893974

research-article2020
RGPXXX10.1177/1089268019893974Review of General PsychologyOsbeck

Special Section: Re-Envisioning General Psychology

Review of General Psychology

General Psychology as Common

2020, Vol. 24(1) 6­–17
© 2020 The Author(s)
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Ground and Point of View: Enduring sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1089268019893974
https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019893974

and Evolving Features journals.sagepub.com/home/rgp

Lisa M. Osbeck1

Abstract
The article draws from historical and contemporary resources to articulate the enduring or persistent responsibilities
of general psychology, suggesting “common ground” and “point of view” as useful concepts in line with these. It then
explores three important developments in the discipline over the past several decades—big data analytics, methodological
proliferation, and critical psychology—and considers the role of general psychology in relation to these developments. The
point of the article is to claim and illustrate that general psychology includes a philosophy of science from within, and that
it has lasting importance to the broader discipline, even as the discipline itself transforms.

Keywords
general psychology, philosophy of science, values, data-driven science, psychological methods, critical psychology

I am grateful to the editors for their insight into the impor-
tance of reexamining general psychology in its full contem-
porary context. In response to the editors’ challenge, I offer
a vision statement in two parts. First, I draw from historical
and contemporary resources to articulate the enduring or
persistent responsibilities of general psychology, suggest-
ing “common ground” and “point of view” as useful con-
cepts for understanding them. Second, I consider evolving
aspects of general psychology by exploring three important
developments in the discipline over the past several decades:
(a) data-driven psychology, (b) the proliferation of meth-
ods, and (c) the emergence of critical psychology (CP).
It may be useful to conceptualize the enduring aspects as
the form, and the examples analyzed as among the content of
general psychology. The content of any discipline (models,
concepts, methods, theories) and its relation to other disci-
plines undergo alteration; the position (form) and thus the
responsibility of general psychology remain the same. In my
view, the required position entails depiction and analysis of
historical and contemporary developments both broad and
specific and their interrelations. Such reflection is philosoph-
ical, not necessarily by formal training, but as an effort to
raise questions, clarify and evaluate assumptions, examine
implications—moral, conceptual, and actionable. Important
to at least some of psychology’s founders (e.g., James, 1890),
the call for philosophical reflection remains embedded in the
mission of the Society for General Psychology and its schol-
arly productions. However, it is inadequately understood or
emphasized. To the extent that general psychology has fallen
away from its position and its associated responsibilities, this
article is a plea for a deliberate return to them.1 I should
acknowledge that although I identify as a general psycholo-
gist, the opinions expressed here reflect my own values and
orientation rather than any organizational stance.
Definitions and Distinctions
As a starting point, we may distinguish in principle two
ways of conceptualizing general psychology. First, we
might have in mind theories, methods, values, and assump-
tions common to all psychologists, to psychology in gen-
eral, that is. Whether such commonalties are to be found in
actuality is a matter of debate; I introduce this sense of gen-
eral psychology principally as an abstraction, one coexten-
sive with the subject matter or essential nature of psychology
itself—that which could be called invariant across psy-
chology. For our purposes, I will refer to this as GP1.
Alternatively, we might regard general psychology as a sub-
specialty within psychology at large, a subspecialty with a
perspective and set of questions that distinguish it from
1
University of West Georgia, Carrollton, GA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Lisa M. Osbeck, University of West Georgia, 1601 Maple Street,
Carrollton, GA 30118, USA.
Email: losbeck@westga.edu
Osbeck 7
other branches of psychology. I will refer to this subspe-
cialty as GP2.2 There are various ways of understanding the
distinction between GP1 and GP2, and the distinction itself
may be only a technical one, not corresponding, that is, to
anything recognizable in the practices of self-identifying
psychologists. At the very least, there is overlap between
the two senses: GP2 may be the specialty aimed at realizing
GP1, or it may be a position from which one concludes that
GP1 is illusory, that is, that psychology is marked princi-
pally by discontinuity or disunity (e.g., Green, 2015).
Importantly, however, in making even this most basic con-
ceptual distinction between two ways of understanding gen-
eral psychology, we confront fundamental but complicated
problems of definition that have long troubled psychology
(or, rather, those who concern themselves with its identity).
That is, how should we describe our subject matter? What is
the definition and essential nature of psychology? These
questions have been posed repeatedly and given varied
answers, yet the subject matter remains elusive. Outside of
summaries in introductory textbooks, the conceptual and
practice territory occupied by psychology is so broad and
overlapping with other disciplinary spaces and so mired in
controversies about what its rightful focus should be that
the very questions can seem pointless or misaimed. The dif-
ficulties in defining “psychology,” that is, make the task of
defining “general psychology” most challenging, if not
insurmountable.
Psychology’s elusive subject matter is a frequent focus
of meta-psychological analysis. Implicit in both pronounce-
ments of psychology’s fragmentation (Goertzen, 2008;
Henriques, 2003; Staats, 1999) and assertions that the
search for unity in psychology is in vain (e.g., Green, 2015;
Stam, 2004) is the conviction that psychology lacks coher-
ence and organization, that there is little in common among
its diverse concerns and specialties. Despite the recent con-
text of these debates, we would be mistaken to regard the
problem of demarcating psychological knowledge and
advancing core theory in the discipline as a problem of con-
temporary origin. It is safe to say that problems in defining
general psychology are tied to some of the earliest and most
controversial problems confronting the development of
psychology as a science. Although the very existence of a
professional body dedicated to the mission and aims of a
general psychology derives historically from the American
Psychological Association’s (APA) postwar restructuring
into a divisional organization, the conceptual life of “gen-
eral psychology” is much older and deeper. Our task for this
issue is to reexamine general psychology in the context of a
very different era, yet there may be benefit to examining
how the problems we are facing were taken up in earlier
contexts in which they also arose. It is outside the scope of
this article to provide a comprehensive review of historical
definitions of general psychology, but a few relevant exam-
ples are useful.
Subtle differences in meanings are evident when exam-
ining what general psychology is contrasted with, whether
the contrast class is obvious or implicit. As one example, a
1909 article on “Mental Inheritance” in The Popular
Science Monthly differentiates the “newer science” of indi-
vidual differences and the “older branch of the science” . . .
“the psychology of what is common to all minds,” identify-
ing the latter as “general psychology” and suggesting its
origins in the publication of Darwin’s (1859) On the Origin
of Species (Bentley, 1909, p. 466). Elsewhere, general psy-
chology concerns “the real mental life and mental develop-
ment of the average human being”; the implied contrast
begs the question of who counts as an average human being
and who departs from this characterization (Ladd, 1899).
Külpe (1901) acknowledged general psychology to be the
psychology of the individual, distinguished from both ani-
mal psychology and social psychology. The English transla-
tor of Wundt’s Elements of a Folk Psychology acknowledged
“the dependence of folk psychology, as conceived by
Professor Wundt, upon general psychology—or, in this par-
ticular case, upon the author’s system of physiological psy-
chology,” noting that what was translated in that volume as
general psychology involves the analysis of individual con-
sciousness. To general psychology so conceived, the psy-
chology of collective life is a necessary supplement and
complement (Schuab, 1916). Earlier, Sully (1884) pro-
nounced “general knowledge of mind” (p. 7) to be accom-
plished only by disregarding or overlooking differences
attributable to variances between experiencing individuals
or within in the experience of any one individual over time.
Titchener (1909), in turn, associated general psychology
with system (systematic analysis), with developed and
cohesive theory, implying a contrast with an assortment of
collected and unintegrated facts.3
We could argue, though not easily, that these are all
interrelated conceptions of general psychology, connected
enough to enable comparison with contemporary defini-
tions and contrasts. We could similarly argue that this brief
sample supports the arguments in favor of viewing the
subject matter as incoherent. We could also point easily to
problems with the focus on individual-level variables over
systems-level analysis, the focus of much critical histori-
cal analysis (e.g., Danziger, 1994; Teo, 2015). But for the
present purposes, the point most important to make is that
questions arise around the boundaries of “general psychol-
ogy” even in these early contexts, and that these questions
include whether general psychology is to be taken as syn-
onymous with “psychology,” or whether general psychol-
ogy constitutes a particular approach to psychology
focused on the laws of individual (“normal”) conscious-
ness, or whether general psychology is to be equated with
the grander project of systematizing an observed range of
facts into something that could stand on its own as a
branch of science.
8 Review of General Psychology 24(1)
GP1: The “Common Ground”
Against these problems, of interest is an early paper “The
Present Problems of General Psychology” published in
Philosophical Review (Ward, 1904), wherein the author
develops a novel position concerning the relation of psy-
chology at large to “general psychology.” The essay both
illustrates the difficulty of definition and provides some
guidance away from the search for unity toward acknowl-
edgment of “the common ground.”
Ward’s essay acknowledges forthrightly that definition
of psychology is a problem, not only as an intellectual exer-
cise but also as a barrier to the development of the science:
“one of the present problems of psychology is the definition
of psychology itself” (Ward, 1904, p. 603). He attributes the
problem to different theoretical and methodological stances
assumed by those seeking to establish the young discipline’s
parameters:
Psychology must be thoroughly atomistic and structural says
one: it should be altogether functional, says another. For some
it is the central philosophical discipline; for others it is but a
department of biology. According to one view, it is a descriptive
science; according to another, it is explanatory as well. (Ward,
1904, p. 603)
That definition should or could be sought is not itself a mat-
ter upon which there was agreement in Ward’s time.
Paraphrasing imagined critics, Ward anticipated objections
to even posing the question of definition in the first place.
The field was expanding and subdividing so rapidly that
any attempted definition would be outgrown by the time it
was formally articulated. Thus, he acknowledged that
although a definition that would stand the test of time seems
an unrealistic pursuit, it remains important: “if we could
define what is common today we could leave tomorrow to
take care of itself” (p. 603).
The “common ground” is what Ward calls “General
Psychology.” It is common not in an empirical sense (i.e.,
that which has been discovered, through research, to be
common to psychologists) but because of what is “presup-
posed” in all the branches of psychology acknowledged to
be existing at the time (e.g., comparative, pathological).
Yet, more boldly, Ward asserted that the common ground
includes concepts that “will be presupposed in any new
developments of the science the future may have in store”
(p. 604). We should note that in emphasizing enduring and
presupposed concepts as the discipline’s common ground
(i.e., rather than empirical objects or methods), Ward
alluded to the importance of offering an adequate philo-
sophical foundation for the project of describing and ana-
lyzing “the invariable factors of psychical life” (p. 604).
Then as now, such a project of description and analysis is
made difficult by the seeming impasses created by compet-
ing schools of thought, rival theoretical and methodological
frameworks within psychology. After considering several
alternatives, Ward’s best answer was that the “dual relation”
of the investigator as both subject of inquiry (knower) and
object (that which is known) is the common ground of psy-
chological science: the unique position of “known actor.”
Ward admitted that to establish this dual relation as central
to psychology across new developments creates more prob-
lems than it resolves, and he ended his analysis by admitting
a kind of defeat, acknowledging that he is unable to do little
other than point to the problems,4 with apology.
Defining psychology or delimiting its province of
inquiry is made much more difficult in 2019 than in 1904 by
the extraordinary variety of psychological specialties,
research methods, and theoretical approaches. But if empir-
ical unity is not attainable, there may still be value in reflect-
ing on psychology’s conceptual common ground, even if
reflection introduces great challenges. It involves situating
psychology in relation to other specialties of research or
practice, invoking questions of “boundaries” or “borders,”
both within psychology and between psychology and other
disciplines. These are questions relating to territory and
specialization, as well as potential for innovation through
various forms of crossing-over boundaries, bearing on con-
ceptual and practical problems well known to the commu-
nity of scholars concerned with the problems and
opportunities of interdisciplinary science (e.g., Derry et al.,
2014). We can acknowledge that borders are porous or tat-
tered, or that distinctions pertain principally in theory rather
than practice, yet still maintain that they serve important
functions. As sociological concepts, boundaries and borders
are “crucial for analyzing how social actors construct
groups as similar and different and how it shapes their
understanding of their responsibilities toward such groups”
(Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 187). Therefore, we can see the
project of reflecting on general psychology and its place in
the 21st century as not merely a technical matter of defini-
tion or determining an elusive essence, but rather as mark-
ing responsibility in relation to others, including but not
limited to other psychologists, thereby establishing possi-
bilities for thought and action (theory and method), for
viable forms of collaboration and integration.
From the point of view of a 21st-century discipline of
psychological science that continues to struggle with its
definition and common ground, the significance of Ward’s
insights is clearer. The idea that the common ground of psy-
chology is a dual relation inherent in all its practices, the
dual position of knower and known, is different from an
assumption that the common ground is to be found in a par-
ticular body of gathered facts, or that the field can be uni-
fied by specifying a method for gathering them. The fact
that acknowledgment of the dual relation, the position of
known actor, stimulates rather than resolves a set of new
problems does not diminish its relevance. It only points to
the ongoing responsibility inherent in the very project of
Osbeck 9
psychology, in any of its branches, in any of its current and
future trajectories. If to affirm the “dual relation” is essen-
tially a philosophical commitment, it serves as a reminder
of an inescapable philosophical responsibility assumed in
the very act of conducting psychological research. The con-
ceptual common ground of psychology—namely, the
acceptance of the special challenges in the position of the
“known actor,” then, may be the best way of understanding
general psychology in this first sense (GP1).
An idea related to the search for discernable “common
ground” is that of a distinct disciplinary “point of view.” For
example, Titchener here discusses disciplinary “point of
view” in his introductory comments on his Outline of
Psychology:
In a word, every science takes up a certain attitude towards the
world of human experience, or regards it from a definite point
of view, and it is the business of the science to describe the
world as it appears after the attitude has been taken up or the
point of view adopted. What differentiates the sciences is just
this difference of human interest; and what holds a science
together, and brings its observations into relation, is just the
fact that all the work has been done under the guidance of the
same principles and from the same point of view. (Titchener,
1909, p. 4, emphasis added)
The idea that differences in “point of view” distinguish
different branches of science was important in early efforts to
define psychology as a distinct discipline, and to what we
earlier identified as GP1. Efforts to demarcate the new sci-
ence acknowledged on one hand the close relation of psy-
chology to physiology, and on the other hand, a close relation
to philosophy, especially epistemology. Understanding the
point of view specific to a science or discipline aids in under-
standing the relation of disciplines to one another, and con-
tributes, in principle, to more comprehensive understanding:
As scientific investigation proceeds . . . more and more aspects
of experience are revealed, and the sciences begin to multiply . . .
They do not exist independently side by side, as accounts of
separate portions of the world or of separate regions of
experience; they overlap and coincide, describing one and the
same world of experience as it appears from their special
standpoints. They are not like blocks of knowledge, which when
cut to the proper size and properly fitted together will give us a
map of the universe; they are rather like successive chapters of a
book which discusses a large topic from every possible point of
view. Some chapters are long, and some are short; some are
general, and some are special; this depends upon the sort of
attitude which a given science takes toward experience. But all
the chapters, or sciences, deal with the same world under its
different aspects. (Titchener, 1909, p. 4)
However, as noted, the identification of the specific psy-
chological point of view is laden with controversy, given
the difficulty of demarcating the specific territory deemed
to be psychological. Many have made an effort, such as
William James (1902/1917) in his attempt to distinguish the
task of the psychologist from that of the anthropologist or
historian in the study of religious experience. But there is
little enduring consensus on this point.
Titchener’s further assertion that point of view is tied to
the “attitude” a science takes toward experience suggests
that there is a conceptual link between point of view and
scholarly or epistemic values: Attitude may be a matter of
priorities, what is cultivated in a community of practice, just
as James (1902/1917) identifies description, and specifi-
cally, description of “feelings” and “subjective phenomena”
as the “natural” province of the psychologist (p. 3). The fact
that different psychologists take different attitudes, result-
ing in different forms of data, different methods for analyz-
ing them, and different conclusions reached from them has
long been evident, reflected in Edna Heidbreder’s (1933)
distinguishing of seven “psychologies.”
The idea of disciplinary “point of view” is linked con-
ceptually to the idea of scientific perspective, that is, the
idea that any scientific practice is constrained in particular
ways. According to Giere (2006), constraints are imposed
both by the general conceptual model in use and by the
instrument employed for the purpose of data collection and
analysis. To distinguish the special attitude of psychology
(or any one of many “psychologies”) amounts to determin-
ing the specific constraints on inquiry, the limits (hence
boundaries). Here, Munsterberg, for example, warns of
blurring the boundaries between epistemic and psychologi-
cal points of view:
Every extension beyond the sharp limits which are determined
by the logical presuppositions can thus be only the triumph of
confusion, and the ultimate arbitration, which is the function of
epistemology, must always decide against it. It is thus love and
devotion for psychology which demands that its energies be
not wasted by the hopeless task of transgressions into other
fields. (Munsterberg, 1899, p. 2)
Is it possible to avoid the confusion and wasted energy of
disciplinary incoherence by establishing specific limits, but,
on the contrary, to acknowledge and honor the vast diver-
sity of psychological subject matter and the plurality of
methods that accompany its expansion? This has been an
ongoing dilemma for our discipline, and it is one unlikely to
resolve itself with any foreseeable developments. As noted,
the only discernable common ground among psychologists,
historical and contemporary, may in fact be philosophical in
nature—the acknowledgment of the dual positionality of
the inquirer. This common ground thus “transgresses” into
philosophical analysis, inviting the conclusion that the idea
of a distinctly psychological realm of inquiry is merely an
abstraction; there is no distinctly psychological point of
view. This has been said in many ways by many others, but
it bears restating here.
10 Review of General Psychology 24(1)
GP2: The “Point of View” of General
Psychology
At this seeming dead end, a turn in focus to the second sense
of general psychology is in order, and it is one that offers a
fruitful way of conceptualizing the ongoing work of general
psychology. Again, an early resource offers guidance.
Jastrow (1901) acknowledged “two tendencies” charac-
terizing the formation and progress of psychology as a
discipline:
the one accepts the obligation of presenting, in some
comprehensive outlook, the status of a general problem, or of a
sphere of psychological influence, or a portrayal of the bearings
and relations that may most wisely pertain between different
divisions or aspects of psychology, or between it and other
departments of learning with which it has natural affiliations;
the other utilizes this occasion for the presentation of a more
specific theme representing the outcome of the reflection and
investigation of the specialist. (p. 1)
More feasible and conceptually coherent than delimiting
the point of view of psychology in general (GP1) may be to
shift focus to acknowledging the problems of the generalist
as these are divergent from the problems of the specialist
(GP2). Note, in relation to the varied definitions of general
psychology reviewed earlier surveyed, of interest is that
Vygotsky (1927/1997) considered the psychology of the
adult normal mind to be an area of specialty on par with
animal psychology or psychopathology, and so drew con-
trast with what he envisioned as a general psychology. To
distinguish the general perspective is paradoxically to ana-
lyze constraints or limits on the generalist, that is, to con-
sider what special problems, questions, and forms of
analysis proceed from this point of view and secure its epis-
temic functions. Of note is that both general and specific
points of view aid in advancing disciplinary progress.
Moreover, ethnographic studies of practicing scientists sug-
gest that, through targeted practices, one can develop the
capacity to shift between points of view in keeping with the
research problem at hand, thereby enhancing problem-solv-
ing flexibility and scope (Osbeck & Nersessian, 2017).
The distinction of general and specific tendencies helps
to clarify the relation between “the common ground” and
the “point of view” as concepts for understanding general
psychology. First, the same common ground can support
different points of view; in this case, general and specific,
inviting different kinds of questions. Second, general and
specific points of view are not limited to the common
ground of psychology but can be applied to any subject
matter, to the common ground of physical science, for
example. Thus, GP2, as we have distinguished it, refers to
the practice whereby one “accepts the obligation of present-
ing in some comprehensive outlook the status of a general
problem” (taking the general point of view) in relation to
the varied subject matter of psychology.5
In the sense outlined by Jastrow, that the attitude of the
specialist contrasts with that of the generalist is straightfor-
ward and noncontroversial. But interesting implications are
embedded. What a general psychologist accepts is the obli-
gation of presenting, with broad view (“comprehensive out-
look”), the status of a general problem, informing the
psychological community about the progress and remaining
challenges on a problem with ongoing significance. “Sphere
of influence” suggests that the implications, the impact of
psychological research, are also the province of general
psychology. Finally, “portrayal of the bearing and rela-
tions” implies that the general psychologist is to represent
and disseminate the connections between different special-
ties (“divisions or aspects”) and with affiliated disciplines—
a very contemporary sounding acknowledgment of
psychology’s inherent interdisciplinary foundation.
The point of view of general psychology so framed
sounds very like that of a contemporary philosopher of sci-
ence focusing on the scientific aspirations and productions
of the science of psychology, concerned with summarizing,
evaluating, and communicating general trends and progress
on big issues. The idea of an obligation accompanying the
point of view, and that the obligation includes reflection on
the relations that “may wisely pertain” underscores once
again, though with different emphasis, the inherently philo-
sophical stance of general psychology, the philosophical
responsibility to be accepted by those who willingly take
the broader view. This understanding of general psychology
may call into question where philosophy ends and psychol-
ogy begins, and whether the ambiguity is problematic is for
the reader to decide. I consider the fuzzy boundary to be
inevitable, which the general psychologist would do better
to embrace than to avoid. In turn, we may regard the point
of view of general psychology as one that implicates reflec-
tion on the discipline’s overall conceptual structure and
development but also values, both epistemic and social.
General Psychology in the 21st
Century: Examples of Contemporary
Developments With Implications for
General Psychology
The question may now be posed more historically: What is
the point of view of general psychology as we enter the
third decade of the 21st century? In asking this question, we
turn from the enduring to the evolving aspects of general
psychology. Not only has the discipline of psychology
undergone changes of such substantive nature that it is
almost unrecognizable from that of Titchener’s vision, but
the disciplinary culture and social/political/cultural context
in which general psychology is practiced has been altered
Osbeck 11
and continues to transform. Analysis of the point of view of
general psychology must include consideration of how the
changes may be expected to affect general psychology in
aim, scope, and means. Yet, we are not limited to a descrip-
tive response (“what is the case”), which might attempt to
discern the existing perspective of those who identify with
the mission of the Society for General Psychology or simi-
lar organizations, or those who are dedicated principally to
teaching undergraduate psychology courses in liberal arts
curricula or who in some other way identify as general psy-
chologists. We might also make a prescriptive statement,
one that analyzes the horizons toward which general psy-
chology should be aiming (“what ought to be”), but
informed by our historical situation and its features.
In the following section, I offer several examples of
recent broad-scale developments affecting the discipline of
psychology in its contemporary manifestation. Not in order
of importance, I will briefly discuss the emergence of big
data analytics, the expanded range of legitimized psycho-
logical methods, and the emergence of an international CP.
In each case, the examples provide illustration rather than
comprehensive analysis, but help to clarify general psy-
chology’s point of view.
Data-Driven Science/Big Data Analytics
Advances in digital technology over the past three decades
have brought rapid and substantive change to biological and
human sciences, including psychology. Although theoreti-
cal attention to these developments arguably remains under-
developed in proportion to the rate and degree of change, a
series of papers and special issues examining the details and
ramifications of big data science for the discipline of psy-
chology have been published over the past 5 years in psy-
chology journals (e.g., Adjerid & Kelley, 2018; Harlow &
Oswald, 2016), joining a broader community of scholars in
cognate disciplines (e.g., sociology, philosophy, science
and technology studies [STS], and human–computer inter-
action [HCI]) committed to examining implications of the
changes underway for the conception and practice of sci-
ence (e.g., Baraniuk, 2011; Kitchin, 2014; Leonelli, 2016).
The term “big data” refers to the data sets of unprece-
dented size and applicability. Data points are mined from
many online sources including social media and are used to
develop models and make predictions germane to a broad
range of concerns including health care and economic
behavior. The open-source movement relates to the avail-
ability of big data but introduces a distinguishable set of
issues I will not engage for the present purposes. However,
the open-source status of big data sets contributes to reasons
big data science invites reflection on ethical issues intro-
duced by its emergence (e.g., privacy considerations). The
interdisciplinary scope of big data, its creation or strength-
ening of links between psychology and other disciplines,
and the projections that big data analysis will continue to
dominate for the foreseeable future invite reactions from
psychologists such as the following:
This broad-and-growing field offers a unique opportunity for
interested psychological scientists to be involved in addressing
the complex technical, substantive, and ethical challenges
with regard to storing, retrieving, analyzing, and verifying
large data sets. Big data science can be instrumental in
collaboratively working to uncover and illuminate cogent and
robust patterns in psychological data that directly or indirectly
involve human behavior, cognition, and affect over time and
within sociocultural systems. These psychological patterns, in
turn, give meaning to nonpsychological data (e.g., medical
data involving health-related interventions, booms and busts
tied to financial investing behavior). (Harlow & Oswald,
2016, p. 448)
Debate concerns the extent to which big data revolution-
izes science (Leonelli, 2016), but that it challenges taken-
for-granted assumptions and has far-reaching impact is less
controversial. Required of general psychology, consistent
with its point of view, is to neither embrace the trend uncrit-
ically nor to reject it out of hand as incompatible with tradi-
tional psychological data and methods. Instead, it falls to
the general psychologist, the psychologist taking the gen-
eral point of view, to seek to understand the significance of
big data developments for the field at large and to evaluate
their impact on present and future developments within it.
Especially, it falls to the general psychologist to better
understand how big data amplify or impede efforts to
address and represent the interconnections between differ-
ent branches of psychology (more accurately, between dif-
ferent dimensions of psychological phenomena), the
linkages with other disciplines, and the nature of the claims
that can be made.
As noted, sources within psychology and philosophy and
allied disciplines aid in the project of evaluation, the dimen-
sions of which are ethical, epistemic, and practical. For
example, among the set of questions with fundamental epis-
temic significance is whether “data-driven” research
accompanying access to data sets of great magnitude func-
tion to eliminate or at least call into question the role of
theory. Issues that straddle epistemic and ethical concerns
include the potentially haphazard and unorganized nature of
data collected, its tenuous relation to specific research ques-
tions and, consequently, its ambiguous value. The role of
the researcher’s creative model-driven reasoning and the
contribution of indiscriminately collected data to the pro-
gression of core theory in any science (including psychol-
ogy) are in need of sustained reflection.
Two sources I find especially helpful for understanding
the nature of the changes introduced by big data are a recent
paper by Adjerid and Kelley (2018) and a longer philosoph-
ical analysis of data-driven biological science by Sabrina
12 Review of General Psychology 24(1)
Leonelli. These papers are, indeed, exemplars of the general
point of view.6 First, Adjerid and Kelley suggest three ways
the problem-solving capacity of big data may be under-
stood, codified as “Big n,” “Big v,” and “Big t” (p. 902).
“Big n” refers to the dramatic increase in the number of
participants, “Big V” to the number and nature (“novelty
and diversity”) of variables available for analysis, and “Big
T” to the hugely expanded time frame, with data collected
continuously. These features of big data establish the condi-
tions of possibility for its problem-solving potential, though
Adjerid and Kelley do not shy from the conceptual and ethi-
cal and practical challenges that accompany the expanded
potential. They acknowledge that the majority of psycholo-
gists lack the technical expertise to enable them to collect
and analyze the data or to appraise contributions that make
use of it, creating a technology gap in the field between
those with the requisite skills and knowledge and those
trained in traditional psychological methods.
Leonelli’s focus is biology, but her effort to provide a
philosophical analysis of data-driven science has overlap-
ping and analogous relevance to psychological science and
provides a template for a generalist’s analysis of big data
analytics in psychology. As a direct counter to the view that
a data-driven research structure eliminates the need for the-
ory, her emphasis is on the forms of human activity that
become centrally important in “a data-centric approach to
science, within which efforts to mobilize, integrate, and
visualize data are valued as contributions to discovery in
their own right and not as a mere by-product of efforts to
create and test scientific methods” (Leonelli, 2016, pp.
1–2). She points out that despite the etymological ground-
ing of data in “what is given,” data are not given but made,
and made for specific purposes, always in relation to a
human aim (p. 71). After exploring the social, institutional,
and political circumstances that undergird contemporary
“data travel” (between research contexts, and for use by sci-
entific communities), she analyzes with great nuance what
counts as data, what counts as experiment, and what counts
as theory. Her concluding remarks encourage students of all
data-centric science to view data “not as inert objects with
intrinsic representational powers but as entities who acquire
evidential value through mobilization, and may undergo
significant changes as they travel” (p. 198). Against this
framing, she notes that analysis of the meaning of data must
be situated, related to the specific context and conditions of
use and the “packaging efforts” (p. 198) that make it avail-
able. Her larger aim, however, is to offer a framework
within which to evaluate recent trends and to emphasize the
human contribution that remains inextricable from science,
however sophisticated the underlying technology. Although
Leonelli’s expertise lies outside of contemporary psychol-
ogy, her approach and conclusions are fully consistent with
what I am calling the point of view of general psychology,
and useful for identifying the kinds of questions that
emanate from it in the face of sweeping disciplinary and
interdisciplinary transformation.
Proliferation of Methods
The trend toward big data analytics underscores that the
nature and meaning of standard or “mainstream” psycho-
logical methods can no longer be taken for granted. The
complexity of the methods question is made greater by
rapid and far-reaching expansion in the number and range
of qualitative methods used in the service of exploration,
innovation, or social justice. Many historical examples can
be named to argue that psychology has long made substan-
tive use of qualitative methods of various kinds (see Wertz,
2014), and, therefore, that the point of view of general psy-
chology has long been inclusive of these forms of inquiry.
However, the past decade alone has been witness to a
renaming of Division 5 to include qualitative methods, the
formation of the Society for Qualitative Inquiry in
Psychology (SQIP) associated with it, and the founding of
an APA journal dedicated to innovation in qualitative
inquiry, which also published guidelines for the preparation
and evaluation of qualitative research projects (Levitt et al.,
2017) and for journal reporting (Levitt et al., 2018). These
developments signal a more formal acknowledgment that
psychology has opened to a broader range of methods and,
arguably, that qualitative methods enjoy more credibility
and status within the discipline than has ever been the case.
The proliferation of methods accompanies new ques-
tions about the disciplinary status of psychology and its
relations to other disciplines. For example, although a
strong divide between natural and human science was once
the focus of a call for an alternative set of methods (e.g.,
Giorgi, 1970), recent years bear witness to an increased
interest in exploring the common ground of psychology and
the arts and humanities (Leavy, 2015; Teo, 2017). The idea
that all forms of human expression offer insight into subjec-
tive experience and, therefore, more comprehensive psy-
chological understanding is not new (e.g., see Koch, 1993),
yet formal recognition of the humanities-based psychology
marks a significant and novel development in the field, and
calls for reflection on its broader implications.
However, psychology’s relations to other sciences,
including science, technology, engineering, and mathemat-
ics (STEM) disciplines, are more directly and deliberately
considered, especially in conjunction with the growing inter-
est in Team Science, an interdisciplinary effort to understand
and facilitate cross-science collaboration (e.g., Bennett &
Gadlin, 2012; Falk-Krzesinski et al., 2010). In either direc-
tion—that is, toward psychological humanities or team sci-
ence, the proliferation of methods and the forging of new
relations with other disciplinary partners can accompany
conflicts in values. Conflicts in values accompany different
theoretical frameworks, different epistemic commitments,
Osbeck 13
and different points of emphasis, manifesting in different
ways of doing—different procedures. Thus, we may regard
methods as value systems, revealing and promoting an inter-
connected web of values in different value categories (e.g.,
epistemic, aesthetic, pragmatic, social; Levitt et al., 2017;
Osbeck, 2019), and different value systems are not always in
alignment. Put differently, psychology has become “epis-
temically multicultural” (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013, p.
1938). These differences, especially if not openly negoti-
ated, can create barriers to effective collaboration both
within psychology (i.e., among psychologists with incom-
patible epistemic values) and between psychologists and
researchers from other disciplines.
How should we understand the “point of view of general
psychology” against the proliferation of methods and the
concomitant potential for value conflicts? I suggest that the
generalist point of view in this case entails two important
functions: (a) It requires pursuit of an accurate and compre-
hensive understanding of where and how value conflicts
come into play and (b) it encourages open communication
and deliberation about values, seeking opportunity to iden-
tify commonality of purpose. In other words, the point of
view of general psychology not only seeks awareness of
differences but also identifies potential for productive
working relations, both between psychologists with differ-
ent values and between psychologists and other disciplines.
Again, this brings us into the province of something akin to
philosophy of science with application to psychology, not
least because it is within philosophy of science that discus-
sion of science and values has been prominent (e.g.,
Douglas, 2009; Lacey, 1999; Lauden, 1984; Longino,
1990). Philosophy of science also offers helpful resources
for encouraging open discussion of values. For example,
Michael O’Rourke and colleagues’ “Toolbox” initiative is
an explicit effort to encourage deliberation by initiating dia-
log about values in the interests of facilitating cross-disci-
plinary collaboration:
Because of its connection with a wide range of disciplines and
its appreciation for their conceptual foundations, we believe
philosophy can be systematically employed to help collaborators
abstract away from specific disciplinary differences toward
epistemic common ground, thereby facilitating development of
the mutual understanding necessary for successful cross-
disciplinary research (CDR). (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013, p.
1938; see also Klein, 2014; http://tdi.msu.edu/)
I suggest that general psychology also has connection
with a range of disciplines and, as noted, the point of view
of general psychology includes appreciation for conceptual
foundations. Thus, the Toolbox Initiative may assist psy-
chologists working with their own colleagues to better elab-
orate values. There are, of course, also many resources
within psychology to aid in the project of encouraging
values-based dialog. The important point is that it falls
within the province of general psychology, is consistent
with the general psychology point of view to understand
value conflicts as well as confluences, and to promote pro-
ductive dialog rather than retreat into respective ideological
and methodological silos.
A complementary responsibility for general psychology
is to foster awareness of methods and methodological tradi-
tions: their various aims, affordances, and limits—broad
understanding of their purposes, possibilities of applica-
tions, and problems. This is not a matter of having expertise
in each method; it is one of seeking to maintain the broad
vantage point, to understand (and articulate—to “repre-
sent”) how various methods might complement and
strengthen psychological inquiry by virtue of their similari-
ties or differences. The point of view of the general psy-
chologist, regardless of the nature and number of established
methods, is concern with the overall structure, the big pic-
ture: the contribution various methods make, and how they
relate to psychology’s responsibility to address the common
good.
Critical Psychology (CP)
The rise of CP interfaces with the increased presence and
acceptance of alternative psychological methods. As Teo
(2015) notes in his comprehensive overview, CP is an
international movement. Its influence is indicated by the
publication of textbooks, a four-volume encyclopedia,
sourcebooks, academic journals, the formation of organiza-
tions, and published histories. Self-identifying critical psy-
chologists engage with many subfields in not only
psychology, most notably social psychology, but also devel-
opment, education, clinical, community, and organizational
psychology. CP overlaps with other movements, including
feminist psychology, critical race theory, indigenous psy-
chology, social justice psychology, social constructionism,
and hermeneutic approaches, among others. Its theoretical
roots are many, and its projects include both negative cri-
tique and the positive contribution of new theory toward the
improvement of human life (Teo, 2013). Given its breadth
and overlap with other movements, CP presents its own
problems of definition and delimitation. Of interest is that
in attempting to define it, Teo (2009) implicitly acknowl-
edges two senses of CP, similar to our earlier distinction of
GP1 and GP2:
Should all approaches that provide a critical evaluation of
psychology’s mainstream be labelled critical psychologies? A
general concept of critical psychology would include all
approaches that critique psychology’s subject matter, or
methodology, or praxis, or a combination of these elements. A
specific concept of critical psychology, on the other hand,
would include approaches sceptical [sic] of the mainstream that
14 Review of General Psychology 24(1)
give primacy to the ethical-political dimensions of praxis. I use
the term praxis in contrast to the term practice to emphasize the
political nature of human activity in any applied area. (p. 37)
Coverage of CP is so thoroughgoing in Teo’s work and
elsewhere (e.g., Billig, 2008) that there is little I can add to
its description, and it is best simply to point the reader to
this work (e.g., Teo, 2009, 2013, 2015) However, I would
note the following: CP is in some respects coextensive with
general psychology, given that its concerns are disciplinary
foundations (metapsychology) and values, both epistemic
and social. Its very essence is critical evaluation—which I
have been repeatedly emphasizing as the point of view of
general psychology. However, CP presents the most formi-
dable challenge to psychology in its traditional or main-
stream trajectories, making the project of maintaining the
broad view, the overall structure earlier noted especially
difficult to accomplish. Can psychology integrate or incor-
porate the position of critic without undermining its very
conceptual and methodological edifices, sabotaging its own
disciplinary progression? More germane to the purposes of
this discussion, what is the point of view of general psy-
chology in relation to the challenges CP introduces?
The other examples of disciplinary developments we
discussed provide guidance for addressing this question.
First, from the point of view of general psychology, the pri-
mary responsibility is to seek to understand, to be aware of
CP and the challenges it poses for discipline—the form and
substance of the critique, at least in its most prominent man-
ifestations. As is required in the face of the proliferation of
new methods (discussed above under Example 2), general
psychology is tasked with understanding the values carried
by CP, and to pursue workable models for clarifying how
and where these values relate to those of psychology in the
main. In some cases, direct value conflicts may be inevita-
ble, but in other cases, similarity of values may be empha-
sized: “Critical psychologists are intellectually engaged
with concepts, theories, and social critique, but also invested
in challenging existing practices, resistance, and offering
alternatives. In doing so, they share values with traditional
psychology” (Teo, 2015, p. 250). Psychology, in other
words, has multiple values, so those of CP need not negate
but can supplement and strengthen other specializations,
even those criticized.
In short, general psychology does not require thorough
grounding in either the theoretical foundations or the array
of contexts of critical practice. What is consistent with the
general point of view is to grasp and reflect on the argu-
ments posed, to explicate or incorporate critical perspec-
tives as at the very least a form of oversight and
accountability, requiring reflection on who psychology
serves, and to what end. This in turn can serve as the disci-
pline’s conscience—a function that is vital to its long-range
viability and impact. It is also important for general
psychology to recognize CP as a source of forward-driving
theory, forging new directions of research and practice
informed by indigenous psychological models and emanci-
patory aims.
However, there may be occasions when it is consistent
with the point of view of general psychology to point out
that critique might require qualification or adjustment, for
example, where significant research or practice is over-
looked or when new developments call into question the
cogency of particular critical responses. For example, as a
general psychologist, I felt it important to highlight newer
frameworks and methods in cognitive science that aligned
in fundamental ways with the values and assumptions of
many critics of “cognitivism,” and suggested that sweeping
critiques require renovation in keeping with new develop-
ments (Osbeck, 2009; Osbeck et al., 2007). In each case,
there may be a need for general psychology to serve impor-
tant translation purposes: on one hand, underlining episte-
mological and ethical challenges introduced by CP and, on
the other hand, seeking accuracy and fairness in representa-
tion of psychological science in all of its variety and dimen-
sion. In both of these cases, it is consistent with the point of
view of general psychology to seek the larger framework, to
explore interconnections, and to acknowledge areas of
impasse, always evaluating the implications of new theo-
retical and research developments for this framework. Note
that “seeking the larger framework” is not to be taken as
consistent with the aim of unifying psychology. One could
seek the larger framework and come to the conclusion that
psychology resists unification, as others have demonstrated
(e.g., Green, 2015; Stam, 2004).
Summary and Conclusion
Although general psychology is ambiguously conceived
both at present and over the long view, it is useful to distin-
guish between two senses of general psychology, here
dubbed GP1 and GP2. GP1 refers to psychology in general,
or psychology at large; GP2 is a special focus within psy-
chology at large that brings a specific set of questions and
performs an important role. Drawing upon historical
resources, this article maintained that the search for implicit
invariants, encapsulated in the concept of “common ground”
is most appropriate for GP1, and that “the general point of
view” is most relevant to GP2. Both senses of general psy-
chology continue to be important. Proposed here is that the
“common ground” of psychology at large might not be a set
of empirical concepts or methods but rather a unique posi-
tion, that of a subject seeking to generate knowledge claims
about itself: the “known actor,” presupposed in any psycho-
logical understanding (Ward, 1904). That this position
invites continual reflection (ontological, epistemic, and
ethical) rather than a set of settled answers is an important
point to emphasize. For GP2, the point of view of general
Osbeck 15
psychology is one that carries with it a set of tasks or respon-
sibilities. Advances in psychological science usually come
through highly specialized research. They are not forged
with a sense of concern for their implications for psychol-
ogy as a whole. The specialist may not reflect on how new
research relates to other areas or to the history of the disci-
pline. It falls to the generalist to provide this integrative
analysis, to keep abreast of new developments across psy-
chology and evaluate their soundness and broader implica-
tions. These responsibilities are reflected in the mission
statements of the Society for General Psychology and in the
Review of General Psychology. Thus, on one hand, we
might claim that there is little need to reenvision general
psychology. On the other hand, what might be required is a
recommitment to these values and purposes, to appreciate
their enduring importance, despite, perhaps especially
because of new developments in psychology at large. A
renewal of vows is more in order than a new relationship.
For the purposes of illustrating the point of view of gen-
eral psychology, I examined three substantive develop-
ments in psychology: big data analytics, methodological
proliferation, and CP. These illustrations underscore not
only the enduring need for the general point of view but also
the fact that the evaluation of disciplinary trends and articu-
lation of values cannot be settled once and for all. There is
room for ongoing reflection, continual renewal, and refine-
ment in our integrative models, even as we maintain stead-
fastly the common ground and general point of view. Yet,
the function of the general psychologist is not merely to
provide conceptual overlay but through important transla-
tion work to encourage mutual understanding and collabo-
ration. As is recognized by those who acknowledge the
value of cross-disciplinary research (to which intradisci-
plinary collaboration is analogous), mutual understanding
in the service of collaborative problem solving may be our
only hope in confronting challenges facing us as a disci-
pline and a species.
Not by accident do we end this discussion by implicating
values, both social (sustainability) and epistemic (multiper-
spectival understanding). The overarching point of this
article is that general psychology is the research specialty
most closely aligned with philosophy of science, but it is a
philosophy of science from within, rather than as an exter-
nal, witness. As such, general psychology is the specialty
most responsible for leading exploration of the meaning,
relative coherence, viability, and value of our research and
practice in each new generation of psychologists, in view of
the changes in their field and the demands of the world in
which they find themselves. These efforts must be rigorous,
specific, and sustained.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Lisa M. Osbeck https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1279-8278
Notes
1. Although “Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology”
(Division 24) explicitly takes up the charge of philosophical
reflection, it does not always do so by directly engaging the
empirical literature of psychological science. In comparison
with “History of Psychology,” general psychology may focus
more directly on contemporary movements. There is obvious
overlap between philosophical, historical, and general psy-
chology, but my point is to introduce some ways of drawing
clearer distinctions between them.
2. We might make the further distinction of demarcating general
psychology to “that which is common to all persons,” which
we might designate as GP3.
3. These examples should be considered in the context of
broad-scale transformations in disciplinary psychology in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, about which much has
been written. See, for example, Araujo (2016) and Hatfield
(2003).
4. Ward (1904) noted a broad array of problems but concluded
that the definition of psychology, the nature of “subject activ-
ity,” and criticism of the atomistic theory are the most funda-
mental at the time of his writing (p. 621).
5. An anonymous reviewer offered the helpful insight that
“point of view” might be interpreted as a merely cognitive
act, suggesting “practice” or “form of life” as broader terms,
and preferable in implicating value stances and power
dynamics tied to perspective taken (e.g., see Stetsenko,
2018). Thus, I should clarify that consistent with earlier
work (especially Osbeck, 2019; Osbeck & Nersessian,
2017), I understand “point of view” here as a form of prac-
tice: a cognitive practice yet linked to epistemic identity,
thereby implicating values and traditions of hierarchical
(power) relations between disciplines. Yet, the reviewer’s
point that adopting point of view is embedded in a larger
social practice, the conditions of which are both ethical and
epistemic is an important one.
6. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing to a
thoughtful interdisciplinary analysis of “Big Data” as a
social and technological development, one yet more critical
in assessing the long-term consequences of contemporary
trends (see Boyd & Crawford, 2012).
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