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    Sultan Imperial Council Grand Vizier Cha

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    Fatih Yucel

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    ‘Acta Oriental Academiae Scientiarum Hung, Tomus XLVI (1-2), 67-85 (1994) SULTAN, IMPERIAL COUNCIL, GRAND VIZIER: CHANGES IN THE OTTOMAN RULING ELITE AND THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND VIZIERAL TELHIS PAL FODOR, (Budapest) (Originally, telfis meant “summary, abstract”. As a term of state administration it ‘mostly, but not exclusively, denoted the petitions submitted by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan, The Grand Vizieral relbis does not belong to the favourite research topics cof Ottoman studies. Except for the brief introductory passages in a few text edi- tions, only one self-contained study has so far appeared about this important document type: Suraiya Faroghi's doctoral dissertation in 1967.' OF the several {questions implied by the felhi, she enlarged upon three: 1. ste analyzed it in terms of diplomaties; 2. discussed the problems of dating, and 3. collected in- formation about the official activity of the Grand Vizier from :he telhis collec- tions available to her, ‘When I started to study the selhis as part of an American—Hungarian re- search project, I soon realized that not only the points studied se far need further investigation? but new aspects should be explored as well. No one has yet raised the question why the [is “suddenly” appeared in the state administration of the latter half of the sixteenth century, or why it appeared exactly at that time. Was it simply an innovation in administration, or did it have some underlying sociological background? And why did the Sultan and his numnber one official replace personal contacts with a cumbersome bureaucratic way of communica- tion? Obviously, without answering these questions, neither the function of the telhig nor its value as a historical source can be estimated. I tierefore endeay- ured to find answers to these questions. Since the institutional structure in ‘which the refhis emerged rested on three pillars: the Sultan, the Imperial Council 1 Surayia Faroghi, Die Vorlagen (tebe) des Gropiwesirs Sinan pafa an Sultan Murad I Diss. zur Erlangung der Doktorwirde der Philosophischen Fakultat der Universitat Hamburg Hamburg 1967. Though one of its chapters, the diplomatic par, also appeared in print (Das Grob- ‘wesinelbis: cine aktenkundliche Studie. Der Islam 45 (1969), 96-116), in the following I refer to the whole dissertation, which enlarges onthe subject in more deta 2'q relevant atempt was made in my diplomatic study “The Grand Vizier elie” in ‘reparation for the volume of studies soon to be published a6 part of the programme entitled "Otioman-Habsburg Rivalry and the History of Cenral Europe 1566-1686 (Sourees and Interpre- tations). aden Kt Bape 68 P.FODOR and the Grand Vizier, the discussion focuses on the role they played in the poli- tics of the Ottoman Empire and the changes in their interrelationship during the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state had become in- contestably the most powerful and prestigious entity within the Islamic world, so ‘much so that in the eyes of European contemporaries it was identified with Islam itself. This approach was not alien to the ruling Ottoman military elite either. According to its “official” ideology, developed mainly during the preceding half ‘century, the Ottoman Empire came to be identified with the proper domain of Islam, where the prescriptions of religious law prevailed; consequently, its rulers — who had also become protectors of Islam’s two holy cities (Mecca and Medi- nna) — could be seen as the rightful masters of the whole of Islam. Accordingly, the Sultan began, with increasing frequency, to be referred to asthe paige Islam. ‘This view of legitimacy, however, which was not universally shared even. within the Ottoman Empire, did not correspond with the real situation in many respects. Rather than being @ religious leader, the Sultan was a sovereign in his own right, whose authority originated in his dynasty's achievements. The dynas- tic law — a common heritage of the Turco-Mongol and the Near Eastern politi- cal traditions, and embodied in the notion of kandn — gave the sovereign dis cretion in areas not explicitly within the jurisdiction of Islamic law. In these areas, his authority was absolute and indivisible, comprising legislative, judicial land executive powers Any of his decrees carried the force of law. At the same time, the Sultan, by virtue of the Islamic identity of his rule, was expected to enforce the precepts of religion. But by making use of their responsibility for ‘administering religious affairs, the Ottoman rulers as it were, transformed the representatives of religious orthodoxy into state functionaries; their employment and careers were strictly linked with the state organization, and the most impor= tant appointments were controlled by “secular” authorities. This is why, despite the tremendous efforts made during the reign of Silleyman to reconcile the con- flicts between the two legal foundations of the Empire, the Islamic legitimacy of the dynasty always remained dubious to a certain degree.+ The Ottoman realm was a traditional empire in the real sense of the term and provided the political framework for the Sultan's power. The essence of this power can be characterized by two words: redistribution and patrimonialism Redistribution lay at the base of Ottoman polity: the collection and disbursement ‘of material goods, which served to sustain the two main pillars of the dynasty, the military and the army of the functionaries, while the patrimonial principle 3.M. Kunt, Onoman Names and Oxtoman Ages. Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986). 232. 4.1. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mus tafa Ati (1541-1600). Princeton 1986, 191-292. A large-scale new summary of other ways in ‘which the Ottomans atempted to legitimate their rule was made by S. Faroghi, Die Legitimation des Ormanensultans: Zur Beziohung von Religion, Kunst und Polk im 16. und 17. Jahundert Zeitschrf fr rkeistudin 2:2 (1989) 49-67. SULTAN, IMPERIAL COUNCIL, GRAND VIZIER o determined the form and functions of its political system. The functionally de- fined social group, which operated this redistributive mechanism and enjoyed its benefits, was called the “asker? (“military”) class by the Ottomans. Within this social stratum, a more narrow echelon can be distinguished, which controlled the ‘more important positiors and in some way was almost invariably attached to the imperial household, the continuously proliferating palace organization. This rul- ing apparatus was theoretically divided into three separate professional career lines, In reality, however, both the governmental careers, and the institutions they were associated with, remained largely undifferentiated and thus permeable weil into the sixteenth century. Due to the great conquests, and the resulting growth in administrative needs during Selim's and Siileyman's time, there was fan inereasing stereotyping of official jurisdictions and growing standardization of bureaucratic procedures. At the same time, there were the first signs of a sepa~ rate bureaucratic body, primarily in the fiscal administration, All of this, how- fever, was merely the overture of a long-term process. For a long time to come, the administrative system retained its personal character; the fate of a given of fice, its position withir the hierarchy and its functions continued to depend at least as much on the personal qualities and connections of the individual office holder as on any bureaucratic or legal regulation.5 It is also instructive that the basic source of legitimacy, the often cited kaniin-i ogmani, regarding the fundamental institutions of the Empire appears to have been most vague. Whatever was definite or relatively well described in the kanin-i ogmdnt, was in some way related to taxation (or to the timar system, which was merely the other aspect of the same phenomenon). The general law codes (e.g. the so-called “constitutional” faniinndme of Mehmed IIS) or individ- 5-The concept ofthe Otoman Empire considered as a patrimonial system is based on Max Weber's writings on the subject se Wirtschaft und Gesellchaf. Grandi der verstehenden So- siologie. I. Halbband, Tubingen 1972’ 580-653. C,H, Fleischer seems t0 overestimate the bu- ‘eaueratiztion ofthe sixtecth century Oxtoman sate organization (op. cit, Chapters 7-8, and ‘idem, Preliminaries to the Study of the Oxioman Bureaucracy. Jowal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986), 135-141), Neither te numerical growth of bureaucracy nor the stability of bureaucratic offices reached such an extent as to Seriously endanger the existence of the pattimonil system, Which vas again strengthened by the crisis of the following period (see: C, V, Findley, Bureau ‘rate Reform in the Ottoman Enpire. The Sublime Porte 1789-1922, Princeton 1980: 3. Shinde, ‘Career Line Formation inthe Ouoman Bureaucracy, 1648-1750: a new perspective. Journal ofthe Economic and Social Hisery of the Orient 16, 2-3 (1973), 217-237) Here I should refer to Chapter 51 of a treatise writen around 1640, entitled Kitabu mesdlih-muslimin ve mendft- ‘nu’minin, which contains at exciting confession of the fac thatthe personal and material potential Of the central administration could not mest the needs of the growing Empire, not even in the middle ofthe seventeenth century (see: Y. Yieel, Osmanit devietteskiléuna dair kaynaklar Ankara 1988, 127-128) © 4, Ocean, Fathinteskildtkanunnémest ve nizam sem gin kardes kali meses, Tarth Dergisi 33 (1980-1981 1982), 29-56. A. Akgundiz, Osmanlthanunndmeeri ve hulu tailer 1. Kita. Osmantshukaunagirig ve Fatih devrikanunnameler. {stanbol 1990, 317-332, 333-345, Inthe same volume the other codes of Mehmed IIs time ean also be found. 0 P.FODOR ual kanin-collections (like that of TevkI Abdurrahman Pasa’) relating to the central state administration, were practical guides for determining hierarchies of ranks, rules of promotions and primarily described ceremonial customs. It is also evident that there were no serious attempts to regulate the provincial dignitaries, and offices. While kanin codes were usually formulated by sanctioning pre-ex- isting practices, itis clear that they did not reflect any underlying intent to le- gally regulate the most important administrative posts and organs (such as Grand Vizier, Imperial Council, and beglerbegi, etc.). This was a consequence of the personal and patrimonial character of the Sultan’s authority. Minute legal rules ‘would have set limits to his absolute sovereignty (mainly, because they would have implied the recognition of certain prerogatives of the “servants”).* This does not mean that the lack of institutional “definition” was necessarily the product of a conscious Sultanic policy; the point is rather that in such a patri- ‘monial world the need for regulations embracing the whole institutional sphere of the state simply did not arise. Under these circumstances, the kann — on a high abstract level — can be seen as an approach based on the sanctity of tradi- tion. In fact, it was customary law that formed the primary basis of sultanic authority and constituted certain limits to the ruler's will. The Sultan could, of course, issue an order, which was not consonant with tradition. Tn such cases, however, he could count on opposition from the officials or from the subject, population. For example, in 1580 Murad Ill decreed that the Grand Vizier would rot be given the imperial seal, which until then had symbolized the delegation of sultanie authority. He was soon forced to retract his decree, since without the seal, the people and the officials refused to accept the authenticity of the Grand Vizier’s orders.10 It was also in the reign of the same ruler that the influence of the palace on state affairs increased considerably. This development was con- ‘demned by members of the old ruling elite, not because it increased the arbitrary nature of the Sultan's power (it was, in a sense, merely the ultimate form of pat- rimonial rule), but because it was regarded as being contrary to the traditional norms of wielding royal authority. It is of interest to note that the formal strengthening of sultanic despotism occurred at a time, when the rise of forces could be seen, which eventually became capable of imposing actual limits on the Sultan's will.’ Wherever a political system is primarily based upon the military power of the sovereign (dynasty), with the passage of time, the army inevitably 7 (evkst SAbdurrabman Papa} (Osmfnl Kininnimeler. Mili Tetebbular Mecmuast 1.3 (1331/1912-13), 497-544. (Henceforth abbreviated: TAP) 8 tris no accident that «considerable portion of Kanan was promulgated by the ene un- ‘er pressure from the involved socal groups, and not by its own decision 3-This view was already held by K. Dilger, Untersuchungen sur Geschichte des oxma- hischen Hofeeremonills im 15. und 16... Mnchen 1967, 11-12. On the other hand, A. Akgin-

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