Arendt On Labor

Hypatia, Inc.
The End or the Apotheosis of "Labor"? Hannah Arendt's Contribution to the Question of the
Good Life in Times of Global Superfluity of Human Labor Power
Author(s): Claudia Lenz and Gertrude Postl
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 20, No. 2, Contemporary Feminist Philosophy in German (Spring, 2005), pp
. 135-154
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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The Endor the Apotheosisof "Labor"?
HannahArendt'sContributionto the
Questionof the Good Lifein
Timesof GlobalSuperfluityof
HumanLaborPower
CLAUDIA LENZ
TRANSLATED BY GERTRUDE POSTL
This paperrelatesArendt'scritiqueof a laborsocietyto her thoughtson the "good

life."I beginwiththeclaimthatin thepost-massproductionera, Westernsocieties,
traditionallycenteredaroundgainfulemployment,encountera decreasein the rel-
evanceof laborandcan thusno longerrelyon it as a resourcefor individualor social
meaning.FromArendt'sperspective,however,the currentsituationallowsfor the
possibilityof a transitionfroma societybasedon laborto a societycenteredaround
activities.I exploreArendt'sdifferenttypesof activities-labor, work,action-with
respectto thequestionof justicebetweenthegenders.
What is most impressivein The HumanConditionis the visionaryforesightof

Arendt'sanalysisof a laborsocietyand its approachingend. Herpredictiondates
back to the 1950s,when industrialnations were in the midst of the recovery
boom after WorldWar II and still held an optimistic belief in an uninhibited
progress."Whatwe are confrontedwith is the prospectof a society of laborers
without labor,that is, without the only activity left to them. Surely,nothing
could be worse."Arendtrecognizedeven then that the concurrenceof dropping
employmentquotas,resultingfromtechnologicaladvancement,and increasing
productivitywould not liberatemodernindustrializedsocieties but ratherpose
an existential threat.
Hypatia vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 2005) ? by Claudia Lenz
136 Hypatia
In this instance, it seems as though scientificprogressand technical devel-

opmentshad been only taken advantageof to achieve something about which
all formerages dreamedbut which none had been able to realize. However,
this is so only in appearance.The modernage has carriedwith it a theoretical
glorificationof labor and has resultedin a factual transformationof the whole
of society into a laboring society. The fulfillmentof the wish, therefore,like
the fulfillmentof wishes in fairytales, comes at a moment when it can only be
self-defeating.It is a society of laborerswhich is about to be liberatedfrom the
fettersof labor,and this society does no longerknow of those other higher and
more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedomwould deserve
to be won. (Arendt 1959,5)
Arendt'sobservationrevealstwo essentialfeaturesof her position addressed
throughoutTheHumanCondition:on the one hand, a pessimisticassessmentof
the possibilitiesof human existence that, in the course of the emerginglabor
societies, allegedly became impoverishedand declined; on the other hand,
Arendt'ssuggestionson how to counteractthis decline. In spite of the skepti-
cism inherent in the claim that contemporaryhuman beings "no longerknow
of those other higher and moremeaningfulhuman activities,"this passagealso
expressesthe possibilitythat the crisis of the old might bring about new ways
of reflectionand thus a new beginning.This possibility,which runs throughout
Arendt'sentire oeuvre, is representedin thinking (which is alwaysa matterof
thinking about something [Nach-denken]),in storytelling (the possibility of
communicating with one another continually through narrativesabout the
meaning of the world),and in acting (peoples'active, cooperative attempt to
shape the world).Already the briefquotation above reveals that Arendt "nar-
rates"the historyof laborand activity;and she narratesit differentlyfromthose
who arecaughtwithin the thinkingof modernityand the logicof a laborsociety.
Arendt remindsus that it once was the ardentlonging of human beings to live
a life without labor. The reconstruction of a history of changing meanings,
desires,and dreamsrendersthinkable what wouldhave remainedunthinkable
within the parametersof the status quo: the desirefor a life beyond necessity,
grind, and yoke (something laborcan also be perceivedas). Arendt evokes the
memoryof the possibilityand value of activities other than labor.
Arendt is not interestedin a positivedefinitionof an alternativeformof soci-
ety but in a processof reflection,in the course of which seeminglyself-evident
meanings and values are contemplatedand negotiated anew:
What I proposein the followingis a reconsiderationof the humancondition
from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears.
This, obviously,is a matterof thought,and thoughtlessness-the heedlessreck-
lessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of "truths"that have
become trivialand empty-seems to me amongthe outstandingcharacteristics
ClaudiaLenz 137
of our time. What I propose,therefore,is very simple:it is nothing more than

to think what we are doing. (1959,6)
THE END OR THE UNLEASHING OF THE ANIMAL LABORANS?
Formodernity,laboris not a culturalphenomenon and signifieramongothers;

rather,it dominatesthe productionof meaning, it becomes,in the literalsense,
the foremostsign (Vor-Zeichen), the "mastersignifier"in Lacan'ssense. In the
meantime,though, this meaningis erodingdue to worldwideupheavals.The era
of Fordismhas come to an end. Fordistproduction,which prevailedthroughout
the twentieth century,representedat the same time a type of socializationand
a principleforgeneratingsubjectivity:in industrializedsocieties, Fordismstood
not only for a division of labor,historicallyunique welfarestate arrangements,
and technological and social hopes for progress,but also for political conflicts
in specific areas and in various forms. The promises of unlimited growth
and uninhibited possibilitiesfor consumption were based on an unrestricted
exploitation of resources.
Welfarestate regulationsentailed a division, based on a genderhierarchy,
betweenpaid"productive" laborand unpaid"reproductive" labor.The enormous
improvementof the materialstandardsof living in industrialnations required
the exploitation of the regionsof the so-called Third Worldthat were used as
resourcesfor rawmaterial.All these were constitutive elements of Fordism,as
wasthe vision of full employmentin industrializedsocietieswherethe participa-
tion in a social, cultural,and political life was (and still is) tied to participation
in gainful employment.This also appliesto the safeguardsof the welfarestate:
entitlementclaimson groundsof gainfulemploymentand a lifelong,continuous
earningareconsideredthe norm.However,in light of the globalizedcapitalistic
"growthwithout labor"and in a situationwherecapital becomes independent
of labor and of nation states, which are forced to compete over location, this
norm is aboutto come to an end. It is possiblethat in the foreseeablefutureonly
a minorityof the populationsin industrialnations will be able to secure their
material livelihood through gainful employment,not to mention the people
in those regionsthat have alreadybeen left behind due to the radicalizationof
competition between markets.All that is left for them is the strugglefor their
bare subsistencethrough the drudgeryof severalbad jobs at the same time.
The end of the standard model for gainful employment also puts into
question the role of labor as source of identity and meaning, as it has been
understoodin modernity.Nevertheless,what dominatestodayis the neoliberal
ideology of success, according to which individuals must assert themselves
within the context of the "freemarket."Those who fail have only themselves
to blame.Worthnoting is the seeming lackof alternativesto this development;
138 Hypatia
the power of economic argumentsdeclares the deregulationof the markets,

the loweringof social standards,and the tightening of the thumbscrewfor the
weakest segments of society-parallel to the pressureput on indebted Third
Worldcountries-to be a matterof fate.
Conceivablealternativesare obviouslymissingat the moment. We lack the
imaginativepowerthat couldhelp to developa formof socialvision and political
opposition against the neoliberal "religion":the meaning and value labor has
had throughoutthe courseof the last two hundredyearscannot be attributedto
it any longer.But insteadof the willingness to createsomethingnew, which for
examplemobilizedthe strugglesof the labormovementagainstearlycapitalist
conditions, the currentclimate is dominated by a feeling of uncertainty and
existentialangst.Thus, JohanoStrasserasks:"Isit possiblethat the widespread
despairof thinking and of hopes is much more dangerousthan an exuberant
social imagination?Is the biggest danger perhaps this 'counterrevolutionof
diminishing expectations'?"(1999, 21).
OPPORTUNITY IN CRISIS: THE QUESTION OF THE GOOD LIFE
The question of labor entails much more than merely the issue of economic
survival. Having the freedom, due to historical changes, to indulge in the
"luxury"of thinking about labor-relatedtopics allows for questions regarding
the meaningful, good life. Does the currentlyemerginggap between people
who are overworkedand those who are unemployed(Koslowski1994) provide
the only availablemodel for human life?
The questionof the good life is at least as old as Westernphilosophy.Labor,
understoodas hardship,drudgery,and the epitomeof a lackof freedom,does not
come off too well in this context. ForPlato, the closest humanscould come to
the ideal of the good life was the contemplative,reflectivelife of philosophers.
If possible,one was supposedto turn awayfrom the changeableworldand the
finite and limited necessities of human existence. According to Ursula Wolf,
Aristotle located the pursuitof a good life in the "continuousself-realization
through reasonableactivity"(1999, 12). What mattershere is the idea of the
right measureof all things, thus a form of life understoodin termsof modera-
tion between unevenly balancedextremes.Buthow do humansknow the right
measurefortheir activity?Classicalphilosophersassumedan absolutestandard
for the meaning of the good life-an idea of the good that human beings will
never be able to attain but which may serve as a guide.
Enlightenmentphilosophyclaimed that humans should be freed from reli-
gious dependence and superstitionand aimed at replacingtheir metaphysical
ties with higher formsof certainty.They were supposedto use their reason to
liberatethemselvesfromtheir self-inflicteddependence.But the high degreeof
ClaudiaLenz 139
personalresponsibilitythis entails led to all kindsof secularsubstitutereligions,

one of them revolvingaroundlabor.
In modernity,labor finally was viewed by Hegel, Marx, and others as the
sourceof "higher"formsof meaningand was turnedinto the epitomeof human
self-realizationper se. The socialistvarianttied the promiseof happinessresult-
ing fromlaborto the promiseof equalityforall within the "stateof laborersand
farmers,"whereasin the capitalistvariant,the promiseof unlimitedconsump-
tion and absolutesatisfactionof desire was offeredas the rewardfor complete
devotion to work.In both instances, the respective"promiseof salvation"has a
religiousdimension-the belief that a completelyfulfilledlife without injustice,
dissatisfaction,and flaw can actually be achieved. Thus labor,viewed as the
vehicle for these promisesof happiness,also becomes an end in itself.
But what are the implicationsof this situation for the question of the good
life?This question has personal/individualas well as worldly/politicaldimen-
sions inseparablefromeach other;however,thinking of those two dimensions
as being intertwinedposes a problemfor the Western traditionof thought. A
traditionof political theory orientedtowarduniversalityand generalityreflects
the depths of this split just as much as a more individualizingapproachthat
views matters in terms of one's "privateaffairs."The refusal to construct an
opposition between those two dimensions is one of the basic foundationsof
Arendt's thought. In her view, plurality is the unique feature of the human
condition: "thatmen, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world"(1959,
9). Implicitin pluralityis the mutualreferenceto the uniquenessof someone
and the fact that this uniquenesscan be realizedonly within a worldlysphere
shared with others. "Humanplurality is the paradoxicalpluralityof unique
beings"(1959, 156).
These two conceptions of pluralitycorrespondto the interplaybetween
one's own renderingof the question of the good life and-given the pursuit
of common interests-its realizationin a community with others. The value
and meaning of labor,attributedindividuallyto one'sown life, correspondsto
a social-politicalengagementwith respect to the reorganizationof labor.The
generallydiagnosed crisis of the current organizationof labor deeply affects
"personal"questions of identity and meaning for the individual;at the same
time,withouta generaldebateconcerningthe re-evaluationof labortherewould
be no opportunityfor a "beginning"in termsof a political re-negotiation.
The way Arendt reconstructs the concept of labor philosophically and
historicallyhelps to eliminate the auraof necessity that surroundsall thinking
about labor.This insight will guide the followingconsiderations.
140 Hypatia
VITAACTIVA
According to The Human Condition, the definition and meaning of the

phenomenon of labor is subject to historical change. Only during industrial
modernitydid labor reach this paramountmeaning that we associate with it
today. Arendt is not interested in a "better"understandingof labor or in a
"counter-concept" to its contemporarymeaningbut in an investigationin terms
of a "phenomenologyof activity."The distinctions she makes in the process
are the result of a historical as well as a philosophical reconstruction.Seyla
Benhabibcalls the philosophicalmethod Arendt appliesa "phenomenological
essentialism"(2003, 123-26). That is to say, the question of human activities
has to be askedagainstthe backdropof the basichumancondition, the conditio
humana,which determines the meaning of those activities. In this sense, the
focus is not primarilyon laborbut on the entire spectrumof human activities.
Fraughtwith a specific meaning in modernity,labor becomes recognizableas
a phenomenon that can be traced back historicallyand philosophically.One
theme in The Human Conditiontraces the changing meanings of activities
(includingthose of the relationshipbetween vitaactivaand vita contemplativa)
since antiquity.However,these considerationsare not supposedto present an
older model as better (as, for example,the idealizedconcept of the Greekpolis
does) or to set it in opposition to the criticizedcontemporarypredominance
of labor.Rather,by using historical examplesArendt demonstratesthe various
aspects and characteristicsof activities that have been forgottenand that are
now nearly impossibleto conceive.
How are activities defined in the vita activa?The structureand method of
this text clearlyreveal Arendt'sproximityto existentialist philosophy.One of
the featuresof her thought that clearlyshows the influence of existentialism
is her unrestrictedconcern-as a philosophical and political thinker-for the
actual world.Choosing this attitude means rejectingany attempt to place the
actual experienceof human beings within a greatermeaningfulwhole, be this
called god, nature, or something else (this is to say, the attempt to endow the
experience of reality with a meaning that precedes this experience or that
would be its prerequisite).Existentialistthinking does not presumethat the
course of the world is determined in advance by any law or plan that would
subjecthumans but would also guaranteethem a degreeof certainty or-most
importantly-release them fromanyresponsibility.Instead,Arendt'sthinking is
guidedby the basicassumptionthat humanbeingsare"setfree"(freigesetzt) in a
doublesense.On the one hand, they arefreedfromthe positionof powerlessness
impliedin the ideaof a completedeterminism:humanbeingsareno longermere
tools in the hands of a "self-realizingwill" that no effortcould change. Rather,
they areput in a position that enablesthem to createtheir own destiny.But this
entails, on the other hand, that being set free (Freisetzung)also means being
ClaudiaLenz 141
deprivedof the confidence and hope attributedto these higher powers,which

in turn resultsin an inevitable encounterwith one's own responsibility.
Arendt knowsthat in light of this freedom,"manin his 'abandonment'or in
his 'individualautonomy'is accessibleto interpretation"(1994b, 169). There-
fore, the meaning of human existence is derivedfrom nothing other than the
activitiesthat human beings themselvesperform:creatingand giving meaning.
And it is exactly this assumptionthat we find at the center of existentialist
philosophy.These philosophical influences determine Arendt's thought and
the question of how to realize human freedomruns through her entire work.
But contrary to her teacher Martin Heidegger,she answers the question by
turning-in a very determinedway-toward the worldand the political. This
also reveals the influence of KarlJaspers,but even more so the integrationof
her own life experience into an independentwayof thinking that nevertheless
remains indebted to existentialistphilosophy.
These considerationsare crucial for understandingThe Human Condition
and they hint at the motivationbehind the beginningquestionof "Whatarewe
doing when we areacting?"How do the differentformsof activitiesrelateto the
conditionsof ourspecifichumanexistence?How do they relateto the realization
of the freedomjust mentioned?The firstchapterof the book is entitled "The
HumanCondition"and Arendt mentionsfourbasicconditions (meaningthose
that are not subjectto human influenceor discretionarypower).
1. As bodily beings with bodily functions and needs, human beings are
part of nature but not fully determined through nature. "Asliving creatures,
humansremainattachedto the realmof the living, fromwhich they neverthe-
less constantly distance themselvesand move towardan artificial,self-created
world"(1994a, 8-9).1
2. Humanbeingsarefinite. Their lifespan,which unfoldswithin the bound-
ariesof birthand death, is thus limitedthroughthe phenomenaof mortalityand
natality.But there is also a far-reachingsymbolicdimensionto those "physical"
facts.The philosophicaltraditionfocusedpredominantlyon mortalityand thus
the finitudeof human life (Heidegger's"lifetowarddeath,"forexample,reveals
that life can recede into the background).Arendt, to the contrary,emphasizes
that due to natality human life is defined also through the ability of "begin-
ning,"thus the abilityto initiate somethingnew:"Thenew beginning inherent
in birth can make itself felt in the worldonly because the newcomerpossesses
the capacityof beginning something anew"(1959, 10-11).
3. In order to realize this specific human existence in terms of a possibil-
ity, human beings depend on the ability to create a "world"that has not
always existed but came about as a commonly established sphere through
human intervention, activities, and actions. The strong and indissoluble
tie of human existence to such a worldlyframe of reference is connected to
plurality.
142 Hypatia
4. Pluralityin Arendt'sview means that human beings are unique and dif-
ferent; at the same time, however, they are capable of communicating with
each other on groundsof the commonalityof being human. They furthermore
depend on participatingin conditions establishedby humans (those being of
material as well as immaterialnature, such as agreementsand regulations).
Arendt'sbasic assumptionof pluralitythereforeconstitutes a view of human
existence that solvesthe seemingcontradictionbetweenequalityand difference
by establishinga relationshipof mutualdependencebetween the two. "Human
plurality... has the twofoldcharacterof equalityand distinction. If men were
not equal,they could neitherunderstandeach other and those who came before
them nor plan forthe futureand foreseethe needs of those who will come after
them. If men werenot distinct, each humanbeing distinguishedfromanyother
who is, was, or will ever be, they wouldneed neitherspeech nor action to make
themselvesunderstood"(1959, 155-56).
Arendt emphasizes,however,that all these conditional elements are not to
be understoodas "conditions"in the sense of mathematicalaxioms;humanexis-
tence cannot be fully"derived"fromthem or definedthroughthem. Rather,she
understandsthose conditions as the basicpresuppositionsthat aresharedby all
humanbeingsand that serveas the groundforthe unfoldingof each individual's
specificity.Contraryto the scientificapproachthat aimsat arrangingdifferences
accordingto the smallestcommondenominator,Arendt is interestedin viewing
the specifichuman situation as never completelydetermined.
The questionof activities,brokendown into three "basictypes"(labor,work,2
and action) is to be understoodin close connection with this interest.Each of
these basic activitiesstands in a special relationto the elementsof the conditio
humanadescribedabove, and together they include, accordingto Arendt, the
entire spectrumof the vita activa.The followingquotationsregardingeach of
these basic activitieswill clarify this connection. It should be noted, however,
that for pursuing the question of basic phenomena that determine human
existence, these variousactivities must not be understoodin a concrete sense
(forexample,"hammering"or "cooking");instead,they shouldbe conceived in
termsof the differentwaysactivitiesmayunfold.This view enablesus to discover
that a particularactivity that seems unambiguousat first glance could mean
something "totallyelse"forthe personperformingit, due to howit is performed
and the meaningit has for the respectiveagent (the best exampleforthis would
be activitiesthat appear"banal"but turn into "sacredactions"when performed
within a ritualcontext). But here are Arendt'sdefinitions:
Labor:"Laboris the activity which correspondsto the biological process
of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual
decay are bound to the vital necessitiesproducedand fed into the life process
by labor.The human condition of labor is life itself" (1959,9). According to
this definition,the logic of laborcorrespondsto the circularorganicprocesses.
ClaudiaLenz 143
Since everything that is producedis immediatelyused up or consumed, labor

is characterizedthrough an endless repetitionof the same steps.
Work: "Workis the activity which correspondsto the unnaturalnessof
human existence. ... Work providesan 'artificial'worldof things, distinctly
differentfromall naturalsurroundings.Within its borderseach individuallife
is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all.
The human condition of work is worldliness"(1959,9). The logic correspond-
ing to work is a means-to-endsrationality.To achieve a certain end, the most
appropriatemeans and the most efficient steps must be clearly determined.
Arendt emphasizesthat this "logic,"which can be pursuedwithout needing
the assistance of others, is actually quite suitable and appropriatewhen it
comes to things;when dealing with people, however,it will inevitablylead to
a violent formof communication,in that the other with his or her own views
and demandscan only be perceivedand treatedas a disturbance.
Action: "Action,the only activitythat goes on directlybetweenmen without
the intermediaryof things or matter,correspondsto the human condition of
plurality,to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earthand inhabitthe world"
(1959,9). According to Arendt, action is closelyrelatedto natality:"Withword
and deed we insert ourselvesinto the human world,and this insertion is like a
second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselvesthe naked fact of
ouroriginalphysicalappearance"(1959,157).Action, forArendt, is inseparably
bound to speech, thus it is an activity directedtowardcommunicationand not
towardany type of material.In this activity the realizationof what it means to
be human unfolds in termsof the personal"who."Through it the "disclosure"
of the person takes place. This is to say,only at the point of appearingbefore
and throughother humanbeingswill the specifichumancharacterof a person's
existence be realized.Arendt emphasizesthat no other activity than action is
so closely tied to participationin the web of human relationships.Existence
without action is, accordingto Arendt, no existence in the full "human"sense,
and this observationleads to the central meaning of the concept of a world.
The claim that "actionconsists in weavingone'sown threadinto a webnot cre-
ated by oneself"(1994a, 174)means nothing other than that individualhuman
beingsarenot "autonomoussubjects,"independentof others;rather,only through
actiondo they realizetheir individualexistence and at the same time confirm,
or continue, the relationalweb of the world.As had alreadybeen stated, labor,
work,and action are not three activities that could be empiricallyascertained
and analytically distinguishedclearly from each other in real life. Rather, if
one follows the phenomenological dimension of Arendt's distinctions, they
are three basic formsof how activity takes place. In this sense one might ask
within which realms(forexample,one'sown professionor life) the activitiesof
labor,work,and action occur and whether,be this individuallyor socially,they
are bound to certain spheresand time periods.Arendt is concerned about the
144 Hypatia
observation that in the course of industrialmodernity the logic of labor has

gained an absolutestatus, assertingitself against all other formsof activity.
"JOBHOLDER":
IMPOVERISHMENT
OF THEPOSSIBILITIES
OF EXISTENCE
The startingpoint forArendt'scritiqueof a laborsociety is the followingobser-

vation:modem industrialsocieties are not determinedby processesof political
communicationor decisionmakingbut throughthe waythe economyfunctions.
This implies that individualsare guided by an exclusive interest to guarantee
their materiallivelihood and to satisfytheir needs forconsumption.The central
meaning of gainful employmentis not that a particularactivity be especially
satisfyingor meaningful, but the pure necessity of having a financial income
to secure one's existence ("to make a living"). The "circularity"that, accord-
ing to Arendt, characterizesthe logic of laborshows itself in modern societies
in the inherent momentumconsumption gains as (substitute)satisfactionfor
social, cultural, and expressiveneeds, in short, in the compulsion to buy: "It
is frequentlysaid that we live in a consumers'society, and since ... laborand
consumptionarebut two stagesof the sameprocess,imposedupon man by the
necessity of life, this is only another way of saying that we live in a society of
laborers"(1959, 110).
Arendt brings this observation to the point in the following way: a labor
society producesonly two types of human beings,"jobholders"and consumers.
One worksto be able to consume and one has to consume to regenerateoneself
fromwork.Everythingis gearedtowardthe functioning of a systemdominated
by economic cycles and for which laborhas become an end in itself. Arendt is
concerned that within this cycle of laborand consumption,the idea of satisfy-
ing materialneeds in orderto free time for other activities (or leisure)is about
to disappear.This resultsin a "lossof world,"in the dwindlingof the ability to
judge and act and the weakeningof the political understoodas an interest in
publicaffairs.Human beings whose only interest is their privatesphere-thus,
the interest in holding a job to maintain or improve a material standardof
living-come very close to what Arendt identifiesas the compliant mass for
a totalitarian rule. Note this descriptionfrom The Originsof Totalitarianism:
"The mass man ... bore the featuresof the philistine ratherthan of the mob
man, and was the bourgeoiswho in the midst of the ruins of his worldworried
about nothing so much as his private security, was ready to sacrifice every-
thing-belief, honor, dignity-on the slightest provocation.Nothing proved
easierto destroythan the privacyand privatemoralityof people who thought
of nothing but safeguardingtheir privatelives"(1976, 338).
So far it has been emphasizedthat Arendt's interest in labor follows from
her broaderinterest in the questionof how to realizehuman freedom.And this
freedom is threatened if the basic human activities are systematicallythrown
ClaudiaLenz 145
off balance, wherebythe possibilityof a balance of variousactivities is tied to

a respective organizationof the social and political life. It is ultimatelyonly
within the realm of the political, thus through the human ability to act, that
freedom can become a part of life. In this sense, the decline of the political
under the dominance of an animallaborans,3determinedexclusivelythrough
economic conditions, constitutes for Arendt a threat to humanity itself. It is
importantto note, however,that she does not devalue the other activities of
laborand work.Rather,throughoutthe entire text, Arendt insistson the neces-
sary interplayof those activities and asks which role each playsat a time or in
a given situation.But in an overallperspectivethe balance of all three types of
activity is necessaryfor establishinga society groundedin choices and creative
abilities. Since they all are part of the basic human condition, emphasizing
one over the others leads to fatal distortionsof human existence and of living
together as human beings.
In that any perspective of a "good life" would have to include Arendt's
notions of labor,work,and action, they might be consideredas basic elements
when speculatingaboutwhat could or should follow the "endof laborsociety."
My understandingof a meaningfuluse of Arendt'sformsof activitiespoints in
the followingdirection:preciselybecause the distinction between labor,work,
and acting goes counter to the predominantthought patternsand evaluations
of laborand is most likely firstmet with irritation,her classificationmight be
usefulfora reevaluationand renegotiationof the currentsituation.If these three
formsof activity, together and in their interplay,reflect the basic experiences
that belong to the realizationof the possibilitiesof human freedom,then they
can serve as touchstonesforcontemporarydebatesabout laboror as criteriafor
the formationof opinions and judgments.
In sum, then, the most importantconsiderationsregardinga labor society
offeredin Hannah Arendt'sThe HumanConditionare these. She introducesa
historicalapproachto laborin that she views it as a phenomenon that changes
and is thus malleable.Her critiqueof a laborsociety is based on a criticismof
the absolute dominance of labor at the expense of other forms of activities,
especially at the expense of the abilities to judge and to engage in political
action, both of which are crucialcharacteristicsof what it means to be human.
This criticismresultsin the suggestionthat we view the debate about laboras
an opportunity to assess the value of gainful employmentas something that
has become an end in itself,to ask the questionof the good life-the life worth
living-and to move the subsequentpoliticalquestionsinto the focus of public
concern.
In an attemptto makeArendt'sconceptsaccessible,I wouldlike to askwhich
aspectsof the contemporarydebatessurroundingthe assessmentand organiza-
tion of laborcan be relatedto her three categoriesof human activity.By wayof
example, I thereforeturn to the issue of laborwith respect to genderjustice.4
146 Hypatia
LABOR AND GENDER JUSTICE
Arendt'scategoryof labor,which assumesa cyclical alternationof production

and consumption,correspondsat the level of a lived world (among others) to
activities relatedto provisionand care. These include all those activities that,
according to a bourgeois gender ideology and division of labor, have been
attributedto "woman'snature"and relegatedto the private sphere. Feminist
theoreticiansof the 1970sand 1980s called this unpaid aspect of a social divi-
sion of labor"reproductivelabor,"therebyunderscoringthe idea that this type
of laborcontributesjust as much to social wealth as "productivelabor,"which is
usuallydefinedas male. In that Arendt points out that the concern forthe bare
necessitiesof life constitutesan elementalpartof human existence and belongs
to the basic human condition, she criticizesmore than just the materialand
conceptualundervaluationof reproductiveactivities.In her view, the exclusive
attributionof productivelabor to just one gender is not compatiblewith the
idea of a good life. The exclusionof women from the public sphere (and their
concomitant restrictionto the privaterealm) leads as much to an impoverish-
ment of life as does the release of men from household activities. According
to Arendt, the same appliesto the free citizens of antiquitywho handed over
the "yokeof necessity"to women and slaves:"The price for the elimination of
life'sburdenfrom the shouldersof all citizens was enormousand by no means
consisted only in the violent injusticeof forcingone part of humanity into the
darknessof pain and necessity.Since this darknessis natural,inherent in the
humancondition-only the act of violence, when one groupof men tries to rid
itself of the shacklesbinding all of us to pain and necessity,is man-made-the
price for absolutefreedomfrom necessity is, in a sense, life itself, or ratherthe
substitutionof vicariouslife for real life"(1959, 103).
Whateveris meant by "reallife,"Arendt rightlyrefersto privation,to a form
of impoverishmentthat occurs when human beings are responsibleonly for a
limited part of the entire spectrumof activities. This claim implies a radical
criticism of a social division of labor between women and men-an arrange-
mentfurtherpromotedin social welfaresystems(Germantax laws,forexample,
clearlyfavorthe model of the "housewife/single-incomemarriage").Criticism
based on Arendt'sconcept of activities could resultin the demandfor socially
organizedlabor in such a way that women and men have the same access to
and the sameresponsibilityforproductivepublic,as well as care-relatedprivate,
activities.
Having formulateda critiqueof a hierarchicallyorganized,sexual division
of labor based on Arendt's categorizationof basic activities, I next examine
her concept of the "consciouspariah"to explore options for political change.
The consequences of a sexual division of labor as it emerged for bourgeois
society in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, based on an ideology of
ClaudiaLenz 147
"natural"masculinityand femininityor "naturalgenderdispositions"(natiirliche

Geschlechtscharaktere [see Hausen 1978]) are far-reachingand have been rec-
ognized and widely criticizedby feministssince their establishment(see Bauer
1978).In this arrangement,women are dependentnot only in a materialsense,
but also lack any access to culturally accepted prerequisitesfor becoming a
subject.After all, on the philosophical level (in Hegel and Marx,for instance)
labor was associated with human "self-creation."As a result, the dominant
order, which centers on the male, rational, and working subject, relegates
women to a position of the "subordinateother."This position is constitutive
of the entire system,because "thesubject"(as a realityassertingphilosophical
construction) establishesits own identity and normalitythrough the creation
of boundaries.
And it is precisely this position of the "other"-required by a majority-
dominatedsociety to reassureitself that it exists-that forArendt characterizes
the figureof the pariah.5It opens up severalstrategiesfor positioning oneself,
especially strategiesthat might help to overcome the situation of oppression
and exclusionfrom the dominant order,includingthe possibilityof participat-
ing in it. Arendt used the term parvenufor the attempt to work one's way up
in the dominant culture through (over)adaptation.She analyzesthis strategy
as hopeless since it fails to recognize that parvenus want to escape exactly
those attributesthat the majority-dominatedculture needs in orderto assure
their own superiority.The only way parvenusare able to join the majorityis
as individuals,by separatingthemselves from the rest of the pariahs-which
makes their attempteven more hopeless.
The "consciouspariah"constitutes for Arendt a different,more promising
and genuine political strategy.This means the freedom to speak up for the
changes of exactly those conditions that establish one's own exclusion. The
conscious pariah thus startsfromhis or her own experienceof oppression,but
is directed against the general structureof oppression.In her essay on Bernard
Lazare,Arendt writesthat he demanded"thatthe pariah... come to gripswith
the worldof men and women. In other words,he wanted him to feel that he
was himself responsibleforwhat society had done to him ... Politicallyspeak-
ing every pariah who refusedto be a rebel was partly responsiblefor his own
position ... Forinsofaras a man is more than a merecreatureof nature,more
than a mere productof Divine creativity,insofarwill he be called to account
forthe things which men do to men in the worldwhich they themselvescondi-
tion"(1978a,77-78). In my view, the figureof the "consciouspariah"is quite an
interestingapproach-albeit not yet developed-for a politicsof emancipation.
Furthermore,this concept could also be of benefit for those feminist debates
that explore the contradictionsof identity politics.
It is not my goal, however,to equate patriarchalmechanisms of exclusion
along gender lines with the exclusion of Jewish people from the Christian
148 Hypatia
majority(Arendt'spoint of referencefor the figureof the "consciouspariah").I

am interestedin the following:this figurecontains a structurethat might assist
in bringing about profoundpolitical changes in discriminatoryrelationships
withoutreestablishingthe very identitiesproducedby the dominantculure. In
that they are oppressed,the pariahs are markedby the traces of their oppres-
sion;denyingthis identityor escapinginto the promiseof equalitywouldfail to
recognizethe factualstructuresof discrimination.At the same time, retreating
to this identity-the essentializingcommitment to attributesthat come along
with it and the constructionof a collective "we"of the oppressed-also misses
Arendt'sspecificpoint of the political:throughpolitical acting, human beings
are capable of creating conditions of equality even though they are distinct
from each other.
This possibilityalso seemsfruitfulforthe followingfeministdilemma:appeal-
ing to the categoryof 'woman'or 'femininity'poses the dangerof reproducing
the dichotomousand hierarchicalorderbetween the genders,yet the category
is indispensableforan adequatedescriptionof a social given:sexism.According
to Arendt, the figureof the "consciouspariah"allowsone to defendoneself not
in the name of a given, essentialist identity,but as one who has been attacked
and who criticizesthe structureof oppressionin any given form. Contrary to
approachesfound within identity politics, this strategyopens up the possibil-
ity of political action within varying coalitions, or, as it were, with "different
others."The context of Hannah Arendt'sworkofferssufficientevidence that she
viewed the consciouspariah in this expandedsense (see Lenz 1996). Her essay
on BernardLazarecan be taken as early confirmationfor this claim. Arendt
emphasizesthere that in his fightforliberation,Lazarewantedto be understood
as a Jewand as socialist. And Arendt describesthe Dreyfusards,who "formed
no partyor homogenousgroup,"in emphaticwordsas "menwho on the morrow
wouldpartcompanyand go their severalways,"in that "'theycome frompoliti-
cal parties and religiouscommunities who have nothing in common"'(1976,
114).Due to their immediateexperience, conscious pariahsare able to clearly
name the structuresand the scandal of their oppression;however,their acting
becomespolitical in Arendt'ssense only when they join togethernot only with
"theirown kind"and if they speak up not only for "theircause."
In light of women'smarginal and distanced position with respect to the
modern, hegemonic concept of labor (which is not freely chosen and fiercely
contested),how is it possiblefor them to gain a freedomcomparableto that of
the conscious pariah?Through its gender-specificconstruction the norm for
gainful employmentalso constitutes a principleof exclusion or a constitutive
element of a male-dominatedculture. Considering the feminist conclusions
and demands that have been derived from the prevailing analysis over the
last one hundredfifty years,it can be seen that the primarygoal was at firstto
participatein the dominant principleof laborin termsof gainful employment.
ClaudiaLenz 149
The importance attributedto women'sparticipationin gainful employment

(their economic as well as political emancipation,their equal share in the very
statusof being human) is expressedin the followingstatementby KlaraZetkin:
"Thosewho have proclaimedon their bannersthe liberationof all those beings
bearing a human countenance, ought not to condemn half of humanity to
political and social slavery through economic dependence. Just as the work-
ers are subjugatedby the capitalists, women are subjugatedby men and they
will continue to remain in that position as long as they are not economically
independent.The quintessentialprerequisitefor their economic independence
is work"(1984, 45-46).
In addition to pointing out women'sexclusion from the sphere of gainful
employment,the analysesemergingin the processof the new women'smove-
ment duringthe 1970sand 1980scriticallyfocusedalso on "theother side":the
fact that the reproductiveactivities assignedto women weredevaluedand met
with ignorance and disdain. The demand for the recognition of these activi-
ties as work in terms of reproductivelabor,and of their importancefor social
functioning (including the figuresof the Gross National Product)was soon
accompaniedby the demand for "wagesfor housework."6 The economic value
of these "feminine"activitiesin termsof paymentis a materialexpressionof the
demand for equalitywith respect to recognition and esteem for one's achieve-
ments. The same criticismwas turnedin a differentdirectionin the essentialist
approachesof difference-theoryfeminists:here "feminine"qualitieswere con-
ceptualizedin termsof a counter-sphere, separatefromthe achievement-oriented
and violent formsof masculinity.This is to say, the equal acceptance within
a male value systemwas rejectedin favorof a "feminine"principle.Systemsof
referencebetween womenweresupposedto bringaboutchangesforwomen (for
example,a different,symbolicallyas well as materiallyfeminine economy).But
no generalsocial change of the predominanthierarchyof activitieswith its clear
favoringof laborcan be derivedfrom this. Nevertheless, the justifiedcriticism
of a "masculine"categoryof laborhad-in spite of the differencesbetween the
variousfeminist schools-an impact on the argumentsof the representatives
of an equalityposition.
Given all the positions that aim at equality between women and men, I
wouldbasicallylike to distinguishtwo strategieswith respectto a gender-specific
division of labor:
(1) the demand for women'saccess to the "masculine"coded
sphereof gainful employmentand subsequentequal rights and
independenceregardingmoney but also legal and social status,
on the model of equal rights throughequal participationin the
domain of gainful employment(see Kurz-Scherf1995); (2) the
demandfora higheror equalevaluationof the "feminine"coded
150 Hypatia
sectorof reproductivelabor,by calling it "labor"and by introduc-

ing a formof paymentforit, on the modelof equalrightsthrough
giving equal worth to the gender-specificspheres.
But all those positions, whether they pursue either the one or the other
strategy,or a mixed version,such as the demandfor the compatibilitybetween
family and career (family shall not be an obstacle for women's attempt to
have professionalsuccess),remain essentiallywithin a labor-centeredorderof
activities.This passesup the opportunityto recognize,fromwithin the pariah
position, the problematicnature of assessingand organizingactivities around
labor and to concentrate instead on the political activity of reevaluationand
redistributionof gainful employment.
In orderto give a feminist critiqueof labora more distinct focus, I propose
to combine Arendt's thinking and feminist debates on labor. This requires
startingfromArendt'scriticismof laboras the absoluteformof activity and its
unfortunateconsequences and showing, at the same time, the gender-specific
constructionsand functioning mechanismsof a laborsociety.The decline that
Arendt describesas a resultof a laborsociety,the loss of the abilityto judgeand
act, the threatening loss of a world,and the disappearanceof the political are
partlythe resultof the specificprivationthat occurs when people are deprived
of the full spectrumof human activities. This appliesboth to being solely in
chargeof the sectorof reproductivelaborand to the exclusiveexistence as job-
holder and breadwinner.A feminist criticism that does not want to demand
access to the one restrictiveconcept (standardsfor gainful employment) in
orderto leave behind the other (houseworkand unpaidvolunteerwork)would
have to formulatea more comprehensivecriticism;for this Arendt'sanalysisof
labor could serve as a model. Such a reconstructionof the dominant concept
of laborwould demonstratethe gender-specificimplicationsof the evaluation
and devaluationof activities as well as the restrictedspectrumof possibilities
forlife in generalinscribedinto those implications.Such an analysiswouldnot
be a means to gain equal access to a work-centeredmodel but a startingpoint
for a far-reachingrevisionand redefinitionof the relationshipbetween various
possibleactivities. Insteadof positivelyrevaluingtraditionallyfeminine activi-
ties becausethey are attributed(exclusively)to women, an approachshouldbe
taken that examines all activities regardingtheir contributionto the question
as to what it means to be human, to a desirable"good"life.
However, it must be continuously pointed out that the existence of two
hierarchicallyconstructed spheres with only the sphere markedmale being
granted any economic and social value is a travesty.For this reason it will
remainindispensablefor the foreseeablefutureto alsodemandequal access for
womento gainfulemployment;but this will be necessaryonly as long as gainful
employmentdeterminesthe access to the entire spectrumof social possibilities
ClaudiaLenz 151
and choices. ForArendt, acting is unpredictableand its processis unforeseeable.

It would thus be a mistaketo indicate a certain point in time afterwhich such
a "doublestrategy"would become unnecessary.Demanding participationin
gainful employmentmakessense only for the moment, since the participation
in social and politicalpossibilitiesdependson it; at the same time, however,it is
necessaryto develop a far-reachingcriticismof the entire principleof assessing
and organizingsocial labor.Accordingly,it shouldbe demandedthat the condi-
tions for an existence that is satisfyingin a material,social, and psychological
sense be detached from gainful employment.
The feminist reconstruction of gender-basedexclusions and devaluations
can initiate a "deconstruction"of the concept of labor (in the sense of chal-
lenging its unquestionedauthority)that will eventuallyresult in a shift of its
evaluationsand judgments.7The goal is to go beyond what seems to be taken
for granted-with respect to the hierarchicaland dichotomousconstructions
of genderarrangementsas well as the evaluationand orderof activities.
JacquesDerrida'sstrategyof deconstructionconsidersthe "margins"of the
dominant order as promisingplaces from which to question the "center"(in
the sense of seeminglydefinite meanings) and to initiate change. I see a close
connection between this thought and Arendt's idea that human beings, on
groundsof their own experience of discrimination,can take responsibilityfor
political change in terms of overcomingany form of discrimination.Feminist
interventionsin the debateover laborcan makeuse of this insight.Contempo-
rarydebatesabout laborcould gain additionalqualitiesand dimensionsfroma
dismantlingof the "mythof full employment"-questioningnot only its possible
realizationbut also its desirability.Of course, those qualities and dimensions
wouldbe irritating,unsettlingandpoliticalin a radicalArendtiansense,bringing
a new dynamic into the generaldiscussionabout labor.
EPILOGUE: "ALL THINKING IS THINKING ABOUT SOMETHING"
Arendt concludes the last chapter of The Human Condition-pessimistically

entitled "The Victory of the AnimalLaborans"-with a thought on thinking.
This, for her, seems to offer a way out of the destructivedynamics of a labor
society,not the presentationof "solutions"or a great"alternativeplan."As she
elaboratesfurtherin The Lifeof theMind, thinking opens up the possibilityof
withdrawalfrom the seemingly self-evident and necessary nature of a given
situation. At the moment, the political elites, such as representativesof par-
ties, government,and unions, treat the question of labor in a ratherthought-
less manner. Even before it could be resolvedwhether the supposedproblem,
namely, the erosion of the "standardmodel for gainful employment,"really is
the actual social problem,to be solved through the creation of new jobs at all
costs, self-proclaimedexperts plunged themselves into hectic activism. The
152 Hypatia
noisy nervousness that currently, especially within the European context,

conjuresup the possibilityof full employmentin the future(throughnew tech-
nologies and the media) makesone believe that everythingwill stay the same.
The use of futureis therebyinflationary,and any new intellectual approachor
creativeimpulseis preventedin advance.In light of this situation,Arendt'sturn
towardcontinued thought without respect (respektloses Weiterdenken) is more
advisablethan ever.According to Arendt, thinking "interruptsany doing, any
ordinaryactivities,no matterwhat they happen to be. All thinking demandsa
stop-and-think"(1978b,78).
The basiccondition for makingwell-foundeddecisions and forhaving one's
actionsguidedby carefullyweighedjudgmentsis to find time and leisurefor"the
soundlessdialogueof the I with itself"(1978b,74) without which nothing new
can come about. A meaningfulorganizationof the coexistence of our various
activities requiresa public, political processof negotiation. Arendt'sthinking
about activities offers a numberof stimulatingsuggestionsfor the assessment
and organizationof laborand activity as well as criteriafor judgingthe public
discussionof these models.
NOTES
This is a revisedversionof a text originallywrittenin Germanandfirstpublishedin

Spanishas"Elfino la apoteosisde la labor?Lavidabuenay la laboren la modernidad,"
in Pensar y actuarenelmundo:Ensayos sobrelaobradeHannahArendt,ed.Marco
crfticos
EstradaSaavedra,MexicoCity:UAM-A.
1. TheGermaneditionof TheHumanCondition is moreextensivethantheEnglish
version.In instanceswherequotationsfromthe Germaneditionwerenot availablein
English,theyhavebeendirectlytranslated fromthe Germanedition.
2. In GermanHerstellen. Althougha moreliteraltranslationof Herstellen would
be "making" or"producing,"the termusedin the Englisheditionof TheHumanCondi-
tionis "work." The presenttranslationaimsat stayingascloseaspossibleto the already
established Englishterminology forArendt'swork,thusthe useof "work" forHerstellen
and"labor" forArbeit.
3. Latin:"theworkinganimal"-the termArendtusedforthe humanbeingthat
is exclusivelydeterminedthroughlabor.
4. Otherexampleswouldbe the connectionbetweenwork(Herstellen) andecology
or the roleof actionforcivil integration.Neitherexamplecan be furtherexploredin
the presentinvestigation.
5. This mechanismof designatingthe identityof the "stranger" in orderto estab-
lish the identityof a majority-dominated societycan be reconstructed with the help
of Arendt'sbookRahelVarnhagen. In lightof the currentnegotiationsof "national,"
"ethnic,"and other identities,this insightis of the utmostrelevance.See Arendt
1974.
ClaudiaLenz 153
6. Forthisdebatesee BockandDuden1976as wellas Strobl1983.

7. I referhere to Derrida's
conceptof deconstruction, which,througha recon-
structionof dichotomousand hierarchicalstructures,allowsfora "shift"that might
bringinto the open new,presentlyexcludedand thusnot yet thinkablepossibilities.
Symbolic,linguistic,and also politicalorderingsystemsproducein theirhermetic
theyappearas naturalandinconceivable
unitythe effectof self-evidence; in anyother
sense.Deconstruction reenactsthe productionof thesehermeticsystemsof meaning
andthusdemonstrates thatthereis alwaysan excluded,a nonredeemed,
an other(the
diff6rance)at work,which,whenactivated,providesa criticalpotentialagainstthe
violenttendenciesof totalityandexclusions.See Derrida1982.
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. 1994b.Whatis existentialphilosophy? In Essaysinunderstanding:
1930-1954.
NewYork:HarcourtBrace& Company.
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tityandpoliticsin themodernage,ed. RonH. Feldman.NewYork:GrovePress.
. 1978b.Thelifeof themind.San Diego:Harcourt,HarvestBook.
. 1976.Theoriginsof totalitarianism:
Neweditionwitheditedprefaces.San Diego:
Harcourt,HarvestBook.
. 1974.RahelVarnhagen: The lifeof a Jewishwoman.Revisededition.Trans.
RichardandClaraWinston.San Diego:HarcourtBraceJovanovich.
. 1959.Thehumancondition. GardenCity,N.J.:Doubleday AnchorBooks.
Bauer,Karin.1978.ClaraZetkinunddieproletarische Frauenbewegung.Berlin:Oberbaum
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Md.:Rowman& Littlefield.
Bock,Gisela,andBarbara Duden.1976.ArbeitausLiebe-LiebealsArbeit:ZurEnt-
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BerlinerSommeruniversitdt fur Frauen,Juli1976,ed. Dokumentationsgruppe der
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Arendt On Labor

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Hypatia, Inc.

This paperrelatesArendt'scritiqueof a laborsocietyto her thoughtson the "good

What is most impressivein The HumanConditionis the visionaryforesightof

Hypatia vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 2005) ? by Claudia Lenz

In this instance, it seems as though scientificprogressand technical devel-

of our time. What I propose,therefore,is very simple:it is nothing more than

THE END OR THE UNLEASHING OF THE ANIMAL LABORANS?

Formodernity,laboris not a culturalphenomenon and signifieramongothers;

the power of economic argumentsdeclares the deregulationof the markets,

OPPORTUNITY IN CRISIS: THE QUESTION OF THE GOOD LIFE

personalresponsibilitythis entails led to all kindsof secularsubstitutereligions,

According to The Human Condition, the definition and meaning of the

deprivedof the confidence and hope attributedto these higher powers,which

Since everything that is producedis immediatelyused up or consumed, labor

observation that in the course of industrialmodernity the logic of labor has

The startingpoint forArendt'scritiqueof a laborsociety is the followingobser-

off balance, wherebythe possibilityof a balance of variousactivities is tied to

LABOR AND GENDER JUSTICE

Arendt'scategoryof labor,which assumesa cyclical alternationof production

"natural"masculinityand femininityor "naturalgenderdispositions"(natiirliche

majority(Arendt'spoint of referencefor the figureof the "consciouspariah").I

The importance attributedto women'sparticipationin gainful employment

sectorof reproductivelabor,by calling it "labor"and by introduc-

and choices. ForArendt, acting is unpredictableand its processis unforeseeable.

EPILOGUE: "ALL THINKING IS THINKING ABOUT SOMETHING"

Arendt concludes the last chapter of The Human Condition-pessimistically

noisy nervousness that currently, especially within the European context,

This is a revisedversionof a text originallywrittenin Germanandfirstpublishedin

6. Forthisdebatesee BockandDuden1976as wellas Strobl1983.

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