Tarlac State University

School of Law
A.Y. 2020-2021

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

Case Digests

Tenth Week

Rochelle M. Del Monte

IV - A
1. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig, G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014

Facts:

Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of
lease over a parcel of land. However, later on, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the
Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the
bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. After being informed, Lui Enterprises wrote
to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’srent.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader
with the RTC of Makati. It alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental
payments. It also prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to
litigate their conflicting claims.

For failure to timely file its answer, Lui Enterprises was declared in default. However, it
argued that the interpleader case was filed to compel Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications to litigate their claims. Thus, declaring the other claimant in default would
ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring petitioner in default

Ruling:

NO. A person may file a special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are
made against him or her over a subject matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is
brought against the claimants to compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among
themselves.

Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves.

An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting
claims over the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or
her from "double vexation in respect of one liability.” He or she may file the interpleader case to
extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants’
dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves.

Here, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent.
Its purpose in filing the interpleader case was not defeated when the Makati trial court declared
Lui Enterprises in default.

An adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule 62,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within the
required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the default is that the
court may "render judgment barring the defaulted claimant from any claim in respect to the
subject matter.” The Rules would not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be declared
in default if it would "ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.”

The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to
answer the complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order
of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed
to prove the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set aside
the order of default.
2. Sabitsana v. Muertegui, G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013

Facts:

In 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) sold a parcel of land to Juanito Muertegui (Juanito)
through an unnotarized deed of sale. Thereafter, in 1991, Garcia sold the same parcel of land to
Atty. Sabitsana.

The, Juanito filed an action for quieting of title against Atty. Sabitsana, alleging the
latter’s bad faith. Atty. Sabitsana sought to dismiss the same arguing, among others, that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the property has an assessed value of P1,230 which
is less than the jurisdictional amount.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

YES. The present case falls under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which provides that an
action to quiet of title to real property or remove cloud therefrom must be filed with the Regional
Trial Courts.

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’
August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to
prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No.
B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief,
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

The main relief sought in a suit for quieting of title is to obtain a declaration of the
complainant’s rights; thus, it is an action for declaratory relief. Therefore, jurisdiction lies with
the Regional Trial Court regardless of the property’s assessed value.
3. Ferrer Jr. v. Roco Jr., G.R. No. 174129, July 05, 2010

Facts:

Mr. Robert L. Obiedo of Peñafrancia Memorial Park Corporation or "PMPC" (formerly

ARE Square Realty Development Corporation) applied for Development Permit for the
development of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park located at Barangay Balatas. However, this
application is subject to the condition of a favorable endorsement by the HLURB.

However, before the HLURB was able to act on the application, petitioners filed an
action for declaratory relief questioning the resolutions issued by respondents.

On the other hand, respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground that it was
premature for violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue:

Whether or not the action is premature

Ruling:

YES. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and
for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a
petition is the question of construction or validity of the provisions in an instrument or statute.

It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:

1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;

2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;

3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;

4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;

5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
 In this case, the HLURB has not yet acted upon the application for Development Permit.
The HLURB is the sole regulatory for housing and development. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, it must first be allowed to take appropriate action on the matter
before the courts may be allowed to resolve the controversy.

The issue being premature, and there being other adequate relief, the case was properly
dismissed.
4. Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012

Facts:

Former President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 7 which provided for
the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position
classification system for GOCCs and GFIs and suspend the grant of allowances, bonuses and
incentives to the members of the Board of Directors/Trustees of said GOCCs and GFIs.

Petitioner, an employee of the PhilHealth, stating that he will be affected by the

implementation of EO 7, questioned its constitutionality through a petition for certiorari.

Respondents sought to dismiss the petition on the ground, among others, that petition for
certiorari was not the proper remedy.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to question the
constitutionality of EO 7

Ruling:

NO. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial,
quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy.

The proper remedy is a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC):

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of against a tribunal, body or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Here, the President, in issuing EO 7, did not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to

determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks
the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance
and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

As such, this petition must necessarily fail, as this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.
5. Malana v. Tappa, G.R. NO. 181303, September 17, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title,
and Damages against respondents. However, before the respondents could file their answer, the
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction when it found out that the assessed value of the
real property was less than P20,000; hence, it is not within the jurisdictional amount set forth
under BP 129, as amended.

Petitioners claim that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners'
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction

Ruling:

NO. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a
will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
 An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" -
that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory
relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of BP 129, as amended, uses the word "shall" and
explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which
involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action
for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.
A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form
of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

Here, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. Jurisdiction over such an action would
depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued
only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.
6. Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

Facts:

Under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), funds are released to senators to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. The funds under the DAP were usually
taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3)
carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving
items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.

Petitioners, through a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65,
assail the constitutionality of the DAP and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing
the DAP.

Issue:

Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies for this case

Rule:

YES. The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar
remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as
it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue
the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules
of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that
purpose, viz:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard,
mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction,
certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for
the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or
proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,

officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering
said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in
orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.
7. Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) v. Acosta, G.R. No. 195320, April 23, 2018

Facts:

Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron) filed an administrative claim for refund or credit
with the BIR. The BIR did not act on the claim; hence, Chevron elevated the same to the CTA
First Division which partially granted the same.

BIR filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for being pro forma. It filed
another motion for reconsideration which was also denied for lack of merit.

BIR did not appeal the case, hence, the decision became final and executory. Thereafter,
BIR filed the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed

Ruling:

YES. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action
of certiorari may only be invoked when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law.

A writ of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. When an appeal is

available, certiorari will not prosper especially if the appeal was lost because of one's own
negligence or error in the choice of remedy, even if the ground is grave abuse of discretion.

Under the Rules of Court, the remedy against a final judgment or order is an appeal. For
cases before the CTA, a decision rendered by a division of the CTA is appealable to the CTA En
Banc as provided by Section 18 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282.

The main issue resolved by the CTA First Division in the Decision dated July 12, 2010
was Chevron's entitlement to refund or credit. In its decision, the CTA First Division found
sufficient basis for Chevron's claim and partially granted the petition. As to the second motion
for reconsideration, the CTA First Division ruled on the merits of the motion and denied the
BIR's argument as to the liberal application of the rules.

Clearly, the CTA First Division disposed of the case in its entirety and no other issues
were left to further rule upon. Therefore, the appropriate remedy to challenge the Resolution is
an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.

BIR had every opportunity to elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc but chose not to
avail itself of this remedy. Hence, the petition must be dismissed.
8. Ampatuan Jr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013

Facts:

In the course of the proceedings in the filing of informations for murder against petitioner
and other accused, petitioner, through counsel wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De
Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Kenny
Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Kenny Dalandag was listed as
one of the prosecution witnesses.

Respondent Secretary De Lima denied the request. Accordingly, petitioner brought a

petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag
as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not public respondents may be compelled by mandamus to investigate and

prosecute a person

Ruling:

NO. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government

whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the
discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on various factors that are
best appreciated by the public prosecutors.

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice,
exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."

While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily,
but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. The admission of Dalandag into the
Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness was not done arbitrarily.

Hence, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of

petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-
request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request,
mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
9. Republic v. O.G. Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 189290, November 29, 2017

Facts:

EMB-Region 7 issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the Panglao

Island Nature Resort Corporation for the beach resort project owned and operated by O.G.
Holdings, with Frederick L. Ong as President (Ong).

Thereafter, O.G. Holdings proceeded to develop and operate the project. However, due to
continuous and multiple violations of the conditions set forth in the ECC, EMB-Region 7
suspended the subject ECC.

O.G. Holdings moved for reconsideration, but due to its failure to comply with the
conditions, EMB-Region 7 issued the second suspensive order. O.G Holdings no longer moved
for reconsideration. Instead, it files a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari may prosper

Ruling:

NO. A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party

can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This well-
established rule is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual
or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case. While there are well-recognized exceptions to the rule, none is said to be present here. For
one thing, O.G. Holdings did not specifically plead any of them in its petition for certiorari.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be
made with the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts for review. If a remedy
within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide a controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before
going to court. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is obliged pursuant to comity and
convenience which in turn impel courts to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with. The issues that an administrative
agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a
court without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues.

O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine. Administrative remedies existed against
the suspension of the subject ECC, made available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30,
Series of 2003 (A.O. No. 30), which was prevailing at the time of the suspensive orders.
 O.G. Holdings should have filed an administrative appeal on the suspension of the beach
resort project's ECC, beginning with the Office of the EMB Director. Indeed, the administrative
machinery afforded even an appeal to the Office of the President, but O.G. Holdings did not
avail of such.

Moreover, factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, which is limited to the
issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. Yet to argue grave abuse of discretion, O.G.
Holdings presented the appellate court with factual matters that do not appear, at least on record,
to have been shared or even passed upon by EMB Region-7.

As stated by the Supreme Court:

In a special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, factual issues may not be brought before us. Here petitioner's submission, however,
shows that he is raising issues concerning alleged errors and misapprehensions of facts
committed by the Court of Appeals. These are not correctible by certiorari under Rule 65. The
only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It is not the office of a writ of certiorari to correct errors of fact or law
which the lower court may have committed. An error of judgment committed by a court in the
exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion.

Finally, the CA erred in ruling that EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez had acted
in grave abuse of discretion. Time and again we have held that a petition for certiorari will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. Abuse of discretion
is grave if it is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Here, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez
when they suspended the ECC for the Panglao Island Nature Resort Corporation. Indeed, even
mere abuse of discretion in the act is absent, as it came on the heels of a recommendation from
the EIA Division and was provoked by O.G. Holdings' continuous noncompliance with
Condition No. 2.2 of the ECC. Such noncompliance is a violation that the National
Environmental Protection Council, now the Environmental Management Bureau, was authorized
to penalize.
10. Republic v. Dimarucot, G.R. No. 202069, March 07, 2018

Facts:

The RTC of Guimba rendered a Decision declaring Respondents' marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the Notice
of Hearing annexed to the MR erroneously set the same for hearing on July 6, 2010 instead
of August 6, 2010 as the OSG later explained.

For the reason that the motion was filed only on July 27, 2010, while the hearing thereof
was set on July 6, 2010, the RTC denied the motion. The Republic then filed a Notice of Appeal,
but the same was denied for being filed out of time since the MR was a pro-forma motion which
did not interrupt the running of the period.

Hence, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition because it was filed without the benefit of a motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari

Ruling:

YES. A prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary for a petition for certiorari to
prosper in cases where such motion would be useless.

It is true that this Court has ruled that "certiorari, as a special civil action will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors.” However, this general rule is subject to well-defined
exceptions, thus:

Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are
well-defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as:

[i] where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

[ii] where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;
 [iii] where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable;

[iv] where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

[v] where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

[vi] where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;

[vii] where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

[viii] where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and

[ix] where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The denial of the Republic's Notice of Appeal through the September 2010 RTC Order
was premised on the RTC's earlier finding that the MR was a pro-forma motion due to non-
compliance with Rule 15. As well, it is necessary to emphasize that the September 2010 RTC
Order explicitly states that the RTC Decision had "attained finality" because the Republic's MR
did not toll the Republic's period to appeal.

Clearly, the Republic's direct resort to the CA via certiorari was warranted under the
circumstances, as it was led to believe that seeking reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC
Order would have been a useless exercise. The CA thus erred when it caused the outright
dismissal of the CA Petition solely on the basis of the Republic's failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration.
11. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., GR. No. 196072,
September 20, 2017

Facts:

Steamship was a Bermuda-based Protection and Indemnity Club. It insures its members-
shipowners against third party risks and liabilities. Sulpicio insured its fleet of inter-island
vessels with Steamship, one (1) of these vessels was the M/V Princess of the World.

M/V Princess of the World was gutted by fire while on voyage.

Sulpicio claimed indemnity from Steamship. Steamship denied the claim and subsequently
rescinded the insurance coverage of Sulpicio's other vessels on the ground that Sulpicio was
grossly negligent.

Sulpicio filed a complaint against Steamship, one of its officers, and its local insurance
agents. Steamship filed its Motion to Dismiss and/or to Refer Case to Arbitration pursuant to the
ADR Law, and to Rule 47 of the 2005/2006 Club Rules, which supposedly provided for
arbitration in London of disputes between Steamship and its members.

The RTC in its decision, denied the motion; it was later on affirmed by the CA.
Steamship elevated the case through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA failure to rule that a valid arbitration agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not petition for review on certiorari was proper

Ruling:

YES. The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65. Rule 45, Section 1 is clear that:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the Court of
Appeals even if the error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law.
"The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one
of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal.”
 Allegations in the petition of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
do not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. As held by the Supreme Court:

Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be
deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The
distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a
petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of
judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings; where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the
case an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

Here, what Steamship seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the CA.
These errors pertain to Steamship's allegations of the CA’s failure to rule that a valid arbitration
agreement existed between the parties and to refer the case to arbitration. It does not impute any
error with respect to the CA’s exercise of jurisdiction, As such, the Petition is simply a
continuation of the appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the
CA, and to this Court via Rule 45.
12. De Ocampo v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., G.R. No. 192947, December 09, 2015

Facts:

De Ocampo filed a comlaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, damages, and attorney's
fees against respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9) and several RPN-9 officers.

The Labor Arbiter found De Ocampo to have been illegally dismissed. RPN-9 was
ordered to pay her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and full backwages. The same was
affirmed by the NLRC.

RPN-9 then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. The CA issued a TRO; the sixty-day period
lapsed without a writ of preliminary injunction being subsequently issued.

The decision of the LA, which was affirmed by the NLRC became final and executory.
Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.

The full satisfaction of the original award notwithstanding, De Ocampo filed a Motion to
Recompute the Monetary Award with Motion to Issue Alias Writ of Execution. The same was
denied on the ground that the award was final and executory.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision was final and executory

Ruling:

YES. It is basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon
as it becomes final and executor; "nothing is more settled in law.” Once a case is decided with
finality, "the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.”

As basic as the principle of finality of judgments is the rule that filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.” Unlike an appeal,
a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order that it assails.

The 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, which were
in effect when the material incidents of this case occurred, explicitly and specifically makes this
principle applicable to decisions of labor arbiters and of the National Labor Relations
Commission. Rule XI, Section 10 of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission states:
 SECTION 10. Effect of Petition for Certiorari on Execution. — A petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed
decision unless a restraining order is issued by said courts.

Accordingly, where no restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the

assailed decision lapses into finality. Thereafter, execution may ensue.
13. Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012

Facts:

Former President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 7 which provided for
the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position
classification system for GOCCs and GFIs and suspend the grant of allowances, bonuses and
incentives to the members of the Board of Directors/Trustees of said GOCCs and GFIs.

Petitioner, an employee of the PhilHealth, stating that he will be affected by the

implementation of EO 7, questioned its constitutionality through a petition for certiorari.
Respondents sought to dismiss the petition on the ground, among others, that petition for
certiorari was not the proper remedy.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to question the
constitutionality of EO 7

Ruling:

NO. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.

Respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:

(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
 (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to

determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is

necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought
before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment
by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of
the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions,
respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will
not lie.

Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition

for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper
recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.
14. Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Facts:

A Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, Preliminary Injunction, and/or Status Quo Ante Order was filed by petitioners against
respondents.

Petitioners seek the declaration of Proclamation No. 475 as unconstitutional insofar as it

orders the closure of Boracay and ban of tourists and nonresidents therefrom.

Issue:

Whether or not prohibition and mandamus are proper remedies to question the
constitutionality of the proclamation

Ruling:

YES. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides for a petition for prohibition as
follows:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered directing

the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As
a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the performance of an act which
is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.

Mandamus, on the other hand, is provided for by Section 3 of the same Rule 65:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station.

Suffice it to state, however, that the use of prohibition and mandamus is not merely
confined to Rule 65. These extraordinary remedies may be invoked when constitutional
violations or issues are raised.

As far back as Tañada v. Angara, the Court has unequivocally declared

that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

It must be stressed, though, that resort to prohibition and mandamus on the basis of
alleged constitutional violations is not without limitations. After all, this Court does not have
unrestrained authority to rule on just about any and every claim of constitutional violation. The
petition must be subjected to the four exacting requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. Hence, it is not
enough that this petition mounts a constitutional challenge against Proclamation No. 475. It is
likewise necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites before the Court sustains the
propriety of the recourse.
15. City Government of Baguio v. Masweng, G.R. No. 195905, July 04, 2018

Facts:

Private respondents filed two separate petitions before the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), assailing that petitioners
have no right to enforce the demolition orders and to evict them from their properties.

Atty. Masweng, NCIP-CAR Hearing Officer, issued two 72-Hour Temporary Restraining
Orders (TRO) on each petition. Subsequently, Atty. Masweng issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the TRO
and preliminary injunction issued by Atty. Masweng.

The CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari for being procedurally flawed
because they did not file a motion for reconsideration before the NCIP.

Issue:

Whether or Not the CA erred in dismissing the case

Ruling:

YES. A petition for certiorari is resorted to whenever a tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an extraordinary
remedy available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In other words, certiorari is a solution of last resort availed of after all
possible legal processes have been exhausted.

Thus, it is axiomatic that a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the

filing of a petition for certiorari. This is so considering that the said motion is an existing remedy
under the rules for a party to assail a decision or ruling adverse to it. Nonetheless, the rule
requiring a motion for reconsideration to be filed before a petition for certiorari is available
admits of exceptions, such as:

1. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

2.Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;

3.Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or the petitioner or the subject matter of
the petition is perishable;
 4. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

5. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;

6. Where, in a criminal case, a relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;

7. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

8.Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and

9.Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

Here, direct resort to the CA was necessary.

First, the issues had been duly raised before the NCIP especially considering that
petitioner had presented similar arguments or opposition from the TRO initially issued by the
NCIP until the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction.

Second, there is urgency in the petition because petitioners seek to implement its
demolition orders with the goal of preserving the Busol Forest Reserve, Baguio's primary forest
and watershed. It cannot be gainsaid that any delay may greatly prejudice the government as the
Busol Forest Reserve may be further compromised.

Third, the preservation of the Busol Forest Reserve involves public interest as it would
have a significant impact on the water supply for the City of Baguio.
16. Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010
Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. However, private
respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC.

Petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court
and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. During the hearing on
said date, respondent judge directed petitioner to file the proper pleading and, on June 11, 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer.

The trial court however, found the service of Summons on petitioner as valid, declared
the Answer as filed out of time, and denied the motion to admit answer.

Hence, petitioner filed present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,
alleging that respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in considering as valid, the Sheriff's
Service of Summons on a person not residing in petitioner's residence.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari must fail

Ruling:

YES. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
which provides when and where a petition for certiorari should be filed, states thus:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a

corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the
court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.1awphi1
 In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court,
the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

Here, taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of

the regional trial court in an electoral protest is considered in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of
the COMELEC.

Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Supreme Court held that if
a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or
judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. A court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if
said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of
the lower court.

Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before
the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that:

Sec. 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within
five (5) days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented
by counsel.

Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from
the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials,
then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said
extraordinary writ.
17. Lokin Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012

Facts:

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution1 expunging the Certificate of

Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives of the party-list group known as
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC). The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said
Resolution, prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F. Planas to file the present Petition for
Certiorari. Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing
both Resolutions, praying that they be recognized as the legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-
list, and that petitioner Lokin, Jr. be proclaimed as the CIBAC party-list representative to the
House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition may prosper

Ruling:

NO. The present petition having been flied beyond the reglementary period, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court compels a dismissal on this basis alone.

The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is governed
specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on

Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately
succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which to
file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65,
they cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for
a period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while
Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under
the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued
the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by
petitioners on 1 September 2010. Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it
took petitioners to file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or
until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the
required period.

The fresh-period rule used in Rule 65 does not similarly apply to the timeliness of
petitions under Rule 64. As held by the Supreme Court:

Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly requires that the COMELEC’s rules
of procedure should expedite the disposition of election cases. This Court labors under the same
command, as our proceedings are in fact the constitutional extension of cases that start with the
COMELEC.

Based on these considerations, we do not find convenience and uniformity to be reasons

sufficiently compelling to modify the required period for the filing of petitions for certiorari
under Rule 64. While the petitioner is correct in his historical data about the Court’s treatment
of the periods for the filing of the different modes of review, he misses out on the reason why the
period under Section 3, Rule 64 has been retained. The reason, as made clear above, is
constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt
determination of election results.
18. Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines, through the through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a petition for quo warranto, seeking the declaration of respondent Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno ineligible to hold the position as Chief Justice for failing to regularly disclose her assets,
liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an
Associate Justice, later as Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court. The Republic further asserts that
such failure shows that she is not possessed of “proven integrity” demanded of every aspirant to
the Judiciary.

Among others, respondent contended that as an impeachable officer under the

Constitution, she may not be removed from office through a petition for quo waranto.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent, an impeachable officer, may be removed from office in a

petition for quo warranto

Ruling:

YES. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public

office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position
or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

Thus, a quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title
to the contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of
the candidates elected, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office
may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings.
 Respondent maintains that she may only be removed through impeachment as stated
under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. Said provision does not foreclose a quo warranto
action against impeachable officers since it used the term “may be removed from office.” The
provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion
and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, and as consistently held by the Court, said
term is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that
opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to
remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.

A quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment.

The fact that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office.
Otherwise, it might lead to an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer
cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign
nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for
impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office
even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it.

There is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the

power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.

However, the Court may still assume jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto
involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a
disqualification, without violating the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.
Impeachment and quo warranto are materially distinct remedies. The former concerns actions
that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, the latter involves matters that
render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.