OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, former Clerk of Court LUIS C. BUCAYON II, Court
Stenographers THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME, MARICAR N. EUGENIO,
and RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and Interpreter PAUL M. RESURRECCION, all of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952 December 24, 2008

Facts:

The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in all 7 branches of the RTC in Muntinlupa City, including the Branch
276, the branch presided by herein respondent Judge Perello. The audit was prompted by
reports of perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.
The audit team reported that for the period of 6 years, a total of 219 petitions for habeas
corpus were assigned to Branch 276 and 22 out of 219 of these cases were not presented to
the audit team, while the case folders of about a hundred cases did not contain copies of the
decisions of conviction. The audit team also noted a huge disparity in the number of
petitions for habeas corpus raffled in the said branch as against those raffled in the other
branches, which led the team to doubt if the raffle had been conducted with strict
regularity considering the fact that Judge Perello was the Executive Judge that time. The
audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses relative to the
disposition of habeas corpus cases in Branch 276. Finally, the audit team observed that in
some of the petitions for habeas corpus, respondent Judge Perello erred in ordering the
release of the prisoners before they have served the full term of their sentence.

In her defense, Judge Perello opined that her decisions ordering the release of the prisoners
who were serving their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act were in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of herein respondent judge of the writs of habeas
corpus is proper

Ruling:

The Court are not impressed with Judge Perello's justification in granting the writs. Such
ratiocination on her part betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation of
penalties. As found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period of
prision correccional in granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners
had served imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she immediately ordered their
release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted
if the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence
up to its maximum term. The maximum range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years. This is the period which the prisoners must have served
before their applications for writs of habeas corpus may be granted. In obstinately granting
the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only served the minimum
period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on
graduation of penalties as well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of
the law.

Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even
without the pertinent copies of detention and judgment of conviction. This is contrary to
the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. The Rules clearly require
that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany the application for
the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid down
in Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, Judge Perello's stubborn
unwillingness to act in accordance with the rules and settled jurisprudence shows her
refusal to reform herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 182855 June 5, 2013

MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE
JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through
its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR., Petitioners,

vs.

SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM,

PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus1 under Rule 102 of the
1997 Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alexander Adonis (Adonis), praying that the Court
directs respondent Superintendent Venancio Tesoro (respondent), Director of the Davao
Prisons and Penal Farm, to have the body of the former brought before this Court and in
the alternative, praying for the application of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 08-2008,2 which imposes the penalty of a fine instead of imprisonment in Criminal
Case No. 48679-2001.3

Antecedent Facts

In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him by then Representative Prospero
Nograles. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five (5) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum penalty, to four (4) years, six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as maximum penalty.4 He began serving his
sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.5

A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed against
Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14.6

On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the
Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included
Adonis. The said document was received by the City Parole and Probation Office of Davao
on May 2, 2008.7

Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the
subject of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."

In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a
Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate release from
detention and for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said
Circular.

On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis
moved for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding
Judge George Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of
₱5,000.9 Subsequently on even date and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an
undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of Davao Penal Colony "to
release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or
offenses."11 On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent,12 but the
release of Adonis was not effected.

On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.13
The respondent consequently filed his Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October 27, 2008
an Urgent Motion to Resolve15 and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion,16
reiterating all his previous prayers.

On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the
Court that Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions set forth in his parole and with the advise to report to the City
Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.17

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone
purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a
valid judgment.18

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed
or discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 48679-2001.1â wphi1 Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not
entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted
him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a
convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of
his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the
disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.20 Notably, at the time he
was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14.21 In
fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still
pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed.
There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.

Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
citing Fermin v. People,22 where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather than
imprisonment under the circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
was issued on January 25, 2008 and provides the "guidelines in the observance of a rule of
preference in the imposition of penalties in libel cases." The pertinent portions read as
follows:

All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of
preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the
crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:

1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for
the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition
of a fame alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary
imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)

A clear reading of the Administration Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular can not be given
retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to
raise such argument considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already become
final and executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced serving his sentence.
Eventually, he was released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the
conditions of the parole granted to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 183711 June 22, 2010

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN.

ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL.
NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 183712

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN.

ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO,
and LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 183713

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; GEN. HERMOGENES

ESPERON, JR.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO;
and Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR.,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision1 in the consolidated petitions
for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,2 for Contempt3 and for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo4 filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her son Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos, who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a woman from
the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever
Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, on April 28, 2007. This CA decision5
dismissed the petitioner’s petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied
the petitioner’s motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.

The Antecedents

The established facts, as found by the CA, are summarized below:6

The established facts show that at around one o’clock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007,
Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa
Bulacan (a chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas)
– was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco
Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On his way out of the restaurant, Jonas told the
manager, "Ma’am aktibista lang po ako!" When a security guard tried to intervene, after he
noticed that the group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the restaurant, he was
told, "Pare, pulis!" The guard then backed off but was able to see that Jonas was forced into
the rear portion of a plain maroon colored Toyota Revo with plate number TAB 194. The
guard then noted the plate number and reported the incident to his superiors as well as to
the police on duty in the said mall.

On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas
was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO
verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. It was also later confirmed by
employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that Mudlong
was arrested and his 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was seized on June 24, 2006 by Cpl. Castro
Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villeñ a of the 56th Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army for
transporting timber without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR employees and officers of
the 56th IB, the vehicle with the license plate no. TAB 194 was impounded in the 56th IB
headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement.

The established facts also show that Lt. Col. Clement and the soldiers of the 56th IB went on
retraining at the Headquarters of the First Scout Rangers Regiment (Camp Tecson) in Brgy.
Tartaro, San Miguel, Bulacan starting November 28, 2006. A "left-behind force" or a squad
remained in the camp of the 56th IB to secure the premises and equipment as it awaited
the arrival of the 69th IB, headed by Lt. Col. Edison Caga, which took over the 56th IB’s area
of responsibility for the duration of the retraining. The 69th IB arrived at Camp Tecson on
December 1, 2006, and remained there until March 7, 2007, when the 56th IB returned.
There was no formal turnover or inventory of equipment and vehicles when the 69th IB
arrived on December 1, 2006.

Meanwhile, on January 17, 2007, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano took command of the 56th IB
from Lt. Col. Clement. The actual turnover of command took place at Camp Tecson where
the 56th IB was retraining. At the time Jonas was abducted on April 28, 2007, Lt. Col.
Feliciano was the 56th IB’s commanding officer. Earlier, on March 23, 2007, 2nd Lt. Dick A.
Abletes, a member of the 56th IB, was caught on video talking to two persons, a male and a
female, at McDonald’s Bocaue. In the video, he was seen handing a document to the two
persons. On March 26, 2007, 2nd Lt. Abletes was arrested and charges were soon filed
against him with the Judge Advocate General for violations of Articles 82, 96 and 97 of the
Articles of War.

Prior to Jonas’ abduction, Mudlong’s 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle remained impounded at the
56th IB’s Headquarters. In May 2007, right after Jonas’ abduction was made public, it was
discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the
engine and other spare parts were "cannibalized."

On direct examination, the petitioner testified before the CA that the police was able to
generate cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the abductors of Jonas
based on its interview of eyewitnesses.7 The petitioner narrated further that these
cartographic sketches were identified by State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the
Department of Justice (DOJ); that when she went to see State Prosecutor Velasco
personally, he gave her "five names" who were allegedly involved in the abduction of Jonas
(namely T/Sgt. Jason Roxas, Cpl. Joana Francisco, M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo, and 1st Lt. Jaime
Mendaros);8 and that the information from State Prosecutor Velasco’s sources
corroborated the same information she received earlier from her own sources.9 The
petitioner also testified that nothing came out of the information given by State Prosecutor
Velasco because he was "pulled out from the investigation by the DOJ Secretary,"10 and
that the police, particularly P/Supt. Jonnel C. Estomo, failed to investigate and act upon
these leads.11

On August 30, 2007, P/Supt. Estomo (the lead investigator in the investigation conducted
by the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group [PNP-CIDG])
testified before the CA that he did not investigate or look into the identities of the
cartographic sketches of the two abductors provided by the PNP Criminal Investigation
Unit, Quezon City.12 P/Supt. Estomo testified further that he showed the photos of Cpl.
Bugalan and Pfc.Villeñ a to witness Larry Marquez for identification but failed to show any
photos of the other officers and men of the 56th IB.13 Finally, P/Supt. Estomo also testified
that he did not propound any clarificatory questions regarding the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos to Lt. Cols. Feliciano, Clement, and Caga of the 56th IB who merely voluntarily
submitted their statements.14

On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D.
Manuel @ KA CARLO, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the
theory that elements of the New People’s Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of
Jonas.15 In his Sworn Statement, Lipio admitted that he is a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP)/NPA and that the NPA was behind the abduction of Jonas.
Lipio revealed that Jonas is known as @KA RAMON in the communist movement. He
claimed further that he and @KA RAMON belonged to the Bulacan Party Committee,
assigned to the White Area Committee doing intelligence work for the movement under the
leadership of Delfin de Guzman @ KA BASTE, and that @KA RAMON was their political
instructor and head of the intelligence unit in the province.16

Sometime early April of 2007, Lipio was present in a meeting between @KA BASTE and
@KA RAMON. At this meeting, the two had a heated argument. For this reason, @KA BASTE
instructed Lipio to place @KA RAMON under surveillance as they suspected him of
pilfering funds from the party and of acting as a military agent.17
Lipio further averred that upon instruction of @KA BASTE, he and a certain @KA CARLO
proceeded to Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007 to monitor the reported meeting
between @KA RAMON and other party members. At one o’clock in the afternoon, Lipio and
@KA CARLO (who stationed themselves near the entrance/exit of the mall) saw a man,
who they recognized as @KA RAMON, forcibly taken by four men, brought outside of the
mall, and shoved inside a Toyota Revo. Lipio further alleged that he recognized two of the
abductors as "@KA DANTE" and "@KA ENSO" who he claims to be members of the
CPP/NPA’s guerilla unit (RYG).18

In his Sworn Statement, Manuel affirmed and substantiated Lipio’s statement that @KA
RAMON and Jonas are one and the same person and that he is a member of the communist
movement in Bulacan. Manuel also corroborated Lipio’s statement regarding the
circumstances of the abduction of @KA RAMON at Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007; he
confirmed that he and @ KA TIBO witnessed the abduction.19

Reyes, a rebel-returnee, provided in her Sworn Statement additional material information

regarding the disappearance of Jonas. Reyes alleged that she was supposed to meet with
@KA RAMON and another comrade in the movement (whom she identified as @KA JO) to
discuss the possibility of arranging a meeting with a contact in the military. She averred
that she met @KA JO at about 11:30 a.m. at the Baliaug Transit Terminal, Cubao enroute to
Ever Gotesco mall where they would meet with a certain @KA RAMON. Reyes further
narrated that they arrived about noon at Ever Gotesco mall; @KA JO left her at McDonald’s
and told her to wait while he went to look for @KA RAMON. After an hour, @KA JO arrived
without @KA RAMON and told Reyes to go home and just keep in touch through text
messaging. Reyes alleged further that she has not heard from @KA JO since.20

The CA Findings

In its July 17, 2008 decision, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed
to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military.
The CA noted that the evidence does not show how license plate number TAB 194
(supposedly attached to the 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle impounded at the 56th IB
Headquarters) came to be attached to the getaway Toyota Revo on April 28, 2007, and
whether the two license plates are one and the same at all. The CA emphasized that the
evidence does not indicate whether the abductors are members of the military or the police
or are civilians; if they are civilians, whether they acted on their own or were following
orders, and in the latter case, from whom.

The CA also found that the investigations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the PNP "leave much to be desired as they did not fully exert their effort to unearth the
truth and to bring the real culprits before the bar of justice."21 The CA held that since the
petitioner has established that the vehicle used in the abduction was linked to a vehicle
(with license plate number TAB 194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56th IB, it
became the burden of the AFP to exercise extraordinary diligence to determine the why
and the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in their custody and its appearance in a
vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo) used in Jonas’ abduction. The CA also ruled that the AFP
has the burden of "connect[ing] certain loose ends"22 regarding the identity of @Ka Ramon
(as referred to by the petitioner’s witnesses) and the allegation that @Ka Ramon is indeed
Jonas in the "Order of Battle."

As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as "rather shallow" and "conducted
haphazardly." The CA took note that P/Supt. Estomo’s investigation merely delved into the
administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56th IB,
and failed to consider them as suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that
the PNP-CIDG’s investigation should focus on the criminal aspect of the present case
pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to "investigate
and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and
assist in their prosecution."

The CA also found P/Supt. Estomo’s recommendation that appropriate charges be filed
against Mauro Mudlong (registered owner of the impounded 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle with
plate license no. TAB 194) to be without any factual basis since no evidence was presented
to connect the latter to the loss of the license plate as well as to the abduction of Jonas. The
CA stressed that it could not find any valid reason why Mudlong should be treated any
differently from the three 56th IB colonels whom the PNP-CIDG did not consider as
suspects despite the established fact that license plate no. TAB 194 was lost while in their
custody.
On the PNP-CIDG’s new information from Lipio who claimed to have seen Jonas being
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG, and
on Marlon Manuel, who corroborated Lipio’s statements, the CA held that steps should be
taken by the PNP-CIDG to verify the veracity of these statements. Notwithstanding the new
information, the CA noted that the PNP-CIDG should not discount the possible involvement
of members of the AFP. Thus, the CA concluded that the PNP must exert extraordinary
diligence in following all possible leads to resolve the crime committed against Jonas.
Finally, the CA noted - based on the Certification issued by the Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor, DOJ dated March 5, 2008 - that no case has been referred by the PNP to the DOJ
for preliminary investigation in relation to the abduction and disappearance of Jonas. This
is contrary to PNP’s manifest representation that it had already forwarded all pertinent and
relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against the suspects
(i.e., @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO).

The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and contempt as against President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from
suit. The CA ruled that the President’s immunity from suit is a settled doctrine citing David
v. Arroyo.23

Our Ruling

Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we
conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case
until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.

From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation - among them the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of
two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of
eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the
petitioner by no less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the
persons who were possibly involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
(Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence
Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP.24 No search and certification were ever made
on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as
the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through was
also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of
two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of
the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present case, did not
appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.

We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-
CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonas was abducted by
a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The
records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to
determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions
were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary
investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded all
pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against
@KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.

Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring

should be undertaken. While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the
investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDG’s investigation
particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the present case to the
CHR as the Court’s directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the
investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to
report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We take into consideration
in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and
empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines.25

Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings,
including field investigations – acting as the Court’s directly commissioned agency for
purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the
identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged
abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and
present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco
alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine
Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine
Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of
Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and investigations, as may be
necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor
Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipio’s
and Manuel’s claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of
the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on records, past and present, as well
as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO;
and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction that may be
necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced
disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVES
to:

(1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative

proceedings, including field investigations – acting as the Court’s directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining
the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors as well as their
whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and
locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the
abduction of Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana
Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias
T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines; further proceedings and investigations, as may be
necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor
Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipio’s
and Manuel’s claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of
the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on records, past and present, as well
as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO;
and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be
necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced
disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
(2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on
Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on
Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;

(3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human
Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded
to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the
Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights
may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;

(4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the
Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under
this Resolution;

(5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and

exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific
directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and

(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Resolution.

In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other
respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent
resolutions and actions from this Court shall also be served on, and be directly enforceable
by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The
present respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the
responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

G.R. No. 153795 August 17, 2006

MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

Director General LEANDRO MENDOZA, Chief Superintendent NESTORIO GUALBERTO, SR.,

Superintendent LEONARDO ESPINA, SR., Superintendent JESUS VERSOZA, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

When respondents deny custody of an allegedly detained person, petitioners have the duty
of establishing the fact of detention by competent and convincing evidence; otherwise, the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. Nonetheless, when the disappearance of a person is
indubitable, the law enforcement authorities are duty-bound to investigate it with due
diligence and to locate the missing person. When the wrongdoing is attributable to the
police agencies and/or their agents, the aggrieved may secure the assistance of the People’s
Law Enforcement Board or the Commission on Human Rights.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse
the March 22, 2002 Decision2 and the May 30, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 68170. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is REVERSED and the petition for habeas
corpus is DISMISSED."4

The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The antecedent facts are narrated by the CA in this wise:

"Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, a resident of 4570
Cattleya Road, Sun Valley Subdivision, Parañ aque City, who was allegedly abducted and
taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30 in the morning of November 19, 2001 while
he was walking along Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house at 3891 Marigold
Street of the same subdivision. The abduction was reported by petitioners to the Barangay,
the Parañ aque Police and the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force at Camp Crame.

"It appears that in the evening of November 19, 2001, the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media
a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a statement confessing to his
participation in the killing of Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca, naming Michael Martinez as
the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk, the husband of Nida Blanca and
alleged mastermind in her killing. In a televised interview with a media reporter on
November 26, 2001, Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp
Crame where he was being detained, and which the former allegedly reiterated when he
talked to Robert Paul Martinez, a brother of Michael, on November 27, 2001 and he even
described the clothes Michael was then wearing, which were the same clothes worn by him
when he was abducted. Petitioners then made representations with CIDG for the release of
Michael Martinez or that they be allowed to see him, but the same were not granted.

"In view thereof, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP Director General Leandro
Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG; Senior
Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza of the CIDG
and members of Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the Nida Blanca murder case,
for them to produce before said court the person of Michael Martinez or to justify the
continued detention of his liberty.

"In an Order dated November 29, 2001, the court a quo set the petition for hearing on
December 3, 2001 and directed respondents to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus
should not issue.

"At the hearing on December 3, 2001, respondents submitted a RETURN wherein they
vehemently and categorically denied any participation or involvement in the alleged
abduction or disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and
detained by them or in their custody at any given time. Respondents thus prayed for the
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

"At the hearing conducted by the court a quo, respondents reiterated their claim that
Michael Martinez is not and was never in their custody. On the other hand, petitioners
presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael Martinez inside a room at the
CIDG where he was brought before midnight of November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of
November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts. Verzosa (sic) and Espina were also in said room and
that the latter even boxed Michael in the stomach.

"Finding that respondents denial pale beside Medel's positive assertion that Michael
Martinez is in their custody, the court a quo, in a Decision dated December 10, 2001
directed respondents to produce the body of Michael Martinez before it on December 11,
2001 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. A copy of said decision was received by respondents
on December 10, 2001

"On December 11, 2001, respondents filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the
Decision is contrary to law and the evidence."5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that Medel’s credibility was
highly suspect. The appellate court opined that he had contradicted himself as to material
facts. Further negating his testimony was Superintendent Espina’s positive testimony that
he was at home between midnight of November 19, 2001, and early morning of November
20, 2001.

The CA relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. It held
that, "[a]s aptly pointed out by respondents, ‘the CIDG itself is equally concerned with the
safety of Michael Martinez relative to the final resolution of the Nida Blanca slay. For he is
definitely a vital witness to his case. The PNP-CIDG has no motive whatsoever to abduct
him as it never did.’"6

Hence, this Petition.7

Issue

Petitioner has failed to make a categorical statement of the issues for the Court’s
consideration. She has also failed to state what relief she prays for.

Nonetheless, the Court will resolve the case on the issue of whether the CA erred in
reversing the trial court and dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus.
The Court’s Ruling

The present Petition for Review has no merit.

Sole Issue:

Reversible Error of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner contends that it is the evaluation of the RTC -- not the CA -- that should be
upheld, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to
determine whether they were telling the truth when they testified.

On the other hand, respondents aver that their candor and the veracity of their denial of the
custody or detention of Michael cannot be doubted by the Court. Their argument is even
strengthened in the face of the incredible and contradictory testimony of petitioner’s
witness, Phillip Medel Jr.

Propriety of

Habeas Corpus

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner’s anchor for the present case is the
disappearance of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely
consequential to his disappearance.

Ostensibly, his disappearance has been established. However, the grant of relief in a habeas
corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal
detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."8

Said this Court in another case:

"The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint. It is a remedy intended to
determine whether the person under detention is held under lawful authority."9

If the respondents are neither detaining nor restraining the applicant or the person on
whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be dismissed.
This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective -- to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person:

"The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his
liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the
person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited."10

Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a
person,11 or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the
disappearance of a certain person.

When respondents making the return of the writ state that they have never had custody
over the person who is the subject of the writ, the petition must be dismissed, in the
absence of definite evidence to the contrary. "The return of the writ must be taken on its
face value considering that, unless it is in some way [convincingly] traversed or denied, the
facts stated therein must be taken as true"12 for purposes of the habeas corpus
proceedings.
Forcible Taking and Disappearance

When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged,
the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and
proceedings.

Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with regard to crimes

are first and foremost the duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), not the courts. There are instances when members of the
PNP -- the agency tasked with investigating crimes -- are suspected of being responsible for
the disappearance of a person, who is the subject of habeas corpus proceedings. This fact
will not convert the courts into -- or authorize them through habeas corpus proceedings to
be -- forefront investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners all at the same time.
Much as this Court would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -- as in the
present case, when it is interested in determining who are responsible for the
disappearance and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is being detained) -- it would not
want to step beyond its reach and encroach on the duties of other duly established
agencies. Instead of rendering justice to all,13 it may render injustice if it resorts to
shortcuts through habeas corpus proceedings. In fine, this proceeding for habeas corpus
cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal investigation.

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), specifically the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB),14 is tasked to investigate abuses or wrongdoings by members
of the PNP. Thus, if they or the NBI abuse or fail to perform their duties, as indicated in this
case, people may refer their complaints to the PLEB, which should be part of their arsenal
in the battle to resolve cases in which members of the PNP are suspected of having caused
the disappearance of anyone. Removing criminals from the ranks of those tasked to
promote peace and order and to ensure public safety would be a big axe blow to the mighty
oak of lawlessness. Let each citizen contribute a blow, puny though it may be when done
alone; but collectively we can, slowly but surely, rid our society of disorder and senseless
disappearances.

Going back to the present case, petitioner must establish by competent and convincing
evidence that the missing person, on whose behalf the Petition was filed, is under the
custody of respondents. Unfortunately, her evidence is insufficient to convince the Court
that they have Michael in their custody. Moreover, "a writ of habeas corpus should not
issue where it is not necessary to afford the petitioner relief or where it would be
ineffective."15

Considering that respondents have persistently denied having Michael in their custody, and
absent any decisive proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to affirm the CA’s
dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus.

In view of the established fact of Michael’s suspiciously felonious disappearance, we exhort

the NBI and the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) to continue their
investigation into the matter, so that all persons responsible can be prosecuted for
whatever crime they have committed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights and the
Department of Interior and Local Government for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.

ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions
and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their
habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during
the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they
were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures
online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily
identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia
and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there
were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not
confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook
page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified
students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student
Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high
school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including
Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr.
Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan
(Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC,
et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the
fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same
day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend
the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement
exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained
unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have
known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not
the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of
the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion
of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b)
respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies
of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be
rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored,
reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s
right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July
5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within
five (5) working days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written
return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners
are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum
shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d)
there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded
on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section
19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould
be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the
pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a
habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this
requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it
facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans
the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which
are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for
the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be
filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay
also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being
an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point,
is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual
or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage"

means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the
case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals
to control information about themselves.23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions,
there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should
be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies
that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to
remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African
High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January30,
2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x
It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously
and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as
the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time,
the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which
would have otherwise remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the
sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by
the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or
"walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her
bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and
videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the
other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has
paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved
in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the
world, and to share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they
can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or
her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the
latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High
Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so
with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its
users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on
one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information.
Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can
view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable

expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the
case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have
a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the
OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in
cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access
to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right
which necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would
be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom
list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or
information within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did
the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that
the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated,
insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies
ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’
privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s
disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore,
according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable
by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are
senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then
said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls.
At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been
times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason:
failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their
allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to
corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is,
the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the
following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools
to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook
friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial
audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100
friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result,
the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity
towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it
encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have
facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51
Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only"
cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’
argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to
Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons
who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of
the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act
of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the
photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that
they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means
that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best
means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one
has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many
OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be
mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already
deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their
respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to
every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity
of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are
wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace,
the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a
good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is
believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that,
in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they
engage incyberspace activities.1â wphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by
entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and
inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the
ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may
or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings
and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the
vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take
utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights,
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July
27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice

AT T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice