SEVILLA v. PEOPLE
He claims that the Information that was filed against him
FACTS: Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged
with the felony of falsification of public document, penalized under
Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term
as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in
his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of
whether there is a pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked
the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a
criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint, docketed
as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed against Sevilla.
Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the
"no" answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any pending
criminal case. However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify
his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a
member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office
yet, he just stayed in his house. At around two o’clock in the
afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish
his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of
Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructed
Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which
he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and
delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the
same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he
failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any
pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to
the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Torres, a former City
Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office
space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the
members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter,
they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres
further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla,
the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision finding Sevilla guilty of
Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless Imprudence.
Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC
since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s
PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false
entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 11
of the RPC.
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether
there was a pending criminal case against him was not the only defect
in his PDS. In answer to question in the PDS, accused answered that
he had not been a candidate in any local election (except barangay
election), when in fact he ran and served as councilor of Malabon
from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question
29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he
was a councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a
negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation of the PDS
was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of
the felony of falsification of public documents through reckless
imprudence.
specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional
felony. Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC,
which is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in
the Information was for the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the
RPC. NO
2. Whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public document is necessarily included in the intentional
felony of falsification of public document under Article
171(4). YES
RULING #1: The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless
imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted
into the falsification of a public document. However, the
Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing
designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself
but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
The proposition that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.
There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code
is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x
It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
whole class, or series, of crimes.
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense
without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and
bar in strict adherence to precedent.17 (Emphasis ours) Thus, the
proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of
public documents through reckless imprudence.
RULING #2: Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance
between the offense charged in the Information that was filed against
him and that proved by the prosecution.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged
against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution.
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful
crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x,
but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our
Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the
present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but
from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals
found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the
cashing of checks inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal
intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure
himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent
man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which
charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but
negligent.
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when
the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged
the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is
untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the
willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the
greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public
documents.
PEOPLE v. MELECIO REYES
FACTS: An information was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna charging Melecio A. Reyes with the crime of "estafa through
falsification of a private document”.
The accused in this case was in charge of entering the laborers'
workdays in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate. He is
accused of having falsified the time book by making it appear that the
laborer Ciriaco Sario worked twenty-one days during the month of
July, 1929, when in reality he had only worked eleven; and having
charged the wages of said laborer for twenty-one days, at the rate of
P1 a day, he prejudice the Calamba Sugar Estate in the amount of
P10.
The evidence shows the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
But he defends himself, alleging that it was on Erquiza, who collected
the wages appertaining to Sario. This individual, however, was not
produced to testify in the case. At any event, it appears that the
accused, knowing that Ciriaco Sario worked only eleven days, altered
and falsified the time book, putting down twenty-one workdays for
Ciriaco Sario, and this constitutes the crime of falsification of a
private document to the prejudice of a third person. The trial court
found the accused guilty of the crime of estafa through falsification of
a private document.
The Attorney-General recommends the affirmance of the judgment
appealed from with the modification that the fine should be imposed
in the maximum degree, taking into account article 89 of the Penal
Code, in view of the fact that the offense is estafa, as defined and
penalized in article 304.
There is no question as to the facts. The only difficulty in this appeal
lies in the interpretation to be given to article 304 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE: When a private document is forged to defraud a third person,
is the crime falsification and estafa? NO. Falsification of a private
document with prejudice to a third person
RULING: There are several cases cited in this case and a careful
examination of these cases cited will show that in the De Castro case,
supra, the court considered the accused guilty of two different crimes:
Estafa, defined and penalized in paragraph 1, article 535 of the Penal
Code; and falsification of a private document, defined and penalized
in article 304 of said Code. And, applying article 89 of the Penal
Code, the court imposed the penalty fixed in article 304 in the
maximum degree. In the Victoria case, article 304 of the Penal Code
was applied, without taking into account the complex nature of the
crime, or the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. In the Chan
Tiao case, the penalty provided in article 304, Penal Code, was
imposed but without taking article 89 into account, and in this case it
was held that the prejudice occasioned or intended by the offender,
does not constitute the crime of estafa. And in the Rosales case, the
accused was sentenced to the penalty fixed in article 534 of the Penal
Code, but without applying article 89 of the Code.
Therefore, where the defendant is accused of estafa with falsification
of a private document, or falsification of a private document with
prejudice to a third person, the weight of authority favors the doctrine
that there are not two distinct crimes committed, estafa and
falsification, and that article 89 of the Penal Code is not applicable.
But it should be observed that although articles 304 and 534,
paragraph 3, of our Penal Code provide the same personal penalty, i.
e., presidio correccional in the minimum and medium degrees, the
first of these articles further provides a fine ranging from 625 to
6,250 pesetas; and that article 534 was amended, on November 28,
1925, by section 2 of Act No. 3244, which adds paragraph 4,
providing the penalty of presidio correccional in the maximum degree
to presidio mayor in the minimum, if the fraud exceeeds fifty
thousand pesetas. In view of this amendment, we are of the opinion
that if an information is filed charging the accused with the crime of
estafa through falsification of a private document, and the value of
the fraud exceeds 50,000 pesetas, all of which is proved at the trial,
the proper penalty would be that fixed in paragraph 4, article 534, of
the Penal Code.lawph!l.net
By virtue of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so
hold that the defendant's falsification of the time book, with the intent
of gain at the expense of the Calamba Sugar Estate constitutes the
crime of falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third
person, defined and penalized in article 304 of the Penal Code.
LIMSON v. GONZALEZ
FACTS: On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal
charge against Gonzalez for falsification, before the Prosecutor's
Office of Mandaluyong City.
The charge for [sic] falsification of Limson is based on Limson’s
assertion that in the records of the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered
as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name
‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, and who pretends to be said
architect. Registered [sic] with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore,
guilty [sic] of falsification x x x."
Gonzalez filed his Counter-Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail
that his full name is EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second
given name) GONZALEZ (father’s family name) y REGALADO
(mother’s family name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was
still in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO
GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ and
that thereafter, he transferred to the University of Santo Tomas and
therein took up architecture and that upon commencement of his
professional practice in 1943, he made use of his second name,
JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has identified
himself as much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,
because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common
surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish
himself with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given
name, EUGENIO. Gonzalez supposed [sic] his allegations with
various supporting documents x x x.
The Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez,
finding that indeed EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES [sic] is the
architect registered in the PRC. Limson elevated the Resolution of the
Prosecutor x x x to the Secretary of Justice. However, the Secretary
of Justice dismissed the appeal of Limson.
Not content with said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, Limson
filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed with finality.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Limson filed a new letter complaint
against Gonzalez, with the Secretary of Justice. She alleged the same
basic facts, evidence, and charges, as already resolved by the
Prosecutor and affirmed with finality, by the Secretary of Justice; but
adding the accusation that because Gonzalez used various
combinations of his name, in different signature, on the [sic] different
occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the
Anti-Alias Law).
The Prosecutor rendered a Resolution, dismissing the new complaint.
Limson insists that the names "Eugenio Gonzalez" and "Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez y Regalado" did not refer to one and the same individual;
and that respondent was not a registered architect contrary to his
claim. According to her, there were material discrepancies between
the graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he
earned his degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas,
Manila,5 and another photograph of him taken for his driver’s license
in 1996,6 arguing that the person in the latter photograph was not the
same individual depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits
documents showing that respondent used aliases from birth, and
passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not. She prays
that the proper criminal cases for falsification of public document and
illegal use of alias be filed against respondent
Respondent counters that he did not use any aliases; that his use of
conflicting names was the product of erroneous entry, inadvertence,
and innocent mistake on the part of other people; that Limson was
motivated by malice and ill will, and her charges were the product of
prevarication; and that he was a distinguished architect and a
respected member of the community and society.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez violated the Anti-Alias Law? NO.
RULING: On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court
observes that respondent’s aliases involved the names "Eugenio
Gonzalez", "Eugenio Gonzales", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez", "Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez y Regalado", "Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez", "Eugenio J.
Gonzalez", and – per Limson – "Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez." But
these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an
erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in
one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or
second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from
error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What
is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names
within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were
not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown
to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or
confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was
justified in fact and in law.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used
by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in
addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or
baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a
competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases.9 An alias is thus a name that is
different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a
name that is not different from his true name.
In Ursua v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court tendered an enlightening
discourse on the history and objective of our law on aliases that is
worth including here, viz:
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in
the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied.1âwphi1 Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings
and recorded in the civil register.
MASANGKAY v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law
wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena), Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and
his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the
incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was
incorporated in June 1990.5
On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the SEC a Petition for the
Involuntary Dissolution. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar
and Elizabeth.7 The said petition was made under oath before a
notary public, and alleged among others that around September 1,
1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused to be
prepared a Secretary’s Certificate which states that at a special
meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its
principal office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by
unanimous votes of the directors present at said meeting and
constituting a quorum was approved and adopted and that Lot No.
2069-A-2 situated at Bo. Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna containing an area
of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the corporation
worth or valued at ₱370,000.00 by way of a "Deed of Exchange with
Cancellation of Usufruct". In addition, Eriberto alleged that said
secretary’s certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because
the alleged meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5,
1992 did not actually materialize and that using the said falsified and
spurious document, x x x respondents executed another fictitious
document known as the "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of
Usufruct".
Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no
meeting of the Board held on December 5, 1992 and that the Deed of
Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious instrument, the
respondent in the SEC case, Cesar, filed a complaint for perjury10
against Eriberto before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal.
Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He also insisted
that there was a prejudicial question. These defenses were sustained
by the assistant provincial prosecutor and the complaint for perjury
was dismissed for lack of merit. It was however reinstated upon
petition for review before the Department of Justice.
Eriberto filed a motion to quash. However, the same was denied by
the MeTC.
Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea
of not guilty during arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar
as its sole witness.23 He testified that on December 5, 1992, a
meeting of the Board of Directors was held at 9:00 o’clock in the
morning at the office of MFI in Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna. He
presented the minutes of the alleged meeting and reiterated the details
contained therein indicating that the Board unanimously approved
Magdalena’s proposal to exchange her son’s (Gilberto Masangkay
[Gilberto]) property with MFI shares of stock.24 The prosecution
established that one of the signatures appearing in the minutes
belongs to Eriberto.25 This allegedly belies Eriberto’s statement that
the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize," and
shows that he knew his statement to be false because he had attended
the meeting and signed the minutes thereof. The prosecution also
pointed out that in the proceedings before the guardianship court to
obtain approval for the exchange of properties, Eriberto had testified
in support of the exchange.26 The guardianship court subsequently
approved the proposed transaction.27 The resulting Deed of
Exchange contained Eriberto’s signature as first party.28
As for Eriberto’s statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated,
the prosecution disputed this by again using the minutes of the
December 5, 1992 meeting, which states that the property of Gilberto
will be exchanged for 3,700 MFI shares.
For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting
did not actually take place. While he admitted signing, reading and
understanding the minutes of the alleged meeting, he explained that
the minutes were only brought by Cesar and Elizabeth to his house
for signing, but there was no actual meeting.29
To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense
presented Elizabeth, the MFI corporate secretary, who could not
remember with certainty if she had sent out any notice for the
December 5, 1992 meeting and could not produce any copy thereof.
The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19,
1993, which called for the MFI board’s initial meeting "since its
business operations started," to be held on November 9, 1993.
Emphasizing the words "initial meeting," Eriberto argued that this
proves that prior to November 9, 1993, no meeting (including the
December 5, 1992 meeting) had ever taken place.
As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the
Deed of Exchange was fictitious and simulated for lack of
consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never issued stock
certificates in favor of his son Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth
corroborated this statement and admitted that stock certificates were
never issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders.30
While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its
approval by the guardianship court, Eriberto maintained that he did so
because he was convinced by private complainant Cesar that the
exchange would benefit his son Gilberto. He however reiterated that,
to date, Gilberto is not a stockholder of MFI, thus has not received
any consideration for the exchange.
On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eriberto’s claim that the board
had its first actual meeting only on November 9, 1993. It explained
that the November 9, 1993 meeting was the initial meeting "since
business operations began", because MFI obtained permit to conduct
business only in 1993. But the November 9, 1993 meeting was not
the first meeting ever held by the board of directors. The prosecution
presented the secretary’s certificates of board meetings held on April
6, 199231 and September 5, 199232 -- both before November 9, 1993
and both signed by Eriberto.33 At this time, business operations have
not yet begun because the company’s hotel building was still under
construction. The said secretary’s certificates in fact show that MFI
was still sourcing additional funds for the construction of its hotel.34
Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a judgment35 holding that the
prosecution was able to prove that the December 5, 1992 meeting
actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced
by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for Eriberto’s statement
that the Deed of Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that his
participation in the approval and execution of the document, as well
as his avowals before the guardianship court regarding the proposed
exchange all militate against his previous statement.
RTC affirmed the MeTC’s conviction of Eriberto. The CA also
affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the
prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in the petition for
involuntary dissolution were deliberately made.
The CA rejected petitioner’s argument that the two statements were
not material. It ruled that they were material because petitioner even
cited them as principal basis for his petition for involuntary
dissolution.41
ISSUE: Whether or not Eriberto is guilty for the crime of perjury
under Article 183 of the RPC. NO.
RULING: For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement
that is required by law; (2) it must be made under oath before a
competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate assertion of
falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a material
matter.
The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the
petitioner and they are indeed present in the instant case. The sworn
statements which contained the alleged falsehoods in this case were
submitted in support of the petition for involuntary dissolution, as
required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code.1avvphi1
The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public.
It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false
statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution which are
contested.
On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact
which is the subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which
tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of
inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who
testifies.51
The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the
very grounds he relied upon in his petition for corporate dissolution.
They refer to acts of the MFI directors which are allegedly
fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify
corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code.
Evidently, these statements are material to his petition for involuntary
dissolution. The element of materiality is therefore present.
The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate
falsehood.
The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt
the falsehood of petitioner’s statement that the December 5, 1992
meeting "did not actually materialize." In other words, the
prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place.
To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the
minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by the
accused, which are inconsistent with his statement that the December
5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According to the
minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according
to the petitioner’s statement in the petition for dissolution, the
meeting did not actually materialize or take place. The two statements
are obviously contradictory or inconsistent with each other. But the
mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two statements
merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the
two statements is actually false. The minutes could be true and the
sworn statement false. But it is equally possible that the minutes are
false and the sworn statement is true. Given the alternative
possibilities, it is the prosecution’s burden to affirmatively prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the
true one, while the other statement (in the petition for dissolution) is
the false one.
We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained
by the prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent or
contradictory statements of the accused, even if both statements are
sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by
evidence other than the contradictory statement.53 The rationale for
requiring evidence other than a contradictory statement is because the
two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some
corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration,
however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show
perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused.
The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution
claimed to be perjurious reads that using the said falsified and
spurious document, respondents executed another fictitious document
known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct which
is said to be void.

Petitioner here is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his

statement that the deed of exchange is fictitious. To support the
accusation, the prosecution proved that petitioner assented to the said
Deed of Exchange by virtue of his signatures in the minutes of the
alleged December 5, 1992 meeting and on the instrument itself, and
his participation in procuring the guardianship court’s approval of the
transaction. These allegedly show that the exchange was not fictitious
and that Eriberto knew it.

We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioner’s imputation

of fictitiousness to the Deed of Exchange should not be taken out of
context. Petitioner’s statement that the exchange was "simulated and
fictitious x x x because they x x x deprived [Gilberto] of his own
property without any consideration at all" cannot be considered a
deliberate falsehood. It is simply his characterization of the
transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did not receive
consideration for the exchange of his land.

As importantly, petitioner’s statements in paragraph 5 of the petition

for involuntary dissolution about the nature of the Deed of Exchange
are conclusions of law, and not factual statements which are
susceptible of truth or falsity. His opinion or legal conclusion may
have been wrong (as failure of consideration does not make a contract
simulated or fictitious),56 but it is an opinion or legal conclusion
nevertheless. An opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an
intentional false statement of facts.