Professional Documents
Culture Documents
- The formal idea of equality is that people who are similarly situated in relevant ways
should be treated similarly
- It is ALSO the idea that people who are not similarly situated should be treated
dissimilarly
- The Constitution commits the state to the goal of achieving equality – it tells us the
type of society that it wishes to create is one based on equality, dignity and freedom
Section 9
Equality
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of
the law.
o The principle of equality before the law and confers the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote
the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
may be taken.
o Affirmative Action
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth.
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless
it is established that the discrimination is fair.
This right comprises a guarantee that the law will protect and benefit people equally
and prohibition on unfair discrimination
- Looking at subsection (2), special measures may be taken to ensure the protection or
advancement of people who have been disadvantaged by discrimination in the past
- The apartheid political and legal system were squarely based on inequality and
discrimination
- Apartheid dealt with the problem of scarce resources by systematically promoting the
socio-economic development of the white population at the expense of the rest of
society
o As the CC pointed out, apartheid systematically discriminated against
black people in all aspects of social life
- The constitutional commitment to equality also entails recognising the shifting
patters of inequality
- The nature of inequality means that the Constitutional commitment to equality cannot
simply be understood as commitment to formal equality
o Substantial inequality can be recognised to be confronted in s9(2) of the
Constitution
- Formal equality simply requires that all persons are equal bearers of rights
- It does not take actual social and economic disparities between groups and individuals
into account
- A purely formal understanding of equality risks neglecting the deepest
commitments of the Constitution
Substantive equality requires the law to ensure equality of outcome and is prepared to
tolerate disparity of treatment to achieve this goal
Interpreting Section 9
In the case of Harksen v Lane NO, the CC tabulated the stages of enquiry into a violation of
the equality clause along the following lines:
According to Harksen the Section 8(1) analysis (now 9(1)): Where section 9 is invoked to
attack a legislative provision or executive conduct on the ground that it differentiates between
people or categories of people in a manner that amounts to unequal treatment or unfair
discrimination, this first enquiry is:
The first stage (Rationality Enquiry) concerns the right to equal treatment and equality
before the law. It tests whether the law or conduct has a rational basis: is there a rational
connection between the differentiation in question and a legitimate governmental purpose
that is designed to further or achieve?
- If no, then the impugned law or conduction violates s9(1) and it fails the first stage
- If the differentiation is shown to have a rational connection, then the second stage of
the enquiry is activated to determine whether the differentiation amounts to unfair
discrimination
- A differentiation that is rational may nevertheless be unfair discrimination
o Refer to mere differentiation
Unspecified grounds – the test for unfairness: equal dignity irrespective of membership
to certain group (Clearly stated in the Hugo case)
- Position of complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past
from patterns of disadvantage; whether the discrimination in the case under
consideration is on a specified ground or not
- Nature of challenged provisions and purpose sought by the provisions:
o If the purpose is not directed at impairing the complaints in the manner
indicated but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal
- Extent to which the rights of the applicant had been infringed and whether it
amounted to an impairment of her fundamental dignity
These factors, assessed objectively, will assist in giving precision and elaboration to the
constitutional test of unfairness – it is the cumulative effect of these factors that must be
examined
If at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then
there will be no violation of s9(3) and (4)
It is important to keep these two stages separate because there can be instances of
discrimination which do not amount to unfair discrimination and it is possible to rebut
presumption of unfairness
What the specified grounds have in common is that they have been used (or misused) in
the past to categorize, marginalise, and often oppress persons who have had or who have
been associated with these attributes or characteristics – these grounds have the potential,
when manipulated, to demean persons in their inherent humanity and dignity
- One first considers whether there has been a violation of the right to equality before
the law and then considers whether there is unfair discrimination
- If the equal treatment right in s9(1) has been violated there will be no need to consider
whether there has also been a violation of the non-discrimination right
In the National Coalition Case, the CC held that a court not inevitably perform both stage of
the enquiry – the first stage of the inquiry would be clearly unnecessary in a case in which a
court holds that discrimination is unfair and unjustifiable
- In a case where a court finds that law or conduct unjustifiably infringes s9(3) or (4),
there is no need to first consider whether the law or conduct is a violation of s9(1)
Section 9 is said to identify three ways in which a law or conduct might differentiate
between people or categories of people
- Mere differentiation: while it does treat some people differently to others, it does not
amount to discrimination
o Mere differentiation will fall foul of s9(1) unless it has a rational connection to
a legitimate government purpose
- Differentiation: amounts to unfair discrimination (prohibited by s9(3) and (4))
- Fair Discrimination: law or conduct that discriminates but which does not do so
unfairly, taking into account the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and
others in his or her situation
The BoR contains a general limitations clause – s36. It is general because the clause applies
generally to all the rights listed in the BoR – this requires a 2 stage process of analysis (refer
to the s36 analysis)
- In the case of the right to equality, it is difficult to apply the usual two stage
analysis of a right and its limitations
o This is because the s9 rights are qualified by the same of similar criteria to
those used to adjudicate the legitimacy of a limitation of rights in s36
- As required by the Harksen formula, the CC has on each occasion when it has found a
violation of the equality clause, also considered the effect of the limitation clause
o The limitation analysis has never resulted in the impugned law being upheld
Mere Differentiation
“In order to govern a modern country efficiently and to harmonise the interests of all its
people for the common good, it is essential to regulate the affairs of its inhabitants
extensively – it is impossible to do so without differentiation and without classifications
which treat people differently and which impact on people differently”
The equality right does not prevent the state from making classifications and from treating
some people differently from others (legitimate differentiation v differentiation that crosses
the boarder of constitutional impermissibility and is unequal or discriminatory)
- The principle of equality does not require everyone to be treated the same, but simply
that people in the same position from a moral point of view should be treated the same
- Laws almost inevitably differentiate between persons – not every differentiation
can therefore amount to unequal treatment
Rationality
Law or conduct that differentiates between groups of people will be valid as long as it does
not deny equal protection or benefit from the law, or does not amount to unequal treatment
under the law in violation of s9(1)
- A law or conduct will violate s9(1) if the differentiation does not have a
legitimate purpose and if there is no rational connection between the
differentiation and the purpose
According to the case of Prinsloo v Van der Linde the constitutional state is required to act
in a rational manner and not regulate in an arbitrary manner as this would be inconsistent
with the RoL and the fundamental premises of the constitutional state – the purpose of the
aspect of equality is to ensure that the state is bound to function in a rational manner
- The court will evaluate the reasons given by the government for a law that
differentiates to determine whether the purpose of the law is legitimate
- It will then consider whether there is a rational relation between the purpose of the
law and the differentiation imposed by the law
How was the test applied in the case of Prinsloo v Van der Linde?
The case dealt with the validity of s84 of the Forest Act
- The Act aims to prevent and control veld and forest fires by creating fire-control areas
where schemes of compulsory fire control are established
- Owners of land situated outside of the fire control areas were not obliged to institute
fire-control measures – s84 created a presumption of negligence by the landowner in
respect of these fires occurring in non-controlled areas
o No such presumption applied in controlled areas
The Act differentiated between owners of land in fire controlled areas and non-fire
controlled areas
- In this case the Constitutional Court was asked to confirm a decision declared a
provision of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (the Act)
unconstitutional.
- The provision prevents employees from claiming damages from their employers,
except where provided for in the Act.
- The Constitutional Court said that it was clear that the challenged provision
differentiated between employees and non-employees
- The only issue was whether the challenged provision was rationally connected to a
legitimate government purpose.
- The Constitutional Court found that the legitimate purpose of the Act is to provide a
system of compensation for employees for disability or death caused by injuries or
diseases in the workplace.
- It allows the employee to claim limited compensation from a fund (to which
employers are obliged to contribute) even where the employer was not negligent.
- Therefore, viewed in the context of the Act as a whole, the challenged provision
depriving employees of their common law right to damages from their employer was
not arbitrary or irrational.
- The Act was rationally connected to the legitimate purpose of the Act.
Discrimination
What makes discrimination unfair? – the determining factor is the impact of the
discrimination on its victims (UNFAIR discrimination: treating people differently in a
way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently
equal in dignity)
- It occurs when law or conduct, for no good reason, treats some people as inferior or
incapable or less deserving of respect than others
- It also occurs when law or conduct perpetuates or does nothing to remedy existing
disadvantaged and marginalisation
Unfair Impact
The following factors must be taken into account in determining whether discrimination has
an unfair impact:
- The position of the complainants in society and whether they have been victims of
past patterns of discrimination
- The nature of the discriminating law or action and the purpose sought to be achieved
by it
- The extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and whether
there has been an impairment of his or her fundamental dignity
To determine whether unfair
- Refers to the impact of the discrimination on the persons fundamental dignity, who
claims discrimination
- Whether the differentiation impairs the inherent equal dignity of the person
concerned and regards them as a second class citizen is determined by considering:
o Listed grounds s 9(3)+(4)
o If not on listed grounds (analogous grounds) then use Harksen test
Grounds – s9(3)
Differentiation on the basis of one of the grounds listed in s9(3) is presumed to be unfair
discrimination until the contrary is proved
- Sex: refers to the biological and physical differences between men and women
- Gender: refers to the ascribed social and cultural male and female roles
Sexual Orientation
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs
- The provisions of the Aliens Control Act were found to constitute unfair
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and marital status
- The provisions granted spouses of South African citizens a right to an immigration
permit
- By granting a benefit to married people that was not granted to people who were not
married or to those who could not marry (same-sex life partners), the Act
differentiated between groups of people
o This differentiation overlapped and intersected on two of the listed
grounds – sexual orientation and marital status
- By excluding gay and lesbian couples from the benefit, the legislation was in effect
saying that homosexual partnerships did not constitute family life
o This perpetuated lots of harmful and hurtful stereotypes
- The court stated that the message that is given is that gays and lesbians lack the
inherent humanity to have their families and family lives in such same sex
relationships respected or promoted
o This impact constitutes a crass, blunt and serious invasion of their dignity
Marital Status
The ground of marital status of discrimination gives motivation to reforms aimed at removing
the historical privileging of common law marriage over other forms
Robinson v Volks
Age
Age is different from most of the other grounds of discrimination in that it does not refer to
an unchanging characteristic
- Age changes constantly throughout the course of everyones life
- It regulates many things: voting; pension; inheritance etc
- Most common challenge is the compulsory early retirement
Disability
Interpreting the provisions of s9(3) against the backdrop of SA’s international obligations, the
court held that the government had the duty to advance and promote the position of disabled
people
- Depending on the nature of the disability, special measures may have to be taken to
ensure that the needs of the disabled people are not merely taken into account, but the
barriers to their effective economic participation are removed
- Must be understood in both a negative and positive terms
Analogous Grounds
Analogous grounds will have a similar relationship and impact as of those listed in the
listed grounds
- There is no presumption to aid the applicant – the applicant must show that law or
conduct on grounds other than those listed in s9(3) is based on attributes or
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons
as humans, or to affect them seriously in a comparably serious manner
- Factors that will have to be considered:
o The position of the complainants in society and whether they have been
victims of past patterns of discrimination
o The nature of the discriminating law or action and the purpose sought to be
achieved by it
o The extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and
whether there has been an impairment of his or her fundamental dignity
Hoffman v South African Airways
- The case dealt with the airlines policy of not employing HIV positive persons as cabin
attendants
- It was argued that the policy amounted to unfair discrimination on the listed grounds
of disability – the CC avoided HIV as a disability, dealt with it as an analogous
ground
- The determining factor in deciding whether discrimination is unfair is its impact on
the people affected
- For people to be denied employment because of their HIV positive status without
regard to their ability to perform the duties of the position from which they have been
excluded is a violation of dignity
- Legitimate commercial requirements are important but they cannot serve to disguise
stereotyping and prejudice, which have no place in this era of respect for human
dignity, compassion and understanding - ubuntu.
The prohibition of indirect unfair discrimination is based on the realisation that, though the
basis of differentiation may, on the face of it, be innocent, the impact or effect of the
differentiation is discriminatory
Direct Discrimination
On the face of it, the provision is discriminatory – indirect discrimination will often need
evidence to show that the particular law or conduct has a discriminatory effect
- There is no need for the applicant to show that a law or conduct which has
discriminatory effect was intended to discriminate
- The applicants only have to show that they were unfairly discriminated against but not
that the unfair discrimination was intentional
The proper reach of the equality right must be determined by reference to our history and
the underlying values of the Constitution.
- This substantive notion of equality recognises that besides uneven race, class and
gender attributes of our society, there are other levels and forms of social
differentiation and systematic under-privilege, which still persist.
- Restitutionary measures, sometimes referred to as “affirmative action”, may be
taken to promote the achievement of equality
- The provisions of section 9(1) and section 9(2) are complementary; both contribute to
the constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure “full and equal enjoyment of all
rights”.
-
If the test is rational and meets the s9(2) standard you do not have to go to the s9(3) standard,
if it does not meet the s9(2) standard, then it will go to the s9(3) test
When a measure is challenged as violating the equality provision, its defender may meet
the claim by showing that the measure is contemplated by section 9(2) in that it promotes
the achievement of equality and is designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged
by unfair discrimination.
How does one determine whether a measure meets the requirements of s9(2)
- Does the measure target persons of categories of persons who have been
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination?
o Does this aim to transfer a particular work force? – is the target a group of
people who have suffered in the past?
o The beneficiaries must be shown to be disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
- An AA plan that places an absolute bar on certain previously privileged people will
not pass the constitutional muster
When someone mentions that there is an AA plan in place, know that it is linked to the
Employment Equity Act that was enacted to give effect to s9(2)
- Know what standard that program was meet to pass constitutional scrutiny
- Do not engage in unfair discrimination analysis… there is no obligation on the
employed to rebut the presumption of unfairness
- Once shown that this measure amounts to affirmative action, it is not unfairly
discriminatory, even if the basis of differentiation is on a listed ground
There were two trains of thought regarding the meaning of ‘designed to achieve’ equality ito
section 8 of interim constitution (now s9)
- One interpretation was that there must be a rational relationship between the means
and the ends. Ie – the means of a programme must be capable of meeting the purpose
for which they were implemented
o Public Servants Association v Minister of Justice
o Court found the words ‘design’ and ‘achieve’ denote a causal connection
between designed measures and their objectives
- This was overruled by the CC in van Heerden – text of s 9(2) requires only that the
means should be designed to protect or advance.
o If the means carry a reasonable likelihood of meeting the ends this is sufficient
o To require a sponsor or remedial measure to establish a precise prediction of
the future outcome, is to set a standard not required by s9(2)
Therefore a litigant does not need to show that it is necessary to disfavour one class in order
to uplift another
- Only when based on AA – ie) the measures must be constructed to protect or advance
a disadvantaged group.
- Therefore it unnecessary to determine that there is no less onerous way in which the
remedial objective may be achieved
- An affirmative Action programme was instituted by the University, who had decided
to limit the number of Indian students accepted to 40.
- This was because the poor number of standards of education available to African
students meant that the merit-based entrance programme would result in very few
African applicants being accepted into the medical school
- An Indian student who obtained 5 distinctions in matric was refused entry because of
this, and so challenged the programme on the grounds of unfair discrimination
- Argued that Indian community had also been disadvantaged by apartheid, and a
measure favouring one disadvantaged group over another mounted to unfair
discrimination
Court held
- The admission policy was a measure designed to achieve adequate protection and
advancement of a group disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
o There is no doubt that Indian people were disadvantaged by Apartheid, but not
to the extent Africans were.
o African people were subject to the lowest of the ‘four tier’ system of
education, which disadvantaged them significantly more than their Indian
counterparts
o Therefore it is perfectly legitimate to apply affirmative action in proportion to
the degree of disadvantage suffered in the past
- When a programme is to disadvantage on the basis of race, the court must focus on
step 2 of the AA clause to ensure it is rationally constructed to achieve equality
b) Access to justice
Second objective of the Act is to provide access to justice and effective remedies for
victims of unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment.
o All complaints ito the Act are hear by equality courts (all HC and designated
MC’s)
o These courts receive training and are specially qualified to hear disputes
regarding Equality.
o Once a matter is brought to the court, they may refer matter to what they
perceive to be the most appropriate institution to hear it
Wide ranging powers of enforcement are awarded to equality courts
o Including power to grant interdicts, award damages, order unconditional
apologies, ordering the respondent to make frequent reports to the court
regarding the implementation of the court’s order, etc.
o Gives rise to Civil cases – therefore remedy is payment, preventing further
action ect
o These courts do not regulate criminal matters but if, for example, the court
determine that the harassment amounts to indecent assault, they can refer the
case to the Director of Public Prosecution
c) Promotion of Equality
Not yet in operation
Concerned with Chapter 5 of the Act
o Sets out lists of positive duties placed on the state to develop substantive
equality and address unfair discrimination.
o Similar lists placed on private persons who directly or indirectly contract with
the state, or who exercise a public power
Harksen v Lane
- Mrs Harksen challenged the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the
Insolvency Act7 which caused her property (as that of the solvent spouse) to vest in
the Master of the High Court and later in the trustee of the insolvent estate upon the
declaration of her husband’s insolvency.
- The Insolvency Act allows for the property of the solvent spouse to be released to her
only if she provides proof of a valid legal title to the property. If the solvent spouse
fails to do so, the property will be considered part of the insolvent estate to the benefit
of the creditors of the insolvent estate.
- Mrs Harksen’s argument was that the Act placed severe and unfair burdens on the
solvent spouse when one compared her position to that of others in intimate
relationships with the insolvent.
- The Act, according to her, discriminated unfairly against spouses on the basis of their
marital status.
- The court disagreed and held that the Act serves to protect the interests of the
creditors
-