Vargas v. Atty. Ignes, Atty. Mann, Atty. Viajar and Atty.

Nadua
A.C. No. 8096
July 5, 2010

FACTS:
KWD, a GOCC, hired respondent, Atty. Ignes, as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective with
the consent of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA).
The controversy erupted when two (2) different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Peñ a board and
Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD. Dela Peñ a board appointed
respondents Atty. Nadua, Viajar and Mann as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its
Board of Directors, under the direct supervision and control of Atty. Ignes. Meanwhile, the OGCC had
approved the retainership contract of Atty. Cunanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired. The termination of Atty. Ignes’ contract was said to be
justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the
new Board of Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty. Ignes’ services and requested to hire
another counsel. Complainants then filed a disbarment complaint against counsels Viajar and Mann alleging
that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Nadua, Atty. Viajar, Atty. Mann and Atty. Ignes acted without authority

HELD:
Yes. Attys. Nadua, Viajar and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of
KWD. Nothing in the records shows that Atty. N was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. There is no
proof that the OGCC and COA approved their engagement as legal counsel or collaborating counsel. In the case
of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had
expired.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and
should be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or
fine, would accomplish the end desired.
Sps. Agbulos v. Gutierrez
GR No. 176530
June 16, 2009

FACTS:

On October 16, 1997, respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the
RTC a complaint against petitioners for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance
and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight
hectare parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo
Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez
executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. Based on the notation at
the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

In an Order dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners' motion and dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction. Respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration which the RTC denied. Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which gave
due course to the same. The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a
letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to
receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition.
She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they
would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was still in America.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed
the notice of appeal without respondents' knowledge and consent.

HELD:
No. A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client
before the appellate court, Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption. A reading of respondent Elena
Garcia's letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitang's authority to
represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they
would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or
impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first appearance and validates the action taken by
him. Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and
retention of benefits flowing therefrom. Respondents' silence or lack of remonstration when the case was
finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
Manangan v. CFI
GR No. 82760
August 30, 1990

FACTS:
In this case, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/ Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for
being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for contempt of Court.

The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal
shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in
Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on
September 29, 1971 in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on
the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the
latter's death, assumed the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of
Filemon Manangan.

By means thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even
the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon Manangan which states that he was admitted to
the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as Legal
Officer I in the Bureau of Lands."

ISSUE:
W/N the present petition should be strike out for being fictitious

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also disclosed
in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the change of his name from Andres
Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his
entire school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres
Culanag, the latter being his real name. The impersonation was carried to the extreme when, in petitioner's
Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused had
died before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death of the real Filemon
Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in the several
pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal Case.

For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and
pleadings, thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve
(12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his real name is Andres Culauag, petitioner has
brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment for contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has
filed likewise calls for dismissal.
Lemoine v. Balon
AC No. 5829
October 28, 2003

FACTS:
Lemoine is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance.His friend
Jesus Garcia arranged for the engagement of Balon’s services as his counsel Balon advised Lemoine that he
was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful recovery. An advance
payment of P50,000 to be deducted from whatever amount would be successfully collected. P1,000 as
appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearing and legal expenses and other
miscellaneouswill be charged to Lemoine’s account which would be reimbursed upon presentment of
account. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.
Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against
Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoine’s claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise,
encash and receive payments Metropolitan Insurance offered tosettle Lemoine’s claim and Balon confirmed
his acceptance of the offer December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to
Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon.
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance
was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid
litigation.December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case
and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorney’s
lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his attorney’s fee equivalent to 50% ofthe entire amount collected. He also
threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with
the mentioned agencies.Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of
Lemoine.No written memorandum of the turn-over was made because Garcia was a co-Rotarian and co-
attorney of Balon. Balon was in possession of the said check for 5 years.

ISSUE:
W/N Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:
Yes. The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the
amount of attorney’s fees to e charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily
apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file the necessary action with the proper
court to fix the feesBefore receiving the check, he proposes a 25% attorney’s fees, after receiving the check, he
was already asking for 50%.Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful acts , must observe fairness.
People v. Godoy
GR No. 115908-09
March 29, 1995

FACTS:
Esutaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., a judge of RTC of Palawan, filed a complaint against Mauricio Reynose Jr., a
columnist and Eva P. de Leon, a publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan
Times for indirect contempt. His Honor’s plaint is based in article written by respondent Reynoso in his
column, “On the Beat” and published in July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper.
The article was written based on the resolution of a separate case People of the Philippines v. Danny
Godoy. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade, and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting,
offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as
a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is
biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending
automatic review.

ISSUE:
W/N there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statement or publication?

HELD:
Whether contempt may still be committed after the tribunal court has already rendered a decision
can be based in the Philippine rule that in the case of post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of
the court, its proceeding and its member, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if publication is attended by either of these two circumstance: (1)
where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. These two circumstances is not present in the instant case, hence
the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for indirect contempt against the respondent.
In the matter of the application for Habeas Corpus of Maximino Gamido vs. New Bilibid Prison
GR No. 146783
July 29, 2002

FACTS:
Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416
William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as counsel for petitioner Maximino B. Gamido.

ISSUES:
W/N Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel for petitioner in this case, considering allegations
that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar.

HELD:
No. Considering representations by the self-styled counsel for petitioner that he, Espiridion J. Dela
Cruz, is a lawyer with a law office bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila,
and for this purpose he used the title of attorney and indicated in his pleadings filed before this Court an IBP
number, which turned out to be spurious, it having been shown and admitted by him that he is not a member
of the Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar Confidant, after he was made to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as counsel in this case without license to practice law,
and although he asked the Court for forgiveness for the wrong he had done, the Court resolved to declare
Espiridion J. Dela Cruz guilty of Indirect Contempt of this Court.
Halili v. CIR
GR No. L- 28464
November 19, 1985

FACTS:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus drivers and
conductors of Halili Transit. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan,
Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE)requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property. Atty. Espinas, (the original counsel)
established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an
associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name “B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the
impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases. Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme
Court but relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion,
praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the
execution of an escrow agreement

ISSUE:
W/N not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.

HELD:
Yes. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties’ litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for
such authority to sell the property makes the entire transaction dubious and irregular. Significantly Atty.
Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did
not possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for valid authority but
instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so
authorize. Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to
imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
Montecillo v. Gico
60 SCRA 234

FACTS:
Montecillo was accused by Gica of slander. Atty. del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully
defended Monteceillo in the lower court. The Court of Appeals reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a
motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that
he thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar
then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CAthe CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.

Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case,
but SC denied both. Del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”. Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court
justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and
regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. It is manifest that Atty. Del Mar
has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding
a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Nunez v. Ibay
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984
June 30, 2009

FACTS:
A judge cited complainant, a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall, in
contempt for using the former’s parking space, and refused to accept the driver’s apology. He sentenced the
driver to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00.

ISSUE:
W/N the judge is administratively liable for grave abuse of authority in citing the driver for contempt
of court

HELD:
Yes. The Court does not see how the improper parking by the driver could even in the remotest
manner disrupt the speedy administration of justice. At most, it would cause the Judge inconvenience or
annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the acts for which a person could be cited for contempt.
Neither does it appear from the records, nor from the evidence presented, that the complainant intended any
disrespect toward respondent Judge. Worse, the Judge immediately detained the driver, thereby preventing
him from resorting to the remedies provided under the Rules of Court. Such abusive behavior on the part of
respondent judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office, but also to his personal demeanor.
Tan v. Balajadia
G.R. No. 169517
March 14, 2006

FACTS:
Balajadia filed a criminal case against Tan. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, Balajadia
appeared to have asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer”. However, certifications issued by the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the IBP showed that he has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, Tan filed a
case against him claiming that he is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer. In
defense, Balajadia claimed that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He stated
that the secretary of Atty. Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit copying in verbatim paragraph 5
of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It was inadvertently alleged that he was a “practicing lawyer in Baguio
City” which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

ISSUE:
W/N Balajadia liable for indirect contempt

HELD:
No. Balajadia never intended to represent himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear
inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty. Aquino. The allegation that he is a practicing lawyer cannot,
by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt.