Rhetorical Trajectories from the Early Heidegger

David L. Marshall

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 50, Number 1, 2017, pp. 50-72 (Article)

Published by Penn State University Press

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 Rhetorical Trajectories from the Early
Heidegger

David L. Marshall

a b s t r ac t

With the publication in 2002 of Martin Heidegger’s summer semester 1924

­lectures, “Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,” a major new star appeared in
the constellation that is twentieth-century rhetoric. Since then, a growing second-
ary literature has emerged. This article organizes that literature as a series of speci-
fications closing in on Heidegger’s critical conception of rhetoric as potentially a
hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with others, and it claims that our under-
standing of this everydayness will remain flat or partial until we situate the concept
in the sequence of Heidegger’s thought in the 1920s. If we work through pre-1924,
1924, and post-1924 periods, it becomes clear that there are religious, modal, and
sophistic contexts for Heidegger’s evolving conceptualization of everydayness. The
concept of everydayness that emerges is disheveled but rich. The article concludes
by suggesting that only faint echoes of these potent rhetorical trajectories can be
discerned in the late Heidegger.

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, everydayness, religiosity, modality, sophistic

introduction
In the early work of Martin Heidegger, I argue, we can confect a particular
and particularly useful conception of rhetoric as a capacity to articulate
situatedness by means, in part, of a more precise vocabulary for what I call
the phenomena of everydayness. One aspect of this claim is that rhetoric is
a diagnostic of established positions. Practicing what I preach, my first task
here is to articulate as synoptically as possible the established positions on

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2017

Copyright © 2017 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
 rhetorical trajectories from the early heidegger

the topic at hand. In the most general terms, that topic is “Heidegger and
rhetoric.” We can identify eight stances in the literature. I articulate them
in order of determinateness, as a series of specifications.
First, before the publication in recent decades of his 1920s lecture
and seminar courses in the German edition of the complete works, it was
possible to defend the position that Heidegger—like many a philosopher
before and after him—more or less ignored rhetoric.1 Second, one might
read Heidegger as ultimately an enemy of rhetoric, if one took his ­disdain
for “idle talk,” “Gerede,” to be directed at those who may be said to orient
themselves to words more than phenomena or if one glossed Sein und
Zeit’s commitment to authenticity as a conscious rejection of “public,
social, communal life” (Discenna 2014, 260). Third, when one knew that
Heidegger had invested heavily in a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in
his 1924 summer semester lectures at Marburg, one might claim that he
learned his lessons more as an orator than as a rhetorician. That is, one
could illuminate Heidegger’s own public speaking practices against the
historical background of Marburg, the Ruhr, and Freiburg in the 1920s
and 1930s (Kisiel 2000, 185–208). Fourth, one could reroute Heideggerian
rhetoric into a theory and practice of hermeneutics: Heidegger continu-
ally stressed listening as the more basic mode of speech; he understood
hermeneutics as a practice of opening up, not as an “art” of interpretation;
and, as a reader, he was highly rhetorical, attuned to the identification
of performatives (Elden 2005, 297, Smith 1998, 1–2, Feldman 2004, 163).
Fifth, one could specify this proto-Gadamerian hermeneutic communi-
tarianism by taking up the Heideggerian term of art, “Miteinandersein,”
“being-with-another,” to argue that rhetoric was the organ by which
political community would be explicated, that the being of a public was
to be understood in terms of moods and emotional o­ rientations, or that
prayer could be understood as a rhetorical being-with-an-­impersonal-
other (Radloff 2001, 439, Smith and Hyde 1991, 447–49, Mailloux 2014,
423–24). Sixth, specifying further, one could argue that this being-with-
another ought to be understood as an appropriation of the ­rhetorical—
principally Aristotelian—conception of pathos, with the result that
emotions would be understood first and foremost not as body states
belonging to individuals but rather as relations between parties in which
“passivity and activity are fundamentally interanimate” (Gross 2005, 21).
Seventh, one could read the situatedness of this emotional topography as
a renovated stasis theory—a reading of topoi as places of encounter and,
simultaneously, as the standard arguments or standard places in which

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argumentation might be discovered. For example, one might argue that

the work of art can be a nascent aesthetic topos discerning a previously
nameless vector of the sensus communis. Or one might claim that nam-
ing a vector of the sensus communis can be a renaming, with the new
emerging as variation on a theme, a kind of temporal stretching out of and
back to an established topos. Or one might suggest that topics itself can
be classified as a precursor to the Heideggerian redescription of abstract
mathematized space as situated place (Reeves and Stoneman 2014, 152,
Grassi, 1990, 100–102, Pöggeler 2005, 163–34). Eighth, one could examine
such topoi more carefully in order to reveal their time-structures, and
one could motivate such an investigation by pointing out that scholars
had been repeating Heidegger’s claim that Aristotle’s Rhetoric should be
understood as “die erste systematische Hermeneutik der Alltäglichkeit
des Miteinanderseins,” “the first systematic hermeneutic of the every-
dayness of being-with-others,” without ever asking themselves what the
man was really getting at with the odd and crucial term “Alltäglichkeit,”
“everydayness” (Heidegger 1927, 138).2
In this article, I push further into the notion that if one is to understand
Heidegger’s reception of rhetoric, one has to focus on “everydayness.” This
move has been made before, and so further specification is required. The
literature provides four established subpositions. One can say that “because
it is the most pervasive aspect of the world, everydayness is the familiarity
of ‘being-at-home’ in the possibilities of ‘the they,’” possibilities that “are
conventional, traditional, and habitual.” That is, what happens everyday or
is everyday mouthed and enacted by a third-person plural set of human
beings to which one belongs slips into a narcoleptic oblivion occasioned by
empty repetition (Smith 2003, 96).3 One can also work on the assumption
that the Heideggerian emphasis on everydayness is a kind of early intuition
of the “ambient rhetorical” qualities of persuasions and cues and communi-
cations that hover in a multitasked, media-saturated, twenty-first-century
no-man’s-land between the attention-grabbing and the inconspicuous, such
that “the everyday” is a cognate of “everyware,” “environment,” and “attun-
ement” (Rickert 2013, 170, 31, 1–2, 8–9, 145–56). Or one can point out that the
being of the everyday consists only in its appearance as a backdrop in times
of crisis, when the radically contingent intervenes (Kisiel 2005, 144). Finally,
one can double down on this temporalization of the everyday by arguing
that, in fact, “everydayness” is not the oblivion into which the habitually-
so state of affairs slips but rather the intense iterability of the now that is
always a now-when, a now-after, and a now-before. Everydayness, on this

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account, is actually a kind of Sisyphean always beginning each day anew

(Struever 2005, 110–11).
In response to and out of these four positions, I make the following
claim: Heideggerian everydayness is both a paradoxical concept that sub-
sumes a number of quite distinct notions and a potentially powerful descrip-
tor of situations in which appeal and argument and persuasion take place.
To develop our sense of the rich paradoxes of everydayness, I trace a short
history of the concept in Heidegger’s early work. Everydayness began its
conceptual life not as the delineation of a specious and inauthentic routine
but rather as a kind of vigilant spiritual waiting—standing guard. Indeed,
everydayness became one among several basic Heideggerian modalities. It
was a particular species of entelecheia (a being-complete or -finished) along-
side the potentiality of dunamis and the actuality of energeia. Subsequently,
in some of Heidegger’s lecture courses between summer semester 1924 and
the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927, we see a calcification of everyday-
ness, where—associated now with sophistic—it becomes a kind of repeti-
tion that roams free from the locus of originary experience. Everydayness
thus morphs from vigil to modality to rut, but this conceptual metastasis
generates a rich set of categories (I distinguish thirteen), and these catego-
ries become a “topics of everydayness” that critics can deploy to discover
better descriptions of rhetorical situations.
The mode of inquiry I adopt is intellectual history, and the intellec-
tual historical trajectory I relay here is one of declension. Indeed, this shift
of everydayness from vigil to modality to rut becomes emblematic of the
broader fate of rhetoric in the Heideggerian program: the freshness of the
original reading is gradually lost, and, in a brief conclusion, I make good on
this claim by tracing the afterlife of rhetorical inquiry in the later Heidegger
and by proposing that rhetoric’s significance there is limited. Thus, the arti-
cle examines the development of Heidegger’s thought on rhetoric up to
the husk 1927 sentence on rhetoric as a hermeneutic of everydayness that
stands in Sein und Zeit as a monument, a mausoleum, to his fitful but at
times intensive engagement with rhetoric in the earlier 1920s. I claim that
this sentence marks a kind of end point for Heidegger’s appropriation of
rhetoric. I claim further that if one is to unpack the cryptic, coded, abbrevi-
ated claims of that sentence, then one has to revisit the process of inquiry
to that led to it. In this way, contemporary rhetoricians can pick up where
Heidegger left off and adopt the sentence as a point of departure. But the
flinty surface of that core claim requires supplement if we are to do more
than translate laconic Heideggerese into loquacious Heideggerese. That is,

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if we want to take up the concept as a line of inquiry, then we have to study

it as a line of inquiry first. Thought, I am arguing (here and elsewhere, e.g.,
Marshall 2013), finds motion and possible motion in its own history.

before summer semester 1924

As a concept in the Heideggerian quiver, everydayness ended up as a ­diagnosis
of the impossibility of repeating an experience without annihilating the
capacity of that experience to present itself in place and time, but it began
as a related but normatively quite distinct commitment to the theory and
practice of vigilance. To understand this, one needs to look to Heidegger’s
early work on religiosity. I highlight three moments in this early work: his
investigation of Pauline historicity, his discussion of Augustinian sinful-
ness, and his dramatization of delayed choice.
In 1920, during his fifth semester of teaching at Freiburg following
his return to university life after the war, Heidegger taught a course bear-
ing the title, “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion.” In sub-
stance, the lectures were focused on a close reading of Paul’s two letters to
the Thessalonians. As Heidegger explained it, it was crucial to go beyond
what he termed an “object-historical” contextualization—twenty years
after the crucifixion, upon Paul’s first mission to Corinth, following time
spent in Philippi, Thessaloniki, Athens, and Saloniki. He wanted to recon-
struct what he called a “vollzugsgeschichtliche Situation,” a “performance-­
historical situation,” which entailed reenacting the situation in which the
letters were written. “We write the letter with Paul,” so Heidegger. That
is, “we perform with the man himself the letter-writing, that is, the dicta-
tion” (1995, 87). We should understand performative reenactment as a very
particular temporalization of experience in which every now is a now that
anticipates the future and metabolizes the past.
What emerged from Heidegger’s experiment in reconstructive reading
was a revision of the early Christian understanding of eschatology. Two
decades after the crucifixion, there persisted in the letters a lived experi-
ence of waiting for the second coming of Christ, the parousia. Heidegger
related that, according to some interpreters, Paul’s enframings of the par-
ousia in the first and second letters were different. Thus, “according to the
second letter, the arrival of the Antichrist precedes the parousia with war
and turmoil, whereas, according to the first letter, peace and security reigns
prior to the parousia—and the Second Coming arrives unexpectedly” (106).
Heidegger rejected the supposition that Paul’s insertion of the Antichrist

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as an intermediary sign of the approaching parousia lessened the tension

involved in a completely unheralded, unpredictable imminence. He saw
the second letter as a ratcheting up of the pressure on the believer, whose
own comportment was now said to be a factor in the Second Coming. The
temporal structure of early Christian experience, as represented by Paul, is
one of anguished expectation and self-inspection. That is, “if the parousia
is dependent on how I live, and if I am then incapable of maintaining the
required faith and love, then I approach a state of profound distress” (107).4
Each day lived in a state of blessed faith that is not the Second Coming is
simply a day that must not be betrayed tomorrow, and thus every achieve-
ment appears only to increase the scale of the task.
We should notice two things about this discussion. First, Heidegger
insisted that the temporal structure of this experience was to be fixed on
the Augenblick, the moment. Each moment was a moment that was not
the eschaton. The continual delaying of the Second Coming constituted a
threat to the believer whose faith perhaps had limits. As Heidegger empha-
sized, this experience of time was one in which every then was a then when
something had not happened. Second, such an orientation to kairos, to the
moment of intervention, was relentless. The moment, the day, the cycle was
endlessly self-regenerative. Here is the point: this relentlessness ought to
be understood as an early variant of the concept that Heidegger would
develop into the mid- and later 1920s sense of Alltäglichkeit, everydayness,
repetition, cycle.
Precisely this quality of “every-day-anew” was conspicuous in
Heidegger’s treatment of Augustine’s Confessions in his subsequent sum-
mer semester 1921 lectures on Augustine and Neoplatonism. The basic
thrust of Heidegger’s lectures was to ask “what does confessing in the
face of God mean, and what does confessing in the presence of fellow human
beings mean?” (177–78). Heidegger read these very particular rhetorical
situations as counterparts of Augustinian tentatio (trial, temptation).
He then seized on the particular time structure of the way in which
Augustine was “a burden,” “eine Last,” to himself (206). The experience
of sexual temptation was to be understood not simply in its carnality
but more precisely in its dailyness. “Täglichkeit” was the unusual word
Heidegger used to abstract Augustine’s characterization of sexual desire
as malitiae diei et noctu (212). The locus of the experience of temptation,
though, was not so much the flesh as language. When Augustine said
“quotidiana fornax nostra est humana lingua” (“our daily furnace is the
human language”), Heidegger explained, he had been conceiving of

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“language as a mechanism of enforcement for a worldly . . . experiencing

with others.” Heidegger was proposing that in publicly available signs
of sexuality Augustine was accosted not simply by his own desires but
also by the desires he assumed others associated with such signs (262).5
Saturated in the valences of symbol, the I was becoming another.
The following semester (in his winter semester 1921–22 lectures),
Heidegger replicated the juxtaposition of minute attention to both the
specificities of daily experience and events of an epochal significance—
whether Second Coming or salvation. Here, the subject shifted from the
personalized world-historical situations of Paul and Augustine to the situ-
ation faced by Heidegger himself and his students. In the context of the life
nexus of the university (“in this lecture hall: you in front of me, I in front
of you, we with one another”), Heidegger said that “we are the descen-
dants of forebears in a way unlike any previous generation,” for “we have a
pronounced historical consciousness . . . of this fact,” namely, our descent, our
status as late-comers; “we live in this consciousness, we see ourselves in it,
and we spy—or rather await—the future through and out of this conscious-
ness.” This was a consciousness of decline. Heidegger noted that Oswald
Spengler, author of The Decline of the West (which first appeared in 1918), was
the “forceful and [paradoxically] confident expression” of this consciousness
(1994, 63, 73–74).6 True, Spengler might be a kook, flawed as a thinker, and
panned by the proclaimed experts, but what counted for Heidegger was
that Spengler was the purest expression of a mood that he perceived—
Germany, 1921, distilled.
The invocation of Spengler was chiefly a gesture, pointing toward a
deliberately out-of-focus background behind the moment encountered
in the lecture hall. Heidegger’s real aim was to dramatize scholarly work
itself. (This was, among other things, a self-dramatization, one presumes.)
This was the dilemma, “to be decided, as a matter of principle”: “either we
live, work, and research beholden to unexamined necessities and suggested
moods, or we are capable of grasping a radical idea in a concrete manner
and gaining our being in it” (1994, 70). The choice was Kierkegaardian. But
perhaps even more important than the choice itself was the quasi-religious
time structure that Heidegger imposed on it.7 He immediately cautioned
against a premature choice between authenticity and inauthenticity. One
was supposed to adopt a posture of resolute waiting, a resoluteness that
was “more certainly present the less it bursts out, the more it remains silent
and can wait” (71). The moment of decision could only be experienced as a
mood, a mood of constant, anxious, perhaps heroic deferral.

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In summer semester 1923, Heidegger delivered “Ontology (The

Hermeneutics of Facticity),” in which these three forms of anguished
self-awareness—Pauline eschaton, Augustinian tentatio, and Heideggerian
entweder-oder—were folded into an examination of hermeneutics itself.
Heidegger railed against what he took to be Friedrich Schleiermacher’s
misprision of hermeneutics. This nineteenth-century forebear had con-
jured up “the sweeping and quickly spied idea of a hermeneutics—compare
Augustine!—confined to an ‘art [that is, a doctrine] of understanding’ the
speech of another” (1988, 13; see Smith 1998, 2, on Heidegger’s critique of
Schleiermacher). Out of the example of Augustine, Heidegger had extrapo-
lated a sense of hermeneutics that denoted “a concerted manner of exerting,
valuing, engaging, questioning, and explicating facticity,” where “facticity
is a term denoting the presencing of ‘our’ ‘own’ being” (7–8). In this way,
the palpability of one’s own indistinctness from others that Augustine had
addressed was reconfigured. The quotidian threat of the secrets in himself
(the masquerades that Augustine had feared) became the everydayness, the
Alltäglichkeit, that we encounter in §27 of Sein und Zeit. Everydayness was,
on one view, a kind of threat to “facticity.” That is to say, the specificity of
every particular being’s relationship to the world could be disguised by that
individual’s reading of itself through the terms, perspectives, and habits of
others. The scene of genuine encounter involved incalculability, character-
ized by “a stiffening associated with the intrusive and the accidental” (100).
Thus, everydayness came to encapsulate a paradox: each and every day, as
if aboriginally, one was to engage the received and habitual categories left
behind by repeated performance.

summer semester 1924

In his summer semester 1924 lectures Heidegger made a host of startling
claims for the significance of the Rhetoric within the program of Aristotelian
research—and indeed within the history of inquiry more generally. Take
three such claims as examples: it is better to have the Rhetoric than any
­philosophy of language; the Rhetoric is the document of the Greek experi-
ence of language; rhetoric, in this incarnation, claims simply to be politics
(2002, 117, 61, 135). On this account (and in stark contrast to Heidegger’s
interest in the atemporal quality of propositions in his dissertation), logos,
Sprechen, would always be “a speaking to someone or with others, with oneself
or to oneself” (17).8 In his gloss, one finds the insistence that hearing must
be the most fundamental mode of perceiving. Also, there is the insistence

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that the definition of the human being as zoon logon echon ought not to be
translated as “an animal possessing reason” but rather as “a life form that
has its own most characteristic manifestation in conversation and in speech”
(108). The model, as so often, was the intensity of Greek orality. To gener-
ate a modern German analogue, Heidegger said, one would be forced to
say something strange. He improvised: “The human being is a life-form
that reads the newspaper” (“der Mensch ist ein Lebendes, das Zeitung
liest” [108]) and has its existence in that reading.9 That is, the existence, the
­ex-stases, of a being would be the array of distances set out in a world of
appearances as splayed by the newspaper. And here we find the line that
historians and theorists of rhetoric cannot forget: “The concrete document
for the primordialness of the Greek view of logos was the Rhetoric in its
entirety.” Here we are to understand “logos” as the fundamental way in
which human being would actualize itself against the background of the
world (61).10 Speech cast human being in relief.
In the Grundbegriffe lectures, Heidegger moved decisively away from
the conception of rhetoric as an art, a technē. The incessantly repeated
code that rhetoric would be an art of persuasion, a power of inculcating
belief, a peithous dēmiourgos, was for Heidegger a classic example of how
terms come to overlay experiences in such a way that in the absence of the
corresponding experience a term loses its true significance. Call rhetoric
a maker of persuasion and people will fear it. They will call it insincere,
they will call it manipulation, and they will fall into an echo chamber of
contempt. Heidegger accepted that Aristotle had described rhētorikē as
a technē, more often than not. Nevertheless, he willfully dismissed this
classification as “ungenuine” and seized instead on the definition near the
beginning of the Rhetoric that presents rhētorikē as a dunamis, a power
or possibility. Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s famous stipulation
“estō dē rhētorikē dunamis peri hekaston tou theōrēsai to endechome-
non pithanon” is “rhētorikē ist die Möglichkeit, am jeweils Gegebenen zu
sehen das, was für eine Sache, die Thema der Rede ist, spricht, jeweilig
zu sehen das, was für eine Sache sprechen kann” (114). His emphasis was
on sheer possibility (“Möglichkeit” rather than “Vermögen” translates
“dunamis”), and he said explicitly that, as compared to the older sophistic
definition of rhetoric as peithous dēmiourgos, the Aristotelian definition
had been much more “cautious.” It did not claim a capacity to achieve
purpose. It concentrated instead on simply laying out before the faculty
of sight the various courses of action that were at hand and considering
them as continuations.

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Heidegger’s understanding of hermeneutics as a practice and not an

art ought to be understood in direct relation to this reorientation of rheto-
ric toward possibility. Hermeneutic is dunamis, capacity and practice, not
theory of reading. Considered in this connection, rhetoric would simply
present the immediate and mediate possibilities deriving from the situa-
tion in which particular beings found themselves. Rhetoric as hermeneu-
tics would then be the practice of a being orienting itself more fully, more
perceptively to the range of possibilities in which its own being consisted.
The possibilities of a situation would be the situation, and we can make
the verb “to be” transitive too, rescuing it thereby from a merely predica-
tive deliquescence. That is, the threats and opportunities clustered around
a situation would constitute that situation. Possibility would not be outside
of or next to being. It would one of being’s basic modalities. Precisely here
(it is no coincidence), we encounter a first draft of the sentence in Sein und
Zeit that would be the last index of Heidegger’s investment in this line of
inquiry: “Die Rhetorik ist nichts anderes als die Auslegung des konkreten
Daseins, die Hermeneutik des Daseins selbst” (110). That is, “Rhetoric is
nothing other than the laying out of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic
of being-there itself.” This laying out was an articulating of actuality by
means of possibility. As Heidegger would later say in Sein und Zeit, inverting
an Aristotelian topos in the process, “höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die
Möglichkeit,” “higher than reality there is possibility” (1927, 38).
Aristotle’s Rhetoric fascinated Heidegger in 1924, I would argue, because
to him it seemed to constitute the centerpiece of the entire Aristotelian
research program. It brought together basic concepts that ran from the
logical works of the Organon all the way to the treatments of animal life
and motion and the theoretical work of the Physics. Ousia, kinesis, and logos
were three of the terms to which he returned again and again. Heidegger
noted that, although it would sometimes appear in the plural in Greek,
ousia had been for the most part an uncountable noun that functioned in
the singular. He emphasized that being could not be understood as a kind
of matter or as a predicate but had instead to be understood as a particu-
lar mode, as a being-always-situated-in-some-particular-here-and-now, a
being-there or Dasein. And, of course, this would be decisive for Sein und
Zeit itself. Things and predicates, when possessed, appear to have the qual-
ity of constancy of existence. One “has” them regardless of whether they are
being used or not. But Heidegger will want to say that the better reading
of the Greek verb “to have” is “to have present,” rather than “to have tucked
away somewhere.” Ousia, Heidegger noted, had been an abbreviation of

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parousia (think Paul and the Thessalonians), and a greater specification of

its ­meaning could be achieved by comparing it to its antonym, apousia. The
antonym denoted not simply an absence or a nothing but rather a deficiency
with regard to the quality of presence. As Heidegger explained, “peering is
a looking into apousia.” Thus, ousia was not simply “presence,” but a kind of
“fully presentness,” a manifest explicitness, one might say. And apousia was
not simply a radically blank nothingness; it was partial absence, impreci-
sion, a blunted and not blank indeterminateness. Being admits of degrees.
Presence would intensify and fade. Moments calling pasts and futures into
their gravitational field were in a more intensive and more complex way.
Being, in this sense, was a kind of colliding the past into the future or the
articulation of that collision. The moment dilated tensions. It was a range
and reach of tensions (2002, 33).11
Particular aspects of this ousia might be discerned, Heidegger argued,
through the terms “energeia,” “dunamis,” and “telos.” As “actuality” and
“potentiality,” energeia and dunamis had been, of course, absolutely funda-
mental terms in the Aristotelian lexicon. Heidegger cautioned that they
ought never to be read in isolation from one another. The rhetorical experi-
ence of a particular moment defined by the series of possibilities attendant
to it was at work in his stipulation that every actuality would possess its
own potentialities and was in point of fact to be identified in large part
through them. Heidegger objected strenuously to the conventional transla-
tion of “telos” as “aim” and argued instead that it was to be understood as a
mode of being permitting something to rest in its own motion. “Telos,” of
course, underwrote that other key modal term, “entelecheia,” rendered by
Heidegger as “Fertigsein.” A telos would not be an aim. It would be a mode
of being beyond which a phenomenon would no longer be itself. It was a
fully-achievedness.
One species of Fertigsein (being-finished, being-spent), we might say,
was hexis or habit, which was a kind of mean of means. As Heidegger pre-
sented it, Aristotle had understood every interaction as a balance between
poiēsis and pathēsis, doing and suffering. Impact as a concept was an analogue
for the “rapprochement” between the impacting and the impacted object.
The impact of one object on another would be an expression of the relative
measures of their ability to occasion and accept motion. Both parties to
the process—both the doer and the sufferer—accommodated themselves
by degrees to the process and expressed in their respective accommoda-
tions a kind of halfway point, or mean (meson). Heidegger pushed further
and found that “the mean is nothing other than the kairos, the entirety of

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the circumstances, the how, when, whither, and about which” (171). What
Heidegger meant was that any given here and now would be a nexus
(whether static, in motion, or unpredictably in motion) of trajectories that
could be analyzed in terms of equal and opposite modes of action and
­passion—one side’s capacity to push and another’s to cede. After the too
soon and before the too late in the rhythm constituted from the ground up
as an idiolect by this complex gestalt lay the mean, the kairotic moment of
intervention.
Heidegger went on to explain that hexis, the condition that has become
permanent or semipermanent through repeated practice (whether active or
passive), was a kind of averaging of these clusters of rapprochement (179).
He pressed further into this concept of hexis, deriving from it a more precise
sense of Alltäglichkeit. Heidegger argued that the protostatistical quality of
hexis was at the core of everydayness. In the scenario where the quantity of
experiences of a certain kind was growing and where deviations from the
mean of that experience were becoming smaller and less frequent, the par-
ticular motions that were here and now could be said to be overshadowed
by the vastly greater number of past experiences that had been condensed,
statistically, into habit. In habit, that which was at hand would fade from
view. In this way, habit would be the capacity to act on the basis of some-
thing in the absence of devoting attention to it. As Heidegger expressed
it, “In the normal run of things, trusted objects are not really there for me;
I see through them; they do not possess the quality of presence; it is as if
they vanish from my everyday being-there” (32). Trust means not having to
scrutinize.
Finally, according to Heidegger, logos too was to be understood in terms
of the capacity to make that which is absent present or, as we have just seen
in the relationship between hexis and Alltäglichkeit, the capacity to make
that which is present absent. Logos is primarily concerned with alētheuein,
the practice of uncovering or disclosing things by pointing them out, pull-
ing them out of the flux of experiences in the world. Aisthēsis as a mode of
being in the world was therefore always already a form of krinein, a distin-
guishing or perceiving of differences. And aisthēsis was very closely related
to noein. “Noein” is often rendered blandly as a capacity to grasp by means
of the intellect, but Heidegger routinely translated it as “Vernehmen,”
which denotes a kind of examining characteristic of a trial, where listening
is intensively inferential (326). Equally inferential, one might say, phantasia
was an overcoming of the strict parameters of the here and now by making
present (vergegenwärtigen) that which was absent but relevant. All of the

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capacities of the soul were thus dimensions of the situatedness—diathesis,

Befindlichkeit—in which Dasein would exist.
Rhetoric, understood as a hermeneutic practice focused on situated-
ness and possibility, became a series of experiences underwriting balance
in moments of decision. Rhetoric represented the possible continuation
of particular scenarios. It therefore set the scene for prohairesis, the spe-
cific motion of taking a decision. As Heidegger framed it, prohairesis “leads
to the eschaton, to the point at which I latch on, where I really initiate
the action”  (146). Rhetorical practice would permit prohairesis to exhibit
the qualities of balance and deftness that were characteristic of those
motions that were not fighting against either an absence of preparation
or a prior overcommitment. One could become habituated to the experi-
ence of ­prohairesis. One could achieve a certain “telos,” a certain Fertigsein,
a certain calm, amid the most chaotic and unpredictable events. Thus, note
the insistence from Heidegger that habituation, Gewöhnung, is not a result
of Übung, exercise, but rather of Wiederholung, repetition, which is to be
understood not as “the bringing into play of a decontextualized skill but
rather an acting at each moment afresh on the basis of the relevant deci-
sion” (189).12 That is, it is not about isolating a motion and working it over.
It is about putting oneself in a situation of judgment and repeating it. That
is, one does not exercise “routine but rather a certain holding-of-oneself-
free, [nonactualized and] potent, at the mean” (“nicht Routine, sondern
Sichfreihalen, δύναμις, in der μεσότης” [190]). In this way, rhetorical orien-
tation to possibility might also seek to identify stances that could be most
easily redescribed should circumstances change. Likewise, a certain form of
everydayness would be concerned with preparing stances of readiness.
True, the experienced, the battle-hardened, the relaxed-in-the-midst-
of-action campaigner is a kind of professional cliché among rhetoricians.
For Heidegger, this kind of being-finished, this achieved aptitude was a
form of entelecheia. That is, beyond simply a being-possible, as dunamis, and
a being-activated, as energeia, there was a full achievement of the being
of a phenomenon, entelecheia. And here lay another form of everyday-
ness. In part, it was diurnal. Think Aristotle’s De caelo. Recall that the per-
fectly achieved motion had been the circular orbit that neither expanded
nor decayed. But it was also the everydayness of an architecture that
would always be encountered in the same way and would be understood
as eternal. Such an environment detached itself from any given here and
now. Its being was distributed in time in a distinctive way. Its quality of
­imperviousness—the practiced hand and the polished surface that neither

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accreted nor decayed—was a form of not being there and then. But the
­connection between habit and ­everydayness also took the form of some-
thing like training. If rhetoric was to be the hermeneutic of this every-
dayness, then it would bring into view all of the sedimentations the very
immobility of which had made them look like necessities.

after summer semester 1924

Even in the context of the summer semester 1924 lectures, Heidegger was
suspicious of the intensity of the Greek intrication of being and language.
As he put it, “when speech is the most characteristic possibility for presenc-
ing . . . , then precisely this speaking is also the possibility . . . of a presencing
that merges with and lets itself be led by typical tendencies, superficialities,
fashion, chatter” (108). It is true that “the specific hexis-character of phronēsis
is the eu bouleuesthai” (i.e., good deliberating), but, as we have seen, habit
was also a mode of making absent that which was present by merging it in a
quasi-statistical manner with previously experienced and similar phenom-
ena (1992, 138). In this manner, the similar would come to be treated as the
same. The power of krinein to distinguish among similars would subside.
Moreover, because the line between courage and foolhardiness (or generos-
ity and bribery) would often be very fine, dulled critical powers increased
risk. Heidegger was relearning a lesson taught by the ancient rhetoricians.
For them, paradiastole was not really a kind of willfulness in calling black
“white” and white “black.” It was instead an awareness of the kind of scal-
pel-sharp judgment required for making apposite distinctions.
In the Grundbegriffe lectures, Heidegger said that sophistry was proof
of the existence of the danger that repetition would make speech a mode
of absenting and not presenting. And it was to the problem of sophistry
that he turned in his winter semester 1924-5 lectures. There, he argued
that in order to approach Plato’s dialogue on the Sophist one had to go
back through book 6 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The 1924 ­interest
in ­prohairesis, opting, thus became an investigation of phronēsis, which
Heidegger understood not in the flat-footed sense of practical wisdom
but rather as Umsicht, which we might call a certain power of circumspec-
tion or a savviness about the conditions of possibility established by the
immediate environment (1992, 47). Despite his occasional lampooning of
what he termed “Entscheidungs-Gerede,” “decision fetish,” Heidegger cer-
tainly was interested in a Kierkegaardian pressurizing of the moment of
decision (2014b, 338). He once again invoked Paul’s Christian eschaton, but

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now in the Greek context of the moment in which action is chosen and
undertaken: “The eschaton is the moment of presencing in concrete beings;
it is the point at which the intervention of the physician begins and, by the
same token, the point at which the weighing up and the talking over cease”
(1992, 157). In this ultimate moment—the moment in which the surgeon
both decides to puncture the skin and does in fact puncture the skin—
Heidegger located not a faculty of will but a glance. Deliberation ended in
aisthēsis, a perceiving in the context of phronēsis that was both nous and “a
moment” in which “I overlook the concrete situation of the undertaking,
out of which and for which I resolve myself ” (165).
Heidegger was largely critical of Plato’s wholesale rejection of rhetoric
in addition to sophistry, but he did accept that the distance between the
ground of experience and the moment of the sophist’s utterance was cause
for suspicion. To have one’s being in speech would be to have one’s pow-
ers of perception vastly augmented because one would be benefiting from
the distinctions drawn and connections made by others in the form of the
words and phrases that one had inherited from them. But such inheritance
would be dangerous because it would facilitate a kind of speaking about
things fluently and intelligibly even in the absence of having experienced
the phenomena or the situations that had brought such paths of speech
into being in the first place. For this reason, “Everyday presencing operates
under a double coveredness: at first, in a simple ignorance, but then in a
much more dangerous coveredness insofar as that which has been discov-
ered becomes a kind of untruth on account of a merely idle talking” (16).
For Plato, the wandering sophist had been overly free to deploy—or to
advise the deployment of—far-fetched arguments in the here and now of
the city-states. Thus, in Heidegger’s words, “the immateriality of speech,”
when it is centered simply on access to and commerce with the world, “is
analogous to inauthenticity and uprootedness in human existence” (230).13
It was a cosmopolitanism that existed in tension with the city-state struc-
ture of Greek politics.
To the rhetorician, however, the manner in which Heidegger expressed
his distaste for idle talk might sound almost indistinguishable from a call
to employ the rhetorical device of enargeia or evidentia. Take, for example,
Heidegger’s discussion of the rather innocuous sentence “A few days ago,
it rained.” I can utter this sentence, Heidegger relayed, “without envision-
ing the rain and everything that went along with it for myself ” (25). Such
“envisioning”—“vergegenwärtigen,” once again—was precisely the role of
phantasia, tasked with making present in a sensory and not merely conceptual

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way that which was absent. The central paradox here (and one that would be
repeated incessantly in Sein und Zeit) was that precisely the same living with
others in the context of having to make decisions that brought language into
being in the first place would also be chiefly responsible for the corruption of
language and the beings who had their primary existence in it.
According to Heidegger, the reason that Aristotle remained so crucial
was that he understood the positive role of rhetoric even as he perceived
and opposed the threat of sophistic. Aristotle’s response to Plato’s desire
to institute a form of dialectic modeled on mathematical demonstration
was not to demote dialectic so that it simply became a form of small-group
disputation between scholars who had some reason to suppose that they
knew what they were talking about. Heidegger argued that Aristotle did not
demote Platonic dialectic but rather returned it to its fundamental role in
the Greek experience of language: “Dialectic is no art of cajoling; actually, it
has precisely the opposite sense, that is, it enables the speech partner to open
his eyes and see” (200). “As a result of the positive account developed by
Aristotle in the Rhetoric,” Heidegger pointed out, “rhetoric and s­ ophistic—
which were still regarded as one and the same in Plato—became separate”
(219). And, in the wake of Aristotle’s distinction, we can see that Plato him-
self had been unable to maintain a consistent line. Heidegger emphasized
that in the Phaedrus Plato had seen that, “insofar as it is concerned with logos
as peithous dēmiourgos (that is, insofar as it deals with probabilities or points
of view), rhetoric . . . is only really possible when it possesses some insight
into alētheia itself—namely, into true speaking” (318; see Plato, Phaedrus,
273d3ff ). Heidegger went so far as to say that insincerity would be entirely
compatible with an acquaintance with things as they were. His example was
the lawyer who would knowingly defend a case of paid murder by redescrib-
ing it as a heroic assassination. In order to be more than a mere babbler (and
thus unconvincing), the lawyer in that situation would have to channel some
real acquaintance with the phenomena of heroism (326).
In the summer semester 1925 lectures, History of the Concept of Time:
Prolegomena, one finds a further specification of the repeated, quotidian,
throwaway quality of Gerede. In addition to another example of idle talk
on the model of the sentence “Some days ago it rained” (this time termed
an “empty intending,” “Leermeinen,” in which a bridge is mentioned but
not “seen”), one encounters an example that turns on a more conceptual
“envisaging.” One could, Heidegger said, repeat the sentence “1 + 2 is 2 + 1”
in an entirely thoughtless manner even as one “understood” it and deployed
it appropriately. But one could also reenact this sentence more consciously,

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“so that each step is executed by means of a visualization of its meaning”

(1979, 54–55). In the absence of such envisaging (whether sensual or concep-
tual), the circulation of sentences would take on the form of a progressive
“petrification,” “Versteinerung” (119). What is interesting here is the notion
of temporal reenactment, ordering. The reading of a poem, like the reading
of a mathematical operation, would consist in marking the timing and the
turning of the lines, locating the inflection points and inflecting oneself in
them. And there would be a bell curve to one’s performance of the poem. It
might take several readings to find the real inflection points, but after sev-
eral more iterations one would know the inflections too well and become
incapable of reproducing them in oneself with the requisite spontaneity.
Repetition is a basic interest, but we should treat it carefully. Note that
“presencing should . . . be understood in the particular manner of its being,
and that means in the first place not in a manner of being that is somehow
emphatic or exceptional.” The project is not to depict some kind of rarely
attained desideratum, the fetish of the first time. Instead, Dasein’s way of
being “must be laid out in its nearest everydayness.” No exceptional circum-
stance can be adequately described in terms of uniqueness. Everydayness
is one of the anchors of the exception too. Heidegger specifies that “we are
reporting no particular everyday; we are instead in search of the everyday-
ness of the everyday” (207–8). The circularity of the phrase should give us
pause and make us surmise that the range of Alltäglichkeit’s meanings was
petrifying in Heidegger’s own mind—rendered narrow and polemical as
repetition, as indifference, as averageness, as an inability to see oneself, as
risibility (1927, 43).14
To counteract the ever-decreasing circles of late Heideggerian prose,
I propose a topics of everydayness. That is, I propose a list of headings under
which arguments can be found that describe the background structures that
give definition and depth to rhetorical situations:

1. The ordinary, the nonexceptional, the nonsingular, the that which

happens often and is as a result inconspicuous;
2. The trivial, the pleasantries one exchanges, the mindless repetitions
one endures in order to get through the day;
3. Nutrition, ablution, diurnal cycles—personal and cosmic;
4. Spaces that lie in the commons beyond the official, the sanctioned,
the fenced-off;
5. In-between spaces that are conduits en route to those other spaces in
which persons become purposeful;

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6. The reverie of the mind that is en route, walking and u

­ nderdetermined,
dream-stated, surreal, superimposed on by its encounters;
7. The accreting palimpsest of lived experiences amid the microaggres-
sions and tacit power negotiations of confrontations avoided, subli-
mated, or deferred;
8. The residue of these aversions in the body taken now as a congeries
of habits, whether capabilities or sensitivities;
9. The held-in-reserve and indeterminate position that may be acti-
vated at any moment;
10. The timely and time-filled quality of a body capable of keeping the
iterations of its habitual scenes distinct, such that habit begins to
look like a trained dexterity;
11. The practice of a body intent on treating all of its repetitions as nov-
elties that must be taken in their singularity—vigilance;
12. The distinctive being of a phenomenon that has what we might
call a distributed temporality because its quality of holding firm
as itself seems immune to both growth and decay—the worn
smooth;
13. The ersatz-necessary, the unchanging as a stand-in for the unchange-
able, the that which is thus, has always been thus, and presumably
always will be thus.

conclusion
In the summer semester 1924 Marburg lectures Heidegger stated at one
point that “an interpretation of [Aristotle’s] Rhetoric cannot be under-
taken here” (2002, 110). Did he undertake it elsewhere? No. Reading the
entirety of Heidegger’s published oeuvre from 1927 onward (that is, from
Sein und Zeit on down), one finds hardly any references to rhetoric at all.
The Aristotelian treatment of rhētorikē played a major role in the trans-
formation of Heidegger’s research program in the early 1920s. One only
has to read his first two books—on the nature of the proposition and
issues of speculative grammar in Duns Scotus, respectively—to realize
the sea change effected in the period immediately after the end of the
war. How should we narrate this disappearance of rhetoric after 1927?
I do not think that one can speak of a “sublimation” of rhetoric here.
The effacement is too complete. Even listening hard, one catches only
the faintest echoes. Let us, conjuring, say that there may be nine such
moments.

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 david l. marshall

First, there would be an epideictic quality to the account of truth,

Wahrheit, in Sein und Zeit, as alētheia, as the unconcealed or as the
“Sichselbstzeigende,” “the self-showing.” If forensic rhetoric had been ori-
ented to the past and deliberative rhetoric to the future, epideictic would
have been a precursor to the Heideggerian investigation of presencing as
a process of self-revelation and self-definition (1927, 28, 213). Second, the
conceptualization of nothingness in Was ist Metaphysik? not as absolute
nothingness but as “unspecifiability,” “Unbestimmbarkeit,” echoed the
rhetorical presupposition of contingency. That is, Heideggerian thought
vindicated and explicated the rhetorical presupposition that one often
acted in situations that were not so much unknowable as still coming
to a head (1929b, 25).15 Third, situating the capacity for temporal per-
ception itself in the Abbildung (imaging), Nachbildung (replicating), and
Vorbildung (preparing) of the imagination (as Heidegger would in his
Kant book) justified the rhetorical investment in spoken rhythms as
basic schemata. We might even say ancient scansion provided a technical
armature with which to express the philosophical position that move-
ment would be experienced as a number of elasticities stretching out into
the past and future (1929a, 166–67, 169). Fourth, Heidegger replicated the
rhetorical analysis of the maxim when he explained that we are lucky
only to have fragments from the Presocratics. It would be disastrous, he
decided, if we suddenly found copies of letters in which they explained
themselves, their day-to-day, their motivations. He was intuiting that
the isolated, stand-alone, quotable sentence is a topos standing ready for
implication in an enthymeme (2014a, 390). Fifth, when Heidegger went
on to say in one of his Hölderlin essays that “Dichtung ist das stiftende
Nennen des Seins” (“poetry is the foundational naming of being”), we
should observe that poetry has colonized the role of rhetoric in laying
out the appearance of phenomena. Naming founds. That is, naming puts
a thing on display, makes it the object of multiple perspectives, and—
for a time—renders that being more determinate (1936, 1073). Sixth,
there was a radicalization of the rhetorical obsession with possibility in
Heidegger’s classification of Nietzsche as the thinker of the last meta-
physical thought in his insistence that, incessantly creative, the will to
power would eventually differentiate all possibilities (as if the universe,
like chess, could eventually be “solved”), such that if one were to be one
had to will eternal recurrence. That is, a narrative runs from the duna-
mis of rhetoric through the stipulation that possibility was higher than

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actuality to the condemnation of the idea of a will that could, would, and
should actualize any and all possibilities (1961, 1.27, 466, 481). Seventh, in
the essay on the origin of the work of art, the emphasis on neither duna-
mis nor entelecheia but rather on energeia privileged what we might call
the irreducibly timed quality of a rhetorical performance, which, after all,
would be the staging of the revealing of a form. Art shared with rhetoric
a basic concern with the disclosing of a phenomenon, not its anticipation
or its achievement but instead its activation or coming into being (1950,
28, 68). Eighth, an almost unique acknowledgment of the lost central-
ity of rhetoric to Heidegger’s project then came in Was Heisst Denken?,
where we get a blithe acceptance that, yes, rhetoric is “das Vermögen
etwas vor- und durchzunehmen,” “the capacity to take something up and
to go through it,” a mode thus of that central Heideggerian predilection
Vernehmen, examining (1954, 27). Yet the banality of the reference corrob-
orates the hypothesis that the once explosive reception burned itself out.
Ninth, in Zeit und Sein (that belated, decades-late, supplement to the
1927 magnum opus), there was something like a refusal to accept that the
past or the future exist. There was a rejection of the present too, and time
was a dilation of the present, a concatenating out into tense and mood
as a spannedness. And here, we may perhaps say, the tenses and moods
of rhetorical inquiry—forensic, deliberative, epideictic—articulated their
inseparability (1969, 14).
This represents a fairly light haul, and, pursuing the metaphor,
some of it probably ought to be thrown back. The core Heideggerian
engagement with rhetoric came in the early work, and the modality
of everydayness was its chief concern. This was a conceptualization of
everydayness forged in Christian sensitivities to waiting, honed in rheto-
ric’s conscious attention to the modalities of being (where the possible
would structure the actual), and blunted by an increasingly prominent
suspicion of the human capacity to repeat and remain perceptive. If we
wish to a­ ppropriate Heideggerian concepts for the purposes of rhetorical
analysis, our focus should be everydayness—as a capacity to begin again
(and again), as a modal category with which to organize our sense of the
appearing of the world, and as an account of how that which is present
shades absent.

Department of Communication
University of Pittsburgh

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 david l. marshall

notes
1. As Michael Hyde (1994, 374) noted, “Martin Heidegger had precious little to say
about the scope and function of rhetoric.”
2. All translations from the German are my own.
3. When Hyde (2001, 27, 44, 62) characterized everydayness as the “communal
­normalcy” in which “the call of conscience is necessarily received,” he was speaking in a
similar way.
4. “Wenn die παρουσια davon abhängt, wie ich lebe, dann bin ich außerstande, das
von mir geforderte Glauben und Lieben durchzuhalten, dann komme ich in die Nähe der
Verzweiflung.”
5. “Sprache als Weise des Vollzugs mitweltlichen (konkreten faktishen) Erfahrens.”
6. Compare the sketch of this period in Kisiel 1993, 63.
7. Kierkegaard’s Either-Or is cited at Heidegger 1994, 182.
8. Heidegger supplemented his reading of Aristotle’s corpus of texts with Crusius’s
edition of Nietzsche’s lectures on the history of Greek eloquence (Nietzsche, 1912). In
­particular, he emphasizes the following passage: “Das Volk, das sich an solcher Sprache,
der sprechbarsten aller, ausbildete, hat unersättlich viel gesprochen” (qtd. in Heidegger
2002, 109).
9. In a recent interview, Hermann Heidegger (the elder son of Martin Heidegger)
has reported that his father hardly ever read a newspaper and certainly did not make it
part of his daily regimen. Whence then his grasp of everyday politics? Secondhand, from
faculty colleagues. See Radisch and Heidegger 2014.
10. “Der λογος ist von den Griechen ursprünglich gesehen. Heute haben wir
eine primitive oder gar keine Vorstellung von Sprache. Der konkrete Beleg für die
Ursprünglichkeit des Sehens ist die ganze ‘Rhetorik.’”
11. “Oυσια ist die Verkürzung von παρουσια, ‘Gegenwärtigsein.’ Häufiger ist das
Gegenteil απουσια, ‘Abwesenheit,’ d. h. nicht einfach nichts, sondern es ist etwas da, aber
in einem Mangel. Schielen ist ein Sehen in der απουσια.”
12. “Wiederholung besagt nicht: Ins-Spiel-Bringen einer festsitzenden Fertigkeit,
sondern in jedem Augenblick neu aus dem entsprechenden Entschluß heraus Handeln.”
13. “Die Sachlosigkeit der Rede [ist] gleichbedeutend mit der Unechtheit und der
Entwurzelung der menschlichen Existenz.”
14. “Wir nennen die alltägliche Indifferenz des Daseins Durchschnittlichkeit.” Then,
Heidegger (2014a, 330): “die größte Gefahr ist nicht die Barbarei und der Verfall, denn
diese Zustände können in ein Äußerstes Hinaus- und so eine Not hervortreiben. Die
größte Gefahr ist die Durchschnittlichkeit.”
15. “Die antike Metaphysik faßt das Nichts in der Bedeutung des Nichseienden,
d. h. des ungestalteten Stoffes, der sich selbst nicht zum gestalthaften und demgemäß ein
Aussehen (eidos) bietenden Seienden gestalten kann.”

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