Personality and Individual Differences 46 (2009) 631–635

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

The Maximization Paradox: The costs of seeking alternatives q

Ilan Dar-Nimrod a,*, Catherine D. Rawn a,*, Darrin R. Lehman a, Barry Schwartz b
a
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z4
b
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, 500 College Avenue, Swarthmore, PA 19081-1397, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Contrary to the common belief that more options lead to better decisions, recent research has demon-
Received 28 August 2008 strated that choosing from a large number of options can have detrimental psychological effects. We
Received in revised form 17 December 2008 investigated whether people were willing to sacrifice resources for more options, and whether choice-
Accepted 7 January 2009
making orientation moderated such willingness. As predicted, people who were motivated to make the
Available online 6 February 2009
best choice possible—‘‘maximizers”—were more willing to sacrifice resources such as time to attain a lar-
ger choice array than were people who tend to search for a satisfactory choice (i.e., ‘‘satisficers”). Addi-
Keywords:
tionally, maximizers who sacrificed to attain more options were ultimately less satisfied with their
Maximizing tendencies
Satisficers
choice relative to maximizers who chose from a small assortment, and to satisficers (Studies 2 and 3).
Choice-making strategies We term the pattern in which maximizers tend to sacrifice resources to attain more options that ulti-
Customer satisfaction mately reduce their satisfaction, the ‘‘Maximization Paradox”.
Sacrifice Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Assortment size

1. Introduction with the ‘‘Paradox of Choice”. Although people tend be attracted

Imagine it is Friday evening and you are going to the movies,
although you are not sure which movies are currently playing.
You debate going to one of two cinemas, equal in price and ambi-
ance. SuperCity Theatre offers 12 movie screens; whereas Town
Cinema offers only four screens. Assuming the same types of mov-
ies usually play at both cinemas, which would you choose?
All else being equal, the larger theatre is the rational alternative.
Theoretically, increasing assortment size should increase the like-
lihood that a person’s preference can be satisfied (Schwartz,
2004). Indeed, much research has demonstrated that people tend
to prefer more rather than fewer options. For example, people
are more attracted to arrays of 30 jams than to arrays of six jams
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), and to arrays of 50 ice cream flavors than
to arrays of 10 ice cream flavors (Rozin, Fischler, Shields, & Masson,
2006). Yet people are less satisfied with outcomes chosen from lar-
ger assortments rather than smaller assortments (Chernev, 2003;
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Lee & Lee, 2004; Schwartz, 2004, 2000).
Schwartz (2004) identified people’s attraction to, yet dissatisfac-
tion with larger assortments rather than smaller assortments the
‘‘Paradox of Choice.” In this paper, we propose that individual dif-
ferences in choice-making orientation moderate costs associated
q
The first two authors contributed equally to this manuscript and are listed
alphabetically. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions.
* Corresponding authors. Tel.: +1 604 822 2442; fax: +1 604 822 6923.
E-mail addresses: ilan@psych.ubc.ca (I. Dar-Nimrod), cdrawn@psych.ubc.ca (C.D.
Rawn).
to larger assortments, only some (i.e., maximizers) may be willing
to make sacrifices such as time, energy, or money, in order to glean
those larger assortments—sacrifices that ultimately lead to dissat-
isfaction with the chosen alternative. We propose the term ‘‘Max-
imization Paradox” to reflect this moderated ‘‘Paradox of Choice.”
Choice-making orientation (Schwartz et al., 2002) is an individ-
ual difference variable that differentiates people based on their ap-
proach to making decisions. At one extreme, maximizing describes
the tendency to approach choices with the goal of finding the
‘‘best” possible alternative. At the other extreme, satisficing de-
scribes the tendency to approach choices with the goal of finding
an option that is ‘‘good enough” according to their threshold of
acceptability.1 Maximizers may be particularly likely to value larger
assortments more than smaller assortments in their quest for the
best, and this may seem to be a logical approach: the chances of find-
ing an ideal alternative may seem greater when one has more op-
tions rather than fewer from which to choose. Past research has
shown that maximizers remember experiencing more dissatisfaction
with their past choices than do satisficers (Schwartz et al., 2002). We
sought to extend these earlier findings and predicted the Maximiza-
tion Paradox. Because of their desire to obtain the best option, max-
imizers will be willing to sacrifice resources in order to attain larger
assortments, yet they will experience dissatisfaction with their
selection from this larger assortment.
1
Although we refer to ‘‘maximizers” and ‘‘satisficers” for ease of discussion, this
individual difference variable is considered a unidimensional continuum (see
Schwartz et al. (2002)).

0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.01.007
632 I. Dar-Nimrod et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 46 (2009) 631–635
The nascent literature investigating choice-making orienta-
tion provides some support for both components of the Maxi-
mization Paradox. When asked to recall past purchases, both
large (in the hundreds of dollars) and small (less than ten dol-
lars), the tendency to maximize positively predicted the num-
ber of products considered as well as the length of time
spent deciding, and negatively predicted satisfaction with the
choice outcome (Schwartz et al., 2002). In more recent work,
maximizers obtained objectively better post-graduate jobs than
did satisficers: Maximizers negotiated starting salaries 20%
higher than satisficers (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006). De-
spite making such superior negotiations, maximizers reported
less satisfaction with their outcome than did satisficers. Taken
together, past research shows that across decisions that can be
evaluated subjectively and objectively, maximizers are dissatis-
fied with their choices.
The job hunt study (Iyengar et al., 2006) provides some indica-
tion that maximizers may have sacrificed more time and effort to
glean their superior job outcome, but the evidence is suggestive
at best. Although maximizing tendencies positively predicted plans
to apply for more jobs, this effect held only among people at lower-
ranked universities, and no data are reported about whether max-
imizers actually applied for more jobs than did satisficers. Despite
some indications that maximizers and satisficers were candidates
of similar quality, maximizers did not receive more interviews or
job offers than did satisficers. Maximizers did self-report actively
seeking more information related to the job hunt (i.e., seeking ad-
vice from experts, friends and family) compared with satisficers,
but this effort did not translate to an increased number of inter-
views or job offers. Therefore there is no evidence that maximizers
actively increased the number of job alternatives from which they
chose.
Based on recall of past consumer purchases and self-reported
data, it appears that maximizers may be more likely than satis-
ficers to make sacrifices to gain more options. Yet no research
has examined whether maximizers will explicitly and deliber-
ately make sacrifices to gain extra alternatives when making a
choice. We examine this hypothesis in three methodologically
varied studies, including a hypothetical scenario, a controlled
lab study, and a field study. All studies require trading-off be-
tween choice set size and resources (i.e., time and effort).
We anticipate that maximizers will be particularly dissatisfied
with their choice when choosing from a larger rather than smaller
set of alternatives. All else equal, the chances of identifying the
best option from a given selection decreases as the number of
alternatives increases. When faced with a large assortment, maxi-
mizers, who are motivated by the desire to attain the best possible
option, are less likely to find the best option, leading to dissatisfac-
tion. In three studies, we examined whether the Maximization Par-
adox would occur among everyday choices. We predicted that
maximizers would be more likely than satisficers to sacrifice to
gain more options from which to choose, but maximizers who do
so will be less satisfied with their selections.
1. Study 1: vignettes study
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants
One hundred and one students from the psychology subject
pool participated in this study for course credit (28 males, 69 fe-
males, four unspecified; age range: 17–42, M = 20.3, SD = 3.19).
Gender and ethnicity did not correlate significantly with any of
the key variables in any of the three studies, and were not included
in reported analyses.
1.1.2. Procedure and materials
Participants completed a questionnaire packet as part of a larger
study. These questionnaires were administered in the following or-
der, separated by filler items.
1.1.2.1. Maximization Scale. The 13 item Maximization Scale (Sch-
wartz et al., 2002), was used to assess maximizing tendencies
(e.g., ‘‘Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always struggling to
pick the best one”). Ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 = com-
pletely disagree, 7 = completely agree). Higher scores indicated a
stronger tendency to seek the best option when making a choice
(i.e., ‘‘maximizing”). The items were summed to create a composite
measure of choice-making orientation (Cronbach a = .572).
1.1.2.2. Choices Questionnaire. Participants read the following
vignette:
Your cleaning supplies (laundry detergent, rags, carpet cleaner,
dish soap, toilet paper, glass cleaner, etc.) are running low. You
have the option of going to the nearest grocery store (5 min away),
which offers four alternatives for each of the items you need or
drive to the grand cleaning superstore (25 min away), which offers
about 25 different alternatives for each of the items (for approxi-
mately the same price). Which store would you go to?
The vignette described a trade-off between options. One option
contained a larger assortment but came at a cost of increased time
(and gas) investment. The other option offered a more limited
assortment but also reduced time (and gas) investment. We antic-
ipated that maximizers would be more willing than satisficers to
sacrifice resources in order to attain the larger assortment.
1.2. Results and discussion
We conducted a logistic regression analysis predicting store
choice from maximization score. The analysis revealed a significant
effect of choice-making orientation, v2 (1) = 4.86, p = .03. For every
one unit increase in maximization score, the odds of choosing the
superstore increased by 6% (.95CI: .6%, 11.9%), Wald = 4.5, p = .03,
OR = 1.06. As predicted, higher scores on the Maximization Scale
predicted a greater likelihood of choosing the superstore (i.e., lar-
ger selection but increased travel time) than the neighborhood
store with less selection. Thus, Study 1 provided initial support
for the idea that maximizers are more likely than satisficers to bear
increased costs (i.e., time and gas) in exchange for more options. In
the following two studies, we examined reactions to actual choices
in the lab (Study 2) and in the field (Study 3).
2. Study 2: chocolate study
Study 2 investigated the Maximization Paradox in the con-
trolled lab environment. We anticipated that maximizers, in their
quest for the best, would be more willing than satisficers to sacri-
fice time in exchange for more options. We also anticipated that
maximizers who had sacrificed for the larger set would be less sat-
isfied than those who chose from the smaller number of options.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants and procedure
Ninety-six participants (18 males, 74 females, and four unspec-
ified) completed personality questionnaires including the Maximi-
zation Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002). They were then told that they
2
This low reliability coefficient falls within the range of previously reported values
(see Schwartz et al., 2002 for rationale). Attenuating reliability increases the effect
size found in this study.
 I. Dar-Nimrod et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 46 (2009) 631–635
would get to consume one chocolate. Participants were instructed
to take their upcoming chocolate taste-test seriously, and were gi-
ven a ‘‘Chocolate Tasting Instructions Sheet” with tips on how to
taste chocolate to experience it fully. The experimenter offered
them a choice between two assortments, from which they would
eventually choose the chocolate to eat. One assortment contained
six chocolates and the other contained 30 chocolates (including
the six chocolates in the smaller assortment). For the opportunity
to choose from the larger assortment, participants had to agree
to complete an additional questionnaire at the end of the experi-
ment that was for the chocolatier and of no interest to the exper-
imenter (i.e., make a larger time investment). Participants then
told the Experimenter which assortment they preferred. Choco-
lates were presented in narrow boxes that held six chocolates
per box, side by side. Participants saw all six or all 30 chocolates
at once, depending on which assortment they selected. Each choc-
olate was accompanied by a note identifying its name (e.g., Almond
Burst, Orange Cream) and the chocolate mix (e.g., dark or milk).
After indicating they had chosen a chocolate, the Experimenter left
to retrieve the chocolate, and participants completed an additional
questionnaire. Upon the Experimenter’s return, participants were
given the chocolate and were left to eat it alone and rate their sat-
isfaction. Participants provided basic demographic information,
were debriefed, paid $10, and thanked for their participation.
Demographics were not related to the variables of interest and will
not be discussed.
2.1.2. Materials
2.1.2.1. Maximization Scale. Choice-making orientation was as-
sessed by the Maximization Scale (Cronbach a = .75).
2.1.2.2. Satisfaction with choice questionnaire. The satisfaction ques-
tions were adapted from Iyengar and Lepper (2000). These three
questions asked participants to report their satisfaction with the
chocolate they had eaten (e.g., ‘‘How much did you enjoy the sam-
ple you tasted?”). The items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Items were aggregated into a single
measure of satisfaction with one’s chosen chocolate (Cronbach
a = .95).
2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Willingness to sacrifice for larger assortment size: part 1 of the
Maximization Paradox
A logistic regression analysis predicting choice of assortment
size from maximization score revealed a significant effect of max-
imization, v2(1) = 7.09, p < .01. For every one unit increase in max-
imization, the odds of sacrificing time to choose from the larger
assortment increased by 5.5% (.95CI: 1.2%, 10%), Wald = 6.36,
p = .01, OR = 1.06.
2.2.2. Satisfaction with chocolate: part 2 of the Maximization Paradox
We anticipated that maximizers who had sacrificed time to
choose from a larger assortment of chocolates would be less satis-
fied with their choice than would satisficers who had just made the
same sacrifice. To test this hypothesis, we regressed the aggregated
satisfaction measure on assortment size, choice-making orienta-
tion, and their interaction. No main effect for assortment size,
b = .05, |t| < 1, or choice-making orientation, b = .10, |t| < 1,
emerged, but the expected choice-making orientation by assort-
ment size interaction did, b = .28, t = 2.71, p < .01. To investigate
the nature of the interaction we conducted simple slope analyses
predicting satisfaction from maximization score separately for
each assortment (Aiken & West, 1991). Among participants who
chose from the larger selection, a stronger tendency to maximize
predicted decreased satisfaction with the choice, b = .39,
633
t = 2.27, p = .03. Among participants who chose from the smaller
assortment, choice-making orientation did not significantly predict
satisfaction, b = .19, t = 1.48, p > .10.
To compare the satisfaction ratings among maximizers faced
with different assortments we divided the sample via median split
on maximization score (Mdn = 56.5; theoretical midpoint = 52,
range = 13–91). An ANOVA (choice-making orientation x assort-
ment size) revealed a marginally significant main effect of
choice-making orientation on satisfaction, F(1, 92) = 3.03, p = .09,
qualified by an interaction, F(1, 92) = 5.85, p = .02, g2p = .06 (see
Fig. 1). A planned comparison indicated that maximizers who sac-
rificed the time to choose from a large assortment were less satis-
fied with their chocolate than were maximizers who chose from
the small assortment, t(47) = 2.23, p = .03, d = .65. The satisfaction
ratings of satisficers were not affected by assortment size
t(45) = 1.25, p = .22. See Table 1 for means.
The results of Study 2 support our hypothesis that maximizers
are more willing than satisficers to sacrifice time to gain more op-
tions. Consistent with predictions, maximization negatively pre-
dicted satisfaction with one’s choice among those who sacrificed
to gain the larger assortment. Choice-making orientation did not
significantly predict satisfaction among those choosing from the
smaller assortment. Thus the results support the Maximization
Paradox: maximizers who sacrificed to choose from the larger
assortment enjoyed the chocolate less than their counterparts
who chose from the smaller assortment. Study 3 sought greater
ecological validity by testing the Maximization Paradox in the field.
3. Study 3: ice cream study
In Study 3 we investigated the Maximization Paradox among
customers in two ice cream parlors, one of which offers approxi-
mately 200 flavors and the other offers approximately 20 flavors.
We anticipated that maximizers would be more likely than satis-
ficers to seek out the larger ice cream parlor, and paradoxically that
maximizers who chose from the larger ice cream parlor would be
less satisfied than those who chose from the smaller ice cream
parlor.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
One hundred and twenty-four participants (55 males, 66 fe-
males, three unspecified; age range = 13–71, M = 31.24,
SD = 12.06) were recruited outside two ice cream parlors in Van-
couver, Canada, immediately after purchasing ice cream. Sev-
enty-three participants were recruited from a parlor that offers
approximately 200 flavors of ice cream and 48 participants were
recruited from a parlor that offers approximately 20 flavors. The
20
18
Satisfaction
16
14
12
10
6 Alternatives 30 Alternatives
Satisficers Maximizers
Fig. 1. Satisfaction with chocolate as a product of choice-making orientation and
number of alternatives.
634 I. Dar-Nimrod et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 46 (2009) 631–635
Table 1
Mean choice satisfaction scores as a function of choice set size and choice-orientation.
Large assortment Small assortment
M SD n M SD
Study 2: chocolate
Maximizers* 4.73 1.86 19 5.64 0.98
Satisficers 6.00 0.85 12 5.44 1.47
Study 3: ice cream
Maximizers* 5.81 1.16 43 6.56 0.70
Satisficers 6.50 0.73 30 6.37 1.03
*
Note: row means significantly differ, p < .05.
neighborhoods in which the two ice cream parlors were located
differed in terms of residential density. Whereas the parlor with
the larger assortment was in an industrial area of the city, located
away from commercial or residential units, the parlor with the
smaller assortment was located in an area with high residential
and commercial density. Moreover, all the patrons who were re-
cruited at the smaller assortment parlor arrived on foot whereas
all the patrons who were recruited from the larger assortment par-
lor arrived by car and left immediately following the study/ice
cream consumption. Therefore we inferred that patrons of the lar-
ger parlor were sacrificing more time and effort to specifically seek
out a larger assortment than were those in the smaller parlor3.
3.1.2. Procedure and materials
Research assistants approached customers leaving the ice
cream parlors with purchase in hand, offering them $5 for their
participation in a short study about making choices. The question-
naire asked participants to rate how satisfied they were with their
ice cream selection (1 = not at all, 7 = very satisfied). Participants
were also asked how frequently they visited the parlor; controlling
for this did not influence results. The Maximization Scale (a = .72)
and demographic questions followed.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Preference for larger assortment size: part 1 of Maximization
Paradox
To investigate the relation between choice-making orientation
and choice of ice cream parlor we conducted a logistic regression
analysis predicting location from maximization score. The analysis
revealed a marginally significant effect of choice-making orienta-
tion, v2(1) = 3.37, p = .07. For every one unit increase in maximiza-
tion score, the odds of being at the larger assortment parlor
increased by 3% (.90CI: .3%, 6.1%), Wald = 3.25, p = .07, OR = 1.03.
Notably, 71% (15/21) of the extreme maximizers (i.e., those with
scores greater than 1 SD above the sample mean) visited the larger
assortment parlor, whereas only 40.9% (9/21) of the extreme satis-
ficers (i.e., those with scores lower than 1 SD below the sample
mean) did.
3.2.2. Satisfaction with ice cream choice: part 2 of the Maximization
Paradox
We next conducted a regression analysis predicting satisfaction
from choice-making orientation and assortment size. Choice-mak-
ing orientation was a significant predictor of satisfaction, b = .23,
t = 2.58, p = .01, but this relation was qualified by a significant
choice-making orientation by assortment size (location) interac-
tion, b = .19, t = 2.24, p = .03. To investigate the nature of the inter-
3
The large ice cream parlor’s owner did not want us to highlight its distant
location, so we were unable to explicitly ask people whether they sacrificed time and
effort to get to the parlor. However, this fact in itself supports our inference that
people who went to the larger parlor were sacrificing to get there.
7
6.6
Satisfaction
n 6.2
30 5.8
35
5.4
18
30
5
Small Assortment Large Assortment
Satisficers Maximizers
Fig. 2. Satisfaction with ice cream as a product of choice-making orientation and
number of alternatives.
action we conducted simple slope analyses predicting satisfaction
from maximization score separately for each assortment size.
Among patrons at the large parlor, higher maximization scores
negatively predicted patrons’ satisfaction with their ice cream,
b = .42, t = 3.55, p = .001. Among patrons at the small parlor,
no relation between choice-making orientation and satisfaction
emerged, b = .03, |t| < 1.
To compare the satisfaction ratings among maximizers faced
with different assortments we divided the sample via median split
on maximization score (Mdn = 58.5). An ANOVA revealed an inter-
action between choice-making orientation and parlor on satisfac-
tion, F(1, 117) = 5.53, p = .02, g2p = .05 (see Fig. 2). A planned
comparison indicated that maximizers at the large parlor were less
satisfied with their selection than were maximizers at the small
parlor, t(59) = 2.52, p = .02, d = .66. Satisfaction ratings of satisfic-
ers were not affected by assortment size |t| (58) < 1. See Table 1 for
means.
Results of Study 3 provide additional evidence for the Maximi-
zation Paradox in a field setting. Maximizers tended to seek out a
larger ice cream assortment than did satisficers despite the fact
that it cost them in terms of satisfaction.
4. General discussion
Across three studies, we demonstrated the Maximization Para-
dox: choice-making orientation positively predicts willingness to
sacrifice time and effort to gain additional options from which to
choose (Studies 1 through 3), yet such sacrifices ultimately de-
crease satisfaction with the chosen option (Studies 2 and 3). Study
1 offers the first evidence that people will deliberately sacrifice
their time and effort in search of more options. As predicted, this
finding is moderated by choice-making orientation. Study 1 relied
on participants to accurately report how they would respond to a
hypothetical situation; Studies 2 and 3 improve this methodology
by investigating actual choices. Study 2 replicates Study 1’s result
in an actual rather than hypothetical choice, and extends it by
investigating satisfaction with the selected alternative. Results re-
vealed that maximizers were more likely than satisficers to explic-
itly and deliberately sacrifice their time to choose from a large
rather than a small chocolate assortment, yet were ultimately less
satisfied with their selection when they did so. Study 3 replicated
Study 2’s findings in a natural setting. Maximizers were more likely
to be found at an ice cream parlor that offers myriad alternatives
located in an isolated industrial area of the city, rather than at a
neighborhood ice cream parlor offering few alternatives. Moreover,
maximizers choosing from the large assortment were less satisfied
with their chosen ice cream than were maximizers choosing from
the small assortment, and to satisficers in general.
Previous research has revealed the detrimental psychological
effects of choosing from large rather than small choice set sizes
 I. Dar-Nimrod et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 46 (2009) 631–635
(e.g., Chernev, 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000,
2004). The present studies empirically demonstrate some people’s
willingness to sacrifice resources to attain additional alternatives.
In addition, they make a novel contribution to the growing litera-
ture highlighting how individual differences in choice-making ori-
entation moderate the psychological impact of choice set size. We
extend earlier work that relies on memory biases (Schwartz et al.,
2002) and inconclusive self-reported assessments of effort exerted
in the choice process (Iyengar et al., 2006) to show for the first time
that maximizers will consciously sacrifice to glean more options
from which to choose. Simultaneously, we offer more evidence
that maximizers are dissatisfied with their choices, in this case
when they choose from a large number of alternatives.
Notably, satisficers did not experience the commonly found ad-
verse effects of choosing from many alternatives (e.g., Iyengar &
Lepper, 2000). Satisficers tended not to sacrifice time and energy
to attain larger choice sets. Past research has claimed a widespread
‘‘lure of choice” (Bown, Read, & Summers, 2003) yet the current re-
sults suggest that large choice set sizes may not be as alluring to
satisficers as they are to maximizers. Contrasting results among
maximizers, the few satisficers who opted to sacrifice for the larger
set were as satisfied with their choice outcome as if they had cho-
sen from the smaller selection. Such outcome satisfaction dovetails
nicely with work showing that satisficers have better health (e.g.,
reduced stress and depression) than do maximizers (Schwartz
et al., 2002), despite sometimes choosing objectively poorer out-
comes than maximizers (Iyengar et al., 2006). More research is
needed to determine the precise mechanism that enables satisfic-
ers to manage choices in a way that supports rather than hinders
their well-being. Doing so may reveal strategies to assist maximiz-
ers to cope productively with choices.
A key strength of our studies is that participants naturally se-
lected whether they would sacrifice for more alternatives. This de-
sign lends critical external validity to our findings while enabling a
true test of whether people will choose to sacrifice for more options
or not. In today’s marketplace there is a plethora of choice, includ-
ing the choice to seek out large stores with vast arrays of options or
small stores with limited selection. Based on our results maximiz-
ers should be more attracted than satisficers to large stores with
great selection despite remote locations, rather than to small local
shops. Yet maximizers will likely experience lower satisfaction with
purchases made from larger rather than smaller stores. Regularly
sacrificing resources for more alternatives, and feeling dissatisfied
with the ultimate choice seems like a particularly unrewarding pat-
tern that may contribute to broader emotional discontent found in
previous research4 (Schwartz et al., 2002). This pattern may be espe-
cially problematic should future research show that the Maximiza-
tion Paradox occurs for countless everyday choices like the ones we
studied as well as important life decisions.
4.1. Future directions
This paper sets the stage for much research exploring the im-
pact of choice-making orientation on decision processes and out-
comes. The next step toward fully understanding choice-making
orientation is to determine the precise mechanisms through which
maximizers decide to sacrifice for more alternatives, and then how
they come to be dissatisfied after choosing from that larger assort-
4
The correlates of maximizing choice orientation, specifically general life satisfac-
tion, may have affected outcome satisfaction results. If general life satisfaction was
affecting satisfaction ratings, we would expect maximizers to be less satisfied than
satisficers regardless of the choice set size, which is a result that we do not find.
Instead, we find no significant differences in satisfaction between maximizers and
satisficers choosing from a small assortment, and a significant difference between
maximizers choosing from large vs. small assortments.
635
ment. Regarding the latter, maximizers are sensitive to regret (Sch-
wartz et al., 2002). Choices made after sacrificing for more
options—as in our studies—may be especially disappointing for
maximizers because of regretting lost time and effort in the search
process in addition to regretting unselected alternatives. It is also
possible that sacrificing to gain more alternatives leads maximizers
to increase expectations for what they consider to be the ‘‘best”
alternative, thereby making it more difficult to actually attain the
best alternative. Future research that determines the processes at
work may help maximizers avoid the cycle of sacrifice and dissat-
isfaction antithetical to their personal well-being.
Would maximizers consciously sacrifice for more alternatives if
they were aware of the impending satisfaction reduction that
accompanies vast searches? Generally, people have difficulty antic-
ipating future physical and emotional states (Gilbert & Wilson,
2007; Giordano et al., 2002; Loewenstein, 2005). Maximizers
may be especially poor at predicting their future states, to the ex-
tent that they are captivated by pursuing the best option at the
moment of choice. Making information about their future (dis)sat-
isfaction salient for maximizers while they are making decisions
may help maximizers curtail the choice process in time to experi-
ence some satisfaction with the choice. In Studies 2 and 3, maxi-
mizers who did not sacrifice for a larger alternative were just as
happy with their selections as were satisficers, suggesting that
some intervention to help maximizers opt out of sacrificing for
more options may improve their outcome satisfaction.
5. Conclusion
Choice is highly valued in society. More options from which to
choose are perceived as better than are fewer options because, log-
ically, the larger set is more likely to yield a desirable option (Iyen-
gar and Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004). Yet some people,
particularly maximizers, suffer adverse consequences from the
promise offered by the larger set of alternatives. Identifying this
paradox is an important step toward helping people deal with
the vast arrays of options they can choose to face or avoid on a dai-
ly basis.
References
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting,
interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Bown, N. J., Read, D., & Summers, B. (2003). The lure of choice. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 16, 297–308.
Chernev, A. (2003). When more is less and less is more: The impact of ideal point
availability and assortment in consumer choice. Journal of Consumer Research,
30, 170–183.
Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. Science,
317, 1351–1354.
Giordano, L. A., Bickel, W. K., Loewenstein, G., Jacobs, E. A., Marsch, L., & Badger, G. J.
(2002). Mild opiod deprivation increases the degree that opiod-dependent
outpatients discount delayed heroin and money. Psychopharmacology, 163,
174–182.
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating: Can one desire
too much of a good thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79,
995–1006.
Iyengar, S. S., Wells, R. E., & Schwartz, B. (2006). Doing better but feeling worse:
Looking for the ‘‘best” job undermines satisfaction. Psychological Science, 17,
143–150.
Lee, B-K, & Lee, W-N (2004). The effect of information overload on consumer choice
quality in an on-line environment. Psychology and Marketing, 21, 159–183.
Loewenstein, G. (2005). Hot–cold empathy gaps and medical decision making.
Health Psychology, 24, S49–S56.
Rozin, P., Fischler, C., Shields, C., & Masson, E. (2006). Attitudes towards large
numbers of choices in the food domain: A cross-cultural study of five countries
in Europe and the USA. Appetite, 46, 304–308.
Schwartz, B. (2004). The paradox of choice. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Schwartz, B. (2000). Self-determination: The tyranny of freedom. American
Psychologist, 55, 79–88.
Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman, D. R.
(2002). Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1178–1197.