Umair jameel

Fa19-bpy-001a

Quiz 2

Q) What do you know about the civil military relationship in Pakistan?

Marks 10

The civil-military relations form an essential strand of national security strategy. In

peace, they affect the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the
outcome. In the developed countries the military is mostly busy in participation of
formulation of national security policy. However, in the developing countries,
particularly those with a colonial past, the military have long maintained a
substantive role in domestic politics. That is, the military have either overthrown
the legally constituted governments, or overly influenced decision-making at
national levels. Same is the case in Pakistan.

Historical background

The evolution of the civil-military relations in Pakistan was affected by many

factors that were unique to the developing world. The political and administration
infrastructures of Pakistan have to be built from the scratch is one these factors.
Like Indian Army, Pakistan army originated from the British Indian army.
However, unlike India, the civil military relations in Pakistan evolved along the
deadly different path. That is why Pakistan witness frequent military interventions;
at least three of them were overt.

Thus, Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has experienced 30 years of military

rule (1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988 and 1999 to 2008); even when not in government
the military has constantly sought to centralise and consolidate political power, and
the military (notably military intelligence, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI))
exerts significant overt and covert control over the civilian authorities in both
domestic and foreign affairs. Given Pakistan’s volatile relationship with India,
centred on the decades-long conflict for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has always
been a ‘security state’, and the national military has historically been a key player
in the geopolitical arena. However, information on Pakistan’s armed forces is very
limited, and interaction with Western civilian and military institutions is heavily
controlled. The climate of secrecy within the Pakistan military and its associated
security services directly and indirectly affects civil–military coordination and
presents humanitarian actors with a highly complicated operational environment.

The role of the military in Pakistani society

Pakistan’s military has multiple roles: preparing for and responding to natural
disasters, contributing military personnel to UN missions (Pakistan has a long
history of contributing troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations and has
consistently been in the top three of contributor nations.), under special
circumstances maintaining law and order and defending Pakistan’s borders and
conducting security operations, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism
operations. Pakistan’s volatile relationship with India has ensured that the military
has been well-resourced.

The armed forces consist of the Army (550,000), Navy (22,000) and Air Force
(70,000), totalling 642,000 military personnel in active service. Paramilitary forces
number 304,000, and there is a reserve force complement of 500,000.

The Army is organized utilizing the customary British two-level chain of command
of officials and enrolled positions, a tradition of provincial principle. Official
positions follow British military naming shows, the most reduced being Second
Lieutenant and the most elevated Field Marshal. Furthermore, there are three
positions of Junior Commissioned Officer: Naib Subedar, Subedar and Subedar-
Major. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) positions range from Solider at the
most reduced echelon to Battalion Havildar Major at the most noteworthy.
Officials are overwhelmingly drawn from Pakistan's working classes; in fact, work
as an official is the dominating calling of the centre and, progressively, lower-
working classes. Choice is profoundly aggressive;

however once enlisted individuals

from the military and their families appreciate broad help, including clinical
consideration at exceptional offices and a support organization. As indicated by
Lieven (2011), the military structures a different 'monster connection bunch' that
'considers itself to be a variety separated, and dedicates extraordinary exertion to
teaching in newcomers the inclination that they have a place with a military family
unique in relation to (and immeasurably better than) Pakistani regular citizen
society'.

Territorially, the northwest Punjab and KP and Punjabi and Pashtun/Pathan

identities separately have given most of military enlisted people, especially for the
Army (Lieven, 2011). Moves are being made to make the military a more public
foundation; enlistment activities have zeroed in on Sindhi, Mohajir and Baloch
with an end goal to build their numbers in the powers, and new cantonments have
been underlying Sindh and Baluchistan. What impact this is having on the ethnic
make-up of the powers is difficult to say as measurements are not made accessible.

Why Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan have always been on a Bumpy

Road?
The most basic precondition of a true democratic setup is a healthy civil-military
relationship. In all democratic countries, an elected civilian government enjoys full
control over the military. However, in Pakistan, control over governance has
oscillated between the two; a decade of civilian supremacy followed by a decade of
military rule. The reasons for this periodic shuffling are incompetent political
leadership, weak political parties and institutions, rising power of civil-military
bureaucracy, serious security threats to the country and frequent use of military in
aid of civil power.

In the early days of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam clearly articulated the role of the
military in the following words: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the
servants of the people. You do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who
decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are
entrusted.”

Leadership Void

Soon after independence, in 1948, the Father of the Nation and the first Governor-
General, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, passed away. Thus, a leadership
void was created after just one year of the country's establishment. The first Prime
Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, who was Quaid's right hand lieutenant,
was also assassinated in 1951. About the rest of the leadership lot, the Quaid had
ruefully remarked that “he had false coins in his pocket.”

Delayed Finalisation of Constitution

Similarly, in 1954, there were nine members of the Prime Minister's cabinet, who
were not members of the Parliament, including Commander-in-Chief General
Muhammad Ayub Khan. Moreover, Pakistan took nine long years to finalise its
first constitution that was enforced on 23 March 1956. This inordinate delay
allowed the Governor-General to continue with his authoritarian rule. This all was
happening at a time when the country direly needed healthy democratic traditions.
In addition, the first general elections in the country, which were due in 1951, were
held after a lapse of almost quarter of a century, in 1970. This further strengthened
the non-democratic and authoritarian tendencies providing space to civil and
military bureaucracies to assume a dominant position in governance.

Weak Political Parties

For any healthy constitutional and political system to function smoothly, strong
and well-entrenched political parties are essential. Unfortunately, political parties
in Pakistan have failed to develop into strong vehicles of national political will.
The main reason is that most of our leaders belonged to feudal and capitalist
classes and were thus, by their very nature, inimical to a democratic polity. Their
incompetence and constant wrangling for power led to ceaseless infighting. For
instance, as early as 1953, a clash between the leadership of the Punjab and the
central government led to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the provincial
capital.

Weak Institutions

After independence, Pakistan had to start from scratch. There was no established
parliament, no civil secretariat, no supreme court, no central bank and no organised
armed forces. There was a paucity of competent parliamentarians. The proportion
of the Indian Civil Service officers who opted for Pakistan was small. The same
was true of the higher judiciary. Unlike other institutions, the proportion of
Muslims in the Indian Army was comparatively substantial, i.e., 33 per cent. This
is also one of the reasons why the armed forces of Pakistan assumed greater
importance right in the beginning and were better established than other
institutions of the state.

Civil Dependence on Army

From the very beginning, the Army remained involved in civil administration. In
1947, it was the Army that was asked to establish civil secretariat in Karachi. They
vacated their barracks, renovated them to house the secretariat and the staff coming
from Delhi. It was the Army which largely contributed to safeguarding the
movement of several refugee convoys carrying millions of refugees from East
Punjab as well as establishing their camps at Lahore. In short, the army was
frequently called in aid of civil authorities in all natural disasters, emergencies and
other civil functions.

Present Situation

Presently, however, the situation is different. Pakistan's political leadership is more

mature and political parties are better established. The country has developed a
middle class, an active civil society, a vibrant media and an independent judiciary.
Whenever required, Parliament is getting briefing on security matters from the
Services Chiefs and decisions are taken through consensus. Although military
enjoys autonomy in its internal affairs, somewhat healthy civil-military relations
exist. The Army is more deeply involved now than a decade ago in support of
activities for the civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief and rescue
operations after natural disasters; the use of its organisational and technological
resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of its personnel in civilian
institutions; anti-terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking.

There has to be full cooperation between the army and the civilian governments at
the centre and the provinces. Similarly, Rangers and Police, and military and
civilian intelligence agencies have to work together rather than work at cross
purposes. Terrorists will have a field day if a tug of war was to ensue between
governments led by the mainstream parties and the establishment or if there is
disregard for civilian institutions by the military-controlled intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.

The Way Forward

Presently, civil-military relations do not seem as healthy and cordial as they should
be. There are apprehensions on both sides. The government's tacit support to Geo
in ISI bashing case has increased the tensions between the two pillars of the state.
Apparently, army and the government are poles apart on the issue of operation
against Taliban.

It is imperative that in the larger interest of the country both these institutions join
hands to save Pakistan from the monster of terrorism and steer the country out of
multifaceted crises which are adversely affecting Pakistan and its citizens. It is
often said that Pakistan is in a state of war and no war can be won when there is
disunity among the state institutions.

1. Laws and clear constitutional provisions should be put in place that defines the
chain of command and civilian authority over the military. Although apparently a
piece of paper, this provision establishes the legitimacy for any action to resist any
encroachment by the military.

2. Bring a change in culture, values and acceptability among the masses that
civilian rule is possible and should be put in place. This enculturation would be
possible through a committed media and impartial press.
3. Structures and processes should be put in place, detailing who will command.
Fourth, openness and transparency or freedom of information is vital so that
everything is open to the public and civilian leadership.

4. Let the military budgets or expenditures be controlled by civilian authorities. No

doubt the civilians linked to this process should be thoroughly scrutinised for their
integrity.