People of the Philippines v.

Maida Tomio and Nakajima Tagahiro

G.R. No. 74630
Justice Davide, Jr.
September 30, 1991

FACTS:
Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, was having a dinner at a restaurant together with his new acquaintances
Maida Tomio alias Sato Toshio, accused-appellant and Mitamura whom he met earlier at a hotel he was
staying when five policemen searched his personal effects and found marijuana. He was then arrested by
these policemen. Nagao stated in his brief that his companion placed the pack of cigarettes which contained
marijuana in his pocket.
While Nagao was at the police station, accused-appellant Tagahiro Nakajima alias Yamada arrived. Later,
Sato Toshio alias Maida Tomio also arrived. Both acted as interpreters for him. They told Nagao that if he was
not able to pay the police 100,000 US dollars he could be sentenced to jail for 6 to 12 years. Nagao agreed.
Thereafter, Toshio and Nakajima informed him that they had advanced the payment of the bribe money to the
policemen who, accordingly, agreed to release him.
Nagao was then escorted to his hotel by Tomio, Tagahiro and a policeman. While there, Nagao stated that he
was not being allowed by his escorts to leave the premises until he paid the demanded sum of money. From
his hotel, the escorts transferred him to three different hotels until he gave them the remitted money of his
father from Japan. After the receipt of money from Nagao at the bank, the two accused-appellants were
arrested by the police with the help of the Japanese Embassy in Manila.
The trial court convicted alias Tomio and Tagahiro for the crime charged of kidnapping and illegal detention
and sentenced each of them the penalty of death.
Tomio and Tagahiro contended that they accompanied Nagao to his hotel immediately after his release from
jail due to his request not to leave, that he is always free to leave, that because Nagao did not know how to go
to the bank, they accompanied him, and that the money received from Nagao was a form of reimbursement of
his expenses and of the money that accused-appellants advanced to the police for his release.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the two accused-appellants were guilty of kidnapping and illegal detention?
2. Assuming further that the payment that accused-appellants received from Nagao was only a
reimbursement of the money advanced to the police, whether or not the same constitute ransom?

RULING:
The Supreme Court held affirmative on both issues. It affirmed the decision rendered by the lower court in
convicting two accused-appellants for the crime of kidnapping and illegal detention.
1. The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellants, together with
their co-conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully designed plan to kidnap Mr. Nagao in order to obtain
ransom from him. The records showed that Tomio’s companion, Mitamura, informed him that a Japanese
was arrested due to possession of marijuana; that Tomio proceded to the Southern Police District without
having to know where the Japanese was arrested and informed them of a Japanese having possession of
marijuana, that hours later, Tomio and Mitamura proceded to have dinner with Nagao to be later on
arrested by the Southern Police District, that after Nagao’s arrest, he was instructed to pay a certain sum of
money for his release.
With the obvious connivance of the police, they put the pressure on the complainant by demanding,
allegedly for and in consideration of his release, the amount aforestated. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, while it may be conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did not
have the freedom to leave the hotel premises at will and go wherever he pleased." To keep him within their
control, appellant Tagahiro Nakajima, who is a businessman and a resident of 101 Peter's Street, BF
Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila, had to abandon his business and his family to be with Mr. Nagao. Thus,
as he admitted upon question by the court, he was, from 3 to 12 May 1986, with the complainant at Holiday
Inn Hotel, Intercontinental Hotel, Philippine Village Hotel and Virra Condominium. He slept there, not in his
residence. The suite (73) which they occupied Virra Condominium is owned by his co-accused Tomio
Maeda.

2. Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created a simple loan contract between
appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted by appellant Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of the former's liberty
until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom. In
People vs. Akiran, et al., this Court, through Justice J.P. Bengzon, ruled that even if the kidnapping were to
compel the victim to fulfill his promise of defraying the hospital expenses of a brother of one of the
accused, there is still kidnapping for ransom, since if that were indeed the purpose, the accused need not
kidnap the victim.

Thus, even if the theory of Tomio is correct, it was not necessary for him and his co-accused Nakajima to
deprive the complainant of his liberty to compel him to pay the alleged loan.
People of the Philippines v. Eduardo Pavillare
G.R. No. 129970
Per Curiam
April 5, 2000
FACTS:
Sukhjinder Singh, an Indian national and the private complainant in this case, was blocked by three
men while he was riding on his motorcycle and accused him of raping the woman inside the red taxi
cab parked nearby. He was then forcefully abducted and was brought to a deserted area where he
was beaten and was demanded for Php. 100,000 for his release. Because he had only Php. 5,000 in
his possession, he was asked to call his relatives and called his cousin Lakhvir Singh who could
come up only by Php. 25,000. For this amount, the abductors agreed to it and instructed Lakhvir to
proceed to mini-grocery for the exchange to take place. Private complainant was then released after
Lakhvir and his uncle gave Php. 20,000 to the accused-appellant.
Two days later from the abduction of private complainant, he executed a sworn statement of the
narrative facts on the incident. Nearly one month later from this date, another sworn statement
regarding the positive identification of the abductor was executed by the private complainant. It was
positively identified that a certain Eduardo Pavillare was one of the three abductors who blocked
private complainant in his motorcycle, brought him to the deserted area and beat him, called his
cousin Lakhvir, and received the ransom money in the exchange which took place in the mini grocery
area.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the private complainant and convicted Pavillare
guilty of kidnapping and illegal detention and sentenced him to a death penalty.
Pavillare, however, alleges that on the date of the incident, he was working for the whole day on the
job site where he was building the house of a client. This allegation was being supported by one of
his employees.
On appeal, he contended that his identification to the crime was improper on the grounds that there
was an inconsiderable duration between the date of the incident and the date when private
complainant identified him, that during this identification he was not being represented by a counsel,
and that private’s complainant identification was inconsistent to the sworn statements he initially
executed. However, this was belied on the fact that during trial both private complainant and his
cousin Lakhvir positively identified accused-appellant. With regard to the testimony of his employee, it
is ruled that this is not sufficient to cast doubt as to his conviction because the distance between his
job site and the area of the incident will only take a man a less than hour to travel by. As to his lack of
representation, it is clarified by the Court that representation only is required during custodial
investigation and the police line-up takes precedence in the custodial investigation.
Lastly, he contended that should he ever found guilty, the crime was simple robbery and not
kidnapping for ransom as private complainant was detained only for at least two hours and the money
demanded for his release was not a ransom but a bribe to drop the accusation of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accussed-apellant of the crime kidnapping and illegal detention is
proper?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision rendered by the lower court.
The accused-appellant's argument that he should have been convicted of simple robbery and not
kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves that the prime motive of the accused-appellant
and his companions is to obtain money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours, are
both unmeritorious.
The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin are replete with positive declarations
that the accused-appellant and his companions demanded money for the complainant's release. The
pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not
supported by the evidence. The complainant's cousin testified that at the agreed drop-off point
Pavillare demanded the ransom money and stated, "Andiyan na ang tao ninyo ibigay mo sa akin ang
pera". The accused-appellant released the complainant when the money was handed over to him and
after counting the money Pavillare and his companions immediately left the scene. This clearly
indicated that the payment of the ransom money is in exchange for the liberty of the private
complainant. The death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court.
The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime
committed, Art. 267, second paragraph. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim
of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home.
People of the Philippines v. Zolio “Sonny” Borromeo
G.R. No. 130843
Per Curiam
January 27, 2000

FACTS:
Under the pretense that he was instructed by the child’s mother, Rowena, to fetch her child and bring
him to her for shoe measurement, the accused-appellant, Zolio, took Kenneth, a one year and 7
months old child, away from his yaya, Anabelle Poon at the Hernandez residence when in fact Zolio
has never been consented to do it. The accused-appellant in this case was previously discharged
from his job as bakery helper at the bakeshop owned by Rowena due to his negative problems.

A day later the incident, the accused-appellant called Rowena and demanded Php. 300,000 for the
release of Kenneth. Subsequently the next day, the accused-appellant called again but this time it
was Nelson, Kenneth’s father, who answered it. Nelson was instructed to deliver the money at the
Max’s Restaurant, near the church in Pasay City. Meanwhile, Nelson reported his telephone
conversation with the accused-appellant to the Pasay City Police who hatched an entrapment plan.
After he received the money and informed Nelson of the whereabouts of Kenneth, the police arrested
accused-appellant. Kenneth was successfully restored in Cavite where he was being taken care of by
the spouses Viray

The Regional Trial Court convicted accused-appellant for kidnapping a minor for ransom and
sentenced him the penalty of death.

However, the accused-appellant gave a different version of the facts of the case. He stated that
Kenneth’s parents allowed him to take Kenneth out for a leisurely stroll, that they reached Cavite, and
that because he was going to be late for work in the next day, he left Kenneth under the care of the
spouse and called Rowena to apologize.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was deprivation of the child’s liberty in this case and that the accused-appellant
had really intended to deprive the mother of the child’s custody?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

We find abundant evidence of this fact in this case. It has been established with great certainty that
Kenneth was deprived of his liberty, having been taken by the accused without the consent of the
child's parents who had custody over him. The accused had to employ artifice and subterfuge to pet
hold of the victim, taking him from his nanny on his false posturing that it was on the orders of the
child's mother. It finally dawned on the nanny later that this could not be so because Rowena had left
more than an hour ago for a department store in Makati City to buy shoes for the boy. Zoilo then kept
the child for two (2) days in a far-flung place south of Manila in the care of a couple while negotiating
with his parents for the payment of ransom. Discernible from this fact is the intent of the accused to
keep the child under detention for as long as no ransom was paid to him for his release. Then again,
there was no voluntary restoration by the accused of the child to his parents. Kenneth was recovered
only after the police intervened and the accused was apprehended. When taken to the police station
for the requisite investigation, Zoilo confessed that he brought the baby boy to a remote barangay in
Alfonso, Cavite, and that he demanded money from the parents for the release of their child so that
he could start a bakery business.

There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of
his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim's liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a
minor. In this case, the minority of Kenneth Hernandez was never disputed. Assuming arguendo that
minority was not proved, still under the same provision of law, the imposition of the death penalty is
obligatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person. This was certainly so in this case. To recapitulate, minority and the demand for the
payment of ransom, both specifically described in the Information, were clearly established by the
State, free of any scintilla of doubt.
Antonio Lamera v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93475
Justice Davide, Jr.
June 5, 1991

FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila,
an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by
Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.

Two Informations have been filed against the petitioner – one on reckless imprudence resulting in
damage of property with multiple physical injuries and another for abandonment of one’s victim.

On 1987, the Metropolitan Trial Court convicted petitioner for the crime of abandonment of one’s
victim. This was appealed to the Regional Trial Court in which the decision of the lower court was
affirmed with modifications.

On 1989, he was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court for the criminal violation of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage of property with multiple physical injuries where petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty.

Petitioner appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court with regard to the crime of abandonment
of one’s victim before the Court of Appeals, where he, among others, contended that the paragraph 2
of the Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him because it was actually Ernesto
Reyes, the tricycle driver, who negligently caused the accident. However, this was denied by the
Court of Appeals for the reason that it is already sufficient to establish that he also accidentally
caused the incident.

Petitioner then raises a question before the Supreme Court invoking the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court denied his petition for lack of merit.
In People v. Doriquez, the Court held that:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a person and the second
against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on
double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, Criminal Case
No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence)
of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, Criminal
Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes
Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the
same Code.
Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an
element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. 
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally
wounded or injured is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code.
Salvador Marzalado v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 152997
Justice Quisumbing
November 10, 2004

FACTS:
During the pendency of the ejectment case against Cristina Albano to vacate the leased unit, the
electricity supply in her apartment was cut off due to non-payment of bills. Hence, she left the
apartment together with her children and stayed at her father’s house which is four houses away. On
November 2, 1993, she returned to the apartment and discovered that her lead pipe was missing.
The following day, November 3, 1993, she discovered that the padlock of the main door has changed.
Lastly, on November 4, 1993, she saw that the place was empty and that her personal belongings
were also gone. After trying to see the petitioner, Salvador Marzalado, but to no avail, she filed a suit
for trespass to dwelling before the MeTC of Quezon City with the Information stating that the said
crime happened during November 2, 1993. This was corroborated by the prosecution’s witness,
Narciso Raniedo who lived in front of the apartment in dispute.
Petitioner, in his defense, testified that he entered the apartment on November 3, 1993, with the
company of barangay officers to stop the open faucet from flowing water to prevent further flooding
within that floor of the building invoking paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code – to
prevent imminent danger to the property.
The MeTC observed that, while rendering its Decision to convict petitioner of the crime of trespass to
dwelling, that the defense would have been "a good defense" had the alleged entry been made on
November 2, 1993 instead of November 3, 1993.
On appeal, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court upon finding of no reversible errors in the judgment promulgated.
In his petition before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in its Decision by its failure to consider that the Information filed against him should be fatally
defective for having stated that his entry was on November 2, 1993, when in fact it was on November
3, 1993.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is an essential element of the
offense of trespass?
2. Assuming further that it is not, whether or not the petitioner is legally justified in his entry to the
apartment without the lessee’s consent?

RULING:
The Supreme Court held negative in the first issue and affirmative in the second issue. Hence, the
petition was granted, the petitioner was acquitted and the decision of Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside.
1. The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of
trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint or Information states that the crime has been
committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Rule 110, Section
11 of the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise time the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date
at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A variance
between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during trial does
not constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score. Thus,
the error invoked by the petitioner in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information is of no
grave import, for it is far from being the decisive issue in this case.
2. As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was
"forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet…"
As Albano herself admitted, she and her children already left the unit when the electricity supply
was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during
some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified
purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open
faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had
taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit.
Rosauro Reyes v. People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
Justice Makalintal
March 28, 1969

FACTS:
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange,
Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. His termination was
allegedly caused by Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan. To stage his anger against them,
petitioner led a group of 20 to 30 persons in demonstration staged in front of the main gate of US
Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing threatening statements that Agustin
and Nolan should die. Agustin became apprehensive of his safety so he sought the protection of Col.
Monzon to accompany him towards his residence. The demonstrators led by Reyes followed Agustin.
Reyes, who is positioned holding the gate, gave his hateful remark against Agustin by saying,
“Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."

As a result, two Informations were filed against Reyes – one for grave threats for threatening to kill
Agustin and another for grave oral defamations for deliberately utter defamatory remarks, to wit
“Agustin, putang ina mo.” These were jointly tried. For both crimes, he was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court. This was later on appealed to Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the ruling of the
lower court.

On appeal by petition of certiorari, petitioner, among others, contented that the Court of Appeals erred
in its decision by convicting him of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one
offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is both guilty for grave threats and grave oral defamations?

RULING:
Yes, for grave threats but no for grave oral defamations. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside
his conviction in grave oral defamations but affirmed his conviction in grave threats.
1. The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station;
the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their
persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give
rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in
the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." Indeed,
Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who
had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be
denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger,
motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We,
therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the
offense of grave threats.
2. The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina
mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by
the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be
viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the
same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the
intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in
the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat.
In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the
letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more
important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court
believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and
principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not
constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from
the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.
People of the Philippines v. Hon. David A. Alfeche, Jr.
G.R. No.102070
Justice Davide, Jr.
July 23, 1992

FACTS:
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Julianna Azarraga filed an Information before the Regional Trial Court
in Capiz accusing Ruperto Dimalata and Norberto Fuentes of the crime of occupation and usurpation
of property as stated in Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code in relation with grave threats as stated
in the Article 282 of the same code when they willfully possess and occupy the lot owned by Teresita
Silva and threatened to kill tenant-encargado, Inocencio Borreros should Silva resist.

Respondent judge, Hon. David Alfeche, Jr., dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction mainly
contending that grave threats cannot be made complexed with the crime of occupation and
usurpation of property because they are both distinct crimes which should be separately and
criminally prosecuted and since the imposable penalty under the crime of occupation and usurpation
of property in this case amounted to Php. 200 to Php. 500, the same is below the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga replied in her motion to reconsideration that grave threats were
made mention in determining the penalty for the occupation and usurpation of property in which the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. Again, it was denied by the respondent judge.

The Office of the Solicitor General sustained Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga’s position.
However, the respondent judge, in his required Comment, defended his challenged orders by arguing
(1) that the crime of occupation and usurpation was charged in the Information and the grave threats
cannot give rise to the complex crime of usurpation of real property with gave threats as basis for
determining the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) that the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for
the acts of violence executed by him" does not refer to grave threats.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over crimes of occupation and usurpation of
property where the intimidation employed consists grave threats?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and suggested that Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga to amend the Information for the sole basis that it does not charge a
crime.

What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an information for
the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or intimidation. But, whenever,
appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts of violence and to pay a fine
based on the value of the gain obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or
usurpation, the crime of homicide, or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or
2 of Article 263 is committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation; or when, in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person
not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of
Article 263; or when it is committed through intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries
not covered by subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., physical injuries
penalized under Articles 265 and 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused may be convicted for
the violation of Article 312. However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide,
rape, intentional mutilation and physical injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263,
other physical injuries or for the intimidation, which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or
Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, and (b) to pay a fine
based on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to 50 to 100 per
centum of such gain, but in no case less than seventy-five (P75.000) pesos, provided, however, that if
such value cannot be ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00) pesos.
Melchor G. Maderazo, et al v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 165065
Justice Callejo, Sr.
September 26, 2006

FACTS:
Medaria Verutiao had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market with a monthly rental of P200.00.
She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and
the Municipal Treasurer. Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the
development of the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private
parties of buildings and other structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof
shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business. She
spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, however, she was not reimbursed by the Municipality.
After the construction, she then opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but
did not pay the rentals in 1993.

In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market
stall. However, considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the
stall, she did not pay her rent.

On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing
her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall and
that the lease contract had been cancelled. On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased
premises. The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on January 27, 1997. The contents of the
market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for safekeeping. While these
were being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from the market stall. She
considered the act of the Mayor as a political harassment, given that her husband, was then a candidate for
councilor under the ticket of the opposition; and that she was a leader of the opposing party.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the party accused is guilty of the crime of unjust vexation?

RULING:
Yes, except for Seniforo Perido. The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of
petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust
vexation.

Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads: Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of
violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of
the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of
the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos. Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by
arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. Compulsion
or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without
compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of
the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice.
The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment,
distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The main purpose of the law penalizing
coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his
hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own
hands the administration of justice.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and
brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it
is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is
enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the
overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and
prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her
possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.