The Biden administration has its sights set on a June summit with Russia.

Given the
new lows plowed in the bilateral relationship — so low that both countries’ ambassadors
have returned home for consultations — talks at the presidential level are an important
channel of communication. While the summit is unlikely to yield a fiasco like the
infamous Trump-Putin press conference in Helsinki, it is also not likely to change the
downward trajectory of the relationship, even if the administration’s proposal to start
arms control and strategic stability talks succeeds.

The Biden administration’s narrow agenda for the summit is reflective of the state of the
relationship, but it also stems from the fundamental continuities in U.S. Russia strategy
since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. That
strategy is extremely pessimistic about what negotiations can achieve with Russia
today, and unduly optimistic that America’s problems with Russia may be easier to
solve in the future. Instead of tinkering with the existing approach, the Biden
administration should attempt to pursue negotiated outcomes with Moscow on a range
of interests and conflicts, beyond just arms control and strategic stability talks. In order
to better stabilize the relationship, the administration should take the opportunity in the
run-up to the summit to revisit core assumptions, and expand the scope for statecraft in
U.S. Russia policy.

Defining the Post-2014 Strategy

America’s post-2014 strategy on Russia has been defined by three central elements.
First and foremost, U.S. policy has entailed a campaign of active pressure. That meant
punishing Russian “malign behavior” through sanctions, reinforcing deterrence and
defense along NATO’s eastern flank states, increasing engagement with Russia’s
neighbors, and trying to isolate Moscow diplomatically. But this was not intended to
become a zero-sum antagonistic relationship. Indeed, the second pillar of the strategy
has been selective cooperation with Moscow on issues of importance to the United
States, but only when Washington deems such cooperation necessary. Prominent
examples include the original Iran nuclear deal negotiations, which involved close U.S.-
Russian coordination at the height of the Ukraine crisis, bilateral engagement on Afghan
peace talks, and President Joe Biden’s proposed arms control negotiations.