1.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 214163, July 01, 2019 ]
RONALD GERALINO M. LIM AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONERS, V. EDWIN M. LIM, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The trial court's noncompliance with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be remedied
by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[1]
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] assailing the June 6, 2014 Decision[3] and August 27, 2014
Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. 14-32157. The Regional Trial Court decreed that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated submission of the
Judicial Affidavits of the prosecution's witnesses.

Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint[5] for grave threats against
his brother Edwin M. Lim (Edwin). Acting favorably on the Complaint, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an
Information[6] against Edwin before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo City.[7] It read:

That on or about November 11, 2012, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, with deliberate intent and without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously threaten to kill Ronald Geralino Lim, by uttering threatening words, to wit, "Pus-on ko ulo mo!" and
"Patyon ta ikaw" (I will smash your head!"..., (sic) I will kill you) having persisted in said threats.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

On arraignment, Edwin pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[9]

The case was then referred to the Philippine Mediation Center for mediation. But due to the parties' failure to reach a
settlement, the case was referred back to the court.[10]

On August 12, 2013, the case was set for pre-trial. However, because of Ronald's and his counsel's absence, pre-
trial was reset to September 5, 2013.[11]

After Edwin's counsel had filed a Motion for time to submit a counter-affidavit, pre-trial was again reset to October 17,
2013.[12]
On October 17, 2013, the defense counsel moved that the hearing be set at 10:00 a.m. However, because the private
prosecutor was unavailable and the prosecution needed time to submit their judicial affidavits, pre-trial was reset to
November 21, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.[13]

At the pre-trial on November 21, 2013, the prosecution, among others, moved that they be allowed to submit the
Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses later that day. It explained that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits
earlier, but "for whatever reason,"[14] was not able to submit them.[15] Despite the defense counsel's insistent
opposition, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities granted the Motion and gave the prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to
submit the judicial affidavits.[16]

Aggrieved, Edwin moved for reconsideration.[17] He argued that the prosecution was deemed to have waived its right
to submit its Judicial Affidavits when it failed to submit them at least five (5) days before pre-trial.[18]
In its December 20, 2013 Order,[19] the Municipal Trial Court in Cities denied Edwin's Motion. It reasoned that since it
had already received the Judicial Affidavits and in the interest of justice, its November 21, 2013 Order stands.
Nevertheless, it ordered the prosecution to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for its failure to file the Judicial Affidavits within the
period prescribed by the Judicial Affidavit Rule.[20]

On January 29, 2014, Edwin filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[21] He contended that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial
Affidavits.[22]
In its Comment,[23] the prosecution argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over them since no
summons had been served upon Ronald and the Office of the Solicitor General.[24] In addition, they contended that a
resort to a petition for certiorari was improper since the remedy of appeal was still available to them.[25]

In its June 6, 2014 Decision,[26] the Regional Trial Court ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.[27] The dispositive portion of the
Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1) the orders of the Hon. Ofelia M. Artuz dated November 21, 2013 and December 20, 2013
allowing submission of the Judicial Affidavits belatedly filed by respondents People of the
Philippines and Ronald Geralino M. Lim in Crim. Case No. S-140-13 pending before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo City are hereby ordered SET ASIDE; and

2) the Judicial Affidavits filed by respondents People of the Philippines and Ronald Geralino
M. Lim are hereby ordered EXPUNGE[D] from the records of Crim. Case No. S-140-13.
Furnish parties copy of this order.

SO ORDERED.[28]
The Regional Trial Court emphasized that under the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the prosecution is required to submit the
Judicial Affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. However, despite several
postponements of the pre-trial, the prosecution still failed to comply with the express provision of the Judicial Affidavit
Rule.[29]
The Regional Trial Court further decreed that while the Rule allows late submissions of judicial affidavits for valid
reasons, the prosecution's justification—"for whatever reason"—was not a valid ground.[30]
Dissatisfied with the Decision, the prosecution and Ronald moved for reconsideration,[31] but the Motion was denied in
the Regional Trial Court's August 27, 2014 Order.[32]

On September 29, 2014, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. They argue that the
Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over them as it had failed to serve the summons and copies of the
Petition on Certiorari and Prohibition personally on petitioners. They maintain that under the Rules of Court,
summons shall be served upon respondent himself, not his counsel.[33]
Petitioners, likewise, argue that since the Office of the Solicitor General is regarded in criminal cases as the appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines, it should have been given an opportunity to be heard on behalf of the
People.[34]

Petitioners similarly contend that the filing of a Petition for Certiorari was improper since the remedy of appeal was
available to respondent. They insist that since the prosecution has yet to present its witnesses in the criminal case,
any question in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities should have been raised on appeal.[35]
Petitioners also maintain that the determination of a valid reason for the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits
depends upon the trial court judge's discretion.[36]

Finally, petitioners insist that respondent's failure to attach to his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition a copy of the
pre-trial's stenographic notes should have prompted the Regional Trial Court to dismiss his Petition outright.[37]
In its October 15, 2014 Resolution,[38] this Court required respondent to file a comment.

In his Comment,[39] respondent argues that the Petition for Review should have been instituted by the Office of the
Solicitor General as the only party authorized to represent the People of the Philippines in cases brought before the
Court of Appeals or this Court.[40] He stresses that the Petition was not even verified by the People, which is the main
party in this case.[41]

As to the alleged non-acquisition of jurisdiction over petitioner Ronald, respondent contends that nowhere in the
Rules of Court does it require that the summons be served on the respondents in a petition for certiorari. He insists
that Rule 65 only states that if the court finds the petition for certiorari to be sufficient in form and substance, it shall
issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on it.[42]
Respondent maintains that contrary to petitioners' assertion, a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
November 21, 2013 Order of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. He claims that it is an interlocutory order from which
no appeal may be taken.[43]
Moreover, respondent insists that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the Judicial Affidavits' belated submission. He asserts that while the Judicial Affidavit Rule allows their belated
submission, the delay must be for a valid reason. He contends that the excuse offered—"for whatever reason"—does
not constitute a valid justification warranting the relaxation of the rules.[44]
Finally, respondent claims that his failure to attach the stenographic notes was not a fatal error meriting the dismissal
of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. He maintains that his belated submission still constitutes substantial
compliance with the rules.[45]

In its February 9, 2015 Order,[46] this Court required petitioners to file their reply.
In his Reply,[47] petitioner Ronald reiterates that the Judicial Affidavit Rule does not prohibit the belated submission of
judicial affidavits. He insists that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities had the judicial discretion to admit the Judicial
Affidavits submitted by petitioners.[48]
In its Reply,[49] the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of petitioner People of the Philippines, argues that while
the Petition for Review was defective for petitioner Ronald's failure to secure its conformity, such defect was cured
when it manifested its conformity and adopted the Petition as its own.[50]
Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the Regional Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, maintaining that it is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary
Procedure.[51]
Thus, for this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over petitioners Ronald Geralino M. Lim and
People of the Philippines;

Second, whether or not the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was the proper remedy to question the November
21, 2013 Order of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities; and

Finally, whether or not the Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the belated
submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

Petitioners' arguments lack merit.

I
Petitioners mainly argue that since no summons had been served upon them, the Regional Trial Court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over them. As a result, they insist that the Regional Trial Court's June 6, 2014 Decision is void.

Contrary to petitioners' postulation, summons need not be issued in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

Under the Rules of Court, there are two (2) types of civil actions: (1) ordinary civil actions; and (2) special civil actions.
Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions. However, special civil actions, such as petitions for certiorari,
are further subject to certain specific rules.[52]
Rule 65, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for certiorari, shall determine
if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once it finds the petition to be sufficient, it shall issue an order requiring the
respondents to comment on the petition:

SECTION 6. Order to Comment. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the court
shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct,
together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.

In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56,
shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to,
and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such other
responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper.

Compared with an ordinary civil action, where summons must be issued upon the filing of the complaint,[53] the court
need only issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition for certiorari. "Such order shall be
served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any
annexes thereto."[54]

In any case, despite petitioners' insistence that they were not served with summons, it must be noted that on January
29, 2014, the Regional Trial Court served the summons and a copy of the Petition on petitioner Ronald, through his
counsel Attorney Alfredo Arungayan III (Atty. Arungayan).[55]
Similarly, the People of the Philippines, as represented by the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, and Judge Ofelia M.
Artuz, through her Branch Clerk of Court, were served with summons and copies of the Petition on January 30, 2014.
[56]

Furthermore, it must be stressed that in People's General Insurance Corporation v. Guansing,[57] this Court reasoned
that when a party participates in a proceeding despite improper service of summons, he or she is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction.
Here, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court a Comment/Opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order[58] on January 30, 2014 and a Comment/Opposition to the Petition[59] on February 10,
2014. By actively participating in the proceedings, petitioners are deemed to have made a voluntary appearance and
cannot argue that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
Finally, petitioners argue that the Office of the Solicitor General should have been served with a copy of the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition. However, under the Rules of Court, when a petition for certiorari is filed assailing an act
of a judge, the petitioner in the main action shall be included as a private respondent, and is then mandated to appear
and defend both on his or her own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent affected by the proceedings. The
public respondent shall not be required to comment on the petition unless required by the court. Rule 65, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 5. Respondents and Costs in Certain Cases. — When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of
a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private
respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and  it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and
the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not
against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not
appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court
by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise
specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (Emphasis supplied)

II
This Court shall discuss the second and third issues simultaneously as they are interrelated with each other.

Settled is the rule that "the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive."[60] When the remedy of appeal is available to a litigant, a petition for certiorari shall not be entertained
and should be dismissed for being an improper remedy.[61]
Under the Rules of Court, an appeal is a remedy directed against a "judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable."[62] It cannot be availed
of against an interlocutory order.[63]
In Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. The Intermediate Appellate Court,[64] this Court distinguished a final order or judgment
from an interlocutory order:
The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has 'become final' (or 'executory' as of right [final
and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to
use the established and more distinctive term, 'final and executory.'
....
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the
parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court, is 'interlocutory,' e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
'final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
[65]
 (Citation omitted)
In contrast, a petition for certiorari is a remedy directed not only to correct errors of jurisdiction, "but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government[.]"[66] As ruled in Cruz v. People:[67]
The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals.
It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction

. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of
discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an
ordinary appeal. . . .

....

An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."[68] (Citations omitted)
In Cruz, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Regional Trial Court
Order. The trial court denied their Motion to release cash bond after the case was dismissed due to the private
complainant's desistance. The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the Petition on the ground that it was an
improper remedy.[69]
There, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals Decision and ruled that the Regional Trial Court's noncompliance
with the Rules of Court constituted grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy against which is a petition for
certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court.[70]
Similarly, here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly disregarding the
clear wording of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, or the Judicial Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is mandated
to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit
them within the time prescribed, they shall be deemed to have waived their submission. Section 9 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule provides:

SECTION 9. Application of Rule to Criminal Actions. — (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:

....

(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days before the pre-trial,
serving copies of the same upon the accused. The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such
documentary or object evidence as he may have marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial
affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
....

SECTION 10. Effect of Non-Compliance with the Judicial Affidavit Rule. — (a) A party who fails to submit the
required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission. The court may,
however, allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly
prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than
P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
Nevertheless, if the belated submission of judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow the delay once as
long as it "would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than
P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court."[71]
Here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities allowed the prosecution's belated submission of their Judicial Affidavits
despite the repeated postponements of the scheduled pre-trial. To recall, the pre-trial was reset thrice: from August
12, 2013 to September 5, 2013, then to October 17, 2013, and finally, to November 21, 2013. In spite of that, the
prosecution failed to submit their Judicial Affidavits within the time prescribed by the Rule. Its excuse— "for whatever
reason"— cannot be considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The June 6, 2014 Decision and August 27, 2014 Order of the Regional Trial
Court in Special Civil Action No. 14-32157 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and  Inting, JJ., concur.
 

August 19, 2019

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on July 1, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on August 19, 2019 at
10:20 a.m.
Very truly yours,

  (SGD.) WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

2.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 213198, July 01, 2019 ]
GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A. "GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO,"
PETITIONER, V. TETSUSHI TOYO, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must be proven as fact under our
rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign judgment, hence the indispensable need to
have it pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be extended to the Filipino spouse.[1]
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Regional Trial Court's February 14, 2014 Judgment[3] and June 11, 2014 Resolution[4] in SP. PROC. No. Q-12-71339
be reversed and set aside. The Regional Trial Court denied Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a. Genevieve Arreza Toyo's
(Genevieve) Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.[5]
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in
Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo.[6]
After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku,
Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family register as certified by the
Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.[7]
On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry.[8]
In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate,[9] Tetsushi's Family Register,[10] the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce,[11] and an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan,
[12]
 among others.[13]
After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court set the case for hearing on
October 16, 2012.[14]
On the day of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements were
established and marked, trial on the merits ensued.[15]
On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment[16] denying Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that
while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local
government of Japan,[17] she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's law.[18]
The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted by
Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the
Department of Foreign Affairs.[19]
Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Regional Trial Court's June 11,
2014 Resolution.[20]
Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.[21]
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an
official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court. That it is an official publication,
she points out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section 25 of the Rules of
Court.[22]
Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not considering the English translation of the Japan Civil Code
as a learned treatise and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.[23]
In its August 13, 2014 Resolution,[24] this Court required respondents to file their comment.
In their Comment,[25] respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain that the Regional Trial Court
was correct in denying the petition for petitioner's failure to prove respondent Tetsushi's national law.[26] They stress
that in proving a foreign country's law, one must comply with the requirements under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of
the Rules of Court.[27]
Respondents similarly claim that what Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court presumes is "the fact of printing
and publication[,]"[28] not that it was an official publication by the government of Japan.[29]
Finally, respondents insist that before the English translation of the Japan Civil Code may be considered as a learned
treatise, the trial court must first take judicial notice that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert
in the subject.[30]
In its March 25, 2015 Resolution,[31] this Court directed petitioner to file her reply.
In her Reply,[32] petitioner asserts that she submitted in evidence the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication
printed "under authorization of the Ministry of Justice[.]"[33] She contends that because it was printed by a public
authority, the Civil Code of Japan is deemed to be an official publication under Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules
of Court and, therefore, is a self-authenticating document that need not be certified under Rule 132, Section 24.[34]
In its August 3, 2016 Resolution,[35] this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of respondent Tetsushi's Comment.
In addition, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda.
In her Memorandum,[36] petitioner reiterates that the Regional Trial Court erred in not considering the Civil Code of
Japan as an official publication and its English translation as a learned treatise.[37]
On September 23, 2016, respondents manifested that they are adopting their Comment as their memorandum.[38]
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry filed by petitioner Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a.
Genevieve Arreza Toyo.

When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce abroad, the Filipino
spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the divorce obtained by the foreign spouse enables him or
her to remarry. Article 26 of the Family Code, as amended,[39] provides:
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph was introduced as a corrective measure to resolve an absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse even after their marital bond had been severed by the divorce decree
obtained abroad.[40] Through this provision, Philippine courts are given the authority "to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage."[41] It bestowed upon the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage considered
dissolved, granting him or her the capacity to remarry.[42]
Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is
indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's
national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. As explained in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:[43]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his [or her] claim or defense.[44] (Citations omitted)
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, purported to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24[45] and 25[46] of the Rules of
Court:
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[47] (Citations omitted)
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce decree have
complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25.[48] However, it found the copy of the Japan Civil Code
and its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that these documents were not duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign
Affairs.[49]
Notwithstanding, petitioner argues that the English translation of the Japan Civil Code is an official publication having
been published under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice[50] and, therefore, is considered a self-authenticating
document.[51]
Petitioner is mistaken.

In Patula v. People,[52] this Court explained the nature of a self-authenticating document:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in
court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before
a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules
of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is
excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have
been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.[53] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc.,[54] a private company in
Japan engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin
Series.[55] However, these translations are "not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese
laws;"[56] rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit
in Japanese.[57]
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication exempted from the
requirement of authentication.

Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules of Court, "[a] witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge[.]"[58] The evidence is hearsay when it is
"not . . . what the witness knows himself [or herself] but of what he [or she] has heard from others."[59] The rule
excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or statements, but also covers written statements.[60]
The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative value[.]"[61] However, a published treatise may be admitted
as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies that
the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject.[62]
Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator's and advisors' qualifications. Nor was an
expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator's and advisors' credentials is the
inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan.[63] Hence, the Regional Trial Court was correct
in not considering the English translation as a learned treatise.
Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition.[64] Questions
of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce,[65] are not within this Court's ambit to resolve.[66]
Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike,[67] this Court ruled that while the Petition raised questions of fact, "substantial ends
of justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings":
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of
pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented
before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a
Rule 45 petition for review.

....

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case
to the [Court of Appeals] under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. — ...

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be
referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on
whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed
when there is error in the choice or mode of appeal.

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the
[Court of Appeals], the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the
case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules
were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its
rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
reason for the existence of the courts.[68] (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action, including the reception of evidence, to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the
pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.

3.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 232678, July 03, 2019 ]
ESTEBAN DONATO REYES, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
 DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Esteban Donato Reyes (Reyes) seeking to
reverse and set aside the June 23, 2017 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38609 which
affirmed the March 3, 2016 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. Q-06-143139, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act
No. 9262 (R.A. No. 9262), otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 (VAWC), committed against AAA.[3]
The antecedent facts are as follows:

An Information, dated June 5, 2006, was filed on September 26, 2006 before the RTC against Reyes designating the
crime as one for violation of Section 5(e), paragraph 2 of R.A. No. 9262. On March 12, 2007, a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) was issued by the RTC directing Reyes to resume the delivery of monthly financial support to private
complainant, AAA, in the amount of P20,000.00 to be deducted from his net monthly salary of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars (US$2,500.00), reckoned from the time it was withheld in July 2005. Upon motion of AAA, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, the RTC issued on August 30, 2007 a Hold Departure Order[4] (HDO) against
Reyes. In the October 28, 2008 Order[5] of the RTC, the TPO issued on March 12, 2007 was made permanent.
On June 11, 2009, Reyes filed a Motion to Quash[6] the Information anchored on the ground that the allegations set
forth therein do not constitute the crime of violation of Section 5(e), par. 2 of R.A. No. 9262. He contended that
"abandoning without financial support," which is different from deprivation or denial of financial support, is not
criminalized under R.A. No. 9262. Reyes posited that the June 5, 2006 Information should be quashed as it does not
charge any offense, otherwise, his constitutional right to due process and right to be informed of the nature and the
cause of accusation against him, would be infringed. By way of Comment/Opposition,[7] the prosecution maintained
that the totality of facts as alleged in the Information constitutes the crime of violation of Section 5(e), par. 2 of R.A.
No. 9262.
In its Order[8] dated November 24, 2009, the RTC ruled that on the basis of the allegations in the Information, Reyes
is being charged with violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 and not with violation of Section 5(e), par. 2.
Consequently, the RTC directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to amend the Information by designating the proper
crime to which Reyes should be charged. The RTC held that the amendment of the Information was proper, since
Reyes has not been arraigned at that time, and inclusion sought would not prejudice his rights being merely formal in
nature. Reyes' Motion to Quash was denied by the trial court.
Upon arraignment, Reyes pleaded not guilty to the crime of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. After pre-trial
was terminated, trial on merits ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution tends to show that AAA and Reyes were married on May 15, 1969. Four children were
born out of this union, of whom only three are living, and who are all now of legal ages. Reyes was seldom at home
since he used to render military service as a Philippine Air Force pilot, and later he worked as a commercial pilot for
the Philippine Airlines. At the time the complaint for violation of the VAWC was filed against him, Reyes was
employed as a pilot based in Angola, Africa tasked to deliver relief goods by air. Sometime in 2005, AAA learned that
Reyes got married to a certain Marilou Osias Ramboanga who had borne him four children and with whom he is living
with up to the present.

AAA claimed that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support, ranging from Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but he suddenly ceased giving the same in July 2005.
On top of this unpleasant situation, AAA got sick of various illness such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease,
diabetes and osteoarthritis. Due to her advancing age, AAA's health condition further deteriorated requiring her to
take maintenance medicines and to undergo regular consultation, monitoring and treatment to prevent organ
damage, stroke, renal failure and heart attack. According to AAA, what impelled her to file the complaint for violation
of R.A. No. 9262 against Reyes was due to the latter's failure to provide her with monthly financial support.[9]
The defense presented petitioner as its lone witness. Primarily, Reyes assailed the validity of his marriage with AAA
alleging that he never attended the marriage ceremony and that his supposed signature appearing in the marriage
certificate was forged. He also pointed out that his supposed age of twenty-five years old as reflected in the marriage
certificate was erroneous considering that he was born on August 3, 1948. Petitioner alleged that he lived with AAA in
a common-law relationship, which produced three daughters and a son. He narrated that he met AAA when he went
for a vacation at her aunt's house in Bicol where AAA was a housemaid. He averred that he gave AAA monthly
financial support of P20,000.00. In addition, he also gave her Christmas bonuses, shouldered the expenses for her
cataract operation, her denture and vacation in Tagaytay, as well as paid for the matriculation of her grandchildren
and the materials of their second daughter. He admitted that he no longer provides AAA with financial support since
July 2006 because he was disappointed with her for instituting a criminal case for Bigamy against him which he
 considered as an act of ingratitude. In 2007, he stopped flying as a pilot after he was prevented from leaving the
Philippines by virtue of a Hold Departure Order issued against him at the instance of AAA.

The RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated March 3, 2016 finding accused-petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC
disposed the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Esteban Donato Reyes GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt [of] violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of THREE (3) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: AAA, her attending physician, Dr. Rey Caesar R.
Anunciacion and the victim's daughter, to be credible and sufficient. It ruled that the evidence proffered by the
prosecution has adequately established all the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.

Not in conformity, Reyes appealed his conviction before the CA.

The CA Ruling
On June 23, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed Decision upholding the conviction of Reyes for Violation of Section
5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, the fallo of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. The Decision dated March
3, 2016 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143139 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The CA echoed the conclusion reached by the RTC that Reyes committed psychological violence against his wife
AAA when he suddenly stopped giving her financial support and by reason of which, she suffered emotional and
mental anguish. According to the CA, Reyes has an obligation to financially support his wife AAA and their marriage
is valid until annulled by the court. It held that Reyes could not escape liability by the mere expedient of claiming that
his marriage with AAA is void because violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 can be committed even against a
woman with whom the accused had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child. The CA
opined that Reyes can also be convicted for violation of Section 5(e), assuming that he is indicted for the said crime,
because said provision criminalizes the mere act of depriving a woman of financial support legally due her.

Maintaining his innocence of the crime charged, Reyes filed the present petition and posited the following issues, to
wit:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED

THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DIRECTING HEREIN PETITIONER TO
RESUME GIVING REGULAR MONTHLY FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO AAA IN THE AMOUNT OF P20,000.00 TO
BE DEDUCTED DIRECTLY FROM HIS NET MONTHLY SALARY RECKONED FROM THE TIME IT WAS
WITHHELD IN JULY 2005.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5(i) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262 OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT AND SENTENCING HIM
TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF THREE (3) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL, AS
MINIMUM, TO EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS MAXIMUM.[12]
Petitioner insists that the Information, dated June 5, 2006, failed to allege any of the acts punishable under either
Section 5(e), par. 2 or Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. He contends that the defective criminal Information should have
been quashed at the first instance by the RTC because it effectively deprived him of his right to due process.

The OSG counters that it is apparent from a perusal of the Information that Reyes is charged under Section 5(e), par.
2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA when he abandoned her and failed to give her financial support.
The OSG submits that the CA is correct in not only affirming the conviction of Reyes under Section 5(i), but in finding
that he can be also held criminally liable under Section 5(e), par. 2 because his purpose in depriving AAA with
support is to cow her from further filing cases against him or to withdraw those already filed. The OSG asserts that
petitioner's guilt for violation of the provisions of Sections 5(e), par. 2 and 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 has been established
by the prosecution beyond cavil of a doubt.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Reyes stands charged with violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. By alleging that the Information should have
been quashed by the RTC for lack of the essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262,
Reyes is essentially averring that the recital of facts therein do not constitute the offense charged.

Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed. It is imperative that an indictment fully states the elements of the specific offense alleged
to have been committed.[13]
The sufficiency of the allegations of facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime charged is crucial
in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation.[14] Every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information[15] since the prosecution has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for the crime charged. Thus, the Information must correctly reflect the charge
against the accused before any conviction may be made.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is whether the
facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.[16] To meet the test of
sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer to the law defining the offense charged which, in this case, is Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 9262, in relation to Section 5(i), which provides as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions, causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

xxxx

Section 5(i) of R.A No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are
women and children through the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.[17]
In Dinamling v. People,[18] the Court had the occasion to enumerate the elements of violation of Section 5(i)
of R.A. No. 9262, to wit:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
 emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar acts or omissions.[19]
Were the elements of violation of Section 5(i) sufficiently alleged in the June 5, 2006 Information? To answer this
query and for easy reference, the accusatory portion of the Information is hereto reproduced, as follows:

That on or about the month of July, 2005 and continuously up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit economic abuse upon his wife, AAA, by then
and there abandoning her without any financial support thereby depriving her of her basic needs and inflicting upon
her psychological and emotional suffering and/or injuries, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[20]
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110, the Court finds that the afore-quoted Information contains the recital of facts
necessary to constitute the crime charged. The June 5, 2006 Information stated in no uncertain terms that: (1) the
offended party, AAA, is the wife of the offender Reyes; (2) AAA sustained mental and emotional anguish; and (3)
such anguish is inflicted by offender Reyes when he deliberately and unlawfully denied AAA with financial support.

Psychological violence is certainly an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally
essential is the element of the mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. Psychological
violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional suffering is the effect caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party.[21] To establish psychological violence, it is necessary to adduce proof of the
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts. We concur with the similar findings
of the courts a quo that the prosecution had duly proved, through the clear and convincing testimonies of AAA and
her daughter, that Reyes committed psychological violence against AAA when he deprived her of financial support
beginning July 2005 and onwards which caused her to experience mental and emotional suffering to the point that
even her health condition was adversely affected.
Reyes argues that he cannot be held liable for violation of R.A No. 9262 because he has no obligation to financially
support AAA since he never contracted marriage with her. Petitioner is mistaken.

We find that the National Statistics Office certified copy of a marriage certificate presented by the prosecution serves
as positive evidence of the existence of the marriage between Reyes and AAA. The certified copy of the marriage
contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between Reyes and AAA on May 15, 1969, and it should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.[22] As correctly pointed out by the CA, their marriage
is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Hence, Reyes is obliged to support his wife, AAA,
the amount of which shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the said petitioner and to the needs of the
latter.[23]
Reyes will not be exonerated even assuming that his marriage is declared void  ab initio by the court. R.A. No. 9262
defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children perpetrated by the woman's husband, former
husband or any person against whom the woman has or had a sexual or dating relationship with, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse or psychological harm or suffering. Thus, the offender
need not be related or connected to the victim by marriage or former marriage, as he could be someone who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship only or has a common child with the victim. In the case at bench, it is undisputed
that AAA had borne Reyes four children out of their relationship.
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be convicted of violation of
Section 5(e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA. Section 5(e), par. 2 identifies the act or acts
that constitute the violence of economic abuse, the pertinent portions of which states:

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physically or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, x x
x;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

xxxx

Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9262 attaches when the accused deprives the woman
of financial support which she is legally entitled to. Deprivation or denial of support, by itself, is already specifically
penalized therein.[24]
Here, we note that Reyes, although gainfully employed after June 2005, deliberately refused to provide financial
support to AAA. According to Reyes, he stopped giving monetary support to AAA because she filed a Bigamy case
against him. The Court finds his excuse unacceptable and will not at all exculpate him from criminal liability under the
VAWC. It is noteworthy that AAA charged Reyes with Bigamy not merely to torment or harass him but to enforce her
right and protect her interest as petitioner's legal wife considering that he contracted a second marriage with one
Marilou Osias Ramboanga during the subsistence of his marriage with AAA. Evidently, the denial of financial support
is designed to subjugate AAA's will and control her conduct, either to pressure her to withdraw said criminal case for
Bigamy or dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him.

There is nothing in the definition nor in the enumeration of the acts constituting psychological violence and economic
abuse that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse Reyes as what conducts are penalized under the VAWC. They
are worded with sufficient definiteness and clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what act is
prohibited, and need not guess as to its meaning nor differ in its application. The express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children.[25]
Lastly, the Court finds that Reyes should be compelled to comply with the directive under the TPO pertaining to the
resumption of providing monthly financial support to AAA. It bears stressing that not an iota of evidence was adduced
by him to show that he is no longer employed and/or he failed to obtain another gainful employment and/or that he
has no resources or means to provide the same.

Having ascertain the guilt of Reyes for violation of Section 5(i), We shall now proceed to determine the appropriate
penalty.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9262 provides:

Section. 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be
punished according to the following rules:
xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty
to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in this section. In addition to imprisonment, the
perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not
more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or
psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree,  i.e., prision correccional, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years, while the maximum term shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending
the commission of the crime.[26] This Court deems it proper to impose on petitioner Reyes the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of  prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
Also, petitioner Reyes is DIRECTED to PAY a fine in the sum of P200,000.00. He is also required to submit himself
to a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment, and to report his compliance therewith to the court
of origin.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 23, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No.
38609 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
(1) Petitioner Esteban Donato Reyes is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5(i) of
Republic Act No. 9262 and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
(2) Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY a fine equivalent to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
(3) Further, petitioner is DIRECTED to UNDERGO a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment,
and to report his compliance therewith to the court of origin within fifteen (15) days after the completion of such
counselling or treatment.
SO ORDERED.

4.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212520, July 03, 2019 ]
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO P.
MAGNO, JR. AND MELCHOR L. OCAMPO, JR., RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

G.R. No. 212520 is a petition[1] assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 122684
promulgated on 4 February 2014[2] and on 9 May 2014.[3] This case involves the same parties in G.R. No. 202141
(Ocampo and Magno v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., et al.), which was denied in a Resolution dated 30 July 2012.

Antecedent Facts

In its Decision[4] dated 27 July 2010, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) stated the facts of the case as
follows:
Complainant-[a]ppellee [Melchor L. Ocampo, Jr., or] Ocampo alleged that he was hired by [Coca-Cola] on 1 May
1988. During the course of his employment he was rewarded with promotions and incentives until he reached the
position of District Sales Supervisor with a basic monthly salary of P45,900.00, cellular phone subsidy, gas allowance
and incentive pay.

Complainant-[a]ppellee [Antonio P. Magno, Jr., or] Magno was employed on 15 December 1988. His last position was
as Territory Sales Manager with a basic monthly pay of P76,410.00, cellphone subsidy, gas allowance and other
incentive pay.

In January 2007, complainants-appellees were meted a suspension for one month because of the charge that two (2)
hauler trucks belonging to one Tirso B. Tablang (Tablang), a dealer of [Coca-Cola's] products, and whose operation
is under Ocampo's district and Magno's territory, were found to be distributing soon-to-expire products in Manila,
which is outside of his dealership area.

Complainants-[a]ppellees claimed that the said incident happened at a time when respondent company's products
were not doing well in the market and this decrease in the sales would result to the expiration of the products stored
in the warehouses. The expiration of the products on [sic] storage would in turn translate to financial losses to
respondent company.

On 29 April 2008, the services of complainant-appellee Ocampo was terminated. On 14 May 2008, complainants-
appellees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal of Ocampo. Furthermore, they prayed for an order of reinstatement
and payment of backwages and other incentives, damages and attorney's fees.

On 18 June 2008, complainants-appellees filed a supplemental position paper alleging that Antonio Magno was
likewise terminated from work on 29 May 2008 when he was not allowed to enter company premises for no reason at
all.

Upon the other hand and by way of controversion, respondents-appellants alleged that the local sales market of the
company is geographically divided into areas, territories and districts. This scheme is meant to protect each dealer's
area and prevent unfair dealings. Thus, the company has a "no encroachment policy" for strict compliance by sales
personnel, the violation of which is a ground for the termination of dealership agreement and/or the services of
employees involved (Annex "I", pp. 107-109, Records).

Complainants-[a]ppellees were assigned in the Nueva Ecija and Aurora province areas. The head of this area is
individual respondent Jaime Ronquillo. Complainant-[a]ppellee Magno is the Territory Sales Manager for Cabanatuan
City and San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija and Baliuag, Bulacan, who directly reported to Ronquillo. In turn, complainant-
appellant [sic] Ocampo was a District Sales Supervisor assigned to Aurora District who reported to Magno.

Respondents-[a]ppellants claimed that Magno and Ocampo who were charged with engaging in fictitious sales
transactions and violation of the "no encroachment" policy; were placed on preventive suspension and dismissed
from service in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 and 12, Rule 005-85 of the CCBPI Rules in relation to
Article 282 of the Labor Code on loss of trust and confidence.

Respondents-[a]ppellants related that complainants-appellees committed the infractions in connivance with the
company's dealer-partner in Casiguran and Dipaculao, Aurora province, Tirso B. Tablang (Tablang). Tablang was
under complainant-appellee Ocampo's district and he sourced his products from Cabanatuan Sales Office, which was
covered by Magno's territory.

Sometime in December 2006, respondent company received reports that some products purportedly hauled from
Cabanatuan Sales Office under the name and by authority of Tablang were not actually delivered to Casiguran or
Dipaculao but were diverted to other outlets in Metro Manila or other district in Nueva Ecija. The products were
hauled using Tablang's delivery trucks/haulers. The company conducted a surveillance of Tablang's trucks and on 28
December 2006 they were able to track down REH 597. Nine hundred cases of soft drinks were pulled out from
Cabanatuan Sales Office, but instead of proceeding to Casiguran or Dipaculao, Aurora, the driver proceeded to
Manila. The surveillance team trailed the truck up to Tambo, Parañaque and saw the products being unloaded from
said truck.

When Tablang was confronted, he stated that complainants-appellants [sic] Magno and Ocampo used his facilities to
buy company products at discounted rates, only to dispose them outside their territory. Ocampo convinced him to
issue a signed blank authorization form so that the former can pull out stocks from the Cabanatuan Sales Office.
These stocks were included as part of Tablang's account with the respondent company. As payment for the stocks,
complainants-appellees [sic] would issue checks to Tablang to cover the amount corresponding to the stocks that
they pulled out.

After further review of the records, respondents-appellants served a Notice to Explain and Preventive Suspension to
Magno on 19 January 2007 and to Ocampo on 24 January 2007 (Annexes "15" and "16," pp. 142-143, Records).

In his letter of explanation, Magno argued that the company did not incur any losses, instead he prevented the same
when he was able to sell and dispose of the soon-to-expire products stored in the warehouse.

Ocampo, on the other hand, admitted that the plan to dispose of the stocks in the manner that they did was a strategy
devised by Magno in order to protect the interest of the company.

However, they did not attend the administrative hearings scheduled on 9 and 12 February 2007. The hearing was
again set for 13 February 2007 for Ocampo and 19 February 2007 for Magno. Still, complainants-appellee [sic] failed
to appear. The meeting was again reset to 22 February 2007, but despite notice, they did not attend. Thus, the
hearing was conducted in their absence and the witnesses present thereat were questioned and were asked to
submit their verified statements.

After evaluation of the records and the statements of both parties, management came to a decision that Ocampo was
guilty as charged and decided to terminate his services on 29 April 2008 through a Notice of Termination dated 23
April 2008. In view of Magno's position in the company and his long years of service, he was given a Fourth Notice to
Explain which was also unheeded. Thus he was given his termination papers on 29 May 2008.[5]
Antonio Magno, Jr. (Magno) and Melchor Ocampo, Jr. (Ocampo) filed a complaint for illegal suspension and money
claims before the Labor Arbiter (LA) on 7 March 2008.[6] On 5 June 2008, the complaint was amended to include a
prayer for reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney's fees and payment of their salaries corresponding to
their suspension.[7]
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Coca-Cola), on the other hand, claims that Magno and Ocampo were legally
dismissed for cause. Magno and Ocampo allegedly violated Sections 10 and 12, Rule 005-85 of Coca-Cola's Code of
Disciplinary Rules and Regulations (the CCBPI Rules), which provided penalties for fictitious sales transactions and
analogous cases.[8]

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On 30 October 2008, the LA, in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-03-13268-08,[9] declared Coca-Cola guilty of illegally
suspending and dismissing Magno and Ocampo. The LA ordered payment of salaries and benefits for the one month
suspension. The LA also ordered reinstatement, as well as payment to both Magno and Ocampo of their respective
backwages, transportation benefits, cellphone benefits, incremental increase, and annual incentive pay. The LA also
awarded payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondents guilty of illegally suspending and dismissing
complainants.

Concomitantly, they are hereby ordered to pay complainants their salaries and other benefits during the time of their
suspension as follows:
1. for complainant Magno:

a. Salary for one month suspension in the amount of P76,100.00;

b. Transportation benefits for one month in the amount of P15,000.00;

2. for complainant Ocampo:

a. Salary for one month suspension in the amount of P45,900.00;

b. Transportation benefits for one month in the amount of P10,000.00.
Further considering that complainants' dismissals are illegal, respondents are also hereby ordered to reinstate
complainants to their former positions under the same terms and conditions prevailing during the time of their
employment without loss of seniority rights and privileges. The reinstatement is immediately executory and
respondent Coca-Cola is directed to submit a report of compliance thereof within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of this decision pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2, Section 14, Rule V of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of
Procedure.

Respondents are further ordered to pay herein complainants the following:

3. for complainant Magno:

a. Backwages from May 29, 2008 up to the date of this Decision computed in the amount of P380,500.00;
b. Transportation benefits from the time it was withheld from them commencing [i]n February 2007 up to the time of
this Decision = 21 months x P15,000 or in the total amount of P315,000.00;
c. Cellphone benefits in the amount of P17,500.00;
d. Incremental increase for 2008 equivalent to P3,000 a month for 10 months = P30,000.00;
e. Annual Incentive Pay which he earned for his accomplishments in 2007 in the amount of P300,000.00;

4. for complainant Ocampo:

a. Backwages from April 29, 2008 up to the date of this Decision computed in the amount of P275,400.00;
b. Transportation benefits from the time it was withheld from them commencing [i]n February 2007 up to the time of
this Decision = 21 months x P10,000 or in the total amount of P210,000.00;
c. Cellphone benefits in the amount of P25,000.00;
d. Incremental increase for 2008 equivalent to P4,200 a month for 10 months = P42,000.00;
e. Variable Incentive Pay from January 2007 up to the date of this Decision in the amount of P550,000.00.
For having suffered besmirched reputation, sleepless nights and serious anxiety, not to mention the presence of bad
faith, respondents are also ordered to pay complainants Magno and Ocampo, moral damages in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 and P2,000,000.00, respectively.

In order to deter anyone similarly inclined to commit such illegal and malevolent acts, respondents are likewise
ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00 for each complainant.

It is also apparent that complainants hired the services of a counsel to litigate their cause, respondents are also
hereby ordered to pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.
Finally, respondents are hereby ordered to expunge from their personnel records, all violations attributed to herein
complainants.

SO ORDERED.[10]
On 5 December 2008, Coca-Cola filed a Memorandum of Appeal[11] with the NLRC, which was docketed as NLRC
LAC No. 01-000034-09. Coca-Cola prayed that the NLRC declare valid Magno's and Ocampo's preventive
suspension and dismissal from service.

During the pendency of the appeal in the NLRC, Magno and Ocampo filed motions for the issuance of a partial writ of
execution before the LA on the following dates: 4 December 2008,[12] 22 January 2009,[13] 3 August 2009,[14] 13
October 2009,[15] 15 December 2009,[16] and 2 March 2010.[17]

Coca-Cola filed the corresponding oppositions to these motions on the following dates: 5 January 2009,[18] 9 February
2009,[19] 20 August 2009,[20] 5 November 2009,[21] and 7 January 2010.[22] Coca-Cola also filed an opposition to Magno
and Ocampo's 1 March 2010 motion for the issuance of a partial writ of execution. This opposition, however, is not in
the records and was only mentioned in the LA's Order dated 26 March 2010.[23]

The LA granted Magno and Ocampo's motions for partial writ of execution in Orders released on the following dates:
9 January 2009,[24] 18 February 2009,[25] 2 September 2009,[26] 15 January 2010,[27] and 26 March 2010.[28] The LA
denied Coca-Cola's Opposition of 5 November 2009 in an Order released on 20 November 2009.[29] The LA also
released on 20 November 2009 a separate Order[30] directing the Branch Manager of Metrobank, San Fernando City
branch to release, in separate checks, the amount of P351,269.00 representing Magno's and Ocampo's
reinstatement salaries and benefits for August and September 2009, and the amount of P4,790.00 representing
execution and deposit fees.

Coca-Cola filed the corresponding memoranda of appeal before the NLRC on the following dates: 5 December 2008,
[31]
 2 February 2009,[32] 2 March 2009,[33] 24 November 2009,[34] 28 January 2010,[35] and 31 March 2010.[36]

On 26 March 2010, the LA ordered Coca-Cola to reinstate Magno and Ocampo to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights and privileges, and specified the amounts that they should be paid. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, let a Partial/Alias Writ of Execution be issued directing the respondents to reinstate the
complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges and for the
respondents to pay them their basic reinstatement wages for the months of December 2009, January
2010 and February 2010 and their sick and vacation leave credits as follows:

  Basic Pay SL&VL TOTAL

Antonio Magno, Jr. P228,300.00 P163,721.00 P392,021.00
Melchor Ocampo, Jr. 137,700.00 98,749.00 236,449.00
TOTAL P628,470.00

SO ORDERED.[37]
There were six sets of these exchanges (motion for issuance of partial writ of execution, opposition,
order granting the writ, memorandum of appeal) from December 2008 to March 2010. The amounts
granted by the LA to Magno from 20 October 2008 to 26 March 2010 are summarized as follows:
  30 October 9 January 18 1 20 15 January 26 March
2008[38] 2009 [39]
February September November 2010[43] 2010[44]
2009[40] 2009[41] 2009[42]
Salary for P76,100 - - - - - -
one-month
suspension
Transportati P15,000 - - - - - -
on benefits
for one
month
Backwages P380,500 - - P 152,200 P 152,200 P 152,200 P 228,300
From 29 May For June For August For For
2008 up to and July and October December
date of 2009 September and 2009 to
Decision 2009 November February
2009 2010
Transportati P315,000 - - P57, 000 P57,000 - -
on benefits (P15,000 x 21
months)  For June  For
and July August
From 2009 and
February September
2007 up to 2009
date of
decision
Cellphone P17, 500 - - P7,000 P7,000 - -
benefits
Incremental P30,000 - - P6,000 P6,000 - -
increase/Sal
ary increase (P3,000 x 10
months)
Annual P300,000 - - - - - -
incentive
pay For
accomplishme
nts in 2007)
Medicine - - - P5,326 P1,030 - -
13th Month - - - - - P76,100 -
Pay
Sick Leave - - - - - - P163,721
and
Vacation
Leave
Statement - "[T]o "[T]o "[T]o "[T]o "[T]o "[T]o
effect the collect the collect immediatel reinstate reinstate
reinstatem reinstatem from y release [Magno] to[Magno] to
ent of ent wages [Coca- the amount [his] [his]
[Magno] toof Cola] the of x x x former former
[his] [Magno] x total P351, position x position
 former x x x." amount of 269.00) x x and for without
position xxx representin [Coca- loss of
without (P356,337. g Cola] to seniority
loss of 00) [Magno's] PAY rights and
seniority representin reinstatem [Magno] privileges
rights and g ent [his] basic and for
privileges, reinstateme salaris/wag reinstatem [Coca-
either nt wages." es and ent wages Cola] to
physically benefits for pay them
or in the for the October their basic
payroll, at months of 2009 and reinstateme
the option August November nt wages
of [Coca- and 2009 and for the
Cola]." September 13th month months of
2009 x x pay for the December
x." year 2009 2009,
x x x." January
2010 and
February
2010 and
their sick
and
vacation
leave
benefits x
x x."
The amounts granted by the LA to Ocampo from 20 October 2008 to 26 March 2010 are summarized as
follows:
  30 Oct 9 Jan 18 Feb 1 Sept 20 Nov 15 Jan 26 Mar
2008[45] 2009[46] 2009[47] 2009[48] 2009[49] 2010[50] 2010[51]
Salary for P45,900 - - - - - -
one-month
suspension
Transportati P10,000 - - - - - -
on benefits
for one
month
Backwages P275,40 - - P91,800 P91,800 P91,800 P137,700
0
For June For August For For
From 29 and July and October December
April 2009 September and 2009 to
2008 up 2009 November February
to date 2009 2010
of
 Decisio
n
Transportati P210, - - P20,000 P20,000 - -
on benefits 000
For June For August
P10,000 and July and
x 21 2009 September
months) 2009

From
Februar
y 2007
up to
date of
Decisio
n
Cellphone P25,000 - - P5,000 P5,000 - -
benefits
Merit P42,000 - - P8,400 P8,400 - -
increase/Sala
ry increase (P4,200
x 10
months)
Variable P550,00 - - - - - -
incentive pay 0

(From
January
2007 up
to date
of
Decisio
n)
Medicine - - - P3,611 P2,839 - -
13th Month - - - - - P48,900 -
Pay
Sick Leave - - - - - - P98,749
and Vacation
Leave
Statement - "[T]o effect "[T]o "[T]o collect"[T]o "[T]o "[T]o
the collect the from [Coca- immediately reinstate reinstate
reinstateme reinstateme Cola] the release the [Ocampo] [Ocampo]
nt of nt wages of total amount amount of x to [his] to [his]
[Ocampo] [Ocampo] xof x x x x x (P351, former former
 to [his] x x." (P356,337.0 269.00) position x x position
former 0) representing x and for without loss
position representing [Ocampo's] [Coca- of seniority
without reinstatemenreinstatemen Cola] to rights and
loss of t wages." t PAY privileges
seniority salaries/wag [Ocampo] and for
rights and es and [his] basic [Coca-
privileges, benefits for reinstateme Cola] to
either the months nt wages pay them
physically of August for October their basic
or in the and 2009 and reinstateme
payroll, at September November nt wages
the option 2009 x x x." 2009 and for the
of [Coca- 13th month months of
Cola]." pay for the December
year 2009 x 2009,
x x." January
2010 and
February
2010 and
their sick
and
vacation
leave
benefits x x
x."
The Ruling of the NLRC

On 27 July 2010, the NLRC promulgated a Decision which resolved Coca-Cola's appeal from the LA's Decision
dated 30 October 2008. The NLRC ruled that Magno and Ocampo were legally dismissed, but their suspension
was illegal.

The 27 July 2010 NLRC Decision adjusted the monetary awards granted by the LA to Magno and Ocampo. In
contrast to the 30 October 2008 Decision, where the LA awarded Magno and Ocampo backwages, transportation
benefits, cellphone benefits, incremental increase, annual incentive pay, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees, the 27 July 2010 Decision of the NLRC limited the monetary awards to payment of salary for one
month suspension and transportation benefits. The 27 July 2010 Decision also denied Magno's and Ocampo's claims
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The dispositive portion of the NLRC's 27 July 2010 Decision reads

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainants-appellees have been
legally dismissed. However, their suspension is declared illegal. Respondent-Appellant Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay their salaries and benefits during the period of their suspension, in the
following grounds [sic]:
1. for Antonio P. Magno:

a. Salary for one month suspension of P76,100.00

b. Transportation benefits of P15,000.00
2. for Melchor L. Ocampo:
a. Salary for one month suspension of P45,900.00
b. Transportation benefits of P10,000.00
The claims for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[52]
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, and the NLRC denied both motions for lack of merit in
a Resolution promulgated on 23 September 2010.[53]

Magno and Ocampo filed a petition before the CA dated 8 December 2010 which questioned the NLRC's 27 July
2010 Decision, which ruled that their suspension was illegal but their dismissal was legal, and 23 September 2010
Resolution, which denied their motion for reconsideration of the 27 July 2010 Decision. The CA petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 117180.

While CA-G.R. SP No. 117180 was pending, the NLRC promulgated a Resolution on 25 April 2011.[54] The NLRC
dismissed Coca-Cola's appeal of the Labor Arbiter's 26 March 2010 Order, which reinstated Magno and Ocampo to
their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and specified the amounts that they should be
paid (that is, their basic reinstatement wages for the months of December 2009, January 2010 and February 2010,
and their sick and vacation leave credits).

The NLRC's 25 April 2011 Resolution stated that "[t]he resolution of this appeal [of the Labor Arbiter's 26 March 2010
Order] is no longer necessary inasmuch as it has been rendered moot and academic by our Decision promulgated on
July 27, 2010 which declared the dismissal of [Magno and Ocampo] as legal."[55]

Coca-Cola filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's 25 April 2011 Resolution, which the NLRC subsequently
denied in a Resolution dated 18 October 2011.[56] The NLRC ruled that "[t]he declaration that complainants were
legally dismissed did not render moot and academic the issue on excess payment of the accrued wages. There is no
doubt that complainants [Magno and Ocampo] were entitled to accrued wages from the time the Labor Arbiter issued
the 30 October 2008 Decision until its reversal by this Commission on 27 July 2010."[57] The NLRC declared that "[t]he
instant appeal centers on whether [Magno and Ocampo] are entitled to vacation leaves and sick leaves."[58] The
NLRC continued:
Thus, it was mandatory on the part of respondents to actually reinstate the complainants or merely reinstate them in
the payroll. Having failed to do so, respondents must pay the salaries they are entitled to, as if the complainants were
immediately reinstated, from November 2008 to February 2010. Such judgment should mean "backwages for the lay-
off period, coupled with seniority or other rights and privileges" attached to the status of the employees when they
should have been reinstated. To put it differently, the affected employees should be treated as if they had not been
absent from work and had been uninterruptedly working during the relevant period. This saving act is designed to
stop a continuing threat or danger to survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and of his family. The
complainants are thus entitled to the salaries or wages plus all other benefits to which they should have
been normally entitled to had they been immediately reinstated, either actual or in the payroll. Had
complainants been immediately reinstated, they should have been entitled not only to their basic wages for
December 2009, January 2010, and February 2010 but also to all other benefits such as vacation and sick leave.
Hence, respondents' argument that there is no basis for the inclusion of the vacation and sick leave pay in the
accrued wages does not have a leg to stand on.[59] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The NLRC proceeded to deny Coca-Cola's appeal, and to affirm the 26 March 2010 Order of the Labor Arbiter in toto.
On 29 December 2011, Coca-Cola filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Coca-Cola
sought to annul the 25 April 2011 and 18 October 2011 Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 122684.

The Ruling of the CA

Both parties filed separate petitions concerning different matters before the CA.

As previously stated, Magno and Ocampo's petition before the CA, as CA-G.R. SP No. 117180, questioned the
NLRC's 27 July 2010 Decision and 23 September 2010 Resolution. The CA's 7 March 2012 Decision[60] upheld the
legality of Magno's and Ocampo's dismissal and correspondingly denied for lack of merit Magno's and Ocampo's
claims for reinstatement, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The CA's 30 May 2012
Resolution[61] denied Magno and Ocampo's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. On 21 June 2012, Magno and
Ocampo filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court. Their petition before this Court was docketed as
G.R. No. 202141. On 30 July 2012, this Court issued a Resolution[62] denying Magno's and Ocampo's claims for
failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution that
would warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Entry of judgment was made on 31 October 2012.[63]

Coca-Cola's petition before the CA, CA-G.R. SP No. 122684, on the other hand, sought to annul the NLRC's 25 April
2011 and 18 October 2011 Resolutions. In a Resolution promulgated on 4 February 2014, the CA stated:
The annulment of the first assailed Resolution sought by the Petitioner, which dismissed its appeal for being moot
and academic, has been rendered superfluous and unnecessary because the NLRC had, in fact, subsequently
reconsidered its stance thereon when it issued the second assailed Resolution. There is, therefore, no need to
question the first assailed Resolution before this Court.

As to the second assailed Resolution, the Petitioner failed to prove that the NLRC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
denying its appeal and in affirming the Labor Arbiter's finding that the Private Respondents are entitled to their basic
wages for the periods of December 2009, January 2010, and February 2010, as well as to all other benefits to which
they should have been normally entitled to had they been immediately reinstated, either actual or in the payroll, by
the Petitioner. The arguments which the Petitioner relies upon to substantiate its claim of grave abuse of discretion
are mere reiterations of the ones it had previously raised before the NLRC. The arguments have already been
considered and resolved by the NLRC in accordance with prevailing law and jurisprudence, thereby negating the
Petitioner's imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

The failure of the Petitioner to point to any specific act on the part of the NLRC that can be construed as amounting to
grave abuse of discretion must necessarily result in the dismissal of its petition for being patently without merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[64]
Coca-Cola's motion for reconsideration[65] was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution promulgated on 9 May 2014.[66]

The Issue

Coca-Cola raises only one argument. It states that:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT SANCTIONED THE EXECUTION AGAINST THE COMPANY OF AMOUNTS IN
EXCESS OF RESPONDENTS' ENTITLEMENT BY WAY OF ACCRUED REINSTATEMENT WAGES. [67]
Coca-Cola's main contention is that "any entitlement of [Magno and Ocampo] to accrued wages should be limited to
their basic pay only."[68] Coca-Cola further states that "[t]here is no factual or legal basis of the inclusion in [Magno's
and Ocampo's] accrued wages of benefits and amounts in excess of their basic pay, including the supposed cash
equivalent of their vacation and sick leave credits."[69] Coca-Cola prays that the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No.
122684 promulgated on 4 February 2014 and on 9 May 2014 be annulled and set aside, and that judgment be
rendered directing Magno and Ocampo to return to Coca-Cola "any and all amounts that they received as part of their
accrued wages in excess of their basic pay."[70]

Our Ruling

We deny Coca-Cola's appeal for lack of merit. Coca-Cola's submissions are utterly bereft of legal basis. We shall now
proceed to determine the components of Magno's and Ocampo's accrued backwages, as well as the period covered
by the award of accrued backwages.

Components of Magno's and Ocampo's Accrued Backwages

The third paragraph of Article 229[71] of the Labor Code provides: "In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately
be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein."

Article 294[72] of the Labor Code further provides: "x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."

Our jurisprudence has been consistent as to what should constitute accrued backwages. In Paramount Vinyl
Products Corp. v. NLRC,[73] we ruled that "the base figure to be used in the computation of backwages due to the
employee should include not just the basic salary, but also the regular allowances that he had been receiving,
such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay mandated under the law." In United Coconut
Chemicals, Inc. v. Valmores,[74] we ruled that "[t]he base figure to be used in reckoning full backwages is the salary
rate of the employee at the time of his dismissal. The amount does not include the increases or benefits
granted during the period of his dismissal because time stood still for him at the precise moment of his
termination, and move forward only upon his reinstatement." Entitlement to such benefits must be proved by
submission of proof of having received the same at the time of the illegal dismissal.[75] Increases are thus excluded
from backwages.

Subject to submission of proof of receipt of benefits at the time of their dismissal, Magno's and Ocampo's accrued
backwages should include their basic salary as well as the allowances and benefits that they have been receiving at
the time of their dismissal. In accordance with the claims previously put forward by Magno and Ocampo, accrued
backwages may include, but are not limited to, allowances and benefits such as transportation benefits, cellphone
allowance, 13th month pay, sick leave, and vacation leave in the amounts at the time of their dismissal. Magno and
Ocampo should also prove that they have been receiving the amounts that correspond to merit or salary increases,
incentive pay, and medicine at the time of their dismissal so that they may validly qualify for receipt of such as part of
their accrued backwages.

Period Covered by the Award of Accrued Backwages

In Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco,[76] we ruled that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued
backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a
higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. Wenphil Corporation v. Abing,[77] further clarified Pfizer:
the start of the computation of the backwages should be on the day following the last day when the dismissed
employee was paid backwages, and end on the date that a higher court reversed the LA's ruling of illegal dismissal.
The date of reversal should be the end date, and not the date of the ultimate finality of such reversal.

Considering that the kind of monetary awards granted to Magno and Ocampo have differed throughout the course of
the present case, the LA should determine the day following the last day when Magno or Ocampo received the
amount for such allowance or benefit. In any event, the last day of the period of computation of Magno's and
Ocampo's backwages should be 27 July 2010. This is the date of promulgation of the NLRC Decision which ruled
that Magno and Ocampo were legally dismissed. This Court's Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 202141 on 31 October
2012 should not have any bearing on the determination of the last day of the period of computation.

The LA is tasked to determine the specific allowances and benefits, as well as the corresponding amounts, that
Magno and Ocampo have been receiving at the time of their dismissal. The LA should also determine the last day
when Magno or Ocampo received the amount for such allowance or benefit. Following this computation, the LA
should then deduct the amount that Coca-Cola previously paid Magno and Ocampo in the course of this case. The
resulting amount, being in the form of a judgment for money, shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. We AFFIRM with CLARIFICATION the Court of Appeals' Resolutions in CA-

G.R. SP No. 122684 promulgated on 4 February 2014 and on 9 May 2014. We REMAND this case to the Labor
Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution, of backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits due to Antonio P. Magno, Jr. and Melchor L. Ocampo, Jr. from the day following the
last day of their receipt of the amount corresponding to a qualified monetary award until 27 July 2010. The Labor
Arbiter should also deduct the amount that Coca-Cola previously paid Magno and Ocampo. Said backwages shall
earn 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

5.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 239986, July 08, 2019 ]
ROMA FE C. VILLALON, PETITIONER, V. RURAL BANK OF AGOO, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
 DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated
August 4, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106920.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 18, 1998, the spouses George and Zenaida Alviar (Spouses Alviar) obtained a loan from herein respondent
Rural Bank of Agoo, Inc. (RBAI) in the amount of P145,000.00, secured by a real estate mortgage over a residential
lot and house of the spouses covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 93-001-43749 and 93-001-52100 located at Barangay
I, San Fernando, La Union. On the same date, the mortgage was registered with the Register of Deeds of La Union.
The loan became due and payable on February 10, 1999, and was renewed for four (4) times with the following due
dates: August 9, 1999, February 4, 2000, August 2, 2000, and January 26, 2001; all evidenced by a promissory note.

On July 30, 2000, the Spouses Alviar borrowed P400,000.00 from herein petitioner Roma Fe C. Villalon (Villalon)
which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on July 30, 2000 over the same residential lot and house
which the spouses used as collateral with RBAI. The real estate mortgage was registered with the Register of Deeds
on July 6, 2001.
On several dates, the Spouses Alviar obtained additional loan from RBAI in the amount of P50,000.00 and
P30,000.00, both secured by a real estate mortgage over the same residential lot and house. For their failure to pay
their loan, an extrajudicial foreclosure was resorted to by RBAI. The foreclosure sale was reset to several dates.

The Spouses Alviar, likewise, failed to pay their loan to Villalon. Thus, Villalon applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgaged realties. The foreclosure sale was conducted on June 26, 2002, wherein Villalon was declared as
the highest bidder, with a bid of P1,050,000.00. A Certificate of Sale of Real Property was issued to Villalon on June
27, 2002, and the same was registered with the Register of Deeds on July 5, 2002.

On June 16, 2004, the foreclosure sale initiated by RBAI finally pushed through. RBAI was the highest bidder with a
bid of P341,830.94 and the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued to it. On October 14, 2005, RBAI paid the
requisite fees, but despite its request, the Certificate of Absolute Deed of Sale was not issued to it.

On the other hand, a Certificate of Absolute Definitive Sale was issued on August 6, 2007 to Villalon, who had been
in physical possession of the property since its foreclosure in 2002. Villalon had it declared for taxation purposes in
her business name "Villalon Lending Investor," and had paid realty taxes for the same.
Upon discovering this, RBAI filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union against Villalon and the Spouses Alviar, claiming principally from Villalon, and
alternatively from the Spouses Alviar, the amount of P750,818.34. RBAI alleged that since the mortgage of the said
real properties in its favor is earlier than the mortgage to Villalon, then RBAI is the first mortgagee/superior lien
holder, while Villalon is only the second mortgagee/subordinate encumbrancer/subordinate lien holder. While the
second mortgagee can foreclose ahead of the first mortgagee, RBAI claimed that the proceeds of the sale should be
used to satisfy first the loan obtained from the first mortgagee. In other words, RBAFs claim of P750,818.34 should
be satisfied from the amount of P1,050,000.00, the bid of Villalon. Despite demand for Villalon to remit or deliver the
said amount of P750,818.34, the latter refused. In the event that Villalon would not be held liable for or would be
unable to pay the said amount, RBAI averred that the Spouses Alviar should be ordered to pay the amount of
P750,818.34.
The Spouses Alviar did not file their Answer despite due summons publication.

Villalon, on the other hand, countered that RBAI has no cause of action against her since she was not a party to the
contract between RBAI and the Spouses Alviar. Thus, she has no obligation to pay the loan granted by RBAI to the
spouses. She has been in lawful and absolute ownership of the properties in question since June 27, 2002, and her
ownership was confirmed and approved by Judge Carbonell,[2] when the latter issued in her favor the Certificate of
Absolute Definitive Sale of Real Property on August 6, 2007. Hence, RBAI cannot assert any right over the properties
in question.
On January 6, 2016, the RTC issued a Decision[3] ordering the Spouses Alviar to pay RBAI the sum of P750,818.34,
plus interest of 12% per annum and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00. The complaint against Villalon was
dismissed. The RTC ruled that RBAI has no cause of action against Villalon there being no contractual relationship
between them. It declared that the foreclosure initiated by Villalon is valid and, therefore, she has a better right over
the foreclosed property. She has no obligation to pay RBAI with respect to the obligation of the spouses to RBAI.
However, since it appears from evidence that the Spouses Alviar have an outstanding obligation to RBAI in the
amount of P750,818.34, RBAI is entitled to recover from the spouses the unpaid loans and expenses in connection
with the collection of such amount.
An appeal was filed by RBAI before the CA, arguing that it is legally entitled to recover from Villalon the amount of
P750,818.34, plus interest. Being the first mortgagee and having registered the real estate mortgage ahead of
Villalon, RBAI contended that Villalon, as a second mortgagee, has the legal obligation to acknowledge and respect
the priority or preferred right of the first mortgagee. Hence, RBAI contends that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale
initiated by Villalon in the amount of P1,050,000.00 should be used first to satisfy the loan obligation of the Spouses
Alviar with RBAI which amounted to P750,818.34, plus interest until fully paid. The excess, if any, shall go to Villalon.

On August 4, 2017, the CA granted RBAI's appeal and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that the RTC erred
in dismissing the complaint against Villalon. According to the CA, RBAI has a cause of action against Villalon for it is
enforcing its first lien or superior lien over the property on the basis of its prior mortgage as against Villalon, the
second mortgagee or junior encumbrancer. Although the complaint is captioned as one for recovery of sum of money,
the allegations in the complaint clearly show that RBAI is asserting its right as a superior lienholder.

The CA noted that the subject matter of the real estate mortgage is an unregistered property, which registration of
transaction was first governed by Act No. 3344 and is now amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529. The proper
foreclosure of the first mortgage by RBAI gave, not only the first mortgagee, but also subsequent lienholders like
Villalon, the right to redeem the property within the statutory period. In order for Villalon to acquire full rights over the
properties subject of the mortgage, she must first redeem the property by paying off the bid price of RBAI in the
auction sale, which was P341,830.94, plus interest of 1% per month, and the assessments or taxes, if any, paid by
the purchaser, with the same rate of interest.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Villalon, but was denied by the CA in a Resolution[4] dated June 7, 2018.
Hence, this petition, raising the following assignment of errors:

A) THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS

PRONOUNCEMENT THAT THE FIRST MORTGAGE WITH RESPONDENT RBAI
PREVAIL OVER THE MORTGAGE TO THE PETITIONER;
B) THE RESPONDENT COURT [OF APPEALS] COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY TO THE RESPONDENT RBAI THE BID
PRICE, INTEREST AND ASSESSMENT OR TAXES IF ANY; [and]
C) THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ENTERTAINING THE
CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER OF GOOD FAITH.[5]
Petitioner Villalon contends that since the foreclosure she initiated was published several times in the newspaper,
which is considered as constructive notice to RBAI, the latter's non-action was tantamount as a waiver to protest the
same. Likewise, petitioner Villalon claims that she was in good faith as she was not aware of the mortgage/s entered
by and between RBAI and the spouses, and that no protest was received during the foreclosure proceedings she
initiated. She also maintains that she has no contractual relationship with respondent RBAI, and the latter's recourse
is against Spouses Alviar who did not appeal the decision of the RTC.

RBAI, in its Comment,[6] stated that the CA was correct in setting aside the decision of the RTC and in ordering
Villalon to pay RBAI the redemption price, together with the assessments or taxes, if any, plus interest. It prayed that
Villalon's petition be denied and the ruling of the CA be affirmed in toto.
We deny the petition.

In Hidalgo v. La Tondeña,[7] We held in the main decision that a mortgage created much ahead in point of time, but
registered later than a levy of execution similarly registered, is preferred over the said levy. In the said case, the
subject property was an unregistered land which was first mortgaged to La Tondeña to secure the payment of a debt
contracted by Valenciano. The Deed of Mortgage was executed on December 12, 1952 and was registered only on
August 14, 1954 with the Register of Deeds under Act No. 3344. On the other hand, Benipayo obtained a judgment in
his favor and to enforce the same, he caused to be levied in execution the interest of Valenciano over the same
property which levy was registered in the same Register of Deeds under the same Act on July 23, 1954. In view of
the motion for reconsideration filed therein by Hidalgo, We modified our ruling[8] and held that Hidalgo's levy and lien
was the better right since it was recorded earlier. This is because when La Tondeña caused its unregistered
mortgage to be entered in the Registry, it was presumed to have become aware of and taken its mortgage subject to
Benipayo's (Hidalgo's predecessor) execution levy (that under the Rules of Court created a lien in favor of the
judgment creditor over the property levied upon).
In the case at bar, it is clear that RBAI's mortgage was first constituted over the unregistered real properties of the
Spouses Alviar on May 18, 1998 and was, likewise, registered with the RD on the same day. On the other hand,
Villalon's mortgage over the said properties was executed on July 30, 2000 and registered with the RD on July 6,
2001. Considering that RBAI's mortgage was created and registered much ahead of time than that of Villalon, RBAI's
mortgage should be preferred. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the proper foreclosure of the first mortgage
by RBAI gave, not only the first mortgagee, but also subsequent lienholders like Villalon, the right to redeem the
property within the statutory period.

Further, Villalon cannot be deemed to be a third party with a better right, as provided for in Act No. 3344, as amended
by Section 113 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, simply because she is a second mortgagee whose rights are strictly
subordinate to the superior lien of the first mortgagee, RBAI. A second mortgagee of an unregistered land has to wait
until after the debtor's obligation to the first mortgagee has been fully satisfied. Hence, notwithstanding that Villalon
was first to foreclose; to have been issued a Certificate of Absolute Definitive Sale of Real Property; and is now in
possession of the property as even the tax declaration is already in her name - these circumstances will not defeat
the rights of RBAI whose mortgage was created and registered much ahead than that of Villalon. At most, Villalon,
being a second mortgagee/junior encumbrancer, has only the right to redeem the property from RBAI, the first
mortgagee.

The extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, as in this case, is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides:

Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the
debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a
lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the
same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be
governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.[9]
Section 28 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. —
The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year
from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase,
with the per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the
amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and
interest on such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to
that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other
lien, with interest.[10]
Thus, in order for Villalon to acquire full rights over the properties subject of the mortgage, she must first redeem
them by paying off: (1) the bid price of RBAI in the auction sale, which is P341,830.94; (2) the interest on the bid
price, computed at one percent (1%) per month; and (3) the assessments or taxes, if any, paid by the purchaser, with
the same interest rate.

Petitioner cannot escape the fact that when she caused the mortgage to be entered in the Registry, RBAI's lien over
the property was already registered as early as May 18, 1998. Thus, she cannot claim to have acted in good faith as
when she caused its mortgage to be entered in the Registry, it was presumed to have become aware of and taken its
mortgage subject to RBAI's lien over the property. This is because registration is the operative act that binds or
affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned.[11] It is upon registration that there is notice to the whole
world.[12]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 4, 2017 and June 7, 2018, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106920, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., conc

6.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 196455, July 08, 2019 ]
CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE INC., EDUARDO R. JABLA, CENTENNIAL
MARITIME SERVICES & M/T ACUSHNET, PETITIONERS, V. EMERITO E. SALES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[2] dated January 21,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Special Fifth Division awarding the payment of total permanent disability benefits
to respondent Emerito E. Sales (Sales).
The Facts of the Case
Sales was hired by Centennial Transmarine, Inc. (CTI), a local manning agency acting for and in behalf of its principal
Centennial Maritime Services, to work as Pumpman on board M/V Acushnet for nine (9) months.[3]
Sales claims that sometime in April 2006, while transferring the portable pump to the main deck, he slipped and hit
the floor. Although in pain from the fall, Sales ignored it and continued with his work, which included carrying heavy
objects. However, the pain on his lower back persisted. On May 5, 2006, Sales reported that he was suffering from
lower back pain.[4] He was initially given an ointment for relief but this did not treat his back pain. Sales sought for
medical assistance and was then referred to a physician in Antwerp, Belgium. Upon examination, Sales was initially
diagnosed to be suffering from "acute traumatic lumbago with ischialgia right leg",[5] and was recommended for
medical repatriation to the Philippines for further evaluation and medical treatment.
On May 12, 2006 or two (2) days after his repatriation, Sales was referred to CTI's company-designated physician.
He underwent a magnetic resonance imaging test (MRI). Sales' MRI results showed that he was suffering from
"degenerative changes of the lumbar spine including disc protrusions at L5-S1 and probably L4-L5."[6] Sales was
recommended by the physician to undergo surgery, but he refused. In a Letter[7] dated July 10, 2006, the company-
designated physician advised that Sales see a rehabilitation doctor for evaluation whether he can be treated
conservatively thru physical therapy. On July 20, 2006, Sales began his "conservative" treatment with the company-
designated physician.
During his treatment with the company-designated physician, Sales sought for a second opinion of his medical
condition at the same hospital he was treated. In a Medical Certification[8] dated September 20, 2006, Sales was
assessed with disability grading "8", describing it as "partial permanent disability." Sales' physician advised that "[h]e
requires constant physical therapy/rehabilitation and may require surgery in the future if his pain symptoms [worsen].
He is totally UNFIT TO WORK as a Seaman."
The following day, on September 21, 2006, the company-designated physician issued a Medical
Certification[9] advising Sales to continue physical therapy sessions. He was also advised to undergo surgery, which
is a more "definitive treatment", but Sales, again, refused. In a Letter[10] dated September 22, 2006, the company-
designated medical director reported that Sales had undergone 10 physical therapy sessions. The report further
stated that "(t)here is no visible problem with ambulation. At this point, patient is advised against lifting heavy objects
which gives him 1/3 loss of lifting power x x x." The company-designated physician issued Sales' disability
assessment with "GRADE 11."[11]
On October 4, 2006, Sales filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) claiming
entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits, attorney's fees, and moral and exemplary damages. Sales
argues that he remained unfit for sea duty for more than 120 days. He lost his capacity to obtain employment as
seaman; that he was not able to get any employment due to his conditions. Sales also claims that he should be
compensated for disability benefits under the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) because he
sustained his injuries from an accident on board the vessel.

On September 28, 2007, the NLRC, though Labor Arbiter (LA) Ligerio Ancheta, ruled in favor of Sales. The LA held
that Sales should be paid permanent and total disability benefits in accordance with the CBA. He was able to prove
having sustained an injury onboard the vessel which eventually caused his disability. The LA was unconvinced of the
allegations of CTI that no accident took place onboard M/V Acushnet. Had there been no accident during Sales'
employment with the company, CTI would not have repatriated Sales to the Philippines nor covered for his medical
expenses thereafter. The LA sustained the assessment of Sales' physician in finding Sales "TOTALLY UNFIT TO
WORK AS A SEAMAN."

CTI appealed the LA's decision with the NLRC arguing that the assessment of Sales' physician should not be upheld
because he is not the company-designated physician. CTI emphasized that, despite recommendation of the company
doctor, Sales refused to undergo surgery, which amounted to a breach of duty.
On April 2, 2009, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. Contrary to the findings of the LA, the
NLRC held that there was no evidence of Sales' accident and that the latter failed to elaborate the incidents of the
accident that caused his medical injury. Hence, there was no basis to apply the provisions of the CBA for purposes of
payment of disability benefits. The NLRC also held that the initial medical assessment of Sales abroad and the MRI
readings of the company-designated physician gave the impression that his conditions of "degenerative change of
the lumbar spine" was internal to his body and not caused by an external incident, such as the accident that Sales
alleged. Finally, the NLRC held that while Sales' physician assessed him to be unfit to work, the same did not show if
Sales' unfitness was due to the accident that he alleged.

On reconsideration, the NLRC awarded Sales disability benefits in accordance with the Grade 11 assessment issued
by the company-designated physician.

Sales appealed the NLRC decision and resolution with the CA on certiorari. On January 21, 2011, the CA, Special
Fifth Division, ruled in favor of Sales. The CA found that Sales had been employed with CTI years prior to his
accident in 2006. The lower back pain manifested during his last tour of duty. Sales' job as pumpman entailed tedious
manual tasks that aggravated the work related pressure on his lower-back. The physicians who examined him found
his injury to be work-oriented, as it could have developed over the years he was working as seaman for CTI. Hence,
his injury is compensable.
Anent payment of disability benefits, the CA held that Sales is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. While
the disability grading of the company-designated physician and Sales' physician varied, the CA held that both
physicians assessed Sales to have suffered from excruciating back pain. CTI is precluded from questioning the
assessment of Sales' physician because the company allowed Sales to seek the opinion of a second physician. The
CA held that Sales' disability went beyond 120 days since his repatriation. The CA emphasized that permanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of a similar nature that
one was trained for or accustomed to perform. In this case, Sales was awarded permanent and total disability
benefits amounting to US$78,750 because he could neither return to work as pumpman nor as a seaman in any other
capacity. He was also awarded P25,000.00 moral damages, P25,000.00 exemplary damages and 10% attorney's
fees.

CTI moved to reconsider the CA decision but the same was denied in the Resolution[12] dated April 12, 2011. Hence,
the instant petition.
Based on the facts, this Court holds that Sales' injury is compensable. It is undisputed that Sales has been in the
employ of CTI since February 2000.[13] Over six years later or in May 2006, Sales reported his back pain to the
company for which he was medically repatriated. Upon his return to the Philippines, Sales was further examined by
the company-designated physician and was assessed to have degenerative changes of his lumbar spine. From the
foregoing, this Court agrees with the CA that Sales' condition could have developed over the years he was working
as seaman for CTI. Sales' job as pumpman entailed manual labor, and his lower back pain could have manifested
only during his tour of duty in May 2006. While there may be no records on Sales' accident, facts concerning the
nature of his work, the longevity of his service with CTI and his persistent back pains on board the vessel and
subsequent repatriation due to such back pain, sufficiently establish that his condition is attributable to his work and,
as such, entitles him to compensation. The company-designated physician also found Sales' condition to be work-
related.[14] In this wise, CTI’s emphasis on Section 20(D) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) finds no application in the instant case. Said provision reads:
Section 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

xxxx

D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect or any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the
seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the
employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the
seafarer. (Emphasis ours)
CTI argues that Sales is not entitled to compensation because of his refusal to undergo surgery. As discussed, facts
sufficiently show that the back injury of Sales is work-related and compensable. Sales' back pains occurred during
the term of his employment while he was onboard the vessel. This Court also cannot agree with the bare allegations
of CTI that Sales must have figured into an accident after his tour of duty. We emphasize that Sales was medically
repatriated due to his complaints of back pain during his term of employment and initial findings of his back injury.
The theory of CTI is improbable.
Further, if, as CTI argues, Sales' refusal for surgery was a breach of duty, then CTI should have immediately stopped
the medical treatment of Sales. From the facts, Sales refused to undergo surgery as early as July 2006. Yet, CTI
continued observing and treating Sales conservatively through physical rehabilitation. CTI had several opportunities
to notify Sales, during his treatment and physical therapy sessions, that not resorting to surgery is a breach and
would forfeit his disability benefits. Further, if Sales had indeed abandoned treatment, CTI would not have issued a
disability assessment in September 2006 because Sales had not completed his treatment. The foregoing factual
incidents do not convince this Court that CTI considered Sales to have breached his duty.

This Court, however, agrees with CTI that non-observance of the 120/240-day rule will not automatically entitle a
seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits. It has been settled that the application of the 120/240 day rule
shall depend on the circumstances of the case, including compliance with the parties' contractual duties and
obligations as laid down in the POEA-SEC and/or their CBA, if one exists.[15]
While Sales remained unfit for sea duty for more than 120 days, records show that he was still under observation and
medical treatment with the company-designated physician. Thus, to require CTI to immediately issue a final disability
assessment, while still undergoing treatment, would be premature. Further, although the disability gradings of the
company-designated physician and Sales' physician varied, both medical assessments show that Sales only suffered
from partial disability. The remarks of both physicians on Sales' conditions were consistent requiring him to continue
physical therapy and to have surgery.[16] As discussed and following the provisions of the POEA-SEC,[17] the disability
shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in
which sickness allowance is paid. The disability gradings as provided in the POEA-SEC must prevail. As to which
disability assessments to uphold, this Court finds for CTI. Upon review of the disability assessments, We find that the
company-designated physician is more knowledgeable of the conditions of Sales, having monitored and treated the
latter from his repatriation in May 2006 to the issuance of the disability assessment in September 2006. Sales' 8-day
evaluation by his physician pales in comparison to the 5-month treatment he had with the company-designated
physician. In fact and to reiterate, the observations in the assessment issued by Sales' physician and the company-
designated physician were consistent. The company-designated physician's disability grading was not arrived at
arbitrarily. In addition, facts do not show that the parties agreed for an assessment of a third physician to settle the
disability grading of Sales. Agreeing to a third physician for a final assessment would have been prudent, more so for
Sales, who was contesting the company-designated physician's assessment. Thus, for lack of an assessment of a
third physician coupled with the foregoing facts, this Court upholds the Grade 11 rating of the company-designated
physician.
Anent the issue of applying the provisions of the CBA, this Court finds it to be proper. Section 20.1.4.1 of the CBA
provides:

20.1.4 COMPENSATION FOR DISABILITY

20.1.4.1 A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of work related illness or from an injury as a result
of an accident regardless of fault by excluding injuries caused by a seafarer's willful act, whilst serving on board
including accidents and work related illness occurring whilst travelling to or from the ship, and whose ability
to work is reduced as a result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the
provisions of this Agreement. In determining work-related illness, reference shall be made to the Philippine Overseas
Employees Compensation Law and/or Social Security Law. (Emphasis ours)
Clear from the foregoing facts, Sales' 1/3rd loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk was rooted from a work-related
injury. Hence, the provisions of the CBA will apply. This Court cannot subscribe to CTI’s position that only permanent
disabilities resulting from an accident will be covered by the CBA. The special clauses on CBAs must prevail over the
standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA-SEC.[18] The seafarer will always have the minimum rights as
per the POEA-SEC, but to the extent a CBA gives better benefits, these terms will override the POEA-SEC terms.
This is so because a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be
endeavored in favor of the laborer. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.[19] In any case, this Court finds that the
fall of Sales while transferring the portable pump constitutes an accident. This Court in NFD International Manning
Agents, Inc. v. Illescas,[20] cited the Philippine Law Dictionary defining the word "accident" as "[t]hat which happens by
chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."[21] To Our
mind, Sales slipping and hitting the floor falls within the above-quoted definition. Thus, the schedule of impediment
grading and appropriate money award provided in Section 20.1.4.4 must be followed. Sales is awarded $11,757.00.
This Court, however, agrees with CTI that the conditions for the award of permanent and total disability benefits
provided in Section 20.1.5 of the CBA[22] are not present. Said provision states that:
20.1.5 Permanent Medical Unfitness
A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the POEA Employment Contract shall, for the purpose
of this paragraph as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e.
US$131250.00 for senior officers, US$110,000.00 for junior officers and US$ 82,500 for ratings (effective January 1,
2007). Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the contract but certified as
permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the company doctor, shall also be entitled to
100% compensation. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the medical assessment of the company-designated physician only shows partial disability grading of
Sales.[23] There were no categorical remarks that he was unfit for further sea service. Although Sales was
recommended to continue physical therapy, he was also required to have surgery as a "more definitive treatment." To
this Court's mind, the condition of Sales is not considered by the company-designated physician as permanent.
With respect to Sales' money claims for moral and exemplary damages, We do not find any cause to grant the same
for lack of factual and legal basis. Likewise, We do not find any evidence to show bad faith on the part of CTI for
paying compensation according to the grading issued by the company-designated physician.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 21, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, Special Fifth Division is MODIFED.
Petitioner company Centennial Transmarine, Inc. is ORDERED to PAY $11,757.00 as disability compensation to
Emerito E. Sales, plus ten percent (10%) attorney's fees and all amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per
annum from the date of filing of claim on October 4, 2006 until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (C.J.), Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

7.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 219614, July 10, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PONCIANO ESPINA Y
BALASANTOS ALIAS "JUN ESPINA AND JR", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This appeal assails the Decision[1] dated November 17, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06178
affirming with modification the trial court's verdict of conviction[2] for murder against Ponciano Espina y Balasantos.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
By Information[3] dated September 3, 2007, appellant was charged with murder for the killing of Ernando Reyes, Jr.,
thus:
That on or about the 26th day of May, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one ERNANDO REYES, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
gunshot wound on the trunk, which eventually caused his death, the said killing having been attended by the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, which qualify (sic) the killing to murder and
aggravated by nighttime and use of a firearm, which is a deadly weapon, that is, all to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of ERNANDO REYES.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty."[4] During the trial, Russel Michael and Ernando's wife Evelyn Reyes
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, appellant alone testified for the defense.
The Prosecution's Version
On May 26, 2005, around 8:30 in the evening, appellant Ponciano Espina, Ernando Reyes, Jr., Russel, Pio Manjares
and a certain Dante were having a drinking spree inside Pio's house in Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig City. While the drinking
spree was ongoing, appellant left. When he returned, he showed his drinking companions a .45-caliber gun and
asked them to hold it, which they did. He later retrieved the gun and tucked it on his waist.[5]
After a while, appellant pulled out the gun and pointed it close to Ernando's chest, posing these questions "Ano
gusto? Patay buhay?" Then right off, he shot Ernando in the upper right chest. Everyone else in the group scampered
away. But shortly after, Russel came back and helped rush Ernando to the Rizal Medical Center. Ernando later died
in the hospital.[6] His wife Evelyn Reyes and his relatives incurred funeral expenses of P25,500.00.[7] They sought
damages of P200,000.00.[8]
The prosecution offered the following documentary evidence:

Exhibit "A" - Affidavit of Evelyn Reyes[9]

Exhibit "B" - Affidavit of Russel Michael[10]
Exhibit "G" - Death Certificate of Ernando Reyes, Jr.[11]
Exhibit "H" - San Roque Parish Receipt[12]
The Defense's Version
Appellant denied the charge and even denied knowing Ernando, Evelyn, Russel, or Pio.[13] According to him, in 2005,
he resided in Las Piñas City and had never before been to Taguig City. It was only on August 27, 2006 that he
started staying in his cousin's house at DC Clamp Compound, Ibayo Tipas, Taguig City.[14]
On September 14, 2006, he got involved in a stabbing incident in Brgy. Kalawaan, Pasig City. He surrendered to the
barangay officials who turned him over to the nearest police station. He was charged with frustrated homicide. Four
(4) days later, on September 18, 2006, a warrant of arrest for the present case of murder was served on him. Thus,
he only learned of the murder charge in the Pasig City police station where he got detained for the frustrated
homicide charge.[15]
On February 6, 2012, the trial court acquitted him in the frustrated homicide case.[16] He, however, remained under
custody for the alleged murder of Ernando.
The defense offered copy of the Decision[17] dated February 6, 2012 of Regional Trial Court -Branch 67, Pasig City
where appellant was acquitted in the frustrated homicide case.
The Trial Court's Ruling
Appellant was pronounced guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.[18] The trial court found that when appellant shot
Ernando in a sudden and unexpected manner, sans any provocation from Ernando, the latter was rendered unable to
retaliate or defend himself. It rejected appellant's bare denial and alibi in light of the prosecution's positive and
categorical evidence pointing to him as the culprit,[19] thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused PONCIANO ESPINA Y BALASANTOS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua which carries
with it the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which he shall
suffer even though pardoned unless the same shall have been expressly remitted therein.
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ernando Reyes the amount of P25,500.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P40,000.00 as moral damages; and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The City Jail Warden of Taguig City is hereby ordered to transfer said accused to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.[20]
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
On appeal,[21] appellant faulted the trial court for convicting him of murder despite the prosecution's alleged failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He averred: (1) the failure of a medical expert to authenticate Ernando's
death certificate[22] rendered the same inadmissible in evidence; and (2) there was no competent proof on record to
establish intent to kill.[23]
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) through Senior State Solicitor Marsha C. Recon and State
Solicitor Samantha P. Camitan countered: (1) appellant was positively identified as the one who slayed Ernando; and
(2) treachery attended Ernando's killing.[24]
By Decision[25] dated November 17, 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision appealed from finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for
parole and shall be liable to pay to the heirs of Ernando Reyes, Jr. the following: the amount of P25,500.00 as actual
damages, P75,000.00 as civil damages ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. He is further ordered to pay an interest of at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the award of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The Court of Appeals ruled that the elements of murder were all present. For it was sufficiently proved that appellant
fatally shot the unsuspecting victim in the chest with a .45-caliber gun while they were having a drinking spree in Pio's
house at Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig. The victim was not shown to have initiated any aggression or provocation.[27]
The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays anew for his acquittal.[28] In compliance with
Resolution[29] dated October 19, 2015, the OSG and appellant manifested[30] that, in lieu of supplemental briefs, they
were adopting their respective briefs before the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed appellant's conviction for murder?
 Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.

There is no question that the victim Ernando Reyes, Jr. was killed. The fact of his death was duly established by his
Death Certificate.[31] In this jurisdiction, a duly registered death certificate is considered a public document.[32] To be
admissible in evidence, there is no need for a medical expert to authenticate or verify. Its issuance by the Office of
the Civil Registry concerned is sufficient proof of the death of the person named therein.[33] So must it be.
Turning now to appellant's theory of lack of intent to kill, the Court keenly notes that it was not what he pleaded
before the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower
court will not be permitted to change his or her theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time at such late stage.[34] To allow otherwise would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory.[35] In any event, changing postures of defense
betray a guilty mind and sheer lack of credibility.
Intent to kill sufficiently established
Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations. In Rivera v.
People,[36] We held that intent to kill must be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence which may consist of:
(1) the means used by the malefactor; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under
which the crime was committed. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the
words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.[37]
The factual circumstances surrounding Ernando's death clearly showed appellant's intent to kill. He left the drinking
spree and shortly after, he came back and showed off his gun to his drinking companions. Then, he pointed it to
Ernando posing two (2) queries: "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" And right off, he shot the unarmed victim in the right
chest.
Appellant's vicious attack was unprovoked. He just shot Ernando in the right chest during the drinking spree. The
Medico Legal Report[38] stated that Ernando sustained one (1) gunshot wound, through and through, causing
laceration of his right lung, diaphragm, liver, and stomach. The cause of death was: "Gunshot wound, trunk.'" It has
been settled that if the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[39] Verily, appellant's intent to kill Ernando was amply established on record.
This brings to fore treachery.

Treachery attended the killing

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
from the offended party's act of retaliation in self-defense.[40] It is a circumstance that must be proven as indubitably
as the crime itself.
Treachery has two (2) elements: (1) employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) such means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.[41] Its
attendance cannot be presumed.[42] Evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself.[43] The evidence must
show that the offender prepared to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make
it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself.[44]
Here, Russel positively testified that appellant and Ernando had no prior conflict or quarrel when appellant suddenly
shot Ernando. Russel vividly recounted that while the drinking spree was ongoing, appellant left and returned shortly.
He was already carrying a .45-caliber gun[45] which he showed to his drinking mates, including Ernando. After
retrieving it from his drinking mates, appellant tucked it on his waist. But he instantly drew it out and pointed it to
Ernando's chest asking "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" And not waiting for Ernando's response, appellant swiftly shot the
unarmed victim in the chest. Ernando was left without even a bit of a chance to defend himself or run away.
Undoubtedly, appellant employed means which ensured the commission of the crime without exposing himself to any
risk which may come from Ernando's possible act of retaliation or defense. This is treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latter's part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the
attack.[46] What is decisive is the offender launched the attack without the slightest provocation from the victim,
making it impossible for the latter to defend himself or retaliate.[47] In fine, treachery or aleviosa attended Ernando's
killing.
As for the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of firearm, although alleged in the Information, these
circumstances were not proved. Consequently, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled them out
as attendant aggravating circumstances.
Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua  to death. There being no
aggravating circumstance proven, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced appellant
to  reclusion perpetua. In accordance with A.M. 15-08-02-SC,[48] the phrase "without eligibility for parole" need not be
bome in the decision to qualify this penalty as imposed on appellant.
We affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[49] however, the
awards of moral and exemplary damages should be increased to P75,000.00 each. We delete the actual damages of
P25,500.00.[50] When the amount of actual damages proved during the trial is less than the sum allowed by the Court
as temperate damages, the latter sum should be awarded.[51] Temperate damages of P50,000.00, therefore, should
be awarded in lieu of actual damages of P25,500.00.[52] Finally, these amounts shall earn six percent (6%)
interest per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 17, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 06178 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant PONCIANO ESPINA y BALASANTOS is found GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. He is required to pay the heirs of Ernando Reyes, Jr. civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages of P75,000.00 each; and temperate damages of P50,000.00 These amounts shall earn six percent (6%)
interest per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

8.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 203076-77, July 10, 2019 ]
AZUCENA E. BAYANI, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO, LEONORA, VIRGILIO,
VILMA, CYNTHIA AND NANCY, ALL SURNAMED YU AND MR. ALFREDO T.
PALLANAN, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NOS. 206765 and 207214]

HEIRS OF CONCEPCION NON ANDRES, NAMELY: SERGIO, JR., SOFRONIO AND

GRACELDA, ALL SURNAMED ANDRES, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF
MELENCIO YU AND TALINANAP MATUALAGA, NAMELY: EDUARDO, LEONORA,
VIRGILIO, VILMA, CYNTHIA, IMELDA AND NANCY, ALL SURNAMED YU; THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY; MR. ALFREDO T.
PALLANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BRANCH 36), GENERAL SANTOS CITY; AND HON. ISAAC ALVERO V.
MORAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 36),
GENERAL SANTOS CITY; YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ROGELIO ENERO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, C.J.:
The guarantee of due process requires that the judgment of the court in an action in personam  shall be enforced only
against individuals who have been properly impleaded and whose persons have regularly come under the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Any person not duly served with the summons or who has not voluntarily appeared in the action
cannot be prejudiced by the judgment.

The Case
Before us are consolidated appeals by petition for review on certiorari,  specifically: (1) G.R. No. 206765 and G.R. No.
207214, filed by the Heirs of Concepcion Non Andres against the Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, et
al.;  and (2) G.R. Nos. 203076-77, filed by Azucena Bayani. These appeals assail the decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals (CA) on May 20, 2011 (assailed decision), as well as the resolutions promulgated on July 19, 2012
and April 17, 2013 respectively in CA-G.R. SP No. 02118-MIN and CA-G.R. No. SP No. 02084-MIN.

Petitioners Sergio Andres, Jr., Sofronio Andres, and Gracelda Andres (collectively, Heirs of Non Andres) are the
children of the late Concepcion Non Andres, the daughter of the late Alfonso Non. Respondents Eduardo, Leonora,
Virgilio, Vilma, Cynthia, and Nancy (collectively, Heirs of Yu) are the heirs of the late Spouses Melencio Yu and
Talinanap Matualaga.

Antecedents

In 1953, a parcel of land, with an approximate aggregate area of 54.4980 hectares, located in Makar, General Santos
City (Makar property), was subdivided into Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Melencio filed applications for free patent as to
Lots Nos. 2 and 4, and his applications were eventually approved.[1]

Sometime after 1963, Melencio executed an Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale  and a Quitclaim
Deed upon the intervention of Alfonso Non. It turned out, however, that said documents were for the sale of all  the
subdivided lots to one John Z. Sycip, instead of only the lots covered by the free patent issued to Melencio. As a
result, the original certificate of title was delivered to Sycip instead of to Melencio and Talinanap.

After the subdivision, the disposition of the Makar property — particularly Lot No. 2 — became the subject of
controversy in several civil cases, the rulings in which were ultimately brought to the Court, namely: (a) G.R. No.
76487 entitled Heirs of Sycip v. Court of Appeals,[2] whose decision was promulgated on November 9, 1990 (1990
Case); (b) G.R. No. 182371 entitled Heirs of Yu  v. Court of Appeals,[3] whose decision was promulgated on
September 4, 2013 (2013 Case); and (c) the present consolidated appeals.

A.
1990 Case (G.R. No. 76487)

After discovering that the original certificate of title had been delivered to Sycip, Melencio and Talinanap commenced
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of South Cotabato an action against Sycip for the declaration of nullity of
documents and recovery of possession of real property (with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction).
The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 1291, was assigned to Branch I of the CFI.

The ruling in Civil Case No. 1291 eventually reached the Court (G.R. No. 76487), and the pivotal question raised
was whether or not the sale of Lot No. 2 was null and void ab initio. Through the decision promulgated on November
9, 1990,[4] the Court nullified the Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale  and the Quitclaim Deed on the
ground that with Melencio and Talinanap being native Muslims belonging to the cultural minority or non-Christian
Maguindanao tribe, the real property transactions to which they were parties were governed by the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the Public Land Act, and Republic Act No.
3872, laws that respectively required the real property transactions to be approved by the relevant Provincial
Governor, the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration;
and that, therefore, the documents were void and inexistent for being falsified, without consideration, and lacking of
the requisite approvals.[5]

The ruling in the 1990 Case (G.R. No. 76487) became final and executory on December 10, 1990, and the entry of
judgment was issued on February 2, 1991. As a result, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City
directed the issuance of the writ of execution in its order dated February 26, 1991.[6]

As it turned out, Sycip had long abandoned the Makar property since the 1980s. As of the time of the execution of the
ruling in Civil Case No. 1291, however, other persons were already occupying Lot No. 2 and had built improvements
thereon. Among them were: (1) the group of illegal settlers that had entered the disputed property in the interim, and
who had organized themselves into the Yard Urban Homeowners Association, Inc. (YUHAI); (2) another group of
illegal entrants who had organized themselves as the Sogod Homeseekers Association, against whom the Heirs of
Yu brought an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 1668-22;[7] and (3) the Heirs of Non Andres,
represented by Gracelda.
When the sheriff implemented the writ of execution issued in the 1990 Case, the occupants refused to vacate Lot No.
2. Thus, the Heirs of Yu moved for the demolition of the occupants' improvements on Lot No. 2.[8] In the order dated
April 26, 1991, the RTC granted this motion and directed "the defendants who have remained in the premises xxx to
remove their houses, otherwise, corresponding demolition will automatically follow."[9]

To prevent the Heirs of Yu from taking over the property where its members had erected their houses, YUHAI filed a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
(TRO), docketed as Civil Case No. 4647, in the RTC, which was assigned to Branch 23 (YUHAI Injunction Case).
[10]
 By this time, the same RTC branch was hearing both Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No. 4647, which had
been consolidated.

The RTC dismissed the YUHAI Injunction Case on March 25, 1995, and the CA affirmed the dismissal on August
28, 1998 in CA-G.R. No. 54003.[11]

Still unsuccessful in obtaining possession of Lot No. 2, the Heirs of Yu again sought the issuance of a special order of
demolition. However, on March 10, 1998, the RTC, then presided by Acting Presiding Judge Monico G. Cabales,
denied their motion to that effect,[12] observing that the improvements being sought to be demolished had been built
by persons not privy to Civil Case No. 1291; and holding that the judgment did not bind persons who were not
parties in the action because every person was entitled to due process of law.[13]

The RTC later denied the Heirs of Yu's motion for reconsideration.

Undaunted, the Heirs of Yu again moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition. The RTC, now under Presiding
Judge Jose S. Majaducon, granted the motion, and issued the special order of demolition dated August 22,
2001 (2001 Demolition Order),[14] which reads as follows:

SPECIAL ORDER OF DEMOLITION

TO: The Provincial Sheriff of General Santos City or any of his deputies

xxxx

WHEREAS, on March 19, 2001, an ORDER was issued by the Court, the dispositive part of which reads as follow
(sic):

"WHEREFORE, the motion to implement the writ of demolition against the defendants and oppositors is hereby
GRANTED."

WHEREAS, on June 20, 2001, an ORDER was issued by the Court, reading as follows:

"Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration on the Order dated [M]arch 19, 2001, granting motion for a special order of
demolition and the opposition thereto, the Court having found no cogent reason to reconsider or set aside the Order,
hereby DENIES the motion.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is very clear on the issues raised in the motion. Since oppositors have not
shown any right to the land, they should vacate the same. According to the Court of Appeals, it is not necessary for
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1291 and defendants in Civil Case No. 4647 to file a separate case to eject oppositors.

WHEREFORE, the motion is denied."

NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the improvements erected by the defendants HEIRS OF
JOHN Z. SYCIP xxx, in Civil Case No. 1291, and plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC.,
ET AL. in Civil Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to plaintiffs in Civil Case 1291 and
defendants Civil Case no. 4647, MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by Original
Certificate of Title [No.] (V-14496) (P-2331) P-523 in Apopong, General Santos City. (Bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis)

By virtue of the 2001 Demolition Order, the provincial sheriff issued notices to vacate addressed to the Heirs of
Sycip, YUHAI, and “all adverse claimants and actual occupants of the disputed lot,"[15] including the Heirs of Non
Andres.

Prompted by the issuance of the 2001 Demolition Order, the Heirs of Non Andres and YUHAI separately filed in the
RTC complaints for quieting of title docketed as Civil Case No. 7066 (Heirs of Non Andres Quieting
Case) and Special Civil Case No. 562 (YUHAI Quieting Case), respectively.

In the meantime, the RTC directed the sheriff to proceed with the implementation of the 2001 Demolition
Order. Thereafter, YUHAI filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the 2001 Demolition Order (docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 69176). Initially, on March 5, 2002, the CA issued a TRO to enjoin the implementation, thereby
effectively deferring the demolition for several years.[16] Ultimately, the CA dismissed YUHAI's petition
for certiorari and denied YUHAI's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. Thus, YUHAI appealed the dismissal to
this Court, which denied the petition for review on certiorari on September 16, 2009.[17]

Inasmuch as the implementation of the 2001 Demolition Order remained pending and incomplete, the Heirs of Yu
filed their Motion to Resume and Complete Demolition.  In its October 9, 2007 order (2007 Resumption Order),[18] the
RTC (Branch 36) granted the motion and directed the provincial sheriff to proceed with and complete the demolition
allowed in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No. 4647,[19] viz:

SPECIAL ORDER TO RESUME AND COMPLETE DEMOLITION

TO: The Provincial Sheriff of General Santos City or any of his deputies

xxxx

NOW THEREFORE, we command you to resume and complete the demolition in [Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647] as
directed in the Special Order of Demolition, dated August 22, 2001, issued by then Judge Jose S. Majaducon.
(Emphasis Supplied)

Subsequently, on November 12, 2007 and December 4, 2007, the sheriff sent notices to all occupants  to vacate Lot
No. 2.[20]

Two parties assailed the 2007 Resumption Order, namely: the Heirs of Non Andres and Azucena N. Bayani.

Arguing that they were not even parties in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No. 4647, the Heirs of Non Andres
assailed their inclusion in the implementation through their letter addressed to the provincial sheriff whereby they
insisted on their exclusion from the implementation, and by filing therein a Special Appearance with Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion.  The provincial sheriff did not act on their letter, while the RTC expressly disallowed their
motion through the order dated December 7, 2007.[21] On December 11, 2007,[22] therefore, they brought a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN) to set aside the 2007 Resumption Order and to permanently enjoin the
demolition as far as they were concerned.

On her part, Bayani also went to the CA by commencing an action for indirect contempt against Deputy Sheriff
Alfredo Pallanan of Branch 36 of the RTC on the ground that the latter had illegally demolished her house (CA-G.R.
SP NO. 02118-MIN).

It is notable that the two petitions filed in the CA to resist the implementation of the 2007 Resumption Order paved
the way to two cases that separately reached the Court, specifically: (1) CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN involving
matters that had occurred in the early stages (i.e., the ancilliary prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the demolition), which led to the 2013 Case; and (2) after CA-G.R. SP NO. 02118-MIN was
consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN, the CA resolved the main issue  on the propriety of the 2007
Resumption Order through the decision promulgated on May 20, 2011.

Bayani and the Heirs of Non Andres have separately appealed the decision promulgated on May 20, 2011, and their
appeals are now the subjects of the consolidated appeals herein.

B.
2013 Case (G.R. No. 182371)

On December 14, 2007, a few days after the Heirs of Non Andres filed their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN), the CA granted their prayer for the TRO "enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of
General Santos City xxx from demolishing any improvements and structures over the subject property and from
harassing petitioners, their agents and representatives until further notice."[23]

Considering that the RTC stated in its order dated December 20, 2007 that the writ of demolition had already been
executed completely on December 13, 2007, the CA, noting said order, lifted the TRO for being moot and academic.
[24]

The Heirs of Non Andres moved for the reconsideration of the lifting of the TRO by insisting that the demolition had
not yet been completely implemented as to them. Hence, on April 3, 2008, the CA issued: (1) an order granting their
motion for reconsideration; and (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction preventing further demolition on the
subject property.

Confronted by another impending delay in the clearing of the subject lot of the occupants, the Heirs of Yu moved to
reconsider and reverse the grant of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and to dissolve the writ. After their
move failed, they came to the Court to seek recourse by petition for certiorari  (G.R. No. 182371), which is the 2013
Case.

The main issue in the 2013 Case was whether or not the CA had properly issued the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.[25] In striking down the CA's order, the Court opined that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction had been done in undue haste and without the requisite posting of the bond; that an order granting the
preliminary mandatory injunction did not automatically entitle the applicant to an immediate enforcement;[26] that the
CA had committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Heirs of Non Andres's prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction,[27] reminding that:

x x x [A] preliminary mandatory injunction should only be granted "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right
is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is
a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing
continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new
relation."[28]

and that the Heirs of Non Andres's entitlement to the preliminary mandatory injunction was more doubtful than clear
and unmistakable because: (a) the evidence they had presented was weak and inconclusive; (b) the right sought to
be protected remained to be disputed;[29] and (c) the damages allegedly sustained did not consist of grave and
irreparable injury.[30]

The Court pronounced that the Heirs of Non Andres were bound by the ruling in the 1990 Case, whereby
the Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale and Quitclaim Deed  were nullified;[31] that said documents could
not prove their ownership and possession of Lot No. 2;[32] that although they had presented other public documents,
such as the application for free patent of their predecessor-in-interest, Concepcion Non Andres, the existence and
due execution of such documents had remained inconclusive and highly disputed; and that, consequently, such
documents could not be the source of a clear and unmistakable right.[33]

The Court observed that the parties had continued to disagree on the fact of prior possession of Lot No. 2; that
although the Heirs of Non Andres had claimed to be "the actual possessors — open, continuous, and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner—and not squatters, of the subject lot for over 50 years," and that they had
erected improvements and structures on the lot that would be in danger of being demolished, the CA had
nonetheless hastily issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction because it had not even ascertained the
veracity of the claim.[34]

During the pendency of the 2013 Case, the CA resolved the consolidated petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 02118-
MIN and CA-GR. SP No. 02084-MIN on the merits through the assailed decision promulgated on May 20, 2011,
decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in CA. G.R. SP No. 02118-MIN is hereby DENIED.

In CA. G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN, the petition is likewise DENIED. The assailed Order dated October 9, 2007 of the
RTC (Branch 36), General Santos City is hereby AFFIRMED. We exhort the court of origin to execute the
decision with reasonable dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In the end, the RTC upheld the 2007 Resumption Order.

In CA-GR. SP No. 02084-MIN, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,  prohibition and injunction filed by the Heirs
of Non Andres, and held that the Heirs of Non Andres did not sufficiently establish any right or interest over Lot No. 2
that would justify a stoppage of the demolition; that in the 1990 Case, the Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of
Sale  and the Quitclaim Deed had been nullified; that under the doctrine of res judicata, the Heirs of Non Andres
could not source any right from said documents;[35] that, more importantly, the 1990 Case conclusively settled the
issue of ownership in favor of the Heirs of Yu; that an issue adjudicated on the merits and resolved clearly in favor of
a party could no longer be re-litigated;[36] that the Heirs of Non Andres had not presented evidence to sufficiently
prove that they had been physically occupying the property;[37] that the argument of the Heirs of Non Andres that they
should have been excluded from the coverage of the 2007 Resumption Order because they had not been parties in
the 1990 Case and its precursor civil cases lacked merit because as early as 1972, their mother, Concepcion, had
already known of Melencio Yu's claim over Lot No. 2; that their grandfather, Alfonso Non, had even been mentioned
in the 1990 Case "as the person who acted as middleman in the fraudulent sale of five (5) parcels;"[38] that the RTC
had issued the 2007 Resumption Order as a consequence of the finality of the ruling in the 1990 Case;[39] that
"actions seeking to question the propriety of orders issued under and by virtue of a final judgment xxx are schemes
calculated to make a mockery of duly promulgated decisions;"[40] and that the Heirs of Non Andres had not shown
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for its issuance of the 2007 Resumption Order considering that the
order was but the necessary consequence of the final judgment rendered in the 1990 Case.

On the other hand, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02118-MIN, the CA dismissed Bayani's petition to cite and punish the deputy
sheriff for indirect contempt of court, holding that in the absence of contrary evidence, the deputy sheriff was
presumed to have regularly performed his duties; and that there was no reason to cast doubt on the sheriffs final
return that clearly indicated that the demolition of the improvements existing on Lot No. 2 had already been
completed.[41]

The Heirs of Non Andres and Bayani separately moved for reconsideration but their motions were denied.

Hence, these consolidated appeals.

The Consolidated Appeals

In G.R. No. 206765 and G.R. No. 207214, the Heirs of Non Andres now raise the following as issues for
consideration and resolution, to wit:

6.1 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE COURT A QUO'S SPECIAL
ORDER DATED 9 OCTOBER 2007.

6.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RES JUDICATA HAS ALREADY
SETTLED IN THIS CASE.

6.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SOLE BASIS OF PETITIONERS'
CLAIM IS THE QUITCLAIM DEED EXECUTED BY MELENCIO YU, SINCE THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS
PRIMARILY BASED ON THEIR POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER. [42]

In the meantime, Sheriff Nasil Palati issued a Notice to Self-Demolish and Vacate dated June 29, 2015[43] pursuant to
the RTC's Alias Writ of Demolition dated May 14, 2015.[44] The notice was addressed to the several occupants of Lot
No. 2, including the Heirs of Non Andres and Bayani.

The issuance of the Notice to Self-Demolish and Vacate  dated June 29, 2015 prompted the Heirs of Non Andres to
file a supplement to their petition for review on certiorari[45] and a Very Urgent Motion to Issue Status Quo Order or
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[46]

On September 2, 2015, the Court resolved to issue a 60-day TRO,[47] thereby enjoining the RTC and the provincial
sheriff from implementing the 2001 Demolition Order and all orders and writs issued pursuant thereto. On December
9, 2015, the Court, upon motion of the Heirs of Non Andres, extended the TRO's effectivity for another 60 days.[48]
On her part, Bayani, the petitioner in G.R. Nos. 203076-77, insists herein that Sheriff Pallanan was guilty of indirect
contempt of court for making an untruthful statement in the sheriff’s return that the demolition had already been
completed.

In the main, the Heirs of Non Andres, the petitioners in G.R. No. 206765 and G.R. No. 207214, aver that grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction attended the following: (a) 2007 Resumption Order for being
issued without the corresponding writ of demolition or writ of possession;[49] and (b) the sheriffs' implementation of the
order for including them despite their not being parties in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No.4647.

At the onset, we clarify that the present case assails only the RTC's execution of judgment. Thus, our review of the
assailed decision and resolutions shall be limited to such issue. Although raised by the Heirs of Non Andres, we shall
not dwell on the issue of ownership.

Ruling of the Court

The Court rules that the doctrine of res judicata  cannot apply to bar the resolution of G.R. No. 206765 and G.R. No.
207214 because the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No. 4647 did not bind the Heirs of
Non Andres for not being parties thereto; that the sheriffs improperly implemented the 2007 Resumption Order; and
that the Sheriffs Report enjoyed the presumption of regularity.

We now explain our holding seriatim.

1.
Bar by res judicata does not apply

These appeals have factual antecedents common with the 1990 Case and the 2013 Case. Even so, we should not
lightly brush aside the pleas of the petitions for review on certiorari by applying the bar by res judicata.[50]

The Heirs of Non Andres hereby claim that the 1990 Case did not apply to them because they (or their predecessors-
in-interest) had not been impleaded in Civil Case No. 1291, the precursor case. More than the lack of identity of
parties, however, a careful perusal reveals that such previous rulings of the Court dealt with and resolved issues
separate and distinct from the question being now raised herein.

In the 1990 Case, the Court resolved the principal issue of the validity of the sale or transfer from the Spouses Yu to
Sycip that had been effected through the Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale and Quitclaim Deed.  The
Court thereby affirmed the CA's decision declaring Melencio and Talinanap "as the registered absolute owners of Lot
No. 2," and ordered Sycip to restore the possession to them.[51]

The focus the 2013 Case was the propriety of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the CA as a relief
that was preliminary and ancillary to the main case in CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN.

In contrast, the petitioners raise in these consolidated appeals the core controversy concerning the propriety of
the 2007 Resumption Order and its implementation, which was the subject matter of the main case in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02084-MIN (later on consolidated with CA-G.R. SP NO. 02118-MIN). Indeed, the ruling in the 1990
Case affirming the RTC's pronouncement of absolute ownership in favor of Melencio and Talinanap was not
conclusive upon the issue raised herein of whether or not the RTC's issuance of the 2007 Resumption Order was
proper, for the determination of such issue was separable and independent from the issue of ownership.

Even granting that the issue of ownership of Lot No. 2 was previously resolved in favor of Melencio and Talinanap,
such resolution did not prejudice the rights of the Heirs of Non Andres as persons who had not been parties in the
main proceeding.[52] The present controversy stems from the implementation against them of the RTC's judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 1291 despite their being strangers in the action. The following circumstances show that,
indeed, they were strangers to the action. Firstly, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1291 – being in personam  –
were exclusively between the spouses Melencio and Talinanap, on one hand, and Sycip and YUHAI, on the other.
The mere mention of Alfonso Non in the 1990 Case did not mean that he had participated at the trial, or that he had
knowledge of the proceedings, or that he had been duly notified of the case as to bind him to the effects of the
judgment therein. Secondly, the character of Civil Case No. 1291 as an action in personam  — being an action for
the declaration of nullity of document and recovery of possession of real property—was unquestionable. Such
character of the action empowered the court "to render personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action" only when it regularly acquired jurisdiction over the
parties. As such, the RTC would acquire jurisdiction over the parties only if they had been properly impleaded and
personally served with the summons and copies of the complaint.[53]

It is equally worthy to note that Rule 39 of the Rules of Court  sets the following guidelines to govern the execution of
judgments for the delivery or restitution of property, viz.:

SECTION 10. Execution of Judgments for Specific Act. — (a) xxx

(c) Delivery or Restitution of Real Property. — The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment
for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to
peaceably vacate the property within three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee;
otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace
officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment
obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be
satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.

(d) Removal of Improvements on Property Subject of Execution. — When the property subject of the execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy,
demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment
obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
court.

Evident from the foregoing is that such guidelines only extend to the judgment obligor or any person claiming rights
under him. It is truly doctrinal that the execution of any judgment for a specific act cannot extend to persons who were
never parties to the main proceeding.[54] A court process that forcefully imposes its effects on or against a stranger,
even if issued by virtue of a final judgment, certainly offends the constitutional guarantee under Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. As
explained in Munoz v. Yabut, Jr.:[55]

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem  is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case
or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-
interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another
is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real
property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam,  for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded.

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580,
the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment
cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them.
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the
judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Considering that the Spouses Melencio and Talinanap sought to nullify two documents (i.e., the Agreement to
Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale  and the Quitclaim Deed) to recover Lot No. 2 from Sycip, who was then in
possession of the lot's original certificate of title, the judgment rendered thereon was not enforceable against the
whole world but only against the defendants thereat (i.e.,  the Heirs of Sycip).

The Heirs of Non Andres were not impleaded in Civil Case No. 1291, much less personally served summons
therefor, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over any of them. The execution of the judgment rendered therein could
not validly include strangers to the case like the Heirs of Non Andres, for the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
them and were consequently not given their day in court.[56]

2.
Sheriff improperly implemented
the 2007 Resumption Order
and the 2001 Demolition Order
The 2007 Resumption Order, as well as the 2001 Demolition Order on which it was based, directed the demolition
of improvements belonging to the Heirs of Sycip and YUHAI. As earlier shown, the 2001 Demolition
Order ostensibly disposed thusly:

xxxx we command you to demolish the improvements erected by the defendants HEIRS OF JOHN Z. SYCIP
xxx, in Civil Case No. 1291, and plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. in Civil
Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to plaintiffs in Civil Case 1291 and defendants Civil Case no.
4647, MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by Original Certificate of Title [No.] (V-14496)
(P-2331) P-523 in Apopong, General Santos City

Said orders were issued by virtue of the Heirs of Sycip and YUHAI being the judgment obligors in Civil Case No.
1291 and Civil Case No. 4647, respectively. The situation became problematic only when the sheriffs tasked to
implement said orders served the notices to vacate to all the occupants of Lot No. 2 without exception.  The notices to
vacate thereby deviated  from the tenor and text of the assailed orders as to cover even the Heirs of Non Andres
although they had not been parties in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No. 4647. Therein lay the prejudice
caused to the Heirs of Non Andres.

Such exceeding their authority on the part of the sheriffs cannot be permitted or validated. The sheriffs duty to strictly
adhere to the mandate of the orders regularly issued by the court for the execution stage of a judgment cannot be
arbitrarily ignored or set aside, but must be faithfully discharged and complied with. The sheriff is bereft of the power
or discretion to expand the mandate in any way. As pointed out in Stilgrove v. Sabas,[57] to wit:

The sheriffs duty to execute a judgment is ministerial. He need not look outside the plain meaning of the writ of
execution. And when a sheriff is faced with an ambiguous execution order, prudence and reasonableness dictate that
he seek clarification from a judge. However, Sabas took it upon himself to execute the order even if it entails
the destruction of a property belonging to a person not a party to the case. By doing so, the sheriff went
beyond the terms of the demolition order as it only ordered the demolition to apply only to "defendants x xx
as well as all persons claiming rights under them x x x." To reiterate our pronouncement in the previous
administrative case, it is of no moment whether Sabas executed the writ in good faith because he is chargeable with
the knowledge of what is the proper action to observe in case there are questions in the writ which need to be
clarified and to which he is bound to comply. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

To contest the invalid implementation of the orders by the sheriffs, the Heirs of Non Andres immediately wrote to the
latter and also filed their special appearance in the RTC, but their attempt to intervene went for naught. Left with no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to them in the ordinary course of law, they went to the CA for
relief. After having satisfied all the requisites laid down in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, therefore, the
Heirs of Non Andres were entitled to the issuance of the writ of certiorari and prohibition.

3.
Sheriffs Report enjoyed
the presumption of regularity

We next deal with Bayani's appeal (G.R. Nos. 203076-77) assailing the CA's denial of her charge of indirect
contempt against Sheriff Pallanan.

Bayani's complaint in CA-G.R. SP No. 02118-MIN charged Sheriff Pallanan with proceeding with the demolition of
the structures found on Lot No. 2 in direct contravention of the CA's TRO dated December 14, 2007;[58] and claimed
that the sheriff had made untruthful statements in his report by making it appear that the turnover of the property and
the demolition of the structures thereon had been completed prior to the TRO's issuance.

We agree with the ruling of the RTC that the sheriff was entitled to be presumed to have regularly performed his
duties; and with the finding that Bayani had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption.

Nonetheless, the sheriffs persistence on demolishing the structures erected on Lot No. 2 by strangers to the action
clearly exceeded the tenor and coverage of the orders. The sheriff thus acted not only erroneously but also outside
the bounds of his authority. However, we have to clarify that the charge brought against him for contempt of court
based on such circumstances must be properly brought to and heard by the RTC, conformably with the recognized
rule that the court against whose authority the contempt is committed has the preferential right to inquire whether any
party has disobeyed its order.[59]

4.
Judge Majaducon could not validly
sit as the presiding judge on the case
involving the Heirs of Yu, his former clients

The Heirs of Non Andres have averred that Judge Majaducon had been Melencio's former counsel prior to his
appointment as the Presiding Judge. In substantiation, they presented two correspondences addressed to the
members of the Sogod Homeseekers Association that had been signed by one Atty. Jose S.
Majaducon[60] demanding the association members to refrain from introducing additional improvements on a lot
located at Barrio New Society, General Santos City and to vacate therefrom. In this connection, it is relevant to
remember that in the 1980s, the Heirs of Yu brought a complaint for forcible entry specifically against the members of
the Sogod Homeseekers Association docketed as Civil Case No. 1668-22.

This averment by the Heirs of Non Andres certainly demonstrates a probable conflict of interest committed by Judge
Majaducon. He had no right to preside in any case that involved the same interests pertaining to Melencio, the
predecessor of the Heirs of Yu, who was his former client. We cannot turn a blind eye to this averment, which must
be treated herein as a very serious accusation that impairs and diminishes the good reputation of a judicial officer as
well as of the entire Judiciary. It is elementary, indeed, that every judge should administer justice impartially.[61] As
such, the judge must inhibit himself from any proceeding that may cast doubt over his impartiality, such as having a
former client as a party in a case before him.[62] Every judge is duty-bound not only to render a just judgment but also
to render it in a manner "completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity."[63]

Under the circumstances, the Court must demand from Judge Majaducon a written explanation why he should not be
administratively sanctioned for violating the ethical rules demanding his impartiality and requiring him to shun conflicts
of interest in every matter he handled as a judicial officer.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari  in G.R. No. 206765 and G.R. No. 207214;
MODIFIES the decision promulgated on May 20, 2011 by the Court of Appeals, as well as the resolutions
promulgated on July 19, 2012 and April 17, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02118-MIN and CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-
MIN by PERMANENTLY ENJOINING the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, in General Santos City and the Provincial
Sheriff from executing or otherwise implementing the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No.
4647 as against petitioners Heirs of Non Andres, namely, Sergio Andres, Jr., Sofronio Andres, and Gracelda Andres,
Azucena Bayani, and all other persons who were not parties therein; DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 203076-77; AFFIRMS the assailed decision and resolutions insofar as the charge of
indirect contempt filed by Azucena Bayani against Sheriff Alfredo T. Pallanan is concerned, without prejudice to the
filing of a petition based on the proper ground and/or an administrative charge against said sheriff; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.

The Court further DIRECTS Presiding Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court in General Santos City to
show cause in writing within 10 days from notice why he should not be disciplined or sanctioned for presiding in Civil
Case No. 1291 and Civil Case No. 4647 despite some of the parties therein having been his former clients.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo, Jardeleza, Gesmundo  and Carandang, JJ., concur.

9.

SECOND DIVISION
 [ G.R. No. 223318, July 15, 2019 ]
CESAR V. PURISIMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE AND EMMANUEL F. DOOC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER, PETITIONERS, VS. SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, FINMAN
GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, MILESTONE GUARANTY & ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY INCORPORATED, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE
INCORPORATED, MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED,
GREAT DOMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INCORPORATED, AND INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS COMPANY
INCORPORATED, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Assailed before this Court, through a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] are the Decision[2] dated May 15, 2015 and
Resolution[3] dated February 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129905, which upheld the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

The Relevant Antecedents

On September 1, 2006, Department Order (DO) No. 27-06, ordering the increase in the minimum paid-up capital
stock requirement of life, non-life, and reinsurance companies, was issued. Superseding several memorandum
circulars, DO No. 27-06 suspended the adoption of risk-based capital framework for non-life insurance and integrated
the compliance standards for fixed capitalization under the DO and the risk-based capital framework.[4]

As a consequence, members of the Philippine Insurers and Reinsurers Association, Inc. (PIRAI) received a letter
from the Deputy Insurance Commissioner, reminding them that their paid-up capital must be at least equal to the
amount scheduled by DO No. 27-06. Similarly, an advisory was sent to them by Commissioner Emmanuel Dooc
(Commissioner Dooc) after having failed to comply with the minimum paid-up capital of P175 Million by the end of
December 2011.[5]

This prompted Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation, Finman General
Assurance Corporation, Milestone Guaranty & Assurance Corporation, R&B Insurance Corporation, Industrial
Insurance Company Incorporated, Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Incorporated, Mercantile Insurance
Company Incorporated, Great Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines, Incorporated, and Insurance of the
Philippine Islands Company Incorporated (respondents), to file a complaint with application for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the Secretary of Finance, Cesar
Purisima, and Commissioner Dooc (petitioners).[6]

In their Complaint, respondents alleged that DO No. 27-06 is unconstitutional because, among others, it vests upon
the Secretary of Finance the legislative power to increase the minimum paid-up capital stock requirement, thereby
violating the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. Plagued with manpower problems and serious business
losses, respondents sought for the suspension of the DO and relevant circulars.[7]

In their Answer, petitioners maintained that compliance with DO No. 27-06 is based on yearly assessment, depending
on the insurance company's net worth and equity structure. Contrary to the contentions of the respondents, DO No.
27-06 is not oppressive because it is germane to the purpose for which it was created, that is, to keep the solvency of
the insurance companies and protect the interest of the public.[8]

In a Resolution[9] dated July 20, 2012, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98, denied the
application for TRO and WPI for failure of respondents to fully substantiate grounds for the issuance of an injunctive
writ. It upheld the validity of the issuance of DO No. 27-06 and relevant memoranda as the Insurance Code expressly
grants the Secretary of Finance and the Insurance Commissioner the power to regulate the insurance business in the
Philippines.

However, on August 31, 2012, the sitting judge of the RTC, Branch 98, inhibited from the case. The case was then
returned to the Office of the Executive Judge for re-raffle.[10]

A supplemental complaint was filed by respondents in view of the passage of DO No. 15-2012 which required the
insurance companies to further increase their paid-up capital from P250 Million to P1 Billion beginning 2012.[11]

After the re-raffling of the case, an Order dated December 5, 2012, granting the application for the issuance of a WPI,
was issued. While the trial court recognized the constitutionality of the DOs, it recognized the need to determine the
reasonableness of the minimum paid-up capital requirement found therein; more so when Circular Letter No. 18-2012
excluded three respondents as having valid certificates of authority.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated February 15, 2013.[13]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC in issuing
an injunctive writ, before the CA. [14]

In a Decision[15] dated May 15, 2015, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. In upholding the issuance of a WPI,
the CA maintained that respondents have established that they were in a clear danger of closing down should the
amount of the paid-up capital mandated under DO No. 15-2012, be implemented, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated December 5, 2012 and February 15,
2013, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[16]

To this, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution[17] dated
February 29, 2016.

Undaunted, petitioners seek relief from this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The Issue

Summarily, the issue to be determined is the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.

The Court's Ruling

On August 15, 2013, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10607 or the Amended Insurance Code was signed into law. Among
others, it provides for the new capitalization requirement for all life and non-life insurance companies, to wit:

Section 194. Except as provided in Section 289, no new domestic life or non-life insurance company shall, in a stock
corporation, engage in business in the Philippines unless possessed of a paid-up capital equal to at least One billion
pesos (P1,000,000,000.00): Provided, That a domestic insurance company already doing business in the Philippines
shall have a net worth by June 30, 2013 of Two hundred fifty million pesos (P250,000,000.00). Furthermore, said
company must have by December 31, 2016, an additional Three hundred million pesos (P300,000,000.00) in net
worth; by December 31, 2019, an additional Three hundred fifty million pesos (P350,000,000.00) in net worth; and by
December 31, 2022, an additional Four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00) in net worth.

Thus, it is clear that the issuance of DO No. 27-06 and DO No. 15-2012 as regards the capitalization requirement has
been rendered moot and academic by the passage of the aforementioned law.

"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
use."[18] No less than the Constitution requires that the exercise of judicial power includes the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies, viz. :

The Constitution provides that judicial power 'includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.' The exercise of judicial power requires an actual
case calling for it. The courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.
Furthermore, courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between
litigants must first exist. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.[19] (Emphases in the original omitted)

It must be highlighted that even the petitioners and respondents in this case recognize the mootness of the issues
raised in the petition before us in their Petition and Comment, respectively.

Hence, this Court, deems it proper to abstain from ruling on the merits of the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ.,concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.

10.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 223624, July 17, 2019 ]
HEIRS OF LEONARDA NADELA TOMAKIN, NAMELY: LUCAS NADELA, OCTAVIO
N. TOMAKIN, ROMEO N. TOMAKIN, MA. CRISTETA* T. PANOPIO, AND
CRESCENCIO** TOMAKIN, JR. (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS,
BARBARA JEAN R. TOMAKIN RAFOLS*** AND CRISTINA JEAN R. TOMAKIN,
PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF CELESTINO NAVARES, NAMELY: ERMINA N.
JACA, NORMITA NAVARES, FELINDA N. BALLENA, RHODORA N. SINGSON,
CRISTINA N. CAL ORTIZ, ROCELYN N. SENCIO, JAIME B. NAVARES, CONCHITA
N. BAYOT, PROCULO NAVARES, LIDUVINA N. VALLE, MA. DIVINA N. ABIS,
VENUSTO B. NAVARES AND RACHELA N. TAHIR, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
assailing the Decision[2] dated October 28, 2014 (CA Decision) and the Resolution[3] dated March 23, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals[4] (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03806. The CA Decision granted the appeal of respondents Heirs of
Celestino Navares (respondents Navares) as well as reversed and set aside the Decision[5] dated May 6, 2010
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-30246,
which was in favor of petitioners Heirs of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin (petitioners Tomakin). The CA Resolution dated
March 23, 2016 denied the Motion for Reconsideration[6] filed by petitioners Tomakin.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The CA Decision narrates the factual antecedents as follows:

The property in dispute is Lot No. 8467[7] originally owned by the late Jose Badana who died without issue. He was
survived by his two sisters Quirina Badana and Severina Badana. The property was then covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2230 (O-7281) in the name of Jose Badana.

On 18 May 2004, [Heirs of Celestino Navares (respondents Navares)] filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and
Damages against [Heirs of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin (petitioners Tomakin)] before the RTC x x x.

In their complaint, [respondents Navares] alleged (a) that on 23 February 1955, Quirina Badana, as heir of her
brother Jose Badana, sold one-half (½) of Lot No. 8467 to the late spouses Remigio Navares and Cesaria Gaviola,
which portion, as claimed, is known as Lot No. 8467-B as evidenced by Sale with Condition;[8] (b) that as successors-
in-interest of the late spouses [Navares], [respondents Navares] inherited Lot No. 8467-B; (c) that they and their
predecessors had been religiously paying realty taxes on Lot No. 8467-B since 1955; (d) that most of them had been
occupying and residing on the property adversely and openly in the concept of an owner; (e) that on 6 December
1957, Severina Badana sold the other half of Lot No. 8467 known as Lot No. 8467-A to spouses Aaron Nadela and
Felipa Jaca, the predecessors-in-interest of [petitioners Tomakin].[9]

On 30 October 1991, [petitioner] Lucas Nadela, together with Leonarda N. Tomakin, sold a portion of Lot No. 8467
with an area of 1,860 square meters out of what they inherited from [s]pouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca to
spouses Alfredo Dacua, Jr. and Clarita Bacalso. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
[10]
 [Respondents Navares] alleged that on the basis of this Absolute Sale, x x x Alfredo Dacua, Jr.[11] caused Lot No.
8467-A to be titled in his name. [Respondents Navares] further alleged that on 10 January 1994, [petitioners
Tomakin] made it x x x appear that one Mauricia[12] Bacus (a complete stranger to the property) executed a document
denominated as Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose Badana with Confirmation of Sale; and that on the
basis of this document, x x x Alfredo Dacua, Jr. maliciously caused Lot No. 8467-B to be titled in the name of
Leonarda Nadela Tomakin and Lucas J. Nadela under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131499.[13] Oral demands were
made by [respondents Navares] upon [petitioners Tomakin] to reconvey the title of Lot No. 8467-B which remained
unheeded.

In their Answer, [petitioners Tomakin] claimed that they are the heirs of the late Leonarda Tomakin; that Lot No. 8467
was purchased by [s]pouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca from Severina Badana, sister-heir of the late Jose
Badana, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 December 1957;[14] that the heirs of [spouses] Aaron
Nadela and Felipa Jaca, namely Leonarda N. Tomakin and her brother Lucas J. Nadela executed a Deed of Partition
conveying x x x Lot No. 8467 in favor of Leonarda N. Tomakin; that before Leonarda Tomakin died, she and her
brother Lucas Nadela sold the one-half (½) portion of Lot No. 8467 in favor of [s]pouses Alfredo Dacua, Jr. and
Clarita Bacalso evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale;[15] that [s]pouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca, their heirs
Leonard[a] N. Tomakin and Lucas Nadela and, thereafter, [petitioners Tomakin] have been exercising acts of
ownership over Lot No. 8467 and Lot No. 8467-B. Lastly, [petitioners Tomakin] averred that [respondents Navares]
are barred by prescription and laches – 49 years having elapsed since the alleged sale of the ½ portion of the
property in 1955.

On 6 May 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of [petitioners Tomakin] and against [respondents
Navares]. It ruled that [respondents Navares] failed to prove that they are the rightful owners of Lot No. 8467-B. x x
x[16]

[The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:]

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing [respondents Navares]:

1) to return the owner's copy of TCT No. 131499 to [petitioners Tomakin];

2) to pay [petitioners Tomakin] [a]ttorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00;

3) to pay [petitioners Tomakin] litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00.

11.
SPOUSES HIPOLITO DALEN, SR. AND FE G. DALEN, EVERLISTA LARIBA AND THE MINOR
BEVERLY T. LARIBA, MAGDALENA F. MARPAGA AND THE MINORS MIKE ANTHONY AND THOMIE
MAE, BOTH SURNAMED MARPAGA, AGNES C. MOLINA AND THE MINORS SHEILA, SIMOUN,
STEPHEN JOHN AND SHARON ANN, ALL SURNAMED MOLINA, EMMA C. NAVARRO AND THE
MINORS RAYMOND, MARAH, AND RYAN ALL SURNAMED NAVARRO, RUTH T. SULAM AND THE
MINOR JEINAR REECE T. SULAM, PETITIONERS, VS. MITSUI O.S.K. LINES DIAMOND CAMELLA,
S.A., RESPONDENT.