in the neighborhood of destroyers.

The system has made it harder also

for underwater craft to attack with the since the submarine once
torpedo,
sighted cannot always shake off pursuit and may be rammed, or sunk by depth
bombs. Ships, however, have been picked out of a convoy and sunk by torpedo.
In many cases, too, the convoy formation has not been successfully maintained,
and then U-boats have attacked laggards. Massed attacks upon convoys have
taken place with varying results. The Germans claim to be able to pick out one
or two vessels from each merchant ship convoy, but convoys of transports
from the United States to Europe have been remarkably free from loss. It is
true, however, that about nine destroyers are used to convoy three or four
transports and that U-boats cannot pierce the cordon. In the Mediterranean,
where there is a greater shortage of destroyers available for such service, there
have been most serious losses in convoyed and escorted vessels. A U-boat
in the Mediterranean was able, it was said, to sink four steamers belonging
to one group. In mid-October, 1918, three ships were sunk from one convoy two
days out from Liverpool. The destruction of the Carpathia and Justicia,
while in convoy, illustrates the possibility of successful U-boat attack. When
submarines are provided with weapons or means which enable them to pick a
ship out of a convoy without the necessity for periscopic observations, then will
the group system be indeed mortally vulnerable.

While the convoy system, when applicable, has succeeded in cutting ship
losses materially, it is in every element a very expensive operation and the
Allies would not like to look forward to carrying it on for some years. In spite
of the attempt to group ships into convoys of corresponding speeds, the delays
due to assembling and marshaling in transit the large groups are truly appal
ling. A voyage of a slow convoy from the United States to Europe takes any
where from 18 to 28 days. A fast convoy can cross the Atlantic in about 12
days, whereas a big passenger liner alone covers the distance in six days, and
most vessels so traveling would consume only about 10 days. It happens also,
despite the best intent, that high-speed vessels are compelled to steam with slow
ones. The yearly carrying capacity or effective tonnage crossing the Atlantic in
convoy is thereby cut down seriously. Furthermore, mishaps are frequent. The
number of marine accidents within the last year, due in a large measure to the
dangers incident to the convoy system, has risen seriously. Vessels often drop
out of a convoy on one pretext or another to avoid the incident vexations. In
order to keep the vessels of different classes at certain relative positions their
engineers must frequently change the speed of the engines. The practice of con
stantly changing speeds is very harmful to the mechanisms and causes a
waste of coal and oil fuel. According to the London "Times" of April 9, 1918,
merchant ships had then to remain half again as long as was necessary in har
bors because it was not possible to get cargoes unloaded rapidly enough. A
well known shipping member of Parliament compiled figures for thirty trips of
his steamers and found that through delays fully twenty-five per cent. of the
available time for each ship was lost.
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