PP v. Victoria, 78 Phil. 129 (Art.

114, Treason)

FACTS:

In an Information filed against Carmelito Victoria, 7 counts of treason were accused with him when he allegedly
found to be a member of the Intelligence Unit of Kempei Tai and found to be giving aid and comfort to the
imperial forces of Japan on 1944 to 1945 which lead to death and arrest of Filipino guerillas.

The People’s Court found him guilty on the 5 counts of treason dismissed the remaining two counts on account
of lack of evidence, i.e., at least two witnesses were are not complied with and there was no confession of the
crime committed.

Moreover, the lower court considered the aggravating circumstance of treachery, use of superior strength and
causing other wrongs not necessary to the commission of the crime. These circumstances were observed when
he was seen to be always guarded with armed men and caused unnecessary wrongs such as setting fire on the
houses of the guerillas and inhumane torture and unlawful detention. The aggravating circumstances considered
led to the imposition of death penalty against Victoria.

Victoria testified that he was not spy, that he was only forced to join the Japanese in their raids, that he was a
guerilla too and that he succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners. With this testimony, the counsel of
Victoria wanted the Court to consider it mitigating.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure immunity and by
causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission of the crime present in this case?
2. Whether the performance of righteous action justify or mitigate the crime of treason?

RULING

1. The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the
undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the
treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series
of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes
as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some accused of
treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not changing the nature of the
offense committed.

2. The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and although
appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing of a single human
being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor.
U.S. v. Bautista, 6 Phil. 581

FACTS

The Court of First Instance of Manila convicted Francisco Bautista, Tomas Puzon and Aniceto de Guzman of the
crime of conspiracy to treason against the Government of the United States and Philippine Islands.

Francisco Bautista was convicted by the CFI because he secretly forwarded to Artemio Ricarte, chief of the
military force of the organization aimed to overthrow the present government, 200 pesos after the latter’s arrival
in the Philippines. He was also seen taking part in the deliberate discussions of plans to destroy the government.

Tomas Puzon was convicted of the above crime because of his acceptance of a commission as bbrigadier-
general of the signal corps and to do his part in organizing troops from Jose R. Muñoz, a proven prime leader of
the movement in overthrowing the Government.

Aniceto de Guzman was also convicted because of the evidence of his acceptance of a number of bonds from
one of the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds to carry out the plans of the conspirators.

Puzon contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspirace should not be considered as overt act to prove his crime considering that according to him he had no
intention of ever taking any further action in the matter and his acceptace was not to vex his frined Muñoz.

ISSUE:

Whether mere appointment as an officer of the military forces of the conspiracy directed to overthrow the
Government constitutes conspiracy to treason?

RULING:

It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him in the light of the decisions of this court in the
cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio Nuñez et
al. 2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United
States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be distinguished from these and
like cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the
apppointment in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the
charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into
consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.  

The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest
substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been
prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it
does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he received
the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was, nor that ever, on any occasion,
assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the bundle and
discovered the nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any dealings with the
conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or the object for which it was organized.
U.S. v. Caballeros, 4 Phil. 350

FACTS:

Roberto Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were conviceted by the Court of First Instance of Cebu as accessory of
the crime of assasinations or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American School teachers as they took
part in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal the crime.

Teodoro Sabate, a witness of the prosecution, testified that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who
killed the Americans and that he was forced to bury the corpses when he was seen by the killers, Damaso and
Isidoro.

Both Sabate and Baculi testified that Apolonio Caballeros did not take any part in the burial of the victims nor he
was seen even in the place of occurrence when burial took place. The confession of guilt and liability was done
by him through the promise made to him that noting would be done to him and the other defendants.

The CFI rendered their decision of the conviction against Baculi and Caballeros on the fact that they have failed
to report to the authorities of the perpetration of the crime.

ISSUES:

Whether the failure to report to the authorities is an offense punishable by laws?

RULING:

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of
the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by
the Penal Code and therefore that cannot render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
Santos v. Misa, 76 Phil. 415

FACTS:

Go Tian Sek Santos, a Chinese citizen, was detained by the US Army and Commomwealth Government as a
political prisoner on February 1945 by the virtue of Commonwealth Act. No. 682.

Petitioner claims that his detention was illegal because he may not be confined under CA No. 682 since he owes
allegiance to neither the United States nor the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign status of the petitioner excludes him from the scope of CA No, 682 which is an act
promulgated to try the political prisoners who may be guilty of crimes against national security during World War
II?

RULING:

As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject. The commitment order No. 291 issued by
the United States Army authorities describes him as such. But it does not follow that he is entitled to liberty now. But
it does not follow that he is entitled to liberty now. He is included among those contemplated by Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which reads partly:

"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the
persons detained by him as political prisoners, to Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special Prosecutors
shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the United States may
have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records,
documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . .
And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid
political prisoners are concerned , until the filing of the corresponding information with the People’s Court, but the
period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government.

His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the provisions. As stated by the Solicitor
General, he might be prosecuted for espionage, (Commonwealth Act. No. 616) a crime not conditioned by
citizenship of the offender, and considered as an offense against national security.
PP v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

FACTS:

Six vintas manned by armed twenty-four Moros surrounded the Dutch boat and asked for food at around 7
o’clock in the evening. When they eventually boarded the boat, they attacked some of the men and brutally
violated two of the women in ways unimaginable. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo and Saraw.

Upon returning home, Lol-lo and Saraw were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance with the
crime of piracy. The counsels of the appellant interposed a demurrer on the ground that the said crime was
committed outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines and that the act did not constitute a public offense according
to the laws in force in the Philippines.

The CFI rendered judgment of finding them guilty of the crime of piracy and sentenced them to life
imprisonment.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippines has jurisdiction over the piracy committed by the Moros?

Assuming that there is such, whether the provisions of crime of piracy are still in force in the Philippine Islands?

RULING:

The answer is in affirmative to both raised issues.

1. It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this
court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani
generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by
all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for
those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

2. The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer
of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is
necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main
rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which
are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or
repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles
of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is
mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the
word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533)
to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer
comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778

FACTS:
127 women from house of ill-repute were forcefully boarded to ship to Davao by Justo Lukban, City Mayor of
Manila and Anton Hohmann, Chief of Police to work as laborers in Davao for Gov. Sales and hecendero Yñigo.
Relatives of the women filed an application before the Supreme Court for writ of habeas corpus by which the
Court granted and ordered the respondents to bring the women before them.
On the first order of the SC, respondent avers that it is impossible to bring the women since some of them
already returned to Manila and that they are not under the control of the respondents because some are already
married and some disappeared.
On the second order, the SC directed respondents to bring the women who are not in Manila unless on written
statements, they renounced their rights.

ISSUES:
Whether petitioner in this case is in good standing to file an application of habeas corpus on behalf of the
women?
Whether Supreme Court should not assume jurisdiction over the case – being the women were at Davao?
Whether women are restrined from their liberty given the fact that they are not under the control of any man
when placed in Davao?

RULING:
The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the
writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained
of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had
standing in court.

It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule.
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall
be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme
Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First
Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that
court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with
their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it
was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ
was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The
failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of
the benefits of the writ.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were
prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived his right.