BURMA CAMPAIGN

Setting of the battlefield

Geographic Setting
 The terrain and climate of Burma placed greater limitations on operations
than in other theaters.
 The Burmese terrain is extremely broken and overly compartmented with limited,
mostly fair-weather lines of communication running along north-south axes
through the major river valleys.
 The monsoon season, extending from May into October, brought ground
movement almost to a halt.
 Much of the country, and especially the river valleys were dangerously infested
by malaria and scrub typhus.
 These conditions resulted in more casualties to Lieutenant General Slim's 14th
Army from disease than from battle injuries. These environmental factors
imposed limitations to sustaining an army in the field and were not easily
overcome.
 They also affected the morale of the army.'
Strategic Setting
 Losing the Burma Road was potentially devastating to the overall war effort
against Japan since this was the single overland supply route into General
Issimo Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Army.
 Without American support via the Burma Road, China could not hope to survive
in the war against Japan.
 The United States upcoming offensive drive across the Pacific in 1944 stood
much greater prospects for success if the Japanese Army were fully committed in
other theaters. This would force Japan to operate on widely divergent lines of
operation, while the U.S. Pacific force operated on single lines of operation.
 As a result, the Americans, determined to keep China in the war, began to
dedicate increasing assets toward supplying China by air via the "HUMP" route
over the Himalayan foothills.'
Operational Setting
 First, the British uncovered a critical vulnerability in the Japanese logistic system.
Although the Japanese could move large forces quickly through the jungle to
encircle and cut their opponent's lines of communication, they had little ability to
sustain themselves for any duration.
 Second, the Japanese proved to be inflexible and incapable of adapting to
rapidly changing situations.
  Third, the Chindit Expedition showed that large forces could be sustained by air
resupply rather than being dependent solely upon overland transportation routes.
Mountbatten was given two major objectives to achieve.
 "Firstly, the enemy was to be engaged as closely and continuously as possible,
and his forces (especially his air forces) worn down so that he would be
compelled to divert reinforcements from the Pacific theatre.
 Secondly, was to maintain and enlarge contacts with China, both by the air route,
and by making direct contact in Northern Burma by the use (amongst other
methods) of suitably organized, air-supplied ground forces of the greatest
possible strength.
This guidance provided the basis for all operational planning in the theater. In
November 1943, the SEAC war plan included seven separate, but related
operations for the 1944 campaign season.
a) Operation BUCCANEER - an amphibious assault to capture the Andaman
Islands (33 Corps, naval, and naval air support)
b) An advance on the ARAKAN front, and eventually an amphibious assault to
capture AKYAB (15 Corps, 224 Group RAF)
c) An advance on the Central front across the Chindwin River (4 Corps, 221 Group
RAF)
d) An advance by the NCAC force down the HUKAWNG Valley to secure the trace
of the LEDO (Burma) Road into China (Stilwell's Chinese Army, Northern Air
Sector Force)
e) An advance from Yunnan to secure the Chinese end of the LEDO Road (CEF,
14th U.S. Air Force)
f) Special operations in support of NCAC and CEF (Wingate's Special Force
(Chindits), No. 1 Air Commando and the Third Tactical Air Force)
g) Capture of the airfield at Rail INDAW by parachute forces and fly-in of an
airborne brigade in support of Special Force (50 Parachute Brigade and 26
Indian Division, Troop Carrier Command)
The Modified Plan
On 5 December 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive cancelling the
previously promised amphibious shipping. Only four of the seven original operations-
a) An advance on the ARAKAN front, and eventually an amphibious assault to
capture AKYAB (15 Corps, 224 Group RAF)
b) An advance on the Central front across the Chindwin River (4 Corps, 221 Group
RAF)
c) An advance by the NCAC force down the HUKAWNG Valley to secure the trace
of the LEDO (Burma) Road into China (Stilwell's Chinese Army, Northern Air
Sector Force)
 d) Special operations in support of NCAC and CEF (Wingate's Special Force
(Chindits), No. 1 Air Commando and the Third Tactical Air Force)
American strategy

 American strategy for waging war against Japan was the need to keep China in
the war- fighting would absorb the Japanese armies that would otherwise be
turned against the Americans in their march across the Pacific.
 What China desperately needed were a supplies to sustain her population,
maintain and improve her armies and support the American air effort against the
Japanese.

American objective

 The American objective was to clear the Japanese armies from northern Burma
to protect the growing airfield complex in Assam, and ultimately to secure the
land route to China.

British strategy

 The British high command was skeptical of China’s value to the war effort. If
China did need to be kept in the war, the more effective means of supply was to
reopen the Burma Road by clearing the Japanese from central Burma and
Rangoon.

British Strategic Objective

 The British looked beyond Burma to their colonies in Malaya and Singapore and
to the Dutch East Indies, the source of much Japan’s oil, as more important
strategic objectives.
 At the Quadrant Conference in August 1943, South East Asia Command was
formed under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as a supreme allied commander.
American and British commander agreed on a:
 Limited advance during the 1943/1944 dry season in the ARAKAN by British
forces and northern Burma by Chinese forces (Gen Joseph Stillwell) in the
Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), combined with second and larger
 CHINDIT operation under Maj Gen ORDE WINGATE, to ensure the security of
the American Air fields and to lay a foundation for later ops.

Japanese strategy

 The Japanese strategy was to create a defensive barrier around their newly
conquered territories and hold his barrier against any allied attack, inflicting such
heavy casualties that the allies would cease fighting.
 Burma was the Japanese barrier protecting Southeast Asia and its vital oil and
mineral resources.
 Lt Gen MATAGUCHI RENYA, commander of the 15 th Army in Burma, argued
forcefully to the Burma Area Army commander, Lt Gen KAWABE Masakazu, that
if the Japanese wanted to forestall and defeat a British offensive into Burma, then
they must capture IMPHAL, the base for any offensive.
 In January 1944, the Japanese Imperial General HQ gave approval for operation
“U-GO”, the capture of IMPHAL and the advance into ASSAM, to be launched in
the 1944 dry season. To tie down British forces in the ARAKAN, “U-GO” would
be preceded by operation “HA-GO”, an attack on the AKYB front.

TURNING THE TIDES

Significant of IMPHAL

 The IMPHAL plain, some 40X20 miles in extent, is the only considerable haven
of flat ground in the great sweep of mountains between India and Burma.
 It lies roughly equal distant from the Brahmaputra Valley and the plains of Central
Burma, a natural half-way house and staging place for any great military
movement in either direction between India and Burma.
 The railhead was located a hundred and thirty miles north of IMPHAL, at
DIMAPUR. Only line of communication was built from railhead at DIMAPUR up
the hill to Kohima, and on to IMPHAL.
Con Ops

The three divisions of 4 Corps (SCOONES) were deployed with two forward,

 17th Division, (right)-TIDDIM in the Chin Hills

 20th Division, (left)-PALEL-TAMU area
 One Div with 254 Indian Tank Brigade, of two regiments concentrated at IMPHAL
 The corps had a frontage of 250 miles to watch and guard.

Early indication of Japanese offensive

Enemy activity and strength all along 4 Corps front were noticeably increasing.
Documents, diaries, marked maps, and even operation orders taken from Japanese
killed in these patrol clashes were being brought in almost daily.

 Development of the roads towards the Chindwin from Central Burma.

 Large numbers of logs being collected at various places on the east bank of the
river
 Camouflaged rafts concealed in the lower reaches of the UYU River opposite
HOMALIN, due east of IMPHAL.
 Spotted great herds of cattle, each several hundred in number, and south of the
UYU and near THAUNGDUT on the CHINDWIN.
 V’ Force agents also brought stories of the massing of transport, mechanical and
animal, even of elephants.

En likely pattern of ops

Employing Japanese Fifteenth Army under Lt Gen MUTAGUCHI, with three Japanese
divisions, 15th, 31st, and 33rd, an I.N.A. Division, a tank regiment, and other troops with
the objectives of:-

 To capture IMPHAL
 To break through to the BRAHMAPUTRA Valley so as to cut off the Northern
front and disrupt the air supply to China.
Own Design of Battle (There broad alternatives (Own Courses of Action):

(i) Course A-To anticipate the enemy offensive by crossing the Chindwin and attacking
him first.

(ii) Course B-To hold the Japanese 33rd Division in the TIDDIM area and fight with all
available forces on the line of the Chindwin, hoping to destroy the enemy as he crossed
the river, with part of his forces on each bank.

(iii) Course C-To concentrate 4 Corps in the IMPHAL plain and fight the decisive
battle there on ground of our Aown choosing.

Slim decided to adopt the third course. He had following considerations;

 A good line of communications behind him.

 Difficult for enemy to maintain their supply.
 British air supremacy and the ability it gave to use air supply. All-weather
airfields were IMPHAL and PALEL.

There are three reasons for retreat from initial deployment:

 Self-preservation
 To save your force from destruction
 Pressure elsewhere which makes to accept loss of territory in one place to
enable to transfer troops to a more vital front; and lastly, to draw the enemy
into a situation so unfavorable to him that the initiative must pass to you.
It was for this third reason that Slim and SCOONES decided on a withdrawal in order to
fight at IMPHAL. Retreat of 1942 aim was preservation of troops, and that of 1944,
which was to regain the initiative.
British Preparation
 Planning for defense of IMPHAL plain. This entailed the concentration of the
scattered administrative units and headquarters into fortified areas, each of which
capable of al-round defense and completely self-contained in ammunition and
supplies for considerable periods.
 Converting IMPHAL and PALEL, vital for air supply, into the main strong-points.
 The garrisons of these fortified areas mainly by the administrative troops to
relieve fighting units and formations to maneuver in an offensive role.
 All unit in the IMPHAL plain prepared defended localities, wired, and stocked.
  The evacuation of non-combatant and labor units and the training of the
remaining administrative troops in a fighting role for the defense of their own
localities was conducted.
The 4 Corps tactical plan
 The 17th Division to move rapidly back from TIDDIM to the IMPHAL plain,
dropping one brigade group some forty miles south of IMPHAL to block the
Japanese advance. The remainder of the division would be in Corps Reserve.
 The 20th Indian Division was to withdraw from its forward positions in the
KABAW Valley, concentrate in the MOREH area, and fall back slowly on
SHENAM, which would be held at all costs.
 The 23rd Indian Division, leaving one brigade group in the UKHRUL area, was to
form with 17th Division, the Indian Parachute Brigade, when it arrived, and 254
Indian Tank Brigade, the Corps offensive reserve.
 The Japanese would thus be allowed to advance to the edge of the IMPHAL
plain, and, when committed in assaults would be counter-attacked and destroyed
by our mobile striking forces, strong in artillery, armor, and aircraft.
Conduct of Battle
The whole battle can be divided into four reasonably clear phases:
(i) Concentration—as each side strained every strength to bring its forces into the
fight.
(ii) Attrition—as week after week in man-to-man, hand-to-hand fighting, each
strove to wear down the other’s strength and to break his will.
(iii) Counter-offensive—as gradually, but with increasing momentum, the British
passed to the attack, and
(iv) Pursuit—when the Japanese broke and, snarling and snapping, were hunted
from the field.

Orders of Battles

Burma Area Army

15th Army

15th Division
31st Division
58 Regiment Group
 60 Regiment Group
33rd Division
213th Infantry Regiment
214th Infantry Regiment
215th Infantry Regiment
I.N.A. Division

British Order of Battle

IV Corps
17th Indian Infantry Division
IMPHAL FRONT
48th Indian Infantry brigade
63rd Indian Infantry brigade
99th Indian Infantry Brigade
20th Infantry Division
80 Brigade
100 Brigade
32 Brigade
23rd Infantry Division
1 Brigade
37 Brigade
49 Brigade
33 Corps
5th Indian Infantry Division
129 Indian Brigade
9 Indian Brigade
161 Indian brigade
2nd British Division
4 Brigade KOHIMA-DIMAPUR
5 Brigade
6 Brigade
 7th Division
33 Brigade
114 Brigade

3 Special Service Brigade

23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade
23 Brigade (CHINDITS)
LUSHAI Brigade
Assam Regiment

Concentration
En Forces
 The 15th and 33rd Division, crossed in three columns about THAUNGDUT,
following the main axis MYOTHIT-SANGSHAK-LITAN and thence round the
north of IMPHAL IOT isolate and then capture the town.
 On the 18th March, the 31st Japanese Division crossed the Chindwin in eight
columns on a forty-mile front from HOMALIN to the north.
Own Forces
 Considering the fact that, the 17th Division was cut off and a strong threat to
IMPHAL. Two bde of the 23rd Division were sent to fight down the road towards
the 17th Division to concentrate quickly in IMPHAL. Leaving the two brigades of
the 23rd Division to hold back the enemy, the 17th Division reached IMPHAL on
the 5th April.
 A brigade of the 23rd Division had been sent temporarily to the banks of the
Chindwin to cover a withdrawal of 20th div.
 On the 2nd April, 32 Brigade was, therefore, withdrawn into Corps Reserve,
leaving only two brigades to cover PALEL and hold the south-eastern
approaches to the plain.
 Situation in the KOHIMA area was likely to be even more dangerous than that at
IMPHAL. Japanese 31st Division was driving for KOHIMA and DIMAPUR. Slim
had badly underestimated the Japanese capacity for large-scale, long-range
infiltration, and for their readiness to accept odds in a gamble on supply (Slim
First mistake).
Slim new plan to concentrate more forces after analyzing Japanese threat
 After the meeting with Admiral Mountbatten, reinforcement of 5th Indian Division
to Imphal, and 3 Special Service Brigade, composed of one Royal Marine
commando was sent by rail to SILCHAR to guard the BISHENPUR-SILCHAR
track, the western entrance to the IMPHAL plain.
 The fly-in of the 5th Indian Division began on the 17th March and completed its
fly-in from ARAKAN.
 7th Indian Division to Kohima Dimapur.
 Wingate’s 23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade, was planned to cover the railway
to LEDO, and to use it against the flank of an attack on DIMAPUR.
 The new 25th Indian Division to replace the 5th Division in ARAKAN. It is also
planned to send 33 Corps Headquarters and the 2nd British Division from his
reserve in India to Dimapur.
 Assam Regiment, with detachments of the Assam Rifles, the local armed police
was placed east, to cover the approaches to KOHIMA.
Slim had given DIMAPUR three tasks:
 To prepare DIMAPUR for defense and when attacked to hold it.
 To reinforce Kohima and hold that to the last.
 To make all preparations for the rapid reception and assembly of the large
reinforcements that were on the way.
Slim gave Lieut.-General Montague Stopford, commander of 33 Indian Corps, as
his objects:
 To prevent Japanese penetration into the Brahmaputra or SURMA Valleys or
through the LUSHAI Hills.
 To keep open the DIMAPUR-KOHIMA-IMPHAL road.
 To move to the help of IV Corps and to co-operate with it in the destruction of all
enemy west of the Chindwin.
On the 3rd April, Stopford established his headquarters at JORHAT Next day he
took over control of operations from Ranking. Immediate tasks had now become:
(i) To cover the concentration of his corps as far forward as practicable.
(ii) To secure the DIMAPUR base.
(iii) To reinforce and hold Kohima.
(iv) To protect, as far as possible without jeopardizing (i) to (iii), the Assam railway
and the China route airfields in the Brahmaputra Valley.
The 33 Corps plan to achieve these ends was:
  To concentrate the corps as it arrived north-east of DIMAPUR. This would avoid
its becoming immediately involved in an enemy attack and would also
automatically protect the railway to LEDO.
 To send forward the first brigade of the 2nd Division as soon as it arrived to hold
the NICHUGARD Pass, eight miles south-east of DIMAPUR, thus covering the
base against a direct Japanese advance.
 To reinforce Kohima with 161 Brigade of the 5th Indian Division at once.
 To use 23 Brigade (CHINDITS), to strike south on Kohima and to the east of it,
with the double object of checking Japanese infiltration towards the railway and
of cutting the enemy line of communication to the Chindwin.
 To cover the western end of the SILCHAR-BISHENPUR track with another
Nepalese battalion.
 To continue to use the newly formed LUSHAI Brigade to prevent an enemy
advance into the LUSHAI Hills.
ATTRITION
 KOHIMA battle have preference over that at IMPHAL for reinforcements,
supplies, ammunition.
KOHIMA
With their center on the town, the Japanese held an immensely strong position.
Plan I
 One brigade of the 2nd Division, supported by the bulk of the artillery, to keep up
heavy pressure against the Japanese center at Kohima
 Two remaining brigades, one on each flank, carried out turning movements to
seize high ground behind the Japanese front line.
 161 Brigade was placed centrally as a General Reserve, and 33 Brigade of the
7th Division was held back to cover DIMAPUR.
 The columns of 23 CHINDIT Brigade were to continue their thrust south-east
towards JESSAMI to cut the Japanese supply routes from the CHINDWIN. When
the two flank brigades had reached their objectives it was intended to launch the
main attack in the center.

Dimapur
33/7

161/ Re
5 s
6/2
Turning
4/2
5/2 movement

Kohima

23
 n

Conduct-Failed to hold an objective as plnned

Plan II
As neither flank brigade could make the progress the divisional plan was changed. The
wider turning movements were abandoned, and it was decided to deliver a more
concentrated attack on the Japanese.
Right Approach: 4 Brigade on the right to capture G.P.T. Ridge, advance to Jail Hill,
and link up with 6 Brigade
Central Approach: 6 Brigade in the center, having broken out from Garrison Hill,
should have taken Kuki Piquet and F.S.D. Ridge.
Left Approach: 5 Brigade on the left was to occupy Naga village and dominate the
Treasury area with the sp of tanks, arty and air.

Dimapur
33/7

161/5 Res

G.P.T
6/2

4/2
Jail Hill 5/2
Capture Naga V and dominate
treasury area

Kohima
23
Chindwin
Conduct
 Failed to hold objective as planned.
Plan III (33 Corps prepared to renew the attack)
 The main objectives in this attack, Jail Hill and the D.LS, were allotted to 33
Brigade of the 7th Division, but as both these were enfiladed from G.P.T. and
F.S.D. Ridges.
 4 and 6 Brigades of the 2nd Division were to clear the other features before 33
Brigade reached its objectives.

Dimapur

1 Res
6
G.P.T 1
4
/
/ 6 5
2 /
33/ FSD
2 5
7
/
Capture Naga V and dominate
Jail Hill treasury area 2

DLS

Kohima
2
3 Chindwin

Conduct
G.P.T. and F.S.D.
 The attack on the night of the 10th/11th May, 2nd Division was only partially
successful. Enemy still held several bunkers on the reverse slopes of G.P.T.
Ridge and a strong-point on F.S.D. Ridge.
Main Objective (Jay Hill and DLS)
 The main attack by 33 Brigade managed better. Punjabi battalion found Pimple
Hill unoccupied and promptly dug in on it.
 The Queen’s Regiment, captured of most of jail Hill;
 Second Punjabi battalion, had cleared the DLS. But interfered from the G.P.T.
and F.S.D. Ridges.
 These position were relieved by a heavy smokescreen.
 During the 11th, both battalions were reinforced, and with the help of Indian
Sappers, they cleared a mine-field between Jail Hill and the D.LS. area.
 The fight was resumed on the 12th, aided by tanks.
 At dawn on the 13th, Jay Hill and D.L.S area were captured, and mopping-up
was completed by midday.
 2nd Division occupied G.P.T. Ridge, F.S.D. Ridge, and Kuki Piquet.
Other Objective
 Deputy Commissioner’s Bungalow, was attacked with the sp of tank and
captured on 13th May.
 By first light on the 15th, the Gurkhas, had occupied the whole of Treasury Hill.

Attrition (IMPHAL)
Six routes converged on to the IMPHAL plain to meet at the hub, IMPHAL itself:
 From the north, the broad KOHIMA road.
 Also from the north, the foot-path down the IRIL River Valley.
 From the north-east, the UKHRUL road.
 From the south-east, the TAMU-PALEL road.
 From the south, the rugged TIDDIM highway.
 From the west, SILCHAR-BISENPUR axis
Conduct
IRIL Valley and UKHRUL Road Spokes (5th div and 23rd div)
By the beginning of April, the leading troops of the 5 th Division had with the remaining
brigade of the 23rd Division pushed back the imminent threat to IMPHAL until the
Japanese were held just west of LITAN.
NUNGSHIGUM Peaks
 NUNGSHIGUM has two peaks, a north and a south. On the 11th April, after
several attempts, the enemy gained that.
 On the 13th, with the support of Hurribombers and Tanks infantry stormed both
peaks—and held them.
 When the 5th Division had secured NUNGSHIGUM, it was relieved by the 23rd
Division of all responsibility for the UKHRUL road and proceeded to clear
the IRIL Valley.
MAPAO Spur
 Between the 16th April and the 7th May enemy drove only from the southern parts
of his position but he still held to the northern.
 First Brigade of the 23rd Division, having combed the hills to the south of the
UKHRUL road and chased the headquarters of the 15th Japanese Division
through the jungle, turned north and cleared the road to within fifteen miles of
UKHRUL.
 By the middle of the month the situation both in the IRIL Valley and on the
UKHRUL road could be considered stabilized.

On the PALEL Road Spoke of the Wheel

 At the beginning of April, the 20th Division, the two remaining brigades, 80 and
100, holding a twenty-five-mile front running from TENGOUPAL, ten miles south-
east of PALEL, through SHENAM to SHUGANU, fifteen miles south-west of
PALEL.
 Major-General Yamamoto launched attack after attack to crash through the 20th
Division defenses on the SHENAM Pass. With support of armor and artillery
throughout April.
 On the night of the 29th/30th April a small Japanese party attacked the PALEL.
 On the night of the 2nd/3rd May, in which a large party of Jiffs was ambushed
and scattered as it approached.
 However, Japanese patrols were in the hills north and east of PALEL. One
Brigade of the 23rd Division chased the headquarters of the Japanese 15 th
Division to the north over the UKHRUL road.
 On the nights of the 6th/7th and the 7th/8 th May fierce Japanese attacks on the
TENGOUPAL front were repulsed.
 On the nights of the 9th/10th and the l0th/11th May again lost some of own
positions.
  The 20th Division had relieved it on the PALEL front by Roberts’s 23rd Division at
its full strength of three brigades.
 On this spoke of the wheel, too, by mid-May we could consider the situation
stabilized.

SILCHAR-BISHENPUR Track, the Southern and Western Spokes of the Wheel

It was along the TIDDIM road and the SILCHAR-BISHENPUR track, the southern and
western spokes of the wheel, that some of the heaviest fighting of this Battle of Attrition
took place. When the 17th Division reached IMPHAL Scoones left behind 49 Brigade, to
hold off the Japanese 33rd Division which was pressing towards IMPHAL.
Conduct
 Repulsed on the TIDDIM road, the enemy, concentrated in the jungle west of the
road, and made for the BISHENPUR-SILCHAR track, hoping to break into the
IMPHAL plain from the west.
 On the night of the I4th/15th April the Japanese 33rd Division, with
reinforcements, attacked towards BISHENPUR, but was again repulsed. The
enemy succeeded in blowing up the bridge at Milestone 51 on the SILCHAR
track. The demolition was a typical Japanese suicide operation.
 The enemy attempted to pass a strong column into the plain round the north-
west of the village.
 On the 19th April, the leading troops of the 17th Division began to arrive and
went straight into action north-west of BISHENPUR.
 A first attempt by 32 Brigade to eject them failed on the 23rd April and so did a
second by troops of the 17th Division two days later.
 The Japanese had managed to get into POTSANGBAM—the ‘Pots and Pans’ of
the British soldier only two miles south of BISHENPUR.
 The Japanese 33rd Division had suffered heavily.
On the IMPHAL-KOHIMA Road
 While some of the enemy turned north and moved on Kohima, a strong
detachment of their 15th Division came south towards KANGLATONGBI, where
we had a large supply depot.
 63 Brigade of the 17th Division, rushed up to the north to stop any further hostile
advance.
 The depot was occupied by enemy.
 In a series of attacks between the 9th and 15th April, in which our tanks, much to
the surprise of the enemy, forced their way on to a steep narrow ridge covering
KANGLATONGBI.
  On the 23rd April KANGLATONGBI was raided. On the 7 th May the brigade was
relieved by the 5th Division.

conduct
 5th Division now had with it 89 Brigade of 7th Division.
 Leaving 9 Brigade, on the east of the road, to hold MAPAO Spur, he used 89
Brigade in a series of short hooks behind the enemy, while 123 Brigade, brought
in by the direct route, and pushed north along the main road.
 After brisk fighting, the supply depot, was finally retaken on the 21st May and
both brigades began to push north up the road. The situation on this spoke was
well in hand.

COUNTER OFFENSIVE
 The immediate object of this offensive was destruction of the Japanese Fifteenth
Army.
 SCOONES decided, with to launch it against the weakened Japanese 15th
Division in the north and north-east, with his 5th and 20th Divisions,
 Wearing down process on the PALEL and BISHENPUR fronts, with the 23 rd and
17th Divisions. This plan had the advantage to reopen our line of communication
to DIMAPUR.
On the PALEL Sector (23 Div replaced 20 div-4 July cleared Palel airfield)
 On the PALEL sector of 4 Corps front the relief of the 20th by the 23rd Division
by the end of May.
 The 23rd Division had consolidated its positions, when, from the 16th to the 20th
May, the Japanese fiercely attacked the SHENAM pass in the PALEL area.
 The enemy resumed his attacks from the 9th to the 12th June and lost heavily. At
SHUGANU attacks and counter-attacks alternated, and, as a result, the 23rd
Division advanced slightly and improved its positions.
 The advance of 1 Brigade, which combed the hills for ten miles to the east of
Palel, put a stop to this nuisance.
 The night of the 3rd/4th July succeed in reaching PALEL airfield.
On the BISHENPUR Sector –End of May
Conduct
 In mid may 63 Brigade had just captured POTSANGBAM.
 On the 17th May, 48/20 div Brigade struck the TIDDIM-IMPHAL road at
Milestone 33 and dug in.
  On the evening of the 17 and 19 th, a more serious attack was delivered but
repulsed. Enemy lost several tanks, and personnel.
 Because of 32 Brigade by itself failed to make enough progress and enemy CA,
48 Brigade was therefore ordered north and, fighting its way from village to
village against considerable opposition, entered POTSANGBAM on the 30th May
and thus rejoined the 17th Division.
 This turning movement had inflicted many casualties on the enemy but it had
failed in its object the destruction of the Japanese 33rd Division.
To the East and to the North Front
 On the UKHRUL road and in the IRIL Valley, the 23rd Division had kept up its
pressure on the Japanese, and under cover of this, the change-over with the
20th Division from the PALEL sector.
 It was discovered that the Japanese were building up their forces in the
SANGSHAK area, with the obvious intention of launching further attacks astride
the UKHRUL road.
Planning
As part of the 4 Corps offensive, on 3rd June the 20th Division was ordered to advance
with the object of destroying that part of the Japanese 15th Division east of the IRIL
River and of establishing a brigade group in UKHRUL.
Conduct
(20 div)-Completed on mid may
 The right wing of the division’s offensive astride the UKHRUL road was at once
counter-attacked by two reinforced regiments of the enemy 15th Division. The
fight swung backwards and forwards.
 Meanwhile the other brigade (80) of 20th Division reached a point twenty miles
north of IMPHAL.
 On the other northern approach to IMPHAL, the main Kohima road, the 5th
Division, after retaking KANGLATONGBI on the 21st May, had pressed north on
both sides of the road.
 After our successes in mid-May and the short pause that followed for
reorganization, the Kohima battle entered on its second phase.
KOHIMA En situation
But the Japanese on the left were still holding the dominating Naga village position and
the surrounding hills, while on the right they were along the great ARADURA Spur.
From both these, they commanded Kohima at close artillery range and, of course,
dominated and closed the IMPHAL road.
Planning
4 and 5 Brigades of the 2nd British Division were, therefore, ordered to press on and
capture the Japanese positions on both flanks.

Initial Deployment
 Meanwhile the headquarters of the 7th Indian Divisio, with its 114 Brigade, had
arrived from ARAKAN and taken its own 33 Brigade and 161 Brigade of the 5th
Division, both already in the area, under its command.
 On the 20th May, the division took over the left sector of the Kohima front, which
included Treasury Hill and Naga village.
 268 Brigade held Garrison Hill, leaving the main KOHIMA-IMPHAL road sector
and all to its right to the 2nd Division.
 33 Brigade then took up the struggle for Naga village where the 2nd Division had
left it.
Conduct-captured by 2nd June
 Between the 24th and 30th May an Indian battalion delivered two attacks on the
center of the enemy defenses and were unable to hold on.
 Medium artillery was then brought up to fifteen hundred yards’ range while a
Gurkha battalion infiltrated on to Gun Spur in the enemy’s rear and dug in.
 At the same time a British battalion skillfully infiltrated in thick mist on to Church
Knoll, the highest point in Naga village; the enemy, who still held positions on the
reverse slopes, had little fight.
 33 Brigade was then relieved by 114 Brigade which kept up the pressure until, on
the 2nd June, the Japanese gave them best and abandoned Naga village.
 Meanwhile 161 Brigade, north of the village, had also made considerable gains
against opposition. The northern half of the Japanese position at Kohima was
able to control.

On the southern sector

Plan I (2nd div)
On the southern sector, as the enemy outposts fell back before them, the 2nd British
Division moved to the attack on the formidable ARADURA Ridge from western and
Northern slope.
Conduct-Repulsed
 On the 26th May, in spite of heavy rain, 6 Brigade reached a point half a mile
west of the ridge.
  The next day 4 and 5 Brigades established themselves on a line running along
the front of the northern face of the ridge to mile 48 on the main road, while 6
Brigade continued its climb to the Crest.
 During the afternoon, 4 and 5 Brigades came under very heavy fire from the
reverse slope of ARADURA Ridge and were compelled to withdraw to their start
line.
 6 Brigade under heavy fire had closed up by evening and were digging in south
and west of the Crest.
Plan II-changed plan and captured on first week of June
The corps commander in these circumstances decided to transfer the attack from the
western and northern slopes of the ARADURA Ridge to the eastern, a method now
made possible by our capture of Naga village.
Conduct
 The attack proper began with an attempt by 5 Brigade to take Big Tree Hill, some
two thousand yards north-east of ARADURA. This attack was held up for certain
time but was successful.
 The whole brigade then advanced to the west of the road, cutting the Japanese
supply routes to their troops high up on the ARADURA Ridge.
 This was the end of the enemy resistance. As our troops advanced, the
Japanese pulled out and the ARADURA Ridge.
 Through the jungle and over the hills, by tracks, passable only on foot or at the
best by pack animals, the columns of the brigade, air supplied, thrust round the
enemy flank and struck at his communications from the Chindwin. The action of
these columns achieved a threefold success.
 They cut the main northern Japanese supply route at the most awkward time
for him
 They constituted a threat to his rear whose strength he found it difficult to
assess
 They stimulated the active support of the local tribesmen

KOHIMA-IMPHAL road
The Supreme Commander, on the 8 th Jun, issued a Directive that the KOHIMA-IMPHAL
road was to be opened not later than mid-July.
Plan
So was Stopford,
 2nd Division, with the bulk of the corps artillery and tank support, as his main
striking force, to push down the IMPHAL road.
  The 7th Indian Division was to advance south-east in pace with the 2nd Division
protecting the flank
 Simultaneously, 23 L.R.P. Brigade was called on for further exertions in an
advance on UKHRUL.

Conduct (Viswema, Songsang Maram)-17th June

2nd Division
 On the 6th and 7th June, the 2nd Division, after mopping up in the ARADURA
area, pushed on towards the 55 Milestone on the IMPHAL road.
 The first serious opposition was met at VISWEMA (covering position for
SONGSANG) at about Milestone 60. Here the enemy held a strong rearguard
position on a great ridge across the road, covered by mine-fields, artillery, and
interlocking machine-guns. Leading troops were held up because of nature off
terrain, weather, enemy resistance and misdirection to the objectives. By the
evening of the 16th, the leading troops were halted about a mile short of Mao
SONGSANG (strong position between KOHIMA and IMPHAL).
 During the 17th June, many enemy positions located on the Mao SONGSANG
ridge were heavily bombarded by night, while encircling movements round both
the east and west flanks were launched. To everyone’s surprise the enemy
abandoned his positions and slipped away.
 The 2nd Division pushed on hard at the heels of the enemy during the 18th held
up a few miles short of MARAM as the Sappers rebuilding a bridge were heavily
mortared.

7th Division-17th June

 Meanwhile the 7th Division had advanced on a wide front east of the road.
 Contact was regained on the 6th June some ten miles south-east of Kohima.
 On the night of the 7th/8th, an indecisive attack was put in on a Japanese
position on the KEKRIMA Ridge a few miles farther east.
 On the 16th, the 7 th Division reached and cut the main Japanese east-west
supply route, at the same time threatening Mao SONGSANG from the rear.
 On the 17th they fought to within a mile of the village. The position was
abandoned.
23 L.R.P. Brigade
 The columns of 23 L.R.P. Brigade had pushed on wide to the east.
  They ambushed bewildered Japanese mule trains, inflicted casualties, took
prisoners, still rather a novelty, and completely dislocated the enemy line of
communication.

5th Division
 By the 18th June, 4 Corps’ 5th Division was, by attacks along the Kohima road
and short hooks to each side of it, slowly approaching KANGPOKPI.
 By the 18th June, the spearheads of two corps were some forty miles apart on
the Kohima road, the 2nd Division approaching MARAM and the 5th nearing
KANGPOKPI.
 The enemy attempted to hold against the 2nd Division another rearguard position
at MARAM, about eight miles farther south. This rearguard was overrun and
mostly destroyed in a matter of hours.
 31st Japanese Division was disintegrating and the enemy higher command no
longer controlled the battle.
 In KARONG, for instance, troops captured the almost complete equipment,
maps, and documents of the 31st Divisional Infantry Headquarters, and at
Milestone 92, the double-span bridge.
 The IMPHAL-KOHIMA battle, the first decisive battle of the Burma campaign,
was not yet over, but it was won.

7
2
PURSUIT
General GIFFARD, directed Gen Slim:
(i) To re-establish communications between DIMAPUR and IMPHAL.
(ii) To clear the Japanese from the area DIMAPUR-KOHIMA-IMPHAL plain-YUWA-
TANIANTHI.
(iii) To be prepared to exploit across the Chindwin in the YUWA-TAMANTHI area,
i.e., along a stretch of some hundred and thirty miles of river.

Planning and preparation for (ii) and (iii) tasks

 The necessary divisions, replenished, trained, equipped, and placed ready to
move.
 A vastly improved system of communications to the Chindwin, an adequate land
and air transport organization, and
5 enough supplies collected well forward.
 Bridgeheads, firmly held, across the Chindwin.
 33 Corps(7/20)-to clear the enemy roughly north of the line KANGPOKPI-
UKHRUL and eastward
 4 Corps(17)-to clear all south and west
UKHRUL was the rallying point for the Japanese 15th and 31 st Divisions and for all
detachments and stragglers, east and north of IMPHAL.

Conduct
 By the 1st July, UKHRUL was encircled
 7th Division attacked from the west and north
 20th Division closed in from the south and south-east
 23 L.R.P. Brigade repeated its old role of cutting the escape routes to the east
 On the 8th July that the whole of UKHRUL itself was finally captured.
 On the day UKHRUL fell Slim transferred another division, the 23rd, from 4
Corps to 33 Corps, and entrusted with the pursuit on the PALEL-TAMU axis
 4 Corps, in addition to cleaning up the BISHENPUR track area and continued to
control the advance on the TIDDIM road.
 The enemy withdrew from several features, preparations for the real advance
were slow.

Stopford reinforced the 23rd Division with a brigade (5) of the 2 nd Division and 268
Indian Brigade.
Roberts’s plan
 23rd Div(1/37/49)-Roberts’s plan was a heavy assault by a brigade (37) in the
center, covered by all available corps artillery and some tanks, combined with an
attack by another brigade (1) which was intended to roll up the enemy from the
right and strike the road behind him. Meanwhile a third brigade (49) on the left
was to carry out a wide turning movement through the hills to cut in on the main
road about ten miles behind the Japanese positions.
 The attack on the center was timed for the 24th July, but the left flank column,
starting earlier, was well behind the enemy and had reached its objective on the
road by the night of the 22nd/23rd July.
 Next day it found the LOKCHAO bridge position, a Japanese tank and artillery
harbor, heavily defended.
Conduct
 The attack on the center made good progress against stiff resistance throughout
the 24th and 25th, while that from the left also pushed on against less opposition.
 By the 27th the right flank brigade had completed its turning movement and
made contact with the left at the LOKCHAO Bridge, from which the enemy
withdrew.
 After their obstinate defense astride the road, the surviving Japanese,
abandoning much equipment, escaped by jungle paths, and a brigade (5) of the
2nd Division passed through to occupy Tamil without opposition.
On the 31st July 4 Corps closed down in Assam, and 33 Corps took over the whole
Central front.
 General Giffard had sent the 9th East African Division under Major General
FOWKES. The 17th Division also gathered at IMPHAL en route for India.
 The 2nd and 7th Divisions were concentrated on the road north of IMPHAL and
about Kohima, and the 20th Division south of IMPHAL.
 This gave 33 Corps five divisions, a couple of infantry brigades, and a tank
brigade to command, but as only two divisions and one brigade were actively
engaged the burden was mainly an administrative one.
On the 6th August, Slim sent orders to Stopford, now in control of all operations on the
Central front (2/7/20/23/East African Div)
(i) To pursue the enemy with not less than one brigade group on each of the routes:
(a) IMPHAL-TIDDIM-KALEMYO-KALEWA.
(b) TAMU-KALEWA.
(c) TAMU-SITTANG,
(ii) To occupy SITTANG and deny the Chindwin to enemy shipping,
(iii) If opportunity offered, to seize KALEWA, and prepare to establish a bridgehead.

5
TAMU
5
EA Div Br head by 10 Sep
25
26

Br head by 10 Sep
Captured by 10 Nov
21
161/5
26
Lusai Asam
K peak
Captured by 4 Nov Captured by 2 Dec
Captured by 12 Nov

9th East African Division

In accordance with these instructions the 9th East African Division, began a two
pronged advance from TAMU towards SITTANG on the Chindwin, thirty-six miles by
road to the east, and into the KABAWE Valley on KALEMYO, some hundred miles
south.
Leading brigade (25)
 On the 16th August, their leading brigade (25) crossed the Yu River.
 On the 4th September, SITTANG was occupied and found to be a second
TAMU.
 On the 10th September, a small bridgehead was formed on the east bank
opposite SITTANG.
The leading brigade (26)
 On the 21st August 1944, the leading brigade (26) of the 9th East African
Division was approaching HTINZIN in the KABAW Valley and was thirty miles
south of TAMU.
 On the 27th September, the first serious resistance in the KABAW Valley was
encountered and the advance resumed to YAZAGO forty-five miles south of
HTINZIN.
 Other units of its brigade (21) were then moved up and on the 20th October
attacked the positions covering MAWLAIK from the north.
 On the 10th November, after a series of small but fiercely contested assaults
MAWLAIK was captured.
 Under cover of this fighting, the 1st Battalion of the Assam Regiment, from 268
Brigade established our second bridgehead on the east bank opposite
MAWLAIK. The East Africans then pushed south along the west bank from
MAWLAIK towards KALEWA.
 Meanwhile with the help of many accurate strikes by the R.A.F., the main
advance in the KABAW Valley and reached a point on the road about twelve
miles from KALEMYO.
 On the 12th, reached a point only five miles from KALEMYO.

5th Indian Division

The Japanese retreat on the TIDDIM road was under better control than on any other
part of the front.
Own design of battle
As soon as the position was located, it was shelled and strafed from the air. While this
preparation was going on, a wide outflanking movement would be launched through the
hills to strike behind the enemy. Then, in co-ordination with this, a frontal attack with
tank support would be launched.

Conduct
 On the 31st, 5th Div leading brigade (9) had reached a point forty-two miles south
of IMPHAL. Many of the Japanese rearguard positions were of great natural
strength and all were stubbornly defended, but own troops ejected the enemy
from each in turn.
 In this way, by the 23rd August, the brigade had reached the 85th milestone from
IMPHAL.
  The engineer resources of the Fourteenth Army did not permit both the TIDDIM
road and the KABAW Valley route to be made and maintained at the same time.
It was decided in favor of the KABAW Valley
 5th Division became completely dependent on air dropping for all its
requirements. It also relied for direct fire support largely on the fighter bombers of
221 Group, R.A.F.
MARINDIN’s plan (Lushai Bde, 161)
MARINDIN’s plan was to deploy the brigade on as wide a front as possible, giving each
battalion a sector with orders to raid the road at least once a day somewhere in that
sector.
He spread three of his battalions along the west of the road from Milestone 44 to
TIDDIM, not continuously, but with gaps of from ten to fifteen miles between the sectors.
Conduct
East bank of River Manipur
 The whole brigade when deployed was thus operating vigorously against the
Japanese line of communication and rear areas on a front of over one hundred
miles.
 The two most northerly battalions were in position by the end of July.
 MARINDIN’s third battalion concentrated on a small sector of eight miles where
the Japanese road ran on the east bank of the Manipur River through a
precipitous gorge.
 Helped by these actions of the LUSHAI Brigade, the main advance on the
TIDDIM road was taken up by a fresh brigade (161) of the 5th Division.
 Its operations followed the pattern of the brigade.
 On the 14th September the leading troops reached the west bank of the Manipur
River, a hundred and twenty-six miles from IMPHAL.
 By the 19th a road-block had been placed behind the Japanese rearguard who’s
shelling, particularly that of some 155-mm guns.
 The leading brigade (123), in spite of the difficulty of the country, advanced on a
wide front so as to overlap the frequent but small Japanese rearguards.
 By the 1st October troops were in the hills some miles due east of TIDDIM and
TIDDIM was occupied on the 17th October.
Vital Corner’ and Kenedy Peak
 As ‘Vital Corner’ and Kenedy Peak were approached the Japanese resistance
became more stubborn. The 8,800-foot Kennedy Peak was the highest point
passed on the TIDDIM-KALEMYO road.
 Warren staged two wide turning movements. One, on the right, by a brigade
(161), aimed at the road junction two miles south of Fort White; the other, on the
 left, by a battalion to strike into the KALEMYO road in the Stockades area, some
ten miles east of the Fort.
 The remainder of the division with its tanks pushed steadily up the main road. Its
leading brigade (9) sent a battalion in a close left hook round the mountain, to cut
the road just south of the Peak, where it established a road-block.
 On the 4th November, Kennedy Peak was captured.
 On the 8th, Fort White was entered by patrols as planned, between 9 and 161
Brigades.
 On the 13th November, occupied deserted KALEMYO.
MYITTHA Valley/GANGAW
 By mid-September, LUSHAI Brigade’s activities had been extended and the
LUSHAI Scouts and Levies were operating towards the main TIDDIM-Fort White
road and even cast of Fort White.
 In October, the brigade was given the role of protecting the right flank of the 5th
Division in its advance and of breaking into the MYITTHA Valley with the ultimate
object of seizing and holding GANGAW, seventy-five miles south of KALEMYO.
 On the 15th November, troops reached the MYITTHA River, forty-five miles
south of KALEMYO, but a Japanese detachment still held GANGAW.
 The Levies and Scouts pushed on eastwards and, by the end of November, were
on the Chindwin, twenty miles south of KALEWA, and raiding the east bank.
 By mid-December, LUSHAI Brigade had cleared the whole country’' west of the
MYITTHA River, and was closing in the MYITTHA Valley at GANGAW.
 The main advance of the 9th East African Division to establish a bridgehead
across the Chindwin at KALEWA continued. The road to KALEWA enters the
gorge of the MYITTHA River five miles east of KALEMYO, and the Japanese
held the entrance in some force.
 Following the own pattern, on the 2nd December brigade entered KALEWA.
Bridgehead
 FOWKES, commanding the 9th African Division, planned with the help of his
brigade already on the east bank to put another brigade (25) over the river Just
north of KALEWA and then to pass his third brigade (26) through to seize all
tactical features within artillery range of the bridgehead.
 The crossing took place on the night of the 3rd/4th December according to plan.
Next night the follow-up brigade began crossing and pushed on down the
PYINGAING road.
 Throughout the establishment of the bridgehead R.A.F. fighter bombers gave
constant and close support.
 On the 10th December engineers completed a floating Bailey bridge over the
Chindwin.
  For several days the bridgehead was expanded by minor advances and clashes,
until, on the 13th December, SHWEGYIN was occupied.
 The 9th East African Division by mid-December occupied a firm bridgehead east
of KALEWA extending to about eight miles by twelve.
Results
Japanese side
Personals
 The Japanese Army had suffered the greatest defeat in its history. Five
Japanese divisions (15th, 18th, 31st, 33rd, and 55th) had, at any rate
temporarily, been destroyed as effective fighting formations.
 Fifty thousand Japanese had been killed or died, and their bodies counted on the
ARAKAN and ASSAM sectors.
 Allowing only half that number for badly wounded.
 Fifteen thousand casualties suffered on the North Burma sector of N.C.A.C
 Some six hundred had been captured.
Equipment
 Nearly all the tanks and most of the vehicles that the enemy brought into Assam
were destroyed or captured.
 Over two hundred and fifty guns were taken.
THE BATTLE OF THE IRRAWADDY SHORE

In defending Southern Burma, Kimura needed to ensure that Burma Area Army retained
control of the oil fields around YENANGYAUNG and the rice growing areas of the
Irrawaddy Delta to sustain his armies. His objective was to hold a line running from
LASHIO to MANDALAY, the east bank of IRRAWADDY running from Mandalay to the
area around YENANGYAUNG and from YENANGYAUNG to RAMREE Island on the
BURMA coast. The correct course was to defend from the from the east bank of the
IRRAWADDY.
  He ordered 33rd Army, with 18th and 56th divisions plus one regiment from 49th
division to hold the area from LASHIO to MANDALAY.
 15th Army with 15th, 31st, and 33rd divisions and 53rd division would defend the
east bank of the Irrawaddy from Mandalay to the area opposite PAKOKKU.
 28th Army, with 54th and 55th divisions and the 72 independent mixed brigade
plus regiment from 49th division would be responsible for defending the area
around the YENANGYAUNG oil fields to the ARAKAN and the Irrawaddy Delta
area.
 In reserve, KIMURA had 2nd division, the remaining units of 49th division and
24th independent mixed brigade.
 The Burma Area Army and 15th Army staff had given some consideration to the
defense of the town of MEIKTILA (admin and the lines of communication center
for 15th and 33rd Armies and surrounded by four (04) airfields).
Analysis on Opposing Plan
KIMURA expected that 14th Army’s objective would be to capture Mandalay.
MANDALAY (ancient capital) had tremendous prestige value.
Here KIMURA failed to appreciate that SLIM’S goal was not territory, but the destruction
of Kimura’s army. Majority believed that British attack against MEIKTILA was highly
unlikely.
14 Area Army Plan
 SLIM’s new plan was based in deception, surprise and speed.
 He decided to have XXXIII corps, with three divisions and one tank brigade
advance on a broad front towards the IRRAWADDY River, then cross the river
north and west of MANDALAY to draw in KIMURA’S divisions for the defense of
the city.
 At the same time he would sent IV corps with two divisions, one infantry brigade
and his second tank brigade for the west to move down the valley of the
MYITTHA River in complete secrecy IV corps would then advance towards
PAKKOKU and cross the IRRAWADDY nearby to establish a bridgehead.
 Without pausing to consolidate IV corps would then send a strong armored force
with a large contingent of mechanized infantry to seize MEIKTILA.
 Slim planned to use multiple crossings of the IRRAWADDY, at different points
and at different times, with feints at other points to create confusion to convince
KIMURA that he was aiming for MANDALAY.
 SLIM allocated XXXII corps (2nd, 19th, 20th divs, 268 indep brigade and 254
Indian tank brigade) that were either east of the CHINDWIN or preparing to cross
it.
 Although 19th div was part of IV corps, it was the farthest to the east and it made
little sense to have the divisions move back to rejoin IV corps in its march down
 the MYITTAH valley. This transfer had the added benefit that the Japanese
identified 19 div with IV corps, which would aid in the deception plan.
 To IV corps Slim allocated 7th, 17th div, 28 East African brigade, the LUSHAI
brigade and 255th tank brigade.
(b) British Forces Preparation
 Air supply took on an ever increasing share of the logistic burden.
 BRITISH and Indian infantry divisions were reorganized to better equip them for
jungle warfare, which also reduced the strain on the supply system.
 The total numbers of vehicles was reduced to a minimum, while more animal
transport was added.
 One artillery Regiment in each division was converted to a mountain regiment
with mortars and mountain guns, while at the battalion level anti-aircraft and anti-
tank gun units were eliminated.
 Tactics were also revised with much greater emphasis on aggressive patrolling in
the jungle rather than possible defense.
 To counter the favored Japanese tactic of envelopment, British and Indian units
were instructed to hold fast in their positions and use the superior firepower and
better supply through air transport, to wear down the Japanese.
 Slim worked hard to rebuild his army’s morale and built confidence of his tps.
 Slim had molded disparate groups (Gurkhas, British, Jats, Sikhs, Rajputs,
Dogras, Baluch) and diets into a cohesive, coordinated force.
 There was close coordination between tank and infantry.
 In the air, the RAF and the USAAF had established a level of air superiority
which helped to air supply with little fear.
 Fighters also used for close air support and interdiction.
Deception-
• 19th division’s association with IV corps would lead the Japanese to believe that
the entire 14th Army was advancing on MANDALAY.
• Multiple crossing to the north and south of the city would draw Kimura’s attention
away from IV Corp’s real advance.
• Slim had a dummy IV corps Headquarters and funneled all radio communications
between XXXIII Corps and 19th division through this dummy HQs.

Conduct
On the right, CHRISTISON’S 15 Corps in ARAKAN and, on the left, Sultan’s N.C.A.C.
had each been actively engaged.
15 Corps (Right front)
CHRISTISON had under him four divisions, the 25th and 26 th Indian, the 81st and 82nd
West African, with 3 Commando Brigade and 50 Indian Tank Brigade. He was
supported by 224 Group R.A.F. Opposing CHRISTISON was Lieut.-General Sakurai
Seize, commanding the Twenty-eighth Army, who had under him in ARAKAN a
regiment of the 54th Division.
About this time. General LEESE ordered CHRISTISON to:
 Develop AKYAB and RAMREE as air-supply bases for the Fourteenth Army.
 Clear North and Central ARAKAN.
 Seize a bridgehead at TAUNGUP, over fifty miles south of AKYAB.
 Open the TAUNGUP-PROME road, if possible, before the monsoon.
Left Front
On the Fourteenth Army’s other flank, the left, Sultan, although the return to China of all
his American and Chinese formations.
 LEESE ordered Sultan to take the KYAUKME-LASHIO line, co-operate in the
Mandalay battle, and then exploit south towards LOILEM.
 On the 7th March, the Chinese Army, captured LASHIO.
 On the 16th March, on the railway thirty-five miles south-west of LASHIO and
about a hundred from Mandalay, was occupied.
 From now on, Chinese ceased to take any part in the Burma War.
Central front
On the 27th February, an A.L.F.S.E.A. Operation Instruction was issued directing
Fourteenth Army to:
 Destroy the Japanese forces in the Mandalay area.
 Seize Rangoon before the monsoon.

Slim plan

 Slim planned to use multiple crossings of the IRRAWADDY, at different points

and at different times, with feints at other points to create confusion to convince
KIMURA that he was aiming for MANDALAY.
 SLIM allocated XXXII corps (2 nd, 19th, 20th divs, 268 indep brigade and 254 Indian
tank brigade) that were either east of the CHINDWIN or preparing to cross it.
Although 19th div was part of IV corps, it was the farthest to the east and it made
 little sense to have the divisions move back to rejoin IV corps in its march down
the MYITTAH valley.
 This transfer had the added benefit that the Japanese identified 19 div with IV
corps, which would aid in the deception plan.
 To IV corps Slim allocated 7 th, 17th div, 28 East African brigade, the LUSHAI
brigade and 255th tank brigade.

Conduct
Rees’s 19th Division(62/64/98)
 On the 26th February one of its brigades (64) broke out from the
KYAUKMYAUNG bridgehead and bit into the foothills to the east, gaining elbow
room for the second brigade (62), The two brigades then drove south. The
enemy were swept away, remaining resistance was dealt by third brigade (98)
raced from the northern THABEIKYIN bridgehead.
 On the 5th, by leap-frogging Rees brigades, next day crossed the
CHAUNGMAGYI River, eighteen miles north of Mandalay and the last natural
obstacle before the city.
 As early as the 6th March, one of 19 th Div brigades (62) had been pulled out of
the race for Mandalay and captured MAYMYO, the summer capital of Burma in
the hills twenty-five miles east of Mandalay.
 In two places the defense was still strong and well organized on Mandalay Hill
and in the city itself at Fort DUFFERIN.
Mandalay Hill
Mandalay Hill is a great rock rising abruptly from the plain to nearly eight hundred feet
and dominating the whole northeastern quarter of the city. Its steep sides are covered
with temples and pagodas, now honeycombed for machine-guns, well supplied, and
heavily garrisoned. It was captured on 9 March.
Fort DUFFERIN
Fort DUFFERIN in Mandalay, was a great rectangular, walled enclosure, containing one
and a quarter square miles of parkland, dotted with official residences, barracks, and
other buildings including the fantastic, teak “built Royal Palace of THEEBAW, the last
Burmese king. Twenty-foot-high outer walls of the fort were faced with thick brickwork
and backed by earth embankments seventy feet wide at their base.
 On the 15th the Fort was completely surrounded. Medium guns were brought up
closer, rafts and scaling ladders prepared, storming parties detailed, and an
attempt made to enter through the great pipes that ran into the trench.
 After several days of these attacks a small breach some fifteen feet wide.
  During the night of the I9th/20th March after the morning air strike, a group of
Anglo-Burmese waving white flags and Union Jacks appeared at one of the
gates.
 The garrison, they reported, had during darkness crept through drains from the
moat into the southern part of the town.
 Found large dumps of Japanese stores and ammunition, a number of European
and Anglo-Burmese civilian prisoners, and a fair scattering of booby traps.
Results
 The capture of MAYMYO cut the road and railway, which were the only direct
and effective lines of communication from the Japanese supply depots of Central
Burma to their troops.
Gracey 20th Division
Planning
 Gracey’s plan was for two of his brigades (32 and 80) of 20 div to converge on
KYAUKSE from the north and north-west, while the third (100) carried out a wide
encircling movement, through PYINZI to take WUNDWIN on the main railway
sixty miles south of Mandalay.
 This brigade, which was spearheaded by an armored and motorized column, had
the double object of cutting off the Japanese retreating in front of the other
brigades and of linking up with 4 Corps from MEIKTILA.
Conduct
 Gracey’s troops pushed rapidly east, clearing village after village, and expanding
their bridgehead towards that of the 2nd Division. On the 2nd March, the two
divisions made contact along the river.
 On the 5th March, the two bridgeheads of the 20th Division linked up. From then
onwards the expansion or the bridgehead was more rapid; the enemy were
obviously breaking.
 On the 8th March, the 20th Division broke out and attacked first at MYOTHA.
 On the 10th that GYO, a village half-way to MYOTHA, was taken by 80 Brigade.
100 Brigade
 On the 19th, another brigade, 100, struck south-east for twenty-five miles and
seized PYINZI.
 On the 21st March, it reached WUNDWIN, surprising the Japanese line of
communication troops there who fled, leaving over two hundred dead.
 WUNDWIN was the administrative center of the Japanese 18th Division. Its
capture disrupted the divisional command and supply systems, and resistance
became even more disjointed.
  From WUNDWIN, the armored column struck north for thirty miles, spreading
consternation among the Japanese installations on both sides of the railway.
 On the 29th March, the brigade made touch south of KYAUKSE with other troops
of the division attacking the town.
80 and 32 Brigades
 While 100 Brigade was playing such havoc with the Japanese around
WUNDWIN, 80 and 32 Brigades struck east and south-east on KYAUKSE and
MYITTHA.
 On the 13th March they were half-way to the MANDALAY-RANGOON railway.
 On the 16th some of our columns reached it, twenty miles south of Mandalay.
 Next day, 32 Brigade was approaching KYAUKSE, ten miles farther south.
(KYAUKSE: This town was of the greatest importance to the Japanese, for not
only was it their chief supply center for a large part of their army, but it was the
bastion behind which Kimura hoped to restore some order in his shattered units.)
 On the 30th March that it fell.
 When our troops reached the railway station, they found a wrecked train fully
loaded with the last stores the Japanese had hoped to get away, medical
equipment, photographic supplies, sewing machines, and, strangely enough,
books and magazines.
Results
In three weeks the division had swept clear of the enemy an area forty-five miles by
forty and was across the Rangoon-Mandalay railway on a fifty-mile stretch. The
Japanese had left two thousand dead and fifty guns behind them. Their 15th and 31st
Divisions were now little more than groups of fugitives seeking refuge in the Shan Hills
to the east.
2nd British Division
 The 2nd British Division, which on the 25th February had been the last to cross
the Irrawaddy, at once began to extend its bridgehead.
 By the 6th March, troops of the division were five miles south of the Irrawaddy
and the bridgehead was expanding to both the east and west along the river
bank.
 On the 20th March, Nicholson’s men occupied AMARAPURA, the great railway
workshops seven miles south of Mandalay,
 On the 21st made contact with patrols of the 19th Division pushing south.
4 Corps
4 Corps continued its movement and on 16 February 1945. It opened a bridgehead
approximately 6,000 yards wide and 4,000 yards deep on the Irrawaddy River near the
town of Nyaungu. Meiktila was seized on 4 March 1945.
Factors for 14th army success
 Battle on the own chosen ground
 Better line of communication behind own forces
 Concentrated against them superior forces drawn from ARAKAN and India, to
wear them down, and, when they were exhausted, to turn and destroy them.
 Reliance on the air forces, British and American, first to gain control of the air,
and then to supply, transport, close support and interdiction of their support
 Learned how to kill Japanese; how to use tanks in any country that was not a
swamp; how to build roads and airfields with little equipment and strange
materials.
 Troops had shown themselves steadier, more offensive, and better trained than
ever before.
 They refused to be jittered by encirclement; they were as ready as the enemy to
strike out into the jungle and to infiltrate.
 Most important of all, every British, Indian, African, and Chinese division that had
served under Fourteenth Army had met picked Japanese troops in straight, bitter
fighting and had beaten them.
 Troops had proved themselves in battle the superiors of the Japanese; they had
seen them run. This was the real and decisive result of these battles.
En
 KAWABE and his subordinates showed the over boldness, the rigidity, and the
disregard of administrative risks.
Japanese Reasons of failure
 The result of tactical doctrine in the battle around MEIKTILA was often lack of
coordination units in attack and attacks by units in insufficient strength.
 Japanese forces assigned to defend and attack were lacked fire power (Artillery,
tanks, anti-tanks weapons).
 Japanese had weaker armor, less powerful guns and under strength. Japanese
tank crew avoided tank-versus-tank actions. Their tank doctrine favored the use
of tanks as close support for infantry, to provide covering fire in infantry attacks.
 Japanese army lacked effective anti-tank guns to counter tank attacks.
 The Japanese used a layer defense employing special infantry tank fighting
teams, anti-tank guns and regimental and divisional artillery.
 The limited aircraft available were not used with much imagination.

Own weakness
  Mistiming the withdrawal of the 17th Division from TIDDIM and
 Underestimating the strength of the Japanese thrust at Kohima.

The race to Rangoon

It would be a race, and a stem one, against two tough competitors, the enemy and the
monsoon.
Enemy’s Disposition
The Japanese, as far as we could judge at this time, were in, or trying to collect in, four
main groups:
(i) In the Irrawaddy Valley -Japanese Twenty-eighth Army, north of PROME, the
54th Division with units from the 49th and 55 th Divisions. PEGU YOMAS- parts of
the 55th Division and a considerable body of line of communication troops.
(ii) In the Shan Hills -56th Division
(iii) East of the SITTANG River were the remnants of the Thirty-third Army,
containing a hotchpotch of units from the 2nd, 18th, 49th, 53rd, and 55th
Divisions, and, farther east still in the Salween Valley, the battered 31st and 33rd
Divisions, with a large number of line of communication troops.
(iv) In the area MOKPALIN-MOULMEIN east of the mouth of the SITTANG and on
the east coast of the Gulf of Martaban Kimura had collected round him 24
Independent Brigade.
(v) The line from KYAUKSE to CHAUK. KATAMURA'S Fifteenth Army, with its
15th, 31st and 33rd Divisions, had disintegrated.
(vi) On the railway axis. Honda's Thirty-third Army, with the 18th, 49th and 53rd
Divisions, was ordered to hold us about PYAWBWE, astride the road and railway
to TOUNGOO. 56th Division, at Shan Hills to threaten and counter-attack in flank
any advance of ours to the south along the railway.
(vii) Sakurai’s task with the Twenty-eighth Army was to prevent our advance
down the Irrawaddy at or north of YENANGYAUNG

Slim intention, therefore, was now:

(i) To intercept and destroy as many as possible of the enemy as they attempted to
reach the east bank of the SITTANG.
(ii) To prevent the Japanese concentrating and reorganizing in the MOULMEIN area,
(iii) To advance on MOULMEIN and destroy the enemy who had already collected
there.
To these ends Slim issued orders:
{a) To 4 Corps
(i) To destroy all enemy attempting to cross the Pegu Yomas from west to east.
(ii) To take MOKPALIN.
(iii) To advance with the 19th Division, which now reverted to 4 Corps, as far as
THAUDAUNG twenty miles east of TOUNGOO and thus secure our line of
communication.
{b) To 33 Corps
(i) To destroy all enemy in the Irrawaddy Valley.
(ii) To open the road and railway from PROME to Rangoon.
(iii) To capture BASSCIN.
(c) To the 26th Division
(i) To secure Rangoon and its area.
(ii) To effect a junction with the 20th Division, south of PROME.

Planning
On the 23rd February, Admiral Mountbatten made decision to discard ‘Dracula’ and
prepare for the operation off the Kra Isthmus—Operation ‘Roger’—to be carried out not
later than 1st June. On the 18th March, issued detailed orders for the advance on
Rangoon, to carry out the Operation Instruction.
On 18 March, in his Operation Instruction, Slim gave his main intention, ‘the capture of
Rangoon at all costs and as soon as possible before the monsoon. He divided the
operation into three Phases:
 Phase I-The present battle- Destruction of enemy and would end soon
 Phase II-An interim period for mopping up and regrouping-
o Messervy’s 4 Corps, (5th and 17 th Divisions and 255 Tank Brigade), would
strike at the Japanese about PYAWBWE and prepare for the thrust south
o Stopford’s 33 Corps, with the 2nd British and 20th Divisions, would clear
the area Mandalay-MAYMYO-WUNDWIN-MAHLAING-MYINGYAN,
freeing all its roads and railways for own use.
o The 19th Division would take over the security of the area from Mandalay
to MEIKTILA.
  Phase III-The advance south-
o 4 Corps would push down the railway axis and take Rangoon.
o 33 Corps, moving on both banks of the Irrawaddy, would capture CHAUK
and cut off YENANGYAUNG by a flanking movement on MAGWE. Then
in turn, YENANGYAUNG, PROME and finally Rangoon, if possible before
4 Corps could reach it, would be occupied.
o At the start of Phase 3, the 19th Division would come under direct
Fourteenth Army control and would be used to protect the left flank and
communications of 4 Corps.

Phase I-completed on 30th March.

Phase II- Slim took advantage of the regrouping necessary for the advance on
Rangoon to comb this area, by a ‘Union Jack’ maneuver. This entailed passing strong
columns diagonally through it; part of the 5th Division with other troops from the north-
west to the south-east, and the 20th and 2nd Divisions (replaced by 7) from north-east
to south-west.
Phase III
33 corps
 KYAUKSE was captured on the 30th March, and collected south of MEIKTILA.
 On the 9th April, the conversion completed
 On the 14th, one of Gracey’s mechanized brigades had seized
TAUNGDWINGYI.
 On the 18th April, a small armored column from TAUNGDWINGYI reached the
Irrawaddy, eleven miles south of MAGWE, and sank three boatloads of
Japanese trying to escape across the river.
 7th Division was pushing from the north down both banks of the Irrawaddy. On
the east bank, a brigade encircled YENAUNGYAUNG, and on the 22nd occupied
the town and oilfield.
 ALLANMYO was entered on the 28th April.
 By the 1st May, 33 Corps Headquarters was established at MAGWE,
 20th Division was just starting its advance from ALLANMYO on PROME and
Rangoon.

Battle on the central front

Conduct
  On the 30th March, MESSERVY’S 4 Corps with the 17th Division and 255 Tank
Brigade, set about doing so.
Battle at THAZI
 19th Division was called from MEIKTILA to deal with THAZI. This they did a few
days later, after some hard fighting.
 10th April, YINDAW, a large village ten miles from PYAWBWE captured by 17 th
Div.
Battle at PYAWBWE
 With combination of tanks and infantry, by dawn on the 11th, the PYAWBWE
was captured by 17 Div.
Battle further South (San Hills)
 5th Division pushed rapidly on for thirty miles to SHWEMYO, which it occupied
on the 16th.
 The Japanese had rushed up from South Burma a fresh regiment of their 55th
Division, which was now hurriedly digging in on the Bluff.
 On the 18th, allied suddenly fell upon them, and flushed them from their half-
completed position.
 On the 19th, the armored group, by-pass road round the town PYINMANA, and
seized the airfield at LEWE—a more valuable prize than the town. In a matter of
hours the airstrip was repaired and troops and stores were being steadily flown
in.
Battle at Toungoo
 Kimura had ordered all troops in the Shan Hills to get to TOUNGOO. Because of
massive air strikes, ambushes and demolitions of bridges enroot, they lost the
race for TOUNGOO.
 On the 22nd April, with a final spurt, armor crashed into TOUNGOO by 5 th Div.
 Without a pause the 5th Division, sweeping aside Japanese fugitives, next day
reached PYU.
Battle at Pegu
Intelligence confirmed that the enemy were concentrating for its defense in PEGU.
 On the 25th April, the 17th Division took the lead.
 On the 26th, DAIKU was reached—eighty miles from Rangoon with five days to
go and PEGU.
 On the 28th, morning, another armored and infantry columns had hooked round
the MOYINGYI Reservoir and cut the Japanese escape road to the east.
Situation
  The Japanese at PEGU were the only obstacle between them and the capital,.
The town of PEGU stands on both banks of the winding PEGU River. The road to
Rangoon crosses the river by the main bridge in the town itself; the railway
crosses twice, by two bridges to the north. The Japanese were cunningly
entrenched in the town and covered both railway bridges which they had
demolished.
Conduct
 On the morning of the 29th April, both these attacks were launched. The northern
attack broke into the town, but was held short of the road bridge.
 Cowan now extended his operations to the west bank. In a series of small dog
fights the approaches to the railway bridges on the east were cleared and
attempts to cross made.
 While this was going on, troops on the east bank, against bitter opposition,
overran almost the whole of the northern residential area of PEGU, but at
nightfall on the 30th the enemy still covered the intact road bridge.
 On the afternoon of the 1st May, a great misfortune occurred 4 Corps. PEGU
was captured but when a torrential storm burst over the whole area, followed
throughout the night by continuous heavy rain.
 On the evening of the 2nd, when news of the successful landing south of
Rangoon and of the Japanese evacuation had been received, the 17th Division
was halted in drenching rain forty-one miles by road from its goal.
 On the 3rd May, they heard 15 Corps had occupied Rangoon.
 On the 6th May, that a small column of the 26th Division from Rangoon linked up
with 4 Corps.
Landing South of Rangoon (Final Battle)
The landing south of Rangoon on the 2nd May had gone smoothly.
The Assault Force, mounted at AKYAB and RAMREE Islands, sailed in six convoys,
slowest first, between the 27th and 30th April.
 On the 1st May, when a heavy bombing attack was delivered on all located
defenses on both sides of the Rangoon River.
 Some hours later, a battalion of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade dropped at
Elephant Point. Early on the same morning a pilot, flying over Rangoon, saw
written in large letters on the goal roof the words, Japs gone. Extigitate.
 A brigade of the 26th Division was landed on each bank and the advance began.
 After landing in RANGOON, it was confirmed that the Japanese had gone.
 The newly landed 26th Division, in and around Rangoon, had gained touch with 4
Corps and was about to do so with 33 Corps, thus completing the incisions which
severed the Japanese from north to south.
Factors of the victory
 Selection and Maintenance of Aim
Burma was not the first, nor was it to be the last, campaign that had been
launched on no very clear realization of its political or military objects.
Commanders in the field, in fairness to them and their troops, must be clearly
and definitely told what the object they are locally to attain is.

 Command and Control

The first step towards ultimate victory in South-East Asia was the setting up of a
supreme command, controlling all Allied forces, land, sea, and air, in the area.

 Seizure of the Initiative

The Japanese, in the earlier stages of the campaign, gained the moral
ascendancy and never seriously challenged their seizure of the initiative.
Japanese initiative was seized in later phases of campaign.

 Flexibility
The hardest test of generalship is to hold this balance between determination
and flexibility. In this the Japanese failed. Slim changed plan for two times being
flexible on his tactics.

 Leadership
The strength of the Japanese Army lay, not in its higher leadership, but in the
spirit of the individual Japanese soldier. He fought and marched till he died. It
was this combination of obedience and ferocity that made the Japanese Army.

 Own Disciplined Forces

The Asian fighting man is at least equally brave, usually more careless of death,
less encumbered by mental doubts, little troubled by humanitarian sentiment, and
not so moved by slaughter and mutilation about him.

 Material
Japanese launched their troops into the boldest offensives on the slightest
administrative margins. This relation between tactical mobility and numbers of
vehicles, between the size of staffs and effective control, will increase in
importance in any future war. Unless they are constantly watched and ruthlessly
cut down, vehicles and staffs will multiply until they bog down movement.

 Invention and Improvisation

Slim forces lacked so much in equipment and supplies and managed to
improvise for his forces. His mass production river shipyards, methods of building
roads and airfields, ‘parajutes’, huge market gardens almost in the battle line,
 duck farms, fish saltings, and a hundred other things were gallant and successful
efforts by the army in the field to live up to its motto, ‘God helps those who help
themselves.

 Training and Morale

Slim’s soldiers forced the opposed crossings of great rivers using ludicrously
inadequate equipment, stretched brittle communication links to fantastic lengths,
marched over the most heartbreaking country on reduced rations, fought disease
with discipline and beat. It is not so much numbers and elaborate equipment that
count in the tough places, but training and morale.

 New Techniques
In Burma battle was fought on a lower scale of transport, supplies, equipment,
supporting arms, and amenities. Higher commander’s flexibility of mind,
confidence in its subordinates, and the power to make its intentions clear right
through the force. Great decentralization on execution and concentration when
necessary were two main techniques applied during campaign.

 Discipline

It was learnt in Burma that strict discipline in battle and in bivouac was vital, not
only for success, but for survival. The real discipline that a man holds to because
it is a refusal to betray his comrades.

 Air Power
A most distinctive aspect of our Burma war was the great use we made of air
transport. Allied maintain large formations in action by air supply and to move
standard divisions long distances about the fighting front by air. The decisive
stroke at MEIKTILA and the advance on Rangoon were examples of a new
technique that combined mechanized and air-transported brigades in the same
divisions.

 Special Forces
The British Army spawned a surprising number of special units. It had
commandos, assault brigades, amphibious divisions, mountain divisions, long-
rang penetration forces, airborne formations, desert groups, and an extraordinary
variety of cloak and dagger parties and employed most of them in Burma, and
some, notably the Chindits, gave splendid examples of courage and hardihood.
Burma war characteristics-
 The acceptance as normal of the regular movement and maintenance of
standard formations by air.
 Great tactical freedom for subordinate commanders.
 The operation, over wide distances in most difficult country, of comparatively
small forces in tactical independence but strategic combination.
 Reduced scales of transport and equipment, supplemented by ingenuity and
improvisation from local resources.
 The high quality of the individual soldier, his morale, toughness, and discipline,
his acceptance of hardship, and his ability to move on his own feet and to look
after himself.
Decisive Engagements
 Slim used transport aircraft to rapidly shift these newly available divisions to the
Imphal/ Kohima Plain.
 Air mobility allowed him to use superior speed and maneuver to mass his forces
for a decisive defense against the U-GO offensive.
 Throughout the campaign General Slim, believing in the principle of the
offensive, sought the decisive engagement. He selected critical objectives that he
believed would create a situation favorable to his force and unfavorable to the
enemy.
On two occasions, Slim demonstrated the superior ability of the Allies to rapidly
maneuver combat forces and mass them at the decisive point.
 Kohima-Imphal Plain
o Slim massed his forces and fought a successful, decisive defensive
engagement.
o Reinforcing and resupplying by air, he held out until the Japanese went
beyond the culminating point.
o The exhausted, almost shattered, Japanese troops were forced to
withdraw when the monsoon season began.
o At this point the tide turned against Japan, and the Allied force transitioned
to the offensive.
o They would keep the initiative for the remainder of the campaign.
 Attack across the Irrawaddy River near the Mandalay-Meiktila
o Slim orchestrated a brilliant deception plan that encircled the main
Japanese force and contributed directly to the rapidly deteriorating
Japanese position.
 o Slim positioned the 19th Indian Division on the Irrawaddy north of
Mandalay to deceive the Japanese as to his true intentions.
o While his enemy attempted to mass forces to meet the obvious threat to
Mandalay Slim, concentrated his main effort, the mobile
armored/mechanized forces of the 7th Indian Division, SW of Mandalay
and launched the decisive surprise thrust toward MEIKTILA.
Logistics and Operational Plans
 Because of the poor lines of communication, Mountbatten made the decision to
depend almost entirely on air resupply to sustain the army.
 As the 14th Army approached Central Burma it reached the extreme range its
transport aircraft.
 This meant that advance air bases would have to be seized in order to continue
the offensive to Rangoon. Therefore, Mountbatten directed that operations take
place in the Arakan to secure airfields at Akyab and Kyaukpyu.
 This would extend the aircraft operating range to cover the final drive on
Rangoon."
 Another operational constraint imposed by logistics came from the limited
number of transport aircraft. There was not enough transport capacity to
adequately supply the entire army by air alone.

The more significant lessons from Burma are summarized below.

 Successfully attacking your enemy's critical vulnerabilities (i.e., supply lines,
command and control nodes, air support, doctrine, etc.) can bring about decisive
results.
 Development of an immature theater presents tremendous challenges. Unity of
command helps to ensure a continuity of effort; simple command relationships
should be arranged and agreed upon as soon as possible. Complicated
relationships should be simplified as soon as practical.
 Cooperation among allies can be problematic, particularly when the partners have
different objectives. Operation plans grouped within a campaign plan should be
developed well enough for each to stand alone. Fragile plans can collapse.
 Operations and logistics plans are interdependent. The effects of one on the other
must be considered before commencing operations. Operations to seize advance
logistics bases or better lines of communication may be required in order to sustain
combat forces.
 Economy of force operations can help to prevent the enemy from concentrating his
forces while choosing the decisive time and place at which to mass. A commander
employing this technique might be able to create the conditions for a decisive
engagement.
 It is important to always consider the effect that enemy actions can have on your
plans; plans that are dependent on a cooperative adversary can be easily upset.
 Joint operations featuring forces capable of combined-arms integration can often
result in more decisive results than when each is employed independently.
 Forces that can be rapidly transported by air are capability of exploiting the
principles of maneuver and mass, economy of force, and surprise.

Military Lessons of the Campaign

Lessons at Strategic Level
Strategic Aim: The Burma theatre was characterized by the conflicting aims of the
participant countries.
 For the Japanese, Burma was the western edge, securing which was essential to
guard against any allied attack. It was also the only land supply route to China.
Once Burma was occupied, China would be isolated and its defeat would be
easier.
 The allied forces had conflicting. For the British planners, Burma’s liberation was
a low priority as defense of England was paramount. On the other hand, the
Americans were providing material support to China with an aim to tie down
Japanese troops within Asia, thereby reducing the chances of their deployment in
other theatres. The US considered Burma as a vital area for the air and land
supply route to China in its war against the IJA.
 The Chinese intentions were not discernable at times which led to piecemeal
distribution of resources, thus, diluting the war effort.
Intent of Higher Commander: Defeat of the Japanese Army in Burma was the center
of gravity for Fd Mshl Slim. It was conveyed to all the commanders, giving them
freedom in the execution of plans, ultimately leading to the defeat of the Japanese
troops.
Evolution of Land-Air Cooperation
Evolution of Land-Air Cooperation was one of the important lessons of the campaign in
joint man ship. The deployment and maintenance of forward troops (the Chindits, with
30,000 troops and 5,000 animals) for several months and use of air-landed brigades at
MEIKTILA and in pursuit to Rangoon resulted due to sound planning between the two
organizations.
Lessons at Operational Level
Campaign Planning Principles: Fd Mshl Slim advocated four basic principles for
operations.
• The ultimate intention must be an offensive.
• The main idea of the plan must be simple.
• The idea must be held in view throughout and everything else must give way to it.
• The plan must have an element of surprise.
(1) Reorganization and Training:
• The major reorganization was the restructuring of the highest controlling Headquarter
with the creation of the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), with the 14th Army as the
land component.
• A mixed transport structure along the mechanical and animal transport lines was
adopted at the division level to improve mobility and tactical effectiveness. It was
implemented with 7 Indian Division being the first formation to be organized along the
new scaling. A component of 56 mules was added as the first echelon element for
supply of essential stores.
• Major emphasis was laid on retraining of the formations. It convinced the military
leadership to establish centrally controlled training schools in jungle warfare. The school
conducted 15-day short courses in patrolling, field craft, minor tactics, establishment of
roadblocks and living off the land. Collective training was practiced from company
upwards up to division level to assimilate the new training philosophy and gain on the
job expertise.
(2) Against the Japanese Hook tactics, the AITM 15 issued in March 1942
conceptualized two new fighting methodologies.
• All round defense would be adopted as the standard defended locality in jungles in
place of linear defence, with mobile reserves to counter enemy action. The box
formation was successfully adopted to defend against many Japanese onslaughts, with
the Battle of Admin Box as a classic example.
• The high wastage rate of men due to terrain and diseases necessitated that soldiers of
all the services, including the non-combatant category, needed to learn infantry tactics
and be able to fight as infantry in jungles. This action provided inbuilt reserves within the
unit and led to higher availability of fighting hands.
(3) Logistics
The major lessons learnt were:
• Integrating Logistics Advisers at the Planning Stage
The Burma theatre was a low priority area and the planners had to conduct operations
with meagre resources. Limitations were placed on the scope of the operation. This
necessitated a dedicated logistics team working in close coordination with the
operational planners.
The troops of 15 Corps were supplied by air in the Battle of Admin Box for months
which resulted in the soldiers holding onto their locations against all odds and giving a
befitting reply to the Japanese.

• Invention by Necessity or Improvisation:

 Two notable improvisations were use of jute parachutes for sustaining troops of
the second Chindits operation, as silk parachutes were not available and jute
was in abundant supply in Bengal and Assam.
 The second was modification of jeeps and fitting them with rail wheels to enable
their use on rail lines for movement and resupply.
• Location of Medical Units: Poor lines of communications necessitated location of
medical units close to forward defenses. It reduced the evacuation chain besides
providing medical facilities as forward as possible. It also ensured that the soldier was
away from his unit for a shorter duration.
Tactical Lessons
The emphasis was on “back to basics” and involved relearning battle drills as suited to
the jungle environment.
 Patrolling: Proficiency in routine area patrols, connecting patrols within the
defended area and prolonged observation patrols became essential. The concept
of Long Range Patrols (LRP) by Orde Wingate, designed to operate deep behind
enemy lines, to disrupt supply chains and harass enemy troops, was a novel idea
which met with limited success.
 Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance troops was another concept practiced with a
battalion level force, which would operate ahead of the advancing division and
maintain contact with the enemy as well as provide information on enemy
dispositions.
 Establishment of a commando platoon: Establishment of a commando platoon
was planned at the battalion level. The platoon provided the battalion
commander with a highly trained and physically fit entity to be employed in any
eventuality.
 Leadership: A Key to Success
Four aspects of transformational leadership were well demonstrated by Fd Mshl Slim
during the campaign;
• Idealized Influence: Fd Mshl Slim generated a collective sense of mission in
the troops. He made himself familiar with his troops and propagated that
everyone’s effort led to success of the mission. Soldiers, thus, had a sense of
purpose and his actions inspired confidence in his command. Half scale rations is
an ideal example in this regard.
 • Inspirational Motivation: Fd Mshl Slim emphasized with his commanders, the
need to engage every man so that the individual felt part of the system. He
regularly visited troops in forward locations and interacted with them.
• Intellectual Stimulation: Fd Mshl Slim’s conferences were not conducted like
dominating discussions but were a platform to voice opinion freely about any
problem. As a leader, he was respectful to his subordinates, approachable and a
good listener.
• Individualized Consideration: He believed that the direct approach to an
individual was the way to achieve a surge in his fighting spirit. He was more
interested in the strengths or weaknesses of his subordinates rather than the
rank or status.
Maintenance of morale: Maintenance of morale at all times was essential to
motivate soldiers who were fighting multiple enemies; the Japanese, the local
climate and the scarcity of resources. Fd Mshl Slim promoted spiritual,
intellectual and materialistic factors as the basic foundation pillars in maintaining
high morale.
 Spiritual training was the first focus area as spirituality enables a man to
withstand strain. Intellectual training was the next aspect, as human
beings are swayed by reason and feelings. The intellectual pillar was
strengthened by the scale of training, from small to big, which meant that
every objective was attainable.
 Good discipline, a theatre newspaper that provided correct information to
the soldiers so that they did not fall prey to rumours and establishment of
high quality rest and recreation camps complimented the effort.
 The material aspect received the last focus as high morale would obviate
the scarcity of resources.

Principles of war used in Burma Campaign

(a) Selection and Maintenance of Aim. This aim in this theater was to establish
land communication with China and clearing Burma of the Japanese.
Mountbatten appreciated that to establish land comn with China, it was
necessary to capture North and central Burma and also Southern Burma. Op
‘Capital and Darcula’ both directed towards the achievement of this aim.

(b) Offensive Action. Withdrawal of British forces from Burma in 1942 is classic
example of lack of offensive. Slim’s bold venture to continue the op during the
height of the monsoons in 1944, after the decisive defeat of Japanese in the
 Imphal plain was a good example of offensive action. Japanese early success-
(Infiltration and outflanking mvre)

(c) Concentration of Force. Slim concentrating 5 and 7 Indian Divs at Imphal and
Kohima and placing local superiority at Pakokku were the example of same.
Employment of Wingate’s special and Long Range penetration Force in violation
of this principle.

(d) Surprise. The operation in Mondalaya-Meiktila sector were a fine example of

the application of this principle. The switching of corps from North to South and
the step taken to conceal this surprised Japanese completely. Making use of the
newly found ‘Third Dimension’ of air supply, the allied trops continued to fight
when surrounded. Surprising and upsetting the Japanese plan at Kohima, Imphal
and Admin Box battle. Japanese achieved surprise during operation ‘C’ and ‘U’
by their speed and might of attack.

(e) Flexibility. The quick switching over of 5 Indian div from Arakan to Imphal and
33 corps to Kohima reflects the flexibility of mind and plan. 4 corps switching
from north to south , thence to Meiktila and it’s change later from river to rail axis
for its race to Rangoon.

(f) Cooperation. Chinese forces in Burma overcome the hinderance of inter

service, inter allied set up and had excellent operation with chindits and 14 Army.
The landing on Ramree Island by allied troops is another example.

(g) Administration. Battle of Burma was largely quartermaster’s battle. The

success of 14 Army was largely due to the efficient administration technique of
Air Supply, improvisation while crossing Irrawady. Manufacture of locomotives of
scraps, running of railway by modified Jeeps are sound example of application of
principle of administration.

Japanese Cause of Failure

(a) Disregard of higher cdr’s aim. The 31 Div was ordered to capture Dimapur.
But Japanese got to embroiled at Kohima that he completely lost sight. The
mistake cost the Japanese.

(b) The administrative problems. The Japanese had planned for 20 days
offensive and had hoped to capture the allied supply dumps within this period.
Failure in offensive and extension of battle caused the exhausted Japanese
supplies.
 (c) Lack of flexibility and coordination. There is little coordination in the battle of
Imphal and Kohima, though they achieved partial local success, their inflexible
plans never catered for regrouping and exploiting the success.

Main problem faced in Burma

(a) Administrative and communication
(b) Medical
(c) Training and morale
(d) Intelligence
Japanese main aims
(a) Japanese launched two offensive in 1944, one in Arakan and other in Manipur
front IOT capture Imphal plains for future operational and logistic base.
(b) Japanese aim was to cut the allies line of comn and starve the allies to
surrender.
(c) In Arakan front, they got behind 7 div, but were denied complete success
because of Air maintenance of the isolated allied forces.
(d) On central front, Japanese aim was to cut off Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal line of
comn and push forward to cut the Bengal-Asian line of comn to isolate General
stilwell in North and 14 army on the central front. But suffered great reverse by
the mistake of Japanese command who wasted his effort against Kohima instead
of pushing into Dimapur.
Japanese ops concept
 Japanese launched ops ‘C’ with troops who had 7 days supplies.
 Japanese launched op ‘U’ and advanced with 20 days supplies with a view to
capture of allies bases with dumps for further operation.

Administrative Problems
The principle problems which are the administrative of force in the presented were;-
(a) Speed of delivery
(b) Maintenance of communication
(c) Disease and casualties
These problems existed because of the following reasons
(a) The offence in Burma carried out in three different sectors separated from each
other by hundred of miles
(b) No intercommunication among these three sectors namely, NCAC, Central and
Arakan Front.
 (c) Administrative problems were enormous due to mtnous country and thick jungle
coupled with non existence of any communication.
Problems were solved by
(a) Air maintenance in bseiged Kohima, Imphal and Arakan.
(b) Race to Rangoon by capturing Akyb and Ramree airstrips to provide air supply.
(c) 96% of supplies to 14 army by air. For this Mountbatten use 5% of India’s total
cloth output to make parachutes and got 4000 power sewing machine from
England for stitching this.
(d) Innovation and improvisation
(e) Maximum use of local resources
Question 1
1. Lord Louis Mountbatten when appointed comd-in-chief SEAC considered
that the following factors were essential to success in Burma:-
a. Moral.
b. Terrain.
c. Climate (Monsoon).
d. Disease.
e. Pri.
2. Discuss these factors as visualized by him and the measures he took to
overcome or exploit these?
Answer
3. Moral.Two yrs fight had found Japanese successful. So myth of invincibility was
very much a factor Mountbatten combatted it by:-
a. Meeting as many tps as he could himself.
b. Lectured on capabilities, character human weakness etc.
c. Promised to sup tps by air, if cut and to fight and rel tps if at any stage
force cut off by infiltration.
d. Ensured senior offrs reflected these views by continuous touring and thus
raising morale and feeling pulse of tps as he did.
e. Ensured aval of time and ordered rigid trg focused on this front particularly
British.
4. This factor of morale, health and trg and the way Mountbatten handled it was
largely responsible for the eventual success of op against the Japanese in Burma.
5. Terrain. Japanese occupation of southern Burma forced op from Indian
side i.e. north, which meant move/attk through mountain ranges thick jungle. Speed and
success would req air sup of most tps. This was eventually adopted.
6. Monsoon. The hy rains (175 inchs in 1944) brought all activity to a stand still.
Mountbatten ordered physical fitness and trg for fighting in monsoons, thereby gaining
tac advantage as well as 5 months more time for fighting. Air sup was also to cont
during monsoons no matter what the loss. He succeded.
7. Health. Burma was infected with Malaria, scrub Typhus and
dysentry.Sickness caused more cas than battle. He gave top pri to eradicate diseases ,
trg prevention and cure. When these measures had been successfully implemented he
deliberately chose to fight in disease ridden area.Strat one of the remarkable decision
of warfare.Sickness for each year were:-
 Year Sick : Wounded
a. 1943 120 : 1
b. 1944 20 : 1
c. 1945 10 : 1
d. Last six weeks of war 6 : 1
8. Pri. Despite reluctance of the British cabinet, he finally managed to prevail with
British Prime Minister to bring the Burma sec of ops to second pri.

Question 2
1. Analyse the difficulties of comm, which resulted in sup problems for 14
Army. Enumerate foundations of moral as ident by Slim?
Answer
2. Topo. 14 Army was depl on a 700 miles frontage along Indo - Burma border.
Along this border in a shallow curve, sweeps the wide belt of most percipitious and
jungle clad mtns which are rail less, rd less and during monsoons even tr less. The area
was sparcely populated, disease infested and at places even unmapped. It was one of
the worlds’s worst country, breeding worst diseases and for almost half of the yr, having
worst climate.
3. Anxieties. On taking over the comd of 14 Army Gen Slim faced himself with
three maj anxieties :-
a. Comn.
b. Health.
c. Moral.
4. Sups
a. Comn. Sup was of course largely a matter of comm. To mov, sup and fight
through the high mtns was thought impossible and so no def work was ever done in
Eastern India’s border and there existed no comm route for trade or war. The comm
was restd to aval rlys and rivers which abruptly ended on either side of the mtn
ranges, some 200 miles apart. No through rds were aval. Maj comm sys were :-
(1) Rly
(a) Route. Calcutta - Parbatipur- Bhramputra (Pandu) - Dimapur - Ledo (800
miles).
(b) Capacity
(i) Calculta - Parbatipur. A broad guage rly line of 235 miles, which was single tr for
over half the distance.
(ii) Parbatipur - Pandu. A meter guage rly line of 215 miles with ferry at Pandu.
(iii) Pandu - Dimapur. Meter guage rly line of 150 miles and terminus of central front.
(c) Improvements in Capacity
(i) Inearly 1943 the capacity was 600 tons.
(ii) By Aug 43, it was 2800 tons.
(iii) It was inc by American rly bns upto 4400 tons in 1944 and 7,300 tons by 1
Jan 46.
(d) Strat Imp. With the loss of Rangoon the sup from sea was no more possible
so this rly line was very imp for Allies for maint of tps during any ops from north, into
Burma.
(e) Southern Front. In the south a broad guage rly line and river craft was aval upto
Dohazari. 30 miles south of Chittagong.
(2) River. The route was from Calculta through Sunderbans along Bhramaputra to
Gauhati and terminating at Dibrugarh. A 1136 miles long route. The river heads were :-
(a) Central Front. Gauhati.
(b) Northern Front. Dibrugarh.
(3) Rds. In order to connect the rail and river heads with the front line fol rds were
req :-
(a) Ledo - Chinese Front.
(b) Dimapur - Central Front.
(c) Dohazari - Arakan Front.
b. Rats. The problem of shortages of rats was also very pronounced which were
overcome by the efforts of Snelling and sp by Gen Auchinlech. Some of the problems
were in :-
(1) Meat.
(2) Vegetables.
(3) Ghee.
(4) Atta.
c. Eqpt. The shortages of eqpt like vehs, amb, WS and med stores were
pronounced in addn to the grave shortages of ammo and even arms req essentially for
jungle warfare. Some of the shortages of ammo were :-
(1) Rifles 26%
(2) Stens 75%
(3) Mors 25%
(4) Arty 50%
5. Health. In 1943 for every cas evac with war injury 120 cas were evac for
sickness. The maj problems were :-
a. Prevalent Sickness
(1) Malaria was at the rate of 84% and it was mostly in fwd tps.
(2) High incidence of dysentry.
(3) Skin diseases.
(4) Jungle Typhus / Mite.
b. Resources Aval
(1) The auth of med estb for 14 Army was lower than the other Brithish Armies in
Africa and Europe.
(2) Even the actual auth str was much below the str of reduced estb.
(3) Shortage of doctors, nurses and med stores. 414 nurses were held which made
50 beds for one in 24 hrs.
(4) The capacity of existing hospitals was inc by 25 %.
c. Remedial Measures
(1) Adoption and application of modern medical research.
(2) No evac to India rather treatment given in fwd areas. (MSTs, MFTUs).
(3) Air evac of serious cas.
(4) Raise the morale.
6. Morale. The defeat in Arakan, added to the cont defeats, brough the morale to a
lower ebb. It was particularly lower in rear area estbs and L of C tps. Slin after a
delibrate thought and with his experience addressed this problem under three basic
themes :-
a. Spirtual. He mentions this first because according to him only spirtual
foundations can stand strain.
(1) There must be a goal and a noble cause.
(2) Attainment of goal or cause is vital.
(3) The method of achievement must be active and aggressive.
(4) The indl must believe that his action is dir related to the attainment of obj.
b. Intellectual. Men are swayed by reasons and feelings.
(1) Attainable Obj. He must be confident that the obj is possible and not out of
reach.
(2) Compitent Org. He must feel that the org to which he belongs is compitent and
capable of achieving the objective.
(3) Confidence He should have confidence in his ldr that if he fights for a cause and
accepts hardships, his life will not be a wastage.
c. Material
(1) He must feel that he will get a fair deal from the Army Comd.
(2) He must be provided with best possible wpn and eqpt to fight.
(3) Should have as good as possible living and working conditions.
Question 3
1. For the great enctr around Imphal and Kohima from Mar - Jul 1944, FM
Slim had three altns. Briefly analyse these and describe the plan finally evolved?
Answer
2. Area of Ops. The Imphal plain some forty by twenty miles, is the only flat piece
of gr in the vast sweep of hills on Indo - Burma border. It is roughly equidistant from
Bhramaputra valley and plains of Central Burma. A staging place for any ops in either
dir. The depots and sup dumps were spread over some six hundred sq miles around
Imphal and Palel. The area had one maj rd from Dimapur to Kohima - Imphal - Palel -
Tamu and then forked in two with one leading to Manipur Valley and other into Kabaw
Valley.
3. Background. For the great enctr in Central Assam Front in early 1944, which
was fought with relentless furry around Imphal and Kohima from Mar - Jul 1944, both
sides meant it to be decissive. The Japanese intentions were offensive and so were
Allied, who had pushed fwd upto west of Chindwin by end 1943.
a. Japanese Intentions
(1) Tarauchi, the Supreme Comd and Kawabe the C in C of Japanese,
wanted the offensive to be decisive.
(2) Destruction of British forces in Burma.
(3) China, being isolated would be drawn into a separate peace.
(4) India, being ripe for revolt would fall into Japanese hands.
(5) Victory in Burma would have geo-strat implications.
b. British Compulsions
(1) With the decision of main offensive from the north, and area not capable
of sp large forces, it was imperative to reduce Japanese str before reentering
Burma.
(2) Slim wanted a decisive battle before going into Burma.
(3) Tac Disadvantages
(a) Large no of sup dumps and adm instls were loc in Imphal plains.
(b) The only L of C in the area was running parrallel to Japanese posns
thus being vuln all along.
4. Opposing Forces
a. Japanese
(1) Comd. Lt Gen Mataguchi.
(2) Forces
(a) 15 Army
(i) 15 Div.
(ii) 31 Div.
 (iii) 33 Div.
(b) INA Div.
(c) Tk Regt.
b. Allied
(1) Comd. FM Slim.
(2) Forces. 4 Corps with fol divs :-
(a) 17 Div
(b) 20 Div
(c) 23 Div.
(d) 254 Tk Bde.

5. Plans
a. Japanese
(1) Capture Imphal.
(2) Enter Bhramaputra Valley to disrupt the air sup to China and cut the land
route.
b. Allied
(1) Vis of Comd. 14 Army Comd vis that Japanese would try to get behind his
fwd divs with a reinforced div and at the sametime attempt crossing of Chindwin
at Homalin and Thungdut with two divs to drive towards Impal through Ukhral.
They would push a regt towards Kohima to cut the rd Dimapur- Imphal and
threaten Dimapur.
(2) Options Aval
(a) To preempt the en’s offensive and attk him first across Chindwin.
(b) To hold the en’s 33 Div at Tiddim with min forces and with rest all
aval forces fight him at Chindwin during the crossing.
(c) To conc 4 Corps in Imphal plains and fight the decisive battle on gr
of own chosing.
6. Analysis.
a. Conc. The first two options gave the en the advantage of conc his forces along
good comm. Japanese could maint a superior force east of Chindwin whereas in the
third option it was other way round.
b. L of C. Allies would have streched their L of C to 120 miles over the worst
possible country in the first two options. The Japanese like always would have enjoyed
the advantage of having good L of C behind them and severing en’s L of C easily.
However, in the third option it was reversed.
c. Decisive Battle. The first two options did not give assurance of a decisive
victory to Allies which was much cherished by Slim before going inside Burma.
d. Weather. In order to avoid destruction Japanese must win before the onset of
monsoons. If not then they would be trapped in a difficult sup sit. This gave advantage
to Allies once they adopted the third option only.
e. Air Superiority. Inspite of difficulties of L of C, still the Allied air supremacy
gave them the advantage of sup the force by air. But this advantage would have lost its
effect during monsoons when holding of all weather air fds would become difficult.
f. Self Preservation. By adopting the third option Allies were resorting to
preserving their resources for subsequent ops and making en mov fwd through difficult
country and in the process undergoing attrition.
g. Frontage. The frontage of 4 Corps was much beyond its capabilities. Instead of
holding a cont line of def for 250 miles, it was more feasable to conc the superior forces
at the pt of decision i.e Imphal plain.
h. Initiative. Although by wdr to Imphal plains it was giving initiative to Japanese
but it was with aim to take the initiative from them before going for ops inside Central
Burma. This justified the wdr and temp loss of initiative.
j. Gr of Own Choosing. In the first two options Allies would have fought the en at
the place of his choosing whereas the third option gave them an edge over Japanese by
fighting him from prep posns and getting him in the trap.
k. Wdr. The third option had the greatest drawback of retreat even before the
start of the offensive which would have had severe consequences on moral of tps. But
Slim prefered destruction of Japanese more than loss of jungle clad territory and
explained to the tps the same through his comds.
7. Plan Adopted. The option to conc 4 Corps at Imphal was adopted as fol.
Question 4
1. Analyse the Battles of Imphal and Kohima and bringout the reasons for
Japanese defeat?
Answer
2. Background. The battle of Imphal -- Kohima fought in the Central Burma
from Mar - Jun 44 was one of the decisive battle in Burma campaign. Japanese were
loosing considerable shipping in Pacific and wanted to capture Bhramaputra valley, cut
the air/land sup route to China and draw her into an isolated peace. On the other hand
Slim having no option but to reenter Burma from the north with ltd means of comm aval,
wanted to make a decissive battle before reentering Burma. However, he had the tac
disadvantages of having only L of C exposed for its entire length to Japanese def along
Chindwin.
3. Topo. The plains of Imphal are the only plains aval in north and central Burma.
They are equidistant from Bhramamputra and Chindwin valleys. They serve as a
midway staging sec for ops in either dir. The area was served by one rd starting from
Dimapur - Kohima - Imphal - Palel and then bifurcating into Kabaw and Manipur Valleys.
The 600 sq miles area of plains around Imphal and Palel were cluttered by adm instls of
Allied Army. Iril and Manipur rivers in addn to Chindwin were maj obs.
4. Forces
a. Japanese. Gen Mataguchi had fol forces under his comd :-
(1) 31 Div.
(2) 33 Div.
(3) 15 Div.
(4) INA Divs.
(5) One tk Regt.
b. Allied. FM Slim, comd of 14 Army had fol tps :-
(1) 4 Corps
(a) 17 Div.
(b) 20 Div.
(c) 23 Div.
(d) 254 Tk Bde.
(2) Fol addl tps were received during the op :-
(a) HQ 33 Corps.
(b) 7, 5 and 2 Divs.
(c) Lushai Bde.
(d) 268 Mot Bde.
(e) 23 Chindits Bde.
(f) 3 Spec Svc Bde.
5. Plans
a. Japanese
(1) Capture Bhramaputra Valley.
(2) Cut the air and land sup routes to China.
(3) The plan for attk was :-
(a) 33 Div to adv in two colms along Tiddim - Imphal and Sittang -
Imphal and cut 17 Div in the south.
(b) 15 Div to adv in three colmns between Litan and Myothit and head
for Imphal.
(c) 31 Div to capture Ukral and attk Imphal, Kohima and the rd.
b. Allied. 4 Corps plan of conc was as under :-
(1) 17 Div to leave one bde 40 miles south of Imphal and conc in Imphal as
corps res.
(2) 20 Div to conc in Moreh and after soft units have wdr to Imphal, to pull
back to Shenam - Shuganu line.
(3) 23 Div less one bde in Ukhral to conc in Imphal as corps res.
(4) 254 Tk bde to conc in Imphal as corps res.
Conduct
6. Conc of 4 Corps - Japanese Apch to Imphal - Kohima
a. Southern Sec
(1) 33 Div started its adv on 6 Mar by crossing Chindwin at Kalewa with one
colm.
(2) Tongzang was contacted by 9 Mar and a rd block estb at MS 109.
(3) On 19 Mar, 17 Div was ordered to pull back to Imphal and was relieved /
helped by two bdes ex 23 Div.
(4) 17 Div completed its conc in Imphal by 5 Apr.
(5) Another colm of 33 Div under Yamamoto with bns of Japanese and Jiffs
mov towards Palel - Tamu from south of Sittang on 12 Mar 44.
b. Central Sec
(1) 15 Div started the crossing from Thaungdut on 15 Mar and headed for
Imphal.
(2) Its northern edge was 10 miles south of Ukhral and southern edge near
Moyothit.
c. Northern Sec
(1) 31 Div crossed Chindwin at Homalin of 15 Mar and headed for Ukhral.
(2) Ukhral was captured on 19 Mar.
 (3) The div then mov in three colms, one in SW dir to Imphal which was being
contained by bde ex 23 Div.
(4) The other two colms struck the rd Imphal - Kohima and cut it 30 miles
north of Imphal. Then one colm mov south to Imphal and another towards
Kohima on 30 Mar 44.
(5) Few more colms were also mov in north for Kohima.
7. Imphal Battle. The battle of Imphal was mainly held along the apchs ldg to it.
These were :-
a. Rd Kohima - Imphal from north.
b. Tr along Irial river from NE.
c. Rd Ukhral - Imphal - NE.
d. Rd Tamu - Imphal from east.
e. Rd Tiddim - Imphal from south.
f. Tr Silchar - Bishenpur from west.
8. The conduct of battle along these apchs is as fols :-
a. Rd Tiddim - Imphal
(1) 17 Div had conc in Imphal by 5 Apr, leaving two bdes ex 23 Div on this
apch.
(2) By the end of Apr bdes ex 23 Div pulled back to south of Bishenpur. At
this stage the responsibility was given to bde ex 20 Div and 23 Div bdes were
pulled out.
(3) Bde ex 20 Div depl at Bishenpur covering the rd from south and tr from the
west.
(4) Japanese launched fierce attks on these posns from west and SE.
(5) They captured Potsangbum by 10 May but could not mov ahead. They
blew the br on Silcher tr as well.
(6) On 20 May the Allies with 17 Div in the area recaptured Potsangbum.
b. Rd Tamu - Imphal
(1) Japanese Yamamoto’s force pushed against Tamu on 12 Mar.
(2) With 15 Div on the northern flank 20 Div pulled back to line Shehnam -
Shuganu and held the posns.
(3) Japanese launched many attks from 29 Apr onwards but they were
repulsed and sit remained the same.
(4) On 7 - 8 May, Japanese attk Tengnopal and Palel. They were beaten back
after fierce fight and 23 Div replaced 20 Div (-) by 15 May.
c. Rd Ukhrul - Imphal
(1) 31 Div mov SW from Ukhrul and colms of 15 Div also mov south of this
apch.
 (2) Bde ex 23 Div and later bde ex 5 Div were mov on this apch.
(3) Japanese captured Naungshegan hts by 6 Apr. However by 7 May Allied
forces (5 Div) recaptured Mao spur and cleared these hts with the help of tks.
(4) Japanese were pushed back to Ukhrul by mid May.
(5) 20 Div was brought in and Japanese 15 Div was attk while it was planing
attk on Ukhrul. By end of May east of Iril was clear and calm.
d. Rd Kohima - Imphal
(1) Having cut the rd 30 miles north, colm of 15 Div mov south.
(2) Bde ex 17 Div was mov north to contact this force.
(3) Japanese kept up their force and were successful to capture Kanglatongbi
on 27 Apr.
(4) Japanese were then attk with tks and the town was recaptured on 21 May
by 5 Div which rel bde ex 17 Div on 7 May.

9. Kohima Battle
a. Vis of Comd. Slim had vis a Regt going for Kohima and Bishenpur.
However, once the battle unfolded 31 Div was conc around Kohima.
b. Initial Plan. Kohima had only one bn of Assam Riffles and few adm tps.
Gen Ranking was made the comd and 161 Bde ex 5 Div was rushed into city by
29 Mar 44.
c. 161 Bde and Assam bn were posn in the south and east of Kohima when
due to faulty reports of Japanese within striking distance of Dimapur, 161 Bde
was wdr to Nichugard.
d. Japanese from south attk Assam rifle bn which routed.
e. Japanese then kept attk on the Central Kohima to capture the adm instls.
f. Rel of Kohima
(1) 33 Corps arrived at Jorhat on 3 Apr and took over the responsibility.
The tasks asg to it were :-
(a) Rel Kohima and deny Bhramaputra valley to Japanese.
(b) Help 4 Corps in south.
(c) Keep rd Kohima - Imphal open.

(2) 33 Corps made fol plan to accomplish the tasks :-

(a) To conc the 33 Corps NE of Dimapur.
(b) To rel Kohima by 161 Bde by 6 Bde ex 2 Div.
(c) To push 2 Div as it arrives into Kohima.
 (d) Hold Silchar tr’s western end by Nepalese bn.
(e) Lushai bde to op in Lushai hills.
(f) 23 Chandits bde to cut Japanese L of C in east and south.
g. As per the plan 161 Bde mov into Kohima but only one bn reached the
Garrison Hill. Two bns were cut off by the rd blocks estb by Japanese on both
ends.
h. Japanese cut the water sup of Kohima on 6 Apr and tps were sup by air
drops.
j. Bde ex 2 Div helped in clearing rd blocks and 161 Bde with tks reached
the garrison on 15 Apr.
k. 161 Bde was then relieved by 6 Bde and it (161 Bde) attk Kuki picquet but
failed on 19 Apr.
l. Initial Plan to Reduce Kohima. By end of Apr, 2 Div had completely been
inducted into Kohima and it planned to take Kohima as fol :-
(1) 5 Bde to make the northern pincer and capture area in the north.
(2) 6 Bde to fix en in central Kohima sp by arty.
(3) 4 Bde to act as southern pincer and roll the en from south.
(4) 161 Bde ex 5 Div was res.
m. The attk was launched on 22 Apr but could not make any progress.
n. 33 Bde ex 7 Div was loc at Dimapur at this time.
o. New Plan. Having failed to achieve success, 2 Div changed the plan of
wide turning movs and the new plan was :-
(1) 4 Bde to take GPT Ridge and Jail Hill, fol by a link up with 6 Bde in
centre.
(2) 6 Bde to capture Garrison Hill, Kuki Picquet and FSD Ridge.
(3) 5 Bde to capture Treasury and Naga village.
p. The attk began on 4 May.
q. 4 Bde could take part of GPT Ridge only and could not take Jail Hill.
r. 6 Bde captured Garrison Hill and reached FSD Ridge but could not retain
it. It failed to take Kuki Picquet.
s. 5 Bde captured Naga village but was thrown out by c attk and stayed on
its western end. Treasury remained with Japanese.
t. The Corps Res of 33 Bde ex 7 Div were given to 2 Div which were used to
attk Jail Hill on 7 May but again could not dislodge the en.
u. Corps Plan. Now comd 33 Corps gave his plan :-
(1) 6 and 4 Bde to take FSD Ridge and GPT Ridge, respectively.
(2) 33 Bde ex 7 Div to capture Jail and DIS Hills.
 (3) Max use of smk to be made.
v. The attk was launched on 10 May and after some resistance Japanese
were blind with smk. The posns were captured by 13 May.
w. DC Banglow and Treasury were also captured by 33 Bde by 15
May 44.
x. No c attk was made by Japanese.
y. 7 Div with 161 Bde captured Naga village by end of May.
z. 268 Inf Bde held central Garrison Hill.

aa. 2 Div mov south to clear Aradura Hill from NW and later from Big Tree Hill
by 6 - 7 Jan.
bb. Link Up on Kohima - Imphal Rd
(1) 7 Div on SE (lt of rd) and 2 Div on the rd, with 23 Chandit Bde and
Lushai’s protecting their flanks, started after clearance of Aradura Hill by
2 Div on 7 Jun.
(2) After annihilation of en and clearance of hts Mao Sansong the 2
Div and 5 Div linked up on 22 Jun at MS 109.
10. Analysis
a. Air Sp. In the begining Japanese air force made few appearences, but then
RAF and USAF ruled the skies. The Allied air made considereable contributions not
only in inflicting cas on en but in providing log sp to tps as well. Some of these were :-
(1) Log Sp. The air drops for providing sups to 17 Div and 23 Bde (Chindits)
and the water and other log drops at Kohima were a great help.
(2) Evac of Cas. All serious cas were evac to base hospitals by air thus
making great impact on moral of tps.
(3) Shifting of Tps. Air lift of 5 Div from Arakan to Imphal changed the bal of
focres to a great extent.
(4) Strat Bombing. Allied air not only bombed en airfds but also their
shipping in harbours thus making a direct impact on their log sups.
(5) CS Msns. It made a great eff and provided superiority and freedom of
mov to the tps.
b. Res. Correct and timely use of res reqs constant and correct reading of the
battle by comds. Japanese used their res in giving depth to their attks and thus lost the
impetus, whereas Allies were in derth of adequate res. They maint tac res at all times
amd made a judicious use of these res eg. 23 Div and 2 British Div which played a
significant role.
c. Log Sp. The maint of forces over this difficult country was a great problem.
Japanese could not really live upto the reqs and thus their str gave up. Whereas the
Allies kept maint their forces,even once the only L of C was cut to Imphal, by air. They
improved the rlys and rds and thus won the log battle.
d. Prep and Terrain. Allies having analysed the sit at the right time had chosen a
better option to prep their posns and fight at a terrain of their choosing. This option paid
them well.
e. Offensive Action. The basic aim of Allied forces was annihilation of en which
they carried out by first causing attrition to en and then changing to ctr offensive. They
even remained aggressive during defensive phase.
f. Maint of Aim. The aim of destruction of Japanese before reentering Burma was
well maint and they achieved it by an excellent plan to wearout and then destroy the en.
g. Surprise. Allies achieved a great surprise by op 23 Bde of Chindits behind en
lines and cutting his L of C. Similarly Japanese surprised the Allies with their initial conc
at Kohima.
h. Flexibility. Japanese comds displayed rigidity while attk poorly held posns at
Kohima. Whereas the Allied forces had always simple and flexible plans sp by adequate
res.
j. Rfts. Much against normal Allies recieved a great number of rfts during the op
and doubled their forces within too months thus having 2:1 superiority on en.
k. Vis of En. Faulty at Kohima.
l. Smk Screen. During final attk at Kohima.
m. Emp of Tks.

Question 5 (IMPORTANT)

What was the directive issued to SEAC prior to the ops across Chindwin and
what plans were made to exec it? How and why the Allied land forces were reorg
to accomplish the policy given in the directive?
Answer
1. In Jun 1944, the Chief of Staff in London had issued a directive for Burma. In it, he
laid down the objects of the next campaign as fol :-
(a) To dev, broaden and protect the air link to China, in order to provide max and
timely sups of POL and stores to China in sp of Pacific ops.
(b) To exert max gr and air effort against the en during the current monsoon
season.
(c) All advantages be prep to exploit the dev of overland comm to China.
(d) All ops must be dictated by the forces aval or firmly allocated to SEAC.
2. SEAC HQ prep three altn plans as fol :-
(a) Plan X. Stillwell's NCAC, reinforced by more British and Indian divs from 14
Army, to be the main striking force, and to secure area upto the line Katha -
Mongnut - Lashio, while the Yunnan Chinese pushed to join up with them about
Lashio. The reduced 14 Army to conduct a ltd offensive across the Chindwin.
 (b) Plan Y. 14 Army to be the main striking force to secure the Mandalay area.
The N.C.A.C and Yunnan Chinese to stage an offensive from the north, and join
up with 14 Army about Maymyo.
(c) Plan Z. The capture of Rangoon by an amph and AB Op, fol by a drive to
meet 14 Army coming from the north.
3. However, the Supreme Comd shortly afterwards issued his overall directive, allotting
each part of the SE Asian forces its tasks. Both plans Y and Z were to be attempted.
The plan for the offensive, to be known by the code word 'Capitol' was as fol :-
(a) An adv across the Chindwin by 14 Army, sp by 221 Gp RAF, to occupy the
area between river Chindwin and Irrawaddy. Success to be exploited to incl the
capture of Mandalay.
(b) A complementary adv by N.C.A.C and the Chinese Yunnan Force, sp by the
10 and 14 USAAF, to the line Mogok - Lashio.
(c) A ltd adv in Arakan by 15 Corps, sp by 224 Gp RAF, to secure fwd posns and
to prevent interference with airfds.
(d) As these ops progressed, a sea and AB aslt codenamed 'Dracula' to seize
Rangoon some time before the 1945 monsoons i.e Mar 1945.
4. Reorg
(a) China - Burma - India theatre was divided into two zones.
(b) 14 Army was rel of responsibility for Arakan and adm responsibility of rear
areas.
(c) L of C comd formed to rel 14 Army from adm responsibility of maint the L of
C.
(d) 11 Army Gp predesignated as Allied Land Forces South East Asia and given
15 (Indian) Corps as well as 3 (Indian) Div under comd for future ops.
(e) 11 Army Gp comd also C-in-C ALFSEA and its HQ shifted to Barrackpur.
(f) NCAC indep under ALFSEA.
5. The change in area of ops req maj changes in org and eqpt of the fmns in order to
attain the desirable mob. Some of the changes which were made in 14 Army are :-
(a) Org. 17 and 5 Indian Divs were reorg as fol :-
(1) Complete div less one bde was mech.
(2) Remaining bde was made entirely air transportable.
(b) Eqpt
(1) For 17 and 5 Divs less their air transportable bdes changes were
made to give them desired mob. Std mixed animal and mech tpt
was done away with. They were issued with all mech tpt.
(2) The air transportable bdes were given all jeeps as their tpt and
issued with modified 25 pounder guns in order to be transported in
Dakotas.
 (3) The baggage and ammo of the air tpt bdes was reduced
considerably. Reliance was one quick air replenishment.
(c) Tac
(1) Armour. Instead of one or two tks surrounded by inf, carefully
nosing fwd along a narrow jungle tr, with open country aval, use of
tks in powerful, rapidly mov armd fmns was resorted to.
(2) Arty. Arty was req to fire at longer ranges, change posns more
frequently and be ready to answer calls from the air more quickly.
(3) Air. Air sp was req to be more quicker and instant for these rapidly
mov forces. The emp of air bdes in Mektila and const of air strip
every 50 miles during adv to Rangoon are suitable examples.
Question 6

What were the orders given to 33 Corps after the Imphal Kohima battles were over and
how they were exec upto Chindwin?
Answer
1. 4 Corps HQ had been in action much longer and had a harder time than 33 Corps. It
was req to be taken out and given rest, so on 31 July it closed down in Assam and 33
Corps took over the whole central front. During Aug, HQ 4 Corps returned to India. 33
Corps had five divs, a couple of inf bdes and a tk bde to comd, but as only 2 divs and
one bde were actively engaged, the burden was mainly an adm one.
2. On 6 Aug, FM Slim sent orders to Stopford, comd 33 Corps as fol:-

(a) To pursue the en with not less than one bde gp on each of the routes :-

(1) Imphal - Tiddim - Kalemyo - Kalewa.

(2) Tamu - Kalewa.
(3) Tamu - Sittang.
(b) To occupy Sittang and deny the Chindwin to en shipping.
(c) If opportunity offered, to seize Kalewa and estb a br H.
3. Exec
(a) Tamu-Sittang Axis

(1) In accordance with the instrs 11 East African Div began a two
pronged adv from Tamu. One prong towards Sittang on the
Chindwin, 36 miles by rd to the east.
(2) On 16 Aug, the ldg bde crossed Yu river.
 (3) On 18 Aug they had a serious clash and drove the Japanese from
this posn.
(4) For the rest of the month they continued adv slowly in face of en
resistance and terrain friction.
(5) On 4 Sep, Sittang was occupied.
(6) On 10 Sep a small br H was formed on the east bank opposite
Sittang.
(b) Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewa Axis
(1) The mainbdoy of 11 East African Div mov as the sec prong into the
Kabaw Valley to Kalemyo, some hundred miles south.
(2) The ldg bde was 30 miles south of Tamu on 21 Aug 1944.
(3) The first serious resistance in Kabaw Valley was enctr on 27 Aug,
when a Japanese rd block was carried by aslt and the adv
resumed.
(4) On 11 Sep, a bn was tasked to take Mawlaik, an imp river port on
Chindwin. The bn was held up.
(5) On 20 Oct, other units of this bde were mov up and an attk was
launched. This attk failed but another next day was more
successful.
(6) On 10 Nov, Mawlaik was captured. A bn slipped across the
Chindwin and by vigorous partrolling estb a sec br H across the
river.
(7) 11 East African Div then pushed on towards Kalewa along the west
bank of the river.
(8) By 2 Nov, main adv, sp by RAF ac, was 12 miles short of Kalemyo
and struck a str en posn.
(9) The ldg bde became involved in front of this and the next bde by
passed it. On 12 Nov, this bde reached a pt 5 miles from Kalemyo.
(10) The routes passing through the town were shelled from here and
ptls cut rd Kalemyo - Fort White. One ptl had contact with a ptl
from 5 Indian Div and the two ptls entered the town together.
(c) Imphal-Tiddim-Kalemyo-Kalewa
(1) On 18 Jul, 5 Div, relieving 17 Div, had taken over ops on Tiddim rd
and by 31 Jul the ldg bde had reached 40 miles south of Imphal.
(2) By 23 Aug, the bde reached MS 85 from Imphal, at an average of
2 miles per day.
(3) As the 14 Army resources could not maint, both Tiddim and Kabaw
Valley rd at same time therefore comd had chosen Kabaw Valley
rd. So Tiddim rd was abandoned as L of C, and allowed to fall
away behind adv tps.
 (4) Since it was impossible in the hills to build landing strips, 5 Div was
totally dependant on air drops for its reqs.
(5) By 14 Sep, 5 Div ldg tps reached the west bank of the Manipur
river, 126 miles south of Imphal.
(6) GOC 5 Div sent his res bde through Imphal to Shuganu and down
the east bank of Manipur river, to come in behind en barring his
adv. This bde had seized the high gr, opposite on the east bank of
the river. The en pulled out.
(7) On 19 Sep, a rd block was estb behind the Japanese rear gd, who
were attk on 20 Sep and dislocated.
(8) By 1 Oct, 5 Div was in the hills due east of Tiddim in contact with en
holding the rd and covering the town.
(9) Tiddim was captured on 17 Oct.
(10) Chocolate Stair Case posn was turned and thus abandoned by the
en. Kennedy Peak was captured by 4 Nov.
(11) The Japanese launched a c attk and recaptured "Kennedy Peak"
on ni 6 Nov. This was their last effort.
(12) On 8 Nov, Fort White was captured. A rapid adv against lt opposn
fol by a link up with ptl from 11 East African Div and the two entered
Kalemyo together.
4. Kalemyo to the Chindwin
(a) 11 East African Div adv to estb a br H across Chindwin at Kalewa cont.
The rd enters the gorge of Myittha River 5 miles east of Kalemyo and the
Japanese held it in str.
(b) In a series of aslts, sp by air, the Africans forced their way through and on
2 Dec entered Kalewa.
(c) A bde of this div mov south from Mawlaik after crossing Chindwin 12 Miles
north of Kalewa on 24 Nov. It then bore down on the en holding the east
bank of Chindwin opposite Kalewa.
(d) 11 Div planned to put another bde over the river north of Kalewa in coord
with the bde already across and then pass through the third bde to capture
all the tac signifgicant features within arty range.
(e) This crossing took place on ni 3 / 4 Dec, the br H was firmly estb by ni 4
Dec. On ni 4 / 5 Dec the fol up bde crossed over and pushed down the
Pyingaing rd in face of stiff resistance.
(f) By 8 Dec, en gave way and started wdr towards Shwegyin. By 10 Dec, a
floating Bailly br over Chindwin was completed.
(g) By mid Dec, 11 East African Div occupied a firm br H east of Kalewa
extending about 8 miles by 12 miles.
6. Subsidery Ops
(a) Lushai Bde. Flank protection to 5 Div and clearing of en from Lushai Hills.
 (b) 268 Inf Bde. Under Brig Dyer's comd with one Nepalese and three Indian
inf bns cleared the area north of Sittang on the west of Chindwin and later
took over the Sittang br H.

Question 7 (IMPORTANT)

Give details of long range pen op by Wingate's force to help Stilwell adv from Ledo
area?
Answer
1. Background. The long range pen op by Wingate was one of the four offensive
plans finalized by SEAC in early 1944. The op was to aid the ops in north and other sec.
At the start of this pen the sit on other fronts was :-
(a) Arakan Front
(1) The op started on 30 Nov 43.
(2) The Japanese had launched attk from the rear areas on 5 and 7
Div on 5 Feb 44.
(3) Allied ctr stroke by 26 and 36 Div was in progress with Japanese
trapped and their ctr offensive dying down.
(b) NCAC Front
(1) Op started in Oct 43 and after initial hold up was making good
progress.
(2) Stillwell's forces were at Maingkwan and Walawbum and captured it
by begining of March 44.
(3) 38 Chinese Div and 22 Chinese Div (-- ) apch Shadozup while
Mauradurs with part of 22 Div mov towards Myitkina.
(c) Imphal Front

(1) Japanese had launched their offensive with 15 Army west of

Chindwin on 6 Mar 44.
(2) Japanese were making progress towards Imphal and threating
Kohima and Dimapur.
3. Opposing Forces
(a) Wingate Forces
(1) 3 Indian Div with six bdes (16,14,3 West African, 23,111,77).
(2) Air. It had its own air force with lt acs, tpt acs, glidders and fighters
for fol :-
(a) Cas evac.
 (b) CS.
(c) Maint, ltd movs etc.
(b) Japanese
(1) 18 Div fighting Stillwell forces in north.
(2) 53 Div with one Regt (arrived fresh in the sec).
4. Orders from SEAC
(a) To help Stillwell forces op from Ledo in attaining their objs and disrupt 18
Japanese Div's L of C to stop their rfts.
(b) Help the Yunnan force (Chinese) in their ops.
(c) Disrupt and destroy en rear areas and L of C.
5. Induction
(a) Assy A. Four assy A were selected :-

(1) Aberdeen. 27 miles NW of Indaw.

(2) Picaddilly. 40 miles NE of Indaw.
(3) Broadway. 35 miles NE of Indaw.
(4) Chowrangee. 35 miles SE of Indaw.
(b) Plan
(1) Gen Outline

(a) The induction was in two phases with 3 x bdes in each

phase.
(b) 1x bde of first wave to pen on foot and 2 x bdes flown in.
(c) Sec wave to rel first wave after 2 - 3 months.

(2) Plan
(a) First Wave
(i) 16 Bde. To conc in Aberdeen infiltrating on foot
starting on 8 Feb 44.
(ii) 77 Bde. Flown in two halves to Picaddly and
Broadway on 5 Mar 44.
(iii) 111 Bde. Flown in to Chowrangee between 5 - 10
Mar 44.
(b) Sec Wave. 14, 3 and 23 Bdes to be flown in after two
months to rel first wave.
6. Conduct
(a) The indcution started with flying in of 77 Bde to Broadway on 5 Mar 44.
(b) 111 Bde was also flown in the Boradway and Chowrangee between 5 and
10 Mar 44.
(c) By 10 Mar 600 sorties of Dakotas had been flown in with 9000 tps and
1500 animals.
(d) 16 Bde reached Aberdeen by the end of march after covering 450 miles.
(e) By the end of march Wingate comd some 11000 tps behind en lines.
(f) Japanese reaction to this AB infiltration was slow.
(g) On 10 Mar few hrs after 111 Bde left Chowrangee, Japanese acs attk the
place.
(h) On 13 Mar, Japanese attk with 30 acs at Broadway but lost 50% of acs
due return fire by "Spitfire" flt and Lt AD Bty.
(j) 111 Bde mov out on 10 Mar in two colms. One colm with Kachin tps and
British offrs (Dah Force) mov west and after crossing to the river north,
cut the rd Bhamo - Myitkinya.
(k) The second colm mov west of Indaw to delay Japenese 2 x inf and 1 x
arty bn of 15 Div on their way to Imphal.
(l) 77 Bde mov out on 16 Mar and struck the main rly from Imphal - Myitkina,
40 miles to west and estb a block. (While City).
(m) By 16 Mar rail rd comm to 18 Div was cut off.
(n) Japanese c attk with 53 Div (1x Regt) "Take Force" While City but
repulsed.
(o) 14 Bde was flown in to Aberdeen in the begining of Apr and 16 Bde with
part of 14 Bde attk Indaw but Japanese resistance was tough and they
were repulsed.
(p) 16 Bde flown out on empty acs returning to India.
(q) By begining May White City was abondoned due to hy conc of Japanese
around it.
(r) 80 miles north on the same rly line another block was estb at Hopin which
was called "Black - Pool".
(s) Black Pool abondended after three weeks due to en conc.
(t) Tps gathered at Indawgyi Lake for evac to India.
(u) 77 Bde struck from south at Mogaung ahead of Chinese 38 Div on 18 Jun
44, and link up took place.
(v) Morris Force threatened Myithkyina from south which was attk by Chinese
on 19 May but captured on 3 Aug 44.
Question 8 (VERY IMPORTANT)
1. Discuss the campaign in Shwebo plains with reasons for fol :-
a. Initial breakout plan into Shwebo plains by 14 Army.
b. When and why 14 Army Comd changed the plan.
c. What was the new plan and how was it exec.
d. How deception was ensured. (Op Capitol).
e. What were the Japanese disposns and why they did not want to fight on
Shwebo plains.
Answer
1. Background. By 15 Dec 44, the ldg elms of 33 Corps i.e. 11 East African Div had
estb three br Hs east of Chindwin. These br Hs were :-
a. Sittang .. . . . . . . . estb on 10 Sep 44.
b. Mawlaik . . . . . . . . estb on 10 Nov 44.
c. Kalewa . . . . . . . . . estb on 13 Dec 44.

2. These br Hs could eff be used as launching pads for any offensive east of Chindwin.
14 Army made full use of them not only to liberate Burma but for destruction of
Japanese forces in Shwebo plains.
3. Reasons for Shwebo as Killing Zone. 14 Army Comd decided to make best
possible use of open country of Shwebo plains as killing gr for Japanese. The main
reasons were
a. To maint the Allied superiority in air and armour.
b. To trap Japanese within the two obs i.e. Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers.
c. Japanese did not believe in givieng some gr without fighting so they were
likely to def Shwebo plains thus getting into the trap.
d. Japanese fmns around Shwebo were battered and disintegrated after the
Imphal - Kohima battles.

4. Composn of Forces. Before the offensive east of Chindwin was launched 14 Army
Comd was relieved not only of Arakan Front but also of the responsibility of vast L of C,
behind 14 Army. The N.C.A.C had already been rel. This left 14 Army Comd, (Slim) to
devote all his energies to the offensive east of Chindwin into Central Burma. The forces
were as under :-
a. 14th Army. HQ at Imphal.
(1) 4 Corps (Messervy)
(a) 7 Div.
(b) 19 Div (newly arrived)
 (c) 255 TK Bde.
(2) 33 Corps
(a) 2 Div.
(b) 20 Div.
(c) 254 Tk Bde.
(d) 268 Inf Bde.
(3) Army Res
(a) 5 Div (would arrive soon after reorg)
(b) 28 East African Bde.
(c) Inf Bde (Lushai Bde)
b. Japanese Forces. In Central Burma the 14 Army (Allied) was opposed
by Japanese 15 Army.
(1) Composn of 15 Army. (Katamura).
(a) 15 Div.
(b) 31 Div.
(c) 33 Div.
(d) 53 Div (rft from 33 Army presently depl in the north)
(2) Dispons of Forces in Central Burma
(a) 53 Div. Gen area Rail Indaw.
(b) 15 Div. Gen area south of Rail Indaw.
(c) 31 Div. Gen area Shwebo and north of it.
(d) 33 Div. Opposite Kalewa.
5. 14 Army Initial Plan. The initial breakout plan was dir towards Shwebo with the
main obj of destruction of Japanese 15 Army at Shwebo Plains. The task given to under
comd fmns was :-
a. 4 Corps. Breakout into Shwebo plains from the Sittang br H and seize the
Japanese airfds in Ye-U, Shwebo area. (255 Tk bde would join 4 Corps in
Ye-U area).
b. 33 Corps. Breakout from Kalewa and Mawlaik br Hs towars Shwebo in
order to estb contact with 4 Corps for ultimate destruction of Japanese 15
Army. If the air strips around Ye-U and Shwebo are captured before the
arrival of 4 Corps, then 4 Corps would be flown into Shwebo area.
c. Lushai and 28 East African Bde. Push down south, remaining west of
Chindwin along axis Kalewa - Gangaw to protect the rt flank of 33 Corps
and the L of C ldg towards the base of pen i.e br H area.
6. Conduct-Progress Before Change of Plan. The breakout started as planned on
3 Dec 1944 :-
 a. A bde ex 20 Div of 33 Corps led adv from Mawlaik br H on 3 Dec 44 (30
miles north of Kalewa).
b. 20 Div also passed through Mawlaik br H behind the ldg bde.
c. 2 Div broke out from Kalewa br H on 19 Dec 44 towards Ye-U after it was
secured by 11 East African Div by mid Dec 44.
d. Up in the north 4 Corps had begun their adv.
e. On 4 Dec 44, 19 Div brokeout from the Sittang br H with orders to take
Pinlebu (60 miles east of Sittang).
(1) On 16 Dec linkup by ptls was estb between 19 Div and 36 Div ex
N.C.A.C fmn. It was the first linkup between the two armies.
(2) Pinlebu and Banmauk were also captured on 16 Dec 44.
f. 268 Bde also brokeout from the Sittang br H and was presently mov rt of
19 Div.
g. On 23 Dec the ldg elms of 2 Div passed through Pyingaing.
h. It was here when the Army Comd changed the complete plan and issued
a new plan to be fol. Regrouping took place immediately and the new plan
was enforced.
7. Reasons for Change of Plan
a. Misreading the En Intentions. 14 Army Comd had misread the
intentions of Japanese comds, who did not want to fight in Shwebo plains.
He was conc his forces on Irrawaddy shore.
b. Destruction of Japanese. The plan concieved by Slim intended to
annihiliate the Japanese. However, soon he realized that his forces were
being inducted into a partial vaccum and the bulk of Japanese 15 Army
had wdr behind Irrawaddy. So, the obj could not be achieved.
c. No Repsite to Japanese. 14 Army Comd never wanted to give
time to the disintegrated army of Japanese to reorg and give another str
resistance.
d. Fear of Being Trapped. Slim realized the intentions of Kimura who
planned to wear out the Allied forced in the loop and then destroy them
with the onest of monsoons and river at their back.
8. New Plan. The obj of the main plan was to destroy the Japanese Central Burma
Army in area Mandalay, Thazi, Chauk and Myingyan. The actual plan stated, "33
Corps, reinforced by 19 Div, to exec forced crossing of Irrawaddy river north and west of
Mandalay, thus drawing towards itself the greatest possible conc of Japanese forces.
Meanwhile, 4 Corps mov secretly south towards Gangaw Valley, would suddently
appear at Pakokku, seize a crossing over Irrawaddy and strike violently at Meiktila".
9. Composn of Forces - New Plan
a. 14 Army
(1) 4 Corps (Masservy)
(a) 7 Div (Less bde)
 (b) 17 Div (Newly arrived)
(c) 5 Div (after Feb 45)
(d) 255 Tk Bde.
(e) 28 East African Bde.
(f) Lushai Bde (flown out after capture of Gangaw).
(2) 33 Corps (Stopford)
(a) 20 Div.
(b) 19 Div.
(c) 2 Div.
(d) 254 Tk Bde.
(e) 268 Inf Bde.
(3) Army Res . 5 Div (till Feb 45)
b. Japanese Forces. 14 Army was opposed by Japanese 15 Army.
(1) Composn of 15 Army (Katamura)
(a) 15 Div
(b) 31 Div
(c) 33 Div
(d) 53 Div (rft from 33 Army presently depl in the north).
(2) Disposn of Forces. Kimura decided to engage 14 Army in "Battle
of Irrawaddy Shore". He depl his tps as fol :-
(a) 15 Army
(1) 15 Div on Irrawaddy shore.
(2) 53 Div south of 15 Div on eastern coast Irrawaddy
river.
(3) 31 Div in Sagaing Hills and on Irrawaddy line towards
west.
(4) 33 Div in Monywa and Gangaw valley.
(b) Army Res (South Burma)
(1) 49 Div.
(2) 2 Div ex 33 Army.
(3) 24 Indep Bde.
(3) Reasons for not Fighting on Shwebo Plains
(a) Japanese divs badly battered in Imphal-Kohima were in no
state to fight in open plain.
 (b) Change in Japanese High Comd. Kawabe was replaced by
Kimura, who believed in realism.
(c) To cripple 14 Army as they struggled to cross the Irrawaddy
river and then with the help of monsoon, to destroy them as
14 Army limped back to Chindwin.
10. Allied Deception
a. Plan. A scheme was prep and hoped that it would persuade Kimura that
4 Corps was still mov complete into the Shwebo Plains north of 33 Corps;
and that any offensive mov into Gangaw valley was merely a demo by a
small force to distract Kimura's attn from 14 Army attk on Mandalay from
the north. Fol actions were taken to ensure success :-
(1) Dummy HQ. A dummy 4 Corps HQ was estb at Tamu using the
same wrls channels.
(2) Sig Msgs. All sigs from 33 Corps to 19 Div were passed through
this dummy HQ.
(3) Wrls Silence. The real 4 Corps HQ moving in Gangaw Valley was
to observe wrls silence unless op nec to break it. Even then they
were to simulate HQ of 11 East African Div.
(4) Disinfo. Indiscreet conversations between SOs and operatores
were arranged, news broadcasts made slightily inaccurate refs to
fmns engaged.
(5) Tfc. Vol of tfc was made to cfm to having both corps conc in
Shwebo plains.
(6) East Africans. 28 East African Bde given to 4 Corps and was ldg
to mislead Japanese of 11 East African Div.
(7) Dispersion. 7 Div fol the ldg bde in Gangaw valley was stretched
out at a distance of over 130 miles just to ensure that en ac cannot
loc hy conc tps in this area.
(8) Extensive Engagements. When 4 Corps had reached Pokokku on
Irrawaddy it was difficult to hide such a hy conc of forces. Max ops
of 33 Corps at this pt were conducted to cross the river from three
different places by 20 Div, 2 Div and 19 Div. All these fmns
threatended Mandalay from north, each and west, thus forcing
Kimura to pay max attn towards Mandalay sector.
b. Results of Deception Plan
(1) Str of Force. Kimura completely failed to ascrertain the exact str in
Gangaw valley. He always believed that 4 Corps was on its way to
Mandalay on the left of 33 Corps.
(2) Pt of Decision. Kimura, considering Mandalay as the decisive
point, conc all his forces from entire Burma and wanted to def
Mandalay area. As a result, initially it was assumed that 14 Army
would enctr four divs and two bdes in Central Burma. But due to the
misreading of Kimura, the divs now conc around Mandalay were
nine with an addition of two bdes.
 (3) Weak Base / Fwd Conc. Due to this deception plan the rear of
Japanese def was completely naked. It could be understood that
Meiktila was attk on 28 Feb and captured on 3 Mar 45 before,
Kimura could react against it.
(4) Off Bal. The deception plan completely threw the en in Central
Burma off bal.
11. Exec New Plan. (Enforced on 26 Dec)

a. In the original plan, 19 Div brokeout from Sittang br H on 4 Dec and

captured Pinlebu on 16 Dec and was now driving towards Shwebo.
b. 20 Div brokeout from Mawlaik br H on 3 Dec and was driving SE.
c. 2 Div brokeout from Kalewa br H on 19 Dec and captured Pyingaing on
23 Dec.
d. New plan was enforced from 26 Dec 44.
e. Ye-U and its airfd was seized by the 2 Div on 2 Jan 1945. In next 24 hrs 2
Div estb br H over Mu river (just next to Ye-U in the east).
f. Linking of 2 Div with 19 Div was also estb NE of Ye-U
g. 19 Div then adv towards Shwebo and reached the town on 7 Jan 45.
h. Meanwhile 20 Div after breaking out from Mawlaik, cleared the opposn in
front of 2 Div along the main rd (east of Pyingaing) was now about to
reach Monywa.
j. 33 Corps was now trying to gain the western bank of lrrawaddy after
clearing Shwebo Plains.
k. 4 Corps
(1) Lushai Bde led the adv upto Gangaw and when it was captured on
10 Jan 45, the bde was flown out to India for rest.
(2) 28 East African Bde led the adv from thereon, fol by 7 Div after
maint due distance.
l. 33 Corps
(1) 19 Div had reached the Irrawaddy and the crossing began on 14 /
15 Jan opposite area east of Shwebo.
(2) Japanese took the crossing as of main 4 Corps in order to join 36
Div coming from the north (N.C.A.C).
(3) Kimura on assessment of his 15 Army Comd reinforced the loc with
more arty fmns and tps.
(4) Menawhile, 20 Div reached Monywa by 22 Jan and captured it. The
same day the remaining units of this fmn (not involved in fighting)
reached the Irrawaddy at Myinmu.
(5) Crossing of river by 20 Div started on 12 / 13 Feb 45. By 16 Feb the
buildup was almost complete.
m. 4 Corps
(1) On 28 Jan, Pauk fell and from here onwards 7 Div led the 4 Corps
adv.
(2) 7 Div reached Irrawaddy on 11 / 12 Feb 45.
(3) The date chosen for crossing was 13 / 14 Feb 45.
(4) Crossing was successful after an initial failure on 16 Feb 45, just
south of Pakokku.
(5) By 21 Feb the 7 Div (less bde left at Palel) was successfully
inducted into the br H, to relieve 17 Div.
n. 33 Corps. The str of fmns for 14 Army at Pakokku was a difficult
proposition to hide. Therefore, some threat to Mandalay from the north
and immediate west was nec to force Kimura not to det any Japanese fmn
to the south i.e. for Pakokku and Meiktila. Therefore :-
(1) 2 Div started its crossing over Irrawaddy river just east of Myinmu
at Allagapa (10 miles east of 20 Div br H, on 24/25 Feb 45. By 26
Feb two of its bdes had crossed. On 27/28 Feb, 14 Army was
instructed to destroy the Japanese forces around Mandalay.
(2) 20 Div was already south of Irrawaddy (west of 2 Div opposite gen
area Myinmu).
o. Mandalay Battle
(1) 19 Div was the first to go east of Irrawaddy from east of Shwebo
and started its adv towards Mandalay remaing east of the river.
(2) 15 Div (Japanese) opposing 19 Div was completely shattered and
disintegrated by 4 Mar 45.
(3) Mandalay was surrounded from north and east by 19 Div on 8 Mar
45. The third bde captured Maymyo (NE of Mandalay). Later it
joined rest of the 19 Div at Mandalay.
(4) 19 Div, thus cleared area Mandalay - Maymyo but also killed six
thousand Japanese by 15 Mar.
(5) One 2 Mar 45, 2 Div and 20 Div made contact south of Irrawaddy. It
was a potent force and a danger to Mandalay from the west while
19 Div from the NE. Hammer and anvil for Mandalay was
successful. 15 Japanese Div with other fmns at Mandalay were
almost smashed.
p. 4 Corps
(1) On 21 Feb 45, 17 Div brokeout from Pakokku br H (formed by
7 Div) towards Meiktila.
(2) On 28 Feb the out skirts were attk and by 3 Mar Meikitla was
captured.
 (3) Although the airstrip of the town was C attk by Japanese but was
retaken on 29 Mar 45.
(4) Loss of Meiktila was a vital blow to the Japanese.
12. Analysis
a. Conc of Force. Kimura very wisely avoided the battle in Shwebo
plains seeing the state of his forces. In order to contain Allied adv he conc
his forces at the likely cossing sites, watched the gaps and held enough
mob res to cater for unforseen.
b. Lack of Air Sp. Kimura was at a disadvantage in the open country by
not having requiste air sp and resourcers for recce. This gave a free hand
to 14 Army to mov and deceive the Japanese.
c. Shortage of Eqpt. Japanese were beaten back from Imphal-Kohima
and needed time to coup up their deficiencies in area and material.
Presently they had no rft from Japan rather all was from within Burma. 14
Army also not at ease and carried out the crossings of rivers with either
Burmesse boats or improvised expendients.
d. Lack of Info. Lack of info and B fd int resulted in Kimura's over conc of
forces at Mandalay.
Question 9
Give British deception plan for apch to Irrawaddy ?
Answer
1. After the decisive defeat at Imphal, the other imp factor which played the most
significant role in final defeat of Japanese was the "deception at Irrawaddy". British had
planned the deception skillfully and had exec it with brilliance. The Japanese were
totally deceived, thus caught unprep and off gd, which led to disaster. Maj deception
plan alongwith contributing factors is discussed in succeeding paras:-
2. Deception Plan
a. Back Ground. After the wdr from Imphal Kohima comd 14 Army aprc
that Japanese would occupy def posn over Chindwin. Basing on this
assumption Allies decided to destroy en forces at Shwebo plain by emp 4
Corps and 33 Corps from Sittang and Kalewa respectively. On the other
hand Japanese comd considering the conditions of his divs decided to wdr
and take posns behind Irrawaddy this compelled the British to change
their initial plan.
b. Plan. The changed plan depended on effective deception. The plan was
as under:-
(1) 33 Corps. To force crossing of the river west of Mandalay thus
drawing towards itself greatest possible conc of Japanese forces.
(2) 4 Corps. Mov secretly south up the Gangaw valley and
suddenly appear at Pakokku, seize a crossing and strike violently,
with armd and air borne force at Meiktila.
(3) The success of the plan could be ensured if Kimura could be
persuaded that 4 Corps was still moving into Shwebo plains on the
 lt of 33 Corps and any mov in Gangaw valley was merely a demo to
distract Japanese attn from attk on Mandalay.
c. This was a colossal task to conceal the mov of a complete corps over a
distance of 300 miles. To accomplish this task fol measures were taken
right from the outset:-
(1) Dummy HQ. A dummy 4 Corps HQ using the same wrls channels
was substituted at Tamu for the real one.
(2) Sigs Msgs. All sigs from 33 Corps to 19 Div (previously part of 4
Corps) had to be passed through the dummy 4 Corps HQ.
(3) Wrls Silence. The real 4 Corps was to keep wrls silence untill
op nec. Even when req it was to be ref as HQ 11 East African Div.
(4) Disinfo. Indiscreet conversations in clear between staff offrs
and operaters were arranged. Many indigenious devices were emp
to mislead the Japanese. News broadcasts were made inaccurate
refs about fmns engaged.
(5) Tfc. Vol of tfc was made to cfm, having both corps conc in
Shwebo area.
(7) Air. Complete air superiority was maint inorder to shoot down /
keep away any Japanese ac.
(8) Dispersion. 7 Div fol the ldg bde in Gangaw Valley was streched
out at a distance of over 130 miles just to ensure en ac cannot loc
hy conc of tps in this area.
d. Other Action / Measures Taken by 4 Corps
(1) Crossing Sites. 4 Corps planned to divert the en from real
crossing at Nyaungu as under:-
(a) Feint crossing opposite Chauk by 28 East African Bde.
(b) A demo at Pakokku.
(c) A demo at Pagan.
(2) Timmings. After some hesitation as to order of crossing the
river, it was decided that 4 Corps will make crossing just after 33
Corps. This was done to avoid any chance of detection.

Question 10 (IMPORTANT)
Give details of fol :-
a. Kimura's initial concept and plan for the battle of Irrawaddi.
b. How did he modify his concept and plan after 19 Div and started its
crossing.
c. How did he further modift his concept and plan when Maiktila was
captured by the British.
Answer
Answer 10 a
1. Background. After the decissive victory at Imphal - Kohima British had stared
planning for further ops. Gen Slim was in favour of continuing offensive ops as
offensives were likely to req to no greater manpower than would be needed to hold a
def line in north Burma. Moreso the Higher Comd had tasked 14 Army to dev, broaden
and protect air link to China. The best and quickest way to secure worthwhile comms
with China was to clear the en out of Burma and use Rangoon. Various contigencies
were being worked out at Army HQ. Finally, Plan Yellow out of various plans was
approved. It envisaged overland and air borne adv to secure Shwebo Plains. Gen Slim
wanted to fight the maj battle at Shwebo plain due to its inherent advantages of being
open country and a geat loop of land between two rivers. In Oct 1944 Gen Kawabe was
replaced by Gen Kimura. Gen Slim expected him to fight a def battle and 14 Army was
ready to take on adv towards Irrawaddi.
2. Gen Kimura's Concept. Gen Kimura decided that he could not in their
present state, risk the three battered divs from Imphal in a battle in the open. Assuming
4 and 33 Corps attk through Shwebo plain he ordered fol :-
(1) Gradual wdr behind the Irrawaddi.
(2) Only lt covering forces were lt behind to delay British adv.
(3) Conc max str against the 14 Army for Battle of Irrawaddi Shore to cripple
14 Army as it struggled to cross the river.
(4) Then with the help of monsoon destroy the British forces of 14 Army.
3. Plan. Japanese considerably reduced the 33 Army by sending the 2 divs back to
Meiktila and tfr 53 Div to 15 Army.
(1) 15 Army
(a) Mandalay - 15 & 53 Divs
(b) Sagaing - 31 Div
(c) Monywa & - 33 Div
Gangaw
(2) Res. 2 Div, 49 Div and 24 Bde became part of res. This res could be mov
north by rail or rd when req and served as a precaution against possible
British amph op in southern Burma.
Answer 10 b
1. Backgrounnd. Japanese confused by numerous feints and ptl crossings had not
been quick to decide about the actual sit. They still did know nothing about 4 Corps mov
south. Kimura still assumed 4 and 33 Corps in the Chindwin - Irrawaddi loop.
2. Concept. Kimura considered Irrawaddi sec against 14 Army as the most imp sec as
compared with north and Arakan sec. He decided to considerably denude str on these
secs to conc max effort against 14 Army in battle of Irrawaddi.
3. Plan. The sit called for drastic measures. Kimura took them. At one stroke
he decided to wdr the bulk of his force on all fronts to bring them against the 14 Army in
the Mandalay area. He ordered fol to wdr :-
 (1) From 33 Army. (Northern Front NCAC).
(a) Bulk of 18 Div.
(b) Regt ex 49 Div.
(2) From Arakan. He ordered 54 Div to march with speed and conc north of
Yenangyaung.
(3) From Southern Burma
(a) Remainder of 49 Div.
(b) One Regt ex 55 Div.
(c) Regt ex 2 Div on its way to Siam was turned back to central
Burma.
(4) The arrival of these fmns added to Japanese divs already opposing 14
Army and will give Kimura a force equivalent to 8 Japanese and 1/3 INA
divs against est Brithish 5 divs.
Answer 10 c
1. Background. 4 Corps mov stealthly towards south undetected. All crossings took
place as planned with tough resistance. Japanese were completely deceived. They
were still expecting British maj thrust against Mandalay. Meiktila was attk. British tps
faced sever resistance but captured on 3 Mar 1945.
2. Concept. He realized at once the fatal danger, he would be in, if he could not quickly
recover Meiktila. Meiktila was more imp than Mandalay. Reinforcing fmns, mov to the
Mandalay area from every part of Burma were diverted to Meiktila. Even some of the tps
already engaged against the Mandalay br Hs were pulled out of the fight and pitched
against this new danger.
3. Plan. The task of re-capturing Meiktila was entrusted to Lt Gen Honda with his 33
Army:-

(1) Cut L of C (British) to Meiktila on both sides of the Nyaungu br H.

(2) After the only L of C cut off the str Japanese forces will attk Meiktila.

(3) After attempt to capture Meiktila failed. Kimura tried to hold line Chauk -
Kyaukpadaung - Mt Popa - Myingyan - Kyaukse to reform his forces and to
cover wdr south or to make another attempt on Meiktila.

Question 11 (VERY IMPORTANT)

Analyse the Battle of Meiktila?
Answer
1. Background. The Japanese offensive at Imphal in the spring of 1944,
which suffered a repulse was a great setback but it was not crushing enough to break
their hold in Burma. Op Capital was an overland thurst by the Allies to recapture north
and central Burma. In mid Oct 1944, when the monsoon rain ceased and the gr dried
up, Fd Marshal Slim started the advance with 33 and 4 Corps. 33 Corps was to capture
Kalewa and Kalemyo and exploit SE to Monywa and Mandalay. 4 Corps mov in SE dir
in conjunction with 33corps.The aim of the offensive mnvr was to encircle and destroy
the en in the relatively open area of the Shwebo-Mandalay plains. By mid Dec 44, 33
Corps had estb a br H across river Chindwin near Kalewa and 4 Corps had advanced
upto Bunmauk. The lack of opposn indicated that the Japanese were wdr from Ye-U-
Shwebo-Mandalay plains and were falling back to river Irrawaddy. Slim therefore
re-casted his plan. 33 Corps was now to advance to Mandalay from the north and gain
crossing over the Irrawaddy and 4 Corps to advance upto Gangaw as stealthly as
possible and then mov to SE to gain a crossing over the lower Irrawaddy near Pakokku
and create a barrier near Meiktila across the rear of Japanese forces holding Mandalay
thus blocking their retreat towards the south and also cutting supes from Rangoon.
2. Topography. Meiktila, loc 320 miles north of Rangoon was the focal pt of
comm between central and southren Burma. Rd and rail routes from SE and west
converged on the city and again spread out to the north as extended fingers of hand
whose fist was the city of Meiktila.The city is approx 500ft above sea level and has
trees, bushes and scrubs all around. The two lakes in the north (Meiktila Lake) and
south (South lake) combined with area in between and to the west of the city were
marshy and broken thus serving as a natural barrier to any maj attk from the west and
south.The area between NE and SE was open and contain many deep irrigation
channels which restd mob of both wh and tr vehs. To the NE lay an imp airfd while on
the eastern side of the southern lake a hill, pt 799.
3. Significance of Meiktila. It hosted huge sup dumps, hospitals and other adm
centres and was the advance sup base for all the Japanese forces in north and central
Burma. Imp air fds whose seizure will result in the collapse of Japanese def strucure
were loc here.The capture of Meiktila would cut the routes going to central and north
Burma and cut the routes of wdr of all forces up to its north.
4. Plans
a. Japanese
(1) Strength and Composition. A total of 12,000 men commanded
by Gen Kasurya were depl in and around Meiktila. This compliment
was scattered in several dets, protect ammo dumps air fds and
important brs. The town of Meiktila was defended by approximately
5000 tps, their composn was as fol:-
(a) One bn ex 168 Regt ex 49 Div accidentaly reached before
Meiktila battle.
(b) 4 AD units totalling 2000 men.
(c) Mix collection of LOC units, sig, sup etc, 2500 men.
(d) Hospital patients 400-500.
(2) Def Preps. Gen Kasuya started preps for the def of Meiktila on
the first alarm and he had very little time to do it:-
(a) The defs were well prep with houses well defended,
concrete and earth covered strong pts presented a
formidable defence.
(b) The town was divided into sectors with the outer defs
extending in an oval shape into 3-4 miles all around it.
 (c) All Japanese tps in the town were issued with wpns and
ammo. Even patients in hospitals who could even stand on
one leg with crutches went into fighting line.The complete
town was ready to make the final stand.
b. Allied Forces. The plan of capture of Meiktila by two motorized bdes
of 17 Indian Division together with 255 Tk Bde was divided into five
phases:-
(1) Phase 1. Crossing of Irrawaddy and induction into br H estb by
7 Div.
(2) Phase II. Capture of Taungtha.
(3) Phase III. Capture of Mahlaing.
(4) Phase IV. Capture of Tabukhton air strip near Meiktila.
(5) Phase V. Capture of Meiktila through a three pronged attk. The
main attk from north and east.
(6) Tasks
(a) 255 Tk Bde. To carryout a flanking mov to the NE of the
town and then attk the air fds upto south lake.
(b) 48 Inf Bde ex 17 Div. To attk from main rd along
Mahlaing and secure area upto northern shore of the south
lake.
(c) 63 Bde. To attk from the west and capture western part
of the town.
(d) All rds leading upto Meiktila were to be blocked.
(e) Gr ops were to be sp by max aval air effort.
5. Conduct
a. Initial Phase till Meiktila
(1) 4 Corps attempted three br Hs on Irrawaddy at fol places:-
(a) Pakokku - Fient
(b) Nyaungu - Actual
(c) Chauk - Fient
(2) 17 Div (-) with 255 Tk Bde brokeout from the br H on 21 Feb
44.
(3) 63 Bde turned north and 17 Div captured Taungtha on 24
Feb 44.
(4) Malhaing was captured on 25 Feb 44 fol by seizure of airfd at
Thabukton on 26 Feb by 255 Tk Bde.
(5) 99 Bde was flown in on 27 Feb and guarded the airfd.
(6) By 28 Feb 44, 17 Div was poised for attk on Meiktila as fol :-
 (a) 63 Bde. Two miles west of the town.
(b) 48 Bde. North of the town.
(c) 255 Tk Bde. NE and east of the town.
b. Capture of Meiktila
a. On 1 Mar 44, all three bdes attk Meiktila simultaneously and made
progress as fol :-
(a) 255 Tk Bde. Bde made deep pen and cut the rd Meiktila -
Thazi and by 2 Mar it had secured the airfd and area east of
South Lake.
(b) 48 Bde. Bde mov on Rd Mahlaing - Meiktila and after clear
str opposn in the north of the city by 2 Mar had pushed the
Japanese to South Lake, thus capturing central town.
(c) Converging Attk. Eastern portion of town was cleared by a
converging attk of 255 Tk Bde and 48 Bde.
(d) 63 Bde. It mov from west of the town with hy arty and CS
fire and captured western town by 2 Mar. It estb a rd block
on Rd Chauk - Meiktila.
(e) Gains and Losses. By 3 Mar, tps converged to the centre
of the town consolidating their posns and next two days were
taken to sweep the minor resistances on all sides of the
town. Japanese were beaten and over 2000 killed with 200
cas to Allies only.
c. Japanese C Attk
(1) Force Aval. The task of recapturing Meiktila was given to Lt Gen
Honda with his 33 Army. He tried to org the hurriedly mov in forces
into these maj gps.
(a) 18 Div. It had tps coming from north.
i. 18 Div (-) from Northern Front.
ii. Regt ex 53 Div from Mandalay.
iii. Regt ex 33 Div from Pakokku.
(b) 49 Div. It had fol tps coming from south.
i. 49 Div (-) from Pegu.
ii. Regt ex 2 Div (joined later)
iii. Remenants of tk Regt and Arty units.
(c) Yamamoto's Force. This force was coming in from Arakan
with fol tps :-
i. 2x Bns ex 55 Div.
ii. 2x Bns ex 54 Div.
 (2) Plan
(a) To launch direct attk on Meiktila from north and SE by 18
and 49 Divs and seize the airfd.
(b) To cut Allied L of C by eliminating the crossing site at
Irrawaddy by a converging attk on both sides of river by
Yamamoto's Force.
(3) Conduct
(a) The attk on Meiktila did not make much progress but
Japanese were successful in reaching very close to airfd.
This stopped the air sup to Allies.
(b) AB Bde of 5 Div was flown in under hy en attks to Meiktila on
17 Mar and Japanese were pushed back from the aidfd but it
remained in dir range of their arty.
(c) The attk on west of Irrawaddy made some progress against
28 East African Bde.
(d) The attk on east of Irrawaddy petered out. But the rd to
Meiktila was blocked.
d. Consolidation. With the rd to Meiktila from the br H and air sup blocked
and Myingyan still occupied by Japanese 4 Corps was facing serious
problems of sups and comm. Fol actions were taken to consolidate their
posn between the Irrawaddy and Meiktila.
(1) Bde ex 5 Div at Meiktila airfd pushed the en away and the air fd
was opened by 29 Mar.
(2) 5 Div pushed fwd from the br H and cleared the rd block and
Thungtha thus clearing L of C.
(3) 7 Div after beating off the attk from the south, mov north and
captured the port city of Myingyan by 23 Mar.
(4) Japanese attk on 28 East African Bde from south was beaten off
with rfts of 2x bns.
6. Analysis
a. Role of Armour
(1) Terrain in Burma did not allow for the ideal emp of armour but the
British tk comds used their ingenuity and exploited the
aggressiveness, shock action, speed and mob of tks. Conversely,
the Japanese appreciated that distances and difficult terrain would
cause hy cas to tks and with inadequate repair facilities, the bulk
would not be brought into action. The Japanese were also
exhausted by the extreme heat on the barren treeless slopes north
of Meiktila and wondered why it did not deter the Sherman tk
crews. These aspects not withstanding the Japanese commanders
also claimed that (and may be as a result of the surprise achieved
by the Allied forces) they did not get enough time to prep their def
against the armour threat.
 (2) The Japanese had only one tank battalion in the Burmese theatre
which was in res against the threat to Mandalay. This force was
picked up by the British ac on 19 Feb and 11 tks were destroyed.
(3) Allied comds made optimum use of tanks by emp them in
combination with mech infantry and self-propelled artillery. Mass
frontal attacks with maximum fire power created the desired shock
effect.
b. Role of Air
(1) Close Air Support
(a) A very high degree of cooperation was achieved between
the United States and British Air forces and the Allied ground
forces. The air almt for Meiktila was based on and
successful due to this close cooperation.
(b) The Allies had achieved air supremacy before the battle of
Meiktila and targets were attacked at will, with medium and
heavy bombers. northeither the Japanese air forces nor the
air defence elements were able to deter the Allied air attack.
(c) The Japanese had a sufficiently high std of passive air
defence, but considerable effort was spent in taking
precautionary measures at the cost of their fighting energy.
Elaborate arrangements had to be made to move men and
material and was only at ni.
(2) Air Transported Operations
(a) The Allies made extensive use of air supply. Success in the
battle of Meiktila may not have been possible without air
supply as most tps were being sustained through aerial
drops. The distance from Irrawady to Meitkila was 82 miles
and such a long line of comumication could not be
maintained and protected in hostile country
(b) 99 Brigade was air transported from the Imphal plain to
Thabutkon in only 6 days, which shows how effective air
transport operations were.
c. Surprise and Deception. The move of IV Corps from north to the south
was done very carefully and total surprise was achieved. At Corps level,
the main crossing of the Irrawady was depicted at Seikpyu,opp the
important oil town of Chauk. Whereas the Division deception plan was to
simulate its objective as Pakokku which was 40 miles up the River from
Seikpyu. Both these feints were extremely successful. The Japanese
counter attacked the feints at Chauk and Pakokku and the place of the
actual attack was left thinly held.
d. Speed. 17 Division along with 255 Tank Brigade captured Meiktila
with lightning speed. Their advance from the Irrawady, in the face of heavy
opposition and over a distance of 82 miles, in only 12 days was
commendable. The speed of Allied operations unbalanced the Japanese
and due to this imbalance, they could neither offer adequate resistance
 nor prepare the defences of Meiktila or divert additional troops for its
defence.
e. Logistics. The Allied line of communication was over stretched and
exposed to interference by the Japanese but the use of air transport by
the Allies and a very effective logistic system, enabled them to overcome
this shortcoming.
f. Training. 17 Division was one of the finest fighting outfits operating in
Burma. It had the unique experience of fighting the entire Burmese
campaign. The Division was raised in August 1941. It was extensively
trained and converted into a hard hitting fighting machine because of
realistic and extensive training.
g. Principles of War. Some of the principles of war that were adhered to or
violated by the adversaries are listed below:-
(1) Offensive Action. Rapidity in action and bold emp of forces with
max fire power was an important contributor to the success at
Meiktila.The failed to effectively coordinate and launch any c attks
against the Allies.
(2) Conc of Forces. The conc use of IV Corps for the attk against
Meiktila surprised the en both from the pt of view of the speed of
conc and the superiority of tps conc for the attk.
(3) Security. The Allied forces managed the security of their force
very aptly. When conc around Meiktila, they sent out ptls to gain
info about the en def but also ensured the security of their own
force through perimeter ptl. Likewise after the capture of Meiktila str
mech teams went on search and destroy msns to prevent the from
launching c attks.

Question 12 (IMPORTANT)
Briefly explain 14 Army Comd's plan for advance on Rangoon and explain the factors /
reasons which led to this plan. Also give the conduct of the advance and carryout its
analysis?
Answer
1. Background. In Mar 1945, the battle of Central Burma was drawing to its close,
yet Kimura refused to admit defeat. His forces were shattered and mostly disorg. The
Allies were in the process of mopping up and making "Union Jack" mnvrs in Meiktila
area. 14 Army Comd was now ready to race for Rangoon and wanted to beat the
monsoons, as they would hinder the advance of his forces seriously and disrupt his L of
C.
2. Area of Ops. The area south of Meiktila was open country with two maj axes ldg
to Rangoon. The Irrawaddy axis along the river and rly axis which ran along the rly line
and rd to Rangoon from Meiktila. Pegu Yomas was restd country. The area was
crisscrossed with numerous water channels.The main built up areas were Magwe,
Pyinmana,Toungoo, Pegu and Rangoon.
3. Composn of Forces

a. Allied
(1) 4 Corps
(a) 5 Div.
(b) 17 Div.
(c) 255 Tk Bde.
(2) 33 Corps
(a) 7 Div.
(b) 20 Div.
(3) 19 Div under dir con of 14 Army.
b. Japanese
(1) 33 Army
(a) 18 Div.
(b) 49 Div.
(c) 53 Div.
(2) 15 Army
(a) 15 Div.
(b) 31 Div
(c) 33 Div.
(d) 56 Div (wdr from Chinese Front)
(3) 28 Army
(a) 54 Div.
(b) 55 Div.
(c) 2nd INA Div.
4. Factors Ldg to the Plan of 14 Army. Fol factors affected the plan of 14 Army
for advance to Rangoon :-
a. Maint
(1) 14 Army at the end of Mar 45 had seven Divs but only three Divs
and two tk bdes could be maint with any degree of rapidity.
(2) This problem of maint created shortage of tps and did not allow the
advance in str on two axes i.e. Railway and Irrawaddy River.
(3) If Rangoon was not taken before monsoons the maint of forces by
rd, air or even air drops would be impossible.
 b. Speed. It was an essential elm in planning and necessitated fol:-
(1) Advance along two axes.
(2) Avoidance of elaborate attks.
(3) Risk of en pockets being by passed.
c. Morale. Inspite of great difficulties of log and tps engaged in cont
fighting, the moral of 14 Army was high and they were greatly in an
offensive mood. It helped the Army Comd in formulating the plan.
d. Amph Op. Although initially refused but was later promissed by SEAC.
It gave an insurance to Army Comd against defeat of his mov, yet ultimate
aim of taking Rangoon still being achieved.
5. 14 Army Plan. Having analysed the above mentioned factocs 14 Army Comd
finalized his plan, to advance on two axes with main on rly axis and sec on river. The
plan was as fol:-
a. Mopping Up and Regrouping (Union Jack Mnvr). In order to clear the
area between Meiktila and Mandalay and regroup the forces fol was
ordered:-
(1) 5 Div from NW to SE.
(2) 2 and 20 Div from NE to SW in Irrawaddy Valley from where 2 Div
would go back to India.
(3) 7 Div already in Irrawaddy Valley to pass from 4 Corps to 33 Corps.
(4) 19 Div to be undercomd Army and clear up remenants.
b. Advance
(1) 4 Corps to advance on rly axis.
(2) 33 Corps to advance on Irrawaddy axis initially with 7 Div, to be
joined later by 20 Div.
(3) 19 Div to protect lt flank and L of C of 4 Corps.
c. Sup
(1) Tps south of Toungoo to be sup by air.
(2) Only one Div of 33 Corps to be sp by air, remanider by inland water
tpt.
6. Japanese Plan. Towards the end of Mar 45, Kimura at last accepted defeat in
Central Burma. He now planned to def southern Burma as fols:-

a. 15 Army. With its remanents to collect in Shan Hills with 56 Div and
head for Toungoo and prep its def.
b. 33 Army. To hold Pyawbwe astride rd and rly to Toungoo.
c. 28 Army. To prevent the advance of 14 Army along Irrawaddy at or
north of Yenang Yaung.
 d. 56 Div. To c attk from Shan Hills the flank of any Allied advance to
south.
7. Conduct
a. Irrawaddy Axis
(1) Union Jack mnvr by 2 Div was completed by 26 Mar.
(2) On 12 Apr,7 Div captured Kaukpadaung.
(3) 20 Div after being mech seized Taungdwingyi on 12 Apr.
(4) Magwe and Yenangyanng fell by 22 Apr.
(5) Allanmyo was taken on 28 Apr.
(6) On 1 May 20 Div was starting its advance to Prome and Rangoon,
when monsoons started.
b. Rly Axis
(1) Advance started with 17 Div and 255 Tk Bde on 30 Mar.
(2) Pyawbye was captured by 11 Apr.
(3) The battle of Pyawbye shattered the Japanese and settled the fate
of Rangoon.
(4) 5 Div cont advance from 11 Apr onwards.
(5) Pyinmana was taken on 19 Apr.
(6) Karen Guerrillas started ambush of forces mov from Shan Hills to
Toungoo.
(7) Toungoo was crashed into on 22 Apr.
(8) 17 Div again took the lead at Penwegon on 25 Apr.
(9) Kimura mov his HQ to Moulmein.
(10) On 1 May Pegu was taken.
(11) Monsoon started and everything halted at its place on Ist May, 41
miles from Rangoon.
(12) 15 Corps launched its offensive on 2 May and captured Rangoon
on 3 May.
(13) On 6 May 26 Div from Rangoon and 4 Corps from north linked up
at Hlegu.
8. Analysis
a. Maint of Aim. Having decided to take Rangoon Allies never forgot
there aim inspite of the overwhelming problems of en resistance and log.
They kept mov without rest and even on half rations towards Rangoon.
b. Offensive Action. Since the defeat of Japanese in Imphal battle Allies
never allowed them to gain time and prep another str def line. They were
always on the offensive and did not let Kimura reorg his armies.
c. Speed. The experience of monsoons during retreat in 1942 had
taught a big lesson to the Allies. They also realized the length of their log
sp line which would be choked during monsoons. This demanded the
attainment of final obj i.e Rangoon before the onset of monsoons in order
to deny Japanese armies time to reorg and gain str. Speed was maint by
14 Army at all costs even by leaving str en pockets behind them.
d. Flexibility. Excellent trg during their stay in India resulted in flexibility in
tps. They shifted from one Corps to another and from one axis to another
without hindering the ops. This aspect was even realized by comds in
planning. The mov of 33 Corps on Irrawaddy axis was only to gain
flexibility in the plan for advance to Rangoon.
e. Morale. The offensive spirit and cont success raised the morale of
the tps. They carried on without much rest and rfts because they wanted
to reach Rangoon. Their final obj. It was only possible with a high degree
of morale.
f. Int. The int and gaining of info about the plans and mov of Japanese
through locals and people loyal to Britishers played its role.Kimura's mov
to Moulmein and having no intention to fight at Rangoon are few
examples.
g. Local Sp. The timely launching of Karan Guerillas against the 15 Army
of Japanese mov into Toungoo from Shan Hills was a serious set back to
Japanese.
h. Amph Op. The amph attk by 15 Corps was a great insurance to 14
Army. Even once they could not reach the final obj in time Rangoon was
taken by 3 May 45.