CASE DIGESTS AND SYNTHESIS OF RELEVANT CASES

I. CASE DIGESTS

A. Nova Communications, Inc. vs. Canoy, G.R. No. 193276, June 26, 2019

Facts: On October 1990, a series of articles against Atty. Canoy were written by Locsin,
Jr. and Molina that were printed in the Philippine Free Press Issue published by LR
Publications and Philippine Daily Globe and Nova Communications.

Because of the subject articles, Atty. Canoy and his wife filed a civil case for damages
for the libelous articles. They claimed that the articles were designed to malign, embarrass,
humiliate, and ridicule him and his wife.

Nova Communications alleged that Atty. Canoy was merely tangentially mentioned in the
subject articles with no intention to cast dishonor, discredit, contempt, or ridicule upon his
person but on his proven identification with ad involvement in the Noble rebellion. As a public
figure, Atty. Canoy’s activities are matters imbued with public interest. Hence, the said words
should be understood as descriptive of an act which had sinister consequences on the
security of the state.

RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Canoy and ordered the petitioners to pay Atty. Canoy and
Mrs. Canoy for litigation expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal to the CA but the same decision from RTC was
affirmed with reduction of the damages. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the subject articles are libelous.

Ruling: Yes, the subject articles are libelous.

Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. Thus, it is an offense of injuring a person's character or reputation through false and
malicious statements. In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, the Court said
that:

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be

construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense. xx x. (Citations omitted)

Beyond question, the words imputed to Atty. Canoy as a veritable mental asylum patient,
a madman and a lunatic, in its plain and ordinary meaning, are conditions or circumstances
tending to dishonor or discredit him. As such, these are defamatory or libelous per se.
 Petition is denied.

B. Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Ruther Batuigas vs. People

of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017

Facts: On 20 December 1990, Batuigas wrote an article in his Bull’s Eye column in
Tempo titled “Crucial task for JoeCon’s successor.” The article dealt with the letter-complaint
of the Waray employees of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Region VIII on the
“[m]ismanagement, low moral[e], improper decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc.” in the
office. One of the public officials complained of was petitioner Regional Director Victor
Domingo (Domingo) who was accused of dereliction of official duties, among others. The
“JoeCon” referred to was the outgoing DTI Secretary, Jose Concepcion.

On 4 January 1991, Batuigas wrote in his column titled “A challenge to Sec.

Garrucho” about the alleged “lousy performance of Regional Director R.D. Domingo in DTI
Region 8,” among others. Peter Garrucho was the newly appointed DTI Secretary who took
over from Jose Concepcion.

Offended by these two articles, Domingo filed, on 18 January 1991, a complaint for libel
and damages before the the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palo, Leyte, against Batuigas and
the Manila Bulletin.

RTC find the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and principal of the crime for
Libel. Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin raised the said decision via an appeal but CA
affirmed the decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the libel was committed.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The 20 December 1990 article was not libelous because it was only a fair and true report
by Batuigas using the documents received by him. On the one hand, the privileged nature of
the 16 January 1991 article and the failure of Domingo to discharge his burden of proving
actual malice on the part of Batuigas failed to support a finding that there was libel.

Records cannot sustain a finding that Domingo was able to establish that Batuigas had
actual malice in writing this article. Batuigas testified that sometime in the latter part of 1990
and until 1991, he received letters of complaint denouncing Domingo. Although Batuigas
was not able to present these letters during the hearing of these cases it can be rationally
deduced that he was in actual receipt of the complaints against the DTI Region VIII officials
and employees because he was able to cite the specifics of the grievances of the Waray
employees in his 20 December 1990 article. Presumably, too, the letters that Batuigas
received were those complaints that had been dismissed by the CSC and the Office of the
Ombudsman.

It was evident that the statements as to the “lousy performance” and “mismanagement”
of Domingo cannot be regarded to have been written with the knowledge that these were
false or in reckless disregard of whether these were false, bearing in mind that Batuigas had
documentary evidence to support his statements. Batuigas merely expressed his opinion
based on the fact that there were complaints filed against Domingo, among others. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.

Petition is granted.

C. Belen vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017

Facts: On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge,
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was assigned to then Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation.

Petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing but was then dismissed by Lagma.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for
Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which later became the subject of this libel
case.

Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed
envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received
by its Receiving Section on August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the
said office are first received and recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to the
records section before referral to the City Prosecutor for assignment to the handling
Investigating Prosecutor.

September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint
for libel on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration &
Disqualify).

Trial court found petitioner guilty of libel. Petitioner then appealed to CA claiming the lack
of publication to which CA pointed out that the defamatory matter was made known to third
persons because other persons were able to read the Omnibus Code and copies were also
furnished to another department. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the element of publication is absent and no libel is committed.
 Ruling: No, the element of publication is not absent. Publication in libel means making
the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to
whom it has been written.

According to the Supreme Court, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope

addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its
possession in such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a
sender of a libelous communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be
intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The
publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate
control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is
hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.

In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but
only complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner
conceded that the defamatory statements in it were made known to someone other than the
person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was contained in sealed
envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that persons other than the one defamed would
be able to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with the
OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in the estafa complaint,
and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well
aware that such motion is not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record
when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequence of his act, petitioner cannot brush aside the logical
outcome of the filing and service of his Omnibus Motion.

Hence, the element of publication is not absent and petitioner is found guilty of libel.
Petition for certiorari is denied and decision from CA is affirmed with modification.

D. Fermin vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

Facts: Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the Editor-in-Chief of Gossip
Tabloid. The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable
for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is evading her conviction in an
Estafa case herein the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases to
confront there. This was said to be due to them, especially Annabelle’s, using fellow
Filipinos’ money and failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of the
cookware they were selling.

On complaint of spouses, two (2) criminal information for libel were filed against the
accused before the RTC. The RTC found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.

Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA which affirmed the conviction of
petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the
libelous article.
 Issue: Whether or not both the publisher and the Editor-in-chief are guilty of libel based
on the libelous article written by Fermin.

Ruling: Yes. Both the publisher and the Editor-in-Chief are guilty of libel.

In U.S. v. Taylor, which provides that: “Every author, editor or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in
any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author
of the same.” In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb “publicar.” Thus, it was held
that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to
be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it.

Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the

publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically
identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication, as
petitioner and Tugas are in this case.

It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the “publisher,” as shown by the editorial
box of Gossip Tabloid but also its “president” and “chairperson” as she herself admitted on
the witness stand. Obviously, petitioner had full control over the publication of articles in the
said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the
libelous article fails to persuade. 

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of Fermin for libel should be upheld. 
CA erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the SC cannot reinstate the
ruling of the trial court convicting Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, SC would run
afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modifications.

E. Novicio v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 141332, December 11, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Ligaya Novicio, stockholder and treasurer of Philippine International
Life Insurance Company (Philinterlife), wrote a letter informing banks in which Philinterlife
maintained its corporate accounts of the CA's resolution in a separate action for annulment
of sale of the company's shares, restraining several stockholders of Philinterlife, including
respondent Aggabao, from exercising their rights as shareholders of Philinterlife and of the
corresponding change of bank signatories in their corporate accounts.

Respondent filed three (3) counts of libel against the petitioner. The informations were
identically worded except as to the names of the depository banks.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations, alleging that the facts charged therein
did not constitute libel. The trial court and the CA denied her motion. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the informations constitute libel.

 Ruling: No, the informations did not constitute libel.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.

At the outset, it should be stressed that, except for the element of identification, the
informations filed against petitioner failed to establish the three other elements of libel.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in

their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.

In this case, the words used by petitioner in her letter did not cast aspersion on
respondent's character, integrity and reputation. They were intended merely to notify the
banks concerned of the change of bank signatories of Philinterlife as a consequence of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals. No veiled and malicious suggestion or innuendo could be
inferred from the fact that respondent, who used to be an authorized signatory of the
company, was being replaced as such.

More importantly, the informations failed to allege the existence of malice. There is
malice when the author is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in response
to a duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.
||| 

Petition is granted.

F. MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines,

Inc., G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

Facts: Respondents, the Islamic Da'wah Council Of The Philippines, Inc., a local
federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual Muslims, filed a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit, against MVRS Publications,
Inc. (MVRS) arising from an article published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid, which allegedly
contained libelous statement that alluded to the pig as the God of the Muslims, and this was
published with intent to disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed by the
article were not specifically identified. The CA, however, ordered the petitioners to pay
damages to private respondents Muslims to whom it was clear the defamation was directed.

Hence, this petition assailing the CA findings.

Issue: Whether or not the article was libelous.

Ruing: No. The article was not libelous.

Supreme Court held that the statements published by the petitioners did not specifically
identify nor refer to any particular individual who was purportedly the subject of the alleged
libelous publication; and that absent circumstances specifically pointing to a particular
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without impairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression as well as of the press under the Bill
of Rights.

Petition is granted and the assailed decision is reversed and set aside.

II. SYNTHESIS OF RELEVANT CASES

The Supreme Court has decided six cases on libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

In the case of Nova Communications, Inc. vs Canoy, G.R. No. 193276, June 26, 2019,
the Supreme Court ruled that to determine if the words used are defamatory in character,
such statement shall be construed in their plain meaning and when these words tend to
cause dishonor or discredit, then these words are considered defamatory or libelous.

In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170341,
July 5, 2017, the court held that an expression of opinion based on an established fact, such
as, basing the comment on the complaints received, is not libelous.

In Belen vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 211120, February 13, 2017, the
Supreme Court furthered illustrated the second element of libel laid down under Article 353
of the RPC which is that the imputation must be made publicly. Accordingly, it is a sufficient
publication even if such is enclosed in an envelope if in such a way that it can be ready by
person other than the offended party.

In Fermin vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008, the Supreme
Court ruled that proof of knowledge of and participant in the publication of the offending
article is not required when the accused has been specifically identified as the author or
publisher of the publication. Jurisprudence teaches that author or editor of any book or
newspaper who prints or publishes a libelous matter also acts as the author of the same.

In Novicio v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 141332, December 11, 2003, the Supreme Court laid
down the following requisites for an imputation to be libelous, to wit: 1) it must be
defamatory; 2) it must be malicious; 3) it must be given publicity; and 4) the victim must be
identifiable. Moreover, to allege the existence of malice, the Court held that the author must
be prompted by personal ill will and speaks not in response to a duty but merely injure the
reputation of the defamed person.

In the case of MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that the identification of
the offended party is required to satisfy the fourth element of libel. Defamatory remarks
directed at a group of persons, such as to the Muslim community, is not actionable unless
the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for the victims to be identifiable.

From the abovementioned cases, the Supreme Court laid down the requirements
needed to constitute libel. These include that the imputation 1) must be defamatory; 2) must
be malicious; 3) must be given publicity; and 4) the victim must be identifiable. Moreover,
libelous statement enclosed in an envelope with a chance of being read by third persons
constitutes a sufficient publication (Belen case). Libel is also committed when in the plain
meaning of such statement brings dishonor to the other party. (Nova case). Lastly, the
author or editor of any book or newspaper who prints or publishes a libelous matter is also
liable with libel.

The following do not constitute libel: when an expression of opinion is based on actual
fact (Fermin case) and when the article alleged to be libelous does not single out the
individuals of the offended party, the fourth essential requisite of the offense of libel does not
exist (MVRS Publication case).

With the above synthesis of cases, one can further grasped the application of Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code and expand one’s learning on the intricacies of the elements or
requisites that constitute libel.