Emergence of the Indian Constitution: Affirmative Action and Cultural Fault Lines

Author(s): VIVEK PRAHLADAN

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 47, No. 7 (FEBRUARY 18 2012), pp. 45-52
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Emergence of the Indian Constitution
Affirmative Action and Cultural Fault Lines

VIVEK PRAHLADAN

The Indi
and South America are dotted with "tinderbox demo-
nation m
The and cracies" landscape Southarethat
cracies" that America ofcomplemented
contradictorily are postcolonialbycontradictorily
the are dotted states with complemented in "tinderbox south Asia, by demo- Africa the
become t
relatively stable Indian state. "There is little doubt that demo-
seeks
cracy in India has taken root".1 Such has been the repetition of to
the electoral process and the evolution of state building and
negotiat
fornation making enterprise that the Indianthem state has survived
and has continued to navigate through fault lines that were
cultural
and are cultural, regional, ethnic, linguistic, etc. The Indian
documen
Constitution, it may be argued, has been at the heart of this
nation state building and has structured the relative stability
attempt
at the core wherein aspirations (of castes and communities)
constitu
emerging from within these fault lines merge successfully into
text tha
constitutional discourses of affirmative action. However, inter-
contest
pretations of the text and form of the Indian Constitution have
remained, in large part, disengaged from the idea of the text of
nation"
this Constitution. A history of the idea of the Constitution is
yet to be established as a part ofthe narratives of "discourse of
Indian constitutionalism and politics".2
First, narratives of modern Indian historiography appear to
be predicated on a "primary contradiction"3 between two his-
tories. On one hand, there are the histories of mass movements,
which may be histories of the left, national movement, peasant
or labour struggles, etc. The other side of this contradiction is
the unexplored historiographical vacuum, the history of the
Constitution. In the existing histories of national movements,
constitutional developments have been viewed as "breathing
spaces" from the point of view of upsurges of masses or periods
when the Indian National Congress (inc) was supposed to be
carrying on constructive work. The following statement sum-
marises the prevailing historiographical consensus on constitu-
tional politics as "simply filling the political vacuum between
two Gandhian struggles".4 However, one may argue that from
a historical perspective, the end product of all mass movements
was the formation and crystallisation of India's new Constitu-
tion and the way its emergence dealt with the issues of caste
and community. Periods of non-mass movements were equally
This paper
significant when discourses of caste and community and not
Conference
merely the inc were negotiating to create a constitutional con-
University
sensus. The emplotment within narratives of the histories of
Conference
Commonw
politics in India, firstly, employ the idea of constitutional his-
I am
tory being limited to a historygratef
of passive responses of the anti-
independen
colonial discourse to British constitutional reforms. Secondly,
Vivek
"constitutional agitation", the preferred term for constitutional Prah
Centre for
politics, was carried on "within the four walls of law"5 which

Economic & Political weekly ЕШШ February 18, 2012 vol xlvii no 7 45

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 SPECIAL ARTICLE ^eee =

acted as breaks
with "after". The former was in the
articulated by the discourses of h
movement caste and community
and interests and the
the latter by the nationalist
tr
India's discourse of the inc. The colonial discourse of representation
evolution as a
re-emerged only
narratives, as the postcolonial debate of affirmative
with action
it
was notand wasonly
followed by the Gandhian and Nehruvian discourse
consti
wherein swaraj orbut
movements puma (total) swaraj came first and every-
"com
discourse of Indian nationalism. thing else after. For instance, Ambedkar stated that "without
The history of the constitutional discourse is a history the
of removal of the taint of untouchability Swaraj is a meaning-
negotiations over a shared constitution. This framework less
of term".12 M A Jinnah, on his participation in the proceed-
negotiations remains hidden behind the dominant tendency ings
of of the second round table conference (rtc), stated that
modern Indian historiography to focus on Hindu-Muslim riots
"we have come here, notwithstanding the opposition of those
and mobilisations and "communal" propaganda. Revisiting the
who stand for complete independence".13 On the other hand,
foundational assumption in modern Indian historiographyGandhi,
of at the same rtc stated that "the agreed solution of the
the dialectic of secularism and communalism is one of the core communal tangle can only be a crown of the Swaraj Constitu-
implications of the framework of this thesis.6 Therefore, the tion, not its foundation".14 Swaraj, through mass movements,
notions of caste, community and culture are not merely ideo- was a consistent and pre-eminent ideological commitment of
logical superstructures but actual existential facts of living social the nationalist discourse.
conditions of south Asian societies. The "communalism" of the The paper identifies four phases in this history of the consti-
Muslim League and Congress Hindus, the Central Sikh League tutional discourse. Each phase represents a turn in the history
and the Hindu Mahasabha were discourses that were generatedof negotiations. (1) the phase of "comprehensive negotiations"
by the cultural fault lines between communities. This is the his-
-1916-32; (11) the phase where constitutional discourse was first
tory of negotiations between bodies that were articulating dis-challenged and then replaced by the discourse of cultural con-
courses of identity, power, representation, affirmative action,
frontation - 1935-46; (hi) the Constituent Assembly and drafting
reservation of seats, etc, and were seeking to embed the matrix
of the Constitution - 1946-50; and (iv) the postcolonial debate
of castes and communities within a single and a shared constitu-
over affirmative action. It will emphasise the contours of the
tional regime. The template of constitutional discourse invitesfirst phase and briefly run through the other three.
reflection on the articulations of caste and community dis-
courses by allowing these to be enmeshed into a single narrative'Comprehensive Negotiations': 1916-32
trope which frames the emergence of a "shared" constitution as
In 1916, the Congress and Muslim League entered into an
was being negotiated upon by Jinnah, the Muslim League,agreement for the first and last time over the issue of separate
electorates. The Lucknow Pact was based on the constitutional
Ambedkar, Sikhs, and the Hindu Mahasabha.7 In these negotia-
tions over constitution making, the inc was only one of theartefact of reservation of seats (for Muslims in the central legis-
voices that were contesting within this colonial constitutionallature). It is important as an event of agreement inasmuch as it
framework. The contemporary contest over the meaning of the gives us an angle to explain the constitutional history of mod-
ern India. In 1916, the inc was still committed to the idea of
Constitution and "the uneasy relationship between Constitution
and democratic politics"8 in postcolonial discourses of power
"constitutional agitation". The term "constitutional agitation"
must be located within this history of negotiations over must
a be differentiated from that of the ideological paradigm of
"shared" Indian Constitution. Further, almost intuitively, post-
"nation through constitution" that posed itself as an alternative
colonial discourses of secularism anchor themselves to the to the Congress' "constitution through nation". Congress was
notion of a "secular" constitution which is considered to be yet
"a to come out of its foundational notion of "nascent national-
charter of Indian unity".9 The historiographical trope of the ism"
con- based on petitioning.15 The term "constitutional agitation"
tradiction between communalism and secularism/nationalism is a reasonable term to understand the pre-swaraj inc. It is in-
carries over to the postcolonial contest over the idea of the tent
con- and content was defined in terms of linear constitutional-
stitution where "communalism remains a major threat to India's
ism imagined within the construct of petition documents.
Constitution based on secular and democratic principles".10 Thus, a pact was inked with the Muslim League as their fellow
The Constitution was drafted in December 1949 againstconstitutionalists.
the However, this political ecology of linear con-
backdrop of the Partition. The latter was seen as the outcome
stitutionalism lost the initiative to the idea of Gandhian swaraj.
of all that went wrong in Indian politics, i e, "communalism"
It was with the advent of swaraj that one sees the fault line be-
which was "without any agitation or struggle".11 On the other
tween the Congress' vision of "constitution through nation",
hand, Indian Independence and the Constitution were seen as nationalism was a non-negotiable "intent", with the vision
that
the logical outcome of all that was right about Indian politics,
of cultural politics of the Muslim League, Akalis (and later
i e, the idea of swaraj, the Gandhi-led national movement and
Ambedkar) articulating the intent of "nation through constitu-
its eminent "secular" values. tion", and their explicit "content" of "culturalism".
This paper views the constitutional discourse as a contestBeginning with the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Con-
between two visions, "nation through constitution" and "consti-
gress and the Muslim League and concluding with the unity
tution through nation" with the word "through" interchangeable
conference at Allahabad in 1932, the nature of negotiations,

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ipso facto, define and distinguish this phase. All the negot- longer motivational. The momentum of mass movements was
iations in this phase involved large delegations (more than 100 lost as Gandhi renounced non-cooperation following the Chauri
in many cases) and were carried out on a "national" platform Chaura episode and was subsequently jailed till 1924. By this
surrounded by massive public interest and media involvement. time, as Anil Seal writes, "the Swaraj party was in the front seat,
The various delegations, formal and informal, counted in its and Gandhi was back-pedalling, from gaol".22 By 1925, Birken-
ranks the most important leaders of modern Indian history. head threw the constitutional option back into Indian politics by
Second, these "comprehensive negotiations" concluded with "challenging Indians to produce a constitution".23
drafts, whether of agreements or disagreements. The draft of First, this saw the return of the Swarajists, as С R Das and
the 1932 unity conference was the last such involving constitu- Motilal Nehru began re-engaging with the re-emerged consti-
tional negotiations between caste and community representa- tutional space. However, the nature of this space had changed
tives. Third, the principle of reservation of seats was at the and ceased to be what is known as "constitutional agitation"
core of the contest over a shared constitution. Fourth, there and saw active negotiations between community and caste
were only two successful negotiations, one involved commu- discourses to evolve an "Indian" constitution. Second, by this
nity and the other caste. The Lucknow Pact was the only suc- time, the Muslim League, which had earlier been overshadowed
cessful agreement on the question of community and even this by the Khilafat agitation, retrieved its status as a Muslim coun-
fell apart. It conceded the idea of reservation of seats for a terpart of the Congress. In Punjab, Fazl-i-Hussain revived the
community. The Poona Pact of 1932, involving Gandhi and Punjab Provincial Muslim League to work with the Muddiman
Ambedkar, was the only other successful agreement and the Committee on constitutional reforms.24 In its 1924 session, the
basic principles of this agreement that of reservation of seats All India Muslim League, with Jinnah in attendance, resolved
for castes, found its way into the constitution of independent that in any constitutional dialogue, the form of government
India. This phase also saw the emergence of electoral politics would be a federation with provincial autonomy and constitu-
and the idea of cultivating electorates to secure seats in coun- tionally guarded Muslim majority in Punjab, Bengal and the
cils and assemblies. Thus, this period saw the emergence of North-Western Frontier Province. Also, by 1925 Maulana
regional parties, caste organisations, and religious/cultural Muhammad Ali had fallen out with Congress and publicly held
bodies besides the advent of the Gandhian mass movement. "a fallen Muslim to be better than Mr Gandhi".25 By 1931,
Maulana Shaukat Ali too was seen opposing Gandhi at the
Emergence of Mass Politics second яте. Third, parallel to this was the rise of the Hindu
Mahasabha as "the wave of riots which spread in the early
The Lucknow Pact conceded the principle of reservation of seats
in the central legislature with separate electorates for the Mus-
1920s resulted in the relaunching of the Hindu Mahasabha".26
lim community. "Tilak was an enthusiastic backer"16 of this
However, the window for dialogue between the communities
agreement and negotiated with the Muslim League. Through remained open. Paradoxically, it seems, the riots made a
dialogue necessary between representatives of the communi-
reservation of seats over and above their proportion it "brought
benefits to the Muslims in minority provinces".17 It was alsoties
a as no one community was able to dominate in "street
way to bridge over the Surat split of 1907 which had virtually
strength" and both had the ability to retaliate. Pandit Malaviya
crippled the Congress and "for the first time since the Surat
insisted on the need "to approach Muslim leaders to devise
split, the moderates, under Chimanlal Setalvad, and the extrem-
means to settle disputes. In case riots occur we should settle
ists, led by Tilak, came together".18 Why did the same Muslimmatters in consultation with leaders of both communities."27
League with similar demands in 1928 come to be termed "com-
Malaviya, along with Jinnah, had opposed Gandhi's non-
munal" in modern Indian historiography? The Montagu- cooperation resolution in 1920. Lala Lajpat Rai, speaking at a
Chelmsford reforms confirmed the suspicion of nationalists (ex-rally in 1925 stated that "it is wrong to represent that Hindus
tremists) that "constitutional agitation" had failed. After the
are altogether opposed to any revision or reconsideration of
the Lucknow Pact".28
first war years, in the words of С Vijayaraghavachariar, there
"entered a historic figure on the scene of Indian politics".19 TheThe process for the next instalment of constitutional reforms
momentum generated by Gandhi proved irresistible. This led was
to on the cards and this led, first, to the "Delhi Muslim propos-
"the open cleavage between open politics and underground als" where reservation of seats in joint electorates could be
politics".20 With the advent of Gandhi and mass movements, explored as the basis for a compromise over separate electorates.
national politics came to be inhabited by those who wereThe Muslim League decided to "frame a constitution for India
gripped by nationalism. Liberals left the Congress and so did on lines acceptable to all communities and all parties".29 The
Jinnah. A realist and a constitutionalist, Jinnah was critical INC
of accepted this principle of reservation of seats for Muslims in
the emotional energies released by the Khilafat agitation and
the central and provincial assemblies at its 42nd session in
non-cooperation and could never be reconciled with the Con- Madras. The Mahasabha also accepted the Delhi proposals. This
gress through their pressure of mass politics.21 momentum culminated with the All Parties National Conven-
tion (henceforward the convention) in 1928 and its outcome,
Re-emergence of the Constitutional Space the Nehru Report. As a response to the Simon Commission, the
By the mid-i92os, the Punjab and Khilafat wrongs, which were
convention was called to explore a consensus through negotia-
the immediate inspirations for mass mobilisations, were no
tions on the constitution. The negotiations could not lead to an

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agreement and the Nehru Report of 1928 was a document of with the principle of reservation of seats (both for majorities and
disagreements. The idea of reservation of seats emerged as the minorities) which held the promise of a compromise on sepa-
core of the constitutional dispute. Why was it that on the issue rate electorates. Thus, community discourses were seeking
of reservation of seats for Muslims in the central legislature, "constitutional equilibrium" through reservation of seats. At
Punjab and Bengal, the convention, in its own words, "could not the beginning of the convention, Motilal, optimistically wrote
arrive at any agreement"?30 This can only be answered by re- to "dear Jinnah" that in regard to Punjab and Bengal "there are
interpreting the convention as a dialogue between communi- already signs of a desire on the part of each community to re-
ties. The key to the negotiations lay in the interventions of a verse its position in regard to reservation".39 Later in 1928,
body called the Central Sikh League based in Lyallpur. The Shaukat Ali wrote to Gandhi that "in your presence Motilalji
articulations of this body may be understood in the context of and myself differed so strongly over the reservation of Muslim
the Singh Sabha movement and the evolution of the notion of seats question".40 Under no circumstance were Sikhs and Mus-
the Sikh panth. The Akalis were the first regional party in the lims willing to accept the implications of the simple arithmetic
subcontinent. Jalal writes that "Punjabis of all religious denomi- of adult franchise in the central legislature or that of popula-
nations had conflicting opinions on the Nehru Report".31 1 would tion proportion in minority provinces. Motilal Nehru also
like to assert that the Sikhs under the Central Sikh League pre- wrote to Jinnah of his suspicions of "even some leading Hindus
sented a formidable unity, though not unanimity. This was of Bengal who are now pleading for reservation of seats to save
unlike the Muslim League which was divided in Punjab over the themselves from the Muslim avalanche at polls".41 By the end
Simon Commission and in Bengal where Fazlul Haq persisted of 1928, the Nehru Report lapsed and the dialogue between
with pushing for separate electorates. communities came to an end with Jinnah's 14-point agenda.
Gandhi's own assessment was that he "had no faith in the leg-
The Communal Question islative solution of the communal question".42 An outcome of
the convention was that reservations became the necessary
The first impact of the community discourse of the Sikhs at the
national level was felt during the convention. Here, the Sikh
condition for an agreement on the "content" required to
League put forth its demand for 30% reservation of seats with
achieve any sort of critical mass for an agreement based on the
"intent" of "nationalism". This leads to the assertion that the
the right to contest additional seats even though their propor-
tion in Punjab according to the Census of 1921 was 11%. This
contest between the two visions of "constitution through na-
demand was based on its understanding that in Punjab "thetion" and "nation through constitution" was also one between
existence of more than one minority favours the reductionthe
of centrality of the assertion of a "content" based nation state
as was asserted by community (and later of caste) discourses
majority in numbers into a minority in representation".32 Motilal
did not anticipate the Sikh insistence on reservation of seatsand
as of "intent" driven nationalism of the inc.
their minimum irreducible condition to any agreement. HeFor his part, Gandhi was waiting for a civil disobedience
wrote to Jinnah, "The strangest development that has takencampaign and with Bardoli he got that chance once again after
place is that of all communities in India, the Sikhs are now
1922. As Judith Brown states "Bardoli lifted Gandhi out of the
thinking of having reservation for themselves in Punjab".33
depression".43 On the back of the failure of the first rtc Nehru
Thus, in an attempt to close the window on the "Hindu-Muslim"
embarked upon the no-rent campaign. However, viceroy Irvin
constitutional dispute over reservation of seats, yet another
succeeded in bringing Gandhi to the negotiating table for pro-
door was opened, that of reservation of seats for Sikhs who
visional cooperation by securing Gandhi's participation at the
saw the Lucknow Pact as a mistake. Baba Kharak Singh
second rtc at London. Here Gandhi rejected any special safe-
"exhorted the Sikhs to throw the Nehru Report in the dustbin
guards for any community especially the "Depressed Classes"
(as it was) another Lucknow Pact in which the interests of and
the put forth a strong claim of the Congress being the sole
representative of the interests of all Indians. Gandhi found
Sikhs had been sacrificed".34 The antagonism of the Sikh body
towards the Congress sharpened in the aftermath of the himself
Ne- opposed by all minority representatives including
hru Report and its secretary wrote to Motilal that "you andAmbedkar. Within this phase of "comprehensive negotiations",
your party have adopted the bureaucratic tactics of divide and
the second rtc marks a shift for three reasons. First, it inaugu-
rule".35 With the infusion of Sikh discourses of representation
rated the entry of caste discourse into the constitutional dia-
and reservation of seats the Hindu-Muslim question in Punjab
logue at the national level that had until now been restricted
"defied all attempts at a satisfactory adjustment".36 The con-
only to communities and issues of caste ceased to remain the
vention found it difficult even to establish the meaning of preserve
the of social reform. Second, it brought to a head the con-
word "minority" because in the negotiations, according to Mo-
test between two visions that had begun with the Lucknow
tilal, "the word minority had sole reference to Muslim
Pact of 1916, that between the constitutional discourses of
communities and castes affirming the notion of "nation
minorities".37 The convention then replaced the word minority
with "small minorities" with the intention that "the word through constitution" and the nationalist vision of "constitu-
would be confined to Muslim minorities".38 tion through nation or Swaraj". Third, the process of Gandhi
The Sikhs, however, remained unmoved by any of these having to reckon with the inescapable implications of the
attempts that would result in watering down their demandconstitutional
for discourse had begun. By the time of the com-
reservations. Eventually, the Nehru Report did away altogether
munal award Gandhi had proceeded to actively engage in this

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constitutional dialogue leading Ambedkar,
to theR Srinivasan,
PoonaSolanki,
PactС Rajagopalachari,
with Ambedkar Rajendra
in September 1932. Prasad, Pandit Malaviya, M R Jayakar, В S Moonje, T В Sapru,
H N Kunzru,
В S Moonje, the Hindu Mahasabha M С Rajah,was
leader Chimanlal Setalvad, G D Birla,
present at thisAV
Thakkar, M S Aney, Purshottamdas
rtc along with Gandhi. The Mahasabha was, among Thakurdas, Walchand
other
Hirachand
things, also actively involved in the andconstitutional
others. At Yerwda jail along with Gandhi there
discourse in
were Devadas Gandhi,for
terms of the constitutional implications SarojiniHindus.
Naidu, Vallabhbhai Patel, Ma- the
During
second rtc, the Mahasabha was hadev Desai, N С Kelkar
holding and Pyarelal. On thein
meetings firstDelhi
day of the "to
consider communal and constitutional
conference at Bombay, Ambedkar stated that "although role
issues".44 Here the I re-
of consensus making played gard
by the Malaviya
question of separate electorates
cannot as closed
be by the Com-
under-
munal Award
stated. He represented the crucial yet I ambetween
link prepared to negotiate
the with Mr Gandhi asline
hard
he was the chief
Mahasabhaites who spoke in terms ofopponent in London".55
military Ambedkar further
regeneration,
the moderate Mahasabhaites added
and thatthe
"I will not discuss the questionHindus
Congress with anybody elselike
other than Mahatma
himself and С Vijayaraghavachariar and Gandhi. The Gandhi".56 In turn, Gandhi, in anMaha-
inter-
sabha was sensitive to the idea
view that, for the
to the press conceded now,
principle constitutional
of reservation of seats
discourse came before that of swaraj.
stating During
that although he held "strongthe second
views about reservation rtc,
Moonje in a letter wrote thatof seats",
"we nevertheless
Hindus he wouldare
"abide by any agreement on
idealists and
fools. We are so impatient forthe basis of joint electorates".57
Swaraj that we Further,
doinnot
a privatebother
letter, Gan- to
dhi wrote toFaced
comprehend its responsibility".45 P N Rajbhoj of his desire opposition
with to meet Ambedkar, a tacitover
acceptance of Ambedkar's
the constitutional negotiations, Gandhi concluded representative credentials
that which he
"the
had questioned earlier in London.
sinful wrangles" would continue to evade any resolution so
This was a quantum
long as there remained uncertainties leap from the to
in regard encounter
"the of confronta-
funda-
tion between
mentals of the constitution".46 T В theSapru,
two at the second rtc where, in the words of
sympathetically
С Rajagopalachari,
noted, on this occasion, that he "witnessed "Mahatmaji the
received funeral
many wounds in of
Lon- so-
don.the
called Indian nationalism".47 By But Dr time
Ambedkar'sofdartshis
were the worst".58 Ambedkar
return to India
wassecond
and after the conclusion of the dictating the rtc,
terms of Gandhi,
these negotiations.
if Theone
secretary of
goes
by the word of M S Aney who state
was noted that Ambedkar
acting "has put forwardof
president someCongress
very sweep-
in 1933, "no longer believed ing
in communal
demands settlement
as an alternative to separate electorates".59 and
Sapru
prepared a scheme
wanted the Congress to work purely on based on primary and
national secondary
basis in elections
con-
wherein
sidering any new constitution of the primaries would be through a panel system (a soft
India".48
On his return, Gandhi and allform of separate electorates)
leading Congress and the secondary
leaders and final
were elec-
imprisoned and "many of thetions
rankthroughand
joint electorates
file with reservation of seats.
followed, byIn Mayhis
meeting
there were 36,000 prisoners".49 The withBritish
Ambedkar Gandhi stated that "primary election
government initi-
ated a series of "shock and awe" ordinances to overwhelm the
would not offend against my vow".6° The negotiators had to
Congress organisation and the civil disobedience movement.concede even reservation of seats at the central legislature
The idea that "the Gandhian campaign had come to an end"50even though it did not form part of the communal award. The
was gaining currency by early 1932. The setback for the Congress Hindus and representatives of the Mahasabha and
Congressmen in general were under tremendous pressure to
"nationalist" discourse of swaraj was further compounded by
Ramsay MacDonald's communal award that projected a frac- come to an agreement.61 Ambedkar was exerting his own pres-
tured vision of the Indian nation state by assuring separate
sure on them by approaching them with the principle of maxi-
electorates for both communities and castes. Gandhi com- mum extraction insisting that "nothing be left unresolved" and
mented that this award "seeks to create such divisions in the that he was "keen on deciding matters once and for all".62
Chimanlal Setalvad remarked after the conclusion of the pact
country that it can never stand up on its own legs".51 Gandhi
had stated at the second rtc that "the claims advanced on that "If Gandhiji had to be saved, everything that Dr Ambedkar
behalf of the untouchables are the unkindest cut of all. I will asked for had to be conceded. Dr Ambedkar was the central
resist it with my life."52 He went on a fast unto death that was,
figure in the conversations with Gandhi."63
in his own words, "aimed at statutory separate electorates in These various agreements were bundled into what is known
any shape or form for the Depressed Classes".53 as the Poona Pact. The implications of this historic agreement
were that first, Ambedkar became established as a prominent
Ambedkar: The Central Figure Depressed Class leader on a national platform. Second, reser-
vation of seats for castes became statutorily entrenched
A conference was convened at Bombay under the presidentship
of Pandit Malaviya to come up with an agreement that could
through a consensus based on negotiations between represent-
convince Gandhi to withdraw his fast. The week from 19th to
atives of castes and this eventually made its way into independ-
ent India's Constitution. Third, the successful completion of the
25th September 1932 was an epic one in Indian history that saw
Gandhi-Ambedkar dialogue of 1932 raised hopes that a wider
leading personalities of modern Indian history involved in
settlement may now be possible. On the day of the announce-
negotiations. "It was a situation that taxed the nation's nerves."54
Some of the leaders who took part in these negotiations werement of Gandhi's fast, Sapru wrote to G D Birla on the need for

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a pact with the Depressed Classes, stating that "this Pact may others. The agenda for discussion was (1) Settling of Funda-
lead to other important constitutional solutions".64 Ambedkar mental Rights - inclusion of Personal Law of Muslim Sharia in
entered into an agreement with caste Hindus through a dia- the Declaration of Fundamental Rights demanded by the Jamiatul-
logue with Gandhi for three reasons. One, Gandhi acknowledged ulama. This was agreed to in principle, (2) Equal rights to the
Ambedkar as a Depressed Class representative. Second, Gandhi Frontier and Baluchistan, (3) Representation by Convention
conceded the principle of reservation of seats, which he had on Minorities in cabinets and services, (4) Agreement over the
opposed in London. Third, Ambedkar was disappointed with Punjab question, (5) Tentative Settlement of Bengal, and
the communal award. He wrote to the secretary of state that (6) Separation of Sind. Ambedkar wrote a letter to the conference
parts of the award "have come as a shock to me" and "the De- that was read out by G К Malaviya which read "there was no
pressed Classes are furious".65 This leads to an assertion that is greater stumbling block than disunity. Hindus must drop their
contrary to the popular as well as academic consensus on this doctrinaire attitude and Muslims must cease saying that their
historic encounter of 1932 that "Ambedkar was unable to with- first word on the 14 points was also their last word."73 Never
stand public pressure to defer to the force of Gandhi's fast".66 before, in the history of negotiations between communities
and castes, was so much put forward on the negotiating table
Separate Electorates and so much lost. К M Ashraf suggests that "Hindu leaders at
Allahabad approached the problem of Indian minorities even
The aspirations for a wider settlement led to the convening of
a Unity Conference at Allahabad at the tail end of 1932. Themore generously than their predecessors at Lucknow at 1916".74
groundwork for these negotiations was carried out by Pandit
The entire first week was spent discussing the question of
Malaviya and Maulana Shaukat Ali. On 16 October 1932, the"Sind Separation which was giving the greatest trouble".75 A
All Parties Conference of Muslim Leaders hammered out a draft document of agreement was prepared for ratification by
resolution wherein they agreed to put the issue of separate the regional community bodies. The "Text of the Agreement
electorates on the negotiating table "subject to the definitearrived
ac- at by the Unity Conference"76 protected personal laws,
ceptance of the Muslim demands".67 Gandhi's intent to medi- and gave Muslims 51% of the seats in the legislative councils of
ate on these negotiations may be understood by M S Aney'sboth Bengal and Punjab. Hindus were restricted to 44.7% in
letter that said, "Everything will be done as desired by you.
Bengal and to 27% in Punjab. Sikhs were allotted reservations
You will shortly proceed to Allahabad to attend the open of
ses-
20% (as opposed to the 30% demanded by them from the
sion, I believe."68 Maulana Shaukat Ali made an attempttime
to of the Nehru Report). The text agreement makes it clear
have Gandhi released and approached the viceroy who, how-
that the conference did not consider itself to be a definitive body
ever, refused. As for Malaviya's efforts, В S Moonje remarked
and realised that the participants were on a strict mandate.
that "he (Malaviya) is obsessed with one idea, i e, forcing the
Thus, it provided that the agreement had to be ratified by
Prime Minister to now change his award in respect of Mos- the "regional bodies" of the communities. This ratification ran
lems".69 The Mahasabha was still open for a dialogue between
into a series of suggested amendments that the conference
communities. It, however, had its own reasons for doing so. It not resolve and the draft eventually collapsed. This
could
concluded that Hindus "cannot fight the Muslims particularlymarked the end of the phase of "comprehensive negotiations".
if they start civil war. We must concede all 14 points of Jinnah
The unity conference was the last such voluntary public gath-
and, at any cost, resolve our quarrel with the Muslims."70 This
ering of leaders on such a grand scale on the constitutional is-
sue of reconciling the contest between communities. The
statement is indicative of the fact that the word "unity" had
many meanings. Shaukat Ali called this conference the
breakdown of dialogue enabled the introduction of the Gov-
"Swadeshi Round Table Conference".71 It was presided overernment
by of India Act 1935 along with the provisions of the
veteran Congress and Mahasabha leader and eminent consti- communal award as amended according to the Poona Pact.
tutionalist, С Vijayaraghavachariar who, in his opening ad- The following is a brief summary of the main trends in the
dress stated that they had "met to consider the situation cre-
remaining three phases. In the second phase (1935-46), the
ated by the Premier's Award and the Poona Pact. If we wishdominant
to theme was the withdrawal of the Hindu Mahasabha
be a nation, an integration of communities must take place."72
from the constitutional dialogue. In the first phase, they were
On 1 November 1932, an informal gathering had taken place
part of the negotiations from 1925 to 1932. Critical of the com-
of Sikh and Hindu delegates from Punjab, Bengal, Sind, munal
the award, the Mahasabha, under Savarkar, embarked
United Provinces, Central Provinces and Madras at К N Katju's
upon a discourse of cultural confrontation. Further, the
residence at Allahabad. Pandit Malaviya, С Vijayaraghavach-
Mahasabha was suspicious of any negotiations by Congress
ariar, G D Birla, Raja Narendranath, Sir Sundersingh Majithia,
leaders with the Muslim League, especially due to the Con-
Ujjal Singh, Ramanand Chatterjee, Radhakumud Mukherji,
gress' ambivalence on the communal award. The Congress
С В Chintamani, H N Kunzru, M S Aney and В S Moonje wereNationalist Party (cnp) represented the link between the
present. The next day saw the arrival of С Rajagopalachariar
Mahasabha and the Congress but the merger of cnp with Con-
and the Depressed Classes leader from Madras M С Rajah, gress for the 1937 elections broke this link. In 1939, the
Rajendra Prasad, К T Shah, M Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad,
Mahasabha passed a resolution stating that "the Congress
G В Pant, Giani Kartar Singh (of Akali Dal and sgpc), Sardar
does not and cannot represent the Hindus, no constitutional
Kartar Singh, Giani Sher Singh (sgpc), Ziauddin Ahmad and
settlement arrived at behind the back of the Mahasabha will

5° FEBRUARY 18, 2012 vol XLVii no 7 ШЗЕЭ Economic & Political WEEKLY

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 be binding power the fragility
on Hindus until of the constitutional
it is consensus on the
sanction
bha".77 On developmental
the other nation state. Fazl-i-Hussain
side, It remains to be seen how the
dating the All contest
India between these two strands
Muslim manifest constitutionally and
Conference as
organ of Muslim politically. The first strand
opinion of - that of reservation for
India Muslims asthe
till a
community is being
safeguards for Muslims in spearheaded
the by thenew
dominant cultural
const
All groups like the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind,
India Muslim League resolution Jamaat-e-Islami, the All
stated
India Muslim Personal Law Board
tion of India's constitutional (aimplb) and the Majlis-e- is t
problems
Ittehadul Muslimeen. The
into independent zones".79 The constitutio second reservations for Muslim dal-
communities its has remained localised,
threatened to unablebeto replaced
match the influence of by
tion. Fazlul Huq, and opposed by the first strand.
according to A curious
the group working
Mahasafor a
actual revolt and civil war if the Indian constitution is not larger Muslim cultural consensus on political issues is the Pop-
ular Front of India which is influential in south India and have
drafted to their entire satisfaction".80 The contest between the
expanded their cultural alliance to include Muslim cultural
two visions of "nation through constitution" and "constitution
through nation" remained irreconcilable. The making of a na-groups from Rajasthan and the Lilong Social Forum of Manipur
(Lilong is a Muslim majority nagar panchayat in Manipur).
tion (independence) and the unmaking (partition) are not par-
allel narratives of secularism and communalism but "lateral
Conclusions
interactions" through constitutional discourse between castes
and communities. The third phase saw the Indian constituentThe engagement of these discourses of castes, communities
assembly preside over the birth of the undefined constitutionaland castes within communities with the processes of demo-
principle of "Indian secularism" by scrapping reservation ofcracy is indicative of the logic of the Indian Constitution being
seats, except for the scheduled castes (Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists implicated with that of affirmative action. The history of the
but not Christians or Muslims) and tribes and resolved that rep-idea of democracy cannot be delinked from that of constitu-
resentation would be on purely national lines. Nehru stated in tional affirmative action in India. The contest across cultural
the assembly that this was "the right thing to do".81 This was not fault lines between castes, communities and castes within
merely a "moment of containment",82 as Rojana Bajpai sayscommunities manifests itself through many signs, affirmative
rather it was one of the most prolific attempts at a realignment action being one such marker. The anti-colonial nationalist
and reshaping of the cultural fault lines between castes anddiscourse of the mass movements resolved upon swaraj first
communities, as undertaken by the constituent assembly of In-and constitution thereafter. On the other hand, caste and com-
dia, simultaneously with the structuring of the postcolonial wel- munities were, in parallel, seeking an agreement over an
fare state. The Constitution attempted to reinterpret the notion"Indian Constitution" first and thereafter on "India". The ma-
of community as an "empirical fact" of the universalised com-trix of castes and communities is, in postcolonial India, under
munity of welfare scheme subscribers of the Indian nation state. constant re-evaluation as "new" minorities (for instance obcs,
The last and fourth phase consists of the contemporary Jats in Haryana, Gujjars in Rajasthan, emerging Sikh sects or
debate over affirmative action demanded by castes and com-deras) emerge from within traditional ones and leverage for a
munities. The rivets of the consensus on the making of theconstitutional minority status. This trend of Indian politics has
nation state through affirmative action for castes within the and will, besides realigning the cultural fault lines between
Indian constitutional regime while leaving that of community castes and communities, come into confrontation with the
(particularly Muslims and Christians) to the goodwill ofconstitutional principle of a ceiling of 50% on reservations
Indian secularism wherein "the state controls the way in whichestablished by the Supreme Court. This contemporary debate
religious and ethnic identities were conceived and empow-on affirmative action invites a more complicated interpretation
ered"83 are falling apart. They are threatening to collapse than merely "the gradual ascendance of primordial politics"84
under the pressure of emerging demands of affirmative actionif it is seen in the mirror of the unbroken history of embedding
from both castes and communities. The recent momentum in castes and communities within a "shared" constitution that
favour of integrating Muslims within the Other Backwardbegan with "comprehensive negotiations" early in the 20th cen-
Classes (obcs) and dalit Muslims through affirmative actiontury. Thus, re-situating constitutional studies, at least in part,
has brought to the landscape of postcolonial discourses ofwithin "the dialectic of source and discourse" that is, history.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 5 Bipan Chandra (1971): Modern India (Delhi, Democracy" in Zoya Hasan, op cit, 68.
1 A Kohli, ed. (2001): NCERT), 212. The Success 9 Ashok ofAcharya India's(2010): "Constitutionalising
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mocracy (Cambridge: 6 For the thematic ofCambridge
Culture, Community and Difference:
University The Indian Experiment" in Achin
Press), 3. Power see Shashi Joshi (1997): Struggle for He- Vanaik and Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Understand-
2 Zoya Hasan and E Sreedharan and R Sudar- gemony in India, 1920-34, Vol 1 (Delhi: Sage). ing Contemporary India: Critical Perspectives
shan, ed. (2005): India's Living Constitution: 7 For a perspective on constitutional politics and (Delhi: Orient BlackSwan), 75.
Ideas , Practices , Controversies (London: An- caste discourse in Bengal see "Constitutional 10 Mridula Mukherjee Presidential address,
them Press), 9. Politics and a Fissured Community" in Sekhar "Communal Threat and Secular Resistance:
3 Bhagwan Josh (1992) : Struggle for Hegemony in Bandopadhyaya (1997): Caste, Protest and From Noakhali to Gujarat" presented in the Indian
India 1934-41, Vol II (Delhi: Sage), 54. Identity in Colonial India: The Namasudras of History Congress 71st Session, Malda 2011.
4 В R Nanda (1995): Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Bengal, (Surrey: Curzon Press), 136-172. 11 Bipan Chandra (1987): Communalism in Mod-
Statesman, (New Delhi: OUP), 22. 8 Sunil Khilnani, "The Indian Constitution and ern India (Delhi: Vikas Publishing), 206.

Economic & Political weekly ИЗИ February 18, 2012 vol xlvii no 7 51

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12 Dr В R Ambedkar (2009): What Congress and
Gandhi have Done to the Untouchables? (Delhi:
Gautam Books, reprint), 34.
13 Proceedings of the Sub Commitees, Volume VI
(Franchise), Indian Round Table Conference,
London, 1930, Nehru Memorial Museum and
Library, Delhi, p 531.
14 Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, Volume 13,
Issue 2, Volume 14, Issue 2, 327.
15 Wolpert Stanley (2008): A New History of India
(US: OUP), 259.
16 Richard Cashman, I (1975) : The Myth of the Lok-
manya: Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra
(California: University of California Press), 214.
17 Syed Nesar Ahmad (1991): Origins of Muslim
Consciousness in India: A World-System Perspec-
tive (US: Greenwood Press), 121.
18 KM Munshi (1967): Indian Constitutional Docu-
ments, Vol 1 (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan), 7.
19 С Vijayaraghavachariar, incomplete Papers,
S No 5, Manuscript Section, Nehru Memorial
Museum and Library (NMML), Delhi, 2.
20 Richard Sisson and S A Wolpert, ed. (1988):
Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Pre-inde-
pendence Phase (California: UCLA Press), 86.
21 Ayesha Jalal writes that "The Khilafat Move-
ment Overwhelmed the League and Broke the
Fragile Constitutional Understanding between
Congress and League Which Jinnah Had Pains-
takingly Helped to Construct" in A Jalal, ed.
(1994): The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim
League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press), 9.
22 John Gallagher and Gordon Johnson and Anil
Seal (1973): Locality , Province , and Nation:
Essays on Indian Politics 1870-1940 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 22.
23 Annie Besant (2003): Theosophist Magazine,
July 25-September 1925 (US: Kessinger re-
print), 686.
24 Ikram Ali Malik (1970): A Book of Readings on
the History of Punjab (Lahore: University of
Punjab), 446.
25 Peter Hardy (1972): The Muslims of British
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Archive), 211.
26 Christophe Jaffrelot (2007): Hindu National-
ism: A Reader (Delhi: Permanent Black), 13.
27 Ibid, p 67.
28 Ibid, p 71.
29 Uma Kaura (1977): Muslims and Indian Nation-
alism (Delhi: Manohar Books), 31.
30 Motilal Nehru Papers, Subject File No 23, Part
(i), NMML, Delhi, 76.
31 Ayesha Jalal (2000): Self and Sovereignty: Indi-
vidual and Community in South Asian Islam
since 1850 (London: Routledge), 307.
32 Motilal Nehru Papers, Subject File 24, NMML,
Delhi, 8.
33 Motilal Papers, op cit, Ref 32, p 59.
34 К L Tuteja (1984): Sikh Politics 1920-40 (Kuruk-
shetra: Vishal), 145.
35 Motilal Papers, op cit, Ref 34, 2.
36 Nehru Report quoted in К Singh, ed. (1991):
Select Documents on the Partition of Punjab,
(Delhi: Natural bookshop), xi.
37 Motilal Papers, File No 23, Part (i), NMML, Delhi.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p 59.
40 M К Gandhi (1970): The Collected Works of
Mahatma Gandhi, Vol xxxviii (Delhi: Government
of India), 436. This entire letter is quite revealing
in terms of the issue of reservation of seats.
41 Motilal Nehru Papers, Subject File 23 (Part II),
NMML, Delhi, p 59.
42 Gandhi's letter to Motilal in Motilal Papers, File
23 (II), NMML, Delhi, 17-23.
43 Judith Brown quoted in Sekhar Bandopad-
hyaya (2004): From Plassey to Partition ( Delhi:
Orient Blackswan), 315.
52
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44 Bombay Chronicle, 6 November 1931, NMML,
Delhi, p 8.
45 Letter, 6 November 1931, С Vijayaraghavachariar
Papers, Correspondence В S Moonje, NMML,
Delhi, 1.
46 N Gangulee (1936): The Making of Federal India
(London: James Nibset), 126.
47 Ibid, 126.
48 С Vijayaraghavachariar Papers, Correspond-
ence, M S Aney, dated 5 January 1932, NMML,
Delhi, p 1.
49 Philip Williamson (2003): National Crisis and
National Government: British Politics, the Eco-
nomy and Empire 1926-1932 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press), 491.
50 Andrew Muldoon (2009) Empire, Politics and
the Creation of the 1935 India Act: The Last Act
of the Raj (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing), 107.
51 Mahadev Desai (1953): The Dairy of Mahadev
Desai, Vol I, Trans Valji Govindji Desai
(Ahmedabad: Navjivan Publications), 291.
52 В R Ambedkar, op cit, Ref 15, 67.
53 Gandhi's interview to press, Madras Mail,
22 September 1932, NMML, Delhi, 5.
54 В D Shukla (i960): A History of the Indian
Liberal Party (Allahabad: Indian Press), 327.
55 Madras Mail, 20 September 1932, NMML, 72 Ibid, "For United India", 4 November 1932, p 1.
Delhi, p 7. 73 Dr Ambedkar quoted in Bombay Chronicle,
56 Moonje Papers, Diaries, NMML, Delhi.
57 "Mr Gandhi on Purpose of Fast", Madras Mail,
22 September 1932, 5.
58 С Rajagopalachari Papers, Instalment IV, Sub-
ject File, S No 23, NMML, Delhi, p 5.
59 United Kingdom, National Archives, Cabinet
Papers, "Communal Decision", CAB/24/233;
SECRET.CP.322(32); Printed for the Cabinet on
24th September 1932 by the India Office of Sec-
retary of State for India, 5.
60 Mahadev Desai Papers, Instalment VI, Diary,
September 1932, NMML, Delhi, pp 67-72.
61 In the aftermath of the Pact many, especially in
Bengal and Punjab, believed that "by his threat
of fast unto death Gandhi coerced the Hindus
to ratify the Poona Pact and separate elector-
ates was changed into reservation of seats at a
premium" M S Aney Papers, Subject File 6,
NMML, Delhi, p 138.
62 Pyarelal (1932): The Epic Fast (Ahmedabad:
MM Bhatt), 64-65.
63 Chimanlal Setalvad, "Poona Agreement as Lib-
erals View It", Bombay Chronicle, 15 October
1932, 11.
February 18, 2012 vol XLVii no 7 вдш Economic & Political WEEKLY
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64 Ghanshyam Das Birla (1953): In the Shadow of
the Mahatma: A Personal Memoir (Bombay:
Orient Longman), 67.
65 Viscount Templewood (Samuel Hoare) Papers,
NMML, Delhi.
66 Nicholas В Dirks (2003): Castes of Mind: Colo-
nialism and the Making of Modern India (Hy-
derabad: Orient Blackswan), p 269. Upendra
Baxi (2005) wrote that "In 1932 Gandhi Gam-
bled on Ambedkar's Self-restraint and Won",
С Jaffrelot, Analysing and Fighting Caste: Dr
Ambedkar and Untouchability (Delhi: Perma-
nent Black), 65. Christopher Jaffrelot writes,
Gandhi's fast "forced Ambedkar to relinquish
his demand for Separate electorates and to sign
the Poona Pact", ibid, 4.
67 К M Ashraf in J Ashraf, ed. (2008): Historical
Background to Muslim Question in India 1764-
1945, Volume 2 (Delhi: Mainframe Publishers), 58.
68 Letter from M S Aney to M К Gandhi dated 24
November 1932 in M S Aney Papers, Subject
File No 6. 1932, NMML, Delhi, p 6.
69 Moonje Papers, Diaries, NMML, Delhi.
70 Ibid.
71 Bombay Chronicle, "Shaukat Ali Blames Viceroy's
Advisors", 1 November 1932, NMML, Delhi, p 1.
"Unity Now or Never", 5 November 1932, p 16.
74 Ashraf, op cit, Ref 67, 63.
75 Bombay Chronicle, 7 November 1932, p 1.
76 M S Aney Papers, Draft Report and the Final
Agreement in Subject File No 3, 1932, Manu-
script Section, NMML, Delhi, pp 34-54.
77 M S Aney Papers, Subject File 7, NMML , Delhi, 90.
78 Malik, op cit, Ref 26, 449.
79 А С Bannerjee, Indian Constitutional Docu-
ments, Vol IV (Calcutta: A Mukherjee, 1945),
pp 171-72.
80 M S Aney Papers, op cit, Ref 72, 68.
81 Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD), Book 3,
Vol VIII, 4th edition (Delhi: Loksabha Secre-
tariat, 2003), p 330.
82 Rochana Bajpai (2011): Debating Difference:
Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press), 30.
83 William Gould, "Contesting Secularism in Co-
lonial and Postcolonial North India between
the 1930 and 1950s", Contemporary South Asia,
14(4), December 2005, 491-92.
84 D Gupta, "Limits of Reservation", Seminar
No 549, May 2005.