a visit to China even before the inauguration.38
Nordpolitik initially was predominantly economic in nature. Seoul’s

announcement of a large-scale development scheme—called the Yellow
Sea Plan (hwanghae gyehoik)—for its western region was followed by
Beijing’s decision to open up the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas.39
In early 1988, Vice Premier Tian Jiyun was the first top official to state
that China would develop direct trade with South Korea.40 Remarks by
Huang Hua, China’s former foreign minister, that characterized the
situation as China’s “gate (to South Korea) remaining closed but not
locked” (guanmen bu suoshang) were also revealed at this time.41
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were a key catalyst in helping South
Korea and China to further expand their economic cooperation, mani-
fested by the doubling of bilateral trade from $1.7 billion in 1987 to
$3.1 billion in 1988. The China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade (CCPIT) proposed to the Korea Trade Promotion
Corporation (KOTR A) in January 1989 that they start negotiating for
the exchange of trade offices. Speculation soon abounded that diplomatic
normalization was imminent.
Two sets of evidence lead us to believe that the Roh administration
sought to develop certain alternative thinking that was quite different
from the conventional line of diplomacy. One set of evidence denotes
that, on several occasions, the United States expressed concern about
the pace at which the Korean-Chinese rapprochement was proceeding
at the time. In December 1988, Park Dong-jin, Korea’s Ambassador to
Washington, characterized the American view of nordpolitik as South
Korea’s “unilateral drive”—that is, lacking sufficient consultation with
its key ally.42 The other set concerns South Korea’s response to the
Tiananmen massacre, which was not synchronized with the tough
measures adopted by the United States, Europe, and Japan. South
Korea had been silent on the military suppression and more willing to
resume business with China. After the target was reportedly adjusted
downward from $4.3 to $2.5 billion, the actual trade turnover surpassed
it by 28 percent.43 South Korea also sent more than 2,500 business
delegations to China in 1989 alone, marking a 70 percent increase
over 1988.44
South Korea was among the very few countries (others being the
Philippines and the Soviet Union), which marked an increase in the
number of visitors to China after the Tiananmen tragedy. In contrast,
Japan and the United States scored a decrease of 40 and 29 percent,
respectively.45 It was in June and August 1989 that Sino-South Korean
ferry routes and charter f lights were opened for the first time.
Furthermore, several South Korean business conglomerates went so far
as to provide $5 million and over 400 passenger cars in goodwill dona-

tions to show their support for China’s hosting of the 1990 Asian
Games.46 This background helps to explain the decision in late 1990 to
exchange trade representative offices in Seoul and Beijing.
Roh’s strategic thought toward China was affected by his preoccupa-
tion with attaining diplomatic normalization before the expiration of
his term. While there was no “buying off ” involved with regard to
China, unlike with the Soviet Union and Hungary, Seoul appears to
have attached so much symbolic importance to normalization that it
was willing to make concessions just to obtain Beijing’s diplomatic rec-
ognition.47 The most serious problem was, perhaps, that once the presi-
dent made it clear that he wished to see normalization and pay a state
visit to China during his tenure, this left very little room for front-line
negotiators to maneuver.48 The Chinese side was keenly aware of Roh’s
“haste” in pushing for normalization and willingness to make conces-
sions.49 Close examination of the negotiations suggests that it was
mostly the Chinese side that set the agenda and controlled the pace.
There is little evidence that leads us to believe that the South Korean
negotiators took crucial initiatives or obtained any substantial gains
from these talks. The bottom-line for them was, unfortunately, that the
historic South Korea-China summit had to materialize during Roh’s
tenure and their Chinese counterparts were well aware of that.50 During
a negotiating session in June 1992, Ambassador Kwon, South Korea’s
chief negotiator, received instructions to this effect, and after that, the
negotiators became totally preoccupied with realizing the summit, pro-
posing a Roh-Jiang summit in July 1992 to announce the diplomatic
normalization. This radical proposal was quietly rejected by China.51
In sum, nordpolitik was rooted in a sort of strategic thinking that
aspired to enhance the nation’s self-esteem and international status by
steering it toward a more “independent” and multidirectional line of
diplomacy.52 Yet, micromanagement of the rapprochement with China
left unclear if the immediate gains from the normalization at that
particular time outnumbered the long-term costs attached to Korea’s
posture vis-à-vis China.53
Kim Young-Sam’s Five Years: Moving

beyond Economics
Once the diplomatic normalization was attained, the growth of the bilat-
eral economic relationship between Korea and China was further accel-
erated during Kim Young-sam’s presidency. The two-way trade—now
mostly direct—increased from $6.4 billion in 1992 to $23.7 billion in

1997. Investment became another pillar of Sino-South Korean economic
bilateralism. The impact of the investment guarantee agreement signed
in 1992 was clearly felt thereafter. In 1993, South Korea already became
the tenth largest investor in China.54 By 1995, China became the
number one recipient of South Korea’s outbound investment. In 1996,
46 percent of South Korea’s total outbound investment was poured into
China.55
As bilateral economic relations were maturing, the end of the cold
war and diplomatic normalization opened up new possibilities of coop-
eration. South Korea-China relations began to move into hitherto
uncharted terrain in the realm of security. Seoul’s strenuous efforts for
rapprochement with China were conducted fairly independently of
American direction.56 What led South Korea to seek room for a more
independent foreign policy? In strategic terms, the desire to reduce
heavy dependence on the United States played a crucial role, given that
America’s changing threat perception had been the sole determinant of
its defense commitment regardless of South Korea’s position.57 South
Korea’s growing national pride—derived from its successful democratic
transition and economic performance—also played a key role in pursu-
ing a position on par with its newly acquired capabilities.58 As an analyst
aptly put it: “Leaders in Seoul display a new appreciation that security
means more than perpetuating the U.S. connection . . . [I]t still remains
vital, but so are Seoul’s new-found diplomatic levers.” 59
This is not to suggest that there was at the time a firm consensus
within the leadership concerning whether and how to adjust relations
with the United States. As a matter of fact, disagreement and confu-
sion more aptly described Seoul’s strategic thinking during the
Kim Young-sam administration. Given that Seoul rarely made explicit
linkages between its diversified diplomacy (oigyo dabyonhwa) and its
Washington-centered foreign policy, a small incident in the spring of
1994 allows us a glimpse at Seoul’s diplomatic hedging in its very
incipient form.
At a press briefing on the night of March 29, 1994, concerning Kim
Young-sam’s state visit to China, Hwang Byung-tae, South Korea’s
ambassador to China, commented that “South Korea-China coopera-
tion over the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program should go beyond
the current level of simply notifying Beijing what has already been
decided between Seoul and Washington . . . . South Korea’s diplomacy
should break out of its heavy reliance exclusively on the United States.”
In less than two hours, upon strong request by the president’s chief aide
on security affairs, the ambassador rescinded his remarks and commented

that they only represented his personal views. 60
Not surprisingly, the incident was widely publicized in the Korean
media, which in turn generated some heated debates. Interesting is the
fact that, despite the media’s predominant characterization of the inci-
dent as a “diplomatic mishap,” some diplomats, politicians, and policy
analysts tacitly endorsed Hwang’s “unconventional” view. 61 Although
Kim did not endorse it, the ambassador was not sacked; in fact, he
remained in the post until 1996. Given the centrality of China’s role in
the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, this incident might
simply have reflected Seoul’s wishful thinking about China exerting a
more constructive inf luence. In hindsight, however, it was clearly a har-
binger of the long-term possibility that South Korea was to maintain a
certain balance of its own between the United States and China. 62
During the Kim Young-sam administration, possibilities existed for
strategic cooperation over North Korea and Japan. On North Korea,
expectations were not met; China mostly sat on the fence during the
first nuclear crisis. Not surprisingly, it vetoed a United Nations con-
demnation of North Korea’s nuclear program; 63 yet, that was precisely
when relations with North Korea began to cool down significantly,
China’s provision of economic assistance notwithstanding. Although
China’s “socialization” into the international community during the
1990s made South Korea increasingly more attractive relative to North
Korea, this did not induce Beijing to abandon Pyongyang’s core strategic
interests.64
On Japan, cooperation between South Korea and China might have
been possible under circumstances where Washington was assigning an
expanded military-strategic role to Tokyo largely irrespective of how
Seoul viewed this.65 While South Korea managed to sustain an amica-
ble official relationship with Japan under the auspices of the United
States, security concerns had always lurked in the background.66
Regarding Japan, there exists a huge perceptual gap between the United
States on the one hand, and South Korea and China on the other. 67
According to two nationwide surveys conducted in South Korea in 1995
and 1997, Japan was viewed as most threatening to South Korea’s secu-
rity interests. In stark contrast, Americans have maintained much more
favorable perceptions of Japan, which they regard as unique among
Asian countries.68 While there were some shared perceptions between
China and South Korea (and North Korea as well for that matter) of the
latent threat that Japan may pose, the possibility of an anti-Japan
“united front” seemed highly unlikely. 69 In the long run, however, South
Korea, which has been increasingly eager to achieve a partner—as

opposed to client—status in its security relationship with the United
States even by shouldering huge defense burdens, may seek to add a
meaningful security dimension to the already burgeoning Sino-South
Korean bilateralism.
Kim Dae-jung’s Peace Strategy:

The Sunshine Dynamics
The Kim Dae-jung administration inherited from its predecessor the
most serious economic crisis that Seoul has ever faced. Deeply enmeshed
within the international trade and financial regimes, South Korea had
to rely to a considerable extent for its stable recovery on assistance from
Washington, which responded, due in significant part to its security
commitment to and economic linkages with Seoul.70 Yet, China offered
South Korea no direct assistance, in contrast to its generous aid to
Thailand. Until South Korea’s recovery, therefore, Kim could not afford
to develop strategic thinking that would pull South Korea away from
the United States.
Quite a number of exogenous factors were also taking effect in the
region at the time. The redefinition of America’s strategic commitment
consolidated the U.S.-Japan alliance, best exemplified by the 1997
Defense Guidelines revision. The U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in 1999, the missile defense controversies, and the recon-
naissance plane (EP-3) incident between the United States and China in
2001 all added to the prevailing concerns with the regional strategic
situation in f lux.71
Just as German unification was made possible by the active persua-
sion by the United States of the concerned European states and the tacit
acceptance of the Soviet Union, so too might Korean reunification
require consensus building.72 Consensus among the four major powers
in Northeast Asia unfortunately appeared a remote possibility, which
posed a problem for Seoul that had to elicit support—or at least no
objection—from the United States and China in particular.73 Given
that South Korea is structurally tied to the United States through the
alliance framework, equating the rise of China with a China threat
would constrain the range of strategic options available for Seoul in its
pursuit of reunification.74
Kim Dae-jung pursued a dual-track strategy—the Sunshine Policy
toward North Korea on the one hand and the engagement policy toward
China on the other—that did not necessarily make the United States
happy. The Sunshine Policy—engaging and assisting North Korea

without requiring a quid pro quo—landed Seoul in the driver’s seat as
far as inter-Korean relations were concerned. Kim’s Berlin announce-
ment in March 2000 was not the result of close consultation with the
United States or the other major powers in Northeast Asia. It was more
the outcome of his strategic thinking on unification.75
More importantly, the Sunshine Policy was apparently supported
more actively by China than the United States. The historic inter-Korean
summit in June 2000 highlighted that South Korea’s search for a proac-
tive and pivotal role in mitigating the tension on the Korean peninsula
was more in line with Beijing’s policy framework than Washington’s.
The summit communiqué, for instance, endorsed Beijing’s long-held
position of “independent and peaceful unification” (zizhu he heping
tongyi) as opposed to Washington’s “peaceful unification.” 76
Kim also capitalized on the changing public opinion toward China
compared to the United States. The emergence of highly favorable views
of China among the general public in South Korea marked a stark
contrast with the plummeting popularity of America. Owing to the
much-shared cultural and historical heritage, geographical proximity,
and rapidly expanding bilateral ties, China was becoming a crucial
intervening variable for South Korea-U.S. relations.77 It was also during
the late 1990s that the initial expansion of bilateral military cooperation—
resulting in defense ministers’ visits and exchanges of port calls by naval
vessels—was facilitated.78
According to a multinational survey conducted in 2000, South
Korean respondents ranked North Korea (54 percent) and Japan (21 per-
cent) as their top two threats while Americans chose China (38 percent)
and Russia (21 percent).79 As the improvement in inter-Korean relations
became more visible and genuine after the summit in June 2000, the
threat perceptions of Seoul and Washington became more diverging
than converging. Furthermore, given Kim Dae-jung’s “soft” diplomacy
toward Japan, how Tokyo’s relationship with Washington would evolve
vis-à-vis Beijing also became a variable.
While the Kim Dae-jung administration appears to have possessed
some threads of strategic thinking of its own, which is discernible
from those of its predecessors, we cannot say for sure whether it did
indeed have a China focus, as a counterweight to the U.S.-centered
diplomacy. Rather, Kim’s strategic thought revolved more closely around
inter-Korean national cooperation (minjok gongjo) and reunification.
Apparently, Seoul was more interested in the inter-Korean summit,
family reunions, confidence building, economic cooperation, and overall
tension reduction with Pyongyang, rather than paying specific attention

to such issues cherished by Washington as nuclear non-proliferation,
missile control, and WMD.80
Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asia Initiative:

Accommodating China’s “Rise”
During the summer of 2002, news media in South Korea were literally
f looded with reports and columns on “China fever,” commemorating
the tenth anniversary of the normalization of relations between South
Korea and China. Lavish receptions were held in diplomatic circles and
academic conferences convened to put the historic event in perspective.
At about the same time, South Korea-U.S. relations plummeted to a
record low in the wake of candle-lit anti-American demonstrations
ignited by the tragic incident where two schoolgirls had been run over
by a U.S. army vehicle. The rise of anti-American sentiments contrib-
uted significantly to the election of Roh as president. The composition
of the Roh administration, along with the National Assembly election
in April 2004 that was won by Roh’s party, introduced a drastic—both
generational and orientational—change to the elite strata in Korea.
Over two-thirds (68 percent) of the National Assembly members in the
incumbent Uri Party and nearly half (43 percent) of those in the Grand
National Party were younger newcomers. More importantly, these were
closely linked with the changes in South Korean elites’ perceptions of
the United States and China.81 According to a survey on 138 newcomers
to the National Assembly in 2004, 55 percent chose China as a more
important foreign policy target than the United States. 82
The South Korean elite’s growing interest in China was further
amplified by surveys of ordinary citizens. According to a JoongAng ilbo
survey in 2003, over 60 percent of the respondents suggested that South
Korea’s relations with the United States need a complete rethinking or,
at least, its exclusive dependence should be reduced. 83 Another survey
conducted by Dong-A ilbo in 2004 also found that 61 percent of the
respondents regarded China as more important in South Korea’s diplo-
macy than the United States.84 As partisanship intensified, the debates
became further politicized and bifurcated, focusing on the relative
priority of the two states. 85
The Roh administration over five years adopted a three-pronged
policy in its external relations. First, with regard to North Korea, it
mostly continued its predecessor’s Sunshine Policy as engagement policy
(poyong jongchaek). Inter-Korean cooperation and confidence building
were still preferred and quid pro quo neither required nor prioritized.
Second, concerning its traditional allies, the United States and Japan,
Roh insisted on diplomacy with self-esteem—that is, different interests
are to be explicitly noted rather than concealed or imposed just for the
sake of the alliance. Third, the geographical focus of its diplomacy was
defined as the region of Northeast Asia.
Because of its inherited engagement policy, crucial discrepancies
with the United States have been discernible in threat perception con-
cerning North Korea. 86 This created the environment where China has
emerged as the most inf luential player and mediator in resolution of the
North Korean conundrum, 87 and questions have been posed as to the
future of the U.S. alliance. The heated debates related to the size, loca-
tion, and timing of dispatching South Korean forces to Iraq in early
2004 were indicative of the state of affairs in the relationship. Whether
the Seoul-Washington relationship would worsen to the extent that
there is actually room available for the third party China to wedge
between them became a key question. 88
It is not entirely clear what Roh’s focus on Northeast Asia really sig-
nifies. It not only reduced the geopolitical scope of Korea’s diplomacy
compared to Kim Dae-jung’s concept of East Asia, but it also did not
pay sufficient attention to how the term Northeast Asia was generally
interpreted in China or Japan. While it might have ref lected Roh’s
vision of South Korea’s place as the hub in the region, the effort was not
even welcomed by China with its eye on Shanghai as the regional hub.
In contrast, its conceptual twin—Northeast Asian balancer—espoused
by Roh, was received critically in Washington but rather favorably in
Beijing. 89
South Korea’s approach to the second nuclear crisis since October
2002 has also highlighted the diverging threat perceptions between
Seoul and Washington. As Bush took it out of the driver’s seat, Seoul
until 2007 had been mostly singing peace and stability to the tune of
Beijing in the backseat in efforts to prevent Washington from employ-
ing nonpeaceful measures against Pyongyang.90 Yet, it is not entirely
clear whether South Korea’s strategic relationship with China has indeed
improved to the extent of making up for the crack in the Seoul-
Washington relationship.91 While China became Korea’s number one
trading partner and investment destination in 2004, grave concern
began to appear over growing dependence on Beijing.92
Roh’s strategic thinking toward China was dealt a heavy blow in the
summer of 2004. The publicity that the media gave to China’s Northeast
Project (Dongbei gongcheng)—efforts to incorporate much of Korea’s
ancient history into China’s local histories (difang zhengquanshi)—

raised the eyebrows of many South Koreans. Many became deeply
concerned that a stronger China could increasingly impose its views as
the Ming and Qing courts did on Josun. The Goguryo history contro-
versy left deep wounds in the minds of South Korean intellectuals as far
as their view of China was concerned.93
As table 1 demonstrates, the impact of the Goguryo controversy was
clearly felt in public opinion surveys. South Korean general perceptions
toward China made an about-face with the summer of 2004 as the
watershed, leading to increased amity toward the United States. A sim-
ilar trend was discernible among the elite as well. According to a survey
conducted among 187 members of the National Assembly in 2005,
68 percent chose the United States as the most important foreign policy
target of South Korea.94 Compared to a similar survey conducted among
138 assemblymen in 2004, in which 55 percent of the respondents chose
China, the impact of the Goguryo controversy was readily discernible.
With the Korean perceptions of China changing, subtle shifts were
discernible. One of Roh’s favorite new books depicts the United States
as a constant—not a variable—in South Korea’s security equation but
emphasizes the need to maintain the South’s “independent” status
vis-à-vis China.95 Seoul’s rather sudden interest in the FTA with the
United States in early 2006 also generated debates concerning South
Korea’s shifting foreign policy focus, which were not ended even when
an FTA agreement was reached in 2007.
Table 1 The Impact of the Goguryo Controversy
Chose China (%) Chose the United States (%)

a
2003 48 33
2004 b 61 26
2005 c 39 54
2005 d 29 55
2006 e 24 47
Notes a. JoongAng ilbo, February 12, 2003. The question: “where should South
Korea’s foreign policy focus be placed?”
b. Dong-A ilbo, May 4, 2004. The question: “which country should South
Korea regard as most important?”
c. Chosun ilbo, January 1, 2005. The question: “which of the four major powers
do you feel most favorably toward?”
d. Dong-A ilbo, November 7, 2005. The question: “on which country should
South Korea’s foreign policy focus be placed?”
e. Munhwa ilbo, September 16, 2006. The question: “which country should
South Korea regard as most important?”
The essence of Roh’s strategic thought toward China can be partly

detected from Seoul’s negotiations with Washington since 2003 on “stra-
tegic flexibility”—that is, on what terms the U.S. forces can be freely
deployed in and out of South Korea to cope with regional contingencies.
While maintaining that it understands and respects the U.S. need for
strategic flexibility in its global military management, Seoul does not
wish to be sucked into an unwanted conflict—say, over the Taiwan Strait.
There was clearly a shadow of China in Seoul’s hesitation to accept stra-
tegic flexibility in its fullest form. An interim agreement at the first South
Korea-U.S. Strategic Dialogue in January 2006 was that Washington
understood Seoul’s concern, while the latter accepted strategic flexibility
in principle, with details pending to be sorted out later.96
Lee Myung-bak’s landslide victory in December 2007 is likely to
bring about at least some changes in South Korea’s policies toward the
United States, as he has always emphasized the centrality of the alli-
ance. This will certainly impact relations with Beijing; yet at this time
it remains unclear if his efforts to reframe Seoul’s foreign relations will
fundamentally alter the evolutionary path that South Korean strategic
thinking has taken over the past three decades.
Conclusion
The seeds of Seoul’s strategic thinking toward Beijing were planted by
Park Chung- hee in the early 1970s. During the ensuing three decades,
this thinking has had ebbs and flows but, overall, became increasingly
manifest and concrete. The normalization in 1992 put relations on a
hitherto inconceivable level. South Korea’s remarkable economic accom-
plishments and successful democratic transition led to enhanced
national self-esteem, which in turn generated the pressure for reduced
dependency on the United States. In the process, China has often
been conceived, if not yet actually utilized, as a strategic alternative or
counterweight.
Seoul wishing to consider Beijing as a strategic alternative—or
strategic supplement—is one thing, while the latter regarding such a
contingency as a real possibility is quite another. Despite its unex-
pected decision in 1997 to join the four-party talks, which were ini-
tially viewed by Pyongyang as a three-against-one formula, Beijing
managed not to tilt toward Seoul at Pyongyang’s expense.97 Similarly,
Beijing has neither sacrificed nor abandoned Pyongyang just for the
sake of Seoul, its proactive efforts for the Three- and Six-Party Talks
since 2003 notwithstanding.98
There are some indications that China’s management of North Korea

under Hu Jintao appears to be somewhat different from the past.99 Its
involvement in the Six-Party Talk process coincided with heated inter-
nal debates since 2003 on whether China should readjust its policy
toward North Korea.100 Some take a nuclear North Korea for granted,
while others actively call for its denuclearization even at the expense of
worsened ties.101 Despite recognition that a nuclear North Korea is by
no means beneficial to China, a consensus has yet to emerge as to long-
term plans for the Korean peninsula. Until then, China’s policy toward
North Korea is bound to have gaps between its pronounced tenets and
actual policy measures.
Against Beijing’s preferences, Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device
on October 9, 2006, an act that the Chinese Foreign Ministry charac-
terized as “brazen” (hanran). Yet, neither was Sino-North Korean trade
adversely affected nor the inspection procedures of cross-border freight
fundamentally altered.102 Even with the follow-up measures for “dis-
ablement” in February 2007, due largely to Beijing’s active cooperation
and Washington’s change of policy, complete rollback of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program seems a remote possibility.103
There is no doubt that South Korea is approaching a crossroads in its
strategic soul-searching. With so many uncertainties in the air, deter-
mining an optimal strategy that can satisfy all segments of the society
is difficult, while simultaneously addressing core strategic interests. In
the short run, South Korea is likely to continue with the dual strategy
of maximizing benefits from the comprehensive cooperation with China
and of minimizing the costs from the strained relationship with the
United States. This may be viewed as an act of hedging, but given the
bifurcation of security and economic logic in East Asia at large, this
may be mostly unavoidable.104 Hedging has embedded risks but, as a
middle power among great power players, South Korea has no other
choice but to work hard to be on good terms with both the United
States and China. Prudence comes at a premium and strategic thinking
will help cultivate just that.
Notes
1. See, for instance, Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999);
and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
2. For a general discussion of this theme, see Karl J. Holsti, International

Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1983), Chs. 4–5.
3. For the trade-offs, see James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs
in the Search for Security,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2
(Spring 1993), pp. 207–33.
4. Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan,” in C.B. MacPherson, ed., Hobbes’ Leviathan
(Harmonsworth: Pelican Books, 1968), p. 185.
5. Matthew Evangelista, “Internal and External Constraints on Grand
Strategy,” in Richard Rosecrance and Authur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic
Base of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993),
pp. 154–78.
6. The modifier “contemporary” has been attached here since quite a few
studies are available on traditional Korea’s strategic reasoning vis-à-vis
China, for example, Hae-jong Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in
the Ch’ing Period,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Choi Soja, Myungchong
sidae Junghan gwangyesa yongu (Seoul: Ewha Woman’s University Press,
1997); and Peter Yun, “Confucian Ideology and the Tribute System in
Chosun-Ming Relations,” Sachong, No. 55 (September 2002), pp. 67–88.
7. Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563–92.
8. Chosun ilbo, September 19, 1961.
9. Shin Myung-soon, “Hanguk gwa Junggong oe gwangye gaeson e gwanhan
yongu,” Hanguk gwa gukje jongch’ i, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1985),
pp. 55–56.
10. See Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford: The
Hoover Press, 1996), p. 105. Nixon’s withdrawal of the Seventh Infantry
Division, which led to a one-third reduction of the American forces, might
have had some impact on Seoul’s overture toward China.
11. The Foreign Policy Archive of the Republic of Korea, File no. 721.1CH/CP
(1972), Microfiche no. C-0044-021.
12. See Chosun ilbo, February 17, March 16, April 11, and July 24, 1971.
13. See Lee Beom-chan, “Hanso gyoryu hyonhwang gwa hwakdae bangan,”
Kongsangwon yongu, Vol. 9 (May 1987), p. 15.
14. Chosun ilbo, March 30, 1972.
15. For the media’s self-criticism of its excessive anti-Communist tone in
reporting on the mainland China, see Chosun ilbo, March 4, 1973.
16. See The Foreign Policy Archive of the Republic of Korea, File no. 721.1CP
(1972), Microfiche no. C-0051-03; and File no. 722.2CP (1974), Microfiche
no. C-0072-10.
17. Chosun ilbo, March 17, 1973.
18. Chosun ilbo, November 27, 1974; and Chi-jeong Park, “Han-Junggong
mingan gyoryu hwakdae bangan,” Jungguk yongu, Vol. 5 (1986), p. 44.
19. In 1974, Park purchased a building in Sheung Wan, Hong Kong, as the
outpost for China diplomacy, which was later renamed the Korea Centre
and housed the Korean Consulate General, Korea Trade Promotion
Corporation (KOTR A), and branch offices of Korean media organiza-
tions. His efforts to initiate economic contact with China during 1977–79
are described in Lee Ho, Hanjung so gan oe Bukbang oigyo silche (Seoul:
Cheil Media, 1997), pp. 188–90; and Byung-gook Lee, Hanjung gyung jae
gyoryu hyonjangron (Seoul: Nanam, 1997), p. 183.
20. Parris H. Chang, “Beijing’s Policy toward Korea and PRC-ROK
Normalization of Relations,” in The Changing Order in Northeast
Asia and the Korean Peninsula cited in Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea,
p. 68.
21. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 64–74.
22. William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence:
Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution
Press, 1999), Ch. 3.
23. Beom-chan, “Hanso gyoryu hyonhwang gwa hwakdae bangan,” p. 15.
24. See Chosun ilbo, December 19, 1978; and Washington Post, January 1,
1979.
25. Korea Overseas Information Office, Forging a New Era: The Fifth Republic
of Korea (Seoul: KOIO, 1981), p. 78.
26. Shin Young-soo, “Han Junggong gyoryu odiggaji wanna,” Bukhan, April
1984, p. 86.
27. Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea, pp. 106–08. For a Chinese take on the
event, see Shen Tu, “Palyi jjalbaso aksu rul halsuopso,” Shindonga, August
1988, p. 520.
28. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the
United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), Ch. 4.
29. The Rangoon bombing might have inf luenced the Chinese leadership’s
view of North Korea, which in turn worked well for the improvement of
Sino-South Korean relations thereafter.
30. Xing Fuquan, “Hanguo yu Zhongguo de tiyu waijiao ji weilai fazhan,”
Dong fang zazhi, Vol. 17, No. 12 (December 1984), pp. 58–59.
31. Lee Byung-gook, Hanjung gyung jae gyoryu hyonjangron, p. 209.
32. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 16. For Washington’s
view of the Chun regime at the time, see William H. Gleysteen, Massive
Entanglement, Marginal Influence, pp. 169–70.
33. Roh can be compared to Indonesia’s Suharto and South Africa’s Mandela
in making the normalization of relations with China a sort of personal
mandate.
34. The Presidential Secretariat of the Republic of Korea, ed., Korea: A Nation
Transformed, cited in Kim Hak-joon, “The Republic of Korea’s Northern
Policy: Origin, Development, and Prospects,” in James Cotton, ed., Korea
under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean

Relations (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 257.
35. Park Chul-un, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun, (Seoul: Random House
JoongAng, 2005), Vol. 2, pp. 24–25.
36. See his “Hanguk oe mirae wa Bukbang jongchaek,” Minjok jisong, April
1984, pp. 190–91.
37. JoongAng ilbo, June 11, 1988; and Roh Tae-woo daetongryung yonsol munjip
(Seoul: Office of the Presidential Secretariat, 1989), pp. 176–79.
38. Hankook ilbo, October 28, 1996. Park Chul-un also reveals in his memoir
that he had worked in vain to facilitate a meeting between Roh and Deng
Xiaoping before the former’s inauguration, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun,
Vol. 1, p. 280.
39. China Daily, January 27, 1988; and Zou Weidong, “Trends in South
Korea’s Preparations for Developing Trade with China,” in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service-China (hereafter FBIS-China), September 15,
1988, pp. 7–8.
40. The New York Times, March 14, 1988.
41. Los Angeles Times, January 20, 1988 cited in Liu Jinzhi, Zhang Minqiu,
and Zhang Xiaoming, Dangdai Zhonghan guanxi (Beijing: Zhongguo
shehuikexue chubanshe, 1998), p. 104.
42. Park Chul-un, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun, Vol. 2, pp. 31, 148.
43. Segye ilbo, August 3, 1989.
44. The number of business delegations from the United States and Japan was
reduced by more than 50 percent. See Thomas E. Jones, “Gaining Visibility:
Sino-South Korean Commerce Is Becoming Too Big To Hide,” The China
Business Review, November–December 1990, p. 46.
45. China Trade Report, February 1991, p. 15; and Peter Polomka, “The Two
Koreas,” in Gary Klintworth, ed., China’s Crisis: The International Implications
(Canberra: RSPS, Australian National University Press, 1989), pp. 57–59.
46. For South Korean corporations’ activism toward China in the wake of
the Tiananmen tragedy, see Lee Byung-gook, Hanjung gyung jae gyoryu
hyonjangron, pp. 42–44.
47. Whereas $600 million and $3 billion were used to attain diplomatic recog-
nition of Hungary and the Soviet Union, respectively, no such conditional-
ity was attached to Seoul’s normalization with Beijing. Yet, the option of
providing economic aid in exchange for diplomatic normalization with
China was seriously considered in 1990 when Park Chul-un offered a $2.7
billion package. The offer was considered unrealistic and rejected by the
presidential economic advisor, Kim Jong-in. See Lee Ho, Hanjung so gan oe
Bukbang oigyo silche, pp. 150, 157, 172–73, 219; Hankook ilbo, October 7
and 14, 1996; and interviews in Beijing in January 1999 and in Seoul in
May 2006.
48. Chosun ilbo on February 12, 1994, characterized this as: “President Roh’s
greed for the first South Korea-China summit totally messed up Seoul’s
negotiations for normalization.”
49. See the memoir of Qian Qichen, Waijiao shiji (Beijing: Shijie zhishi
chubanshe, 2003), pp. 145–54; and the memoir of Zhang Tingyan, China’s
first ambassador to South Korea, Yan Jing, Chushi Hanguo (Jinan:
Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2004), pp. 16–17.
50. In early 1992, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry designated 1992 as the year
of “wrapping up the northern diplomacy.” See Lee Byung-gook, Hanjung
gyung jae gyoryu hyonjangron, p. 196.
51. See Chosun ilbo, February 12, 1994; and Hankook ilbo, December 2, 1996.
52. One goal of nordpolitik was to “expand the horizons of Seoul’s foreign
policy, which were hitherto limited to the countries like the U.S. and
Japan.” See Ministry of Information, “Great Strides Made during the First
Four Years of the Roh Tae-woo presidency,” Backgrounder, No. 94
(February 8, 1992), p. 10.
53. For the long-term impact of the normalization dynamics on Korea-China
relations, see Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, Ch. 6.
54. JoongAng ilbo, May 10, 1993.
55. Munhwa ilbo, February 20, 1997.
56. Several interviewees—particularly those of the Foreign Ministry—
confirmed that much of Seoul’s northern diplomacy had been conducted
independently of Washington. Ambassador Donald Gregg, in a conversa-
tion with this author in August 2004, on the other hand, argued that
Washington had been well informed of Seoul’s northern initiatives. For
America’s concerns on this, see Park Chul-un, Barun yoksa rul wihan
jungun, Vol. 1, p. 355 and Vol. 2, p. 148.
57. See Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 153, 158.
58. These sentiments came to the surface within a decade, particularly after
Roh Moo-hyun’s election.
59. Edward A. Olsen, “Korean Security: Is Japan’s Comprehensive Security
Model a Viable Alternative?” in Doug Bandow and Ted G. Carpenter, eds.,
The US-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change (New Brunswick:
Transactions, 1992), pp. 146–48.
60. For an hour-by-hour description of the event, see Chosun ilbo, March 31,
1994.
61. For a strong endorsement of Ambassador Hwang’s view, see Sisa Journal,
April 14, 1994, p. 112. My interviews with some South Korean diplomats
at the time were also indicative of their empathy with Hwang’s remark. For
a similar appraisal, see Dong-A ilbo, September 8, 1998, which characterized
the event as a “meaningful incident.”
62. I noted this trend in The Rise of China and the Korean-American Alliance
(Stanford: Institute of International Studies, February 1999); and “South
Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic
Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September–October 2001)
pp. 777–96.
63. For a summary of this episode, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas,
pp. 320–21.
64. North Korea’s Decline and China’s Strategic Dilemmas, United States
Institute for Peace Special Report (Washington, DC: USIP, October 1997),
p. 6; and Phillip C. Saunders, “Korea as Viewed from China,” in Jonathan
D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, 2005), pp. 234–37.
65. For American views of South Korea as a peripheral security interest at best,
see Ted G. Carpenter, “South Korea: A Vital or Peripheral US Security
Interest?” and Doug Bandow, “America’s Korean Protectorate in a Changed
World: Time to Disengage,” in Doug Bandow and Ted G. Carpenter, eds.,
The US-South Korean Alliance, pp. 1–15, 75–93. Also see Sun Cheng,
“Meiguo yao tisheng Riben,” Shijie zhishi, No. 8 (2001), pp. 14–15.
66. See Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan
Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Ch. 1.
67. For details, see Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, Ch. 8.
68. 1995 Sejong Survey (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 78; and 1997
Sejong Survey (Seoul: Dongseo Research, 1997), p. 11; Seymour Martin
Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1996), Ch. 7.
69. For China’s expressed concern with Japan’s potential military ambition,
see Li Luye, “The Current Situation in Northeast Asia: A Chinese View,”
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 79–80.
For the idea of a South Korea-China alliance against the Japanese threat,
see Gerald Segal, “Northeast Asia: Common Security or A La Carte?”
International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4 (1991), p. 765. In fact, one reason for
Beijing’s decision to normalize relations with Seoul was allegedly to create
an anti-Japanese coalition. See Yan Jing, Chushi Hanguo, p. 17. Also see
Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in
the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), p. 170.
70. See Lawrence B. Krause, The Economics and Politics of the Asian Financial
Crisis of 1997–1998 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998),
pp. 224–25, 228–30.
71. Had it not been for September 11, U.S.-China relations could have reached
a much more confrontational phase.
72. See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe
Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1995); and Gary L. Geipel, “The Diplomacy of German Unification:
Lessons for Northeast Asia,” in Robert Dujarric, ed., The Future of
Korea-Japan Relations (Washington, DC: The Hudson Institute, 2001),
pp. 151–52.
73. Americans believe that China generally prefers the status quo on the
Korean peninsula. Chinese, on the other hand, consider Americans as the
one that least wants unification. See Chen Fengjun, “Ershiyi shiji Chaoxian
bandao dui Zhongguo de zhanlue yiyi,” Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu, No. 4
(2001), pp. 8–9.
74. Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, “South Korea’s International Relations:
Challenges to Developmental Realism,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The
International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004), p. 271.
75. Samuel S. Kim, “Inter-Korean Relations in Northeast Asian Geopolitics,”
in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen
Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 170.
76. Compare The Washington Post, June 21, 2000 with Renmin ribao, June 16,
2000.
77. For the swing of public opinion in favor of China during this period, see
Jae Ho Chung, “Dragon in the Eyes of South Korea: Analyzing Korean
Perceptions of China,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian
Pivot, pp. 258–59. For the role of cultural proximity as a key factor in
Sino-South Korean relations, see Xu Derong and Xiang Dongmei,
“Zhonghan jianli mianxiang 21shiji hezuo huoban guanxi de beijing
fenxi,” Dangdai Hanguo, No. 22 (1999), p. 34.
78. For an argument that Korea’s efforts to develop military-to-military ties
with China is related to Seoul’s will to prevent the South Korea-U.S. alli-
ance from taking up the role of constraining China, see Liu Ming, “Hanguo
de diyuan weizhi yuqi waijiao he anquan zhengce,” Yatai luntan (Asia-
Pacific Forum), Nos. 3/4 (1999), p. 37.
79. Dong-A ilbo, December 5, 2000.
80. The differences in policy horizons in Seoul and Washington are noted in
Catharin Dalpino and Bates Gill, eds., Brookings Northeast Asia Survey
2000–01 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 31.
81. In elite interviews conducted by an American think-tank in 2002 with a
new generation of South Korean opinion leaders, 86 percent wished to
see South Korea’s future ties with China further strengthened as
opposed to only 14 percent for the United States. See William Watts,
Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea: Opinion Survey
Reports and Analysis (Washington, DC: Potomac Associates, April 2002),
p. 12.
82. See Dong-A ilbo, April 19, 2004.
83. JoongAng ilbo, February 12, 2003.
84. Dong-A ilbo, May 4, 2004.
85. For the debate between the so-called Northeast Asian School and the
American School, see Lee Soo-hoon, “Now, It Is the Era of China” and
Chun Chae-sung, “It Is Still America Not China,” Chosun ilbo, April 21
and 25, 2004.
86. The recent survey of Korea specialists in Washington, DC conducted by the
Mansfield Foundation and Kyunghyang shinmun shows nearly unanimous
agreement that the U.S.-Korea alliance is experiencing profound change.

See http://w w w.mansf ieldfdn.org/pubs/pub_pdfs/khsm_summary.pdf
(accessed on December 18, 2005).
87. China’s provision of food and energy and growing investment and North
Korea’s rapidly rising trade dependency—over 50 percent in 2005—has
been central to the survival of the regime. Kim Jong-il’s visits to China in
May 2000, January 2001, May 2004, and January 2006 should be
interpreted as Pyongyang soliciting Beijing’s support for its new policy
framework.
88. It is often suggested that Roh’s focus on “independence” or “self-reliance”
is closely related to taking a stance closer to China than to the United
States. The outcome of its painstaking compromise can be found in
National Security Council, Pyonghwa wa bonyong ul wihan Dongbukka
(Seoul: NSC, February 2004).
89. For China’s positive response to the concept, see Li Dunqiu, “Lu Wuxuan—
zuo junhengzhe,” Shijie zhishi, No. 11 (2005), pp. 30–33. For a critical
view of the concept in Korea, see Jae Ho Chung, “Gyunhyongja doegi wa
gyunhyongjom chatgi,” Dong-A ilbo, April 27, 2005.
90. See Norman Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind? The U.S.-ROK Security
Relationship after 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: R AND, 2004).
91. In January 2006, the Korean government was not notified of the visit to
China by Kim Jong-il before or even during the event.
92. See Dong-A ilbo, March 15, 2006; and Chosun ilbo, May 26, 2006.
93. For such concerns, see Nan Liming, “Hanguo dui Zhongguo de wenhua
kangyi,” Yazhou zhoukan, July 25, 2004, pp. 16–17; Dong-A ilbo,
December 3, 2003, August 25 and December 25, 2004; JoongAng ilbo,
December 4, 2003; and The Washington Post, September 23, 2004. For
the goals of the Northeast Project, see Ma Dazheng, ed., Zhongguo dongbei
bianjiang yanjiu (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2003); and
Jae Ho Chung, “Dongbuk gongjong oe hyonjaejok uimi wa Hanguk
oigyo,” Wolgan JoongAng, September 2004.
94. Dong-A Ilbo, April 13, 2005.
95. Bae Ki-chan, Korea—dasi saeng jon oe giroe soda (Seoul: Wisdom House,
2005), pp. 426–28.
96. See Dong-A ilbo, January 21, 2006 and Chosun ilbo, February 2 and 3,
2006.
97. For Pyongyang’s initial perception of China’s participation, see Eric
McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” in James
R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the Future
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 289.
98. See Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: The Limits of Inf luence,”
Current History, September 2003, pp. 274–78.
99. Jae Ho Chung, “China’s Ascendancy and the Korean Peninsula,” in David
Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005), p. 156.
100. See the controversial article by Shen Jiru, which called for deleting the
automatic involvement clause in the Sino-North Korean Friendship
Treaty, “Weihu Dongbeiya anquan de dangwu zhi ji,” Shijie jing ji yu
zhengzhi, No. 9 (2003), p. 57. In 2004, the prestigious journal, Strategy
and Management, was terminated for publishing an article critical of the
Kim Jong-Il regime. See Wang Zhongwen, “Yi xinde guandian lai
guancha Chaoxian wenti yu Dongbeiya qingshi,” Zhanlue yu guanli,
No. 4 (2004), pp. 92–94.
101. Compare Shen Dingli, “Accepting a Nuclear North Korea,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, No. 168 (March 2005), pp. 51–54, with Zhang Liangui,
“Stalemate and Solutions,” Beijing Review, Vol. 48, No. 33 (August 18,
2005), p. 11.
102. “Chinese Investors Keeping Eye on North Korea,” The Straits Times,
March 9, 2007.
103. Rowan Callick, “US-China Alliance Reaps First Fruit,” The Australian,
February 14, 2007.
104. See Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, Ch. 9.
CHAPTER 8

toward Japan
Gilbert Rozman
F
or South Koreans, it remains easier to criticize Japan than any
other country. After all, it occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945 and
has failed, even after normalization of relations in 1965, to show
the remorse sought by the Korean nation. Indeed, satisfaction with the
results of normalization with the Soviet Union/Russia and then with
China have left many Koreans careful to avoid criticisms that might
strain relations anew, but a different logic operates for Japan. Yet, after
the cold war, as regional experts looked for ways to gain leverage in the
region, successive Korean presidents recognized the disadvantage of
one-sidedly pointing the finger at Japan. Repeatedly, efforts were made
to put relations on a firmer footing and make strategic use of Japan, as
had been done at times during the cold war by presidents whose dictato-
rial power could dismiss public opinion. We can see evidence of this in
the maneuvering at the end of the cold war that led to nordpolitik, early
attempts to set a new course on the basis of normalized relations with
all regional powers that was interrupted by the first North Korean
nuclear crisis, responses to the difficult environment of the Asian finan-
cial crisis, the hopeful mood of the Sunshine Policy, and the turbulent
early days of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. With each new
challenge, decisions had to be taken on the priority of Japan and whether
to approach it more strategically.
Despite the logic of healing lingering wounds in the first two decades
after World War II, South Korea could not find common ground for
180 ● Gilbert Rozman
normalizing relations with Japan. The fact that the two states shared
dependence on an indispensable ally, the United States, and antagonism
to a readily demonized foe, North Korea, failed to convince leaders in
Seoul, or for that matter in Tokyo, to make a strategic decision to turn
to their neighbor in a way that would elicit further support. It was only
Park Chung-hee’s dictatorial power that permitted him to make the
unpopular decision in favor of establishing diplomatic relations in 1965.
Yet, the strategic wisdom of doing so, especially for the economic devel-
opment of his country, did not subdue an emotional outcry that this
move was not consistent with national pride. Japan’s refusal to accept
standard historical verdicts on its colonial rule left Koreans without the
psychological fruits of a strategic breakthrough.
The distinct nature of the challenge posed by Japan was not simply
because it uniquely offered a powerful temptation to indulge in emo-
tionalism, but also because among the active powers in the region it
presented the most genuine options. It was neither the South’s bedrock
protector nor its implacable foe, and its relations with the North were
not such that any shift might have immediate consequences for penin-
sular security. Also significant was the fact that dealing with Japan at
crucial times required a triangular strategy, complicating the usual dip-
lomatic challenges. Not surprisingly, the overall record is mixed; impres-
sive strategic moves from Seoul involved breakthroughs with Tokyo,
but at other times troubled relations testified to strategic failures.
From Park Chung-hee to Chun Doo-hwan

The twenty years after normalization brought rich economic rewards as
well as increased security even as the United States, caught in the
Vietnam War and in its aftermath, was lowering its profile in parts of
Asia. Already at the end of the 1960s the United States had insisted on
Japan doing more to support South Korea, in the 1970s Japan found it
useful to bring the South under its wing in the f lying geese formation,
and in the early 1980s Nakasone Yasuhiro seized the opportunity of
Chun Doo-hwan’s unpopularity to offer a financial assistance package
in return for closer political ties. Yet, observers are likely to notice the
shallowness of bilateral political and cultural ties throughout this
period. For a long time no summits occurred, South Korea maintained
strict restrictions on Japanese cultural imports, and public opinion on
both sides was filled with suspicion and even disdain. As regional
security was being transformed, South Korean-Japanese ties were
unresponsive.
Strategic Thought toward Japan ● 181
In the early 1970s breakthroughs in Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese

relations along with detente between the United States and Soviet
Union offered fleeting hope for an inter-Korean rapprochement. By the
end of the 1970s strategic thinking in Seoul was gravitating to ways to
develop economic ties with China with the possibility of political ties
later.1 In the midst of this quest for broadening relations beyond one-
sided dependence on the United States, strategic calculations paid little
heed to substantial political ties with Japan in disregard of the increas-
ingly close integration of the South’s economy with it. Not only had
normalization taken twenty years from the end of the war, through the
following twenty years the absence of normal political and cultural ties
handicapped the South as well as Japan, leaving the former much weaker
relative to their mutual ally.
In order to comprehend the pattern of South Korean strategic ties to
Japan over the past two decades we need to look back to two critical
postwar turning points: the 1965 normalization by Park Chung-hee,
and the 1983 upgrading of political relations by Chun Doo-hwan.
Desperate circumstances in each instance drove a leader to strategize
anew about Japan. Subsequent presidents would turn their attention to
Japan without the same degree of desperation, but each on at least one
occasion during his tenure would significantly raise his estimation of
Japan’s value for South Korean diplomacy and proceed accordingly. At
other times, however, they would lower their estimation or simply suc-
cumb to the easy payoff of demagoguery before a readily aroused public.
A cyclical pattern emerged in the Blue House’s strategic thinking. It
had its roots in the incomplete results realized with the agreement on
diplomatic relations of 1965 and with the improvement of political
relations reached in 1983. They brought little satisfaction.
After years of unsuccessful negotiations into the early 1960s and fur-
ther failed talks at the beginning of the 1980s, a similar combination of
factors overcame all obstacles in allowing Seoul and Tokyo to achieve a
breakthrough. 2 The first condition was an economic imperative for
Seoul to secure large-scale funding only available from Tokyo. In the
early 1960s it was falling behind Pyongyang in industrialization, and
Park Chung-hee desperately grasped for economic growth to legitimate
a widely disliked regime founded through a military coup. In the sec-
ond case Seoul was faced with a heavy military burden in trying not to
fall further behind the sustained militarization of the North at the same
time as Chun Doo-hwan after his suspect military takeover and repel-
lent repression of demonstrating students at Gwangju was anxious to
overcome a serious economic slump in order to keep his grip on power.
In 1965, Japan in the midst of double-digit growth was understood to

be ready to offer assistance in lieu of reparations, and in 1983 its brim-
ming surplus could cover loans to a partner in regional security if the
right appeal were made. Strategic moves responded to these economic
imperatives, which gave Japan the advantage.
The second condition favorable for a bilateral breakthrough was
awareness of new U.S. determination to boost its security in East Asia
through pressure on Japan to foot a large part of the bill for South
Korea. In the first half of the 1960s the United States urged Japan to do
much more to ensure the security of the South, interpreted broadly as
supplying the capital and technology for a rapid economic rise essential
for political stability and the capacity to compete with the North.
Similarly, Ronald Reagan took office obsessed with strengthening the
alliances that checked Soviet expansionism, and he appealed to an obvi-
ously prosperous Japan with its limited defense budget to find other
ways to contribute to regional security in order to fulfill its international
responsibilities. After making clear his commitment to the defense of
the South Korea, Reagan called on Japan’s leaders to assist its continued
economic development, finding in Nakasone a partner prepared to act
without taking seriously the fact that he was also eager to gain some
leverage over the history issue.
Park and Chun deserve credit for strategic boldness, despite initial
wariness by Japan’s leaders and public wariness at home. They changed
the terms of debate in dealing with Japan, specifically citing the strate-
gic imperative for U.S. alliance ties and their own country’s defense.
Although public discourse continued to downplay the new realities of
dependence on Japan, the strategic debate advanced toward realistic
diplomacy as it led the way toward more breakthroughs with states
previously demonized as enemies.
Japan also had significance as a source of information on North
Korea. There was an active league of Koreans in Japan ( Jochongryon)
with close ties to Pyongyang. A few switched sides and provided infor-
mation to the South Korean government. During the cold war era
finding informants, including assistance from the Japanese government,
met Seoul’s strategic aims. Only from the 1990s, as Tokyo took ever
harsher measures to curtail the flow of money to North Korea and the
community of its supporters split over abductions and nuclear revela-
tions, did Seoul turn elsewhere for most of its information. By then, it
had direct contacts in Pyongyang as well as extensive networks in
China, but at earlier times Japan’s suspect pro-North Korean community
served as a useful conduit.
Arguably, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and

the first visit of a Japanese prime minister after the war were the two
most important strategic shifts for South Korea in the quarter century
between the war-torn 1950s and the waning of the cold war in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s. They helped rally the South Korean economy at
critical junctures and revitalized the U.S. alliance with a dose of trian-
gularity at moments of uncertainty. Above all, they shifted the balance
in the desperate struggle with North Korea, while prodding Japan to
become more involved in regional security in a manner that buttressed
the United States in its competition with the Soviet Union in Asia. Such
strategic decisions forged a triangular framework vital to the South’s
emergence from the cold war assured of its economic vitality and military
security. In turn, these critical adjustments left a legacy of reliance on
Japan, but without candid acknowledgment of how much that country
mattered for the South’s successful rise into a middle power. On the
contrary, both sides were guilty of mishandling sensitive matters, such
as kidnapping Park’s opponent Kim Dae-jung from Japan in 1973 or
failing to take responsibility after a Korean Japanese belonging to a pro-
North Korean group attempted to assassinate Park, killing his wife
instead in 1974.3
The strategic moves with Japan in the 1960s were aimed less at
deterring war with North Korea than at building up the South Korean
economy. After the pull back of U.S. troops by Richard Nixon in 1969
and the start of detente, both Japan and South Korea felt more vulner-
able than before. South Korean strategy turned to ways to find more
maneuverability. As success with other countries proved difficult, the
importance of Japan rose. In the 1970s the security aspect of this was
obscured, but it kept growing. When Park was angered by Jimmy
Carter’s intention to withdraw U.S. troops, he turned to Prime Minister
Fukuda Takeo for support and received it, as Japan took some credit for
dissuading the United States. The possibility of appealing to Japan
arose again. The alliance triangle could serve South Korean interests,
even if many were hesitant to acknowledge its existence.4
Japan’s efforts under Nakasone to intercede in South Korean relations
with China, as well as to represent Asia in foreign affairs, were met with
suspicion. When Korea rose to the top of the agenda in Nakasone’s
meetings with Chinese leaders, South Korean officials, fearful of a hasty
move toward normalization with North Korea, doubted his motives.
They also suspected that Japanese regarded their role on the peninsula
as special, assigning themselves a major voice and failing to consult
sufficiently.5 In the fall of 1984, when Chun made the first official visit
to Japan of a Korean head of state, an important step occurred toward

overcoming distrust, despite widespread concern among young Koreans
about increasing economic dependence on Japan. 6 By calming these
fears and those of an older generation still aroused against Japanese
arrogance, Korean leaders could sustain their country’s economic ascent
and position it for more active diplomacy.
In the cold war era South Korea depended exclusively on the United
States even as it found itself relying increasingly on Japan’s economy
and on its politicians for loans. Rather than maneuver for leverage in
the context of this triangle, it sustained a drumbeat of hostile rhetoric
toward Japan. This may have served the legitimacy of unpopular auto-
crats and ref lected Japan’s own indifference to winning trust and seek-
ing more strategic ties, but it indicates that even leaders who at times
recognized the value of breakthroughs with Japan hesitated to try to
sustain their strategic initiatives.
The Roh Tae-woo Era

The end of the cold war was accompanied by a more aggressive U.S.
posture to open the South Korean as well as the Japanese economies.
Having already successfully pressed Japan to increase the value of the
yen, the United States in 1989 focused on the won. If Japan and the
South had their own tensions over alleged unfair trading practices, this
did not mean that their parallel positions in Washington did not allow
for shared awareness. Yet, as Japanese triumphantly indulged in expla-
nations of Nihonjinron (the theory of Japanese uniqueness) for why they
were overtaking the United States, they blamed their neighbors for
Hanguknon (the theory of Korean uniqueness), exaggerating through
nationalism what made Korean culture different and superior.7 Cultural
pride linked to historical narrow-mindedness left little room to view the
other strategically, while preoccupation with U.S. economic policy
removed the triangular frame for cooperation.
At the start of the 1990s South Korea refrained from initiatives
toward Japan. Lacking popularity and concentrating on his nordpolitik
policy as well as North Korea, Roh lacked any incentive from Japan or
the United States to turn his attention there. Indeed, the end of the cold
war reduced calls for strengthening the weak leg in the U.S. alliance
system, and the booming South Korean economy with attractive new
prospects saw no need to single out Japan. At the same time, Japanese
moves to assert leadership in the region and to forge a new Sea of Japan
economic sphere aroused little interest. With Japanese leaders showing no
foresight in responding to the newly empowered public in South Korea,

all that could be expected was to keep relations from deteriorating.
When Seoul sought Tokyo’s understanding for its new overtures to
the North, it found not only support but also signs that this would be
taken as an opening that freed Japan to make its own overtures. From
1988 to 1992 coordination was inconsistent. The same result was visible
in the first half of the 1970s when South Korean moves toward the
North gave Japan the green light to pursue a two-Korea policy. Many in
Seoul were nervous that after Japan’s normalization with China it was
too energetically pursuing the North in a manner that could unsettle
the North-South dialogue and could signify that Japan was content
with a divided Korea. It narrowly focused on its own gains, interfering
with the unification process, they warned in the 1970s and again in the
early 1990s.8
An exchange of visits in 1990–91 brought Roh Tae-woo to Tokyo
and Kaifu Toshiki to Seoul. Roh agreed to look ahead toward coopera-
tion in developing an Asian-Pacific community, while focusing on
opening the Japanese market and drawing more Japanese investment
and technology into his country. As the first presidential visit since
1984 and a sign of more coordinated bilateral ties advocated by diplo-
mats on both sides, this momentarily raised hopes. Yet between the two
visits, each country surprised the other, first when Roh met with
Gorbachev causing fear that the latter could use the “South Korean
card” in difficult talks with Japan over their territorial dispute,9 and
then when Kanemaru Shin went to Pyongyang as South Koreans fretted
that normalization of relations and a large influx of economic assistance
would boost the North’s leverage.
After the Kanemaru delegation’s daring attempt to reach a break-
through with the North to the shock of many South Koreans, efforts
were made to repair bilateral relations in a new international context.
Roh’s appeal of October 1990 for Japan to change the way it dealt with
the North, acting only in accord with the North-South dialogue, was
accepted. As he pursued his own initiatives to the North, Japan’s leaders
promised to coordinate more closely. In those days, LDP politicians
eager to compromise with the North as well as reserved in their trust of
the South had considerable clout, but the situation was kept under
control. Indeed, the sudden need for coordination provided new glue
for bilateral ties as U.S. pressure receded. After the two Koreas had
agreed to simultaneous admission into the United Nations and made
progress in bilateral talks, Japan again made the South nervous when
Kaifu pressed for quick normalization. If it was soon stymied by the
early emergence of the abduction issue and the North’s hardening posi-
tion on the nuclear issue, a more important factor obstructing bilateral
talks may have been the selection of Miyazawa Kiichi, a champion of
close ties to the United States, as prime minister along with the weaken-
ing of Kanemaru and other figures in the LDP eager to achieve a break-
through with the North even if it meant an independent foreign policy.10
After these uncertainties, Seoul and Tokyo in 1992–93 stabilized their
relations, including new security cooperation.
As the cold war ended, the United States flexed its muscles in the
Gulf War while showing no interest in Gorbachev or Kim Il-sung’s
separate overtures for negotiations to put in place a new architecture in
Northeast Asia. Many in South Korea feared that Japan would draw the
wrong lessons from the Gulf War on the need to boost military power,
while regretting that it gave no encouragement to the United States to
embrace multilateralism.11 In April 1991 when he visited Jeju island,
Gorbachev proposed a treaty of good neighbors and cooperation that
was welcomed by Roh until he realized that both the United States and
Japan were concerned about its implications along with the speed of
normalization.12 Already a gap was opening between the South’s incli-
nation to a regional balance of power and the U.S. and Japanese desire
to convert victory in the cold war into regional leadership. Yet, in this
new context Japan and South Korea found more common ground not
only on how to deal with North Korea but also on the need to regularize
and diversify their ties. This led to more people-to-people exchanges
and diverse, new economic arrangements.
The Kim Young-sam Era

Compared to the mid-1980s, South Koreans were decidedly more con-
fident in the mid-1990s. Their economy was vastly stronger, in some
sectors surpassing even that of Japan, and wanton criticisms of Japan
with nary a refutation had given way to somewhat more objective
coverage.13 As progressives grew more assertive, conservatives became
more confident too; changing national politics and diplomatic options
suggested that the South could play a more active role. A moderate
agenda made globalization the priority after Kim Young-sam took office
in 1993. This downgraded security issues in favor of economic and cul-
tural ones such as human rights, while placing stress on the United
Nations and on regional cooperation. In many ways, this overlapped
with Japan’s foreign policy agenda, especially after the LDP was replaced
by a coalition of parties. In place of the old discourse that kept the focus
on Japan’s bad behavior and the danger of a large trade deficit with it,
there was some scope for finding more common ground. Japan showed
a more apologetic face to the past. It was looking for alternative path-
ways to Asia as ties with Russia, North Korea, and China all became
more problematic, while trade tensions with the United States were slow
to heal. Meanwhile, nordpolitik had run its course, and Seoul was
searching for an encore without expecting early results with Pyongyang.
For the first time an incoming Korean president focused on improving
relations with Japan.
Kim Young-sam’s strategic thinking toward Japan was more incon-
sistent than that of his predecessors. He started with efforts to improve
ties, turned more negative for roughly two years, and then in 1997
repaired ties. At first, joint exploration of common interests led the two
states to consult on the global economic talks that led to establishing
the WTO. Miyazawa’s approval of an official statement recognizing the
history of the comfort women earned Japan some trust in early 1993.
Then Hosokawa visited South Korea, taking a more contrite position
than his predecessors on historical matters. Finally, Murayama gained
credibility as the prime minister most sincere in sustaining this spirit.
Yet, his role as a socialist in a cabinet comprised mostly of LDP politi-
cians loath to give ground on matters of history undermined his per-
sonal image. Koreans were frustrated by the backlash in the Diet against
Murayama’s efforts to calm historical animosities. Moreover, his
contradictory tone on the question of the legality of the annexation of
Korea set back the recent reconciliation.14 Despite the best atmosphere
in the past forty years for setting history aside, South Koreans turned
away from taking a strategic approach, as Kim Young-sam raised emo-
tions against Japan anew. Only near the end of his term when Hashimoto
made efforts to calm the situation did ties improve.
As China’s rapid rise as a regional power became clear and Sino-
Japanese ties hit a snag at mid-decade, South Korea gave at least the
appearance of tilting toward China and putting pressure on Japan. As
early as 1994 Kim Young-sam had raised the theme of a four-corner
foreign policy that boosted China’s place, and his ambassador in Beijing
went further by introducing the notion of equidistance with the United
States, leaving Japan in the shadows. Moreover, Japan’s economic
stagnation led many to no longer see it as capable of being the motor
for regional development or a threat to dominate the region. This
made it easier both to turn elsewhere in the region away from Japan and
to improve relations with that country. South Korea’s options had
increased.
Having warmed to globalization, South Koreans increasingly also

embraced regionalism with balance between China and Japan.15 The
first nuclear crisis revealed a lack of agreement among the United States
and its allies in dealing with an assertive North Korea. The South
objected to U.S. efforts to impose economic sanctions,16 nervously
watched preparations for war, and found Japan’s lack of preparation to
take a stance troublesome too. Given that both Seoul and Tokyo felt
marginalized in the crisis, both in the U.S. plan for a military strike and
in the deal that was reached, they showed signs of increased cooperation—
security ties rose in priority as the United States discussed with both
sides the logistics of military operations. In this context, South Korea
was prepared to include Japan in its call for a Northeast Asian regional
security dialogue—,17 but the end of the crisis brought a downturn in
ties. Coordination toward Pyongyang again proved difficult. Kim had
tried at the outset of his term to upgrade cooperation with the North,
offering the prospect of assistance, then when he was rebuffed and the
crisis occurred, he had taken a tough stance, but after a deal was reached
by the United States, he veered toward engagement once more only to
be rejected after failing to send a delegation to the funeral of Kim
Il-sung. Japan’s responses to the North did not suit this timetable. For
instance, it took the lead in 1995 in offering food assistance just when
the North was shunning the South, and it did so without advance coor-
dination, arousing suspicion that it was again pursuing an independent
policy toward the North.18
During the leadership transition in the North, the South focused
elsewhere, but Kim Young-sam laid a foundation for policies to follow
by insisting that the South would not take advantage of the North’s
troubles, would not isolate it, and would not seek unification through
absorption. As the United States and Japan recovered from troubled
trade talks and committed themselves to a stronger alliance, the South
seemed headed toward a more independent foreign policy. With greater
legitimacy as an elected civilian president and more diplomatic options,
Kim could approach Japan with few of the old restraints. This provided
an opportunity both for new overtures, independent of pressure from
the United States, and renewed demonization, less likely to be a quick
fix for domestic unpopularity.
With South Korean emotionalism heightened in 1995–96 after
renewed historical consciousness at the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s
end, some charged that the country was unable to think strategically.
They accused the public of being easily aroused and the country’s lead-
ers of overeagerness to pander to emotions. At this time, however, fear
of the North was subsiding in the face of its severe famine and the 1994
Agreed Framework, and, unlike in Japan, China’s rise loomed as a great
opportunity. After a downturn in ties with Japan, blamed by many
Koreans on provocations over history issues (statements by high offi-
cials, revival of the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, and a 1996 visit to Yasukuni
by Hashimoto) from a revitalized LDP losing restraints from the political
left, Hashimoto took pains to repair ties with Kim at a 1997 Beppu
meeting, even calling Kim “older brother.” On both sides there was
caution about a downward cycle that could reawaken emotions only
recently brought under some control. Altering the momentum, Kim’s
visit paved the way for Seoul’s most significant strategic move toward
Tokyo since 1965.
The Kim Dae-jung Era

Of all Korea’s presidents, Kim Dae-jung knew Japan best. He had
the advantage too of working with Obuchi Keizo, who gave attention
to bilateral ties, and of an urgent atmosphere due first to the Asian
financial crisis and then to the Taepodong missile test by North Korea
in August 1998, firing eastward over Japan with the intention of
shaking the region into addressing its concerns. Making use of this
opportunity, Kim became the only Korean president to gain popularity
in Japan.
Coming after Japan’s financial assistance in the crisis had boosted its
image, Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Tokyo in October 1998 had tremendous
impact on both nations, transforming bilateral ties, reshaping public
opinion, and increasing scope for regional diplomacy. Prior to the visit
the two states had reached common understanding on how to deal with
the financial crisis and to put in place regional measures to prevent a
recurrence. On the eve of the visit, the South Korean defense minister
had gone to Tokyo to establish closer security cooperation in response
to North Korea’s missile threat.19 Yet, in the aftermath of the summit,
excessive optimism in Japan and among some in South Korea obscured
the widening gap evident in how the two states were dealing with the
missile launch and Kim’s proposed Sunshine Policy. If on the Japanese
side the effect on public opinion proved more substantial than on pol-
icy, as many distorted the strategic impact of the summit, South Koreans
were slow to shed their skepticism even as policy toward the region was
quickly building on this foundation. Lack of coordination on North
Korea kept reappearing as a principal barrier to strategic understanding
and cooperation. 20
In the face of contrasting policies toward North Korea, the United

States came to the rescue in forging a security environment that eased
tensions. The Perry process not only gave a powerful boost to Kim Dae-
jung’s Sunshine Policy, setting U.S.-North Korean relations on a positive
track and quieting concern about the North’s missiles as earlier had
been done about its nuclear weapons potential, but it also led Japan to
send a delegation headed by former Prime Minister Murayama to begin
preparations for improving bilateral ties. This led Japan to remove the
sanctions it had imposed after the missile test and served Kim Dae-
jung’s strategy of establishing an international atmosphere conducive
to North-South reconciliation. It helped boost coordination for a few
years, despite the sharp divide in views of the historic inter-Korean
summit.
After Japan redefined its security activities in conjunction with the
agreed new defense guidelines with the United States to range beyond
homeland security to neighboring areas, South Korean leaders were
clearer on both the danger of increased confrontation between Japan
and China over Taiwan and the opportunity for more Japanese involve-
ment in the security uncertainties related to North Korea as part of the
U.S. alliance. Despite press discussion wary of Japan’s newfound mili-
tary interests, far-sighted leaders might find some benefit in making
alliance relations more triangular. Accepting Japan as an indirect ally
could prove helpful for improving the military efficiency of the alliance
with the United States and eliciting Japan’s support in the process of
Korean unification. 21 This reasoning spread by the year 2000 in a
setting where Seoul was taking the diplomatic initiative and optimism
prevailed over the chances of cooperation with North Korea and U.S.
support of this process, while China and Japan were joining with the
South in the quest for regionalism. As these conditions faded in the
following years, South Korean reasoning about Japan had to change
too. Those Japanese who insisted that South Korea needs Japan because
it would become the savior in the event of conf lict with North Korea,
owing to its importance in resupplying U.S. forces, overstated the
degree of common security interests. 22 Their effort to impose on South
Korea a particular type of Japanese strategic thinking—linked to fear
of a China threat and focused on regime change in North Korea—
proved futile.
The Asian financial crisis brought bilateral ties closer, as South Korea
favored Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund and beseeched
Japan even after it failed to find a way to offer a large loan in lieu of
IMF conditionality. Only after this path was closed and U.S. pressure
intensified was agreement with the IMF possible; however, even as a

presidential transition began, a facade of willing globalization was
accompanied by more efforts at regionalism through encouragement of
Japanese initiatives. After the financial crisis, the view spread that
regional cooperation was necessary to prevent a further bout of finan-
cial destabilization as well as to make full use of the rapid economic
integration under way. Kim Dae-jung explicitly linked his Sunshine
Policy to a favorable regional environment, setting the context for
future-oriented projects with Japan. 23 In the fall of 1999 the two agreed
with China on upgrading ASEAN 1 3, making the summit meeting of
their three states more formal, and over the next few years many initia-
tives followed to reflect shared strategic interests in regionalism. Yet, as
Sino-Japanese relations grew more confrontational and security prob-
lems rose to the fore, the pull of regionalism was fading for both Japan
and South Korea. Their bilateral relationship was critical for regionalism,
but Seoul as well as Tokyo had other priorities.
The framework for viewing Japan had changed to comprise the entire
Northeast Asian region. The alliance triangle was receding, as was the
notion that South Korea had no other option than to depend uncondi-
tionally on the United States, and in its shadow to nurture ties with
Japan. Increasingly, the competition between China and Japan became
an issue in thinking about Japan. China was more fully supportive of
the Sunshine Policy and more interested in regional integration rather
than keeping a wary eye on containing one or another power. When
U.S. policy toward the region became more divisive and left the status
of North Korea in greater doubt, South Korean leaders were inclined to
side with China’s response rather than Japan’s, and Japan often failed to
make a case for itself. 24
In 2001–02, with Bush’s support for the Sunshine Policy in doubt,
Kim Dae-jung had good reason to seek Japanese help with their mutual
ally. After all, he had closer ties to Japan than any previous postwar
Korean leader, Japan was pursuing its own opening to the North, and
Bush’s abrasive approach to the region contrasted with the cooperation
between Seoul and Tokyo on regionalism through ASEAN 1 3. Despite
the textbook controversy in the spring of 2001 that riled the Korean
public and made it impossible to proceed with talks about inviting the
Emperor to South Korea for the opening ceremony of the jointly hosted
FIFA World Cup, the mood of reconciliation resumed and the World
Cup results boosted the spirit of cooperation. In these circumstances,
Seoul sustained the TCOG for developing common policies with
Washington and Tokyo on North Korea, resumed its cultural opening
to Japanese products, and took satisfaction from the growing Korean

wave among the Japanese public. Yet, the downturn in relations in
2001 exposed the fragility of ties due to Japan’s insensitivity to the
consequences of its revisionist leanings and South Korean emotional
sensitivity. 25
The 2002 World Cup was accompanied by talk of a new era of
cooperation, as if the opening of a new century in which both had
become part of a global society meant a new direction. Finally, a large
percent of Japanese (77 percent up from 55 percent before) regarded
South Korea as a partner country and the number of South Koreans
who thought of Japan similarly had risen more sharply (from 24 to
42 percent). 26 Now talk of common interests included not only demo-
cratic ideals and a free market system, but also security, where close
cooperation was said to be needed. Yet, within months of the glory of
shared success in soccer came the shock of nuclear crisis in October
2002. While South Korean leaders groped for Japan’s help and under-
standing in the face of Bush’s unilateral actions, Japan’s leaders wavered
without showing great concern for the arguments raised in Seoul. It
would not be easy for the South to sustain the elevated hopes for
strategic cooperation with Japan, now buoyed by Bush’s whole-hearted
backing in a triangle that left the South isolated and also newly insis-
tent on symbolic manifestations of historical revisionism, above all
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine marked by defiant claims in
Japan that this showed it no longer needed to bow to the sensitivities of
its neighbors.
The Roh Moo-hyun Era

Roh Moo-hyun came to power rallying the progressives resentful
not only of Japan’s historical conduct but of the legacy sustained under
the South’s conservative “collaborators” and of the incomplete normal-
ization. His own revisionist agenda aroused emotions not readily
compatible with a sober approach to Japan’s role in Northeast Asia in
conditions of regional insecurity. Just as many alert to the impact of
anti-Americanism on Roh’s election doubted that he could manage
relations with the United States well, many saw his background and the
worldview of this enthusiastic backers as standing in the way of strategic
thinking toward Japan. Yet, for two years Roh took pains to steady
relations.
Roh Moo-hyun had ample reason to show patience toward Japan in
the first part of his tenure. Suspected of anti-Americanism from the
time of his election and caught in the perilous grip of the North Korean
nuclear crisis with scant leverage of his own on the Bush administra-
tion, he turned to Koizumi as a leader Bush was energetically wooing
and the best hope to steer the crisis toward a compromise resolution.
Second only to his reliance on China, Roh grasped at trilateralism with
Japan as one means to control Bush. As long as Japan took a middle
position on handling North Korea, this made sense.
The June 2003 visit of Roh to Tokyo proved to be an important test.
Across the political spectrum, Roh was seen as exercising restraint for
strategic reasons. In the face of widely perceived Japanese arrogance,
such as timing the visit on Korea’s Memorial Day, and Koizumi’s strong
support for Bush’s tough posture toward North Korea, Roh showed
restraint while repeatedly calling for peaceful resolution of the issue. 27
Yet, the conservative and centrist press faulted him for being soft on
Japan on history issues, 28 similar to past criticism from the progressives
of conservative leaders for the same transgression. It was hard to earn
credit for strategic restraint with Japan. Moreover, the gap was too great
to bridge in the face of a U.S. administration out of control in its uni-
lateral and preemptive actions, and a North Korean regime ready to
escalate the confrontation. If sober voices in Seoul and Tokyo stressed
the importance of the two coordinating to keep this crisis from spiral-
ing downward and preventing the North from seeking advantage in
their differences, 29 Roh’s early efforts failed. His followers were impa-
tient, and Japan’s leaders were insensitive. In these conditions, he over-
reacted, castigating Japan and letting foreign policy drift to the extent
that some saw ideological factors at work.30 Samuel Kim refers to this
response to the “constant war recall trigger” squeezed by Japan as “the
total mobilization of national identity politics.”31
Given the priorities of Roh and Koizumi as well as Abe, finding
common ground was not easy. Their notions of reordering their own
societies appealed to clashing themes of nationalism. Their thinking
about how to deal with Korean reunification took sharply contrasting
approaches to the North and the international environment conducive
to its transformation. Moreover, their ideas for regionalism and regional
security differed on the role of both China and the United States, while
their views of the international order as well as UN Security Council
reform were at odds. With the strategic gap widening, insensitivity to
symbolic and historical questions could more easily ignite tensions.
In 2005 Roh faced a difficult strategic environment. Once reelected,
Bush took a tough but unsustainable line toward North Korea, while
Koizumi backed him at the same time as he pushed for Japan to become
a permanent member of the UN Security Council without striving to

improve ties with South Korea. While some in South Korea reluctantly
called for acquiescence due to the country’s weak position, this would
have sent the wrong message to all parties. Roh’s assertive response,
especially to Japan after Shimane prefecture provocatively raised the
territorial issue by proclaiming Takeshima (Dokdo) day, aroused fur-
ther emotionalism. With obsessive talk in Japan about abductees taken
by North Korea, the emerging China threat, and denying the historical
consciousness of the victims of its colonization and aggression, South
Koreans could do little to halt its self-induced isolation in the region.
Yet, even if conditions were not ripe for any strategic initiative toward
Japan, the overblown response did not position the South well for later
developments, such as working with a new prime minister, Abe Shinzo,
who came to Seoul as well as Beijing just after taking office, and coor-
dinating following the February 13, 2007 breakthrough in the Six-Party
Talks when the United States changed its position.
With Japanese politics shifting to the right and South Korean
politics to the left, finding common ground proved difficult. Elder
statesmen who had worked to reduce differences in the 1980s–90s now
appeared insufficiently nationalist to have credibility with decision-
makers. With the strong backing of his increasingly likely successor
Abe, Koizumi after failing in direct talks with Kim Jong-il, found
benefit in stressing the abduction issue. This demonized North Korea,
focusing public opinion away from the strategic implications of the
nuclear crisis and the multilateral diplomacy swirling around it. Roh,
in turn, lashed out at Japan’s handling of historical and territorial
issues.32 The tone of relations sharply deteriorated under the sway of
emotionally charged criticisms. Indeed, in 2006 Abe’s baptismal visit
to Beijing and Seoul showed more progress in restoring a business-like
atmosphere in Sino-Japanese ties, where Hu Jintao emphasized prag-
matism, than in South Korean-Japanese ties, where populism had
resurfaced.
Whether attempting to place the South in the middle of triangles
with China and the United States, Japan and the United States, or
North Korea and the United States, Roh overrated his country’s lever-
age. It lacked the power or maneuverability in Northeast Asia to become
a balancer or an active center at a time of sharp conf lict. With Japan
lacking an Asian strategy and insensitive to the South’s needs, this
outcome was not so unexpected. Also with Japan marginalized in the
Six-Party Talks, there was not a lot Roh could gain from cooperation
with it. Yet, the February 13 agreement refocused the talks, suggesting
that before long, regional diplomacy would become energized and it

would be wise to prepare for a time when Japan was again energetically
engaged in Northeast Asia.
While in 2007 differences over how to deal with North Korea and
the United States rose to the forefront, discussion of Japan remained
obscured. Conservatives sometimes fault Roh for mismanaging rela-
tions with Japan, but they realize that there is little mileage to be gained
with the Korean people by putting the blame largely on their own
country rather than on Japan’s nationalist leaders. Yet, by recasting the
problem not in terms of bilateral ties but in the context of the alliance
with the United States and its strategy for the region, the arguments for
closer ties with Japan could get a broader hearing. As Michael Green
argued in an opinion perspective published in a Korean newspaper on
June 13, 2007, South Korea is being tempted by the U.S.-Japan effort to
establish a network of bilateral alliances involving Australia and even
aiming to reach India. This open, inclusive, and security-oriented
integration in the region, according to both American and Japanese
proponents, would emphasize shared values. 33 Yet, its maritime focus
and undisguised intention of putting pressure on China to reform polit-
ically and abandon attempts to forge other types of regionalism leave
South Korea caught between two competing visions.
If Japan insisted on focusing on this divisive approach, represented
by Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s “arc of freedom and prosperity,” then
South Korea would have to tilt its foreign policy substantially away
from China and from the strategy it has been pursuing toward North
Korea in order to participate. In contrast, it may be inclined to persist
in working through ASEAN 1 3 and the EAS in the hope that Sino-
Japanese differences can be narrowed and existing mechanisms for
boosting regionalism strengthened. As seen already, it is ready to give
more weight to the Six-Party Talks as a lasting institution not only for
dealing with further uncertainty about North Korea but also for advanc-
ing a regional security agenda in Northeast Asia. With China and
Russia intent on developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) further and in other ways to boost continental regionalism as
opposed to Aso’s maritime regionalism, we may be in store for the
coexistence of three distinct approaches toward regionalism, none of
which is apt to gain dominance in the next decade. Seoul may not throw
its weight behind the U.S.-Japan plan and cannot subscribe to the Sino-
Russian one; it would become a f loater, emphasizing the Six-Party Talks
as the driving force for regionalism as a bridge between the maritime
and continental approaches.
If the Six-Party Talks continue to progress, South Koreans would

likely become more complacent about the military threat from the
North and more seriously consider not only a reduced role for U.S.
troops in their country but also a major justification for relying on
Japan since the 1960s. Far-sighted strategic planning to use Japan as
part of a balance of powers could be overlooked. Recognition of the
benefits from a population receptive to Korean culture and supportive
of democratic values could be lost in the emotionalism lingering from
Japan’s historical outrages. It will require not only a more long-term,
patient outlook by the South’s leaders to overcome this, but most likely
also strategic cooperation from the United States and restraint from
Japan to create the right conditions.
With the completion of Phase 1 of the Joint Agreement assured,
South Koreans had reason to be more concerned about Japan’s isolation
in mid-2007. Talk was beginning about holding four-party talks on a
peace regime to replace the armistice on the peninsula as Japanese ner-
vously fretted about their absence, which would deepen their isolation
after the United States changed its policy and the South accelerated
steps for reconciliation with the North.34 Meanwhile, South Koreans
could watch gleefully as the Japanese squirmed and resorted to desperate
measures in an effort to avoid the U.S. House of Representatives passing
the Mike Honda sponsored resolution condemning Japan’s handling
of the comfort women issue. Reaching agreement on an FTA with the
United States, before Japan had even begun to hold talks with the United
States after blaming Japan for the breakdown in their own bilateral
talks over an FTA, South Koreans could feel smug about Japan’s grow-
ing concern about its diplomatic exclusion. Yet, with the right wing in
Japan insisting that evidence such as the Korean mass media calling the
emperor “Japan’s king” proves that an abiding anti-Japanese bias exists,35
compounding the existing mutual distrust is unlikely to serve strategic
objectives. Lee Myung-bak, Roh’s replacement, faces an even greater
challenge than recent predecessors in improving relations.
Conclusion
No country has tested the strategic thinking of South Korean leaders in
the cold war era and again over the past two decades as much as Japan.
At first, strategic thinking toward Japan was focused on securing eco-
nomic assistance and investment in a context where almost all attention
went to deterring the outbreak of war. Then, in the wake of the Nixon
Doctrine as Park sought more autonomy from the United States in the
midst of its overtures to Beijing and Tokyo’s as well coupled with its
moves toward Pyongyang, he broadened his concern to keeping them in
check. Failing in his own efforts to engage Beijing and Moscow, his
options were limited as economic and even strategic dependence on
Japan was rising at a time both countries felt more vulnerable.
At critical junctures South Korean leaders demonstrated strategic
foresight toward Japan. Indeed, every president since Park Chung-hee
boldly pursued an upgrading of ties early in his time in office. Each
time it made triangular sense given the state of relations with the United
States. Not only would Seoul be rewarded by Tokyo, economically at
first and more broadly in regional political and security leverage at later
dates, but it would also gain appreciably with its vital alliance partner.
Increasingly, a third payoff also drew attention: benefit in the triangle
involving North Korea. Instead of Japan developing an independent
policy toward the North that could boost the North’s leverage with the
South, leaders in Seoul were anxious to keep its full support. Moreover,
as engagement with Pyongyang progressed, they sought reinforcement
for their overtures and resistance to strong pressures from Washington
to take a harder line. In both of these triangles, Japan figured repeat-
edly as a force that could affect the results. These triangles were not
the only ones where Japan had strategic potential for South Korea’s
policies.
In two other triangles Japan only drew occasional attention. Despite
the historical significance of Japanese-Russian competition over the
Korean peninsula and the renewed divide between the two, as seen in
their extreme positions in the Six-Party Talks, leaders in Seoul generally
showed little interest in this triangle. An exception in the early 1990s
came when first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin showed their pique at
Japan’s leaders as their supporters talked about playing the “South
Korean card.” Yet, it is not clear that South Korean officials had any
plans of their own to use a “Russian card” with Japan. From the mid-
1990s this talk had been replaced by speculation about a triangle with
China. After all, the three joined together in ASEAN 1 3 and other
settings for discussion of regionalism. In 2005 Roh’s suggestion that
the South could become the balancer drew attention to inf lated aspira-
tions not only in the triangle with the United States and China but also
in the triangle with China and Japan. He lashed out against Japan, as he
seemed to rely increasingly on China. Yet, given U.S. sensitivities about
strains between two allies and close ties with what had only recently
been called a “strategic competitor,” the theme of balancing within a
triangle of China and Japan was little pursued.36
Arguably, the Bush administration played a big role in driving Japan

and South Korea apart from 2001 to 2006. Despite calls for solidifying
a triangular alliance, its blank check to Koizumi coupled with suspicion
of Kim Dae-jung already in the first half of 2001 cast doubt on the
pivot’s skill in aligning all sides of the triangle. After 9/11, the strategy
for the war on terror, including the term “axis of evil,” left the South
Korean public and policymakers nervous while it increasingly energized
support in Japan. The triangle was tilted, Japanese were responding
with security and regional thinking that only left South Koreans appre-
hensive.37 After the nuclear crisis became the dominant regional issue,
U.S. appeals to Koizumi drew him ever further from a middle position
that could bridge the gap with the South and appeal to Roh to stay
close. If Clinton’s policies, especially in the late 1990s, generally facili-
tated triangularity, Bush’s mitigated against it. Yet, Roh’s own strategic
thinking bears some of the responsibility, as his handling of Japan from
March 2005 brought back memories of numerous occasions since 1945
when the South had let relations stagnate or decline despite the strategic
imperative for making use of it. In 2007 Bush’s position at the Six-Party
Talks had changed, but with Abe as prime minister and Roh unforgiving
about his approach toward the Six-Party Talks, there was no prospect of
reconciliation.
A comparison of South Korean presidents’ strategic thinking toward
Japan gives the edge to Kim Dae-jung and puts the onus on Roh
Moo-hyun. Kim’s 1998 success in boosting all-around ties ref lected
far-reaching insight into the benefits for his country, but his handling
of Japan’s nervousness in the aftermath of the 2000 North-South sum-
mit and in the face of the Bush administration’s unilateralism did not
suggest similar skill. Roh’s 2005 willingness to allow ties sharply to
deteriorate ref lected inadequate awareness of their importance for his
county, although his forbearance in 2003–04 had revealed more
patience and strategic calculations. Earlier presidents had a mixed
record too; each making an effort to improve ties with Japan for strate-
gic ends but also exacerbating ties at potential cost to South Korea’s
objectives. Circumstances have made sustained strategic thinking
toward Japan difficult, but that does not remove the burden to achieve
what is possible.
Conservatives in the South are split between realists and ideological
nationalists, which has not mattered much for thinking about the
United States but has in approaching Japan. The result has been that
conservative presidents have had difficulty finding a consistent for-
mula for dealing with Japan. In opposition to Kim Dae-jung and
Roh Moo-hyun, they vary in their criticisms from accusing these lead-
ers of responding to provocations too weakly to charging that overly
damaging relations with Japan does harm to the South’s strategic
position. The fact that conservatives generally do not share the animus
found in conservative circles in the United States and Japan toward
China means that even the ones who eschew ideological nationalism are
unlikely to let their realist approach lead very far in Japan’s direction.
Yet, increasingly it is clear that because of different perceptions of North
Korea and the United States, conservatives place a greater strategic pri-
ority on Japan than progressives such as Roh Moo-hyun. They fault
Roh for a serious strategic error in 2005 and insist that, even in the face
of provocations over history, they could better manage to keep equilib-
rium in dealing with the powers of Northeast Asia. Based on past
records, this will not be easy. With democratization in the South, a
changing balance in economic power, a revisionist upsurge in Japan, a
shifting role of the United States, differing views of the rise of China,
and clashing interpretations of the challenge from North Korea, Seoul
has more difficulty in finding common ground with Tokyo. For strate-
gic thinking, Japan has continued to be the most difficult challenge
whatever the triangular or regional context. Even so, in 2008 Lee
Myung-bak is likely to view improved relations with Japan as a strategic
priority.
Notes
1. Jae Ho Chung, “Korea and China in Northeast Asia: From Stable Bifurcation
to Complicated Interdependence,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert
Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: The
Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe),
pp. 200–13.
2. Kimiya Tadashi, “1960 nendai Kankoku ni okeru reisen gaiko no sanruikei:
Nikkan kokkyo seijoka, Betonamu hei, ASPAC,” in Okonogi Masao and
Moon Chung-in, eds., Shijo, kokka, kokusai taisei (Tokyo: Keio University
Press, 2001), pp. 96–105; Okonogi Masao, “Shinreisenki no Nichibeikan
taisei,” in Okonogi Masao and Moon Chung-in, eds., Shijo, kokka, kokusai
taisei, pp. 189–241.
3. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic
Books, 2001), pp. 47–56.
4. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security
Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
5. Han Sung-joo, Korea in a Changing World: Democracy, Diplomacy, and
Future Developments (Seoul: ORUEM, 1995), pp. 345–48.
6. Ibid., pp. 351–54.

7. Tei Taikin, Kankoku no nashyonarizumu (Tokyo: Iwanami gendai bunko,
2003), pp. 51–65.
8. Tae Youl Paek, “Korean Unification and Japan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical
Overview,” in Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, eds., Japan and Korean
Unification (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 37–43.
9. Chae-Jin Lee, “U.S. and Japanese Policies toward Korea: Continuity and
Change,” in Hung Yung Lee and Chung Chongwook, eds., Korean Options
in a Changing International Order (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian
Studies, University of California, 1993), pp. 45–46.
10. Hong Nack Kim, “Japan and North Korea: Normalization Talks between
Pyongyang and Tokyo,” in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World:
Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 120–22.
11. Youn Jung-suk, “US and Japanese Foreign Policy toward the Korean
Peninsula in the 1990s,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2
(1992), pp. 364–83.
12. Chee Choung-il, “The United States and Japan’s Perspectives on South
Korea’s Foreign Policy toward the USSR and the PRC,” The Journal of East
Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1992), pp. 402–10.
13. Michigami Hisashi, Nihon gaikokan Kankoku funtoki (Tokyo: Bunshun
shinsho, 2001), pp. 16–20.
14. Wada Haruki and Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nitcho kankei 60nenshi (Tokyo:
Akashi shoten, 2005), p. 216.
15. Ko Ildong, et.al, Hanjungil gyong jae hyopryok oe chujin pangan gwa juyo
bumunpyol gwaje (Seoul: Hanguk kaebal yonguwon, 2002), pp. 11–13.
16. Hideshi Takesada, “Korea-Japan Defense Cooperation: Prospects and
Issues,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan
Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: Oreum Publishing, 2000),
pp. 127–28.
17. 21 segi oe Hanil gwangye: chigum muos ul haeyahalgosin ga? (Seoul: Asia
yongu gigum, 2003), p. 17.
18. Wada Haruki and Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nitcho kankei 60nenshi,
pp. 214–18.
19. Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Japan’s Asian Regionalism and
South Korea,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim,
and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center, p. 134.
20. Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Multilevel Approach toward the Korean Peninsula
after the Cold War,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S.
Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center, p. 186.
21. Sang-woo Rhee, “Introduction,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds.,
Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. vi–vii.
22. Hisahiko Okazaki, “Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation: A View
towards the Future,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan
Security Relations, pp. 90–96.
23. Cheol-Hee Park, “The Development of Korea’s Regional Strategy in

Northeast Asia,” in Hoon Jaung and Yuichi Morii, eds., Cooperation
Experiences in Europe and Asia (Tokyo: Shinzansha Publisher, 2004),
pp. 232–34.
24. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Competition over the Korean Peninsula:
The Nuclear Crisis as a Turning Point,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea:
The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006),
pp. 287–306.
25. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan and South Korea: Should the U.S. Be Worried
about Their New Spat in 2001?” Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002),
pp. 1–28.
26. Gong Ro-myung, “Hanil gwa Dongbukkasia gongdongche: Hanil gwangye
wa gukje jilso,” 21 segi oe Hanil gwangye: chigum muos ul haeyahalgosin ga?
pp. 61–64.
27. Hankyoreh, June 9, 2003, p. 4.
28. Kyunghyang shinmun, June 10, 2003, p. 3
29. Mainichi shimbun, June 5, 2003, p. 3.
30. Byung-Kook Kim, “The Politics of National Identity: The Rebirth of
Ideology and Drifting Foreign Policy in South Korea,” in Jonathan D.
Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot, pp. 79–120.
31. Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 192.
32. Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, “Unraveling the Japan-South Korea
‘Virtual Alliance’: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of
Conf licting Regional Strategies,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (September/
October 2006), pp. 661–84.
33. JoongAng Daily, June 13, 2007, p. 11.
34. “Chosen bando o yomu,” Sunday Mainichi, July 22, 2007, p. 43.
35. Sankei shimbun, June 23, 2007, p. 7.
36. Gilbert Rozman, “South Korea and the Sino-Japanese Rivalry: A Middle
Power’s Options within the East Asian Core Triangle,” Pacific Review,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 197–220.
37. Heo Tae-hoi, “9–11 ihu daetero jonjaeng gwa Hanbando jongse: Miguk oe
jonryak gwa yonghyang,” Anbo haksul nonjip, Vol. 13, No. 1 (June 2002),
p. 120.
CHAPTER 9

toward Russia
Gilbert Rozman
O
ver the past two decades Russia (the collapse of the Soviet
Union did not alter the geographic reality) has recurrently
served as a demanding test of South Korea’s rise as a middle
power in Northeast Asia. It has done so as a great power active in the
region with a rapidly changing strategic role in relation to other powers.1
We discern three sharply variant stages in Russia’s regional aspirations
and also in South Korean strategy for dealing with them: 1) the
Gorbachev era’s new thinking and Roh Tae-woo’s search for normaliza-
tion; 2) Boris Yeltsin’s neglect of Northeast Asia and Kim Young-sam’s
disregard of Russia; and 3) Vladimir Putin’s stress on security in
Northeast Asia as Kim Dae-jung welcomed Russia’s role and Roh Moo-
hyun followed him. So far in a series of ups and downs revolving around
the nuclear crisis of 2002–07, we observe no major change in strategic
thinking toward Russia, although the response is affected by the apathy
of many, the romanticism of some, and a growing sense among a minority
that it is becoming a negative factor. Based on recent signs, Koreans
have reason to anticipate a fourth stage in Russia’s presence with impli-
cations for a series of triangular relations and for regionalism.
The challenges shaping bilateral relations with Russia have differed
sharply over time. Unavoidably, elites in Seoul perceived Russia less
through the narrow lens of bilateral ties than through a prism of trian-
gular relations, involving the United States, North Korea, China, and,
at times, even Japan. Although the focus centers on power emanating
from Moscow, on occasion Seoul also has taken into account the strategic
implications of events in the nearby Russian Far East. Perceptions of
Russia itself played an indirect role as calculations put that country’s
actions or the vulnerability of its exposed Asian periphery mostly in the
context of what the other powers were doing.
Russia matters strategically to South Korea for at least four reasons.
First, it may, as in the 1890s–1900s when its imperialism vied with that
of Japan or the 1940s–50s when it aimed to control North Korea and
approved its invasion of the South, have designs on gaining dominance
or at least casting a strong shadow over the Korean peninsula. Second,
it is prone to exert influence as a military and political force in Northeast
Asia determined to shape a multilateral balance of power, sometimes by
coordinating with China or by relying on North Korea, as in the cold
war era. 2 Third, as a neighbor of the North and long its principal secu-
rity benefactor, Russia sets its sights, apart from the early 1990s, on
playing a large role in any reunification or even reconciliation process
on the peninsula. Finally, in developing the Russian Far East and Siberia
and wielding its energy resources through tight state control, Russia has
increasing potential to inf luence regional economic security, including
choice of partners as well as of routes for pipelines, electricity grids, and
railroads. Given South Korea’s high energy dependence and intense
concern with both North Korea and the regional balance of power,
strategic thinking cannot avoid paying close attention to Russia.
Three of Seoul’s priorities in Northeast Asia—reunification, regional
security, and regionalism—cannot escape inf luence from Moscow’s
decisions. Reunification was inconceivable as long as Moscow threw its
full support to Pyongyang through the 1980s, and again since Putin
reinvigorated ties to the leadership there, it has a voice that should be
taken into account. Leverage among the great powers in order to reduce
excess dependency on the United States without creating a security
dilemma is another objective that may be affected by Moscow’s maneu-
vering for great power inf luence. How Moscow deals with Washington,
Tokyo, and Beijing shapes the environment for Seoul to seek some bal-
ance. Finally, regionalism in Northeast Asia is a growing interest for
economic as well as other reasons. While Russia is often omitted from
the discussion, the importance of energy and transportation to plans
for establishing a hub in the South draws repeated attention. Despite
the rapidly changing prospects of Russia and the fluid nature of the
Northeast Asian region, analysts in South Korea may overcome the recent
pitfalls of apathy, romanticism, and antipathy by taking a more serious
look at Russia’s evolving situation and its potential impact.
Strategic Thought toward Russia ● 205
Some may overlook Russia as basically a European state, whose

population declining toward just six million east of Irkutsk and reduced
conventional military power leave it marginalized in Northeast Asia.
Often since the collapse of the Soviet Union this outlook has resur-
faced; when Russia’s impact on the Six-Party Talks seemed marginal it
was again widespread. Others may incorporate it into their strategic
calculus for very limited concerns, such as to reassure Pyongyang to
engage with Seoul or as an energy provider, giving it a definite, if not
large, status in any regionalism. In contrast, advocates of a radically
different regional order are tempted to overestimate Russia’s potential
in order to bolster their arguments. Their romanticism cannot be sepa-
rated from a desperate search for a major power that will give the South
leverage it does not now have. The reality is that this imposing state
occupying the entire northern part of Asia is a distant fourth among the
powers that Seoul incorporates into analyses of regional forces, but that
does not mean it has not been a factor in the minds of those searching
for strategic reasoning to achieve national interests and priorities.
Leaders in Seoul may only pay intermittent attention to Russia’s strate-
gic role, but when they do, they are finding it increasingly difficult to
find the right balance toward it.
Strategizing toward Russia under

Gorbachev and Yeltsin
Beginning in 1986 in Vladivostok, close to the border with North
Korea, Mikhail Gorbachev declared his intent to reorient Russia’s stra-
tegic position in the Asia-Pacific region. His “new thinking” soon
expanded, opening a place for improved ties not only with China and
Japan but also with South Korea. Preparing for the 1988 Olympics,
which would be attended by the Soviet Union to the chagrin of the
North, some in Seoul grasped the opportunity of achieving a rapid
transformation in Moscow’s relations with both sides of the peninsula.
Their goals included reshaping North Korean behavior and gaining
long-sought leverage in relations with China, the United States, and
Japan. Under the slogan nordpolitik, Roh made Moscow his immediate
target. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that for most of
his presidency Moscow offered the most scope for strategic thinking.
He responded well with emissaries, promises of generous assistance, and
dogged pursuit of his target. The result was a strategic breakthrough.
Beijing and Tokyo placed territorial demands on Moscow, and espe-
cially the former insisted on withdrawal of its support for occupations
in Afghanistan and Cambodia as well as a reversal of its militarization

of areas just north of China’s border. Negotiations aimed at normaliza-
tion were approved with Beijing in the fall of 1982 and with Tokyo at
the beginning of 1986, but they long faced difficult hurdles. In con-
trast, Roh was intent on asking for little, knowing that the mere fact of
recognition would deal a powerful blow to Kim Il-sung’s reliance on a
sharply divided region prepared for conf lict. By 1989 Moscow’s nor-
malization with Beijing was realized, but within weeks the international
community had reacted with horror to the massacre of students on
Tiananmen Square and Moscow decided to be careful about consum-
mating the new relationship for fear of alienating its Western partners.
Meanwhile, talks with Tokyo were not proceeding smoothly. In addi-
tion, the Soviet economy had come unglued in the course of perestroika,
raising the lure of a large infusion of money.3 Offering a mix of grants
and loans, Roh succeeded in getting Gorbachev to normalize ties in
1990 without any agreement with Kim Il-sung on how to control the
negative backlash, economically and strategically. As Pyongyang stewed
in its anger and then turned to nuclear weapons development, Seoul
bathed in the satisfaction of achieving a diplomatic coup that was then
repeated with Beijing. It had rightly calculated that the road to China
went through Russia, and it was amazed that Russia had gone so far as
to desert the North.
The immediate goal in approaching Moscow at the end of the 1980s
was Koreanization of North-South relations. Pyongyang would lose its
ability to play off the Soviet Union against China, while the Russian
economy would be integrated into the regional economy and become a
factor in favor of a new political orientation. In 1989 glasnost at last
yielded articles in Moscow in support of cross-recognition of the two
Koreas, South Korea’s entry into the United Nations, and a new
approach to bilateral ties, following similar moves toward openness on
Japan.4 Economic missions to Moscow helped to sway Soviet leaders.
Optimists saw a bright future because the Soviets needed the Korean
economy more than the other way around,5 and a strategic advantage
from the fact that Seoul rather than Tokyo was quick to respond to the
changes in Moscow.
Nordpolitik was a dramatic case of strategic thinking in which Russia
was the first target. Similar to the Sunshine Policy a decade later, its
salience extended to the central themes of South Korean foreign policy:
reunification, the alliance with the United States, and multilateralism.
The sequence was first to end the cold war in Northeast Asia, then to
forge a great power framework that would diminish exclusive dependency
on the United States and encourage the North to come to the negotiat-
ing table as well as to end its siege mentality, and finally to explore the
path to reunification through Koreanization and a supportive great
power environment. Success with Moscow was vital for ending the cold
war and forging a favorable great power atmosphere.
With excessive expectations on each side, diplomatic relations were
established in 1991. While Russians anticipated large-scale South
Korean economic support without recognizing how dysfunctional their
system was for utilizing it and reassuring donors as well as investors,
Koreans did not realize how rapidly Moscow’s strategic clout would
diminish, notably in North Korea. What had promised to be an ascen-
dant relationship was floundering as early as 1993 with neither side
seeing much further value in the other. Although Yeltsin’s fall 1992 visit
countered these dead-end concerns with uplifting rhetoric about a
special relationship rooted in shared values and interests, there was little
more to discuss. The promised $3 billion in grants and loans that had
launched the new relationship stopped flowing by 1993 after about half
the sum had been delivered, leading to recriminations that Seoul
reneged on its commitment and fretting that Moscow was not paying
interest on loans, whose money had been lost. 6
In the second stage after the Soviet collapse, a weakened Russian
state gave lower priority to Asia, and Seoul reduced its interest too.
Challenges related to Moscow’s weakness replaced those of the military
juggernaut or the fading superpower’s waning efforts to forge a regional
security framework. Yeltsin’s visit desperately sought to prevent this
transition, but instead it ushered in an era through the rest of the decade
when Moscow had little leverage and Seoul along with others did not
give it the status it desired. Why do so when Russia’s criminalized econ-
omy swallowed investments and its political leverage was inconsequen-
tial? Over this period there was at least satisfaction in outmaneuvering
Japan. In the fall of 1992 Yeltsin cancelled his planned visit to Japan on
short notice and then went to South Korea in part to demonstrate that
Russia had other options. While Japanese exports to Russia had been
ten times those of the South in 1988–92, by 1995 the South was ahead
even if its imports trailed far behind and its own trade would slump
after a peak in 1996.7 Yet, with South Korean investment partial to the
Russian Far East, unlike other foreign investors who focused on Moscow,
the South was particularly vulnerable to the widespread chicanery there
and had no reason to be satisfied with the troubled state of economic
relations after both it and Russia suffered financial crises in 1997–98. 8
Later in the decade, Moscow’s eyes were on Tokyo much more than
Seoul even if normalization was not achieved, and its strategic partner-
ship with Beijing reinforced the image of great powers maneuvering
with Koreans sidelined.9
When Kim Young-sam went to Moscow in 1994, Koreans were still
concentrating on solidifying the shift of Moscow away from Pyongyang,
succeeding at that time in obtaining documents that revealed how Josef
Stalin and Kim Il-sung had planned the war and also in getting reassur-
ance that old treaty obligations would not lead Russia to assist the
North if war should occur in the midst of the first nuclear crisis. Yet, it
was largely taken for granted that Moscow had made its choice and that
it had little more to offer as it focused whatever remaining diplomatic
leverage it had on Europe. Russian ties slipped into obscurity. It seemed
that Seoul was content with what had been gained by 1992 and would
allow ties to drift. Given Yeltsin’s lack of a regional strategy and the
dismal state of the Russian economy, this may not be surprising; how-
ever, resentment in Russia was growing, and widening divisions in the
region would oblige South Koreans to look anew.
Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung with new intensity at the outset
of his term as president paid attention to broadening South Korean
options in dealing with the other three powers, and Russia only
f leetingly entered the picture as the fourth target. Multilateralism’s eco-
nomic emphasis marginalized Russia with its depressed economy. With
the dual economic shocks of 1997–98, risky investments became less
imaginable. Political ties also did not draw much interest. In the first
nuclear crisis and its aftermath Russia appeared irrelevant. Even as
Yeltsin and his foreign minister and then prime minister, Evgeny
Primakov, showed new interest in Pyongyang, few foresaw serious stra-
tegic consequences. Only in 1999 did Kim Dae-jung make an effort to
repair relations and seek Moscow’s support for his Sunshine Policy as he
prepared the groundwork to engage Kim Jong-il. Because Yeltsin gave
Korean leaders little reason to improve ties with Russia, we cannot fault
strategic thought that bypassed it besides noting slow anticipation of
the need for any change.
The Russian Far East played a role in strategic thinking in the
mid-1990s more than afterwards. For a few years South Korea seemed
to be extending its nordpolitik of encircling the North with political and
economic initiatives there. Only when a South Korean official was
murdered was there a realization that this dangerous struggle served
little purpose. After all, there were few ties between North Korea and
this part of Russia, and they had no significance for the survival of the
regime in Pyongyang. Moreover, the attempt to fill the vacuum in this
area backfired when corruption and local troubles led to a loss of invest-
ments and little increase in trust. The much-heralded South Korean
industrial park in Nakhodka was never built because of Russian failure
to provide the legal framework or infrastructure. As late as 2003 textile
firms from the South were employing as many as 10,000 workers in the
town of Artem, near Vladivostok, in an effort to bypass quotas on
exports to the United States in other markets, but labor productivity
was low (leading the firms to replace Russian women with Chinese
migrant labor), government harassment was frequent (sanitary inspec-
tions and methods to extort funds), and the advent of WTO regulations
that eliminated quotas all led to a hasty retreat. The Russian authorities
had not valued these jobs or the taxes that they could bring enough to
try to overcome such problems. In contrast, some were eager to increase
the quota for North Korean laborers to many times the figure of 3,000
(mostly for construction apart from a separate program for lumberjacks
confined to North Korean run camps), but they were thwarted by
Moscow. Rather than create attractive conditions for investment from
South Korea where enthusiasm was highest, local interests were attracted
to cheap labor from the North without any rights, while resisting North
Koreans who might become refugees and cause disorder or human
rights appeals.
Seoul-Moscow ties emerged from a low point in 1998 to focus more
on strategic understanding. If the first upsurge in 1988–92 centered on
economic benefits from Seoul and even raised hopes in Korea that large
amounts of raw materials and energy would f low its way, the second
upsurge a decade later began with sobering economic news lowering
trade levels. Likewise, the arrest of a Russian scholar for spying for
South Korea amid charges of brazen acts by the Korean Intelligence
Agency was a wake-up call about the South’s repeated interest in using
Russia to outf lank North Korea. Fallout from this scandal after repeated
warnings by Russian authorities brought the expulsion of diplomats and
a nadir in relations.10 In contrast, the new, more modest upsurge arose
from Kim Dae-jung’s desire for North Korea not to collapse and sup-
port for Russian ties to the North. Kim’s visit to Moscow in May 1999
brought mutual understanding, not in professed shared ideals such as
democracy and a market economy later seen to be hollow in the light of
Russian actions, but in signs of common strategic resolve not excluding
the goal of a multipolar world. The notion of a six-country framework
involving the countries to become part of the Six-Party Talks was
already drawing interest. Before long, progress was achieved in arrang-
ing payment of the Russian debt through barter, including arms sales as
part of new military cooperation. With Putin’s rise to power, South

Korean strategic planners started with this improved foundation.
Strategizing toward Russia under Putin

The third stage began when Putin made the Korean peninsula a priority
in his more energetic security-oriented and energy-based diplomacy just
as Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy was bearing fruit. Understandably,
more attention to Russia followed. It started with elements of overopti-
mism about Putin’s positive influence with Kim Jong-il, his similar
view of the value of multilateralism in Northeast Asia, and his enthusi-
asm for foreign investments and economic openness on internationally
acceptable terms. Some Korean analysts noted with approval that Putin
had turned away from Russia’s pro-West orientation of the 1990s and
was challenging U.S. unilateralism in support of multilateralism in a
region where it could restore Russian inf luence. By resuming balance of
power policies that Yeltsin had foresworn and finding room for maneu-
ver where conf licts arose, he had made Northeast Asia as well as Europe
the two wings that would determine Russia’s foreign clout. Asserting
that Putin was ready to use Asia to overcome Europe, one book equated
his diplomacy to Gorbachev’s shift in 1986 as a kind of new Asian
doctrine. While China received priority in what was termed the golden
age for Sino-Russian relations, the Korean peninsula became the arena
for Putin’s prominent early diplomat success at the Okinawa G-8 sum-
mit relaying a reassuring message on missile tests from Kim Jong-il.
Rather than criticizing this intense pursuit of North Korea, the book
found his objectives in line with those of the South: preventing a
monopoly on power by the United States or China, working to shape
reunification so that it would not lead to anti-Russian policies, striving
for a cooperative regional economic system through which Russia would
export more, and, it followed, realizing a nonnuclear peninsula that
could avoid military conf lict.11 If this optimistic response to Putin’s
personalized ties with Kim Jong-il and turn to China was not shared by
conservative analysts, it also was little criticized. Russia appeared to be
marginal.
In 2000–02 it was easy to give Putin the benefit of the doubt as a
partner of South Korea. He was seen as seeking a balanced region, with
the result that Russia was more supportive of reunification than China,
which in turn was more supportive than Japan. To sustain the Sunshine
Policy, China took priority, but if it bore fruit with the North, Russia’s
weight might grow. Little concern was shown that Putin’s pursuit of
Pyongyang might complicate direct ties across the peninsula or lead to

a revival of Soviet-era logic.
Russian arms had exerted a powerful inf luence on the Korean penin-
sula from 1945 to 1990 and again became a subject of attention from
the late 1990s. Seoul dangled hope that Russia could repay much of its
debt of the early 1990s through arms sales, even opening the bids for
some large weapons procurement to Russian suppliers despite questions
about how the United States would respond should the Russians actu-
ally be awarded a contract. Negotiations exposed a cultural gap, failing
to proceed smoothly. Russia was faulted for not supplying information
needed to assess the weapons to be sold, presumably distrusting the
South, and Russians charged that the South was not serious and unwill-
ing to use objective criteria because of its strong ties to the United
States, as in the decision not to purchase SA-300 missiles. Even so, for
a time military cooperation seemed to be a bright spot in improving
relations. Yet, by 2001 attention was shifting to what arms Russia would
provide North Korea. Rumors that it had in the mid-1990s sent vitally
needed spare parts to the North in order to pave the way to this revival
arose as more military missions were sent. Even if amounts were limited
by the North’s lack of cash and disagreement over how to handle its
huge debt as well as by Russia’s assurance that it was not providing
offensive weapons, some in Seoul sought to convince it to place tighter
limits on the arms trade. Yet, not seeing a security threat after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and regarding Russia as seeking a role in a
balance of power rather than aiming for domination, South Koreans
responded to Putin’s intensified interest in North Korea without
concern.
Along with the security dimension in which Seoul accepted Moscow’s
desire for equal relations to the North and South and an active role in
shaping the North’s reintegration into the world community, there was
an economic dimension tied to Russia’s expanded exports of natural
resources including energy, as global prices soared, and its reemerging
market, as its economy started to boom. For the former the focus was
on the Russian Far East and Siberia, where marine resources, lumber,
minerals, and especially oil and gas might be obtained. A friendship
train with as many as 250 South Koreans, most from the business com-
munity, traversed the Trans-Siberian railroad in July 2002—a year after
Kim Jong-il’s similar trip—to demonstrate the South’s interest. With
Putin eager to diversify beyond China and North Korea in establishing
a regional strategy, South Korea showed interest. Yet, Putin’s hasty visit
to Seoul in early 2001 seemed more to prove that he wanted balanced
relations with the two Koreas as he wooed Kim Jong-il than to suggest
serious interest of his own. In return, Kim Dae-jung’s intermittent pur-
suit of Putin appeared mostly to be a way of demonstrating support for
the Sunshine Policy and secondarily to keep South Korea’s foot in the
door should Russia improve its investment climate to pursue grandiose
plans heralded at summit meetings.
By 2005 Russia was considered along with China, India, and Brazil
to be one of the BRIC countries, newly grouped together as having
promising prospects to move from 43 percent of the world’s population
supported by only 8 percent of its GDP to become rising economic
powers. In 2004 South Korean exports to this foursome had risen by
40 percent and the pace did not slow in 2005.12 Putin’s success in reviv-
ing the Russian economy as well as the global increase in commodities’
prices boosted economic ties and reasons for thinking strategically
about what Seoul might gain from making them closer. Yet, the focus
rarely veered from energy, where prospects were considerable but
remained uncertain after many years of apparent agreement and few
tangible results. The tone is positive about taking Russia seriously and
exploring options, but there often is doubt about how much Russia is
prepared to do in order to attract the foreign capital and international
cooperation vital to its various proposals. One basic question is the geo-
political purpose of these energy proposals. Is Moscow really keen on
developing its Far East and Siberia as part of regional integration or is it
focused on producing more revenue for overall geopolitical ambitions
with little likely to be ploughed back into the area and further wariness
about letting the Far East draw close to the outside world.13
Koreans show understanding for Moscow’s shift from “excessive
hopes in South Korea” in line with Yeltsin’s early foreign policy roman-
ticism to a prolonged search for equidistance on the peninsula, and
finally to strategic ties with Pyongyang that raised Russia’s national
influence by renewing a traditional sphere of influence. That Putin
accomplished this last step taking advantage of Kim Jong-il’s “nuclear
card” and making it clear that Russia was amenable to preserving the
North Korean system and Kim’s power did not hurt relations with Roh.
Respected as realism, treated sympathetically as using both Koreas to
check the United States and forging a new regional security system,
Russian policy is credited with expanding its inf luence in ways helpful
to South Korea.14
The nuclear crisis from the fall of 2002 changed the strategic envi-
ronment. The primary foreign policy issue for Kim Dae-jung in his
final months and for Roh Moo-hyun after he was elected was how to
convince the United States to negotiate seriously with North Korea

while engaging the North to urge it to become more accommodating.
Among the other powers, China’s importance rose as a reliable support
of a similar strategy and Japan’s declined as increasingly a stumbling
block refusing to join in this effort. An early mission by Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Han-kyung to Moscow began the process of consulta-
tions with the other relevant actor. Seoul encouraged Moscow to play
an active role, hoping not only that the recent meetings between Putin
and Kim Jong-il would give it leverage but also welcoming efforts that
could attenuate U.S. stubbornness. If when the nuclear crisis erupted
some in South Korea thought that Putin would seek coordination and
were disappointed by his exploration of a shortcut to Pyongyang in
January 2003,15 this did not prevent new versions of the romantic part-
nership on the part of leftist strategists toward a country that appears to
share long-term objectives. After Alexander Losyukov’s mission to
Pyongyang failed, it became clear that Russia would not play a major
role; yet with Moscow soon accepted into Six-Party Talks and Seoul
struggling to inf luence two recalcitrant adversaries, there was still rea-
son to urge Moscow to voice reassurance to the North and resistance to
U.S. hard-line thinking.
In his first year as president, Roh focused on reassuring the United
States as well as establishing good relations with Japan. In July 2003 he
was scheduled to visit Russia, but the trip was cancelled to Russia’s
annoyance. Having cultivated ties with Kim Jong-il and viewed his own
2001 visit with Kim Dae-jung as a milestone in Moscow’s growing role
as a force on the peninsula, Putin was not pleased to be marginalized by
a new leader making the rounds to prove the South’s centrality in
regional diplomacy, as if Russia was an outlier, a state that does not
warrant the kind of major voice that the United States, China, and even
Japan expect. When in the summer of 2003 North Korea asked that
Russia be included in the Six-Party Talks and China gave its assent,
South Korea may not have seen benefit in this but calculated that any
opposition would dampen North Korea’s interest and possibility alien-
ate China. Yet, some saw Russia as the second positive influence after
China in reassuring the North that it could get a fair hearing, and at
times sought its help in bringing the North back to the talks. Given the
assumption that Putin is serious about wanting the North to denuclear-
ize, to abandon its missile development, and also to refocus on the
South after it declined to participate in U.S. missile defense plans, many
saw a realistic basis for cooperation even if some on the right appeared
apathetic and others on the right romanticized Russia’s role.
As Roh’s relationship with Bush became increasingly strained, the

value of ties with Putin rose for some officials. Roh’s visit to Moscow in
the fall of 2004 came amidst growing doubts that if Bush was reelected,
the Six-Party Talks would make headway. This warm meeting in Putin’s
dacha that highlighted shared thinking as U.S.-North Korean relations
were at an impasse suggested that Russia’s place was rising in the South
Korean strategic calculus. Yet, Putin no longer was seen as close to Kim
Jong-il or as having strong interest in the Six-Party Talks, and there was
little to gain from broadcasting a special Russian connection.16 Three
triangles loomed in the background. For the inter-Korean and Russian
triangle there was optimistic talk of five Eurasian corridors: an oil
pipeline, a gas pipeline, the Trans-Siberian-Korean (TSK) railroad, an
electricity grid, and an optic fiber line. This triangle depended on the
Six-Party Talks and on subsequent plans for economic development
linked to reunification, but basic agreement on how to handle the North
made it easier to stress shared goals. In dealing with the nuclear crisis
and security, Roh and Putin had the triangle with China in mind. Putin
was largely going through China in the Six-Party Talks, and Roh’s posi-
tion was close to Beijing’s too. In Roh’s increasing emphasis on moving
toward a multilateral regional security structure, he finds that both
Russia and China are supportive; yet, many recognize that it is concern
over China’s rapid rise that may bring South Korea and Russia closer
together some day. In the background is awareness of the U.S.-South
Korean-Russian triangle. Even as Roh’s fear was mounting that Bush
was pushing Japan toward a divisive approach to the region with long-
term consequences, he understood the advisability of not appearing too
close to Putin at a time of increasingly strained U.S.-Russian ties and
warnings that Putin might again, as he had in 2001 with Kim Dae-jung
on the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, be trying to lure the South
into a statement alienating it from its ally.
The brief meeting between Roh and Putin on May 9, 2005, at the
sixtieth anniversary of the victory in World War II may have had some
significance in shoring up the three-way coalition to soften the U.S.
position in the Six-Party Talks. Hu Jintao and Putin had met a day
earlier, and despite the great many foreign leaders who were not awarded
an audience with the host at this busy time, Roh was so honored in light
of the significance of the North Korean nuclear issue. They agreed that
the negotiations must revive, and the burden was on the United States
to not drive the North into a stalemate. With the shared goal of a peace-
ful resolution, the two had no need to discuss different notions about
what might follow.17 An image of strategic consensus obscures what
should be doubts about Russian policy toward the region as that country
grows more assertive.
Russian officials made the case that the two states have very
similar approaches to critical international issues. In September 2005
Ambassador Gleb A. Ivashentsov on the occasion of the fifteenth
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations listed support
for creation of a multipolar world based on equality among all states,
support for the key role of the United Nations, and rejection of dictat-
ing to others in interstate relations, before adding combating interna-
tional terrorism and securing WMD from proliferation. He added that
Moscow plays a constructive role in the Six-Party Talks, supporting
steps taken by both North and South Korea and building on the success
of the September 19 agreement. Beyond this, he saw this achievement as
laying the groundwork for the future structure of peace, security, and
cooperation in Northeast Asia and called for creation of a special eco-
nomic bond through joint investment projects in energy, petrochemi-
cals, the automobile industry, and “Europe-Korea” through a Russian
railroad corridor and an electrical energy supply system reaching North
Korea from two sides. As Putin was preparing to visit South Korea in
November, this was an appeal for reorienting the state from its mari-
time and U.S.-Japan orientation to a continental one, including greatly
boosting the 2005 level of $8 billion in trade.18
When Roh and Putin met in the shadow of the Busan APEC sum-
mit, Putin was again trying to find financing for the oil pipeline planned
from West Siberia to the Pacific and estimated by one Korean newspa-
per to cost $11.5 billion. With the argument that the first stage to
Skovorodino on the Chinese border to be completed in 2008 will not
mean that the bulk of the oil will go to Daqing leaving little for others
and that Japan remains keenly interested in construction of the second
stage, Russians appealed for Seoul to help with finances, perhaps also
hooking up to the line, presumably through a North Korean spur.19
South Korean leaders showed interest, but there was no reason to make
a commitment until the Sino-Japanese competition for the pipeline
and Moscow’s own strategic thinking as well as feasibility studies were
clear. 20
One interpretation of South Korean-Russian joint planning on
pipelines and their high-sounding summit rhetoric is that they have
been part of a persistent charade. For Russia the absence of agreement
on how to incorporate foreign capital into big energy projects and
industrial parks and the tolerance for lawless ways in the Russian Far
East as elsewhere demonstrates a lack of seriousness about repeated
agreements to welcome South Korean investment. The Kovytka gas

fields, a gas pipeline from Sakhalin to the Korean peninsula, an Iron
Silk Road through the TSK railroad, and the Nakhodka industrial park
are showcase projects that cater to Russian vanity but have little pros-
pect without fundamental rethinking in Moscow. Even after they have
failed, summit talk attempts to resuscitate them, as in discussion of
Nakhodka during Kim Dae-jung’s 1999 visit. 21 They give the impres-
sion that Russia has a regional strategy, when in fact its default position
of reliance on China prevails. In turn, South Korea continues to find
Russia useful in dealing with North Korea and looks for ways to keep
its attention. Thus, at each summit big projects are revealed or revived,
even if there is some awareness of the need to first resolve the nuclear
issue. If there should be a deal leading to a multilateral economic pro-
gram for the North, it may be that Russia’s proximity to the remote
northeast of North Korea will give it low priority in comparison to
cross-DMZ projects and Chinese interest in linking its Northeast prov-
inces to North Korea and the sea as well as to the critical Shinuiju—
Pyongyang—Seoul corridor.
The latest false step in the effort to secure a beachhead in the Russian
Far East was the oilgate scandal of 2005 under investigation by an
independent counsel after it was revealed that a 2004 contract for oil
exploration involving the Korean state railroad and influenced by polit-
ical connections had been a fraudulent scheme that cost at least $3 mil-
lion. 22 It was but one more in the long list of misguided efforts to invest
across the Russian border with strategic overtones as well as economic
objectives. Whether aimed at outflanking North Korea, building a
closer relationship with Russia, facilitating the return of persons of
Korean descent to areas from which they were deported, or just gaining
access to energy resources, such projects invariably f loundered in the
face of Russian duplicity or criminal conduct. If business skepticism
abounds in Seoul, this often is not echoed in government dealings or
comprehensive analysis of Russia’s role.
An impression spread that in an effort to engage Moscow, some
South Korean government figures exaggerated its positive contributions
while overlooking its negative ones. In one speech on January 21, 2003,
which was translated into Russian, So Chong-hwa, chairman of the
Committee on Reunification, International Affairs, and Foreign Trade
of the National Assembly, made a number of one-sided remarks. He
stated that in 1884 when international relations between Russia and
Korea were established, the two cooperated closely in order to restrain
the pretensions of Japan to the peninsula, as if Russia did not display
pretensions of its own that led Korean leaders to turn to Japan too. The
division of the Korean peninsula is explained passively as a factor that
forced an interruption in ties with the Republic of Korea rather than
blamed on the Soviet leaders along with Stalin’s approval of the North
Korean attack in 1950. Overoptimism is expressed toward the TSK
project as having global historical significance without noting what
Russia must do to make this remote possibility happen. Finally, we read
of Seoul’s hope for a continued constructive role by Moscow in resolv-
ing the nuclear crisis without any sign of concern that its role in drawing
closer to the North may not prove to be so constructive. 23 Although
these were remarks in only one speech, they suggest the dilemma of a
country that is anxious to stress the positive in relations with its neigh-
bors while facing difficult challenges of convincing them on ways to
cooperate.
Without taking notice of the more negative Russian ties with the
United States and signs that after the Joint Statement Russia was lean-
ing closer to the North’s position, some in Seoul excused Russia as using
the Six-Party Talks to try to position itself for reunification on the pen-
insula without thinking seriously about what kind of reunification it
may prefer and how its backing might be utilized by the North. It does
not seem to have registered that Russia is using the North’s belligerence
as a mechanism for shaping the balance of power, especially seeking to
gain a foothold versus the United States, China, and even Japan. During
the nuclear crisis Russia’s role has, from the U.S. point of view, shifted
from independent voice seeking its own solution, to constructive force
serving a joint effort to convince the North, to a nonentity with few
expectations, to signs of becoming a spoiler contributing to the North’s
resistance. Seoul showed signs of seeking Moscow’s initiative in the few
months prior to the failure of this effort in late January 2003. Then it
showed little interest as Moscow coordinated with Washington and
Beijing through much of that year and even less so as it kept a low pro-
file for more than a year. Roh’s own discontent with the Bush policy
deepened in late 2004 and 2005 just as Moscow’s role was starting to
show signs of becoming more supportive of the North and even a spoiler
in its resistance to U.S. efforts to rally the Other Four. While there was
no sign of coordination and even some efforts to avoid the appearance
of it, failure to look critically at what Moscow was doing came amidst
some romanticism about an overlap of interests in dealing with the
North and the region.
As opposed to many South Koreans who see Russia as quite irrele-
vant, others attach some long-term importance to it as a country inclined
to multilateralism in security and eager for partners for a regional bal-

ance of powers. The growing appeal of multilateral security cooperation
in Northeast Asia drew analysts to Russia’s longstanding advocacy of
this. Unlike China and Japan, which are often suspected in South Korea
of having hegemonic designs and have been hesitant about multilateral-
ism, Russia is seen as wary of any country gaining dominance. In the
1990s it experienced a time of weakness with little inf luence, sentiments
sometimes shared by South Korea, and under Putin it is grasping for a
way to gain a larger role. Rather than behaving as in the time of the
Soviet Union as a superpower bent on dominating or even as the three
other powers active in the region inclined to putting South Korea in a
subordinate role, Russia shares the South’s priority of seeking partners
for multilateral ties that can limit assertive powers. It follows that
Russian interest in having a say on the North Korean nuclear question
poses no problem, while Roh’s priority on “a policy of peace and
prosperity” with good ties to all meshes well with Russian thinking;
however there are limits to the relationship. Seoul has no reason to fol-
low Beijing’s path in forging close strategic ties to Russia, in part because
it lacks great inf luence in dealing with the North and the peninsula in
general. This is a sympathetic view of Russia as pragmatic and worthy
of a “comprehensive, friendly, partnership” without urgency to reach for
more. 24 Yet, there are also warnings that it is still early to say how Russia
will play its role, 25 and in 2007 Putin’s high-profile diplomacy of pro-
test drew some attention. This dearth of strategic foresight is a sign that
some still cling to the goal of weaving a regional web around the North,
including Russia. Not only does Russia border on the North and have
historic ties to it with bold ideas for projects to integrate the region and
use its energy card, but is also a middle power in this region with many
overlapping interests with the South. This implies that together they
can become region builders, straddling Japan’s alienation, U.S. distrust,
and China’s potential for dominance. Romanticism toward Russia
draws on Roh’s desperation for engaging the North and balancing the
various powers.
During 2005–06 the Roh and Putin administrations both resented
the U.S. approach to North Korea that restricted their countries’ grow-
ing ties with the North and hopes to influence it. Both downplayed any
threat. Each had its eyes on reunification as a process that would be
welcome, offering economic opportunities and political clout. 26 Thus,
Korean writings on Russia and the peninsula generally took a positive
view of its objectives, despite its lack of influence. 27 Yet, this impression
should be put in the context of widespread doubt that Russia’s role
matters much, leading to relatively little attention to it. Given the dearth
of criticism of Putin’s retreat to authoritarianism and state-centered
economic control, South Korea may not be preparing itself for the next
stage of Russian involvement in Northeast Asian affairs.
Opinions differ on South Korea’s rank for Russia in Northeast Asia.
Usually, it is assumed that it is a distant third after China and Japan.
This led to not thinking seriously about strategy toward Russia. Yet, as
Japan’s relations with Russia are mired in a territorial dispute accompa-
nied by mutual distrust, and as Russia takes a fresh look at how the
Korean peninsula may emerge from the nuclear crisis, some analysts see
Russia raising its priority for the peninsula. After all, unlike China it
has been dissatisfied with its weak role in the region and a major trans-
formation on the Korean peninsula focused on the outsider North
Korea could be just what is needed to change its fortunes. On one level,
the deal necessary to rid the North of nuclear weapons can expose the
weakness of the United States and Japan and shift the psychology
toward them, especially in South Korea. On another level, a slow, dif-
ficult process of reunification could serve to boost Russia’s role as the
country most trusted by the North. Finally, the Six-Party Talks show
promise of becoming the very multilateral security framework for the
region that Moscow has long espoused. South Koreans outlining this
Russian strategy generally show sympathy for it, finding it similar to
the outlook of the Roh administration without probing further into the
likely differences, such as how close contacts with Pyongyang may
harden its resolve and subvert the expected reunification process,
according to current assumptions. 28
Roh’s popularity had fallen sharply already in 2006–07 as Putin’s
image in the West was deteriorating. With the GNP skeptical of unilat-
eral concessions and assistance to the North and disinclined to view
Russia with a tinge of romanticism about overlapping objectives in the
future, a more sober look at how Russia was seeking advantage from the
crisis was likely. After all, it was relying mostly on the North to make
its voice heard and could be expected to do so even after the crisis passed
in ways that tilted the balance, if possible, toward the North and chal-
lenged the stabilizing role in the region of the United States and Japan.
A conservative leader in Seoul would be prone to put relations on hold,
while raising the strategic priority of sound U.S. relations as well as
efforts to resolve the split with Japan. After all, some analysts are aware
that Russian ambitions are far from realized. Through the outcome of
the talks, it seeks many more concessions from South Korea, leading to
energy and railway networks, a role in the industrial rebuilding of the
North, an inf lux of South Korean capital into Russia, and an enduring
voice in a reorganized great power balance. In short, it has a lot at stake
in the Six-Party Talks, especially as a kind of sponsor of the North.29
In 2007 Russia flexed its military muscle by testing new strategic
missiles and Putin openly challenged U.S. policies on many fronts.
After the fall 2006 North Korean nuclear test, Russia showed less
concern despite agreeing to some Security Council sanctions.30 Later
the Russian media broke from the consensus over the Joint Agreement
by stressing U.S. unwillingness to meet its commitments. The South
Korean press, conservative and progressive, began looking anew at
Russia’s rising clout. Earlier rosy assumptions could not be sustained, and
awareness that Russia mattered was overtaking the prevailing apathy.
Yet, with critical decisions ahead in a presidential election year and in
Phase 2 of the February 13 agreement, it was easy again to overlook
Russia’s involvement amidst its continued claims to be an “honest bro-
ker” and in accord with the thinking in Seoul, seeking to demonstrate
independence from Washington.31
As Roh prepared for the inter-Korean summit with Kim Jong-il to
create a “unified economic zone,” including many large-scale projects,
talk revived of trilateral cooperation with Russia, an ardent supporter of
the summit. Putin was also intensifying ties to the North, not waiting
for denuclearization let alone progress in Phase 2 before increasing its
economic benefits. Warding off warnings from the GNP that defending
national security takes priority, Roh pressed for more economic interde-
pendence as critical for guaranteeing peace on the peninsula, but his
term ended before Russia’s role could be clarified.
Conclusion
Russia figures into the overall South Korean strategic calculus as a force
for multilateralism and balance, but its presence is not necessarily
reassuring. In the period 1988 to 1992 Moscow stood as a prize catch
for a country intent on persuading Pyongyang to shift away from con-
frontation toward dialogue and mutual recognition. By withdrawing its
support from the North and drastically lowering its own strategic profile
in Northeast Asia, the collapsing Soviet Union and then the f ledgling
Russian Federation exceeded South Korea’s expectations. In the period
1993–1999 Russia fell in importance, and its rising interest in rebuild-
ing ties with the North and exerting some influence on regional change
did not cause any anxiety. In fact, Kim Dae-jung included Moscow in
his tour of foreign capitals as he built support for the Sunshine Policy.
He welcomed it as a potentially reassuring voice for Pyongyang and as a

weak regional force that could become useful for eventual balancing in
the midst of a United States hesitant about acknowledging the rise of
regionalism, China growing assertive about its central role in the region,
and Japan still groping for its place in a rapidly changing context.
After Putin made North Korea the launching pad for reasserting
Russia’s place in Northeast Asia, Kim and his successor Roh continued
with the course already set. Yet, assumptions on which Russia had been
welcomed increasingly were cast in doubt. Russia’s ties with China
improved, while those with the United States and Japan deteriorated.
Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear crisis raised the stakes of deal-
ings with Pyongyang, and Moscow’s role became more ambiguous.
With more immediate challenges in dealing with the other states, Roh
was not inclined to make any visible shift in Russia policy, leaving in
place the assumption that Russia’s role would be supportive of reunifi-
cation and positive for great power dynamics.
South Korea has at times raised Russian expectations, offering vast
sums to sway Gorbachev to switch Moscow’s allegiance in 1990–91,
encouraging Yeltsin in 1999 to play a more active role with Pyongyang
in order to reassure it about the new Sunshine Policy, and praising
Putin’s personal diplomacy with Kim Jong-il in 2000–02 as sustaining
vital great power engagement, notably when Bush’s intentions were
suspect. At other times, while Russian leaders complained about broken
promises and marginalization, South Korean leaders were prone to
accentuate the rosiest prospects for relations, including large-scale eco-
nomic projects with questionable futures due to the uncertainty of the
North’s economic reforms. Without attention to values, the illusion has
surfaced from time to time that Seoul and Moscow have a special affin-
ity and by working together can, to some degree, reshape an environ-
ment dominated by the United States, China, or even Japan. It is still
unclear how far the Moscow-Pyongyang rapprochement will proceed
and to what degree the Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership challenges
cautious cooperation; however, by 2007 Russia’s role had become more
problematic, and the need was growing to dispel overoptimism about it
in order for South Koreans to achieve an overall understanding of the
great power framework in Northeast Asia.
Prevailing apathy and an excessive dose of romanticism have compli-
cated the challenge of adjusting to the rapidly changing strategic role of
Russia in the region. The success of strategic thinking in the Roh
Moo-hyun era and the lack of serious problems from neglect under Kim
Young-sam may have lulled observers. Kim Dae-jung had some success
in involving Russia in his Sunshine Policy, but as Putin drew closer to

Kim Jong-il and shifted policies to the region toward more assertiveness,
the response has fallen short. Under Kim Dae-jung the impact was
growing, and under Roh the presence of romanticism has become a
more serious concern as even widespread apathy leaves strategists unpre-
pared to interpret how Russia’s role is evolving. There has been insuf-
ficient triangular analysis of great power relations or analysis of how the
North Korean nuclear crisis is contributing to shifting Russian ambi-
tions. South Korea is at the center of tectonic movements within the
global balance of power, and it cannot afford the luxury of fixing its
gaze almost exclusively on Washington on the one hand, and Pyongyang
on the other, without comprehending the regional great power frame-
work as a whole. Accurate incorporation of Moscow into the analysis
adds an essential element.
Notes
1. Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” in Samuel S.
Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 201–24.
2. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Russian Shadow,” in Lam
Peng Er, ed., Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power (London:
Routledge, 2006), pp. 213–33.
3. Gilbert Rozman, “Ajia taiheiyo chiiki e mukete takamaru Soren no kitai,”
Soren no kiki to Niso kankei (Tokyo, 1991), pp. 86–96 and 243–69.
4. Gilbert Rozman, “Moscow’s Japan-Watchers in the First Years of the
Gorbachev Era: The Struggle for Realism and Respect in Foreign Affairs,”
Pacific Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1988), pp. 257–75.
5. Byung-joon Ahn, “The Soviet Union, China, and the Korean Peninsula,” in
Dalcheong Kim, ed., Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Seoul:
Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1990), pp. 83–94.
6. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in
the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), pp. 119–22.
7. I Yun, “Hanguk gwa Roshia kan mujok oe tukjing gwa chonmang,” in
Chung Yo-chon, ed., Hanro gyong jae gyoryu 10nyon oe pyongga wa Roshia
gyong jae oe mirae (Seoul: KIEP, 2000), Ch. 1.
8. Gilbert Rozman, “Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization,
Open Regionalism, and Internationalism,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs,
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997), pp. 537–69.
9. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet,”
Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 93–113; Gilbert Rozman,
ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Gilbert Rozman, “Russia’s Calculus
and Japan’s Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia,” in Takashi Inoguchi, ed.,
Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002),
pp. 167–91.
10. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, p. 222.
11. Hong Wan Suk, ed., Hyondae Rosia gukka cheje wa segye jonryak (Seoul:
Hanul Publishing Co., Seoul, 2005), pp. 601–30.
12. JoongAng Daily, November 19, 2005, p. 3.
13. Yoon Yik-jung and Yi Yong-gwon, “Dongbukkasea enoji anbo paerodaim
oe hyongsong kanungsong: Rosia oe yokhal gwa yonghyang ul chungshim
uro,” Shin Asea, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), pp. 81–82.
14. Seung-Ho Joo, “Russia and North Korea, 1992–2006: From Distant
Allies to Normal Neighbors,” Korea Observer, Vol. 38, No.1 (Spring
2007), p. 96.
15. Chung Taeik, “Bukhan haekmunje e taihan Rosia oe ipjang mit shisajom,”
Oigyo, April 2003, pp. 26–33.
16. Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 140.
17. Kwon Oguk, “Rosia aeso ogo gan Bukhaek: Guraedo 6jahoidam oe yuilhan
haebop,” Tongil Hanguk, 2005, pp. 27–29.
18. The Korea Herald, September 30, 2005, p. 4.
19. The Korea Times, November 21, 2005, p. 1.
20. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Competition over the Russian Far East: Is
the Oil Pipeline Only a Starting Point,” in Akihiro Iwashita, ed., Siberia
and the Russian Far East in the 21st Century: Partners in the “Community of
Asia,” Vol. 1, Crossroads in Northeast Asia (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center,
2005), pp. 1–20.
21. Dongbukka 2003 (Seoul: The Korea Development Bank, 2003),
pp. 583–93.
22. The Korea Herald, June 29, 2005.
23. So Chong-hua, “Budushchee Koreisko-Rossiiskikh otnoshenii,” Moscow,
Diplomatic Academy, January 21, 2003.
24. Cho Han-bom, “Bukhan e daehan yonghyangryok jisok ul tonghan dae
Hanbando palongwon kanghwa rul uido,” Bukhan, September 2005,
pp. 53–56.
25. Chong Hui-sok, “Dongbukka dajaanbo hyopryok gwa Rosia,” Hanguk
jongchi oigyosa nonchong, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2006), pp. 429–63.
26. Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “The Past Is the Future: Russia and the Korean
Peninsula,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), p. 326.
27. Yon Hyon-sik, “Rosia yonbang oigyo jongchaek gwa Hanbando tongil,”
Jungso yongu, Vol. 29, No. 1 (May 2005), pp. 152–63.
28. Chang Dok-jun, “Bukro gwangye oe jongae: Kongdonghwa toin dongmaeng
uro puto saeroun hyopryok gwangye ro,” Jungso yongsu, Vol. 28, No. 3
(2004), pp. 139–44.
29. Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four
Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States (New York:
Palgrave, 2007).
30. Hiroshi Kimura, “Putin’s Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: Why Is
Russia Losing Its Inf luence?” in Hiroshi Kimura, ed., Russia’s Shift toward
Asia (Tokyo: The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2007), pp. 171–75.
31. Ha Yongchool and Shin Beomshik, “Non-Proliferation and Political
Interests: Russia’s Policy Dilemmas in the Six-Party Talks,” in Iwashita
Akihiro, ed., Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Vol. 2. Russia and Its Eastern Edge
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), p. 197 and Steven Kim, “Resolving
the North Korean Nuclear Problem: The Status Quo versus the
Transformative Approach,” in Rouben Azizian and Boris Reznik, eds.,
Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific (Honolulu: Asia Pacific
Center for Security Studies, 2006) pp. 177–79.
CHAPTER 10

toward Regionalism
Shin-wha Lee
D
uring most of the cold war period, South Korea remained
ambivalent about the strategic value of participating in regional
multilateral regimes. Since hegemonic U.S. power dominated
the landscape of Northeast Asia, bilateral relations with the United
States and the anticommunist coalition around the world were at the
heart of Korean diplomacy. In addition, inter-Korean relations were
fraught with distrust and propaganda, fomenting fear of confrontation
and even armed conf lict. Therefore, maintaining a guarantee of secu-
rity by the United States, seeking international recognition as the only
legitimate country on the Korean peninsula, and triumphing over
North Korea politically, economically, and socially were among the
most critical goals in Seoul’s foreign policy. This cold war structure
limited the scope of its regional security maneuvering and the extent of
diplomatic engagement with the outside world.
The years that followed the end of the cold war have marked a new
era in South Korea’s pursuit of regionalism. Although bilateral efforts
such as inter-Korean dialogue and the Korea-U.S. security alliance
remain crucial to its strategic thought, the increasing salience of multi-
directional diplomacy in the post–cold war security environment has
not been lost. Enthusiasm for redirecting regional economic integration
and enhancing national dignity, together with the imperatives of security
stabilization on the peninsula, have guided evolving strategic planning
toward East Asian regionalism.1
226 ● Shin-wha Lee
As ideology no longer steers foreign policy decision making, South

Korea has sought hard to enhance its regional position by boosting eco-
nomic ties with its continental neighbors, China and Russia. It has also
attempted to deepen multilateral cooperation in regard not only to its
North Korean policy but also to its initiatives for realizing the vision of
an EAC. 2 These endeavors reveal the nation’s growing self-assurance
achieved through remarkable industrialization, all-around moderniza-
tion, and democratization during the cold war period, successful host-
ing of major international events such as the 1988 Summer Olympics
and the 2002 World Cup, and rapid recovery in the wake of the 1997–98
Asian financial crisis.
Recently economic regionalism and cultural ties have developed to a
noticeable extent in East Asia and raised hopes for the emergence of a
more integrated regional community, but there has been little progress
on political or security regionalism. The growing rivalry between China
and Japan has been proving problematic, as Japan anxiously has
responded to the rapid rise of China and China in turn has fretted about
Japan’s aspirations to become a “normal state” by strengthening its alli-
ance ties with the United States and increasing its military capabilities.
Resurgent nationalism, which is complicated by the history between
the two countries and a sense of rivalry for future dominance in the
region, has further aggravated their ties. The relations between Seoul
and Tokyo also plunged in early 2005 as nationalism and populism dis-
torted foreign policy planning. The latter’s “unapologetic” foreign pol-
icy, manifested in its controversial history textbooks, renewed attention
to the disputed island Dokdo/Takeshima, and Japan’s troubling position
on “comfort women” and Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine posed
significant barriers to intraregional reconciliation.
Recently, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong’s call for joint
efforts to promote healthy and stable development of China-Japan rela-
tions and Fukuda’s visit to China in December 2007 have raised hope
for bilateral strategic relations.3 Yet, rivalry for oil, as well as their geo-
political rivalry, remains an unavoidable reality. Korea-Japan relations
are also expected to improve as Fukuda’s focus on friendly ties with
Asian neighbors will be complemented by Lee Myung-bak’s emphasis
on closer Korea-U.S.-Japan ties, although aforementioned obstacles to
trust remain.
Meanwhile, the position of the United States toward Northeast Asian
regionalism has been elusive. Its policy is focused on maintaining and
consolidating bilateral alliance relations, so as to deter the rise of any
potential powers in the region. The region’s initiatives for regionalism
Strategic Thought toward Regionalism ● 227
have often run afoul of the U.S. resolve to keep regional relations under
its command, as evidenced by objections to Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir’s notion of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in the
early 1990s and Japan’s proposal for the establishment of an AMF in the
late 1990s. From the perspective of countries in the region, a paradigm
shift in the U.S.-centric approach to security is needed to construct a
multilateral regional security cooperation regime that would comple-
ment existing bilateral security arrangements. Otherwise, East Asian
regionalism will not go far, as the United States warns against even a
“non-security” type of EAC.4
Another serious challenge obscuring South Korea’s pursuit of region-
alism are the divisions related to perceptions and policies on how to
deal with North Korea. While Tokyo has consolidated its alliance with
the United States by upholding the Bush administration’s pre-2007
hard-line policy toward the North, Seoul continued to appease
Pyongyang even after its recent nuclear weapons test. Such differences
incapacitated the “virtual alliance” between South Korea, the United
States, and Japan, which was based on the continuation of two solid
alliances and the strengthening of security cooperation between Seoul
and Tokyo,5 as well as on the establishment of the TCOG in 1999
bringing together high-level officials from the three countries to find a
unified voice in dealing with Pyongyang.6 TCOG talks stalled as
tensions mounted between Seoul and Tokyo over disputes related to the
territorial and history issues and have been further constrained by
discrepancies in perceptions of the North Korean threat.
Such discrepancies generated a situation where Beijing has emerged
as a key arbitrator in the process of addressing North Korean nuclear
issues, leaving Seoul hesitant about siding with the United States and
Japan. While Seoul has also tried to improve its relations with China
and Russia in pursuit of “independent diplomacy” beyond the “asym-
metric alliance” with the United States,7 many Koreans strongly favor
maintaining strong security ties with their ally and trilateral coopera-
tion among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington vital for resolution of the
nuclear crisis.
Against this backdrop, four sets of questions help us to examine the
evolution of strategic thought on regionalism: 1) How does South
Korean regional thinking differ from that of its neighbors, and how
has it evolved over time? 2) Was there any discernable strategic thought
to realize regional aspirations during the cold war era, and afterward
how has it responded to the dynamics of regionalism in Northeast
Asia? 3) Is South Korean strategic thought on regionalism long-term,
goal-oriented, and consistent? Does it set priorities, recognize trade-

offs, and change in response to actual results or new developments in
the region? How do competing visions of domestic forces define its
scope and direction? 4) Under what circumstances has Seoul given
regional multilateral cooperation a prominent place in its strategic
thinking and national security doctrine? Is it based on careful delibera-
tions and a realistic understanding of costs and benefits? This chapter
reviews Seoul’s strategic thought on regional multilateral cooperation
in Northeast Asia during and after the cold war, followed by consider-
ation of the challenges and opportunities for growing regionalism with
Korean “centrality.”
The Evolution and Characteristics of

South Korean Regional Thinking
In past centuries Korea had had little room to stake out its centrality in
regional strategic balancing. It was under China’s tributary state system
during the Ming and Qing dynasties. With the transition from the
Sinocentric regional order to the modern international order, Korea
began to see China in relative terms, but this provided little opportu-
nity to assert itself given the rise of Japanese imperialism. After inde-
pendence in 1945, a divided Korea could not escape the great power
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the
growing inf luence of the newly formed People’s Republic of China. In
light of the geopolitical realities of the cold war period, South Korea
had no choice but to depend heavily on the United States for its very
survival. Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula has been main-
tained through South Korea and Japan’s security alliances with the
United States, balancing the Soviet-China-North Korea coalition. In
this setting, multilateral regional cooperation meant promoting trilateral
security cooperation with the United States and Japan.
As the 1980s ended, however, South Korea experienced internal
and external transformations that greatly affected its regional relations.
The democratic transition made it possible to alter “the ideological
and institutional foundations of political and economic governance.”8
Shortly thereafter the end of the cold war system facilitated South
Korea’s normalization of diplomatic ties with the former Soviet Union
and China as well as its joint admission alongside North Korea into the
United Nations, thus allowing it to employ multilateral diplomacy
rather than solely depending on U.S. guidance in economic and security
globalization.9
One president after another seized the new opportunities to enunciate

new ideas with implications for regional cooperation and institution
building. Roh Tae-woo’s nordpolitik, Kim Young-sam’s “new diplomacy,”
and Kim Dae-jung’s EAC all espoused “open regionalism” with broad
membership and little exclusivity of functions in the era of globaliza-
tion, ref lecting an increasing commitment to regionalism that reaches
beyond Northeast Asia. Yet, perceptions predominantly focused on
China and Japan, as South Korea aspired to position itself as a middle
power at the nexus of two great powers, partly through playing a role as
intermediary between the two rivals. For the most part, it views the
three countries as constituting one region while recognizing obstacles
to cooperation that slow the prospects for actually forming an institu-
tional framework that could lead to regionalism on this basis.10
Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative and his sug-
gestion that Korea be a “Northeast Asian balancer” echoed this strategic
perspective.
While the term “Northeast Asia” has different meaning for each of
the three countries, the scope of “East Asia” is understood to mean the
geographical sum of Northeast and Southeast Asia. The current trend
of integration links the Northeast Asian states with the glue of ASEAN,
as realized in ASEAN 1 3.11 In fact, East Asia is currently a “much
more closely knit region than it was at the end of World War II or even
a decade ago.” Yet, no single map of East Asia is “so inherently self-evi-
dent and logical as to preclude the consideration of equally plausible
alternatives.” The inaugural EAS in December 2005 demonstrated why
East Asia remains a contentious regional idea. Being wary of China’s
dominance, Japan strongly promoted an expanded region, adding
Australia, New Zealand, and India to ASEAN 1 3. On the other hand,
China insisted that the pursuit of an EAC is the responsibility of the
existing thirteen-member group, not the new sixteen-member EAS.12
Although the EAVG and EASG under Kim Dae-jung sowed the
seeds for an EAC, Seoul’s voice was not heard in the process of estab-
lishing the EAS. Some proposed that it turn its diplomatic efforts to
changing the name of the EAS to the “post-ASEAN 1 3 summit,” or
“expanded (hwakdae) ASEAN 1 3 summit,” promoting East Asian
cooperation in this framework for the foreseeable future. The organiza-
tion would operate at four levels: ASEAN for the traditional tasks of
that well-established entity; ASEAN 1 3 along lines developing since
1997 when that organization was formed; the EAS with a broader
agenda; and a multipurpose summit in which the United States, Russia,
the EU, Pakistan, Canada, and other countries that wish to join
participate in discussing comprehensive security and political agendas.

In this perspective, the development of the EAS into a community-
building association would become a long-term task requiring deepening
“functional cooperation” over a considerable period.13
Regional integration, signifying changes beyond the domain of state
sovereignty, would advance gradually led mainly by market forces, while
regional cooperation, a process of negotiation among sovereign states
that pursue their national interests within a certain geographical region,
would gain momentum at those times when leaders reached agreement
on their common interests. Seoul has preferred to use the term “regional
cooperation” to regional integration, aware that East Asian countries
are hesitant to transfer and share sovereignty with others.14 For instance,
the objective of Roh’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative is to take
the initiative for cooperation among Northeast Asian countries rather
than pursuing regional integration. The term “regionalism” itself refers
to a common sense of identity and objectives combined “within a spe-
cific international region in terms of economic, political and security
linkages.”15 It can also be defined as the “transformation of a particular
region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard
to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security,
economic policies and political regimes.”16 In this sense, in Korea
regionalism has been conceptualized as a government-led national proj-
ect to form a certain regional space through largely top-down efforts
based on geopolitical conditions. It can thus be argued that regionalism
there, as elsewhere in Northeast Asia, is for the most part realist, in
contrast to idealist notions of letting nongovernmental forces reach
across to each other across national boundaries.
The Cold War Era: Restrained and

Distorted Regional Aspirations
The polarized cold war era divided most states along ideological lines,
compelled them to see the world in terms of friends and foes, and made
them depend on one of the two superpowers to be their security guaran-
tor. This was particularly true on the Korean peninsula where ideological
rivalries prevailed and a renewal of war between the two Koreas
remained possible. Strategic thinking in Seoul during the cold war days
therefore produced a foreign policy of bandwagoning with the United
States and the anticommunist alliance. Accordingly, its pursuit of
regionalism had clear goals and action plans based on ideologically
guided strategic calculations. First, the origin of its strategic thought on
regionalism was closely associated with its aspirations for bilateral, tri-
lateral, and multilateral relations within the Western bloc. Application
of the Hallstein Doctrine until 1973 limited Korea’s formal diplomatic
relations to Western countries.17 Second, Seoul engaged in a diplomatic
war with Pyongyang to promote ideological causes and obtain political
legitimacy within the international community, including at the United
Nations until September 1991 when both gained membership. Third,
Seoul recognized ASEAN as an anticommunist coalition to deter
China’s expansion toward the Indochina peninsula.18 Fourth, Third
World diplomacy was pursued as a diplomatic and security imperative
to countervail the North’s advantageous position in bilateral and mul-
tilateral relations with the nonaligned movement countries in South
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
During the 1960s, South Korea also played a key role in regional
efforts to formalize collective security cooperation by proposing Asian
and Pacific cooperation to contain China’s expansion in the region. In
September 1964, the government seized the diplomatic initiative in cre-
ating the Asia-Pacific Council (ASPAC), in which Australia, the
Republic of China (Taiwan), Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam were
founding members. None of the member states were communist; all but
Malaysia were allied with the United States, and most were contribut-
ing troops to the war in Vietnam (except for Japan, Malaysia, and
Taiwan). All member states, to a greater or lesser degree, perceived
communist China as a threat.19
Pursuit of regional collaboration along ideological lines faced new
challenges from the late 1960s. First, the Guam Doctrine, which was
proclaimed by Richard Nixon in July 1969, brought new wariness
regarding U.S. security guarantees on the Korean peninsula. The doc-
trine emphasized U.S. commitments in maintaining treaty agreements
and providing a nuclear umbrella to allied countries, but asserted that
the nation directly threatened was to take primary responsibility for
providing the manpower necessary for its own defense. Although the
doctrine was designed to signal the start of “Vietnamization” of the
Vietnam War, it also required Asian states to create their own military
organizations to provide mutual security assurances. 20
Second, the U.S.-China détente also posed a challenge. Although
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 was regarded as a U.S. effort to partner
with China against the Soviet Union, this shift (together with the 1969
doctrine) caused profound reverberations. Neither Japan nor South
Korea had a voice in the process. Japan quickly adjusted to the “Nixon
shokku” (and the West German negotiations with the Soviet Union) by
normalizing diplomatic relations with China in 1972. In contrast,
South Korea’s rapprochement and normalization with China had to
wait until the ideological iceberg thawed. In this altered environment,
the anxious Korean government began to consider alternative measures
such as “self-reliant national defense” and “inter-Korean reconciliation”
(Nambuk hwahae), rather than exclusively depending upon the bilateral
alliance with the United States for national security. Consequently, it
sought ways of relieving tension on the peninsula, which eventually led
to the South-North Communiqué (Nambuk gongdong sungmyong) on
July 4, 1972, establishing the basic negotiating principles of autonomy,
peace, and national collaboration in the process of reunification.
Third, with the U.S.-China rapprochement, the fall of Saigon, and
China’s increasing role in regional relations during the 1970s, the solid
bipolar structure in Northeast Asia—the Soviet Union, China, and
North Korea on one side and the United States, Japan, and South Korea
on the other—came apart, leading to the breakup of ASPAC. Although
the South’s relations with major communist countries were still limited,
the change in the regional security structure facilitated strategic moves
toward neighboring countries. The Hallstein Doctrine was abandoned
on June 23, 1973, in favor of a Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification
(pyonghwa tongil oigyo jongchaek), which was followed by establishing
diplomatic relations with “nonhostile” countries in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, as well as opening the door to the Soviet Union and
China. If normalization of relations with communist countries was not
accomplished until the era of nordpolitik, the Park Chung-hee govern-
ment at least moved to extend its traditional security alliances with the
United States and Western countries to include a more diverse set of
relations. Such recognition became more prominent when the United
States decided to downsize its commitment of soldiers to defend South
Korea by withdrawing the 7th Infantry Division in 1976. Closer secu-
rity ties with Tokyo were considered out of fear of abandonment by the
United States. 21 Park also gave thought to normalization with China,
reflecting reduced confidence in the U.S. defense against North Korea. 22
Still, such multilateral diplomacy remained at the incipient or even
conjectural level as the U.S.-centered system of bilateral alliances was
too sturdy to be replaced by any cooperative multilateral regional secu-
rity architecture. Similar to Tokyo, Seoul regarded its alliance with the
United States as the foundation of its foreign policy.
South Korea’s multilateral approaches during the cold war were more
driven by economic necessities than security imperatives, particularly
since Park actively pursued an export-driven development strategy in

the 1970s. Although its foreign policy toward many countries began in
the context of its diplomatic competition with North Korea, relations
expanded especially through trade and other commercial activities. As
the South surpassed the North in the economic race by the mid-1970s,
its economic impetus in foreign relations was further reinforced. In
addition, though perceived as an anticommunist coalition at first,
ASEAN was soon recognized as an important new market and provider
of natural resources. 23 While the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral alliance
structure was central to security, cooperation with Japan in engaging
ASEAN countries was troublesome due to competing economic devel-
opment strategies. South Korea also became a founding member of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) that was established in November
1966 to help finance economic growth. In addition, it emphasized the
necessity of economic and social cooperation among ASPAC member
states and considered setting up an economic coordination center under
this council. 24
The Chun Doo-hwan administration expanded trade with other
countries in the region and hoped to establish new regional arrange-
ments for a stable and open environment. In 1985, the Working Team
for Northern Policy was created under the Agency for National Security
Planning to seek ways of advancing ties with the Soviet Union and
China. Seoul’s interest in the concept of regional cooperation derived
from its judgment that such multilateral arrangements could promote
its diplomatic objectives, expanding its regional role and enhancing its
global image. Since it was not yet a member of a regional organization
such as ASEAN, a broad scheme designed for the Asia-Pacific region
was believed to give easier access to other countries.
Successive administrations demonstrated an interest in enhancing
regional cooperation, reinforced by the development imperative, espe-
cially as the South Korean economy grew rapidly. Yet, the country’s
strategic thought toward multilateral cooperation was rather restrained
by the impregnable security alliance with the United States and the
“diplomatic handicap” resulting from the ideological rivalry with North
Korea. In addition, regionalism in the cold war context was distorted by
superpower intervention that limited forces within the region focusing
on their own common ground. 25Above all, the South’s primary motiva-
tion for participation in these regional multilateral processes was to win
the diplomatic war with North Korea and to help the United States
reinforce the coalition of noncommunist Asian and Pacific states, as
stipulated in Korea’s initiatives for creating ASPAC.
Regional Strategic Thinking at the Dawn

of the Post–Cold War Era
South Korea’s quest for regionalism during the initial post–cold war
years was largely guided by two predominant strategies: Roh Tae-woo’s
nordpolitik and Kim Young-sam’s “new diplomacy,” which espoused
five strategic fundamentals, that is, globalism, diversification of
interstate relationships, a multidimensional and pluralist approach to
national interests (dawonhwa), regional cooperation ( jiyok hyopryok),
and future orientation (mirae jihyang). The principal strategic idea of
nordpolitik was to pursue wide-ranging relations with the traditional
allies of North Korea, putting pressure on the North to cooperate with
the South in the inter-Korean peace and unification process. 26 It enabled
Seoul to expand the geopolitical range of its foreign policy, at the same
time building momentum for awareness of regional identity as part of
Northeast Asia. Rising awareness of regional ties extended also to
Southeast Asia and a new sense of both East Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
These changes created leeway to construct a favorable environment for
security cooperation and increase South Korea’s international position
as a middle power.
Trade and other economic considerations became a higher priority
after the cold war. In fact, nordpolitik was initially designed to expand
trade relations by drawing Moscow and Beijing closer, at least partly to
cope with the perceived increasing trade protectionism of the United
States. 27 Under Roh Seoul sought to build on its economic accomplish-
ments to enhance its regional and global role. It became one of the
founding members of APEC in 1989. With intraregional trade growing
rapidly in the 1990s, its economic foundation for regionalism developed
at an accelerated pace. 28 Nordpolitik has been evaluated as a great
success, as expanded relations with China and Russia paved the way for
regional diplomacy on more autonomous and multilateral terms.
“New diplomacy” was also a response to the emergence of a new
global and regional order, which posed both profound challenges and
opportunities for South Korea’s post–cold war diplomacy. It empha-
sized ties with countries that respected universal values such as freedom,
justice, welfare, and human rights, and also stressed active participation
in tackling global issues including arms control, poverty eradication,
and environmental protection. In addition, diversified diplomacy
encouraged the expansion of ties with ASEAN states, other Asian coun-
tries, the European Community, Latin America, the Middle East, and
Africa, while improving relations with traditional partners. Diplomacy
for regional cooperation meant pursuit of Asia-Pacific security and

economic cooperation based on the assumption that the twenty-first
century would be the Asia-Pacific era. It also aimed to channel efforts
to realize an economic cooperation bloc in the Asia-Pacific region with
APEC at the center, as well as multilateral security dialogues in the
Asia-Pacific region and especially Northeast Asia while consolidating
the South Korea-U.S. alliance. These efforts were part of a strategic
adjustment to the dramatically changing security paradigm and economic
dynamics of the post–cold war world.
Under Kim Young-sam, there was growing consensus on the need for
greater multilateral regional security cooperation. Mindful of their
potential contribution to regional peace and stability and alleviation of
tensions on the Korean peninsula, Kim not only pursued proactive
participation in global and regional organizations such as APEC, the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asian Cooperation
Dialogue (NEACD), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), but also sought ways to increase North Korea’s
involvement. 29 Although he emphasized the Asia-Pacific as a diplomatic
arena, proposals and ideas that limited the scope of regional multilat-
eral security cooperation to Northeast Asia were also put forward. The
Korean proposal for a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at
the ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting in Bangkok in 1994 was to promote
confidence building in the Northeast Asian region through interstate
dialogue on issues of direct interest to the countries in the region,
including the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia;
however, neither North Korea nor China showed an interest. 30 Additional
suggestions for establishment of a Northeast Asian Security Cooperation
framework were made in the ARF on July 25, 1995. At the Track II
level, Korean scholars and former government officials were instrumen-
tal in establishing CSCAP, a nongovernmental forum to promote mul-
tilateral security dialogue, in June 1993.31 Yet, Seoul had opposed the
establishment of the EAEC, an exclusively Asian forum, despite some
support from “pro-Asia” Korean officials, due to U.S. opposition. 32 The
U.S. factor remained critical, as in the first North Korean nuclear crisis.
Kim’s efforts to promote cooperation in the region stumbled against the
rising tensions associated with this crisis.
Although there were some tangible results in multilateral diplomacy
during the Kim Young-sam period, as exemplified in South Korea’s
gaining accession to the OECD (1996), the WTO (1996), and the
United Nations Security Council (1997), as well as being awarded the
right to host the third ASEM summit and participate in the NEASED
and the ARF, all these multilateral cooperation efforts were seen as
supplements to bilateral relations with the United States. In fact, Kim
viewed NEASED and ARF as vehicles for keeping the alliance with the
United States sturdy.
Regional Strategic Thinking during the

Kim Dae-jung Administration
South Korean strategic thinking was notably reshaped during the Kim
Dae-jung administration, particularly in terms of how to deal with
North Korea and how to advance East Asian regionalism. There are at
least five factors that explain how he was able to make discernable prog-
ress in advancing inter-Korean cooperation and the vision of the EAC,
while maintaining steadfast relations with the United States. First, his
Sunshine Policy “set off a spate of regional maneuvering for advantage
on the Korean peninsula”33 by ameliorating ties with North Korea.
When Kim assumed office in February 1998, inter-Korean relations
were more or less hostile. North Korea, under the basic principle of
“mobilizing South Korea through the United States,” focused on engag-
ing in talks solely with the United States while intentionally excluding
the South. In this light, his Sunshine Policy aimed at specifically
redressing this forced exclusion through contacts with the North, and
thus constructed a long-term plan with the goal of making the Korean
issue wholly Korean. This policy was adopted under the assumption
that reconciliation and cooperation are preferable to the possibility of
another disastrous inter-Korean military conf lict. Kim also expected
South Korea to take the initiative in promoting regional cooperation,
raise its diplomatic status by adopting soft-power diplomatic techniques,
and ultimately increase its power in persuading other countries to adopt
a similar agenda.
The historic South-North summit in June 2000 gave new momen-
tum for regionalism as the four great powers, the United States, China,
Japan, and Russia, increased their efforts to improve relations with the
North. North Korea’s inclusion in the ARF as the twenty-third member
in July 2000 provided the long-awaited opportunity to facilitate multi-
lateral talks on Northeast Asian security issues by establishing a subre-
gional Northeast Asia Security Forum within the ARF framework.34 A
few months after the summit, talks on railroad construction and energy
pipelines through North Korea became more earnest, serving as another
impetus toward regionalism. Linking the process of Korean reunifica-
tion and East Asian regionalism,35 Kim’s regional initiatives were tied
to South Korea’s security imperatives, particularly in the context of

inter-Korean reconciliation. In fact, such reconciliation—especially
among South Korea, Japan, and China—was a prerequisite for maxi-
mizing the achievements from the Sunshine Policy. Therefore, Kim
scurried to raise the global standing and regional influence of South
Korea so as to convince the international community to support North
Korea’s economic opening and the inter-Korean reconciliation process,
as well as East Asian community building.
Second, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which hit South Korea
during the last months of Kim Young-sam’s tenure, provided strong
impetus to strengthen regional cooperation efforts and thus fostered the
common perception that East Asia needed to institutionalize these to
preempt or cope with similar problems that could reemerge. Kim
Dae-jung stressed how closely the financial crisis was connected to the
regional economy, acknowledging the deepening of economic f lows in
East Asia, not only in terms of trade and financial exchanges but also in
interstate policy coordination for building an economic safety net at the
intraregional level.36 Therefore, it was natural for him to actively seek
leading roles in ASEAN 1 3, including in the 1 3 separate sessions that
became institutionalized in 1999, two years after the larger organiza-
tion’s first meeting.37 Urging the ten ASEAN countries and three
Northeast Asian states to integrate as one entity, Kim sought a regional
arrangement that would prevent the recurrence of another financial
crisis.
Kim Dae-jung was enthusiastic about East Asian regional coopera-
tion, as seen in his initiatives on the EAVG in 1999 and EASG in 2000.
As a panel under ASEAN 1 3 without formal government representa-
tion, the EAVG was able to produce mid-term and long-term action
plans and feasible policy guidelines aimed at building a foundation for
regionalism. It emphasized the ultimate goal of creating an EAC, trans-
forming the ASEAN 1 3 summit into an EAS. The EASG, which con-
sisted of government officials, worked as a follow-up group to assess the
recommendations of the EAVG’s Final Report and review the possibility
of establishing an EAS.
Third, Kim Dae-jung’s initiatives on East Asian regionalism did not
run into U.S. resistance in contrast to past cases. One possible reason is
that the United States preferred a close ally like South Korea—that
neither has the power that Japan has in the region, nor the tendency to
follow Malaysia’s path of anti-Americanism—to take the initiative in
creating a regional cooperation framework if such a process was becom-
ing inevitable. In fact, Kim’s vision of inter-Korean reconciliation and
East Asian cooperation was developed based on the assumption that

there would be solid alliance coordination with the United States, which
respected South Korea’s liberal values.38
Fourth, Kim’s new approach for improving relations with Japan
served as an important catalyst for putting forward a vision of regional
community building. His visit to Japan in October 1998 achieved a
breakthrough in relations, leading the two nations to decide to boost
cultural exchanges and develop closer ties. As they agreed on a set
of principles—open regionalism, “functional” cooperation in the eco-
nomic, cultural, and environmental areas, and respect for the ideals of
a liberal democracy—in the midst of increasing global economic
liberalization, they shared a strong incentive to strengthen regional
cooperation.
Fifth, Kim Dae-jung’s personal inclinations and political orientation
were also related to the progress that he made in pursuing East Asian
regional cooperation. Among regional leaders, he was the one to express
his perceptions of the region in the most systematic manner. First, he
had already conceived of the East Asian region within the context of the
U.S.-centered cold war system during the 1960s. In particular, he saw
that the nucleus of U.S. policy toward East Asia was Japan and tried to
understand ROK-Japan relations at the regional level in a manner con-
sistent with that fundamental reality. Kim Dae-jung had also once tried
to combine realism (establishing an anticommunist bloc against China)
and idealism (apologizing for historical issues and mutual equality) in
pursuit of fully normalized ROK-Japan relations. His visit to Tokyo in
1998 could be understood within the latter context. Of course, events
demonstrated that engagement with China would be necessary and that
South Korea could not play a leading role while competing against
China and Japan. It had to try to bridge the gap between them on the
basis of trust from both sides. Many of Kim’s ideas were already well
ref lected in his congressional speeches during the 1960s, suggesting
that the active regional strategy that he adopted after his inauguration
had its roots in the ideals he articulated three decades earlier. 39
Kim Dae-jung’s East Asian regionalism, arguably, contributed to
some extent to South Korea’s improved relations with North Korea. In
particular, the South’s economic prowess was sufficient to lure China
into closer ties, reshaping the triangle that would play an important role
in inf luencing the North’s behavior. In addition, Kim’s personal char-
acter also facilitated this process. As can be seen, he wished to lead East
Asian regionalism (including the establishment of a community) and
wanted to be the first Korean president to attend the first EAS; yet, his
personal desire and passion also suggested impatience in the face of

hurdles to building a regional community. The government-led EASG
was supposed to be established after the success of the nongovernmental
EAVG, but he initiated the EASG when the EAVG process was still
ongoing in the hope of accelerating the pace of community building.40
Kim’s vision for creating an EAC was directly related to his promo-
tion of greater cooperation in Northeast Asia. The geopolitical environ-
ment in which South Korea is surrounded by four superpowers limited
its capacity to pursue a regional community. Efforts to forge a coopera-
tive, strategic, prosperous environment based on the South’s economic
power and enhanced diplomatic capability were hindered by such
geopolitical conditions. Realizing such goals was beyond the control of
its president.
The domestic situation also served as a constraint on Kim’s efforts to
improve relations between the two Koreas and to pursue regionalism,
which after seeming to sail smoothly during the first half of his term,
were complicated in the second half due to the scandal that arose after
the exposure of his secret payment of perhaps $500 million to North
Korea and other corruption scandals. Kim’s failure to achieve bipartisan
support for the Sunshine Policy gave rise to the expression “Nam-Nam
galdung,” or South-South conf lict regarding North Korean policies.41
Another problem was Kim’s inclination to see improving relations
between the two Koreas and regionalism as one. At the end of his term,
the North Korean nuclear issue exploded into a tense international
standoff, making difficult further moves to take the lead in advancing
regional goals.
Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asian Cooperation

Initiative for Peace and Prosperity
Roh Moo-hyun aimed to strengthen Kim Dae-jung’s policy for “East
Asia,” also joining in multilateral efforts to expand the ASEAN 1 3
framework to the EAS. Yet Roh’s strategic orientation has been more
directed toward Northeast Asia, as represented in his foreign policy
slogan of making Korea the “Central State of Northeast Asia.” This was
later revised as the “Hub of Northeast Asia” in the wake of diplomatic
controversies over the use of the term “central state.”
At his inauguration Roh announced the Northeast Asian Cooperation
Initiative for Peace and Prosperity and as a first step, the Presidential
Committee on Northeast Asian Business Hub was launched in April
2003. The committee was designed to establish financial networks,
attract foreign investment, and advance cooperation in developing the

energy and railway sectors within the region, thus concentrating on
items related to prosperity. In June 2004 Roh changed its name to the
Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative
(Dongbukka sidae wiwonhoi) to expand its role beyond the economic
arena and to formulate “a long-term vision and strategy for promoting a
peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia in the 21st century.”42 To real-
ize such a vision, the committee suggested that Korea play the strategic
role of a bridge linking continental and maritime powers, a hub of ideas
and interregional networks, and a cooperator functioning as a catalyst
for a regional community of peace and prosperity through a cooperative
mechanism (e.g., a regional multilateral security cooperation regime
and a Northeast Asian FTA). The principles for pursuing this vision are
simultaneous linkage, multilayered (bilateral, subregional, regional, and
multilateral) cooperation, open regionalism, and community building. 43
In the first half of his tenure Roh ambitiously pushed forward various
projects to place Korea at the center of Northeast Asia, attempting to
upstage Kim Dae-jung’s steps to put it in the spotlight.
Various difficulties thwarted Roh’s aspirations. First, given the recent
security developments in Northeast Asia—with the North Korean
nuclear crisis, the realignment of U.S. troops and the planned reduction
of these forces in Korea, China’s rise as a great power in the interna-
tional community and as Korea’s largest trading partner (if not com-
petitor), Japan’s inf lexibility in dealing with historical and territorial
disputes with its neighbors, and Russia’s economic transformation and
recovery and its growing strategic importance, especially in terms of
energy security—Roh seems to have had little choice but to refocus his
strategic thinking toward Korea’s neighbors and the United States, both
bilaterally and multilaterally.
Second, Roh’s prioritization on Northeast Asia appeared not to have
been welcomed by its neighbors. Concerns have been raised regarding
its compatibility with Japan’s desire to include the entire Asian region
and China’s preference to encompass East Asia only. Furthermore, the
concept of “Northeast Asian balancer” unveiled by Roh in February
2005 when he argued that Korea should play the role of a balancer or
“honest broker” between China and Japan, and also between the United
States and China, so as to reduce tensions in Northeast Asia, was
received critically by several nations, particularly the United States.44
Although Roh did not suggest that South Korea side with China against
the United States or Japan (he actually emphasized a strengthened
Korea-U.S. alliance in various policy announcements), speculation
arose that the “balancer policy” heralded Seoul’s intentions to adjust its
longstanding alliance and shift its foreign policy in the direction of
Beijing. Many argued that it is too weak to play such a big role in a
turbulent environment dominated by traditional great powers.45
Third, debate in setting Korea’s geographic sphere for regional coop-
eration during the Roh administration has been mired in confusion
about its identity: Are we talking about the broader Asia-Pacific region
or a narrower East Asian (or even Northeast Asian) region? Those who
promote broader regional cooperation such as the Asia-Pacific are
hesitant about pursuit of the EAC. There were conflicting views at the
end of 2005, toward APEC in Busan in November vis-à-vis the new
EAS in Kuala Lumpur in December. In contrast, there was growing
recognition of a need to develop a framework that is limited to the
Northeast Asian region separate from ASEAN countries. The ARF has
proven to be insufficient in dealing with sensitive issues in Northeast
Asia as it still remains a loose forum for dialogue, not to mention the
fact that it is an institution that was established under the initiative of
ASEAN. Even in the nongovernmental CSCAP Korean representatives
raise similar concerns. Therefore, there have been increasing appeals
within the Northeast Asian region to develop an independent coopera-
tion forum, which would address the security issues unique to the
region, including the North Korean question. In 2003 establishment of
the Six-Party Talks potentially provided the mechanism for this frame-
work, and in 2007 its further division into five working groups suggested
that it was becoming more institutionalized.
Fourth, as nationalism has intensified in the region and Japan has
antagonized Koreans, South Korea has increasingly demonized Japan.
Roh and Koizumi both brought up history for their own political
purposes, and after Abe took office there was little improvement.46
Sino-Korean relations have also been uneasy as China has attempted to
validate academically and scientifically through the Northeast Asian
Project its assertions about the ancient Goguryo kingdom, from which
springs the basis of present Korean identity and legitimacy, being part
of China.
Fifth, domestic issues also play a role in discouraging Roh from try-
ing to take a leading role in Northeast Asian cooperation, especially in
the second half of his term. Popular frustration has mounted with the
unification and security issues, and over the government’s perspective
toward North Korea, the president’s frequent misstatements, his contro-
versial real estate and educational policies, and other problems resulted
in a loss of popularity, and fragmentation within the ruling party,
including the president’s defection from it. As a consequence, Roh paid

less attention to Northeast Asian cooperation, which was “apparently
no immediate issue.” In addition, some critics claimed that the slogans
and policies of his committee for the promotion of Korea-led Northeast
Asian cooperation not only focused too narrowly geopolitically but also
appeared to be idealist with weak realist considerations.47
Still, the new framework for security cooperation in Northeast Asia
triggered by the Six-Party Talks may lead to a regular multilateral
security forum. Some suggest that the notion of a Northeast Asian
Multilateral Security Dialogue, or Northeast Asian Peace Community
can be developed, modeled after the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although this would depend on
whether the talks are successful in bringing about a multilateral solu-
tion to the North’s nuclear crisis, such expectations are totally new to
the region. The second summit between the leaders of the two Koreas
in October 2007 was regarded as good news by those who believe that
inter-Korean reconciliation would have positive effects on the Six-Party
Talks, particularly at the critical juncture after the first phase of the
February 13 agreement had been concluded and the second stage requir-
ing disabling of the North’s nuclear facilities and declaration of its
nuclear assets was beginning. Some argued that, unlike the situation at
the time of the first summit in 2000, the decision this time is affected
by other nations and the state of the Six-Party Talks, thus raising hopes
for resolving the nuclear issue and even ending the North Korean threat
while advancing stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This
optimism about the way forward, including a boost to regionalism,
however, came amidst an uncertain outlook about whether North Korea
would offer its counterparts a complete and correct declaration of all
the nuclear development programs, materials, and infrastructure or
facilities.48
The pursuit of a policy of “functional” regional cooperation has also
been a characteristic of the Roh administration. Acknowledging
the importance of continued close military and political relations with
the United States, it aspired to increase South Korea’s influence among
the great powers by promoting cooperation first in economic and cultural
affairs as a catalyst for broader regional cooperation including in the
political and diplomatic arenas. For instance, Roh’s strategy for Northeast
Asia initiatives valued the expansion of social and cultural exchanges as
the first step in establishing a regional “peace regime’ and “economic
community.”49 However, such “functionalist” approaches may not prove
effective in Northeast Asia, and the Korean peninsula in particular,
where geopolitical complications and urgency prevail. Indeed, intensi-

fying economic and social interdependence, people-to-people exchanges,
and transboundary environmental problems alone have not generated
the necessary conditions for a regional community. Therefore, consoli-
dating confidence building measures in “more traditional” political and
military sectors are crucial, demanding leaders with a strong commitment
and the will to achieve political breakthroughs.
Conclusion
South Korea’s strategic thought towards regionalism was restrained by
the cold war structure, though this did not entirely dislodge foreign
policy considerations at the regional level. It often turned its limited
capacity toward the region’s multilateral processes, which comple-
mented its strong alliance with the United States. The ideological,
political, and economic rivalry with North Korea in the international
(and regional) community was also a factor restricting possible regional
strategies.
The record of regionalism in post–cold war Northeast Asia has been
mixed, with some economic regionalization, but little political or secu-
rity regionalism. Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam advocated region-
alism, whether Asia-Pacific, East Asia or Northeast Asia oriented, in the
context of internationalization and globalization campaigns. Kim Dae-
jung aimed to create an EAC by engineering the ASEAN 1 3 formula,
while Roh Moo-hyun put priority on addressing Northeast Asian issues.
All the presidents advocated “open regionalism,” welcoming participant
nations from the region and from other parts of the world, in order to
promote peace and mutual prosperity in the region, but Korea’s regional
idea has developed primarily from the perspectives of a geographic
domain that includes Korea, Japan, and China. Their respective poli-
cies toward regionalism have been evaluated as inward-oriented and
directly related to promoting the development of inter-Korean relations,
while at the same time, adopting a protectionist approach in trade
cooperation.
Responding to Asian multilateral initiatives that exclude the United
States as a member state has been a serious concern in Seoul’s strategic
planning. So far, the United States has been stressing that “most prob-
lems [are] global and thus [lend] themselves to multinational rather
than single country or small group solutions”50 as a means of expressing
its reservations about evolving regionalism. It is difficult for Seoul to
disregard these intentions because of the geopolitical reality in and
around the peninsula. In particular, states in the post–cold war era still
tend to collaborate with their “patron state” in situations of urgency. In
fact, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many states (e.g., the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany) closely collaborated with the United
States on a bilateral basis rather than within a regional framework (the
EU) in order to respond to the threat of terrorism. The response of
states also demonstrates that religion and civilization do not replace
realpolitik, that is, pragmatism, national interest, and the principles
that have traditionally dictated international relations.
International relations in Northeast Asia can be characterized by the
difficulty of enhancing integration through cooperation in areas of
“low politics” that would eventually lead to cooperation on issues of
“high politics.” As was argued by Stanley Hoffman, the anticipated
“spill-over” effects of functionalist integration efforts to other issue
areas are impeded by nationalistic aspirations and interest-centered
state behavior.51 While economic regionalism has developed to some
extent in post–cold war Northeast Asia amid increased hopes for a more
integrated community, there has been little progress on political or
security regionalism, as evidenced by the rocky bilateral relations of
states triggered by past history issues and territorial disputes. This con-
firms that there are limits in applying the functionalist approach in the
Northeast Asian region.
Despite various obstacles to the development of regionalism, evolu-
tion in the institutional design of regional cooperation efforts is an irre-
versible trend in Northeast Asia. It is, thus, encouraging to note that the
new leaders Fukuda and Lee Myung-bak seek stronger ties with Asian
neighbors both bilaterally and multilaterally. This trend suggests that
cooperation efforts will be encompassed within a bi-multilateral coop-
eration framework, a multilateral mechanism that will complement
existing bilateral relations and alliances. More than 66 percent of the
South Korean people believe that a regional community should be
established in Northeast Asia.52 Such domestic support can encourage
the government to continue to give regional multilateral cooperation a
place in its strategic thinking, but this should be based on prudence
while maintaining South Korea’s alliance with the United States.
Lee begins his presidency with a pledge for a “greater Asian diplo-
macy.” His notion of an “Asian cooperative network” is to enrich South
Korea’s relations with other Asian states and to serve as a bridge between
Asia and the rest of the world. One plan is to expand cultural exchanges,
beginning with China and Japan, as South Korea tries to position itself
as a leader through the Korean wave, the IT industry, and cultural
diplomacy. He has also proposed an “energy silk road” initiative, which

demonstrates the pragmatic character of his regional plans. No matter
how eager Lee is to develop his regional strategy, it is clear that he will
not do so at the cost of the bilateral relationship with the United States.
Regionalism remains a goal for South Korea, but it will not be allowed
to supersede high priority objectives centered on the United States,
North Korea, and triangular relations with China and Japan.
Notes
1. Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia: Korea’s Return to Center
Stage,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and
Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism inNorth-
east Asia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 151–66; Shin-wha
Lee, “South Korea’s Strategy for Inter-Korean Relations and Regional
Security Cooperation,” in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Asia-Pacific
Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order (Armonk, New
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 106–27.
2. Shin-wha Lee, “South Korea’s Strategy,” pp. 106–27.
3. “Joint Efforts Urged to Promote China-Japan Relations,” Xinhua,
December 24, 2007 (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-12/12/
content_6317129.htm).
4. Donald S. Zagoria, “The Future of the Bilateral Alliances: US-Japan and
US-Republic of Korea,” Trilateral US-Japan-ROK Track II Conference,
Conference Report, October 3, 2005.
5. Ralph Cossa, US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building toward a “Virtual
Alliance” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
CSIS, 1999).
6. Mitchell B. Reiss, “Japan II: A Path to East Asian Stability,” International
Herald Tribune, June 22, 2002 (http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/06/22/
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7. Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” pp. 151–66.
8. Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, “South Korea’s International Relations:
Challenges to Developmental Realism,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The
International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004), p. 251.
9. Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” pp. 151–66.
10. Yong-hwa Chung, “Hanguk oe jiyok insik gwa gusang: Dongyang
pyonghwa gusang,” in Sohn Yol, Chung Yong-hwa, Park Myoung-rim,
Cho Young-nam, and Park In-hui, eds., Dongasia wa jiyokjuoi (Seoul:
Jishik madang, 2006), Ch. 2.
11. East-West Center, “Asia in Search of an Identity,” East-West Wire,
July 26, 2006 (http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/
archived-news-wires/?class_call=view&news_ID=342&mode=view accessed
12. Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord,”
YaleGlobal, December 20, 2005 (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.
article?id=6645 accessed on December 5, 2007).
13. Geung-chan Bae, “Je1cha Dongasia jongsang hoioe (EAS) gaechoi jonmang
mit gwaje,” Presidential Report, 2005 (http://www.cwd.go.kr/cwd/kr/
common/download.php?id=f518829918419d71b4da5e32 accessed on
December 7, 2007).
14. Dong-yong Yum, “21segi Dongbukka gukjae jilso wa jonmang,” Sasang,
Vol. 55 (Winter 2002), pp. 30–56.
15. Christopher M. Dent, “Introduction: Northeast Asia-A Region in Search
of Regionalism?” in Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang, eds.,
Northeast Asian Regionalism: Lessons from the European Experience (New
York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 1.
16. Björn Hettne, “Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia,” in
Toshio Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, eds, Globalism and Regionalism:
Proceedings in Global Seminar, ‘96 Shonan Session (Hayama, Japan:
September 2–6, 1996), p. 8.
17. The Hallstein Doctrine, named after Walter Hallstein, was a key in the
foreign policy of West Germany between 1955 and 1969, giving it the
exclusive right to represent the entire German nation, and with the excep-
tion of the Soviet Union, it would not establish or maintain diplomatic
relations with any state that recognized East Germany. This doctrine was
abandoned with the adoption of ostpolitik by Chancellor Willy Brandt,
which resulted in mutual recognition between East and West Germany
as two states. See “Hallstein Doctrine,” from Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallstein_Doctrine accessed
18. Yoo Sok-yeol, “ASEAN chaeje wa Hanguk oigyo oe hyangbang,” Bukhan,
Vol. 71, No. 11 (November 1977), pp. 118–27.
19. Chris Braddic, “Japan, Australia and ASPAC: A Cooperative Security
Framework,” Australian National University(ANU) Seminars and Events,
October 14, 2005 (http://asianstudies.anu.edu.au/calendar/view_entry.
php?id=223&date=20051014 accessed on December 4, 2007).
20. “President Nixon’s Speech on ‘Vietnamization,’ November 3, 1969,”
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969,
pp. 901–09.
21. Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security
Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
22. Jae Ho Chung, “South Korean Strategic Thought toward China,” ch. 7
this book.
23. Yoo Sok-yeol, “ASEAN chaeje wa Hanguk oigyo oe hyangbang,”
pp. 118–27.
24. Yung-Hwan Jo, “Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Japan’s

Role,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August 1968), pp. 780–97.
25. Björn Hettne, “Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia,” p. 8.
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and Prospects,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 9 (September 1991), p. 817.
27. Beom-shik Shin, “Bukbang jongchaek gwa Hanguk-Soryon/Rosia
gwangye,” Segye jongchi, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2002), p. 291.
28. Martin Rudner, “APEC: The Challenges of Asiase Pacific Economic
Cooperation,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 1995),
pp. 403–37.
29. Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, NEASED (Northeast Asia
Security Dialogue), Oigyo tongsang yongo sajon (http://61.72.226.18/
MofaDic.nsf/webview_07/824504395A852918492567040023631A?Open
Document accessed on November 30, 2007).
31. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security,
and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” International Security, Vol. 26,
No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 153–85.
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president.go.kr/cwd/kr/diplomacy/2004_11/index_04.html accessed on
December 2, 2007).
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34. Ralph A. Cossa, “North Korea’s Coming Out: Party Continues,” The Korea
Times, July 24, 2000.
35. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in
the Shadow of Globalization, Ch. 6.
36. East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), Towards an East Asian Community:
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38. Scott Snyder, “Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Kim Dae-jung
Era,” ch. 4 this book.
39. Park Myung-rim, “Hanguk oe jiyok insik gwa gusang: Kim Dae-jung oe
sarye,” in Sohn Yol, Chung Yong-hwa, Park Myoung-rim, Cho Young-nam,
and Park In-hui, eds., Ch. 3.
40. This assessment was made by the author based on her working experience
for the EAVG as the chair’s advisor.
41. “Poyong jongchaek ijen no, jonmung adul sae taebuk jongchaek
jaesi,” Dailian, February 5, 2007 (http://news.media.daum.net/society/
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2007).
42. Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative,

“Chairman’s Message” (http://www.nabh.go.kr/english/about/greeting.
html accessed on November 27, 2007).
43. Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative, “Goals
and Principles: Building Peaceful and Prosperous NEA Community” (http://
www.nabh.go.kr/english/policy/vision.html accessed on November 29,
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44. Zhiqun Zhu, “South Korea as Northeast Asia’s Honest Broker,” Asia Times
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GD20Dg01.html accessed on
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45. Lee Jang-gyu, “Dongbukka gogan gukkaga doeja,” JoongAng ilbo, April 12,
2005 (http://article.joins.com/article/article.asp?total_id=15928 accessed on
December 8, 2007).
46. Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, “Unraveling the Japan-South Korea
‘Virtual Alliance’: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of
Conf licting Regional Strategies,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 5 (September/
October 2006), pp. 761–84.
47. “Roh Moo-hyun jongbugga amatua jongburanni” (http://blog.chosun.
com /blog.log.v ie w.screen?blog Id=2682& log Id= 438728 acce ssed on
December 3, 2007).
48. “Disarmament Documentation: US briefing on Six Party talks, December 6,
2007,” Evening Walk-Through at Six-Party Talks Christopher R. Hill,
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kerry Center Hotel
Beijing, China December 6, 2007 (http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0712/
doc08.htm accessed on December 23, 2007).
49. Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative,
“Peaceful and Prosperous NEA Community” (http://www.nabh.go.kr/
english/policy/community.html accessed on December 3, 2007).
50. “The White House Rejects Pyongyang’s Invitation for the Chief US Envoy
to the Nuclear Talks to Visit the DPRK,” CanKor, No. 251, June 5, 2006.
51. Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State
and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, No. 95 (1966), pp. 865–85.
52. Nae Young Lee, Hanul Chung, and Wonchil Chung, Global Views 2004
(Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2005) and updated information by CCGA/
EAI Global Views 2006, provided by Hanul Chung at East Asia Institute
on December 24, 2007.
List of Contributors
Jong-Yun Bae is a research professor at the Kim Dae-Jung Presidential

Library and Museum, Yonsei University and was a research associate at
the Princeton Institute of International and Regional Studies, Princeton
University. His interests include Korean foreign policy and decision-
making, unification of the Korean peninsula, and regional integration.
Jae Ho Chung is Professor of International Relations at Seoul National
University and Founder of the Asian Network for the Study of Local
China (ANSLoC). He is the author of Between Ally and Partner: Korea-
China Relations and the United States (2007) and editor of Charting
China’s Future (2006).
Kyudok Hong is Dean, College of Social Sciences, Sookmyung
Women’s University. He is currently the President of the International
Policy Studies Institute, Korea (IPSI-Kor) and Secretary General of the
Korean Academic Council to the United Nations System (K ACUNS).
He coedited Asia-Pacific Alliances in the 21st Century (2007).
In-Taek Hyun is Director of Ilmin International Relations Institute
and Professor of Political Science at Korea University. He is currently
serving as Senior Member of the 17th Presidential Transition Team of
the Republic of Korea.
Shin-wha Lee is professor and chair of the department of political
science and international relations, Korea University. She was special
advisor to the United Nations Independent Inquiry on Rwandan Genocide
and chair’s advisor to the East Asian Vision Group. Her numerous
publications on nontraditional security issues cover environmental and
human security themes, UN peacekeeping, and an East Asian security
community.
Gilbert Rozman is the Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton
University, where he has taught since 1970. Apart from this series, he
250 ● List of Contributors
wrote the monograph Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral

Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (2004) and also coedited
Korea at the Center: The Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia
(2006).
Seong-Ho Sheen is Assistant Professor and Director of the International
Cooperation Office at the Graduate School of International Studies,
Seoul National University, where he teaches East Asian Security and
U.S.-Korea Relations. He published “Preempting Proliferation: PSI and
Its Challenges,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Winter 2004).
Scott Snyder is Senior Associate in the International Relations program
of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS based in Washington,
DC. He served in Seoul as The Asia Foundation’s Korea representative
and with the U.S. Institute of Peace and The Asia Society. He wrote Paved
with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (coed., 2003).
Index
Abductions issue, 69, 88, 182, 186, 194 77–78, 81–82, 93, 164, 179, 237;
Abe Shinzo, 19, 114–15, 193–94, 198, recovery from, 139, 226
241 Asian Games, 13, 44, 158, 161
Afghanistan, 43, 206 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 71, 190,
Agreed Framework of 1994, 16, 59–62, 227
72–73, 78, 85, 94, 103, 137, 139, 189 Asian Pacific Economic Caucus
Albright, Madeleine, 85, 103 (APEC), 71, 105–6, 139, 215,
Alliance with the U.S., 18, 20, 22–28, 234–35, 241
225; impact of changes in, 34, 72, Asia-Pacific Council (ASPAC), 231–33
80, 143, 183; need for, 4–7, Aso Taro, 6, 195
63–64, 140, 186, 225, 235, Australia, 195, 229, 231
243–44; tensions in, 102, 111–20, Axis of evil, 103, 141, 198
157; versus national reconciliation,
56–57, 88, 102–3, 137–38, 195 Baekdu mountain, 109, 148
Anti-Americanism, 21, 36–38, 102, Balance of powers in Northeast Asia,
119–20, 142, 166, 192, 237; and 1, 4, 121, 220–21; goal of, 7, 186,
victimization, 23; causes of, 23, 63 204, 210–11, 218; and
Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, 214 regionalism, 8, 26, 92–93, 197
Anti-communism, 37, 46, 131, 133, Balancer (gyunhyongja), 2–3, 19–20,
136, 146, 205, 230–32, 238; and 95, 110–17, 121–22, 198, 240–41
its legacy, 14 Basic Agreement of 1991, 15, 49, 52,
Arc of freedom and prosperity, 6, 195 60, 65, 72, 82, 136–37, 141
Armistice agreement, 59, 69 BRIC countries, 212
ASEAN, 43–44, 229–34 Bush, George H.W., 24
ASEAN + 3, 17, 26, 64, 71, 91, 191, Bush, George W., 11, 195; and nuclear
195, 197, 229, 237, 243 crisis, 88, 105–10, 192–93, 198, 223;
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Sunshine Policy, 18, 24, 73,
235–36, 241 85–86, 94–96, 141, 191; unilateralism
Asia-Europe (ASEM) meetings, 92, 235 of, 19, 119, 142, 178, 218
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 233
Asian financial crisis, 16–17, 24, Carter, Jimmy, 36, 38, 59, 62, 157, 183
55–58, 70–71; and Japan, 25, 70, Central state (jungshim gukka), 2–3,
87, 179, 190–91; impact of, 71, 239
252 ● Index
Chaebol, 87 Council for Security Cooperation in

Cheney, Dick, 86 the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), 235,
China, and June 4, 1989, 15, 46; 241
economic integration with, 10, 14, Cultural diplomacy, 29, 244–45
25, 62 , 78, 83, 110–12, 161–63; Cultural opening to Japan, 87, 192,
engagement of, 7, 50, 58, 156–59, 238
166–67, 238; influence of, 12,
16–18, 23, 26–28, 62, 89–91, Declaration of June 23, 1973, 49
121; opening in 1971–72, 1, 39, Declaration of July 7, 1988, 49–51, 159
132–33, 139–40, 181, 185, 197, Declaration of nuclear assets, 109–10,
231–33; regional hegemony of, 242
4–5, 104, 229; role in strategic Demilitarized zone (DMZ), 21, 27, 45,
areas, 25–26, 65–66, 149, 150–51, 104, 116, 142; and Panmunjom,
159, 227 155
China’s rise, and South Korea, 2, 26, Democratization of South Korea, 2,
51, 121, 139, 154, 199, 240; and 13–14, 35–37, 45–49, 77, 136,
the U.S., 165–67, 170, 221; 139, 169, 228; and civilian
deference to, 4, 28; fever, 156, president, 55–56, 64, 138; and
166; threat of, 190, 194 legitimacy, 10, and the U.S.,
Cho Myong-rok, 85, 103 23–24; deepening of, 85, 97, 199
Chun Doo-hwan, 13–15, 23, 34–45, Deng Xiaoping, 46, 158
233; and China, 142–44, and the Denuclearization, as goal, 6, 29,
cold war, 2, 134, 146; and North 104–10, 132, 136, 142–48; and
Korea, 63, 146; legitimacy of, 9, China, 170; as a condition, 3, 9,
145, 180–83 12, 22, 25, 220
Clinton, Bill, 23–24; and China, 78, Dependency, 3–4, 9, 81, 138, 180, 184,
89–90; and Japan, 63; and Kim 228, 230; and self-esteem,
Dae-jung, 18, 94–95, 140; and 153–54, 168–70; deepening of,
Kim Young-sam, 16, 60, 94, 13, 22, 140, 182; economic,
138–39; and North Korea, 10, 39–40, 46, 48; goal of reducing it,
59–61, 85–86, 103 7, 25, 36–40, 133, 143, 155, 162;
Cold war impact, 1–3, 23, 146, 155, symbols of, 63
167, 186, 204, 228, 230–33, 218, Dialogue vs. pressure, 7, 104, 109
224; end of, 6, 13–15, 46–47, 55, Dictatorship, 7, 13, 23, 43, 180
95, 131, 136–37, 179, 183–86, Diplomatic cross-recognition, 39–40,
205–7, 234–35, 243; legacy of, 49–50, 145, 206–7
27, 81 Diplomatic diversification (oigyo
Comfort women, 114, 196 dabyonhwa), 2–3, 15, 50, 57,
Confidence-building measures, 5–8, 155–59, 161–62, 225, 228,
21, 243 232–34
Confucian thought, 34 Dokdo/ Takeshima, 68, 87–88, 97,
Congress of the United States, 94, 114, 114, 189, 194, 226
196
Cooperative security, 2–3, 47 East Asian Community (EAC), 6, 91,
Corruption, 15, 93 226, 229–30, 236–43
Index ● 253
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), Fukuda Takeo, 183

227, 235 Fukuda Yasuo, 19, 25, 226, 244
East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), 62
East Asian Study Group (EASG), 91, Gaesung Industrial Complex, 104–9,
229, 237–39 141–42
East Asian Summit (EAS), 91, 195, German reunification and ostpolitik,
229–30, 239–41 49, 61, 75, 136
East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), 91, Globalization (segyehwa) or globalism,
96, 229, 237–39 2–3, 15, 57–58, 71, 87, 139, 188,
East Timor, 92 191; or internationalization, 8
Eastern Europe, 51, 65, 159–61 Goguryo, 12, 26, 113–14, 167–68, 241
Economic assistance to North Korea, Gorbachev, Mikhail, 13; and
21, 83–84, 104–5, 109, 138–45; normalization, 46, 48, 70, 185,
by China, 163 197, 203–6, 221
Economic growth, and legitimacy, 34, Grand National Party (GNP, or
41, 180, 232–35; priority of, 6, 50, Hannara dang), 8, 21, 77, 166,
117, 133, 145 219–20
Economics, linked to politics, 34, 37, Greater Asian diplomacy, 29, 244
41, 42, 47–48; separate from Guam Doctrine, 36, 40, 180, 183,
politics, 11, 83, 139 231
Elections, for president in South Korea, Gulf War, 186
8–9, 15, 21, 26–27, 36, 102, 146–47, Gumchang-ri, 72, 88–89
169; and new leadership, 2, 77; for Gumgang mountain tourism, 18, 45,
National Assembly, 12, 84, 168 76, 104–6
Electricity, 142, 204, 215 Gwangju massacre, 14, 23, 35, 38, 41,
Energy, as Russian asset, 4, 86, 115, 159
204, 211–12, 215; diplomacy, 29;
for North Korea, 21, 142, 144; Hallstein Doctrine, 231–32
security, 13, 240; silk road, 245 Hanahoi, 56
Environment, 58, 87, 92, 234, 243 Han Sung-joo, 57
Europe, 22, 40–41, 47, 86, 116, 146; Hashimoto Ryutaro, 67–68, 187,
European Union (EU), 92, 229, 189
234, 244 Hill, Christopher, 97, 109–10
Export industries, breadth of, 6, 93 Hosokawa Morihiro, 68, 187
Hu Jintao, 170, 194, 214
Family reunions, 39, 50, 85, 134, 140 Hub of Northeast Asia, 102, 110–11,
Famine, 10, 17, 60–61, 77–78, 138, 188 116, 121, 167, 204, 239–40
Financial liberalization, 58, 93–94 Human rights, 12, 23, 106, 119, 143,
Fishing, 44, 87, 109, 140, 155 186, 209, 234
Flying geese model, 180 Humanitarian assistance, of South
Four-party talks, 17, 60, 66, 70, 89, Korea, 16, 21, 78–86, 105, 108,
138; after 2007, 109, 145, 169 138–40; by others, 16, 66, 95,
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 25, 188; suspension of, 144
91–92, 111, 117, 120, 168, 196, Humanitarian issues, 21, 41
240 Hyundai’s Chung Ju-young, 82, 141
254 ● Index
India, 43, 195, 212, 229 reciprocity, 83–85, 165; and

Intelligence, 14, 78, 82, 182, 209 Russia, 190, 208–12, 222;
International Atomic Energy Agency assertive policy of, 2, 80–82,
(IAEA), 59, 103, 109 91–92, 236; vision of, 80–81, 86,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 89, 91–92, 96–97, 237–39
16–17, 25, 70–71, 77, 94, 190–91 Kim Il-sung, 14, 38, 41, 49, 56,
Iraq War, 24, 88, 120, 167 133–34, 141, 186, 206–8; death
of, 59, 68, 71, 137, 188
Japan, 67–70, 86–89, 114; and Kim Jong-il, 11, 18, 62, 78, 148–49;
historical justice, 10, 16, 27, 117, and nuclear card, 19; and nuclear
179–80, 188–89; and history, 79, disablement, 21; and Putin,
91, 93, 182, 187, 192, 194, 227, 210–13, 221; and summits,
241; and normalization talks with 85–86, 95, 194; boom, 141; trust
North Korea, 140, 183–85, 197; of, 105, 137
bargaining with, 37, 181–83; loans Kim Jong-pil, 84
from, 37, 40, 42, 51, 65, 182–84; Kim Young-sam, 15–17, 23, 54–59,
occupation by, 3, 111, 179, 187, 137–39, 187; and China, 65–67,
228; power of, 4, 226; reentering 89, 161–64; and Japan, 63–64,
Asia, 2, 28; regional leadership of, 67–70, 186–89; and nuclear crisis,
1, 13–14, 184; sanctions of, 129, 59–62; and Russia, 70–71, 203,
190; security ties to, 78, 140, 183, 208; and the post cold war, 3, 55,
188–92, 232 62–63, 235
Japan-Soviet/Russian relations, 46, Koizumi Junichiro, 11, 18–20, 88–89,
182–83, 197, 204–7, 219 112, 114, 226, 241; and Bush, 93,
Jiang Zemin, 16–17, 65–66, 90, 139, 193–94, 198
161 Korea Trade Promotion Corporation
Johnson, Lyndon, 42 (KOTRA), 160
Joint Agreement of February 13, 2007, Korean Peninsula Energy Development
5, 8, 20–21, 113, 242; as turning Organization (KEDO), 78, 138
point, 9, 12, 108, 116–19, 144–46, Korean War, 6, 27, 63, 70, 109, 113,
170, 194; phases 1–2, 8, 21, 118, 133, 139–40, 204, 217; and
109–10, 149, 196, 220, 242 separated families, 37; end to, 3,
Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, 109, 146, 148, 230; records of,
18, 87 137, 208
Joint Statement of 2005, 142–43, 215; Korean wave, 26, 192, 196, 244–45
implementation of, 109 Koreans, in Japan (Jochongryon), 182;
Josun era, 3, 168 in Russia, 216
Kosovo War, 90, 140, 164
Kaifu Toshiki, 185
KAL 007, 36 Labor disputes, 48, 85, 93
Kanemaru Shin, 69, 185 Lee Hoi-chang, 94
Kim Dae-jung, 15, 17–19, 23, 41, 69, Lee Jong-seok, 104–7
139–42, 183; agreement with Lee Myung-bak, 8–9, 21–22, 25, 29,
Japan in 1998, 10–11, 25, 79–80, 122, 149, 169, 196, 199, 244–45;
86–89, 165, 189, 198; and election of, 3
Index ● 255
Li In-mo, 57 Natural resources, 39, 43–44, 211

Liberation Day speech 1996, 61, 138 New diplomacy (shin oigyo), 1, 8, 57,
Light-water nuclear reactors, 59, 78, 94 71, 229, 234–35
Lim Dong-won, 82, 87, 107 New Korea (shinhanguk), 56, 71
New Zealand, 229, 231
Mahathir Mohamad, 227 Nixon, Richard, 36, 40, 183
Malaysia, 43, 227, 231, 237 Nobel Peace Prize, 86, 92, 97
Mao Zedong, 141 Non-government organizations
Maritime vs. continental strategies, (NGOs), 83, 95
6, 14, 195, 240 Nordpolitik, 2–3, 23, 46–52, 65, 72,
Middle East, 43, 47 135, 159–60, 187, 205; as turning
Middle power, 4, 74, 92, 97–98, 111, point, 10, 14, 81, 229; significance
115, 170; and China and Japan, of, 34, 84, 89, 179, 234; start of,
28, 229; of Russia, 204–5, 218 155–58, 184–85, 205, 232
Military, background of leaders, 34, Normalization of relations, and
159; bases of the United States, 9, diversified options, 4, 10–11, 14,
22, 117–18; spending, 63–64, 72, 46–48, 133–35; hopes for, 9, 38,
111, 117, 138, 181 124, 164, 197; with China, 23, 65,
Ministerial consultations, 85, 132–34 89, 139–41, 154–58, 169, 228,
Ministry of National Defense, 117–18 231–32, 234; with Japan, 36–37,
Ministry of Unification, 82, 104–7, 41–42, 121, 178–83, 192; with
121, 137 Soviet Union, 65, 70, 155, 203–7,
Missiles, defense, 164, 213; freeze of 221, 228, 234
North Korea, 17, 95; threat of, North Korea, and regional competition,
94; tests in 2006, 105, 144 1, 120, 231–33, 242; and Chun
Miyazawa Kiichi, 67, 186–87 Doo-hwan, 134; and Kim
Mori Yoshiro, 87 pDae-jung, 139–41; and Kim
Multilateral regional security framework, Young-sam, 137–39; and Roh
22, 51, 92, 116, 195, 209, 225, 242; Moo-hyun, 103–10, 142–46; and
and alliance framework, 5–6, 63, Roh Dae-Woo, 134–37; and U.S.
95, 186, 232–36 troop withdrawal, 40, 45, 148;
Multipolarity, 64, 215 armed provocations of, 143;
Murayama Tomiichi, 68, 140, 187, 190 cultural cooperation with, 25, 79;
freedom of action of, 4; labor of,
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 180, 182 209; peaceful coexistence with,
Nakhodka industrial park, 216 23, 38, 129–32; nuclear card of,
National Assembly, 12, 19, 56, 92, 156, 19, 22; options toward, 5–8, 12;
168 subsidies to, 10, 211; threat of,
National identity, 7, 12–13, 111–14, 2–3, 6, 9, 34, 167, 190, 227; threat
120, 154, 162, 193, 226, 241; receding, 10, 63–64, 71, 159, 199;
Hanguknon, 184; and minjok, 57; trade with, 96; views of, 129–32
and Nihonjinron, 184 North-South summit, and transfer of
National Security Council (NSC), 102, funds, 11, 80, 97, 141, 239; hopes
104 for, 14, 20–21, 59, 96, 103,
National Security Law, 49 139–40; of 2000, 11, 17, 79,
256 ● Index
North-South summit—continued and Japan, 180–83, 196–97; and

84–85, 90, 94–95, 130, 140–41, the United States, 49
165, 190, 236; of 2007, 8, 12, 22, Peace dividend, 6–7
109–10, 117, 119, 132, 145, 148, Peace regime or treaty, 21, 59–60, 83,
183, 242 102–3, 107–10, 145–48, 196; and
Northeast Asian era, 2–3 Roh’s legacy, 3, 116, 242
Northeast Asian Cooperation Perry, William and the Perry process,
Initiative, 229–30, 239–42 10, 17, 24, 87, 94, 139–40, 190
Northeast Asian History Foundation, Persian Gulf War, 24
114 Philippines, 43, 160, 231
Northeast China, 47, 216 Pipelines, 92, 196–97, 236
Northern Limit Line (NLL), 109 Powell, Colin, 86
Nuclear crisis, comparison of two, 142; Primakov, Evgeni, 71, 140, 208
impact of the first one, 3, 10, Progressive-conservative split, 12,
15–16, 24, 55, 59–62, 71–72, 118, 15, 22, 49, 94, 122, 138, 148,
131, 138, 163, 188, 235; impact of 186, 192–93, 198–99; nature of
the second one, 1, 8, 96, 104–5, rift, 2, 7–8, 18–19; and elections,
130, 167, 193, 199, 212–13, 240 26–27
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
(NPT), 57, 59, 103, 125 106, 143
Nuclear reactor shutdown and Public opinion, 35, 48–49, 113, 120,
disablement, 21, 108–9, 145, 242 143, 156, 163, 244; and China,
Nuclear test of 2006, 98, 119, 122, 167–68; and Japan, 87, 160,
144, 147, 170; responses to, 8, 180–81, 185 188–96; and North
220, 227 Korea, 80, 83–85, 97, 106–9, 119,
Nuclear weapons, program of South 134–41; importance of, 2
Korea, 38, 40, 51, 133, 142; start Putin, Vladimir, 11, 18–19, 115, 203,
in North Korea, 50, 190 210–20
Nye Report, 63, 72
Railroads, linking North and South,
Obuchi Keizo, 79, 87, 97, 189 21, 143–44, 148, 236; iron silk
Oil, 43–44, 211; deliveries to the road or Trans-Siberian-Korean
North, 109 (TSK), 92, 142, 214–17
Olympics in Seoul, 2, 9–10, 13, 44–47, Rangoon bombing, 38
51, 158, 160, 226; preparations Reagan, Ronald, 23–24, 36, 42–43,
for, 37, 134, 205 51, 134, 182
Organization for Economic Realism, as a standard, 2, 182, 230,
Development and Cooperation 238, 242
(OECD), 71, 235 Red Cross, 39, 156
Organization for Security and Regionalism, and South Korean
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 242 initiative, 11, 91–93, 188, 197; as
policy challenge, 2, 25–28, 193;
Park Chul-un, 50, 159 emergence of, 6, 17, 57, 185,
Park Chung-hee, 34–43, 50, 63, 133, 225–28; interest in, 71, 191, 204,
146; and China, 154–57, 231–33; 221, 230–45
Index ● 257
Reunification, 2; and competition of 112–13, 158,187; economics of, 6,

North and South, 6, 136–37, 181; 110–11
and Koreanization, 3, 206; and Sino-Soviet/ Russian ties, 15, 41,
regime collapse, 61, 117, 137; costs 46–51, 147, 204–6, 228; and
of, 117; path to, 11, 27, 79, 83, strategic partnership, 64, 71, 210,
106–7, 145, 210, 220; proposals of 221
1970s-80s, 39, 44–45, 133–36, Sino-U.S. relations, 66–67, 78, 90, 121,
221; shifting views of, 27–28, 50, 160, 181, 197, 231–32
81, 116, 141, 204 Six-Party Talks, coordination in,
Revisionism, 2, 7, 11, 28, 192, 199 20–21, 25, 108–10, 148–49, 170;
Rhee, Syngman, 37, 40, 133, 140 and Japan, 195–98; impact of, 5,
Roh Moo-hyun, 19–22, 101–3, 219, 242; rapprochement of U.S. and
239–42; and Bush, 213; and China in 2007, 6, 144; and
economic interdependence, 136, Russia, 203, 213–20; working
220, and reciprocity, 7, 12, 108–9, groups, 6, 21–22, 144–45, 242
119, 142–45; boldness of, 2–3, 20, Soft power, 26, 29, 235–36
119–22, 194, 242–42; Japan Soft-landing vs. hard-landing, 60–62,
policy of, 192–96, 227, 241; 68, 140
Northeast Asian priority of, South Korea, as driving force, 3–4, 8,
110–17, 243 15, 22, 105–6, 110, 115, 160–61,
Roh Tae-woo, 35–36, 45–52, 72; and 235; economic miracle, 2, 14, 38,
China, 159–61; and end of the 134–38, 169, 184, 186;
cold war, 2, 14, 61, 135, 184; and generational differences, 19, 27,
Japan, 184–86; and North Korea, 142, 166; regional differences, 18,
138, 146, and Russia, 205–7; 27, 78–79
legitimacy of, 10, 15, 136, 145 South-North Joint Communique
Russia, imperialist history of, 216–17; (Nambuk gongdong sungmyong)
loans to, 48, 206–7, 211, 221; of 1972, 39, 133, 138, 140, 232
power of, 4, 60, 218, 240; regional South-South conflict (Nam-Nam
aspirations of, 28, 204–5, 212; galdung), 80, 239
relevance of, 16, 58, 70–71, 78, South-South relations, 13, 43–44, 49
92, 115, 208, 217; variations in Southeast Asia, 13, 43, 49, 150,
responses to, 7, 29, 203, 220–21 229–31, 234
Russian Far East, 92, 207–9, 215–16; Soviet Union, and end of cold war, 1,
and Siberia, 204, 211–12 133–34; and airplane downing,
143; as a threat, 5, 23; collapse of,
Sadae, 3, 111, 113, 168 55, 204–5, 211, 220
Self-reliant defense (jaju gukbang), 8, Sunshine Policy (poyong jongchaek), 1–2,
94, 111–12, 117–22, 143, 232 17–18, 104, 164–65, 179; as turning
Shanghai Cooperation Organization point, 9, 116–7; meaning of, 11,
(SCO), 195 79–86, 139–40, 236; responses to,
Singapore, 43 89–90, 94, 189, 191, 208
Sino-Japanese-South Korean triangle,
54, 67, 93, 101, 197, 226, 243; Taepodong missile launch in 1998, 10,
diplomacy of, 17, 28, 46, 90–91, 24, 94, 140, 189
258 ● Index
Taiwan, 48, 64, 112, 139, 154–58, 169, alliance triangle, 6, 25, 29,
190, 231; abandonment of, 15; 191–93, 197–98, 227–28, 232,
crisis of 1996, 17, 6–67 238; and defense guidelines, 190
Terror sponsoring states and Trading Universal values, 6, 23, 29, 119,
with the Enemy Act, 110 192–93, 195, 209, 234
Terrorist bombing in 1987, 44 Uranium enrichment, 110
Thailand, 43 Uri Party, 12, 19, 166
Three-party talks of 2003, 169
Tiananmen, 15, 160, 206 Vietnam War, 36–42, 156–57, 180,
Tributary system, 3, 228 231
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight
Group (TCOG), 87, 191, 227 Walker, Richard, L., 23, 51
War on terror, 27, 215; and U.S.
Unification through absorption, 11, response, 2, 103–4 118, 141,
107, 116–18, 136–42, 188 198, 244
United Nations, 156, 186, 215; Weapons of Mass Destruction
simultaneous entry into, 15, 23, (WMD), 27, 83, 106, 215
40, 43–49, 133–36, 185, 206, Wen Jiabao, 115
228, 231 World Cup in 2002, 68, 87, 93,
United Nations Security Council, 235; 191–92, 226
and Japan, 115, 193–94; approved World Trade Organization (WTO), 78,
sanctions of, 5, 20, 144; 90, 187, 209, 235
resolutions, 62, 106 World War II, 3, 196, 198, 228
United States, abandonment by, 38, 72; Wu Yi, 89
and coordination over North
Korea, 60–64, 85–88, 94–96; and Yasukuni Shrine, 27, 88–89, 112, 114,
regionalism, 6, 244; economic 189, 192, 226
pressure of, 16, 24, 184–85, 234; Yeltsin, Boris, 70, 140, 203, 207–8,
sanctions for counterfeiting, 221
143–46; strategic flexibility of, 4, Yongbyon nuclear facilities, 103,
108–10, 117–20, 169; troop 108–10
realignment of, 16, 38–39, 157, Yushin (Revitalized Reform)
196, 232, 240; unilateralism of, Constitution, 39, 51
188
United States-Japan alliance, 64–69, Zeng Qinghong, 226
114, 120, 139, 181–83, 188; and Zhu Rongji, 90

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South Korean Strategic Thought

Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia

Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia

Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia

9 South Korean Strategic Thought toward Russia 203

List of Contributors 249

Terms such as “nordpolitik,” “cooperative security,” “globalization,”

cooperative security. The second period is the time of Kim Young-sam,

Priorities in Strategic Thinking

discussion of its possible future regional hegemony. Russia has lost

Also critical to prioritizing goals in East Asia is figuring out how to

dividend for the economy. Indeed, a fourth priority of normalizing

the latter fault so-called appeasement policies for naively pursuing

December 19 with domestic economic issues foremost on voters’ minds,

Turning Points in Strategic Thinking

states raised hopes for economic and political normalization.

The Transition from Chun Doo-hwan to Roh Tae-Woo

power would become the means to political breakthroughs. The United

The Kim Young-sam Period

Kim’s ties to the Clinton administration advanced unevenly. It took

The Kim Dae-jung Period

importance as the anchor in facing the North’s inclination to brink-

The Roh Moo-hyun Period

of 2004 in search of a future vision and in ref lections on more than a

presidential election and in the shadow of critical watersheds in Phase 2

The United States as a Factor in South Korean

movement in 1986–87 exposed the shortsightedness of the Reagan

Forces of Change in Strategic Thinking

Lessons for Strategic Thinking

Second, successive experiences since nordpolitik demonstrate that

South Korean Strategic

responded to both domestic and international challenges. South Korea’s

Decision-Making Authority and

through bold foreign policy initiatives and positive results in areas

he expressed strong anticommunist sentiments and sought an image as

As for Kissinger’s other two factors shaping leadership types, South

Changing Dynamics of the International System

relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the one

following: 1) not to oppose North Korea’s participation in international

Key Strategic Decisions under Park Chung-hee

in the United States before he finally won approval from Lyndon

Key Strategic Decisions under Chun Doo-hwan

oil. In addition, the ASEAN countries, which accounted for 76 percent

states, and the establishment of resident liaison missions in each other’s

Nordpolitik under Roh Tae-woo

pledging to double his efforts to outperform his predecessors in order to

China’s borders to investment and trade with a desire to encourage

The Security Dimension

The Economic Dimension

The Domestic Political Dimension

attempting to reunite families, and opening trade contacts. The remain-

initiative since it was encouraging Russia and China to get further

affected Pyongyang. Despite his repeated pledge not to isolate North

22. Hong Yung Lee, “South Korea in 1991: Unprecedented Opportunity,

Strategic Thought toward

financial crisis. Russian ties grew less important, but in 1996–97

New Korea, New Strategy

to establish the Globalization Promotion Commission (Segyehwa chujin

emotional rekindling of historical issues on the other. In comparison to

The First Nuclear Crisis and the

Even though this historic agreement appeared to be a turning point

Post–Cold War Developments in the ROK-U.S.