Operation Killer

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Not to be confused with Operation Rat Killer during the same war.
Operation Killer
Part of the Korean War

Operation Killer map

Date 20 February – 6 March 1951
Location Korea
Result U.N. victory
Belligerents
 United Nations:

  United States
  South Korea
 China
  United Kingdom
 North Korea
  Australia
  Canada[1]
  New Zealand

Commanders and leaders

Douglas MacArthur
Matthew Ridgway
Bryant Moore  †[2]
Peng Dehuai
Oliver P. Smith
Edward Almond
Yu Jae-hung
Casualties and losses
Total unknown
7,819 killed
59 killed
1,469 wounded
802 wounded
208 captured
119 missing
  v
 t
 e

Korean War

Operation Killer was the start of the second major counter offensive launched by United
Nations Command (UN) forces against the Chinese Communist People's Volunteer Army (PVA)
and the North Korean Army (KPA) during the Korean War between 20 February and 6 March
1951. The offensive was formulated by General Matthew Ridgway with the goal of annihilating
enemy forces south of a line designated the Arizona Line. The operation was immediately
followed by Operation Ripper.

Contents
 1 Background
 2 Battle
 3 Aftermath
 4 References
 5 External links

Background
Following their defeats in the Battle of Chipyong-ni on 15 February 1951 and in the Third Battle
of Wonju (13-18 February), it became apparent that the PVA/KPA forces were retreating from
the salient they had created in the central region in the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive. The
withdrawal fit the pattern of PVA/KPA operations observed before, in which assault forces were
obliged to pause for refitting after a week or so of battle. During the evening of 18 March
General Ridgway planned an advance designed to deny the PVA/KPA any respite in which to
prepare new attacks and, in particular, designed to destroy those enemy forces moving north out
of the Chech’on salient. He intended that two principal thrusts by UN forces, up Route 29 from
Wonju beyond Hoengsong and up Route 60 from Yongwol beyond P’yongch’ang, would block
the main paths of PVA/KPA withdrawal. Other forces were to move through and clear the
adjacent ground. Given the particular purpose of the attack, he called it Operation Killer.[3]

When the code name Ridgway had chosen for the coming attack was heard in Washington D.C.,
he received a courteous but immediate protest from the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins,
who indicated that the word "killer" was difficult to deal with in public relations. Ridgway
nevertheless kept the name, which fully described his main objective.[3]:305–6
General Ridgway instructed US IX and X Corps to destroy PVA/KPA forces located east of the
Han River and south of a line, designated Arizona, running from Yangpyoeng eastward across
Route 29 3 miles (4.8 km) above Hoengsong and across Route 60 6 miles (9.7 km) above
P'yongch'ang an advance of approximately 12–15 miles (19–24 km) above the front line. The
principal thrust up Route 29 was to be made by IX Corps, the one up Route 60 by X Corps. To
accommodate the scheme of attack, the IX Corps-X Corps boundary was to be relocated east of
Route 29 and the X Corps-Republic of Korea Army (ROK) III Corps boundary shifted to the east
side of Route 60 when the advance was opened on 21 February.[3]:306

The west flank of the advance would be adequately protected by US I Corps and 24th Infantry
Division positions along the lower bank of the Han River. To protect the east flank, ROK III
Corps was to send its leftmost division, the 7th Infantry Division, north through the heights east
of Route 60, gauging the division's rate by the progress of X Corps. ROK III Corps' remaining
divisions, the 9th and Capital Infantry Divisions, were to secure the lateral Route 20 winding
southwest through the mountains out of Gangneung on the coast. If ROK III Corps commander
Major General Yu Jae-hung was unable to develop continuous defenses above the road, he was
at least to guarantee possession of Gangneung, the road's eastern gate. If necessary, Yu was to set
the Capital Division in a strong perimeter around the coastal town, and Ridgway would see that
the division thereafter was supplied by sea or air and supported by naval gunfire.[3]:306

During the week past, as PVA forces broke up X Corps' Roundup advance and threatened to
strike deep through the Han River valley, Ridgway had ordered the US 1st Marine Division up
from Pohang, where it had been conducting anti-guerilla operations, to Chungju arriving on 18
February. Ridgway attached the division to IX Corps. The Marines were to relieve the US 2nd
Infantry Division and 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (187th RCT) in the Wonju area,
which on the 21st would fall within the zone of IX Corps. The 2nd Division and the 187th RCT
then were to shift east and rejoin X Corps.[3]:306

IX Corps commander Major General Bryant Moore chose the 1st Marine Division to make the
IX Corps drive along Route 29. The division initially was to seize high ground just south of
Hoengsong from which it could control that road center. To the west, the ROK 6th Infantry
Division, British 27th Infantry Brigade and the US 1st Cavalry Division were to clear the
mountains between the Marines and the Han. In the X Corps' zone, the US 7th Infantry Division
and ROK 3rd Division were to open the advance to the Arizona Line; they were to be joined later
by the 2nd Infantry Division after it shifted east from Wonju. The damaged ROK 5th and 8th
Infantry Divisions were to move off the line, the 5th to help protect the Corps' supply route, the
more severely reduced 8th to go south to Daegu, where it was to be rebuilt under ROK control.
[3]:306–7

The 187th RCT, when it moved from Wonju, was to assemble northeast of Chech’on ready to
assist the 7th Division's attack. X Corps' commander General Almond was not to commit the
unit, however, without Ridgway's approval. Depending on the favorable progress of Operation
Killer, Ridgway intended to move the airborne troops to the Daegu airfield for refresher jump
training. He was looking to possible future operations, in particular to plans prepared at his
direction in January for the seizure of Seoul. These plans in part called for an airborne landing
behind the capital to block enemy escape routes.[3]:307
General Almond assigned the 7th Infantry Division to make the X Corps' thrust up Route 60 on
the Corps' right flank. Initially the 7th was to clear Pyeongchang and seize the junction of Routes
60 and 20 5 miles (8.0 km) north of the town. Almond wanted General Ferenbaugh then to block
Route 20 to the northeast and at the same time strike west across the Corps' front along Route 20
to a juncture with IX Corps to seal off enemy forces remaining in the Chech’on salient. At the
left of the Corps' zone, the ROK 3rd Infantry Division was to clear enemy forces from an area
narrowing to a point on Route 20. The 2nd Infantry Division, less the 38th Infantry Regiment
(which was to become Corps' reserve), was to start north on 22 February to clear a wide area of
rough ground in the center of the Corps' zone and to occupy positions commanding Route 20. If
the timing was right, General Ruffner's forces could hammer enemy units against an anvil
provided by 7th Infantry Division troops driving west over Route 20.[3]:307

Battle
By 21 February the PVA and KPA had had at least three days in which to withdraw from the
salient and had given no indication that they would stop before they had moved north beyond the
Arizona Line. If these forces were to be destroyed, Ridgway's assault had to advance rapidly, but
the weather made speed impossible from the outset. For the first twenty days of February,
weather conditions in the battle zone had been within their normal range. The average extremes
of temperature varied from scarcely a degree above the freezing point to fifteen degrees below,
and precipitation was largely snow that remained on the ground, sometimes as ice. An abrupt and
unexpected change accompanied the opening of the operation. The temperature rose to almost 50
degrees on the 21st and that night barely fell to the freezing mark. The higher temperature range
persisted during the remainder of the month. The 21st and the three days following saw steady to
intermittent rainfall. Together, the unseasonable rain and warmer temperatures changed rivers
and streams into courses of deep, fast water filled with floating ice. Fords became unusable, and
low bridges were washed out or damaged beyond use. The rain and daytime thawing made
quagmires of the roads and countryside, and landslides blocked or partially blocked tunnels,
roads, and rail lines. Night freezes made the roads difficult to negotiate, especially where grades
were steep and curves sharp. As a result, the operation became at once a plodding affair, not so
much an advance with two main thrusts as a more uniform clearing operation in which assault
forces fought hardest to overcome the effects of weather. Ahead of the advance, the PVA/KPA
concentrated on evacuating the salient, leaving behind only scattered forces to fight occasional
but strong delaying actions.[3]:307–8

Ridgway kept a careful watch over the operation, reconnoitering much of the zone of advance
from the air and questioning Corps' commanders closely during the first three days of the
operation on the problems weather had created. Although Moore and Almond were experiencing
difficulty in supplying the operation, neither advocated abandoning or postponing the advance.
Frequent airdrops kept the supply problem from becoming critical, and by 25 February engineers
had repaired much of the damage to main lines of communication. The advance continued, if far
more slowly than anticipated.[3]:308

About 10:30 on 24 February, the helicopter carrying Major General Moore crashed into the Han
River and Moore subsequently died of a heart attack. He was temporarily replaced by 1st Marine
Division commander Major General Oliver P. Smith.[3]:308–9
Laboring forward through the remainder of February, Ridgway's central forces largely
eliminated the PVA/KPA's recent ground gains. From west to east, the IX and X Corps front on
the last day of the month traced a shallow concave arc from positions 5 miles (8.0 km) above
Chipyong-ni, along high ground overlooking Hoengsong and Route 20 from the south, to the
high hills 4 miles (6.4 km) north of the Routes 20- 60 junction. The two Corps thus were on or
above the Arizona Line on the extreme west and east but somewhat short of it elsewhere.[3]:309

Meanwhile, in the ROK III Corps' zone General Yu opened a lateral attack, sending two
regiments of the Capital Division from the Gangneung area westward over Route 20 across the
fronts of his other two divisions as a preliminary to establishing defenses above the road. The
regiments, moving in column, advanced easily until late in the afternoon of 3 March when the
leading regiment ran headlong into an ambush near Soksa-ri, some 25 miles (40 km) west of
Gangneung. Hit from both north and south by a regiment of the KPA 2nd Division, the ROK
regiment lost almost a thousand men - 59 killed, 119 wounded and 802 missing. The damaged
regiment returned to the Gangneung area to reorganize and Yu canceled what from the outset
had been a decidedly risky movement.[3]:310

To the west, in the meantime, those IX and X Corps units not yet on the Arizona Line continued
their advances to reach it. In the IX Corps' zone, the 1st Marine Division cleared Hoengsong
against little opposition on 2 March en route to Arizona objectives 3 miles (4.8 km) north of
town. By evening of 6 March all IX Corps' assault units had established positions near or slightly
above the Arizona Line, the final advances encountering no resistance at all. The X Corps' units
met stiff opposition over the first five days of March, particularly the 2nd Infantry Division as it
attempted to occupy the high ground just above Route 20. But during the night of 5 March the
KPA defenders vacated their positions, and by 7 March General Almond's forces were mostly in
full possession of their Arizona objectives.[3]:310

Aftermath
Over the fourteen days the two Corps took to reach and consolidate positions along the Arizona
Line, each reported having inflicted substantial casualties. IX Corps alone reported 7,819 enemy
killed, 1,469 wounded, and 208 captured. But from the outset it had become steadily clearer that
the primary objective of Operation Killer of destroying all PVA/KPA forces below the Arizona
Line would be only partially achieved. The PVA/KPA forces' head start in withdrawing, their
disinclination to take a defensive stand below the objective line other than in spotty delaying
actions and difficulties in negotiating the ground had prevented any other result.[3]:310

References
1.

 Bercuson, David J. (1999). Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War.
University of Toronto Press. pp. 83–91. ISBN 0802009808.
  "General and Flag officers killed in war".
 3.  Mossman, Billy (1988). United States Army in the Korean War: Ebb and Flow
November 1950-July 1951. United States Army Center of Military History. p. 302.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

External links
 The Korean War: Operation Killer
 2nd Infantry Division in the Korean War

Coordinates: 37°32′35.79″N 126°58′53.93″E

Categories:

 Conflicts in 1951
 1951 in Korea
 Military operations of the Korean War
 Battles of the Korean War involving Australia
 Battles of the Korean War involving Canada
 Battles of the Korean War
 Battles of the Korean War involving the United States
 February 1951 events
 March 1951 events

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