Almocera vs. Ong complaint for Damages against Andre T.

Almocera and
546 SCRA 164 FBMC alleging that they were guilty of fraudulent
G.R. No. 170479 concealment and breach of contract when they sold to
February 18, 2008 him a townhouse unit without divulging that the same,
at the time of the perfection of their contract, was
FACTS: already mortgaged with the Land Bank of the Philippines
Johnny Ong tried to acquire from Andre T. Almocera and (LBP), with the latter causing the foreclosure of the
First Builder Multi-Purpose Cooperative (FBMC) a mortgage and the eventual sale of the townhouse unit to
"townhome" in Cebu City. As reflected in a Contract to a third person.
Sell, the selling price of the unit was P3,400,000.00
pesos. In their Answer, Almocera and FBMC denied liability
claiming that the foreclosure of the mortgage on the
Out of the purchase price, he was able to pay the townhouse unit was caused by the failure of Johnny Ong
amount of P1,060,000.00. to pay the balance of the price of said townhouse unit.

Prior to the full payment of this amount, Ong claims that ISSUES:
defendants Andre Almocera and First Builders 1. WON it was a contract to sell or a contract of sale.
fraudulently concealed the fact that before and at the 2. WON the respondent’s refusal to pay the balance of
time of the perfection of the aforesaid contract to sell, the purchase price is justified. -YES
the property was already mortgaged to and encumbered
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). In addition, HELD:
the construction of the house has long been delayed and 1. It cannot be disputed that the contract entered into
remains unfinished. On March 13, 1999, Lot 4-a
by the parties was a contract to sell. In a contract
covering the unit was advertised in a local tabloid for
to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not
public auction for foreclosure of mortgage. It is the
to pass to the buyer until full payment of the price.
assertion of Ong that had it not for the fraudulent
concealment of the mortgage and encumbrance by
The contract was denominated as such and it
defendants, he would have not entered into the contract
contained the provision that the unit shall be
to sell.
conveyed by way of an Absolute Deed of Sale,
together with the attendant documents of Ownership
On the other hand, defendants assert that on March 20,
– the Transfer Certificate of Title and Certificate of
1995, First Builders Multi-purpose Coop. Inc., borrowed
Occupancy – and that the balance of the contract
money in the amount of P500,000.00 from Tommy Ong,
price shall be paid upon the completion and delivery
plaintiff’s brother. This amount was used to finance the
of the unit, as well as the acceptance thereof by
documentation requirements of the LBP for the funding
respondent. All these clearly indicate that ownership
of the Atrium Town Homes. This loan will be applied in
of the townhouse has not passed to respondent.
payment of one (1) town house unit which Tommy Ong
may eventually purchase from the project. When the
The unit shall be completed and conveyed by way of
project was under way, Tommy Ong wanted to buy
an Absolute Deed of Sale together with the attendant
another townhouse for his brother, Johnny Ong, plaintiff
documents of Ownership in the name of the BUYER
herein, which then, the amount of P150,000.00 was
– the Transfer Certificate of Title and Certificate of
given as additional partial payment.
Occupancy within a period of six (6) months from
the signing of Contract to Sell.
However, the particular unit was not yet identified. It was
only on January 10, 1997 that Tommy Ong identified
2. The respondent is justified in refusing to pay the
Unit No. 4 plaintiff’s chosen unit and again tendered
balance of the contract price.
P350,000.00 as his third partial payment. When the
contract to sell for Unit 4 was being drafted, Tommy Ong
From the terms of the contract, it is clear that
requested that another contract to sell covering Unit 5 be
petitioner and FBMC had the obligation to complete
made so as to give Johnny Ong another option to choose
the townhouse unit within six months from the
whichever unit he might decide to have. When the
signing of the contract. Upon compliance therewith,
construction was already in full blast, defendants were
the obligation of respondent to pay the balance of
informed by Tommy Ong that their final choice was Unit
P2,400,000.00 arises. Upon payment thereof, the
5. It was only upon knowing that the defendants will be
townhouse shall be delivered and conveyed to
selling Unit 4 to some other persons for P4million that
respondent upon the execution of the Absolute Deed
plaintiff changed his choice from Unit 5 to Unit 4.
of Sale and other relevant documents.

In trying to recover the amount he paid as down

The evidence adduced shows that petitioner and
payment for the townhouse unit, Johnny Ong filed a
FBMC failed to fulfill their obligation -- to complete
and deliver the townhouse within the six-month
period. With petitioner and FBMC’s non-fulfillment
of their obligation, respondent refused to pay the
balance of the contract price. Respondent does not
ask that ownership of the townhouse be transferred
to him, but merely asks that the amount or down
payment he had made be returned to him.

The contract subject of this case contains reciprocal

obligations which were to be fulfilled by the parties,
i.e., to complete and deliver the townhouse within six
months from the execution of the contract to sell on
the part of petitioner and FBMC, and to pay the
balance of the contract price upon completion and
delivery of the townhouse on the part of the
respondent.

In the case at bar, the obligation of petitioner and

FBMC which is to complete and deliver the
townhouse unit within the prescribed period, is
determinative of the respondent’s obligation to pay
the balance of the contract price. With their failure
to fulfill their obligation as stipulated in the contract,
they incurred delay and are liable for damages. They
cannot insist that respondent comply with his
obligation. Where one of the parties to a contract did
not perform the undertaking to which he was bound
by the terms of the agreement to perform, he is not
entitled to insist upon the performance of the other
party.

Petitioner insists there was no delay when the

townhouse unit was not completed within six
months from the signing of the contract inasmuch
as the mere lapse of the stipulated six (6) month
period is not by itself enough to constitute delay on
his part and that of FBMC, since the law requires
that there must either be judicial or extrajudicial
demand to fulfill an obligation so that the obligor
may be declared in default. He argues there was no
evidence introduced showing that a prior demand
was made by respondent before the original action
was instituted in the trial court.

We do not agree.

Demand is not necessary in the instant case.

Demand by the respondent would be useless
because the impossibility of complying with their
(petitioner and FBMC) obligation was due to their
fault. If only they paid their loans with the LBP, the
mortgage on the subject townhouse would not have
been foreclosed and thereafter sold to a third person.
Gaite vs. Fonacier
2 SCRA 831
G.R. No. L-11827
July 31, 1961
FACTS:
Isabelo Fonacier executed a ‘Deed of Assignment’ in favor
of Fernando Gaite as his true and lawful attorney-in-fact
so that the latter may enter into a contract for the
exploration and development of the mining claims owned
by Fonacier. Gaite executed a general assignment
conveying the development and exploitation of said
mining claims to Larap Iron Mines owned by him.
Fonacier decided to revoke the ‘Deed of Assignment’ to
which Gaite assented on the condition that Fonacier is to
pay him P75,000 for the 24,000 metric tons of iron lodes
already extracted and to retain the company name Larap
Iron MInes. Fonacier already paid P10,000 leaving a
balance of P65,000 which, as agreed by them, is to be
derived from the local sale of Iron ore made by Larap
Iron Mines. On December 8, 1954, Fonacier issued a
security bond to secure payment of balance with Far
Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. but the surety
provided that liability to the company will only attach
when there had been actual sale of iron ore by Larap
Iron Mines for an amount of not less than P65,000 and
that the bond will automatically expire on December 8,
1955.
No sale of the iron ore was made thereafter. Gaite failed
to pay Fonacier the balance and the surety company
refused to pay contending that the bond expired
automatically.
Gaite instituted the present case. Fonacier argued that
the payment of the P65,000 balance was subject to the
condition that it would be paid out of the first sale of the
iron ore by Larap Mines which did not happen.
ISSUE:
WON the obligation of Fonacier to pay Gaite the balance
of P65,000 was extinguished because the iron ore was
not sold within a year.
HELD:
The shipment or local sale of the iron ore is not a
condition precedent (or suspensive) to the payment of
the balance of P65,000.00, but was only a suspensive
period or term. That the sale did not occur within a
period of one year did not extinguish the obligation of
Fonacier to pay Gaite the balance of P65,000 because it
does not seem to be the intention of the parties to the
contract.
The Court looked into several circumstances which lead
them to conclude that the sale of the iron ore is but a
suspensive term. First, the words of the contract express
no contingency in the buyer's obligation to pay.
Second, in the usual course of business, an onerous
contract is most likely preferred by the parties in a sale.
Nothing is found in the record to evidence that Gaite
desired or assumed to run the risk of losing his right
over the ore without getting paid for it, or that Fonacier
understood that Gaite assumed any such risk. This is
proved by the fact that Gaite insisted on a bond a to
guarantee payment of the P65,000.00, an not only upon
a bond by Fonacier, the Larap Mines & Smelting Co.,
and the company's stockholders, but also on one by a
surety company; and the fact that appellants did put up
such bonds indicates that they admitted the definite
existence of their obligation to pay the balance of
P65,000.00.
Assuming that there could be doubt whether by the
wording of the contract the parties indented a
suspensive condition or a suspensive period (dies ad
quem) for the payment of the P65,000.00, the rules of
interpretation would incline the scales in favor of "the
greater reciprocity of interests", since sale is essentially
onerous. The Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 1378,
paragraph 1, in fine, provides:
“If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests.”
There can be no question that greater reciprocity obtains
if the buyer' obligation is deemed to be actually existing,
with only its maturity (due date) postponed or deferred,
that if such obligation were viewed as nonexistent or not
binding until the ore was sold.
The only rational view that can be taken is that the sale
of the ore to Fonacier was a sale on credit, and not an
aleatory contract where the transferor, Gaite, would
assume the risk of not being paid at all; and that the
previous sale or shipment of the ore was not a
suspensive condition for the payment of the balance of
the agreed price, but was intended merely to fix the
future date of the payment.