PFR CASES

Tanada vs Tuvera GR No 63915 12/29/1986

Askay vs Cosalan Gr NO L-21943 9/15/1924
Balbuna vs Sec of Education GR no L-14283 11/29/1960

1. Tanada vs Tuvera GR No 63915 12/29/1986

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.   Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.  2

In the Comment   required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
3

request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply   refuting these arguments. Came
4

next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in
view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding
because it was not supported by eight members of this Court.  5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,   is the Civil Code which did not
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become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as
a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.   The evident
7

purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication
in the Official Gazette   and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
8

the people were sufficiently informed.   One reserved his vote   and another merely acknowledged
9 10

the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made.   It is therefore necessary
11
for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as
we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa,
I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had
promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax
on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance
of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players
Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At
the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette
as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need
of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle
posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication
effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa,
I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had
promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax
on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance
of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players
Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At
the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette
as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need
of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle
posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication
effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 242-250.

2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.

3 Id, pp. 271-280.

4 Id, pp. 288-299.

5 Id, pp. 320-322.

6 136 SCRA 27,46.

7 Rollo, p. 24,6.

8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and

Lorenzo Relova.

9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos,
Efren 1. Plana Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.

10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

Case Digest:
Tañada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986

FACTS:

Pursuant to the Tañada v Tuvera 1985 decision prescribing respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration/clarification, specifically asking the following questions:

1. What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability”?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by “publication”?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

ISSUE:

W/N the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted.

RULING:

The Court held that the clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. For example, the general rule did not apply in the effectivity
of the Civil Code since the code itself provided its effectivity “one year after such publication.”

Pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. For example, the general rule did not apply
in the effectivity of the Civil Code since the code itself provided its effectivity “one year after such
publication.” Therefore, the clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity, and
not the requirement of publication itself.

As for the questions presented, the Court held the following:

1. Law of public nature is one that affects public interest (could be directly applicable only to one
individual, a group, or the whole public).

2.
LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY LAWS WHICH ARE NOT
All statutes
All laws internal in nature
Presidential decrees
Interpretative regulations for
Executive orders
personnel of agencies
Charter of a city
Letters of instructions issued by
Circulars issued by the Monetary
administrative superiors
Board that are meant to “fill in the details”
3. Full content publication or none at all

4. Official Gazette (Subsequently amended by EO No. 200, providing for “any newspaper of general
circulation”

5. Upon approval or ASAP

What are the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Tañada vs.
Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915; December 29, 1986)?

1. Issuances internal in nature need not be published.

2. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers not to the requirement of
publication but for the length of time of publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
3. Publication of laws is an element of due process.
4. Interpretative regulations need not be published.
5. All statutes must be published, including those which are local or private in
application.
 6. Administrative rules and regulations enforcing existing laws must be
published.
7. Charters of cities must be published.
8. Circulars intended to fill in details of acts passed by Congress must be
published.
9. Publication must be full or there is no publication at all.
10.All issuances punitive in nature must be published.

2. Askay vs Cosalan Gr NO L-21943 9/15/1924

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-21943. September 15, 1924. ]

ASKAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FERNANDO A. COSALAN, Defendant-Appellee.

A. de Guzman for Appellant.

Camus & Delgado and Pio Duran for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTES; ACTS OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE, WHEN IN FORCE;

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, SECTION 11 CONSTRUED; ACT No. 3107 CONSTRUED. —
Section 11 of the Administrative Code provides: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature
shall, in the absence of special provision, take affect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after
the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being
excluded." Act No. 3107, amendatory of section 155 of the Administrative Code, authorizing a
Judge of First Instance to be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for a period
which shall in no case exceed six months, in a district or province other than his own, for the
purpose of trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, was made to take
effect on its approval, and the Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Held: That as there is a
special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general provision contained
in the Administrative Code. Held, further: That as Act No. 3107 went into effect on March 17,
1923, and that as it was subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge of First Instance
Harvey was authorized to hold court at Baguio beginning with May 2, 1923, Judge Harvey had
jurisdiction to try the case of Askay v. Cosalan.

2. SALES; FRAUD. — Fraud must be both alleged and proved.

3. ID.; ID.; GROSS INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION. — Gross inadequacy of the

consideration naturally suggests fraud and is some evidence thereof, so that it may be sufficient
to show it when taken in connection with other circumstances, such as ignorance or the fact that
one of the parties has an advantage over the other.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The fact that the bargain was hard one, coupled with mere inadequacy of price
when both parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction,
is not a sufficient ground for the cancellation of a contract.

5. ID.; ID.; ID. — Held: That the plaintiff has not established by preponderance of the evidence
the allegations in his complaint to the effect that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was
accomplished trough fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.  :

The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years of age,
residing in the municipal district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various times
has been the owner of mining property. The defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the
nephew by marriage of Askay, and municipal president of Tublay, who likewise has
been interested along with his uncle in mining enterprises.

About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in Tublay,
Benguet. On November 23, 1914, if we are to accept defendant’s Exhibit 1, Askay sold
this claim to Cosalan. Nine years later, in 1923, Askay instituted action in the Court of
First Instance of Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim declared null, to
secure possession of the mineral claim, and to obtain damages from the defendant in
the amount of P10,500. Following the presentation of various pleadings including the
answer of the defendant, and following trial before Judge of First Instance Harvey,
judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant from the
same, with costs against the plaintiff. On being informed of the judgment of the trial
court, plaintiff attacked it on two grounds: The first, jurisdictional, and the second,
formal. Both motions were denied and an appeal was perfected.

Two questions are suggested by the assignments of error. The first is whether Judge
George R. Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case. The second is whether the plaintiff
has established his case of action by a preponderance of the evidence.

I. On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of Justice
authorized and instructed the Honorable George R. Harvey, Judge of First Instance of
the Ninth Judicial District, to hold a special term of court in the City of Baguio, Mountain
Province, beginning May 2, 1923. (Administrative Order No. 43, 21 Off. Gaz., p. 893.)
Acting under the authority granted by the order of the Secretary of Justice, Judge
Harvey proceeded to hear the case of Askay v. Cosalan, without protest from anyone
until after an adverse decision for the plaintiff and until after Judge Harvey had left the
district.

The point which plaintiff now presses is that Act No. 3107, amendatory of section 155
of the Administrative Code, which authorizes a Judge of First Instance to be detailed by
the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for a period which shall in no case exceed
six months, in a district of province other than his own, for the purpose of trying all
kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, was not in force until fifteen days
after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, or not until
August 3, 1923. Plaintiff relies on section 11 of the Administrative Code, which in part
needs: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall, in the absence of special
provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded." cralaw virtua1aw library

Now turning to Act No. 3107, its final section provides that "This Act shall take effect on
its approval." The Act was approved on march 17, 1923. Obviously, therefore, there
being a special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general
provision contained in the Administrative Code.

Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March 17, 1923, and that it
was subsequent thereto, on April 16,1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized to hold
court at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant’s argument along this line is
found to be without persuasive merit. We pass to the material issue which is one of
fact.

II. Plaintiff contends that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was accomplished
through fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff may be right but in our
judgment he has failed to establish his claim. Fraud must be both alleged and proved.

One facts exists in plaintiffs favor, and this is the age and ignorance of the plaintiff who
could be easily by the defendant, a man of greater intelligence. Another fact is the
inadequacy of the consideration for the transfer which, according to the conveyance,
consisted of P1 and other valuable consideration, and which, according to the oral
testimony, in reality consisted of P107 in cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one cow, and two
carabaos. Gross inadequacy naturally suggest fraud is some evidence thereof, so that it
may be sufficient to show it when taken in connection with other circumstances, such
as ignorance or the fact that one of the parties has an advantage over the other. But
the fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere inadequacy of price when
both parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the
transaction, is not a sufficient ground for the cancellation of a contract.

Against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, we have the document itself
executed in the presence of witnesses and before a notary public and filed with the
mining recorder. The notary public, Nicanor Sison, and one of the attesting witnesses,
Apolonio Ramos, testified to the effect that in the presence of the plaintiff and the
defendant and of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses, the deed of sale was
interpreted to the plaintiff and that thereupon he placed his thumb mark on the
document. Two finger print experts, Dr. Charles S. Banks and A. Simkus, have declared
in depositions that the thumb mark on exhibit 1 is that of Askay. No less than four
other witnesses testified that at various times Askay had admitted to them that he had
sold the Pet Kel Mine to Fernando A. Cosalan.

Having in mind of these circumstances, how can the plaintiff expect the courts to nullify
the deed if sale on mere suspicion? Having waited nine years from the date when the
deed was executed, nine years from the time Fernando A. Cosalan started developing
the mine, nine years from the time Askay himself had been deprived of the possession
of the mine, and nine years permitting of a third party to obtain a contract of lease
from Cosalan, how can this court overlook plaintiff’s silent acquiescence in the legal
rights of the defendant? On the facts of record, the trial judge could have done nothing
less than dismiss the action.

We conclude, therefore, that Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case, that his
findings of fact are in accordance with the evidence, that no prejudicial error was
committed in the trial, and that the complaint was properly dismissed. As a result,
judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Case Digests:
 3. Balbuna vs Sec of Education GR no L-14283 11/29/1960

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14283           November 29, 1960

GIL BALBUNA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

K. V. Faylona and Juan B. Soliven for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino Padua for appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, dated June 23, 1958, dismissing their petition for prohibition and mandamus against the
Secretary of Education and the other respondents.

The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the
Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag
ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners appellants assail the
validity of the above Department Order, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of
speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since
the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied,
the issue ultimately boils down the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which promulgated
the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.
This case, therefore, is on all fours with Gerona, et al., vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil., 2;
57 Off. Gaz., (5) 820, also involving Jehovah's Witnesses, and assailing, on practically identical
grounds, the validity of the same Department Order above-mentioned. This Court discerns no
reasons for changing its stand therein, where we said:

In conclusion, we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious
veneration; rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an
emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony
but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which
the flag stands for; that by the authority of the Legislature of the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement
of observance of the flag ceremony, or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8
does not violate the Constitutional provisions about freedom of religion and exercise of
religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations
and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony, is a prerequisite to
attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they
were attending.

However, in their memorandum, petitioners-appellants raise the new issue that that Department
Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette as
allegedly required by Commonwealth Act 638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code. We see no merit in this contention. The assailed Department Order,
being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions
under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application. Moreover, as observed in
People vs. QuePo Lay, 94 Phil., 640; 50 Off. Gaz., (10) 4850 (affirmed in Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central
Bank, 104 Phil., 573; 55 Off. Gaz., [6] 1006), —

the laws in question (Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930) do not require the publication of
the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and
effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, regulations, decisions of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be published shall be
published in the Official Gazette but said two laws do not say that unless so published they
will be of no force and effect. In other words, said two acts merely enumerate and make a list
of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the
different branches of the government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

It is true, as held in the above cases, that pursuant to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11
of the Revised Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is likewise true
that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the force of law.
Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank which provided for
penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that influenced the rationale of those
decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those
pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of
said order. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline
which the school authorities are bound to maintain. As observed in Gerona vs. Secretary of
Education, supra,

... for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not
being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal
sanction. If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
 public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more.
Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their
right to attend public schools.

Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an
undue delegations of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and definite standard
by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of those rules and regulations
which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of
the Act read as follows:

Section 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth, observed daily flag ceremony, which
shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine
National Anthem.

Section 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to
be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provide.

In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and
dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem — specially when contrasted
with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest"(People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.
328); "public welfare" (Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); Interest of law and
order"(Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of the
case" (Int. Hardwood vs. Pañgil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and efficient
instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz., 6230). That the
Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the
statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that will limit the
discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of
exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation
is intended to achieve.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellants.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

CASE DIGESTS:
FACTS:
1. Members of the Jehova’s Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the
enforcement of Dept. Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and
regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.

2. The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of
worship and of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

a. the department order has no binding force and effect, not having been published in
the Official Gazette; and
b. it is an undue delegation of legislative power

3. The petition was dismissed. Hence, appeal to the SC.

ISSUE/S:
1. Does it violate freedom of worship and speech?
2. Is it in accordance with the requirements of publication?
3. Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING:
1. Issue on freedom of worship and speech. No.
a. the court maintains that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious
veneration; rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an
emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity;

b. that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for;

c. that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations is
a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed
from the public school they were attending.

2. Issue on publication. Yes.

a. Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930 do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and
effective;

b. said two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the
government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

c. while it is true that statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days after publication in
the Official Gazette and it is also true that administrative rules and regulations have
the force of law, the primary factor for this rationale is that such statutes provided for
penalties for violations thereof.

d. in the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against
those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise
violating the provisions of said order; their expulsion was merely the consequence of
their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to
maintain.

e. for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were
not being prosecuted under threat of penal sanction; if they choose not to obey the flag
salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at
the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more and having elected not to comply,
they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. Issue on undue delegation of legislative power. No.

a. the requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an adequate
standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the
National Anthem.

b. that the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection
to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of
standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency;

c. to require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated
power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended
to achieve.