COLLEGE OF LAW

University of the Cordilleras

Baguio City

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: MIDTERMS (PART I)

DIGEST CASES (2000- 2018 as much as possible) EACH INVOLVING THE

FOLLOWING TOPICS:

1. Difference between special proceedings and civil actions (2 cases)

2. Jurisdiction of a probate court/ probate jurisdiction (2)
3. Partition as a mode of settling the estate of a deceased person (2)
4. Probate of a holographic will (5)
5. Probate of a notarial will (5)
6. Letters testamentary and letters of administration (2)
7. Executors (5)
8. Administrators (5)
9. Special administrator (2)
10. Trustees relating to wills (2)
11. Claims against estate (5)
12. Payment of debts of estate (1)
13. Distribution and Partition of estate (3)
14. Escheat (3)
15. Guardianship (3)
16. Trustees relating to written instruments other than a will (2)
17. Adoption (3)
18. Rescission of adoption (1)
19. Revocation of adoption (3)
20. Hospitalization of insane persons (2)
21. Habeas corpus (5)
22. Writ of amparo (2)
23. Habeas data (2)
24. Change of name / cancellation or correction of entry in civil registry (6)
25. Dissolution of corporation (most recent) (1)
26. Filiation (2)
27. Declaration of presumptive death (2)
28. Absentee (2)
29. Advance distribution of proceeds in special proceedings (1)

Additional instructions: this will be 30% of your midterms. Email to

amymac0207@gmail.com individually on or before march 30, 2020. If you
cannot timely comply due to covid-related reasons, I need your honest
explanation. Stay safe. Wash with soap and water, it is more effective than
alcohol.
Difference between special proceedings and civil
actions (2 cases)

Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

Doctrine/s:

An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice

in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term “special proceeding” may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of
a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.”

Facts:

Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were

registered owners of a parcel of land located in Manila. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six
children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s
estate.

On 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an

“Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then donated to his children, share
and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Graciano’s name.
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia
Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold his land to his
wife Patricia. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his
second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as
heirs.

Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon

Graciano’s death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment
of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, making it appear that
Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation and the issuance of
title in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of
such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or
as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of
advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir
of the deceased.”

CA reversed and set aside the lower court.

Issue:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general

jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the
heirs?

Held:

No. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil
Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out
said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages

is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Republic vs. Madrona G.R 16304; May 6, 2005; 458 SCRA 200

Principles:

1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of contracting a

subsequent marriage is not a special proceeding. It is a summary ordinary
proceeding.
2. Ordinary civil action vs. Special proceeding
- Ordinary civil action – one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong ( Section 3(a),
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court)
- period to appeal- 15 days
- perfection of appeal- notice of appeal

- -Special proceeding- a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a

right or a particular fact ( Section 3 © Rule 1 of the Rules of Court).

- Period to appeal- 30 days

- Perfection of appeal- notice of appeal+ record on appeal.

FACTS:

Regional Trial Court granted the petition for the declaration of presumptive death and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner- wife nine years
earlier, presumptively dead. The Republic, through the OSG, sought to appeal the RTC’s
order by filing a Notice of Appeal. RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal since RTC
believed that the present case is a special proceeding that needs a record of appealto
perfect the appeal. The republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
The Republic then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was
also denied on the same grounds.

ISSUE: WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death is a summary ordinary
proceeding and not a special proceeding.

HELD: NO. A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary ordinary

proceeding and not a special proceeding.

It is an ordinary proceeding since Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and record on appeal is
required for an appeal to be perfected, does not include declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse in its enumeration.

It is a summary proceeding since Artice 41 of the Family Code provides that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage is a summary proceeding.

Not being a special proceeding, the petition therefore does not need a record of appeal to
perfect the appeal. Rule 41, Section 2 subsection (a) of the Revised Rules of Court
provide that a record of appeal is only needed in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these rules require.

Probate of a notarial will (5)

1.Baltazar v. Laxa

G.R. No. 174489, 11 April 2012, 669 SCRA 249

FACTS:

Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and testament
in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of
retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her
last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated
as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his
own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death.

Four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of
Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance
of Letters of Administration in his favor. Antonio Baltazar, petitioner filed an
opposition to Lorenzo’s petition and averred that the properties subject of
Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest;
hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins
and that that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she
would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later. On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor
nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based
on her personal assessment.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of
Paciencias Will on the grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a
Will at the time of its execution, that she was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threat and that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo.

Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any
mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. Lorenzo
belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery
upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the
same was executed.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason
or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went
up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD:

Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with
the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the
Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that
the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in
the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners
acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although
they question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the
voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with
the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of
the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be
in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall
be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.”
2. G.R. No. 169144               January 26, 2011

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE

WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL
MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

FACTS:

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a

naturalized United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C.
Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the US. On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas,
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as
special administrator of her estate. On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners
Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the
Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and
without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act.
Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio,
were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent
Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it
granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their
memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated
in and allowed by a court in the Philippines. On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an
order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an
unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated
for the first time in the Philippines. On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,
affirming the assailed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed
the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the
authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of
required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said
the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and
allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in

the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed.
RULING Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to
the formalities observed in his country. In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have
been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and
Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated
and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since
this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings
of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.

3. ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, -versus

ROSARIO GUEVARA AND HER HUSBAND PEDRO BUISON,
RESPONDENT-APPELLEES. G.R. No. L-48840, EN BANC, December
29, 1943, OZAETA, J.

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the
whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator. Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will
and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind
and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by
means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the
court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the
certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which
the land lies.

It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will
to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a
person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000,
and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there
until he delivers the will.

FACTS

Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their
inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by
Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict
legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased. The defendant answered
the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff might have had, had
been barred by the operation of law.

It appears that Victorino L. Guevara executed a will apparently with all the formalities of
the law, wherein he made the several bequests and devices.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament,
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various
legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been
given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their
favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of
Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have
possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed
of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions
made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter
and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171
hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after
the testator's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against
Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose herein before indicated; and it was only during
the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having
it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged
her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of
the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because
the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein
made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be
disregarded.

Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario
Guevara was legal? (NO)

RULING:

We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in
our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the
last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force
up to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent
provisions:

Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass
either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First
Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will shall,
within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the
court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A person named as
executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testor, or
within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such
knowledge after knowing of the death of the testor, present such will to the court which
has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall,
within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in
writing his refusal to accept it.

The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which
took effect on July 1, 1940. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with
notice by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.

Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact
that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not
acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by
means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the
court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the
certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which
the land lies.

It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will
to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a
person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000,
and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there
until he delivers the will.

The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of the word
"legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of a deceased
person's estate, whether he died testate or intestate may be made under the conditions
specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as
the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the non-presentation of a will for
probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to
present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously
provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial
partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not
say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among
themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The
petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two
different things, although both may be made in the same case, the allowance of a will
precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78).

One can have a will probated without necessarily securing letters

testamentary or of administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to
Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make
an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so
away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression
of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given
to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and
devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the
estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the
existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be
disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the
custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity
and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in
accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court,
first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the
probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted
by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance
with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means
provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and
all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in
evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could
decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary
action for reinvindicacion or partition.

We therefore believe and so holds that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, do not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent.

4.FELIX AZUELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO

substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO GR. NO. 122880

April 12, 2006

FACTS:

Felix Azuela filed a petition for probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. Felix
is the son of the cousin of Eugenia. The will consists of two pages and written in
Filipino language. Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada were
the three named witnesses in the will who affixed their signatures on the left-
hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation
clause. The probate petition stated only two heirs, legatees and devisees of the
decedent, namely: Felix Azuela and Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have
resided abroad. The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo, who
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of Eugenia.
Geralda claimed that the will is a forgery and argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She claimed that the Eugenia’s
signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not
properly acknowledged. After due trial the Regional Trial Court admitted the will
to probate. Ernesto Castillo (substituted Geralda) appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the dismissal of
the petition for probate. CA noted that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of
probate. Felix argued that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code
that the number of pages used in a notrial will be stated in the attestation clause
is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to the
substantial compliance rule.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the requirement of the law of placing the pages used in the
attestation clause is merely directory and susceptible to substantial
compliance rule.

2. Whether or not the signatures of the witnesses in the left-hand margin of

the second and last page of the will conform substantially to the law and
may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

3. Whether or not the will of Eugenia was properly acknowledged by the

notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista , who wrote “nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo”

RULING:

1.No. The Supreme Court stated three cases. In Manuel Singsong v. Emilia
Florentino, et al, it was held the will is valid although the attestation in the subject
will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was
found in the last part of the body of the will. In Apolonio Tabaoada v. Hon.
Avelino Rosal et al, the will was held valid because the notarial
acknowledgement in the will states the number of pages used.

In the case of re: Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which
failed to state the number of sheets or pages used, it was denied probate for it
cannot be denied that the requirement affords additional security that the will may
be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material. However in the present case, the
number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the will. The will does
not even contain notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the
will should be stated. With regards to the substantial compliance rule the
Supreme Court stated that in the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue
and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance
with all the requirements of article 805. At the present case it is apparent that it
lacks the requirement of stating in the attestation clause the pages used in the
will.

2. No. The Supreme Court held that that Article 805 particularly segregates the
requirement of the signing of the witnesses on the left margin and the attestation
and subscription by the witnesses. The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature are distinct. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every
page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation
clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in
the attestation clause itself. The attestation clause is separate and apart from the
disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will.
Thus, the will cannot be considered as validly attested.

3. No. The requirement of under Article 806 states that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The non-
observance of Article 806 is fatal flaw equivalent to non-compliance with Article
805. In the present case, although there was the statement of the notary pubic
stating, “nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo” does not
contemplate an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to
the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. Hence, there was no
proper acknowledgment.

G.R. No. L-23135      December 26, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO

SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE
PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA and ANDREA
RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.

Facts: 

On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of the alleged will of Hilarion
Ramagosa, who died on December 26, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The
said will was written in Tagalog, dated February 26, 1949 and institutes Sumilang as his sole
heir. The petition was then opposed by 2 sets of opposItors, first were Saturnina and Santigo
Ramagosa who questioned the due execution of the will contending that it was procured with
under duress and was not intended to be the Last Will and Testament of the testator and
likewise claimed that they were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased instead of
Similang. The other set of oppositors prayed for the disallowance of the will. During the
hearings, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter alleging that the will was
impliedly revoked by the testator himself when he sold the parcel subject in the will to the
petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario six years before his death. Petitioner then
filed opposition to the motion for dismissal stating that: a.) that oppositors have no legal
standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and
testament of the testators; and b.) that oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the
distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will Hilarion Ramagosa be denied.

Ruling: NO, the petition for probate goes to the extrinsic validity of the will which is a
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities required by law. The alleged sale of the
property goes to the intrinsic validity of the will and is not a ground for the dismissal of the
petition for probate.

Trustees relating to wills (2)

Salud Teodoro Vda. de Perez v. Hon.

1.

Zotico A. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, June

2, 1994
FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in
New York, USA.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Jose executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife “all the remainder” of his real and personal
property at the time of his death “wheresoever situated.” In the event he
would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children
and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He
appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael Jr. as substitute executor.

In his will, Dr. Jose provided that should he and his wife die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of their deaths, the presumption is that he died first.

Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own last will and testament,
containing the same provisions as that of her husband. Likewise, she
provided that should she and her husband died under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of their deaths, it should be presumed that he died first.

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they
were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
proceedings for the probate thereof in the Surrogate Court of the County
of Onondaga, New York. The wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn,
filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the
two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also
asked that she be appointed as special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel,
Bulacan. She was granted letters of special administration and posted
bond in the amount of PHP 10,000.00. As special administratrix, Salud
consolidated the assets of the Cunanan spouses, including the bank
deposits of Dr. Jose.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed and asked to be notified of
the proceedings as heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as heirs
were disputed by Salud, who said that they were only collaterals and not
heirs as “heirship is only by institution” under a will or by operation of
the law of New York. Since the will of Dr. Jose provided a presumption
that he predeceased his wife, his estate passed on to his wife, Dr. Evelyn.
Salud, being the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn, thus inherited the estate of the
Cunanan spouses.

The Cunanan heirs soon asked that the RTC proceedings be nullified
and that the appointment of Salud as special administratrix be set aside.
They also asked that Dr. Rafael Sr., brother of Dr. Jose, be appointed the
regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. They alleged
that the Cunanan heirs and Salud had entered into an agreement in the
United States “to settle and divide equally the estates.”

RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling
the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the
submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her
as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and
academic.  The RTC Judge reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove
the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court
had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with
the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption
is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law
of the Philippines.

Salud’s motion for reconsideration was granted. In another order, the

RTC Judge held that the documents presented did not establish the law
of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills but granted a
motion to submit additional evidence to prove the law of New York.
However, the RTC Judge ruled that the probate of two wills in a single
proceeding is not procedural.

Hence, this petition.

 
ISSUES:
 WHETHER OR NOT THE REPROBATE OF THE TWO WILLS
IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING IS PROCEDURAL
 

 WHETHER OR NOT THE TWO WILLS PROBATED OUTSIDE

THE PHILIPPINES MAY BE REPROBATED IN THE
PHILIPPINES
 

RULING:

Requirements for allowance of foreign wills for probate in the

Philippines

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American

citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the
following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

“Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country,
or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by
New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which

have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3)
the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that
the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and law
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should

relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of
which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate.

The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly

There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view
that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and
therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate
probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal
and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the
rules shall be “liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only

result in the delay in the administration of justice.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for
the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In
the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since
the two will contains essentially the same provisions and pertain to
property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a
number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation.

On the requirement of notice

Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of
the proceedings.

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will
shall “cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance” means that with regards to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will
that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance
with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice
by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s

claim are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills.
Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the “court
shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, …”

G.R. No. 175073

August 15, 2011
ESTATE OF MARGARITA
D. CABACUNGAN,
represented by LUZ LAIGO-
ALI, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO
ROY LAIGO, STELLA
BALAGOT and SPOUSES
MARIO B. CAMPOS AND
JULIA S. CAMPOS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in
1969, Roberto applied for a
tourist visa for the United
States. However, in order to
qualify, Roberto had to prove
that he owned real
properties. Roberto asked his
mother, Margarita, to help
him by transferring her
tax declarations over the
above-mentioned properties
in his name. Margarita
obliged, executing a
Transferor’s Affidavit in
favor of Roberto. The
transfer was
made without the knowledge
of Margarita’s other children.
Armed of such
ownership, Roberto
succeeded in acquiring a visa.
Roberto then left for the
United States but returned in
due time.
On February 1979, Roberto
married Estela Balagot in
Aringay La Union.
On July 26, 1990, Roberto
sold the 4,502 square meters
land in Baccuit,Bauang,
La Union to spouses Mario
and Julia Campos for P
23,000.00 without the
knowledge or consent of
Margarita and her other
children.
On August 26, 1992, Roberto
likewise sold the 1,986 and
3,454 square meters
land to his adopted children,
Marilou and Pedro Laigo, for
in consideration of p
100,000.00 and P 40,000.00,
respectively, again without
the knowledge or
consent of Margarita and her
other children.
On August 15, 1995, Roberto
died. During his wake,
Margarita learned of the
surreptitious sale of the
properties by Roberto,
prompting Margarita to file a
complaint for annulment of
sale of real property,
recovery of ownership and
possession and cancellation
of Tax Declarations with
damages against the
spouses Campos, Marilou
and Pedro.
Margarita claimed that the
transfer of the properties to
Roberto was not Intended
to divest her of ownership the
properties; that the sale is
null and void as Roberto
had no right to sell the
properties. Margarita also
alleged that the sale is merely
G.R. No. 175073
August 15, 2011
ESTATE OF MARGARITA
D. CABACUNGAN,
represented by LUZ LAIGO-
ALI, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO
ROY LAIGO, STELLA
BALAGOT and SPOUSES
MARIO B. CAMPOS AND
JULIA S. CAMPOS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in
1969, Roberto applied for a
tourist visa for the United
States. However, in order to
qualify, Roberto had to prove
that he owned real
properties. Roberto asked his
mother, Margarita, to help
him by transferring her
tax declarations over the
above-mentioned properties
in his name. Margarita
obliged, executing a
Transferor’s Affidavit in
favor of Roberto. The
transfer was
made without the knowledge
of Margarita’s other children.
Armed of such
ownership, Roberto
succeeded in acquiring a visa.
Roberto then left for the
United States but returned in
due time.
On February 1979, Roberto
married Estela Balagot in
Aringay La Union.
On July 26, 1990, Roberto
sold the 4,502 square meters
land in Baccuit,Bauang,
La Union to spouses Mario
and Julia Campos for P
23,000.00 without the
knowledge or consent of
Margarita and her other
children.
On August 26, 1992, Roberto
likewise sold the 1,986 and
3,454 square meters
land to his adopted children,
Marilou and Pedro Laigo, for
in consideration of p
100,000.00 and P 40,000.00,
respectively, again without
the knowledge or
consent of Margarita and her
other children.
On August 15, 1995, Roberto
died. During his wake,
Margarita learned of the
surreptitious sale of the
properties by Roberto,
prompting Margarita to file a
complaint for annulment of
sale of real property,
recovery of ownership and
possession and cancellation
of Tax Declarations with
damages against the
spouses Campos, Marilou
and Pedro.
Margarita claimed that the
transfer of the properties to
Roberto was not Intended
to divest her of ownership the
properties; that the sale is
null and void as Roberto
had no right to sell the
properties. Margarita also
alleged that the sale is merely
Distribution and Partition of estate (3)