Professional Documents
Culture Documents
OTC 7120
This peper was presented st the 25th Annual OTC In Houston, Texas, U. S.A.,3-6 May 1993.
This peper wee selected for presentation by the OTC Program Committee following review of information contained in an ebetract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the pspar,
se presented, have not been reviewed by the Offshore Technology Conference and are subject to aorrectlon by the author(s). The mat9rialt as praaented, does not n~essarilY reffact
any position of the Offshore Technology Conference or its officers. Permission to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 3@lwords. Illustrations may not be copied. The abstract
should centeln censplcuous acknowledgment of where end by whom the paper Is presented.
365
2 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
The contingency planning described herein The time period for initiating containment opera-
should be used as a guide. Each company must tions is short. The blowout will often do most
weigh alternatives and make selections to form damage within 1-2 hours. Operations must be
their unique contingency plan. Consultation assessed and implemented within this time
with blowout specialists during contingency frame to mitigate substantial damage. This
plan development is recommended. phase is influenced by the type and severity of
blowout so on-site decisions must be made.
This discussion identifies topics found in con- Pre-planning and drills can assist the operator.
tingency plans including the following: The responsibility for this phase rests on the
operator because third party blowout special-
a) Management structure ists will normally not be on-site at this time.
b) Stage 1 - Disaster Early Response
c) Stage 2- Disaster Containment Blowout control (Stage 3) is usually implement-
d) Stage 3- Disaster Control ed with the assistance of specialists, An on-
e) Blowout data and information requirements site inspection is usually required before plan-
f) Blowout control equipment ning can be completed. The specialist will
g) Specialist third party personnel require some information about the well before
h) Kill technique selection making recommendations.
The format for the contingency plan will vary A training program for company personnel
among operators. Also, it may be prepared as a should be defined and presented in the contin-
written document and/or computerized, gency plan. The training may be restricted to
developing an understanding of the contingency
Relief well contingency planning is a sub-set of plan or it can be extended to cover advanced
blowout control contingency planning (Stage 3). well control topics designed to develop a
Relief well plans can be large and are often knowledgeable group of internal company
prepared as a separate document. Most infor- specialists. Drills are recommended. A periodic
mation is available on a preliminary basis to review of job functions will refresh personnel
prepare the relief well plan. Capping operations with their roles and task requirements,
can not be pre-planned to the same level of
detail as relief wells since capping is dependent Some companies organize their management so
on blowout conditions and the resulting dam- a team of in-house well control specialists can
age, Relief well contingency planning will be take an active part in operations. In some
described briefly. cases, this includes capping specialists and
relief well engineers. An advanced well control
Blowout management can be separated into school designed for these personnel is appro-
several stages, A possible division is as follows: priate.
366
OTC 7120 N.J. ADAMS AND L.G. KUHLMAN 3
Figure 1 shows the relationship. Several organi- Command center. A command center is the
zational structures will usually be required to focus point for operations on the well, third
handle various tasks. Sub-levels of manage- party relations and contact with parties outside
ment structures should be identified. immediate involvement with the well. The
command center should be located slightly
Each position must be identified in terms of its away from the well site so it will not be affect-
responsibility, personnel filling the position and ed by the well’s noise or heat and traffic to the
back-up (relief) personnel. well. The center should be located within a
reasonable distance to the well so operations
The operations manager is a key position. personnel can easily commute to the well as
Several philosophies exist as to the type of necessary.
individual assigned to this post.
The facility could contain the following:
a) The operations manager should be from
outside the district. The existing district a) Telecommunications including telephone,
manager can continue his normal duties. radios, fax and telex links. Multiple tele-
The (blowout) operations manager can phone lines should be available.
perform his duties without the burden of b) Meeting rooms including a conference room.
blame and fault judgment that occasionally c) A computer system with all appropriate
accompanies disasters. software for management, word processing,
contingency planning, relief well drilling and
b) The operations manager should be from well killing.
within the district. He is knowledgeable of d) Resting/sleeping accommodations for 2-4
previous conditions, current operations persons.
structure, and suppliers. e) Audio-visual equipment including TV, VCR,
overhead vu-graph projector, video recorder,
c) A company specialist trained for this camera, and marking boards.
situation. f) Multiple copies of the site plan, local maps,
telephone lists, blowout contingency plan
A good option is an operations manager current- and well records.
Iy assigned outside the district but who formerly g) Reference material such as applicable
served in a top role within the district. government regulations, emergency equip-
ment lists, photographs and videos of the
Most operations managers for blowout control site before the blowout, etc.
are from drilling or production groups. Few h) Rig layout drawings for offshore installa-
have pollution control experience. Due to tions, emergency equipment layouts, fire-
demanding requirements associated with a fighting equipment layout, power generation
polluting event, it is recommended to provide system information, tank configuration and
basic pollution control training to these manag- operating manual for semisubmersibles,
ers. jacking system and operating manual infor-
mation for jackups, and details of major
Contractor interface. A recommended contrac- systems and structures for platforms.
tor-operator structure is shown in Figure 1.
Other options for relating to blowout specialists Drills (exercises). Regular drills should be
are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Some blowout conducted to maintain operational readiness of
specialists historically have taken charge of all personnel. The drills should be scheduled so
operations and given few options to the opera- crews can plan and organize their actions
tor. This structure is changing as operating before the event. Also, unannounced drills are
necessary to improve sudden action responses.
367
4 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
Field and office drills should be conducted, recognized by crew members. This information
on hydrogen sulfide ignition should be defined in
It is beneficial to plan the exercises in conjunc- the contingency plan.
tion with a blowout specialist, He can offer real
situations from his experiences and prompt Notification of the blowout to certain parties
company personnel on recommended actions. should begin as soon as possible. This can
Drills simulating actual conditions are valuable. include the following:
368
—
OTC 7120 N.J. ADAMS AND L.G. KUHLMAN 5
d) Inject water into the wellhead to reduce Blowout control services can be classified as
erosion on the BOP or lines, follows:
e) Flare to an overboard line.
f) Deploy booms and skimmers for offshore a) Direct services related to capping hands-on
events or build containment dikes and estab- work or relief well planning and supervision.
Iish flow channels for oil to avoid location b) Support services for the direct operations
flooding on land sites. including pumping, equipment fabrication,
g) Implement active bridging techniques. well drilling, engineering, pollution control,
h) Position a tool joint immediately above the transport/logistics, etc.
rig floor. c) Associated services are necessary but not
i) Close and lock pipe rams to prevent pipe linked to direct services. These can include
from being blown out of the well. news media interfacing, working with regu-
j) Drive off the location if the well is blowing Iatory authorities, preparing insurance
out through the riser on a floater. claims, etc.
k) Ignite an oil spill if possible or practical. d) Required support services are dependent on
kill technique selection. The kill techniques
Blowout specialists have the experience neces- are discussed in a later section.
sary to advise operators on detailed plans for
damage mitigation, General information about BLOWOUT DATA AND INFORMATION RE-
the operator’s production structures should be QUIREMENTS
provided to the blowout specialist. A review of
similar events from a blowout database is bene- The contingency plan should identify required
ficial to provide insight into anticipated circum- data and information for blowout specialists to
stances, select and implement the kill techniques. A
sample list as included here, has been devel-
STAGE 3- BLOWOUT CONTROL oped from the authors’ blowout control experi-
ences. Some situations will require other data.
Blowout control efforts may require a few hours
to many months, The options are usually sepa- a) Well name/number/identification, drilling
rated into surface and sub-surface operations contractor and rig name.
commonly called capping and relief well drilling. b) Well location (onshore/offshore), directions
and arrangements to travel to the well
The starting point to develop a contingency plan c) Maps of the area, data on distances to
for blowout control is a definition of worst case available transport centers (airports, supply
scenarios that might reasonably be encoun- bases, boat docks, etc.)
tered. These might be defined as follows: d) Type of blowout - shallow gas, hydrocar-
bons (moderate to deep), geothermal, etc.
a) High control difficulty to include a multiwell e) Well type - exploration, producing, work-
platform fire or a shallow gas blowout with over, etc.
possible rig or platform fire. f) Probable cause(s) of the blowout
b) High environmental impact such as an oil g) Status at the time of the blowout:
production platform blowing out and collaps- - Date and time of the blowout
ing below the water line or a subsea oil well - Total depth
blowout. - Hole configuration
Bit location
A blowout database is beneficial to assist in - Casing/liner sizes and setting depths
developing worst case scenarios that will coin- - Drill string, bottomhole assembly, tub-
cide with the type of production the operator ing, and other downhole equipment
currently has offshore. sizes and configuration
Mud type/weight/properties
369
6 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
370
OTC 7120 N.J. ADAMS AND L.G. KUHLMAN 7
Each commercial blowout company offers a Subsea blowout pollution control requires
range of services, Some are extensive while unique and novel solutions. This approach is
others are more concentrated. As an example, particularly applicable in a rough sea environ-
several companies offer well capping and fire- ment where surface containment is difficult.
fighting services exclusively while others may
offer capping, firefighting, relief well operations Insurance adjusters. Most operating companies
and blowout engineering services within the maintain insurance coverage for blowouts. The
same company. It is wise to visit with each insurance underwriters contract services of
company and become familiar with their servic- third-party adjusters to settle claims on a
es. blowout event. Some adjusting companies will
provide an on-site representative to monitor
Contract terms should be discussed with the operations during control efforts.
specialists prior to a blowout. Fees and terms
of work should be defined. The operator is at a Effective interfacing with the adjusters usually
disadvantage for fee and contract negotiations expedites claims payment. The adjusters are
if required to call a specialist after the blowout ultimately responsible to the underwriters to
has occurred, provide an accurate claims assessment. An
“open door” policy between the operator and
Firefighting and capping specialists. Firefighting adjuster usually assists in a quicker settlement.
and capping specialists provide surface kill
capability. They usually can provide equipment News media interface. Although it may seem
and experienced personnel on a call-out basis. initially counterproductive, it is important to
The equipment stocked by most blowout spe- provide immediate and direct contact with news
cialists is designed primarily for land wells with media representatives. The news staff have a
some offshore applications. perceived obligation to report new events to the
public. Some situations have occurred where
Relief well planning, drilling and supervision. the reported events were not completely correct
Contrary to some industry opinions, relief well with the actual facts. Experiences have shown
371
8 CONTINGENCY PIANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
that formal news releases with factual content It is obvious that a blowout should be controlled
is the best approach to containing adverse with the optimum approach. However, history
publicity. of blowout control efforts shows optimum
approaches are not always used. In some
The news media contact needs several qualifi- cases, inappropriate techniques have been used
cations, He should be knowledgeable of news resulting in loss of the well or platform, or cost
media requirements, technically competent and huge sums of money without yielding success,
an articulate speaker. It is recommended to Some operators are now taking control of the
provide a written statement daily, decision making process away from firefighters
and blowout specialists.
Regulatory authorities interface. The operator
should provide a contact person to interface Factors constituting an “optimum approach” for
with governing groups. Regulatory groups are kill technique selection include the following:
required by law to monitor blowouts. The level
of monitoring varies with each agency, Most a) Probability that the technique will work
groups have some degree of legal power to under the blowout conditions
interact with the operator, Some have the b) Time, cost and logistical requirements for
ultimate power to shut down operations if they the technique
believe prudent actions are not being carried c) Terminal nature of the technique
out. d) Safety of personnel
e) Comparison to other techniques
KILL TECHNIQUE SELECTION
These factors warrant discussions.
The blowout contingency plan should contain
guidelines on blowout control as part of Stage Success probability. An important question
3. These guidelines will be used by the opera- relates to the probability that the proposed
tions manager (and team) to direct control technique will be successful under reasonable
procedures. Many operators are beginning to conditions. It is important that a strong differ-
exercise more control over the field operations entiation be made between “probability of
and relying to a lesser degree upon blowout success under reasonable conditions” versus
specialists. Guidelines are necessary because “technical possibility”.
most operations managers will not have signifi-
cant levels of blowout experience. Kill options should be evaluated technically, A
“hunch” or a “feel” should not suffiCe to inVeSt
Some operators prepare comprehensive contin- time and money into a kill effort. Usually, the
gency plans for several kill techniques as sup- “gut instinct” must be combined with a techni-
porting documents to the plan. These include cal approach. Statistical analysis and/or the use
shallow gas handling, relief well drilling and, to of a blowout database can assist in making an
a lesser degree, well capping. These plans can ‘educated’ decision.
be general in nature or customized for a specific
platform or field, If the operator elects to One suggestion involves using the “decision
prepare a general relief well plan, as an exam- tree” approach to determine the best kill option.
ple, it is recommended to include a detailed (Figure 4) This could result in a kill procedure
case example of actions and calculations for a that takes into account most variables, Ad-
sample blowout. This provides additional vance pre-planning is necessary for this ap-
guidance for the management team. proach, Unanticipated conditions and circum-
stances at the site must be considered in the
The initial step is kill technique selection, This decision tree process.
is a crucial step that sets the future course of
operations. The decision must be made quickly Time, cost and logistical requirements. For
in some cases without undue influence from each possible kill technique, an evaluation must
situation stress, panic, or public pressure,
372
OTC 7120 N.J. ADAMS AND L.G. KUHLMAN 9
be made for time to complete the kill, cost and Safety to personnel off location should also be
logistical requirements. The time aspect relates considered, High volumes of sour gas, accumu-
to the point at which the well is safely killed or Iations of combustible hydrocarbons and large
controlled. fires can pose a hazard to people working and
living near the blowout. Panic and flight from
Logistical requirements can be extensive in the area during evacuation can also result in
some situations. Remote locations can pose injury. Selection of a “quick” kill technique may
transportation problems. Movement of explo- be warranted in such a situation even though it
sives can cause significant “red-tape”, may have a lower probability of success than
other techniques, This presumes that personnel
If only one kill option exists for a blowout, the directly involved in the kill are adequately pro-
time and cost evaluation has little significance. tected.
Cost is an important topic that should be dis- Comparison of other techniques. Consideration
cussed. The typical approach to cost consider- must be given to all kill options prior to making
ations for most drilling wells is to get “best a final decision on one approach. Recent situa-
value for the money”. In dealing with most tions have occurred in which one approach was
aspects of blowout control, the recommended followed against recommendations of other
approach is to prioritize the best service avail- groups for alternative approaches that had
able and then compare costs if the services are significantly more technical merit and a definite
nearly equal. Real savings do not mean accept- safety advantage. The alternative approaches
ing the lowest bidder, but rather using the best were not given due consideration, Ultimately
service available that can safely do the required the initial approach resulted in failure and
task effectively and efficiently. tremendous financial losses, The alternative
solutions were finally used efficiently and effec-
Terminal nature of the technique. A proposed tively but only after major efforts were expend-
kill approach must be evaluated to determine if ed on a “brute force” initial approach. In
it could eliminate other options if unsuccessful summary, all options should be evaluated on an
(i.e., if it does not work, it terminates other equal basis and then make a decision for a kill
options). technique.
Safety of personnel. Without understating the The operator must participate in these evalua-
issue, personnel safety must always be the high tions. They should be the experts with respect
priority concern. During the final stages of an to drilling and reservoir conditions for the blow-
intense kill operation, it is easy to become ing well. Without their input, an inappropriate
“tunnel-visioned” on the well control objectives or less-than-optimum technique could be used.
and lose sight of personnel safety matters, The A “decision tree”, prepared by the blowout
well control specialist must always maintain the specialists and/or other team members, is
safety issue in the forefront of his operations. suggested to allow the operator the conduct an
informed comparison of the various kill tech-
Firefighters and blowout specialists are often niques.
involved in operations containing risks. They
are supposed to know how to handle these Description of available techniques. A variety
risks. Other personnel involved with the killing of blowout kill techniques are available. Some
operations often want to provide assistance, are applicable only in certain situations. Others
sometimes in a very eager manner, They usual- are more universally applicable. An example is
Iy do not understand the risks and related safety capping and snubbing into a land well. This
procedures. They can expose themselves to technique does not have easy applicability on
the danger of an accident, It is incumbent on underwater offshore blowouts. Relief wells can
the well control leader to be cognizant of this be used almost universally.
potential problem area,
373
10 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
Kill techniques can be separated in two broad the well bridges or it does not bridge, but no
categories: one has much control over it.
a) Top kill techniques involve surface control Techniques are available for active bridging,
methods such as well capping and subse- Some firefighters and blowout specialists can
quent bullheading or lubrication of mud, implement techniques to accelerate the bridg-
b) Bottom kills require that mud be circulated ing. An active bridging technique involves
from the bottom to the top of the well. opening the BOP/diverter stack or removing
damaged, leaking wellhead component(s) to
Some require a combination of surface control allow accelerated entry of reservoir fluids result-
and a bottom kill, An example is capping and ing in high annulus velocities and subsequent
diverting a well followed by snubbing pipe for a bridging.
bottom kill.
Factors generally found in bridging situations
Common kill techniques are as follows: include:
Bridging typically occurs within 24 hours after If the well is shut in, access to a competent
the well blows out, This observation is con- casing string is required. The casing string
firmed by a computerized database of almost must have integrity and must be sufficiently
1000 blowouts, If the well does not bridge deep to have a fracture gradient that will with-
within 24 hours, it is likely to blow for an stand shut-in conditions. Reservoir drawdown
extended time or until it is killed. Bridging does pressures should be evaluated and compared
occur however, on wells after the 24 hour with the fracture gradient at the casing seat
period in some situations, Technical reasons before the decision is made to shut-in the well.
exist for the 24 hour bridging phenomenon,
These involve near-wellbore pressure draw- Considerations for capping and shutting in the
down, erosion of wellhead and BOP compon- blowout include the following:
ents and formation integrity under open flow
conditions. a) Access to a casing string with the neces-
sary pressure rating.
Bridging is typi~ally considered a passive tech- b) Fracture gradients sufficient to withstand
nique. The term “passive” means that it is shut-in pressures. Initial and drawndown
subject to formation properties and generally is pressures must be considered.
not influenced by kill attempts. In simple terms,
374
OTC 7120 N.J. ADAMS AND L.G. KUHLMAN 11
c) Sufficient blowout flow rates for the fluids on the blowout from the vertical position. The
to extend some distance above the top of work can include killing a shallow gas blowout,
the casing or BOPS or the fire must be entering a blowout through the casing string,
extinguished. explosively removing a wellhead or BOP stack,
d) If H2S is present, the well must be capped or other similar operations,
on fire. All equipment must be H2S service-
able, The range of capabilities for the approach has
not been completely explored at this time, New
Typically a casing string is set deep to achieve technology and field experiences continue to
the desired fracture gradient. add capabilities to vertical intervention.
375
12 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
a) Casing or drill pipe must be in the well at a) Capping operations that are reasonably
least as deep as the minimum intercept quick and “routine”,
point, b) The blowout fluid is sweet gas rather than
b) Reasonable surveys indicating the general oil or sour gas,
bottom hole location, c) A second approach is not technically or
c) Ability to locate the surface site of the realistically feasible.
blowout well. This presents difficulties if
the blowout is in a deepwater environment. Other reasons probably exist for using a single
kill method,
The well must be blowing out for a relief well to
be successful. If the well is shut in under high Most wells have been killed by using a single
pressure and surface intervention is not a safe approach. However, some wells have caused
option for any reasons, a relief well can be extended problems because the initial approach
highly effective if the trouble well can be flowed failed and a second approach had not been
from the top in a controlled manner, implemented.
376
OTC 7120 N.J. ADAMS AND L.G. KUHLMAN 13
The impact of water depth on a subsea H S No blowout database is available which covers
well is interesting to note. It appears that t~e every blowout event to-date. Several proprie-
water may strip the HZS and create sulfuric tary blowout databases exist incorporating
acid. The escaping gas is sweet, The key enough events to allow general analyses. In the
variables are the gas concentration and water case of a current blowout, it may be useful to
depth. It is believed that in depths of 500-600 access data on similar blowouts. Although
ft, the gas will be sweetened. Lesser water conditions may not be exactly the same, such
depths have appeared to have sweetened the factors as kill methods, blowout duration and
gas in the few field cases that are available. pollution volumes can assist in making educated
However, it is clearly recommended to conduct decisions on a current blowout.
on-going tests to evaluate this situation if plans
involve working near a sour gas blowout, Computerized blowout database analyses can
also be used for statistical analyses covering
COMPUTERIZED BLOWOUT CONTIN- the above items plus provide additional benefits:
GENCY PLAN
a) Identification of blowout causes for better
Blowout contingency planning is a suitable well control training and planning.
candidate for a personal computer-based soft- b) Identification of blowout situations for
ware application. It can be tailored for a partic- which suitable handling procedures have not
ular geographical area if desired. The various been developed.
options which must be considered for a particu- C) Investigation of damage extent and costs.
Iar scenario can be evaluated quickly on the d) Identification of blowout pollution volumes
computer. Recommendations can be presented and comparisons to other sources (tankers,
for use by crisis managers and operations etc. ).
personnel. e) Presentation of data to support discussions
with insurance underwriters and regulatory
Software can be programmed to provide infor- agencies.
mation and capabilities for specific scenarios
including: Interface with a computerized blowout equip-
ment and services database can be beneficial in
a) Management organizations a crisis situation. The database should contain
Project task requirements names of companies; key contact personnel;
Organization structures fax, telephone and telex numbers; addresses;
Contact data - phonelpagerlfaxltelex and descriptions of available products and
numbers services.
b) Kill technique selection
Sub-routines for analyzing kill options The database would be interfaced with task
Equipment/services required for each descriptions for each blowout scenario. Sug-
option gested vendors, service companies and equip-
C) Interface with a blowout database for data ment can be listed for each task. Specific
on similar events contacts would be identified. Without back-
d) Interface with a blowout equipment/services ground knowledge, a large amount of time can
database be wasted trying to determine which specialized
e) Emergency response and control measures services and equipment are needed, available
f) Data transmission sources and the particular person in charge of
the special services/equipment.
Details of most of these items are presented in
other parts of this paper. Interfacing with other ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
databases needs further discussion.
The authors wish to thank the Offshore
Technology Conference for the opportunity to
377
14 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS OTC 7120
REFERENCES
378
F
OPERATOR
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KILL TEAMS
SUPPORT
SERVICES
I CONTINGENCY I
I CAPPING
ADMINISTRATION
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I
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RELATIONS
REGULATORY
I
RELIEF WELLS I AGENCIES
POLLUTION
Figure 1
QRGAN17ATION.
Organization Chart with
Blowout Advisor to the Operator
+
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————— ———— ——
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BLOWOUT
SPECIALIST
I I
I I
I
1
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LOGISTICS
ADMINISTRATION
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Figure 2
ORGANIZATION
T~ical Capping Job
I OPERATOR
[ OPERATIONS
I MANAGER
5=
DRILLING
I WELL KILLING
OPERATOR BLOWOUT
REPRESENTATIVE SPECIALIST
I I I I
d ,, ‘
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CONTRACTOR
SUPPORT
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MUD
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DRILLING
SUPERVISOR
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PLANNING
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CEMENTING
I RRH-l PUBLIC
EQUIPMENT
SPECIFICATION
RELATIONS
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Typical Relief Well COORDINATION
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