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Nazario N. Marifosque v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 156685
Justice Ynares-Santiago
July 27, 2004

FACTS:
When the Shellane tanks of Yu So Pong were stolen at his gasoline station, Police Sergeant Narciso
Marifosque offered the recovery of the lost items in exchange of a cash consideration through a
police asset.

Hian Hian Yu Sy, daughter of Yu So Pong, together with her husband, proceeded to report the
robbery and the alleged extortion of Marifosque to the Crime Investigation Services. An entrapment
was then organized where Marifosque was arrested for direct bribery.

Marifosque testified that a police asset came to him and reported the incident. The police asset, who
is later known as Elmer Arnaldo, the brother of Edgardo Arnaldo who is the prime suspect in the
robbery, asked for a price for each recovered cylinder tank in exchange of the information of the
whereabouts of the suspect.

Marifosque contented that he is not guilty of bribery on the grounds that the agreed cash
consideration was not for him. He anchors his defense on the fact that: (1) he merely relayed to Yu
So Pong the assets request for a reward money; and (2) Yu So Pong was agreeable to the request.
He further contends that the act of receiving money for the asset is not one of those punishable under
the law as direct bribery.

The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Marifosque guilty of direct bribery and meted him the
penalty of prision correctional as minimum and prision mayor as maximum and a fine of 3,000 pesos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Marifosque is guilty of direct bribery?

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan but modified the penalty of fine to
18,000 pesos.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise
of his functions as a public officer.

There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code, which includes all persons who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as
an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class. At the time of the incident, petitioner
was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He directly received the bribe
money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen
cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code. The act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer.
 2

Eduardo P. Diego v. Judge Silverio Q. Castillo

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673
Justice Azcuna
August 11, 2004

FACTS:
Antecedent to the administrative complaint against Judge Castillo for knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, Judge Castillo acquitted Lucena Escoto for the crime of bigamy on the ground that the
accused was in good faith when he contracted her second marriage with the late Manuel P. Diego.
The complaint was anchored on the ground that the Judge in rendering his decision was unjust
knowing that the accused had a former marriage with a Filipino and got divorced in a foreign country.
Divorce decreed in a foreign country between Filipinos is not valid within the Philippines. Eduardo P.
Diego, brother of Manuel P. Diego, then proceeded to file the administrative complaint against the
Judge for knowingly rendered unjust judgment and ignorance of the law.

Judge Castillo, however, maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce
decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and
she could marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the
accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the
accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Castillo knowingly rendered unjust judgment and grossly ignored the law?

RULING:
The Supreme Court fined Judge Castillo in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust
and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or
intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or
is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice.

The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him
for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates
that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.

There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

However, the error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.
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Nathaniel S. Manipon v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-58889
Justice Fernan
July 31, 1986

FACTS:
Pursuant to the NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al v. Harry Dominguez
et al" where Dominguez was ordered to pay Tabek in the amount of 2,720 pesos with interest for the
balance of their work contract, Deputy Sheriff Nathaniel Manipon, instead of acting to immediately
satisfy the judgment, sent a notice to Commercial Bank and Trust in garnishing the bank accounts of
Dominguez. This garnishment was not relayed to the Labor Arbiter who rendered the decision.

When Manipon and Dominguez met, the former said that he can remedy the withdrawal. Dominguez
was under the impression that Manipon shall release the garnishment in exchange of money.
Because of this, Dominguez proceeded to National Intelligence and Security Agency to report the
matter in which the agency hatched a plan to entrap Manipon. Entrapment pursued and Manipon was
arrested after finding the 1,000 marked bills in his possession.

By way of defense, Manipon posited that the 1,000 was a partial satisfaction to the judgment which
was agreed by Tabek, the principal creditors in the case. He also averred that he was going to issue
Dominguez a temporary receipt but Dominguez brushed it aside. Lastly, he claimed that he was
framed by Dominguez because of former grudge against him.

The Sandiganbayan found Manipon, guilty of direct bribery, sentenced him to four months and twenty
days of arresto mayor with temporary special disqualification for eight years and one day and a fine of
P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. By filing a petition
for certiorari by Manipon in seeking the reversal of this decision, the case was elevated to Supreme
Court for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of Manipon should be given credence?

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied his petition and affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

The temporary receipt adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a
last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment
debt. Contrary to Manipon’s claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in getting
said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially
complied with his legal obligation.

The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is
Manipon’s co-sheriff and is therefore biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the
witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness. While
he claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other creditors, he could not present any
authority that would allow him to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in their
behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names.

Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation. That
affidavit contained two annexes but the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December
28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only several weeks after
he had made the affidavit. This leads us to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary receipt
at all at the time of payment and that it was concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort to make
the authorities believe that what had transpired was not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of
a judgment debt.
 4

Jesus P. Morfe v. Amelito R. Mutuc

G.R. No. L-20387
Justice Fernando
January 31, 1968

FACTS:
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts
of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar: . . ."

The plaintiff challenged the periodic requirement of submission of SALN, among others, to be
violative against unreasonable search and seizure and an oppressive exercise of police power.

The Executive Secretary and the Secretary of Justice, as defendants, denied that there was a
violation of his constitutional rights against self- incrimination as well as unreasonable search and
seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it
impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely
seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean
public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power.

The Court of First Instance, however, declared Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
required periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an
official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon
assuming office to be unconstitutional, null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether the periodical submission of SALN for public officers is oppressive and unconstitutional on
the basis that it is violative of the ban against unreasonable search and seizure and the ban against
self-incrimination?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the CFI.

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion. Every man has obligation to give testimony. But that obligation can be
exacted only under judicial sanctions. Police cannot just search and seize on the basis that they need
papers for litigation.

We have the right to be alone (right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure)
except under judicial compulsion.

It is clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown
to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial condition set forth in
the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
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Hilario Jaravata v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-56170
Justice Abad Santos
January 31, 1984

FACTS:
Six classroom teachers of La Union Barangay High School agreed that their Assistant Principal,
herein petitioner, Hilario Jaravata follow up their salary differentials in Manila. After the petitioner
facilitated the transaction incurring a total amount of Php. 220.00, the classroom teachers received
their salary differentials from him and with the exception of two classroom teachers, reimbursed him
of varying excessive amounts instead of Php. 36.00 each. Due to disapproval of one teacher of the
reimbursement, he returned the money given to him by other teachers for his reimbursement.

Accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner faced trial before the
Sandiganbayan where it convicted him guilty and sentenced him the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 1 year as minimum to 4 years as maximum. The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision, also recited
that the evidence is overwhelming to show that petitioner received more than the rightful contribution
of P36.00 from four classroom teachers. In short, the total amount received by the petitioner in
excess of the share of the classroom teachers in the reimbursement of his expenses is P194.00.

Petitioner moved to file for petition for review before the Supreme Court of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner violated Section 3(b) of the Republic Act No. 3019, as amended?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as defined by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even
normal from the government." It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess
of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit. The pivotal question,
however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La
Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials
for 1978 of the complainants. It should be noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary
differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers
in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his
expenses.

In the Court’s opinion, Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention
is required by law in a contract or transaction.

There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary
differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the
petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the
salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene
in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law
afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.
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Generoso Trieste, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No.70332-43
Justice Alampay
November 13, 1986

FACTS:
Mayor Generoso Trieste, Sr., herein petitioner, was being charged of 12 criminal violations of Section
3(h) of the Republic Act No. 3019 on the ground that he intervened in awarding Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation, where the petitioner is the president, Incorporator and major stockholder,
of the purchase of construction materials on behalf of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan.

Petitioner, however, stressed that he did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question as he signed the Municipal vouchers only after all the
purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further
pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the 12 Information filed
against petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal
canvass.

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner to be guilty in 12 criminal cases filed against him and
sentenced him of an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 3 years to 6 years as well
as the punishment of perpetual disqualification of public office.

The Solicitor General, at this time, pointed that failure of the petitioner to show divestment of his rights
in the corporation served as a prima facie evidence to sustain the case against him.

However, the new Solicitor General’s office, after adopting the statement of facts recited in the
consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General, moved for the acquittal of the petitioner on the
following grounds: 1) petitioner has divested his rights in the corporation before assumption of public
office; 2) petitioner’s signing of vouchers after payment does not constitute intervention as
contemplated in the Section 3(h) of the Republic Act No. 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting
papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer constitute a
violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the impugned decision of the Sandiganbayan and moved to acquit
petitioner.

What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction
in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not
dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract
with the office. For the law aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power.

There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence,
power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn’t ask anyone — neither
Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.

Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction. Petitioner should not be faulted for
Trigen’s transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even before
petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that
Trigen’s offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality.
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Arturo A. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-51065-72
Justice Cortes
June 30, 1987

FACTS:
Arturo A. Mejorada, herein petitioner, was charged with 8 criminal violations of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 on the basis that he, acting as a right-of-way agent, caused undue injury to the
Government by making the sworn statements to reflect a higher value of the lots and improvements
affected by the widening of roads at Binangonan, Rizal and caused undue injury to the claimants by
divesting them a large proportion of their payments for the said properties.
Petitioner, acting on a promise that he could work out the claims of the owners of the lots and
improvements which will be affected by the widening of roads, required claimants to sign blank copies
of documents such as “Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties"
and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements". However, the said
documents reflected very much higher value of the respective properties of the claimants than the
actual value claimed by them. Eventually, these documents were made as the basis for the assessor
in determining the value of claims which were supported by the Declarations of Property under the
name of the claimants but registered to other persons. This showed that there was falsification on the
part of the petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the 8 criminal
violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Petitioner, on his defense of his criminal violation of the said law, contends that 1) he is not a public
officer charged with the grant of license, permits or other concessions, 2) there was no caused injury
to the Government since the basis in determining the claims of properties was not caused by him but
by the assessor; 3) that in order to establish that he gave undue advantage to claimants through bad
faith and inexcusable gross negligence, he must be, at the time of divesting them of large sums of
payments, in the discharge of his administrative functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and
convincingly proven?

RULING:
Yes. The Court finds Mejorada’s petition to be devoid of merit and it resolves the above-mentioned
contentions of the petitioner as explained below.
1. Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public
officers declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion
of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary
concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting
licenses or permits or other concessions.
2. The fact, however, is that the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's
having inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted
by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and
which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is
belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property
owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
3. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a
right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish
and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements
and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values
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of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148965
Justice Puno
February 26, 2002

FACTS:
In connection with the impeachment proceeding against former President Joseph Estrada, an
Information was filed against him, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, and other conspirators for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080. Upon finding probable cause to issue warrant of arrest, the
several accused were taken under the custody of law.
“Jinggoy” Estrada, herein petitioner, filed a series of motions praying for his right to bail and to quash
the Information, alleged that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for
plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
However, respondent Court, the Sandiganbayan, denied all his motions and continued to arraign him.
Resulting from the refusal of the petitioner to enter into arraignment, the respondent court has
prompted to make a plea of not guilty for him.
For this reason, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court claiming that the respondent gravely
erred in charging the petitioner of a crime of plunder on the following grounds: 1) the application of
R.A. 7080 to him is unconstitutional because it charges him more than one crime; and that 2) his
involvement to one crime is not to be punished with the same gravity as compared to the principal
accused in plunder.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in sustaining the Amended Information proper to charge
petitioner with the crime of plunder?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

1. The allegation in the information is that petitioner Jinggoy received or collected money from
illegal gambling "on several instances", meaning he committed the predicate act in series.
Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, it cannot be said that he was charged with the
commission of only one act, considering the phrase "several instances".

It was held in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan that the words "combination" or "series" are taken in
their popular, not technical, meaning. "Series" is synonymous with the clause "on several
instances". "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1 (d) of the law. "Combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of said items.

2. Petitioner labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or offense
and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the
Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion
perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an
accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph
of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the
predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations
 9

are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the
former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. 

Carmen Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 71581
Justice Padilla
March 21, 1990

FACTS:
Carmen Labatagos, herein petitioner, was the cashier and the collecting officer of the Mindanao State
University. Upon the examination of the Commission on Audit to the cash accounts of the petitioner
while the latter was on a maternity leave, it was found that, from January to August 1978, the
petitioner has an unremitted amount of Php 34,336.19 and Php. 71,365.75 from January 1979 to
June 1980, or for a total of Php. 105,711.04 of unremitted amounts. The two Reports of Examination
prepared by the COA were duly signed by the petitioner, without exception. The petitioner, thereafter,
was charged for the crime of malversation of public funds in an Information filed by the Tanodbayan
before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner, in her defense, claimed that she signed the audit reports on the understanding that her
shortage would amount to only P2,000.00; that she could not be held accountable for the collections
for March, April and May 1978 because she was on maternity leave; and that several disbursements
in the total amount of P49,417.12 were not credited in her favor by the auditors. She claimed further
that she should not be held accountable for the alleged misappropriations between the months of
January 1978 and August 1978 in the amount of P34,336.19 because those who appropriated the
amounts were her superiors and that the amounts taken were properly receipted but that the receipts
were lost.

The Sandiganbayan, however, did not give credence to her defense and found her guilty of the crime
of malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation of public
funds?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court denied her petition for review and affirmed the decision of the
Sandiganbayan there being no reversible error in the impugned decision of the respondent court.

There is no merit in the accused’s defense. Her claim that she signed the audit report and statement
of collections and deposits prepared by the audit team of Francisco Rivera on the understanding that
her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied when she signed, without exception, the Reports of
Examination showing that she incurred a shortage of Php. 34,336.19.

Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecution’s rebuttal witness, confirmed that she assisted the accused in
the collection of fees; that the accused filed application for maternity leave in March 1978 but
continued reporting for work during that month; that the accused did not report for work in April 1978;
and that she (Guanzon) was the one assigned to collect the fees in her stead. Mrs. Guanzon,
however, explained that she turned over all her collections to the accused during all the times that
she was assisting her in collecting the fees; and that even in April 1978 when the accused was
physically absent from office, she also turned over her collections to the accused in the latter’s house
with the duplicate copies of the receipts she issued which the accused signed after satisfying herself
that the amounts turned over tallied with the receipts.

All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by Director Osop, Alikhan Marohombsar and
Auditor Casan totalling P31,070.00. (Exhs. 12, 12-A, etc., 13-A and 14-A), supported as they are by
mere pieces of paper, despite the admission by Director Osop of having signed some of them (Exhs.
 10

12-A, 12-D, 12-E and 12-I) were not valid disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the
chits were really secured by the persons who signed them, the responsibility to account for them still
rests in the accused accountable officer. Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or
converting public funds or property to one’s personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to
make use of or misappropriate them.
Alfredo L. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 116033
Justice Panganiban
February 26, 1997

FACTS:
As a sub-contractor of Jaime Ancla who was a delinquent taxpayer of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Alfredo Azarcon, herein petitioner, signed a pro-forma receipt and assumed the custody
and the obligation to deliver the constructively distrained personal property of Ancla as payment of his
back taxes. However, petitioner informed Jose Batausa, the Regional Director of the BIR, that Ancla
surreptitiously withdrew the same property under his custody and wished to relieve him of his
obligation by virtue of the signed receipt, Regional Director denied his request of relief and filed a
letter-complaint against him.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision of convicting petitioner for the crime of malversation of
public funds, sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 10 years as minimum and
17 years as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify the BIR of the unpaid taxes of Ancla.
Petitioner, in praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan, mainly contended that the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by private individuals and
that his appointment as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property does not make himself to
be considered as a public officer.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly
owned by Ancla, and in requiring petitioner who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt
for it, effectively "designated" petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing the case of U.S. v. Rastrollo, a
public officer.
Moreover, the prosecution argues that Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code defines the individuals
covered by the term ‘officers’ under Article 217 of the same Code. And accordingly, since Azarcon
became a "depository of the truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer who can be
prosecuted under Article 217.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court set aside the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan and declared it null
and void for lack of jurisdiction.
The case of U.S. v. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts therein
are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial
deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench
dealt with the BIR’s administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of
taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received by Petitioner Azarcon. In the
cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that court’s jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute
the judicial deposit and give "the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public official." 33
However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a
receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice." This is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must
be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . ." The
language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the
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public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the
provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same
penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a
private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.