THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.

, as Presiding Judge of the Regional

Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set side a decision from the RTC of Makati. Petitioner
is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City and is represented by the Papal Nuncio
in the Philippines. The petition arose from a controversy regarding a lot, Lot 5-A, of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Parañaque, registered in the name of the petitioner. Lot 5-A is contiguous
to two other lots, 5-B and 5-D. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, who later assigned his rights to
the sale to the private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., involved in real estate. Informal
settlers were squatting in the property, and dispute arose as to who would evict them. The conflict
intensified when the lot was sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation by the
petitioner. The private respondent filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati against the petitioner and
three other defendants: Msgr. Domingo Cirilos, who acted as agent to the sellers, the PRC and
Tropicana. It prayed for: 1) annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one
hand and Tropicana on the other; 2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; 3) specific performance of
the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots and; 4) damages. The petitioners and Cirilos
separately moved to dimiss the complaint: petitioners for lack of jurisdiction based on soverign
immunity from suit and Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by
private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, reason
being that the petitioner can no longer be immune as they entered into a business contract. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. They then filed a “Motion for Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing
Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense,” to facilitate the hearing in its
defense of sovereign immunity. Private repondents opposed the motion as well as the motion for
reconsideration. The trial court ordered the resolution be suspended until after trial on the marits and
directing the petitioner to file its answer. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. The
petitioner invoked its privilege of sovereign immunity only on its behalf and on behalf of its official
representatives, the Papal Nuncio. Eventually, the Department of Foreign Affairs filed for a Motion of
Intervention caliming its legal interest on the outcome of the case concerning the diplomatic immunity
of the petitioner. It stated its adoption upon the claim of the petitioner with regard to its claim for
soeverign immunity from suit. This was opposed by the private respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner is dismissed.
Reason: Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or absolute theory,
wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of another sovereign without its consent
and; b) restrictive theory, which puts conditions on when to recognize immunity.

Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is private or acts jure gestionis
(those that are for profit), then immunity cannot be invoked.

In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot 5-A were
made for profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose
of building official residence of Papal Nuncio. However, when the informal settlers refused to leave the
property, the petitioner decided to dispose the property, not for commercial purpose. The DFA
intervened as they established in a Memorandum and Certification the privilege of sovereign immunity
of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Philippines exempt
from local jurisdiction and has title to all rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in the country. When the plea of immunity has been recognized by the executive department,
such shall be conclusive to courts.
China National Machinery v. Santamaria

Facts: On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr.
for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union
(the Northrail Project).

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed
to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project.3 The
Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the
DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding
USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of
3% per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a
letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as
the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.

On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of
Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the
Contract Agreement).7 The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan
Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000
in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail
Project.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with
Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying
the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG,
the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the
National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. The case was filed before the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC Br. 145). In the Complaint,
respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary
to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.

On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and setting
the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued.
CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.

the appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

Petitioners Argument: Petitioner claims that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail
because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do
business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a
purely commercial transaction.

Respondents Argument: respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement
were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise
known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner CNMEG is an agent of the sovereign People’s Republic of China.

Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement between two sovereign
states.

Ruling: The instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement.
CNMEG’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being
moot and academic.

The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to
commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz

Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of
the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character.

Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan
Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.
JUSMAG Philippines v. NLRC

GR No. 108813, 15 December 1994

DOCTRINES:

• A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States Government, and in the

absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG

cannot prosper

• Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international

law that the Philippines recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land

FACTS:

• Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) assails the January 29, 1993

Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public respondent), in

NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor

Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal

dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner.

• Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support

personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from

December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the

position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINESFILIPINO CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly

registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated

allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was also advised that he was under

administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his

leave.

• On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor

and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from

service by JUSMAG. He asked for his reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a Motion to
Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further

alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to

sue and be sued.

ISSUE:

Whether JUSMAG was immune from suit as an agency of the United States.

RATIO:

• YES, from the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private

respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States

pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree

with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit

it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived

or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

• In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these

universally recognized principles. In international law, “immunity” is commonly

understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of

another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under

which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in

parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal)

• The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The

view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign

states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between

sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a

more restrictive application of the doctrine. Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz,

we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with respect to the waiver of
State immunity, was obiter and “has no value as an imperative authority.” As it stands

now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to

sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot

be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

Wylie vs. Rarang

GR No. 74135, May 28 1992, 209 SCRA 357

FACTS:

Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was
the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.

Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as
merchandise control guard.

M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station supervised the
publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US Naval Base station.

The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to
military personnel.

One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry."

On February 3, 1978, the POD made a publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" which
mentioned a certain person named “Auring” who is described as a disgrace to her division and to the
Office of the Provost Marshal.

The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal
and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to when petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a
letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.

The private respondent the filed an action for damages alleging that the article constituted false,
injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in
the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel.

The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the
defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as
officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; and the United States Naval
Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit.
HELD:

The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain "Auring" as ". . a
disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal."

The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated
items like cigarettes and foodstuffs.

There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private respondent as she was the
only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal.

Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by her supervisor.

Before the article came out, the private respondent had been the recipient of commendations by her
superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.

It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is far removed in
the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him
responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.

This may be true as a general rule.

In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the
commanding officer for approval and he approved it.

The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records.

The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial
court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and why their decisions should
be reversed.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent."

Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of
libel, slander or any other form of defamation.

In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the
character and reputation of the private respondent.

Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the
deletion of the name Auring if the article were published.

The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication
without deleting the name "Auring."

Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty.

It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.

As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched
reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was
baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they
caused the private respondent.
Shauf v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 90314, 27 November 1990

FACTS: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Don Detwiler
and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City for the alleged
discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-
9 position in Clark Air Base. Private respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the
powers vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from
suit.

ISSUE: Can the private respondents validly set up the defense invoking the doctrine of immunity from
suit?

HELD: NO.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not also all-encompassing as to
be applicable under all circumstances.

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of
have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is
very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable.
Shauf v. CA

Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi, respondents

Second Division

Doctrine: official v. personal capacity

Keywords: void for overbreadth

Date: November 27, 1990

Ponente: Justice Regalado

Facts:

Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was
rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which
she is eminently qualified.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period
with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no
vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s
available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her
position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said
position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as
retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a
joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission,
Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.

RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such
amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from
defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit
for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions
pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They
likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be
dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against
the US government which would require consent.

Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits
against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines
& is not part of international law.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Held:

No they are not immune.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and
severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:

They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in
their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or
in excess of the powers vested in him.

It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State
from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer
or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates
or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive
conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of
discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.

There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused
appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.

She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has
completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral
science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a
doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance
Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she
applied for the same position in 1976.

In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the
application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B.
Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution
ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of
have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is
very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the
United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly
exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under
a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain and
simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her
interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should
not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on
that score.