PEOPLE V.

ODTUHAN
FACTS:
 Respondent married Modina on 1980. On 1993, respondent then married
Alagon. Sometime in 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage with Modina. This was granted by the RTC in 1999 for lack of a
valid marriage license. In 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, private
complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of the previous marriage
and thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with bigamy.
 On 2008, respondent filed a motion to quash on two grounds:
o That the facts charged do not constitute the offense
o That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
 RTC denied Omnibus Motion. On appeal, the CA granted the petition and
ordered the RTC to give due course to the motion.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the motion to quash should be given due course

RULING: NO.
 Montanez v. Cipriano, Teves v. People and Antone v. Beronilla
 Antone: “a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information.”
o Hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information
o Whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law.
 Evident on its fact
o If can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is
given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment
 XPN: ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy
o However, the allegations in this case are sufficient to constitute the
crime of bigamy.
 Legal marriage
 First marriage has not been legally dissolved
 Contracts a second marriage
 Second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
LAZARTE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 NHA awarded the original contract for the infrastructure works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C.
CRUZ CORP.
 CONTRACT COSTS: P7,666,507.55 FUNDED BY WORLD BANK
UNDER PROJECT LOAN AGREEMENT (between PH Gov and IBRD –
World Gov
 AC commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990
o 1991: Fajutag, Jr. was designated as Project Engineer
 Fajutag discovered certain deficiencies on the alleged excavation of
unsuitable materials and road filling works
 Apparently, contractor failed to comply with the work instruction.
There was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken.
 There was only 40.89% accomplishment of the contractor
 Contract for the development of said project was rescinded
 Contract was then awarded to Triad, with contract amount of P9,554,837
 Triad discovered that certain work items were in fact non-existent.
 SHORT FACTS: AC CONSTRUCTION WAS FOUND TO HAVE
CONDUCTED GHOST PROJECTS
 CHARGE: Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 against Arceo Cruz and
AC
 Petitioner filed MOTION TO QUASH raising the following grounds:
o Facts charged do not constitute an offense
o No conformity to the prescribed form
o Constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them have been violated
o Prosec failed to determine individual participation
 DENIED BY SANDIGANBAYAN
 PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
 WoN SB erred in denying motion to quash

RULING
 GR: Denial of motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. When the
motion to quash in a criminal is denied, the remedy is for petitioners to go
to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.
 WHY? Motion to Quash is an INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
 XPN:
o Grave abuse of discretion.
 In this case, SB did not appear to have any grave abuse of discretion.
 FUNDAMENTAL TEST IN REFLECTING ON THE VIABILITY OF A
MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND THAT THE FACTS CHARGED
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
o Whether or not the facts asservated, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in
law.
o In this case, the information sufficiently established all the elements
of the offense
1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged
in conspiracy with him;
2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his official duties or in relation to his public
position;
3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
PEOPLE V. SALAZAR
FACTS
 2 counts of statutory rape
o AAA (12 y/o)
 Accused was the step father
 AAA purportedly executed an Affidavit of Desistance wherein she stated
that she was not raped by accused-appellant, but then explained that her
own mother forced her to execute the affidavit upon the threat of harm
 RTC: guilty
 CA: guilty for simple rape – no evidence of age
ISSUE
 WoN the RTC and CA erred in not giving weight to the affidavit of
desistance
RULING: NO.
 The CA reasoned: “the affidavit of desistance relied upon by appellant
could not be given any probative weight considering that it was not duly
sworn to. Further, when private complainant was confronted about it, she
testified that her mother threatened to kill her should she refuse to execute
the affidavit.”
 The alleged affidavit was executed after the case had already been
instituted. Thus, the Court already had acquired jurisdiction over the case
and control over the proceedings
 By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
 Complaint for graft against City Admin Alba and Chairman of IEMELIF
(Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas) Cruz
 Alba – SG 27; Cruz – private person
 Apparently, construction of IEMELIF encroached on the lot of Pabalan,
and no building permit was secured
o QC building official was informed and, consequently, the demolition
of the structure was ordered
o Became final and executory upon failure of the religious
congregation to appeal on time to the DPWH
 However, Cruz wrote City Admin Alba requesting that the order be not
enforced pending appeal. This was objected to by Pabalan
 Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019; approved by the Ombudsman
 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ORDER REINVESTIGATION AND/OR QUASH
INFORMATION ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
o Finding of probable cause in the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman was not supported by the facts and evidence of this
case
o Facts recited are not sufficient in substance to indict the accused
criminally
 SB granted motion for a reinvestigation
 Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the SB that,
after review of the case, the Ombudsman was affirming its finding of
probable cause against the respondent and prayed for arraignment
 April 2000: respondent was arraigned and pleaded not guilty
 On the same day, motion for leave to travel abroad without prejudice to
the resolution of his motion to quash was granted
 June 2000: motion to quash granted
ISSUE:
 WoN the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
RULING: YES.
 Records show that the SB quashed the information with the ruling that the
respondent acted on the basis of the January 12, 1994 memorandum to
him of then Mayor Mathay. SB concluded that having acted on the basis of
the memo of the mayor, respondent count not be considered as having
usurped authority of the building official or SPWH. The City Admin’s action
was also agreed upon by the Graft Investigator.
 SB ruled, based on these, that there was no probable cause
 However, the petitioner is correct in showing that the memo has already
been amended by a subsequent issuance: authority to act on violations of
the Building Code rested on the respondent as City Admin, but on the City
Engineer
 Additionally, Omnibus Motion of the respondent was converted into a
motion for reconsideration. In effect, he withdrew his motion to quash the
information.
 Furthermore, there was already a valid arraignment. The accused even
posted bail. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of the accused was already
acquired
 TO QUASH MEANS TO ANNUL, VACATE OR OVERTHROW. THE
ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WARRANT OF ARREST IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE QUASHAL OF
THE INFORMATION BUT IS A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE.
 By quashing the Information on the premise of lack of probable cause
instead of merely dismissing the case, the SB acted in violation of case
law and, thus, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction
SORIANO V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Soriano and Ilagan were the Pres. and GM of Rural Bank of San Miguel
(RBSM)
 During incumbency, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM
 Falsified loan applications and other bank records, made it appear that
Virgilio Malang and Rogelio Manaol obtained loans from RBSM (P15M)
 State Prosec Subia charged Soriano in the RTC w/ violation of Section 38
of the General Banking Act
 Same day, info for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was
also filed against Soriano and Ilagan
 Another information for the violation of the same laws were filed against
petitioners for the other 15B loan
 Moved to quash information
o More than one offense is charged
o Facts charged do not constitute an offense
 RTC denied motion
o Same fate with other two informations
 CA: sustained denial
ISSUE: WoN motion to quash should have been granted
RULING: No.
 Sec. 3(e) of Rule 117 prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense
 DUPLICITY OF CHARGES: Single complaint or information that charges
more than one offense
 In this case, Soriano was actually charged with more than ONE
INFORMATION, each charging a different offense
o Thus, it is erroneous to invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to
quash
 AS TO TWO DIFFERENT OFFENSES CHARGED FROM SAME ACT
o A single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several
charges
o DOSRI violation – failure to observe and comply with procedural,
reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of
a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests
in the bank
 AS TO FACTS CHARGED NOT CONSTITUTING AN OFFENSE
o FUNDAMENTAL TEST: whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined by law
o Informations contain material allegations
 DOSRI rules: alleged Soriano as president
 ESTAFA: making it appear that others obtained loans when
they did not secure said loans or receive these
 That money, goods or other personal property be
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same
 That there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt
 That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another
 That there is demand made by the offended party to
the offender
GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 Recovery of unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate
amount of PhP143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife, children had amassed
o Case for forfeiture of properties, raffled to Fourth Division of anti-
graft court
 Another forfeiture case of P202,005,980.55
o Raffled to 4th div of SB
 Prior to Forfeiture II but subsequent to Forfeiture I, Ombudsman charged
the Garcias and three others with violation of ra 7080 (PLUNDER);
PhP303,272,005.99
o Raffled to second div of SB
o Covered substantially the same properties identified in both
forefeiture cases
 Corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at
his place of detention
 Garcia was declared in default after his motion to dismiss was denied
 Motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on the following grounds:
o Filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4 th Division of jurisdiction
over the forfeiture case
o Consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double
jeopardy entanglements
 FORFEITURE II: SB sheriff gave copies of summons to the
OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to
Gen. Garcia
 TWO ACTIONS BEFORE SC:
o FORFEITURE I: Special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari
 LACK OF PROPER AND VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS
o FORFEITURE II: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
 Summons was improperly served
ISSUE: WoN 4th division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner and her three sons on the ground that summons have been effectively
or improperly served and that the plunder case has already been filed and
pending with another division of the SB

RULING:
 FOR PLUNDER CASE FILED PRIOR:
o Petitioner alleges that forfeiture cases must be filed with plunder
cases to obviate possible double jeopardy
o SB had jurisdiction.
 Civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the
commission of a criminal offense
 FORFEITURE: arises when a public officer of ee,
during incumbency, acquires during his incumbency
 an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of
his property and to his other lawful income
o Forfeiture is civil, plunder is criminal
 Separate and different cause of action
 For forfeiture, disproportion of properties and income
(preponderance of evidence only)
 For plunder, commission of criminal acts in furtherance of
the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (GBRD)
 Thus, no double jeopardy could attach
 BUT SB DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF PET
AND CHILDREN
o Defect on summons
 Substituted summons were made on detained Garcia
PNB v. SORIANO
FACTS
 PNB extended a credit facility in the form of a Floor Stock Line (FSL) to
LISAM
 Soriano is the chairman and president of LISAM, and the authorized
signatory in all LISAM’s transactions with PNB
 LISAM made several availments of the FSL in the total amount of
P29,645,944.55 credited to its current account PNB
o 52 Trust Receipts
 After actual physical inventory of LISAM’s motor vehicles and motorcycles,
only four units covered by the TRs amounting to P158,100.00 remained
unsold
 Furthermore, P29,487,844.55 should have been remitted to PNB. Despite
several formal demands, respondent Soriano failed and refused to turn
over the said amount to the prejudice of PNB.
o Trustee’s failure to account to PNB for the Motor Vehicles received
in Trust and/or for the proceeds of the sale thereof within 30 days
from demand made by PNB – prima facie evidence of
misappropriation
 Thus, complaint-affidavit before OCP of Naga
 Accused claims that the obligation is purely civil in nature
 52 counts of Estafa were still filed against the accused
 Meanwhile, PNB filed a petition for review of the resolution before the SOJ
 One of the criminal cases against Soriano was dismissed. In the same
year, Soriano was arrainged.
 DOJ, however, reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the Naga
City Prosec
 Information was thus withdrawn. RTC claims that it no longer had authority
to re-instate, revive or re-file the same
 CA did not find grave abuse of discretion with the questioned reso of DOJ
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in affirming the DOJ’s ruling that the
restructuring of LISAM’s loan secured by trust receipts extinguished Soriano’s
criminal liability
 WON the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 2001-0641 to 2001-0693
violate the constitutional provision against double jeopardy

RULING: NO.
 Withdrawal was ordered by RTC
 DOJ ordered city prosec to move, with leave of court, for the withdrawal fo
the Informations for estafa against Soriano
 The reinstatement of the criminal cases against Soriano will not violate her
constitutional right against double jeopardy
o First jeopardy attached prior to the second
o Validly terminated
o Second jeopardy for the same offense as in the first
  Attaches only:
 Valid indictment
 Before a competent court
 After arraignment
 When a valid plea has been entered
 When the accused has been acquitted or convicted,
or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent
 In the present case, withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a
categorical dismissal by the RTC. Double jeopardy had not set in because
Soriano was no valid dismissal or termination of the fifty one cases against
her.
o Why? RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 Accused Panlaqui, Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, Velaso and Pelayo,
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator and the Municipal
treasurer, etc.
o Leased 7 units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell and 1 unit of Back
Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a period of thirty
days
o Accused caused it to appear that work on the said project ahd been
accomplished and 100% completed per approved Program of Work
and Specifications
o Acts caused undue injury to the Government and granted
unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction
 Duly arraigned, trial ensued
o Prosec and defense were both able to present evidence
 ACQUITTED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN
o There was indeed a project in the two rivers, and accomplished by
J.S. Lim
ISSUE: WoN Sandiganbayan acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion
RULING: NO.
 An acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy. Onli exception: where there is a finding of mistrial
resulting in a denial of due process.
 Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties
 There was no showing that prosecution has indeed been deprived of due
process of law.
o No showing that trial court hampered the prosecution’s presentation
of evidence in any way
 There being no mistrial, acquittal can no longer be reviewed by the Court
– violation of the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
PEOPLE V. NAZARENO
FACTS
 Three separate but related contracts – between PNP and Beltra Industries
o Purchase and delivery of Caliber .45 Thompson Brand pistols
 Criminal charge against respondents
 Three purchase orders signed by then Dir. Gen.
Nazareno and Director Nartatez
 Tri-agency investigating committee composed of lawyers from PNP’s
Inspector General’s Office, National Police Commission, and the OP
o Found no overpricing and no collusion among the officers of the
PNP participating in the transactions.
o COA: Special audit team
 Found that it was indeed overpriced, would have cost P45M
less
 Office of the Special Prosec filed an information against the respondents
 SB: acquitted respondents – AFP prices did not offer sufficient basis for
comparison to be able to establish firmly the alleged overpricing in the
purchase of subject firearms by the PNP
o There was no evidence that the three accused indeed conspired
with one another
ISSUE
 GAOD
RULING
 DIMSISSED ON THE BASIS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
 SEC. 21, ARTICLE III: no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense
 Sec. 7, Rule 117
 Judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable
 FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: humanity of the laws and in a jealous
watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State
 Bars multiple criminal trials
 State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal through either
a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the RoC or an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45
PEOPLE V. LACSON
FACTS
 Originated from the brutal killings of eleven suspected members of a
notorious Kuratong Baleleng gang on 17 May 1995
 Respondent Lacson, together with 25 other police officers were charged
with multiple murder
 Respondent filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
for examination of prosec witnesses
 Seven or eight victims’ next of kin executed affidavits of desistance, while
others recanted their affidavit-complaints.
o Trial court provisionally dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause
 Panel of state prosecutors issued a resolution finding probable cause
o RTC-Manila denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order – dismissal of the case is not one of the merits
and without any recorded arraignment
o CA: proceedings conducted by state prosecutors were null and void
ISSUE:
 WoN the provisional dismissal was valid
RULING: NO.
 Provisional dismissal were with the express consent of the respondent as
he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion
for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
witnesses
 However, it ordered to remand the case to the lower court for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8,
Rule 117
 Upon MfR, respondent failed to prove that the first and second requisites
of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when the trial judge
dismissed those criminal cases
o EXPRESS CONSENT: viva voce or in writing
o Motion for provisional dismissal by accused – express consent
 Not present in this case.
o Respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses
 Furthermore, no notice of any motion for provisional dismissal or of the
hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days
before said hearings as mandated by Rule 15, Sec. 4 of the RoC
 In crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the
offended party or parties or heirs of the victims must be given adequate a
priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case. MfR was granted.
LOS BANOS V. PEDRO
FACTS
 Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm
o w/o required written authorization from the COMELEC a day before
the May 14, 2001 national and local elections
 BP Blg. 881 – Omnibus Election Code
o Pedro was caught illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at
Boac, Marinduque
 Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating
the election gun ban
o Carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business
without any authority from the COMELEC
o After inquest, Marinduque provincial prosec. filed the Info against
Pedro w/ Marinduque RTC
 Pedro filed a Motion for PI, which the RTC granted. However, it did not
materialize
o Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash: Info contains
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification and/or the facts charged do not constitute an offense
 He attached to his motion a Comelec Certification that he
was exempted from gun ban
 RTC quashed the info and ordered the police and prosecs to return the
seized articles
 Private prosec Los Banos moved to reopen the case: cert was falsification
and prosec was denied of due process
 RTC reopened the case
o Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s order primarily
based on Sec. 8 of Rule 117
 RTC ruled for petitioner
 CA: denied Pedro’s petition, but reversed itself upon MfR
ISSUE: WoN Sec. 8, Rule 117 applies
RULING: NO
 MOTION TO QUASH
o Motion by which the accused assails, before entering his plea, the
validity of the criminal complaint or the information filed against him
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on
the face of the Information
 PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL
o Sec. 8, Rule 117
 Requisites: (1) express consent of the accused and (2) with
notice to the offended party
o Not exceeding 6 years: 1 year. >6 years, 2 years
o REQUIREMENTS
 Prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or
the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio)
 of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for its provisional dismissal
 The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case
 The court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally
 The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case
o TIME-BAR RULE: 1 or 2 years
 Dismissal based on a motion to quash and provisional dismissal are far
different from one another as concepts in their features and legal
consequences
 It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal
to which Sec. 8, Rule 117 applies
 Latter provision does not state what a provisional dismissal is.
“Provisional” directly suggests that the dismissals which Sec. 8 essentially
refers to are those that are temporary in character and not permanent
 Permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of DJ, by the
previous extinction of criminal liability
 Furthermore, Sec. 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional
dismissal
o Marked contrast with a MtQ, whose grounds are specified under
Sec. 3. A motion to quash is thus a class in itself
 Consequences: MtQ: Secs. 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 117
o Sec. 8 only states that a prov dis can be made
 Motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy
of the complaint or information
o While prov dis may be at the instance of prosec or accused, or both
 Form and content of mtq are not applicable to pd
 Mtq assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the information for
defects or defenses apparent on face of the info, prov dis may be other
than this
 Mtq is allowed before arraignment; prov dis even during trial proper – as
long as consent is present
 Prov dis: impermanent until time-bar applies
 Info quashed is quashed until revived