A.
WHEN LAW TAKES EFFECT that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
Tañada v. Tuvera
GR No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446)
April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24,
1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring
in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification
of that decision. Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.
In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply
refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the
new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for
the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to
be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and
supported by eight members of this Court.
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
2. Whether there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not.
3. Whether publication means complete publication.
4. Whether the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
HELD:
1. No.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided.”
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons
they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
2. Yes.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. [[1]]
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule
but by the Local Government Code.
3. Yes.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. One reserved his vote and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it
should be made. It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive
at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
4. Yes.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to
give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Fuentes v. Roca
GR No. 178902
April 21, 2010
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza sold a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City, on October 11,
1982 she to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years
later, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners the Fuentes spouses. They later signed an
agreement to sell dated April 29, 1988 which required Tarciano to secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario Roca, to the sale within six months. According to the lawyer, he went
to see Rosario in Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.  Tarciano executed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away,
followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
 
Eight years later in 1997, the respondents, the Rocas filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC of Zamboanga City
claiming that the sale to the spouses was void since Rosario, did not give her consent to
it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses
paid Tarciano.
 The RTC dismissed the case because the action grounded on forgery or fraud had already
prescribed.  Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was
issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989. Also, the RTC noted that the law does not
require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid.  
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in
1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under
which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be
brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently,
the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11,
1989 sale.
 
The CA held that the sale was voidable, its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement
of what they paid him plus legal interest and the value of their improvements.
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for
review.
ISSUE:
Whether the Family Code applies in the sale of the conjugal property by Tarciano.
HELD: Yes.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family
Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold
the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 [17] prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without
his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right
to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the
sale.Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the
value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code
on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.[18] Further, the Family Code provisions
were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights.[19]
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11,
1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real
property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void. 
Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation
GR. No. 179579
February 1, 2012
DOCTRINE: Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and publication under the
Revised Administrative Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.
FACTS:
On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes,
classifies wheat according to the (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port
of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat would then be classified either as food
grade or feed grade with a corresponding tariff of 3% and 7% respectively.
On December 19, 2003, the respondent, a wheat importer, filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the RTC of Las Pinas contending that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following
the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and
publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty
(20) days from notice. Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that, among
others, was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature.
On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to follow the basic
requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of the CMO.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003. CA
dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners
and other importers and that the petitioners should have observed the requirements of
notice, hearing and publication.

ISSUE:
Whether CMO 27-2003 is valid.
HELD: No.
Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an
importer of wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent
provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the
CMO.
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of
persons. Section
Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall,
as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the
rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Acaac v. Azcuna
GR No. 187378
September 30, 2013
FACTS:
PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in the protection
and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental.PETAL built some cottages on Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and
became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,among whom are petitioners Hector
Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal
building activities on Capayas Island. On July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez
adopted a Municipal Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;and (b) the construction of
any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local
government.
On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint
hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including
Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and
egress thereto.
A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island.
Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and damagesagainst
respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds : (a)
it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by the Local Government Code (LGC); and (c) it
was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are
not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and
property belonging to the public domain.
The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.
On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the
SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section
56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject
ordinance is valid.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners
HELD: Yes.
Though the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of
time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on fisheries and aquatic
resources of the SP, 30 days have already elapsed form the time the said ordinance was
submitted for review by the SB. If no action has been taken by the SP within 30 days after
submission of such ordinance, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and valid.
Assumption that officials have done which the law requires them to do.
A public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Acaac,
has the burden of proof, failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment.
Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan
for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local
development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local
development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents,
inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in
making its decision
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is
beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in
part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall
advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30)
days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
B. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
Kasilag v. Rodriguez
GR No. 46623
7 December 1939
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner (Kasilag) from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court
held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-
respondents (Rodriguez, et.al.), then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its
improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are
entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of
the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien.
The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract
of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land,
the land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the
contract of mortgage.
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands Petitioner,
acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no knowledge that
the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith?
HELD: Yes.
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already
passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final
judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the
possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but unfortunately, private
documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, while no
one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and
apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable
ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different this
is possible and excusable errors arising from complex legal principles and from the
interpretation of conflicting doctrines
Even ignorance of the law may be based upon error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact
is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,
compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and error of law is
possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with
the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding
the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits,
he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as lien, was prohibited by
section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner,
his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may therefore, be the basis of
good faith.We do not give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which
consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may
only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by
the petitioner, to about which we have stated that the petitioner’s ignorance of the law is
possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking
possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
Elegado v. Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. L-68385
May 12, 1989
DOCTRINE: CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
EXCUSES NO ONE FROM COMPLIANCE THEREWITH; APPLICABLE WITH EQUAL FORCE AND
EFFECT ON TAX CASES; CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues
that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on
which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner
suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their ignorance? If
our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not
allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than
that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
FACTS:
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national, formerly residentof the
Philippines, died in Oregon, USA. As certain shares of stock are left inthe Philippines, his son
Ward Graham filed an estate tax return. [Meanwhile, W.Graham designated executor,
appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-in-factfor the allowance of the will in the
Philippines.]On the basis of such return, the respondent Commission of Internal Revenue
assessed the descendants estate in the amount of P96,509.35. The assessment was
protested by the law firm of Bump, Yang, and Walker on behalf of the estates which
wasdenied by the Commissioner.Elegado as an ancillary administrator filed a second estate
tax return. The Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in the amount of
P72,948.87 based on the SEC return, which was protested by the Agrava Law Office on behalf
of theestate. While the protest was pending, the petitioner filed a motion for the allowance
of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35. He said that this liability had not yet been paid although
the assessment had long become final and executory. Petitioner was denied contending that
the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return filed for by
lawyers.
ISSUE:
Whether the first assessment is binding being filed for by lawyers.
HELD: Yes.
The Supreme Court held that Elegados contention is flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious
when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed
the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the
petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their
ignorance?
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not
allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than
that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
C. RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS
David v. Agbay
GR. No. 199113
March 18, 2015
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having
no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen
by naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and
purchased a lot where they constructed a residential house. However, they came to know
that the portion where they built their house is a public land and part of the salvage zone. In
April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land
wherein he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed
the application and she also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
(Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship in October 2007.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in court.
David filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was
denied. Meanwhile, CENRO rejected David’s MLA, ruling that the latter’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA. Thereafter, an
information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial Court
and a warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter then filed an Urgent Motion
for ReDetermination of Probable Cause, which was denied. David’s petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether David may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
HELD: Yes.
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,”
was signed into law by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and
3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
 Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath (Emphasis supplied).
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is
qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The
taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens
who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “reacquired”
for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
“Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the
terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is
not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign
citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section
3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new
law’s effectivity.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC
refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements
of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of
his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen
loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofaras his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did
not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article172,
paragraph 1.
Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Elvin Chan and Court of Appeals
GR No. 157547
February 23, 2011
FACTS:
In 11 July 1997 the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22.
Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check with a declared
amount of P336,000. The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund the check
he issued, contrary to the information he had given to the respondent. Despite notice
insufficiency of his account s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the value of
the check within 5 days after receiving the notice.
Three years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC in Pasay City a Civil
Action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00.
On 17 August 2000, Simon filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to change
plaintiff s attachment bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia as a consequence of
the pendency of another action between parties for the same cause.
The plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any
allegation as to the exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, constituting an implied
right to initiate civil action. The Plaintiff also cited Rule 11 1 Section 2, exception to file
separate civil action during the pendency of a criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and
2177 of the CCP. The case falls under Art. 33 of the CCP.
On 23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted Simon s urgent Motion to Dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff s attachment bond for damages. On 31 July 2 001, the RTC of
Pasay City upheld MCTC s dismissal of Chan s initiated Civil Case.
Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the following issue; Whether or not the
RTC erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.
The CA over turned the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the CA
recognized that civil case cannot anymore initiated following the filling o f a criminal case, the
following case falls under the exception under Rule 111 Sec. 2. The case remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for
review.
ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court circular pertaining to BP22 can be applied retroactively.
HELD:
The SC set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on Jun e 25, 2002.
Furthermore, the SC reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2 000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically. The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time
of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for
being ex post facto under the Constitution.
The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the cor responding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. The
aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in eff ect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
Any new rules m ay validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of proced
ure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if t hey permit or
require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is requi red at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity wo uld be unconstitutional for being
ex post facto under the Constitution Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be successfully
invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary,
namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same intere st
in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs pr ayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would , regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility
of the existence of the third becomes nil. A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal
Case No. 275381 ineluctably sho ws that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant.
First of all, the par ties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil
Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in
Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon
had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to ca sh, thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as we ll as the facts upon which
the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in al l respects. And, thirdly, any judgment
rendered in one case would necessarily ba r the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would
be recovering twice upon the same claim. It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City
properly dismissed Civil Cas e No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision
dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
Pablo C. Francisco v. Court of Appeals and The Honorable Maximo C. Contreras
GR No. 108747
April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in five (5) separate information instituted by five of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to
12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61,
found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5)
cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to
appear and testify.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction
to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties
imposed.
HELD:
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is
based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but
because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit.
The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave
felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who
are deemed to be less perverse.
Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the
offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a
maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core
criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance
which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in
each case to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension.
The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC
although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted
only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed
on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an
appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review
should be as it is hereby DENIED.
Pesca v. Pesca
G.R. No. 136921
April 17, 2001
DOCTRINE: Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith,
but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis.
FACTS:
The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel
and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize
his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The children also
suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later,
they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She was battered
again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their
marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Santos and Molina have retroactive effect in the case at bar in terms of identifying the
meaning of Psychological Incapacity?
HELD: Yes. Court decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” –
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on
the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by
the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to
assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the
force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature.
The petition was denied
D. MANDATORY OR PROHIBATORY LAWS
Nerwin v. PNOC
GR No. 167057
April 11, 2012
FACTS:
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (“NEA”) published an invitation to pre-
qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery
of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces
of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project.  
Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent
[Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract.  NEA
then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing
plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to
supply and deliver NEA’s requirements.
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin
filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin
Industries Corporation   v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as
Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an
attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and
praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint
averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were
not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum
shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action
for certiorari  (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had
been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express
prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation
of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and
in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing them.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the
Supreme Court, on government projects.
HELD:
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier
underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of,
and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have
such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
E. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Consunji v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137872
20 April 2001
FACTS:
On November 2, 1990, around 1:30PM Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji
Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal
Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead
on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and DelsoDestajo, performing their work as
carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were
on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or
looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report
dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for
damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from
DMConsunji amounting to P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for
itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish
any defense relating to the incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be
filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims
under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s
Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the
remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar
came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence
when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant
been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already
had.
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz
GR No. 19565
January 30, 1968

FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in
various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of
their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had
always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since
1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella.
The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and
dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE:
Whether separation of husband from his wife constitutes abandonment in law that would
justify the separation of conjugal partnership property.
HELD: No.
There was only mere physical separation and not real abandonment. Abandonment
contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement, moral and FINANCIAL desertion.
Based on how abandonment was used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to
constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties
and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis
is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to resume or
claim one’s rights or interests.
Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention to leave his family permanently since he
continued to give support despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to return
and resume his marital duties and rights. There was evidence that he supported the family
and that the family was not living in want.
Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect the CP except if the husband
abandons his wife without just cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of concubinage on
part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of abandonment which
shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets. There is no strong
corroborated evidence that demonstrates the existence of illicit relations between Nenita
and Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he actually increased the value
of their assets by over a million pesos
Dona Adela Export International Inc. v. Tidcorp & BPI
G.R. No. 201931
February 11, 2015
DOCTRINE:
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties
to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.
The rule is based on Article 1311 of the Civil Code, which provides that "contracts take effect
only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.
FACTS:
Petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. The
case was docketed and raffled off to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211. The RTC, after
finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an order declaring petitioner as
insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner.
Thereafter, Atty. Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales
proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to
submit proof of their respective claims. Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into
Compromise Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise.
Petitioner through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center (TRC)
entered into a Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to
transfer a parcel of land with existing improvements situated in the Barrio of Hulo,
Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement
bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance,
Manifestation and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement.
The creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement which
contained some terms and conditions for their benefit. The RTC rendered the assailed
Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s
agreement imposes on it several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and
waiver of confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said
agreement.
In its Order, the RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s silence and acquiescence
to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while creditors BPI and TIDCORP set it
for hearing was tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank
deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000?
HELD: No.
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil
case is final, unappealable, and immediately executory.
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake,
or duress, he must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise
agreement to reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the
said grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of judgment. In this case,
petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based on compromise agreement
assailing the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its two creditors,
TIDCORP and BPI, in which petitioner was not a party.
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only.
There was no written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr.,
that petitioner was waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the
waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the
agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was
without the express consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the said
agreement.
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its
objection during the proceedings. It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must
be positively demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The
norm is that a waiver must not only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly,
intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to relinquish
the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right should not be construed as
surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the
existence and validity of such waiver.
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its
property, assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or
assignee. Thus, in the order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was
directed to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies,
estate and effects with all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto, pursuant to Section
32 of the Insolvency Law. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the
estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. Corollary, the stipulation in
the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement that petitioner waives its right to
confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as
receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects of petitioner have been assigned
and conveyed to her and she has the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims
belonging to or due to the insolvent debtor.
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement, she did not sign or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted
by TIDCORP and BPI. In her Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) there is
no showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of confidentiality of
petitioner’s bank deposits.
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and
conformity of the receiver. The court held that the petitioner was not bound by the said
provision.
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties
to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.
The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code, which provides that contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. The sound reason for the exclusion of
non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie, which is the
efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation.
Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is
binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties
who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its
submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on
the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot
bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.
Aujero v. Philcomsat
G.R. No. 193484
January 18, 2012
DOCTRINE: Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present, the quitclaim
executed by a party constitutes a valid and binding agreement.
FACTS:
Petitioner Hypte Aujero was the Vice President of respondent company Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat). After 34 years, he applied for an early
retirement which was approved. This entitled Aujero to receive his retirement benefits at a
rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. Aujero
subsequently executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor following his
receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91. After 3 years, Aujero filed
a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits claiming that the actual amount of his retirement
pay is P14,015,055.00. Aujero contends that the significantly deficient amount he previously
received was more than an enough reason to declare his quitclaim null and void. Aujero
further claimed that he had no choice but to accept the lesser amount as he was in dire need
of money.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Aujero and directed Philcomsat to pay the balance of
his retirement pay. The LA maintained that Philcomsat failed to substantiate its claim that the
amount received by Aujero was a product of negotiations between the parties. On appeal,
the National
Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) reversed the decision of the LA and decided in favor of
Philcomsat.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby
foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat
continued her carefree ways.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without
notifying her husband and told the servants that she was bringing their daughter to Basilan
Province.

HELD:
Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court in Makati City, but
Petition GRANTED.
was dismissed the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to find the respondent
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are and their daughter. However, he did not find them there. The barangay office issued a
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their certification that the respondent is no longer living there.
legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's
claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Considering Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus in the CA which could issue a
Aujero’s claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, the Court writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. It was denied because of lack of
finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver. jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, RA 8369 (Family Courts Act) impliedly
repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 which granted the CA with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
That Aujero was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would
corpus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. Dire necessity
may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low
and the employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling
the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. While it is
the Court’s duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also behooves this Court to ISSUE:
protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws.
Whether or not RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129
Aujero’s educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was
pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. The Court cannot
permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his
knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that Aujero RULING:
allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his
retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of No.
being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
The CA did not lose its jurisdiction to issue writs of Habeas Corpus involving the custody
G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004 of minors. There is nothing in RA 8369 which revoked it of such jurisdiction. The word
“exclusive” cannot be construed as automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts
over habeas corpus cases involving minors. The jurisdiction of the CA and and the Family
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of Habeas Corpus
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA can issue the
FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, 
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines in cases where the territorial jurisdiction
vs.
for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
The literal interpretation of the word “Exclusive” will result in grave justice.
FACTS:
Furthermore, implied repeals are not favoured. Provisions of RA 8369 reveal no
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in August 28, 1998 in manifest intent that it revoked the CA and SC’s jurisdiction to issue writs of HC relating to
Manila. They have a daughter name Sequeira Delle Francisco Thornton. After 3 years, custody of minors. RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7902 and BP 129.
respondent wanted to return to her old job as a “GRO” in a nightclub, with the freedom to go
out with her friends. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she
G.R. No. 196271               February 28, 2012
 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case assailed the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization, this law postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011,
to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President‘s power to appoint
officers-in-charge to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of
the elected officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054
RULING:
No.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first
ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In
providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly
do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No.
9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM
elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the
subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving
the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the
dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or
provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA
No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No.
9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws
which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the
Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153
without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and
Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is
no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article
XVII of RA No. 9054.
G.R. No. 207942               January 12, 2015
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality
of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and mined by Philippine
Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMIs portion
(known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking
Corporation (MBC) and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro,
or BDO). The Government then opened the area for exploration. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy
Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from 1986 onwards.
In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over
the area, their agreement being duly registered by the Mining Recorder Section of Regional
Office No. V of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997,
Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA)over the area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which was amended in 1999, was granted
on July 28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive
right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.
August 31 2007: Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that
it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale,
stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-Asias
MPSA5. In September 14, 2007 in Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would
commence exploration works in Yinlus areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to
allow its personnel to access the areas for the works to be undertaken. Yinlu replied that
Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration works on its own private property in the
Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents. TransAsia found
out that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlus request to
register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.
DENR Secretary directed MGB Regional Office V to verify the validity of the mining
patents of Yinlu.a. MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that
there was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly,
the parties were required to submit their respective position papers. DENR Sec Atienza
ordered the amendment of Trans-Asias MPSA by excluding therefrom the mineral lands
covered by Yinlus mining patents. DENR Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr in his order found that the
mining patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and indicated in PIMIs
certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents were validly transferred to and
were now owned by Yinlu. He rejected Trans-Asias argument that Yinlus patents had no
effect and were deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant to
Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended.
He refuted Trans-Asias contention that there was a continuing requirement under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent holder to undertake improvements in order to
have the patents subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to
undertake the improvement, observing that the requirement was not an absolute imposition.
He noted that the suspension of PIMIs operation in 1974 due to financial losses and the
foreclosure of its mortgaged properties by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB) constituted force
majeure that justified PIMIs failure in 1974 to comply with the registration requirement
under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was the basis for issuing the
patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals, rendering the minerals covered by the
patents to be segregated from the public domain and be considered private property; and
that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all natural resources, was adopted
only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The Office of the President affirmed the DENR Secs Order. Under the Philippine
Constitution, there is an absolute prohibition against alienation of natural resources. Mining
locations may only be subject to concession or lease. The only exception is where a location
of a mining claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the government under
the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according to the laws existing at that time a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain, and the locator is
entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefore. The right of the locator to the mining patent is a vested right, and the Constitution
recognizes such right as an exception to the prohibition against alienation of natural
resources. The right of the appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject mining patents in
this case, therefore, is superior to the claims of appellant. The existence of the TCTs in the
name of appellee further bolsters the existence of the mining patents. Under PD 1529, also
known as the Property Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all claims or where none
exists, the ownership over the real property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive
and indefeasible even as against the government.
The CA agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held mining patents over
the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents under PD
No. 463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the
patents lapsed and had no more effect.
Yinlu asserts the following:
a. The mining patents of Yinlu were registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 ,
1902), the governing law on the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and
indefeasible
i. Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: allowed citizens of the United States
and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and purchase mineral lands
ii. Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: after the exploration and claim of the
mineral land, the owner of the claim and of the mineral patents was entitled to all
the minerals found in the area subject of the clai
iii. its registered mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not be defeated
by adverse, open and notorious possession and prescription;
b. substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902
subsisted despite the changes of the Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws
i. Constitution could not impair vested rights;
ii. Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair its vested rights under
 its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it;
iii. Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section 100
and Section 101 to vested rights.
ISSUE:
Whether Yinlus mining patents constitute vested rights and could not be disregarded.
HELD: YES
A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the government for the said mining claim.
Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the alienation of
natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited.
The natural resources being referred therein included mineral lands of public domain, but
not mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect no longer formed part of
the public domain. Prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a
mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935.
McDaniel v. Apacible: A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest
sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant
(patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of the lands
located. The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to
the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government itself.
Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated
from the public domain and the property of the locator.
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with
the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is no
provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination thereof.3. Even without a patent, the
possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property
right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the
Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise.
The mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain
when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come
within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the
right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual
work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides that the
provisions of PD No. 463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights under
other mining laws
Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights. Changes
made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with order mining laws
previously in force shall have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions
of this Decree which are procedural in nature shall prevail.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some
particular person or persons as a present interest. It is the privilege to enjoy property legally
vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law or
some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police powerc.
It has been observed that, generally, the term vested right expresses the concept of
present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just an imperative right which an enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
Republic v. Court of Appeals held that mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be
impaired even by the Government. In the present case, the mining patents of Yinlu
were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired
vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired even in
light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work
obligations.
G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner 
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children.
She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves
were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half
an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned
for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to
be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent
and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, an held
that petitioner failed to show proof that respondent was indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that would cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant.
The CA stated that “the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution.”
Petitioner would have the decision of the CA reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos vs. CA, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. CA and Molina
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could
be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the
Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or nor the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. CA and Molina should be
taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
RULING:
No, It should be taken to be merely to be mandatory in nature.
The “Doctrine of stare decisis”, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - “Legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”-
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
“lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal
life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines
to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the
force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature.
The petition was denied.
G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.
FACTS:
The forthcoming retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 (7 days after the
Presidential election) led Congressman Matias V. Defensor (an ex-officio member of the JBC)
to address a letter to the JBC requesting that the process for nominations be commenced
immediately. The JBC in its meeting en banc passed a resolution that they unanimously agree
to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice Reynato Puno. As a result, the
JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation and published its
announcement for that purpose.
Conformably with its existing practice,the JBC “automatically considered” the 5 most
senior of the Associate Justices of the court: Antonio Carpio, Renato Corona, Conchita Carpio
Morales, Presbirito Velasco, Jr., and Eduardo Nachura (the last two declined their
nominations). Other candidates either applied or were nominated.
In its meeting on Feb 8,2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filing of the position of Chief Justice
Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved.
The complied cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next
chief justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the “In Re Appointments” dated March
30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of branch 62, Bago City
and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela
case, by which the court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the
President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Valenzuela case is controlling in this case
RULING:
No.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere,
i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling
the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction,
unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent
authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that
reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those
duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the
decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority
do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.
The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United
Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A
judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the
latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned,
or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is,
therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the
Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
G.R. No. 187451               August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner, 
vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of
unsurveyed land situated in Basilan. His application was approved however years after. The
land was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 as a consequence of a
public land subdivision. Lot 39 was allocated to Custodio, while Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner Virtucio. Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and
Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot nos.
139 and 140.
The RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio that he is in possession of Lot 140. However, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes is in possession of Lot 140. Thus,
Virtucio sought to reverse the ruling of CA on the ground that the CA gravely erred in
disregarding the decision on CA- G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
Custodio vs. Alegarbes, which contains some factual circumstances as in this case and ruled
against Alegarbes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision in Custodio vs. Alegarbes should apply as stare decisis to
the present case.
RULING:
No.
It must be noted the the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to
Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever
benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual
circumstances. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial
precedent. “The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by the lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.”
G.R. No. 199310               February 19, 2014
*REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Remman Enterprises filed an application for judicial confirmation over two parcels of
land in Taguig. LLDA filed its Opposition to the application for registration, asserting that the
lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Republic also
opposed, alleging that Remman failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. applies in this case
RULING:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., Court stated that in addition to
the certification issued by the proper government agency (such as the PENRO or CENRO) that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public
domain as alienable and disposable. Republic v. Tan Properties ruling applies retroactively,
since it merely refers to the proper construction of an already existing law. Having failed to
prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, the respondent’s application for registration should be denied.
 G.R. No. 204039
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner  Cola Products Phils. Inc., the Court explained that the doctrine of stare decisis deems
vs.
SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY UY, Respondents
FACTS:
Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the joint developers of
the Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily
Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills.
PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the buyers, which included
respondents, of units in Kiener Hills to UCPB as PPGI’s partial settlement of its loan with
UCPB.
Respondents filed a complaint before the the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) for sum of money and damages against PPGI and
UCPB. They claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to
complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills.
The HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled to a refund in view of PPGI’
s failure to complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that UCPB cannot
be solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables were conveyed to UCPB
and not the entire condominium project.
UCPB appealed to the CA, in which the latter applied the decisions UCPB v. O’Halloran
which by decided by the CA and not the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the CA erred in applying the O’Halloran case
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court held that Stare Decisis applies only to cases that it decided.
As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 ‘Halloran arguing
that it was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In  De Mesa v. Pepsi-
decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts, to wit:
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
xxxx
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule
already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial
precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is
true regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as
only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions of
lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.
G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
*I don’t know how the case is related to duty to render judgment
FACTS:
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200,
and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.
Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her
vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was
brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the
object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro
inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago.
A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The RTC of Olongapo rendered a
decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art. 4 of the
RPC: “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court
however, reversed the judgment of the lower court acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
RULING:
No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age.
As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also
testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from
that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object
has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3
months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award
to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,  nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided
share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro
Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption of her brother.  Trial court dismissed the complaint,
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New
Civil Code.
RULING:
YES.
Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
[courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to
the law maker’s will.
G.R. No. 165287               September 14, 2011
ARMANDO BARCELLANO, Petitioner, 
vs.
DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact CRISPINO
BERMILLO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Dolores Banas, an heir of bartolome Banas owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay.
Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot
for sale to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando
Barcellano. The heirs of Banas contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem
the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was
also mention that the Banas heirs failed to give the amount required for them to redeem the
lot.
Action to redeem the property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the
ground that the Banas heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period
provided in Art. 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC decision to deny the Banas heirs of their right to legal
redemption is valid.
RULING:
The court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the
Banas heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the
provisions of Art. 1623 NCC. A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor.
Nothing in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties showed that there was a
written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of 30 days
within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist.
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court that where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.  There is
only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where
a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. 
The law is clear in this CASE , there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas.
The Supreme Court found no need to rule on the other issues presented by the
petitioner.  The respondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger
of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no
tender of payment or no consignation.
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite
direction, while their carromata  went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by.    However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied
by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff’s
head.
The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran,
and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing
them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The
court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to
reverse such decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of
horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.
RULING:
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which,
in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
 The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial
rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act
that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent
because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to
deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been
practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the
judgment is therefore reversed.
G.R. No. 182434               March 5, 2010
SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A.
MUSOR,Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia and Ramia A. Musor,
daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Shari’a District Court an action for
quieting of title docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97 against Sultan Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda
Radia.The respondents alleged that, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, they were the
absoluteowners of the lot subject of the complaint; Tomawis assumed ownership of the said
property onthe claim that he purchased the same from Mangoda Radia, who claimed that he
inherited it fromhis late father; in 1996, they were informed that the small houses built on
the said land with their permission were ordered by Tamawis to be removed; they had been
unlawfully deprived of their right on the land, and Tomawis’ actions had cast doubt on their
title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Shari’a District Court can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No.
102-97
RULING:
The allegations as well as the relief sought by the private respondents to eliminate
doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land are within the jurisdiction of the Shari’a
District Court. The said court has, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction over all personal
and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143 (1)(d) which states that all actions from
customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, except those for ejectment.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. Private respondents’ petition in Civil Case
No. 102-97 alleged the concurrent original of the SDC. On the other hand, BP 129 was
enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the
judiciary.The concurrent jurisdiction of SDCs and the RTCs over cases involving only Muslims
is recognized by the Court. The SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions
arisingfrom contracts customary to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception
under PD1083, while both courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal
actions. Art.143 of PD 1083 , which states the jurisdictional conferment, is applicable solely
when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a
non-Muslim.
G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, 
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in August 28, 1998 in
Manila. They have a daughter name Sequeira Delle Francisco Thornton. After 3 years,
respondent wanted to return to her old job as a “GRO” in a nightclub, with the freedom to go
out with her friends. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she
continued her carefree ways.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without
notifying her husband and told the servants that she was bringing their daughter to Basilan
Province.
Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court in Makati City, but
was dismissed the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to find the respondent
and their daughter. However, he did not find them there. The barangay office issued a
certification that the respondent is no longer living there.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus in the CA which could issue a
writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. It was denied because of lack of
jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, RA 8369 (Family Courts Act) impliedly
repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 which granted the CA with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129
RULING:
No.
The CA did not lose its jurisdiction to issue writs of Habeas Corpus involving the custody
of minors. There is nothing in RA 8369 which revoked it of such jurisdiction. The word
“exclusive” cannot be construed as automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts
over habeas corpus cases involving minors. The jurisdiction of the CA and and the Family
Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of Habeas Corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA can issue the
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines in cases where the territorial jurisdiction
for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty.
The literal interpretation of the word “Exclusive” will result in grave justice.
Furthermore, implied repeals are not favoured. Provisions of RA 8369 reveal no
manifest intent that it revoked the CA and SC’s jurisdiction to issue writs of HC relating to
custody of minors. RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7902 and BP 129.
G.R. No. 196271               February 28, 2012
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case assailed the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization, this law postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011,
to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President‘s power to appoint
officers-in-charge to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of
the elected officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054
RULING:
No.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first
ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In
providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly
do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No.
9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM
elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the
subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving
the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the
dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or
provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA
No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No.
9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws
which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the
Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153
without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and
Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is
no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article
XVII of RA No. 9054.
G.R. No. 207942               January 12, 2015
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,  effect and were deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant to
vs.
TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality
of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and mined by Philippine
Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMIs portion
(known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking
Corporation (MBC) and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro,
or BDO). The Government then opened the area for exploration. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy
Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from 1986 onwards.
In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over
the area, their agreement being duly registered by the Mining Recorder Section of Regional
Office No. V of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997,
Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA)over the area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which was amended in 1999, was granted
on July 28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive
right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.
August 31 2007: Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that
it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale,
stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-Asias
MPSA5. In September 14, 2007 in Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would
commence exploration works in Yinlus areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to
allow its personnel to access the areas for the works to be undertaken. Yinlu replied that
Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration works on its own private property in the
Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents. TransAsia found
out that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlus request to
register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.
DENR Secretary directed MGB Regional Office V to verify the validity of the mining
patents of Yinlu.a. MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that
there was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly,
the parties were required to submit their respective position papers. DENR Sec Atienza
ordered the amendment of Trans-Asias MPSA by excluding therefrom the mineral lands
covered by Yinlus mining patents. DENR Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr in his order found that the
mining patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and indicated in PIMIs
certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents were validly transferred to and
were now owned by Yinlu. He rejected Trans-Asias argument that Yinlus patents had no
Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended.
He refuted Trans-Asias contention that there was a continuing requirement under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent holder to undertake improvements in order to
have the patents subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to
undertake the improvement, observing that the requirement was not an absolute imposition.
He noted that the suspension of PIMIs operation in 1974 due to financial losses and the
foreclosure of its mortgaged properties by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB) constituted force
majeure that justified PIMIs failure in 1974 to comply with the registration requirement
under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was the basis for issuing the
patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals, rendering the minerals covered by the
patents to be segregated from the public domain and be considered private property; and
that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all natural resources, was adopted
only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The Office of the President affirmed the DENR Secs Order. Under the Philippine
Constitution, there is an absolute prohibition against alienation of natural resources. Mining
locations may only be subject to concession or lease. The only exception is where a location
of a mining claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the government under
the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according to the laws existing at that time a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain, and the locator is
entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefore. The right of the locator to the mining patent is a vested right, and the Constitution
recognizes such right as an exception to the prohibition against alienation of natural
resources. The right of the appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject mining patents in
this case, therefore, is superior to the claims of appellant. The existence of the TCTs in the
name of appellee further bolsters the existence of the mining patents. Under PD 1529, also
known as the Property Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all claims or where none
exists, the ownership over the real property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive
and indefeasible even as against the government.
The CA agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held mining patents over
the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents under PD
No. 463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the
patents lapsed and had no more effect.
Yinlu asserts the following:
c. The mining patents of Yinlu were registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 ,
1902), the governing law on the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and
indefeasible
iv. Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: allowed citizens of the United States
and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and purchase mineral lands
v. Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: after the exploration and claim of the
mineral land, the owner of the claim and of the mineral patents was entitled to all
the minerals found in the area subject of the clai
vi. its registered mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not be defeated
by adverse, open and notorious possession and prescription;
d. substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902
subsisted despite the changes of the Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws
iii. Constitution could not impair vested rights;
iv. Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair its vested rights under
its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it;
iii. Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section 100
and Section 101 to vested rights.
ISSUE:
Whether Yinlus mining patents constitute vested rights and could not be disregarded.
HELD: YES
A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the government for the said mining claim.
Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the alienation of
natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited.
The natural resources being referred therein included mineral lands of public domain, but
not mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect no longer formed part of
the public domain. Prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a
mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935.
McDaniel v. Apacible: A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest
sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant
(patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of the lands
located. The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to
the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government itself.
Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated
from the public domain and the property of the locator.
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with
the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is no
provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination thereof.3. Even without a patent, the
possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property
right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the
Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise.
The mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain
when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come
within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the
right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual
work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides that the
provisions of PD No. 463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights under
other mining laws
Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights. Changes
made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with order mining laws
previously in force shall have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions
of this Decree which are procedural in nature shall prevail.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some
particular person or persons as a present interest. It is the privilege to enjoy property legally
vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law or
some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police powerc.
It has been observed that, generally, the term vested right expresses the concept of
present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just an imperative right which an enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
Republic v. Court of Appeals held that mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be
impaired even by the Government. In the present case, the mining patents of Yinlu
were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired
vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired even in
light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work
obligations.
G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner  further proceedings and not its dismissal.
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children.
She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves
were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half
an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned
for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to
be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent
and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, an held
that petitioner failed to show proof that respondent was indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that would cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant.
The CA stated that “the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution.”
Petitioner would have the decision of the CA reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos vs. CA, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. CA and Molina
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could
be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the
Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for
ISSUE:
Whether or nor the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. CA and Molina should be
taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
RULING:
No, It should be taken to be merely to be mandatory in nature.
The “Doctrine of stare decisis”, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - “Legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”-
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
“lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal
life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines
to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the
force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature.
The petition was denied.
G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.
FACTS:
The forthcoming retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 (7 days after the
Presidential election) led Congressman Matias V. Defensor (an ex-officio member of the JBC)
to address a letter to the JBC requesting that the process for nominations be commenced
immediately. The JBC in its meeting en banc passed a resolution that they unanimously agree
to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice Reynato Puno. As a result, the
JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation and published its
announcement for that purpose.
Conformably with its existing practice,the JBC “automatically considered” the 5 most
senior of the Associate Justices of the court: Antonio Carpio, Renato Corona, Conchita Carpio
Morales, Presbirito Velasco, Jr., and Eduardo Nachura (the last two declined their
nominations). Other candidates either applied or were nominated.
In its meeting on Feb 8,2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filing of the position of Chief Justice
Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved.
The complied cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next
chief justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the “In Re Appointments” dated March
30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of branch 62, Bago City
and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela
case, by which the court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the
President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Valenzuela case is controlling in this case
RULING:
No.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere,
i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling
the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction,
unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent
authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that
reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those
duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the
decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority
do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.
The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United
Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A
judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the
latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned,
or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is,
therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the
Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
G.R. No. 187451               August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner, 
vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of
unsurveyed land situated in Basilan. His application was approved however years after. The
land was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 as a consequence of a
public land subdivision. Lot 39 was allocated to Custodio, while Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner Virtucio. Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and
Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot nos.
139 and 140.
The RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio that he is in possession of Lot 140. However, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes is in possession of Lot 140. Thus,
Virtucio sought to reverse the ruling of CA on the ground that the CA gravely erred in
disregarding the decision on CA- G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
Custodio vs. Alegarbes, which contains some factual circumstances as in this case and ruled
against Alegarbes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision in Custodio vs. Alegarbes should apply as stare decisis to
the present case.
RULING:
No.
It must be noted the the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to
Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever
benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual
circumstances. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial
precedent. “The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by the lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.”
G.R. No. 199310               February 19, 2014
*REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Remman Enterprises filed an application for judicial confirmation over two parcels of
land in Taguig. LLDA filed its Opposition to the application for registration, asserting that the
lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Republic also
opposed, alleging that Remman failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. applies in this case

RULING:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., Court stated that in addition to
the certification issued by the proper government agency (such as the PENRO or CENRO) that
a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public
domain as alienable and disposable. Republic v. Tan Properties ruling applies retroactively,
since it merely refers to the proper construction of an already existing law. Having failed to
prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, the respondent’s application for registration should be denied.
G.R. No. 204039
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner  decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts, to wit:
vs.
SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY UY, Respondents
FACTS:
Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the joint developers of
the Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily
Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills.
PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the buyers, which included
respondents, of units in Kiener Hills to UCPB as PPGI’s partial settlement of its loan with
UCPB.
Respondents filed a complaint before the the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) for sum of money and damages against PPGI and
UCPB. They claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to
complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills.
The HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled to a refund in view of PPGI’
s failure to complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that UCPB cannot
be solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables were conveyed to UCPB
and not the entire condominium project.
UCPB appealed to the CA, in which the latter applied the decisions UCPB v. O’Halloran
which by decided by the CA and not the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the CA erred in applying the O’Halloran case
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court held that Stare Decisis applies only to cases that it decided.
As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 ‘Halloran arguing
that it was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In  De Mesa v. Pepsi-
Cola Products Phils. Inc., the Court explained that the doctrine of stare decisis deems
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
xxxx
 It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule
already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
 
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial
precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is
true regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as
only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions of
lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.
G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
*I don’t know how the case is related to duty to render judgment
FACTS:
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200,
and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.
Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her
vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was
brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the
object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro
inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago.
A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The RTC of Olongapo rendered a
decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art. 4 of the
RPC: “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court
however, reversed the judgment of the lower court acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
RULING:
No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age.
As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also
testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from
that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object
has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3
months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award
to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided
share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro
Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption of her brother.  Trial court dismissed the complaint,
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New
Civil Code.
RULING:
YES.
Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,
[courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to
the law maker’s will.
G.R. No. 165287               September 14, 2011
ARMANDO BARCELLANO, Petitioner,  The Supreme Court found no need to rule on the other issues presented by the
vs.
DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact CRISPINO
BERMILLO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Dolores Banas, an heir of bartolome Banas owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay.
Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot
for sale to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando
Barcellano. The heirs of Banas contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem
the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was
also mention that the Banas heirs failed to give the amount required for them to redeem the
lot.
Action to redeem the property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the
ground that the Banas heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period
provided in Art. 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC decision to deny the Banas heirs of their right to legal
redemption is valid.
RULING:
The court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the
Banas heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the
provisions of Art. 1623 NCC. A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor.
Nothing in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties showed that there was a
written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of 30 days
within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist.
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court that where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.  There is
only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where
a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. 
The law is clear in this CASE , there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas.
petitioner.  The respondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger
of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no
tender of payment or no consignation.
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite
direction, while their carromata  went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by.    However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied
by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff’s
head.
The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran,
and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing
them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The
court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to
reverse such decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of
horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.
RULING:
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which,
in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial
rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act
that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent
because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to
deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been
practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the
judgment is therefore reversed.
G.R. No. 182434               March 5, 2010
SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A.
MUSOR,Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia and Ramia A. Musor,
daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Shari’a District Court an action for
quieting of title docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97 against Sultan Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda
Radia.The respondents alleged that, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, they were the
absoluteowners of the lot subject of the complaint; Tomawis assumed ownership of the said
property onthe claim that he purchased the same from Mangoda Radia, who claimed that he
inherited it fromhis late father; in 1996, they were informed that the small houses built on
the said land with their permission were ordered by Tamawis to be removed; they had been
unlawfully deprived of their right on the land, and Tomawis’ actions had cast doubt on their
title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Shari’a District Court can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No.
102-97
RULING:
The allegations as well as the relief sought by the private respondents to eliminate
doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land are within the jurisdiction of the Shari’a
District Court. The said court has, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction over all personal
and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143 (1)(d) which states that all actions from
customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, except those for ejectment.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. Private respondents’ petition in Civil Case
No. 102-97 alleged the concurrent original of the SDC. On the other hand, BP 129 was
enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the
judiciary.The concurrent jurisdiction of SDCs and the RTCs over cases involving only Muslims
is recognized by the Court. The SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions
arisingfrom contracts customary to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception
under PD1083, while both courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal
actions. Art.143 of PD 1083 , which states the jurisdictional conferment, is applicable solely
when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a
non-Muslim.
G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a
civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since
then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab
initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD
1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
“marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
The petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 193902               June 1, 2011
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON
R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS: 
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed
again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution
of their marriage was confirmedytheShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of
Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at
the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte.
Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC,
Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between
her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum
escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and
Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in
the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal
and disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold
Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against
Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a
decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were
such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?
HELD: 
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and
recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos'
divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage
are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges
on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and
the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have supended the proceedings until Pacasum had
litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court
and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq
entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural Communities x xx, [and] the State shall consider their
customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its
policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction
over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an
Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
GRANTED
G.R. No. 188832               April 23, 2014
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner, vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and
ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father HadjiKalam T. Mala, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his
bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore,
Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default.
Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff  P2.000 as actual damages
P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby
rendered judgment hence this appeal.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
 
HELD:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of
it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and
unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil
Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary
damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly  acted in wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.
G.R. No. L-18630      December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
ApolonioTanjancocourted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she consented to
his pleas for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition,
she had to resign from her work. Because she was unable to support herself and the baby,
and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral
and exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
WON the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.
HELD:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to
marry. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1
whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.Plainly here there is voluntariness and
mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces for a year.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
FACTS:
Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of good moral character and
reputation, duly respected in her community filed a complaint on October 27, 1987, against
GashemShookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen, and an exchange student taking up a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.  The complaint for damages is
due to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.
Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou and proposed to marry her.  She
accepted his love on the condition that they will get married.   They agreed to get married at
the end of the semester, which was October of that year.  They also visited Marilou’s parents
in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.
Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live with him in Guilig, Dagupan City.  It
should be noted that she was a virgin before she lived with him and not a woman of loose
morals.  A few weeks after she begun living with him, Gashem started to maltreat her, which
result to injuries.  A confrontation with the barangay captain of Guilig ensued and Gashem
repudiated their marriage agreement and said that he is already married to a girl in Bacolod
City.
On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article 21 of the New Civil Code in its decision
favoring Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to pay PhP 20,000 moral damges, PhP
3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP 2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.
Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court seeking for the review of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court in Pangasinan and to set aside the said decision which was also
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 
HELD:
The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, the Court rules that no foreigner should make a mockery of our laws.  It was
evident from the facts presented to the Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to marry
Marilou Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”
In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by good faith and honest motive
when he proposed his love and promised to marry Marilou Gonzales.  He was merely
motivated by lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied
the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.”
The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Aticle 21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the breach of promise to marry, but due the
fraud and deceit employed by herein petitioner that wilfully caused injury to the honor and
reputation of the herein private respondent, which committed contrary to the morals, good
customs or public policy.
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations.  Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and
intimidation and without her consent.  As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.  Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.  The complaint was dismissed by
the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action.   Plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby
girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint
averred no cause of action”. 
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held  that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”.  The conceive child may also receive donations
and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born
as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights.  Thus,
she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against
appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring
to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio
Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by
Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in
consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the
abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the
third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of
course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of
the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case,
the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must
be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased child.
G.R. No. L-39110             November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned
by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.  Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years
of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his
haircut in the said barber shop.  He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship.   As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17,
1931. 
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.  On February
1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his
name to be given to the child.  Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote
letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake.    The defendant
ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph
Hospital in Manila. 
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila
where they lived together for about a year.  When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this
time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge
of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of
Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES: 
1.  Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant
to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2.  Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the
said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other
letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia.  The mere
requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.    could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.
 “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to
Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing
in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring
the defendant to recognize the second baby, PacitaLoanco.  Finally, SC found no necessity to
modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the
amount of P50 pesos per month.  They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who
has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.
G.R. No. 182836               October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.HON. ACCREDITED
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA.
The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature
delivery while she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the
labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate
death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate
dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s case. They further contend that the only one
with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to
petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the
right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner
appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
HELD:
No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced.  Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.   legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil
personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is
not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before s/he
ISSUE:
W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
HELD:
Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached
38-39 weeks without depending upon its mother.
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, Petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, Respondent.
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to
the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and
one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the
said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that
Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is
a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had
lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the
certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and
the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets
left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations
which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the
deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons,
is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such
unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial
administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which
survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a
part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the
commission.
nullity.  Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person as far as Oria was concerned.  He had no more civil personality and his juridical
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria
does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorney’s fees against the corporation.     
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case
No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of
Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976 (b) Death NCC 42

DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee. Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
FACTS: determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the Case no. 1 | TOMAS EUGENIO, SR.,  petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, et.
sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became
Al.,  respondents G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.   Defendants failed to
pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold
by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under
the bond.  Facts: Vitaliana is the common life of the petitioner and the full blood sistrer of the private
respondents. Sometime in 08/28/1988, Vitaliana died, leaving her brothers and sisters
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960.  Quality Plastics was not
aware on Oria’s death.  The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June unaware of her death. V was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own confined by petitioner in his palace located at Jasaan, Misamis Orienta. It was also alleged
behalf and his co-defendants.  that despite her desire to escape. Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any
legal authority. At the time, vitaliana was 25 years old at that time and was living with
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in petitioner Tomas Eugenio
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873).  Dionisio
also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.

ISSUE:
Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of
lack in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already
dead prior case T-662 was filed.  The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that indeed
Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria
as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming the lack of
jurisdiction of the curt over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to
sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner
argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were
granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of
Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition),
private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.
Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of
kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.
An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for
resolution on 21 October 1988.
RTC Decision: The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already
dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by
respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case
because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the
determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana
Vargas as welt of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and
Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the
allegations in the original petition as well as in the two amended petitions
show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she
were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that
this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an
action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the
petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this
court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this
court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . .  10
~01/23/1989 –a new petition was petition for review with application for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470) ~
Petitoner filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction
of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule
72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not
applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
of a live person.
ISSUE: W/on the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers
and sisters or her common law spouse.
Ruling:  Herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22
,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted
however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not
common-law spouses)." While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that
such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
The Penal Code article, Art. 332, it said that it makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife
de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana
was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her
in her lifetime.
The custody of Vitaliana’s dead by was correctly awarded to the private respondents.
Sec.1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
 Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability
for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow
specified:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left
any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the
deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession
of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

Under 332, Art 332 of the RPC,

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal
Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23
But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to
a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
Case no. 2 Marcos et. al. v. Hon. Manglapus et.al G.R. No. 88211 09/15/1989
Facts: A petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the courts to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of the family and to
enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before
the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there
must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family to return to thte Philippines is guaranteed
The universal declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country. Issue w/on the president may prohibit the Marcoses
from returnin to the Philippines
Issue: WON the President has the right to impair the Marcoses’ right to return to the
Philippines
Ruling: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country,
a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated,
Service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to
guide governmental action.
The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the
exercise of he even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in
absolute terms, admits the limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally
important public interests.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning
has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution
proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the
President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for
true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." The
Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to
come home to die in his country.
that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty
of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of
which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a
plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a
foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We
cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is
totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of
resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously
and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic
collapse.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Case no. 3 | Valino v. Adriano, et al. G.R. No. 182894 04/22/2014
FACTS: Atty. Adriano, who married Rosario Adriano, on Nov. 15, 1955. They had 5 children
during their marriage and one adopted daughter, al. The couple’s marriage turned sour and
eventually separated-in-fact.
Years later after the separation, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, herein petitioner, who was
once of his clients. Eventually, they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite
such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children
(respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. During his death, the respondents were
spending Christmas in the United States. None of the family members were present, hence
petitioner took upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano.
When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she called petitioner and requested
that she delay the interment for a few days. Petitioner ignored her request. The remains of
her husband was interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial
Park. Respondents were not able to attend the burial.
With this, respondents commenced suit against petitioner for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains be exhumed and transferred to the family
plot.
In her defense, Valino countered that Atty. Adriano and Rosario had been separated for more
than 20 years. She claimed that throughout their time together, he had introduced her to his
friends and associates as his wife. Petitoner also admitted that he never forgot his obligation
to the respondents. She contended that unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano
and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. In addition, despite knowing
that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario left for the United States. According to
petitioner, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum. She further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit bought
by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and
atty’s fees.
RTC Ruling: complaint filed by respondents were dismissed for lack of merit, together with
the counterclaim filed by Valino as it found to be insufficiently proven.
RTC opined that b/c petitioner lived with AA for a very long time, she knew very well that it
was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. The trial concluded that Rosario did
not show love and care for him, taking into consideration that Rosario left for the US at the
same time he was fighting his illness. Given that petitioner performed all duties and
responsibilities of a wife, the RTC reasonably presumed that the wished to be buried in the
Valino family mausoleum.
RTC also noted that the exhumation and transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano would not
serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected.
CA Ruling: reversed and set aside RTC Decision
It directed Valino to have the remains of AA exhumed at the expense of the respondents. It
likewise directed respondents, at their expense to transfer, at their expense, the remains of
the decedent in the family plot.
Explanation: Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her
deceased husband. Under Art. 305 of the NCC in re to Art. 199 of the Family Code, the law
gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of her husband. Rosario was entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting
marriage with AA at the time of the latter’s death, regardless of being separated for 30 years.
However, all types damages were not rewarded due to the good intentions shown by Valino
in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were in the US.
ISSUE: WON who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of AA
RULING: Rosario, being the lawfully wedded wife of AA. Art. 305 of the OCC, also known as
Art. 199 of the FC, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased.
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of
a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support,
under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants,
the paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Art. 308 of the CC:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and
305. [Emphases supplied];
Moreover:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate
duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate
liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein
below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial
shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient
means to pay the necessary expenses;
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions
but not in the Philippines.
Authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. We hold
that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was
not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right
and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her
husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the
same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her
legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed
to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative
of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as
to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s
keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even
bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino
family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of
the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of
the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the
family.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
~generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be
established by some form of testamentary disposition. (Dr. Tolentino~)
As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It
cannot be inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last
remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that
Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented
to corroborate it.
~The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to
law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the
disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the
place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.11  [Emphases supplied] (Dr. Tolentino)
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305
of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those
charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of
their loved-one.
NCC 43
Art. 43 The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination
shall be considered legitimate, and their custody and support in case of
dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the done
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said done are
revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policty, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj) – (kk) (1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence)
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the
same calamity, such as wreck, battle, conflagration, and it is not shown
who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it
can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, accd’g to the following
rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have
survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have
survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to
have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the
male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages,
 the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are
called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
(5a)
Case No. 4 | Joaquin V. Navarro G.R. No. L-5426 05/29/1953
FACTS: This is a matter of question related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., his wife, and their children. All of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by
Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of these
persons to have accrued in order: 1 st the Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad; 2nd Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4 th Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. The CA concurred with the trial court except that, with re with regard to Angela Joaquin
de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the
petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of
succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural
child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C.
Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who
miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as
between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the
survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied.
CA reasoning: Angela was survived by her son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later, the father
Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
Total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether
she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. 2 nd in declaring that those
fallen in the same battle are to be disregarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not
overlooked that a variety of cause of death can operate in the source of combats. No
evidence is available on the point. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the
presumption of survivorship cwould be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like
these. Hence, the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his
mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec
(ii) ROC.
It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is
total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
ISSUE: WON Angela died first before Joaquin Navarro, Jr or the other way around; or both
died the same time
RULING: Neither of the 2 provisions is applicable for the following reasons:
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or
conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2)
particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is
presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of
the sexes, according to the following rules:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or
more persons who would inherent one from the other, the persons who
alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence
of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no
transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing
decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a
rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
It must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German
Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or
less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building.
The presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The
opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts
which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail.
This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which
was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that
of her son.
3. Presumption of Capacity
Case No. 5 | Catalan v. Basa et al., G.R. NO. 159567 07/31/2007
FACTS: Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active service due to being unfit to render
military service because of “schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him
because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce (sic) and pointless speech.”
A year later, he married Corazon Cerezo (one of the respondents).
06/16/1951 – Feliciano allegedly donated a parcel of land to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN
(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described. Consequently, it was registered with the
RD. BIR then cancelled the TD No. 2876, and issued TD No. 18080 to Mercedes for the land
that was donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Feliciano’s name
under TD No. 18081.
12/11/1953 – People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings before the CFI to
declare Feliciano incompetent. 12/22/1953 the RTC issued its Order of Adjudication of
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. The
next day, the RTC appointed PBTC as Feliciano’s guardian. (PBTC is presently known as Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
03/26/1979 – Mercedes sold the property in issue and in favor of her children Delia and
Jesus Basa. The deed of absolute sale was registered with RD of Pangasinan on 02/20/1992
and TD No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents
04/01/1997 – BPI, as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, as Feliciano
never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had
truly intended to give the property to her would still be void, as he was not of sound mind
and therefore was incapable of giving consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute
Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa
should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone.
BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long
after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for
incurred damages and litigation expenses.
08/14/1997 – Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute the
heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
RTC Ruling -- the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of
donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity
or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the
donation in question must be upheld.
CA Ruling – Affirmed RTC decision
Nothing of the infirmities which allegedl flawed its authenticity is evident much less apparent
in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that
the DAS was registered only in 1992, after the death of Catalan does not make the sale void
ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution.
In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant
ISSUE: WON RTC and CA committed an error in holding that the petitioners failed to prove
the insanity or mental incapacity of the late Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when
the property in dispute was donated.
RULING: Petition is bereft of merit, RTC and CA findings are hereby affirmed.
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at
the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental
faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time
and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.30
Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.31 mother, worth P400 which was then divided by 2 plaintiffs and their 2 sisters,
Concepcion an Paz, notwithstanding the assessed value at P3,795
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he  The part belonging to the 2 plaintiffs can produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum,
donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum
entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of  Luis had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death
donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained  Counsel asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null
competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis
other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs
the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
shown.32 deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof,
uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property the costs of the suit.
to whomever she chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim
The defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying said
that Mercedes’ sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is
allegations. He alleged that the subject-matter of the complaint had an area of only 21
of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What
cavanes of seed rice,
is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the
time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
 On 05/25/1894, its owner, the deceased Magarita Espiritu, with due authorization
of her husband Wenceslao, sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of
In view thereof, petition is denied, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners. said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required fifteen cavanes of seed;
 On 05/14/1901, Wenceslao, Margarita’s husband, in his capacity as administrator
(4) Restrictions on Capacity to Act of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis at the
NCC 38 – 39, cf. NCC 1327 price of P375 the remainder of the said land to meet the expenses of the
(a) Minority maintenance of his (Wenceslao’s) children, and this amount being still insufficient,
1. Age of majority, RA 6809, FC 234, 236, 221, 225 he successively borrowed from said Luis other sums of money aggregating to P600
2. AM No. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship  On 05/17/1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be legal of age, executed with
3. Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution [cf. Sangguniang Kabataan] their sisters Maria Del Consejo and Maria Dela Paz, ratifying said sale under pacto
4. Marriage, FC 5; 14, 45 (1); 35 (1); cf. RA 6809; FC 79 de retro to being sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis, in consideration of
5. Contracts P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they
i. NCC 1327 NCC 1390 (par 1), 1403 (par. 03) NCC 1397, acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser.
1399 NCC 1489 NCC 1426 – 1427  In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the
plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the
Case No. 6 | Mercado v. Espiritu GR NO. L-11872 12/01/1917
sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He
therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep
FACTS: Plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed
perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said
Mercado, are children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of Luis Espiritu (as Luis
intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be
died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in
charged against them.
his capacity being the administrator of the estate of the deceased).
CFI Ruling: plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a new
 Margarita died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48
trial. The motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill
hectares which hereditary portion had since then held by the plaintiffs and their
of exceptions having been presented, and the same was approved and transmitted to the
sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, the husband of Margarita.
clerk of this court.
 About year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, fraudulently succeded in getting the plaintiffs
Dominga and Josefa to sign a deed of absolute sale of the land left by their
ISSUE: WON Luis Espiritu employed fraud in obtaining the signatures of the plaintiffs
RULING: The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the
purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect
the sale mentioned.
There is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and simulated on
account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of
the consent of the vendors who executed it.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its
ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale;
and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May
17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao
Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property;
but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely
acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt
to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in
the deed Exhibit 3.
To judge from the statements made by their father himself, they received through him, the
benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans; the
plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to
that P2, 000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by their father
makes all together the sum of P3, 000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all
the land. Property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as
equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.
Case no. 7 | Bambalan v. Maramba G.R. No. L-27710 01/30/1928
FACTS: Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner of the land in equestion and that
petitioner is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as
regards the said land.
Defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document. The plaintiff
asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made
upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the
former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not decisively
support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being
void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a
minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real
intention to sell the land in question.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.
RULING: As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and
Mercado vs. Espiritu  (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from
contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the
case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to
the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula
used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and
her son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no
amount was given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness
Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by
that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about
half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award
the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
Case no. 8 | Suan and Chiao vs Alcantara G.R. No. L-1720 03/04/1950
FACTS: On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons,
Damaso and Ramon conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was then 17
years, 10 months and 22 days old.
On 08/27/1931 – Gaw Chiao, Husband of plaintiff, received a letter from Francisco Alfonso,
attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon
Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein
Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from
Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores
from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
08/08/1940 – Action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the CFI of Laguna for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land
covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was filed against the
plaintiff spouses, against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, et. al
CFI Ruling: on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in
view of his minority on the date of its execution
CA Ruling: Reversed the decision of RTC; the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara
appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the
ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority
on the date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon
Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his
share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint)
Refused to apply doctrine of Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu, as contended by the
appellants because they did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and
therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that
the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee’s father, Rufino
Alcantara.
ISSUE: WON CA committed an error in reversing the decision made by the RTC
RULING: In favor of the plaintiff souses
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3,
1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It is not
pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such
recital of fact. the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when informed of
appellant's minority, the appellees took no steps for nine years to protect their interest
beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor,
strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was
executed."
In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of
legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract
is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was
admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid
consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that
may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on
any ground other than the appellee's minority.
The consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing obligation. In the second
place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not
necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a
valid consideration.
Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the
real age of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The
suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point,
because the findings of the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants knew or could
suspected appellee's minority.
Case no. 9 Braganza v. Villa-Abrille G.R. No. L-12471 04/13/1959
FACTS: Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo, received from Fernando
F. de Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and
promised in writing to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the Philippine Island two years
after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been
established in the Philippines", plus 2% per annum. Because payment had not been made,
Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949. After hearing the parties and their evidence, the court
rendered judgment in favor of de Villa Abrille.
Braganza, claimed to have received P40,000 only—instead of P70,000 and averred that
Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note, filed a petition to
the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeals' decision whereby they were required
solidarily to pay Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2% interest from October 30, 1944.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodolfo and Guillermo de Braganza are bounded by the promissory
note considering they were minors, with the age of 18 and 16 respectively, when they signed
it.
RULING: Being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo de Braganza could not be legally bound by
their signatures in the promissory note.
The SC did not agree with the Mercado case cited in the decision under review and specified
it is different because the document signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of
age; here the promissory note contained no such statement. The de Braganzas did not
actively present themselves to be of legal age and the notion that they falsely claimed their
age is purely constructive, hence, they cannot be held liable. "The fraud of which an infant
may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full age must be
actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient."
(27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
On the other hand, they may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, even if their written contract is
unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may
have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds
delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese
occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of
the value of such money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 or P46,666.66, they should now
return P1,166.67. Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, cannot be enforced,
as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability is
presently declared without regard of the said promissory note, but solely in pursuance of
Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza
shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.33 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and
Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus
6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed.
6. Criminal Liability
RPC 12 (2) – (3); RPC 3(2); PD 603 Secs. 189 – 2004 Also see: rule 3, section 5 1997
Rule of Civil Procedure Juvenile Justice Law, sec. 6 ug 7
Case no. 10 Atizado and Monreal v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 173822 October 13,
2010
FACTS: Petitioners Atixado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio
Llonaon April 1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder,
where the victim was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. After the shooting,
they fled. For their defense, the petitioners interposed that they were at their family
residence and drinking in. The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder
and sentenced them with reclusion Perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court affirmed the
conviction in 2005.It is important to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at the time of
the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred infinding the petitioners guilty beyond
reasonabledoubt for murder.
What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, aminor during the time of the commission?
RULING: Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended.
The witness positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on
what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against
Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with
treachery. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion Perpetua to
death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty
of reclusion Perpetua on Atizado. But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for
Monreal due to his being a minor over15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did
not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably
because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubted that
Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18,
1994.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and trial records show that Monreal was a
minor at the time of the commission. Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it
conformed to the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344: Section
7. Determination of Age.
- The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the Cpresumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18)
years old or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and
other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law. Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the
time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of
Monreal’s detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41
of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his immediate Release from
the penitentiary. defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.

(b) Insanity, FC 45 (2), NCC 1327 ISSUE: WON these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane,
therefore exempt from criminal liability.
(1), 1328
RULING: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellant’s conduct was
1. Marriage, FC 45 (2), Art. 79 consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the
time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is
2. Contracts, NCC 1327 (1), 1328 insane. The popular meaning of “crazy” is not synonymous with the legal terms “insane”.
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions
3. Criminal Liability of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected
and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.

i. RPC 12 (1) Rule 101, Rules of Court

The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from
any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the
Case no. 11 | United States v. Vaquilar GR No. L-9471 and L-9472 March13, 1914
person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of
proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior
FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was charged with two separate informations with parricide, one for
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of
killing his while the other for killing his daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to
mind.
indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case.
From this judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court together.

The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the
manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these
crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in Case No. 12 | PP vs. POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., G.R. No. L-54135 11/21/1991
his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to
the commission of the crimes. They also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his FACTS: On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years
head and stomach prior to the killing. old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio
Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same. Policarpio was then married and
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified had two children.
that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of
right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back
the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house. Attending to the
he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that
store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the
when the appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other
complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near
night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you
him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said that they should have
doing to me, you are beasts."
intercourse, Ronaya refused. The accused held a bolo and pointed it to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronaya in spite
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found
of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the
that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds
complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he
on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to
would kill her. In the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what
the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail
happened that night.
and that he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration
characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial
court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived.
Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26
June 1978.
On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in
household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and
"oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a
"much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested
that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect
implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped
complainant.
the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened
complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him,
indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral
quality of that assault. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence
which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and
convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual
assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed.
Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians which, however, did not
purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not
specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape.
Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of
people afflicted with schizophrenia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reason of insanity in this case is sufficient to relieve himself of
criminal liability through exempting circumstance.

RULING: NO.

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that the acts without the least discernment; or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that
a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder

characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied
by hallucinations and delusions

In the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the
time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if
Case no. 13 | The Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Juan Codina Arenas and others,
defendant; Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appellant
FACTS:
 Dec. 15, 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino (as principals) w/
Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and (the Chinaman) Siy Ho (as sureties)
assumed obligation to pay – jointly and severally – to the plaintiff-appellee the sum
of Php 3,305.76, three months from this date, with an interest at Php 1 per month.
 •April 5, 1909: Standard Oil sued the five debtors for payment of sum, together w/
the interest thereon at rate of 1 per cent per month from date of assumed
obligation (12/15/08) and the costs; Defendants were summoned, w/ record that
showed summons was served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17.
 May 12: Villanueva and Ho were declared to be in default, notified (14th for latter
and 15th for former).
 Aug. 28: Court of 1st Instance (of the city of Manila) sentenced all defendants to
pay (jointly and severally) to plaintiff company the aforementioned sum, w/
interested thereon at 1 per cent a month from Dec. 15, 1908 until complete
payment of principal + costs.
 While judgment was in course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva (Vicente’s
wife), appeared and alleged the ff:
 July 24, 1909: latter was declared to be insane by Court of 1st Instance (Manila);
a) She was appointed his guardian by same court;
b) Oct. 11: she was authorized by the court as his guardian to institute
the proper legal proceedings in the present cause (issued in behalf
of the plaintiff-appellee co.);
c) She as guardian was not aware of the proceedings had against
Vicente and was only by chance informed of it, and;
d) When Vicente gave the bond, he was already permanently insane
and was in such state when summoned and still continued to do so.
In conclusion, she petitioned court to relieve her husband from compliance, and to reopen
the trial for the introduction of evidence on his behalf, with respect to his capacity at the
time of the bond’s execution.
 Court granted the petition, thus trial was reopened for introduction of evidence (after
due consideration); court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on 12/15/1908,
executed bond in question, he understood perfectly the nature and consequences of the
act performed by him. As a result of such findings, court ruled that the petition for an
indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be denied, and that
said execution be carried out. After filing of an exception to the ruling, a new hearing
was requested “w/reference to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva” and upon its
denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of said appeal, submitted to SC and
based on a single assignment of error:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the
defendant…does not imply incapacity to execute a bond…
ISSUE: Does the claim of defendant’s wife, w/respect to the defendant himself, on being
exempted from court’s orders of paying jointly and severally (with other defendants) the
sum and additional costs, under the basis that he is mentally insane and therefore without
capacity to enter such contracts, stand as valid?
RULING: “All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of medical science
distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility…hence the confusion and the doubt
in the minds of the majority of authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of
sane judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some who consider
as a sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even those
other somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers passional(?)
states which more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty.” (Manresa,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p.342.)
 *In the SC’s knowledge (at the time) of the state of mental alienation such certainty has
not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion – in a judicial decision – that he who
suffers the monomania of wealth…is really insane. In absence of a juridical declaration,
that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when
he executes an onerous contract. The bond executed by Villanueva on 12/15/1908, and
his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until
07/24/09.*
 Civil Code, Art. 1277: In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as was invited to engage in such by Arenas.
in all contract of pure beneficence, than the liberality of the benefactor.
 There is also no proof granting that he was a monomaniac, and that he was dominated
ANALYSIS by that malady upon the bond’s execution. It is a rule of constant application that it is
not enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of
 SC has not found the proof of the error, it would have been necessary to show that such dementia at a given time.
monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient;
that there was not, nor could there have been any other cause for the contract than an
Cordora v. Comelec
ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of wealth, and that the
monomania existed on the date when the bond in question was executed.
 

 Witness testimonies from defendants’ physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don
FACTS: 
Gervasio de Ocampo, the first of whom had visited him some 8 times from 1902-1093,
and the latter only once in 1908; with regards to the defendant’s alleged monomania Dr.
 
Cuervo believes that if defendant were to be presented a document not concerning his
houses, he would be able to understand and comprehend the contents, while on the
topic of sane intelligence, Dr. Ocampo stated that he is of “ordinary intelligence”, with Cordora accused Tambunting of an election offense violating Section 74 in relation to Section
knowledge on how to read and write. 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run
for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency
 Meanwhile, Mr. F.B. Ingersoll (witness for plaintiff) testified that as a notary he had
requirements. To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen,
prepared the bond and received the signers’ statements and that he had explained to
defendant its contents and upon observation found the defendant to be normal and Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
regular with nothing that would “indicate the contrary”, with the defendant being instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16
“quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way…”. In addition, Hon. Judge Araullo December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to
testified as a witness for the plaintiff as well and testified the same as many, in that he
Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship
did not notice any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties. Capacity to
act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved. Court sides with opinion that it has not.  

 Unclear why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of Areneas & Co. in
Francisco Lara and Juan Arenas. In addition, appellant presented a note by the latter
addressed to his “friend”, Mr. Villanueva, on 05/13/09, which was two days before he
was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference “for the purpose of treating
of a matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva…” It cannot be affirmed
with certainty that defendant engaged in the business of giving bonds nor can it be
sustained that there was no other cause for the giving of bond in question than the
mental disorder that dominated defendant’s intellect. There is no proof that the said
bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth nor that he was
influenced only by the monomania of boasting wealth. Here defendant’s wife stresses
that she had no clue that her husband engaged in the selling of bonds, and that with
reference to the one concerned, she had only learned of it by finding to note wherein he
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in
his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born
of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was
naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US
government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a
Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9225.  To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
 
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may

ISSUE:  arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
  and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states

W/N Tambunting is a natural-born Filipino  

  Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
HELD: 
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
 
 
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand,
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.

 
 

In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual
willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
requirements prescribed by law.
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.  
However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate  

of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not
Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec
disqualify him from running for public office.
 
 
FACTS: 
  resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by evidence.

Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,  
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to
During the course of the proceedings, Tan filed a manifestation with motion to admit newly
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Reyes on the ground that it contained material
discovered evidence and amended list of exhibits   among others: 
misrepresentations, specifically: 

(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;
 
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan,
Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a
resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is
either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
1. A copy of an article published on the internet entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth About
Regina O. Reyes with affidavit of identification and authenticity of document which provides
database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Reyes is an American Citizen
and a holder of a U.S. passport; 
2. (2) a Certification of Travel Records of the petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief,
Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that
petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
Comelec First Division canceled Reyes’ COC. 

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
 
Reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner
resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of America; and  surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American
citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however,
 
that such marriage only resulted in dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the

(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.  twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public. 
 
 
In her answer, Reyes countered that while she is publicly known to be the wife of
Congressman Mandanas, there is no valid and binding marriage between them. As to her COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration

date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it for lack of merit.

was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent
 
Four days thereafter, Reyes was proclaimed the winner of the elections. COMELEC En Banc David v. Agbay
issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
 
final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the
date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. Petitioner Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
has yet to assume office.  retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the
beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion
 
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
ISSUE: 
 
 
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR.
W/N Reyes is a Filipino citizen and therefore allowed to run as a candidate of the House of In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Representatives. 
 
 
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
HELD:  Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
 
 
NO. The Court herein ruled that Reyes was not a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate
of candidacy. To be a candidate of the House of Representatives, an individual should be a
Filipino citizen at the time of his or her filing of the COC and must be resident thereof (of the Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic
municipality he or she will be representing) for not less than 1 year. In the case at bar, Act No. 9225.
petitioner Reyes failed to prove that she had already renounced her American citizenship.
Her contention that she already renounced the same cannot  

be entertained. She stated that she already took her oath of allegiance when she was The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
appointed as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque. However, the said oath taking was not
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
in accordance with present laws. For a former citizen to be considered as a Filipino citizen
again, he or she must conform to the rules stated in RA 9225. In this case, petitioner Reyes
did not comply with the said requirements. Moreover, her residency issue was also barring  
her candidacy. She failed to prove that she had intent to establish her domicile in the
Philippines. Her actions prove that she has no intention of leaving her domicile in the United An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant
States. PETITION IS DISMISSED. of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged
was alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine
 
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian
citizen.Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
 
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.  

  Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
 
citizen.

ISSUE:
 

 
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,

Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen

Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225

citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225. six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC, therefore, did
  not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
RULING:

 
 

 
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph Olaguer v. Purugganan
of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the  

required oath of allegiance.

FACTS:

 
Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer who is an activist against the Marcos administration was the

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is owner of 60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of

not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such P600,000.00. Anticipating the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained by

reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost the

Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became

 
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy
that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifeña had an unwritten agreement that, in
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies the event, that petitioner was arrested, they would support the petitioner’s family by the
that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity. continued
payment of his salary. Oleguer executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 May
1979,appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña for the purpose of
selling or transferring petitioner’s shares of stock with Businessday. The parties
acknowledged the SPAbefore respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the
Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City.
On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by virtue of an Arrest,
Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly committing arson.
In view of petitioner’s previous instructions, for such price and under such terms and
conditions that the agents may deem proper. When the petitioner was detained, respondent
Locsin tried to sell petitioner’s shares, but nobody wantedto buy them. Petitioner’s
reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and
discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. Respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares
himself.
 
Although the capital deficiency suffered by Businessday caused value of the shares to
plummet below par value, respondent Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value.
The RTC found that petitioner consented to have respondent Locsinbuy the shares himself,
through his wife received from respondent Locsin the amount of P600,000.00 as payment for
the shares of stock.
 
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA.
DECISION:
It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed;   will be held to grant
only those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from
the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the
extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. If the language willpermit, the
construction that should be adopted is that which will carry out instead of defeat the
purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other
should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its general
intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always be deemed to
give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.In the present case,
limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and
of "incapacity" under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney
by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily
stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge.
Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been appointed
toadminister the property. In the present case, petitioner himself had already authorized
agents todo specific acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment
of one by the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction," as provided
under Article 38, would render the SPA ineffective.
Petitioner received from respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment
payments for a total of P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or complaint. It
was only four years
after 1982 when petitioner demanded the return of the shares. The petitioner’s claim that he
did not
instruct respondent Locsin to deposit the money to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to
prove that petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since respondent Locsin was
authorized, under theSPA, to negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale including the
manner of payment. Moreover, had respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the
petitioner, as the latter suggested in this
petition, the proceeds were likely to have been included among petitioner’s properties which
were
confiscated by the military. Instead, respondent Locsin deposited the money in the bank
accounts of 
petitioner’s in-laws, and consequently, assured that the petitioner’s wife received these  
amounts
ASB Realty then served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate
. and Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 2003.
In asserting his right to remian on the property based on the oral lessee contract with
Article 1882 of the Civil Code provides that the limits of an agent’s authority shall not
Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was for a long period of

be consideredexceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous to time”. Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended,

the principal than that specified by him. they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that Umale did not have to pay with
the sale over the property as it has already been perfected between them. 
 
 
 
Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering
Umale v. ASB Realty Corporation that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had
been duly appointed. Under  the  Interim  Rules  of Procedure  on  Corporate  Rehabilitation
 
(Interim Rules),  it  is  the  rehabilitation receiver  that  has  the  power  to  "take  possession,
FACTS:  control  and  custody  of  the debtor's assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the
subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that should sue to recover possession of
 
the same.

This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Str., Ortigas Center, Pasig City which
 
was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation, a company that is, in turn, wholly-
owned by ASB Realty Corporation. ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for  Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease
with  Amethyst Pearl in 1999  because  Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996. 
 
 
Amethyst Pear executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor
of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl’s outstanding capital MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB
stock from ASB realty making it the owner of the subject premises.  Realty had no cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not
Umale's lessor.  MTC  agreed with  Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file  suit
 
to recover  ASB  Realty's property.  Havingbeen placed under receivership, ASB Realty had no
more personality to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.
In 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale.
ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale. Their agreement was for
 
Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.
Upon the contract’s expiration on continued occupying the premises and paying rentals.  RTC  reversed  decision  of  the  MTC.  It  found  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the
conclusion that it was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract withUmale.  With
respect  to  ASB  Realty's  personality  to  file  the  unlawful  detainer suit, the RTC ruled that
ASB  Realty retained all its corporate powers, including the power to sue, despite the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the Interim  Rules,  the  RTC  noted  that  the
rehabilitation  receiver  was  not  granted therein the power to file complaints on behalf of
the corporation.  Moreover, the retention  of  its  corporate  powers  by  the  corporation
under  rehabilitation  will advance  the  objective  of  corporate  rehabilitation,  which  is  to
conserve  and administer  the  assets  of  the  corporation  in  the  hope  that  it  may
eventually  be able to go from financial distress to solvency.
Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC
denied reconsideration  of its  Decision and granted  ASB  Realty's Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution.  the power  to  sue  in  its own  name.  This  power  is  granted  to  a  duly-organized
Umale then filed  his  appeal  with  the  CA  insisting that  the  parties  did  not  enter into a
lease contract.
Pending  the  resolution  thereof,  Umale died  and  was  substituted  by  his  widow and legal
heirs. CA affirmed RTC decision in toto.  successful  operation  and  solvency,  if  it  is  shown  that  its  continuance  of  operation  is
Issues:Can  a  corporate  officer  of  ASB  Realty  (duly  authorized  by  the  Board  of
Directors)  file  suit  to  recover  an  unlawfully  detained  corporate  property  despite  the
fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?     This   means   that   the   debtor   corporation   (the   corporation  undergoing rehabilitation),
 
The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.There  is  no  denying  that
ASB  Realty,  as  the  owner  of  the  leased  premises,  is  the  real party-in-interest in the
unlawful detainer suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the  judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
What  petitioners  argue  is  that  the  corporate  officer  of  ASB  Realty  is  incapacitated  to
file this  suit  to  recover  a  corporate  property  because  ASB  Realty  has  a  duly-appointed
rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the
instant suit.
Corporations, such as ASB Realty, arejuridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a
creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or
impliedly,  in  the  law.  Among  the  general  powers  granted  by  law  to  a  corporation  is
corporation, unless specifically  revoked  by  another  law.  The  question  becomes:  Do  the
laws  on corporate rehabilitation —particularly PD 902-A, as amended and its corresponding
rules of  procedure —forfeit  the  power  to  sue  from  the  corporate  officers  and  Board  of
Directors?    
Corporate  rehabilitation  is  defined  as  "the  restoration  of  the  debtor  to  a  position  of
economically  feasible  and  its  creditors  can  recover  by  way  of  the  present  value  of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if
it is immediately liquidated." This concept of preserving the corporation's business as a going
concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place.
through its Board  of Directors and corporate officers, remains in control of its business  and
properties,  subject  only  to  the  monitoring  of  the  appointed  rehabilitation receiver. The
concept of debtor-in-possession  is carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules,  the  rule
that  is  relevant  to  the  instant  case.  It  states therein  that  the  interim rehabilitation
receiver  of  the  debtor  corporation  "does  not  take  over  the  control  and management
of  the  debtor  corporation."  Likewise,  the rehabilitation  receiver  that  will replace the  
interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the rehabilitation
 
plan.  There  is  nothing  in  the  concept  of  corporate  rehabilitation  that  would ipso facto
deprive  the  Board  of  Directors  and  corporate  officers  of  a  debtor  corporation, such as Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales
ASB  Realty,  of control  such  that  it  can  no  longer  enforce  its  right  to  recover  its
property from an errant lessee.  

  FACTS: 

To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. Dr. Mariano Favis was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had seven children When

The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of which Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife

involve  some  kind  of  disposition  or  encumbrance  of  the  corporation's  assets)  during with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got

the pendency  of  the  rehabilitation  proceedings  but  none  of  which  touch  on  the  debtor married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his

corporation's right to sue.  legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has
four children. 
 
 
While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to
recover  its property  and  the  back  rentals  from  Umale,  the necessity  of keeping  the Dr. Favis died intestate on 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed

receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with

closely  monitor  the  assets  of  ASB  Realty,  the  rehabilitation  receiver  has  to  be  notified Juana. Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina,

of the developments in the case, so that these assets would be managed in accordance with petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory,

the approved rehabilitation plan.  liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano
and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
 
 
 
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. Trial
  Court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full
control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. 
 

 
 

Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu
 
proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment
  that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made as mandated by Article 151 of
FC.  respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is
 
AFFIRMED. Petition for review is 

ISSUE: W/N CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise. 
HELD: 
Yes. 
CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. A failure to allege earnest but
failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. In the case at
hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners
was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The
decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged
error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the
statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on
the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such
failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
GRANTED.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

  In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly
denied.
applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not,
after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the
did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners
First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
complaint. The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though,
number of votes.
was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial District of Leyte.
Board of Canvassers.
 
Issue:
 

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one
 
year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
 
Held:
 

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
 
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
 
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
 
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the Jalosjos v. Comelec
1987 Constitution.
 
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he was
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the Philippines
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin
and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a
in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos
certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Australian citizenship. 
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
 
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent
run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the application
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
and included Jalosjos in the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the
RTC.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned  
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for

the 2010 elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).
 
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the
Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this
reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.  Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD:
NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his
Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga
Sibugay.
 
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one
year before the elections.  For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile:  i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place,
but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention.  To determine compliance with the
residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
  (a)               every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
(b)               where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and
(c)               a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he acquired
Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.  On
the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother
in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for
good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to
that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the
loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brother's house.  A candidate is not required to have a
house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place.  It is enough that he should
live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.  To insist that
the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office.  What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically
present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national
party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC.  The court

also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay.  This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 
 
 
 
 
Naldoza v. Republic
FACTS: 
Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married. They begot two children. After a
quarrel between the spouses, Dionesio left the conjugal home and never returned. He
allegedly swindled Congressman Maglana and other persons.
 
The classmates of the two children were allegedly teased about their father being a swindler.
Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Zosima, on August 10,
1978, filed in the CFI of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two
children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. The trial court dismissed the
petition.
Zosima appealed to this Court.
Issue: WON the children should be allowed to drop the surname of their father and be
allowed to use the mother’s surname?
Held: No.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. To allow
the change of
surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression
that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That
would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.
As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time
must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable
of selecting a name for
himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname,
then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. 
 
Yasin V. Sharia District Court
G.R. No. 94986, 23 February 1995
 
FACTS:  

On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
"Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do
the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of
Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the
petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order  
alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a
petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her In re: Stephanie Garcia
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion  
since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in
the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.
FACTS:
 
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
ISSUE: Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her

Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and
the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition
for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING:
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the

NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by
adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art.  
370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case
of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee ISSUE:
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her
maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. her natural mother as her middle name.
Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after
the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage,
 
after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not
obligatory except in case of legal separation.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law  to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.
Remo v. DFA
FACTS:  Held:
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her
Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her
surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her
marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she
made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married
name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the
implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce,
and death of the husband. 
Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling.
The CA also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an
implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]
Issues: 
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport,
can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage. 
No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage
subsists. 
 
Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to
use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.  whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains
subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a
 
replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution
of one’s marriage. 
RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married
 
woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for
the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her Special law prevails over general law 
husband’s surname. 
 
 

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using
her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using
her maiden name. 
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of
Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. 
Implied repeals are disfavored

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she
Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal
may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in
is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be
Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of
harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to
marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden
repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish. 
use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. 
 
 

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport 

Yasin case not in point 
 
 

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application.
Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee

If her present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting
to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and
identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be
countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise.  a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from
it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.
TOPIC: RULES GOVERNING PERSONS WHO ARE ABSENT
Eastern Shipping vs. Lucero, 124 SCRA 425
Facts: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio Lucero Jr. was appointed as captain of the Ship
Eastern Minicon of Eastern Shipping Lines. Under the contract, his employment was good for
one round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the
vessel at the port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain’s
salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. Captain
Lucero sent three distress messages to the company on the following dates: February 16,
1980 (7am), February 16, 1980 (3:30pm), February 16, 1980 (9:50pm). On the third message
he stated that seawater was entering the vessel and they were preparing to abandon ship.
The company notified the coast guard. Search results were negative. The insurers of the
company confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the company paid the corresponding
death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who
refused to accept.
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary
allotment of her husband which the company had stopped since March 1980 and for
continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port
of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with
the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only
upon the vessel’s arrival in Manila. The company refused to pay. The National seamen board
upheld the complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not Mrs. Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary.
Ruling: The NLRC based its judgment on Art. 391 regarding the presumption of death at sea.
They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died because under the law,
four years have not yet passed. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes
including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board vessel lost during
since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; The Supreme Court ruled however that a
preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not
heard of again show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew
perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro, “where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in,
and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.”
Hence, the decision of the NLRC is reversed; however, death benefits should be paid.
Manuel vs. People, GR No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005
Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18,
1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B.
Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their
meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s
knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and
Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then
filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his
declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial
Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to
ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with
modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten
years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php 200,000n as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of
fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law.  Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent
spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court ruled against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and
caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against
public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals
and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an
innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
Pantollano vs. Korphil, GR No. 169575, March 30, 2011
Facts: On March 24, 1994, Korphil Ship management and Manning Corporation (Korphil)
hired Vedasto C. Pantollano (Vedasto) as 4th Engineer on board the vessel M/V Couper under
a Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) approved contract of employment. On
August 2, 1994, Veadsto did not show up for his duty. The vessel then altered bits course to
search for Vedasto, the search and rescue operation lasted for about six hours, but Vedasto
was not found. On August 3, 1994, a Report was issued by the Master of M/V Couper
declaring that Vedasto was missing. His wife, Imeldo Pantollano (Imelda), was likewise
informed about the disappearance of Vedasto while on board M/V Couper. Since then,
Vedasto was never seen again.
On May 29, 2000, Imelda filed a complaint before the NLRC where she sought to
recover death benefits, damages and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter (LA) held that the
legal heirs of Vedasto are entitled to the payment of death benefits and attorney’s fees. The
NLRC reversed, stating that the death of Vedasto which was clearly shown by evidence to be
a case of suicide was not compensable under the clear provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract. However, the NLRC reversed itself after.
Korphil appealed. The CA held that under Article 291 of the Labor Code, Imelda should
have filed her complaint within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Thus,
Imelda should have filed her complaint within three years from Vedasto’s disappearance on
August 2, 1994. Having filed her complaint only on May 29, 2000, the same is already barred
by prescription.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of Imelda for death compensation benefits filed on May 29,
2000 or more than five years from the time her husband Vedasto was reported missing on
August 2, 1994, is already barred by prescription following the provisions of Article 291 of the
Labor Code.
Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.
Labor Law & Civil Law: Period by which to claim death benefits arising from a person
presumed dead.
Preliminarily, it must be stressed that Korphil is estopped from asserting that Imelda
cause of action accrued on August 2, 1994. In a previous case involving Korphil, and which
also involved an earlier claim for compensation benefits filed by Gliceria (the wife of a
seaman also presumed missing). Korphil claimed that it was still premature because the
death of Vedasto was not yet duly proven and the period that must elapse before a seaman
can be lawfully presumed dead has not been complied with. Consequently, Korphil is
estopped from insisting in this later case filed by Imelda that Vedasto should be considered
dead from the time he went missing on August 2, 1994 and therefore the claim was filed
beyond the allowable period of three years. Indeed, when Imelda claimed the benefits,
Korphil informed Imelda that it was still premature to claim the same and advised her instead
to wait four more years before her husband could be presumed dead thereby entitling his
heirs to death benefits. Korphil is therefore guilty of estoppel.
Korphil also posits that the three-year prescriptive period referred to in Article 291 shall
commence to run from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., at the time Vedasto died on
August 2, 1994. However, on August 2, 1994, it cannot as yet be presumed that Vedasto is
already dead. A person missing under the circumstances as those of Vedasto may not legally
be considered as dead until the lapse of the period fixed by law on presumption of death,
and consequently Imelda cannot yet be considered as a widow entitled to compensation
under the law.
The provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code state that a person “shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs when inter alia, the
person has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.” Thus, Vedasto can only be presumed dead after the lapse of four
years from August 2, 1994 when he was declared missing. Vedasto is thus presumed legally
dead only on August 2, 1998. It is only at this time before her husband could be presumed
dead entitling his heirs to death benefits. Korphil is therefore guilty of estoppel.
Having already established that Imelda’s cause of action accrued on August 2, 1998, it
follows that her claim filed on May 29, 2000 was timely. GRANTED.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Yolanda Granada, GR No. 187512, June 13, 2012
Doctrine: Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no
longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”
Facts: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married
in 1993. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went
to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother
testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no
avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed
to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that
he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which
the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus,
judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence,
is not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration
of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.
Ruling:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory. Even if the RTC
erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41,
238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can
be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without
saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party
may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the
CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not
adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was
already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant
by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in
a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in
truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives
of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw
light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to
be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her
brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from
the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines.
She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to
explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny
the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to
declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Roberto Narceda, GR No. 182760, April 10, 2013
Doctrine: The judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The filing of a Notice of Appeal under Rule 42
does not toll the running of the period for filing a Petition for Certiorari, the remedy available
to assail the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding for abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Facts: Robert P. Narceda married Marina on July 22, 1987. A reading of the Marriage
Contract he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years
and 4 months old. According to Robert, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and
never returned since. There was never any communication between them. He tried to look
for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left, one of their town mates in
Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his wife,
the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, Robert filed with the RTC on May 16,
2002 a Petition for a Judicial Declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.
The RTC granted respondent’s Petition. Petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the
diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a “well-founded” belief that she was
dead. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and thus governed by
Title XI thereof. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary proceedings shall be immediately final and executory.
Issues:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
2. Was respondent able to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is
dead?
Ruling: The Court in this case agreed with the CA when pointed out that it lacked jurisdiction
in the resolution of the petition. The resolution of a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural rules to be followed are
those enumerated in Title XI of the Family Code Articles 238, 247, and 253.
The judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts.
In this case, the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, but it availed itself of the
wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari
continued to run and was not toiled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could
no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that respondent has failed to
establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be
entertained by this Court.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Benjamin Estrada, GR No. 214792, March 18, 2015
Facts: On October 14, 2008, Teresita Olemberio filed a Petition for Declaration of Absence
and Presumption of Death of her husband Diego before the RTC Malaybalay. She alleged that
she and Diego married on November 25, 1973 in Bukidnon that sometime in December 1976,
Diego left their residence and never came back. He failed to communicate for the past 32
years and never made contact with any of their children or even immediate relatives.
Teresita also alleged that she made efforts to locate the whereabouts of her husband but
failed. She filed the present petition to declare her husband presumptively dead so that she
could contract another marriage without impediment.
The RTC Malaybalay granted the petition and declared Diego for all legal intents and
purposes presumptively dead in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG
appealed in the CA the RTC’s decision alleging that the lower court erred in the appreciation
of facts and circumstances of the death of Diego as well as the insufficiency of efforts of
Teresita in locating Diego’s whereabouts.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition.
Ruling: No. Article 41 of the Family Code provides, “A marriage by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is a danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.”
In this case, Diego’s absence for more than 30 years, which far exceeded the law-
required four years of absence, is more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for
all legal intents and purposes. Further, it can be clearly gleaned from the totality of evidence
that Diego had already died due to the prevalence of New People’s Army in Malaybalay.
Therefore, the petition is denied and the RTC’s decision and CA’s resolution are hereby
affirmed.
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
Dela Cruz vs. Garcia, GR No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Facts: Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got
pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth. Jenie then
applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino. When Jenie
applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the following: Certificate of Live Birth,
AUSF together with Dominique’s father and brother, and Affidavit of Acknowledgement
issued by Dominique’s father and brother. Respondent denied the registration because the
child was born out of wedlock. The trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the
document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states that: “Private
handwritten instrument must be signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity.”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
Issue: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as recognition of paternity.
Ruling: Yes. Article 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument must be signed by putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Article 175
and 172. It is therefore implied.
Special circumstances to the case:
 Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
 Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
 Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and
brother who stand to the affected by their hereditary rights
The court then adopted the following rules: (1) Where the private handwritten
instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent, (2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Braza vs. Registrar, GR No. 181174, December 4, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin
Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo.
Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the
Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick
having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by
virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that
Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before
the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in
the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous
on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:
1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name
of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;
2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;
3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and,
for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code,
has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Issue: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an
action to correct entries in the civil registrar?
Ruling: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes
of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be
filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that,
doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as
the petition filed before the court a quo.

Corpus vs. Sto. Tomas, GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Facts: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married
Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work
commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair
with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January
2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the
Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree
but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law,
that the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of
foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according
to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
Issue: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the
foreign divorce decree.
Ruling: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of
Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as
it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign
divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed
to be void.
Iwasawa vs. Gangan, GR No. 204169, September 11, 2013
Facts: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never
married before." Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner
came... back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002. After
the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his
shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed... away.
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife's confession and discovered that
indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took
place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces
of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent
Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo
Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent. The prosecutor appearing on behalf
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of
the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there
was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent's prior existing valid marriage to
another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private
respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC
ruled that petitioner's testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of
private respondent's prior marriage nor of Arambulo's death which makes him a complete
stranger to the marriage... certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the
latter's death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner's testimony about the NSO
certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.
Republic vs. Olaybar, GR No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Facts: Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage
contract... the assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Respondent
requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace
of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma.
She revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had
met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. Her name was
used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.
Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of
MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in
their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not a respondent.
A document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged.
RTC granted petition.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Ruling: The SC denied the petition. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding.
An appropriate adversary suit or... proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. As long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding
to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported
husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was,
she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a
certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. In allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not,
in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary.
In Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108,
with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of
the appropriate adversarial proceeding.”
Barcelote vs. Republic, GR No. 222095, August 7, 2017
Facts: On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky 0.
Tinitigan in her relative’s residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to
register the birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did
not give birth in a hospital.
To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur
while Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24
August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel
Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible
criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally
decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del
Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late
registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with
Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335, respectively, after submitting proof that the
National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.
However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the
NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth
certificates) with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their
office.
The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City
state the names “Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan Barcelote
Tinitigan”. Ricky Tinitigan was the listed Informant in both birth certificates.
Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the
subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and
for containing erroneous entries.
RTC granted the cancellation of birth certificates. CA, however, reversed and set
aside the same.
Issue: Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered
by their father Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were void.
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that since the undisputed facts show that the children were born
outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011,
respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children
shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject  birth certificates as
to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been
“Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”
The Court did not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates were the
express recognition of the children’s filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly
registered in accordance with law i.e. the subject birth certificates of the illegitimate children
were not signed by their mother.
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, 16 states:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the
birth or by either parent of the newly born child. (first paragraph)
xxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.   The first
paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is legitimate since
our law accords a strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of children. On the other hand,
the fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate child,
the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
the mother if the father refuses. The fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an
illegitimate child and likewise underscores its mandatory character with the use of the word
“shall.”
Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child;
otherwise, the same is void
Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as
his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is
the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision
ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to
the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and
custody of the illegitimate child.
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not
sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth
certificates. Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the
provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from
the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is
incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also
incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.
 Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their
cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code
requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753
requiring the signature of the mother in her children’s birth certificates.
81 Effect and Application of Laws