Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Notes:
INTRODUCTION t of through tribunals
Dispu internatio through local
Definition te nal modes administrativ
Public v Private International Law of e and judicial
Basis of Public International Law settlemen processes.
1. Naturalist t – like
2. Positivists negotiatio
3. Eccletics ns and
Three Grand Divisions arbitratio
Relations between International and Municipal n,
Law reprisals
1. From the viewpoint of doctrine and even
a. Dualist war
b. Monists 3. Derived Consists
2. From the view of practice Sourc from such mainly from
a. Doctrine of Transformation e sources as the
b. Doctrine of Incorporation internatio lawmaking
nal authority of
¯°º°¯ customs, each state.
DEFINITION OF Public International Law internatio
It is the body of rules and principles that are nal
recognized as legally binding and which govern conventio
the relations of states and other entities invested ns and the
with international legal personality. Formerly general
known as “law of nations” coined by Jeremy principles
Bentham in 1789. of law.
Public International Law Distinguished From 4. Applies to Regulates the
Private International Law/Conflict of Laws Subje relations relations of
It is that part of the law of each State which ct states individuals
determines whether, in dealing with a factual inter se whether of
situation, an event or transaction between private and other the same
individuals or entities involving a foreign element, internatio nationality or
the law of some other State will be recognized. nal not.
persons.
Public Private
1. Public is As a rule, 5. Infractions Generally,
Natur internatio Private is
Respo are entails only
e nal in national or nsibil usually individual
nature. It municipal in
ity collective responsibility
is a law of character. for in the .
a Except when
violat sense that
sovereign embodied in ion it
over those a treaty or
attaches
subjected convention, directly to
to his becomes
the state
sway international and not to
[Openhei in character.
its
m – It is a law, nationals.
Lauterpac not above,
ht, 38.] but between,
sovereign BASIS OF PIL – 3 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT [Why are
states and is, rules of international law binding?]
therefore, a
weaker law. 1. Naturalist –
[Openheim – ★ PIL is a branch of the great law of nature –
Lauterpacht, the sum of those principles which ought to
38.] control human conduct, being founded on
the very nature of man as a rational and
2. Disputes Recourse is
social being. [Hugo Grotius]
Settl are with
★ PIL is binding upon States
emen resolved municipal
3 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
This is because such courts are organs of are given equal standing with, but are not
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in superior to, national legislative enactments. Notes:
all circumstances. The fact that international law Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat
was made part of the law of the land does not priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute
pertain to or imply the primacy of international and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
law over national/municipal law in the municipal where the Constitution is the highest law of the
sphere. land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
are in conflict with the Constitution. (Secretary
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No.
countries, decrees that rules of international law
139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])
are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments.
Q: Is sovereignty really absolute and all-
encompassing? If not, what are its restrictions
In case of conflict, the courts should harmonize and limitations?
both laws first and if there exists an unavoidable Held: While sovereignty has traditionally been
contradiction between them, the principle of lex deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
posterior derogat priori - a treaty may repeal a domestic level, it is however subject to
statute and a statute may repeal a treaty - will restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to
apply. But if these laws are found in conflict with by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
the Constitution, these laws must be stricken out member of the family of nations. By the doctrine
as invalid. of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law,
In states where the constitution is the highest law which are considered to be automatically part of
of the land, such as in ours, both statutes and our own laws. One of the oldest and most
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict fundamental rules in international law is pacta
with the constitution. sunt servanda – international agreements must be
performed in good faith. A state which has
Supreme Court has the power to invalidate a contracted valid international obligations is bound
treaty – Sec. 5(2)(a), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution to make in its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations.
Q: What is the doctrine of incorporation? How
is it applied by local courts?
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or
Held: Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules
restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
of international law form part of the law of the
voluntary act, nations may surrender some
land and no further legislative action is needed to
aspects of their state power in exchange for
make such rules applicable in the domestic
greater benefits granted by or derived from a
sphere.
convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
confronted with situations in which there appears
their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties
to be a conflict between a rule of international
have been used to record agreements between
law and the provisions of the Constitution or
States concerning such widely diverse matters as,
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to
cession of territory, the termination of war, the
both since it is to be presumed that municipal law
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation
was enacted with proper regard for the generally
of alliances, the regulation of commercial
accepted principles of international law in
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down
observance of the Incorporation Clause in Section
of rules governing conduct in peace and the
2, Article II of the Constitution. In a situation
establishment of international organizations. The
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and
a choice has to be made between a rule of
in reality be considered absolute. Certain
international law and municipal law,
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should
imposed by the very nature of membership in the
be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason
family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
that such courts are organs of municipal law and
treaty stipulations. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA
are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
18, May 2, 1997 [Panganiban])
The fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
Doctrine of Transformation –
imply the primacy of international law over
Legislative action is required to make the treaty
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
enforceable in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law
5 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
Generally accepted rules of international law are Q: A treaty was concurred between RP and
not per se binding upon the state but must first be China. Later, a law was passed which has Notes:
embodied in legislation enacted by the lawmaking conflicting provisions with the treaty. Rule.
body and so transformed into municipal law. This A: A treaty is part of the law of the land. But as
doctrine runs counter Art. II, Sec. 2, of the 1987 internal law, it would not be superior to a
Constitution. legislative act, rather it would be in the same
A reading of the case of Kuroda v Jalandoni, [GRN class as the latter. Thus, the latter law would be
L-2662 March 26, 1949], one may say that considered as amendatory of the treaty, being a
Supreme Court expressly ruled out the Doctrine of subsequent law under the principle lex posterior
Transformation when they declared that generally derogat priori. (Abbas vs. COMELEC)
accepted principles of international law form a
part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the convention
embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not cofined to the recognition of rules and
principles of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been
or shall be a signatory.
accordingly launched a goodwill campaign and Reports 293, 302 [1924]) (Holy See, The v. Rosario,
offered the Philippine government substantial Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 533-534, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc Notes:
assistance for a program that will promote [Quiason])
through government and non-governmental
organization women’s rights, child welfare, Q: What is the status of an individual under
nutrition and family health care. An executive public international law? (1981 Bar)
agreement is about to be signed for that A: According to Hanks Kelson, “while as a general
purpose. The agreement includes a clause rule, international law has as its subjects states
whereby the Philippine government and obliges only immediately, it exceptionally
acknowledges that any liability to the comfort applies to individuals because it is to man that the
women or their descendants are deemed norms of international law apply, it is to man
covered by the reparations agreements signed whom they restrain, it is to man who,
and implemented immediately after the Second international law thrusts the responsibilities of
World War. Julian Iglesias, descendant of now law and order.”
deceased comfort woman, seeks you advise on
the validity of the agreement. Advise him. Q: Is the Vatican City a state?
(1992 Bar) A: YES!
A: The agreement is valid. The comfort woman
and their descendant cannot assert individual
claims against Japan. As stated in Paris Moore v.
Reagan, 453 US 654, the sovereign authority of
the state to settle claims of its nationals against Holy See v. Rosario
foreign countries has repeatedly been recognized. [GR 101949, 01 Dec. 1994]
This may be made without the consent of the
nationals or even without consultation with them.
Since the continued amity between the State and The Lateran Treaty established the STATEHOOD of
the Vatican City “for the purpose of assuring to
other countries may require a satisfactory
compromise of mutual claims, the necessary the Holy See absolute and visible independence
and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty
power to make such compromise has been
recognized. The settlement of such claims may also in the field of international relations”.
be made by executive agreement.
From the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is
Q: What must a person who feels aggrieved by difficult to determine whether the statehood is
the acts of a foreign sovereign do to espouse his vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City.
cause?
Held: Under both Public International Law and The Vatican City fits into none of the established
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved categories of states, and the attribution to it of
by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own “sovereignty” must be made in a sense different
government to espouse his cause through from that in which it is applied to other states.
diplomatic channels.
The Vatican City represents an entity organized
Private respondent can ask the Philippine
not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes
government, through the Foreign Office, to and international objects.
espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first
task is to persuade the Philippine government to
take up with the Holy See the validity of its Despite its size and object, it has an independent
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first government of its own, with the Pope, who is also
make a determination of the impact of its head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy
espousal on the relations between the Philippine See or Head of State, in conformity with its
government and the Holy See. Once the traditions, and the demands of its mission.
Philippine government decides to espouse the Indeed, its world-wide interests and activities are
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. such as to make it in a sense an “international
state”.
According to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the forerunner of the International Court It was noted that the recognition of the Vatican
of Justice: City as a state has significant implication – that it
is possible for any entity pursuing objects
“By taking up the case of one of its subjects and essentially different from those pursued by states
by resorting to diplomatic action or international to be invested with international personality.
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own rights – its right to Since the Pope prefers to conduct foreign
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for relations and enter into transactions as the Holy
the rules of international law.” (The Mavrommatis See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one
Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court
9 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the essentially different from those pursued by states
Holy See that is the international person. to be invested with international personality. Notes:
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign
The Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
relations and enter into transactions as the Holy
status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the
diplomatic representations with the Philippine
Holy See that is the international person.
government since 1957. This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the
Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Q: Discuss the Status of the Vatican and the Holy Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal
See in International Law. Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with
Held: Before the annexation of the Papal States the Philippine government since 1957. This
by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and appears to be the universal practice in
he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of international relations. (Holy See, The v. Rosario,
International Law. With the loss of the Papal Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 533-534, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc
States and the limitation of the territory under [Quiason])
the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the
position of the Holy See in International Law
became controversial.
the new government is not internationally Q: What happens to sovereignty if the acts of
bound by the agreement that was concluded by authority cannot be exercised by the legitimate Notes:
the former government of Islamabad and authority?
Baleria. Moreover, Islamabad further contended A: Sovereignty not suspended.
that the agreement was contrary to its
plasmatic law. Is the Islamabad revolutionary EX.: Japanese Occupation during WWII
government under obligation pursuant to ★ Sovereignty remained with the US
international law, to comply with what was ★ Japanese merely took over the exercise
agreed upon and set forth in the agreement of acts of sovereignty
concluded between Baleria and its former
government? Reasons. (1985 Bar) Q: In this case, what are the effects on the
A: Yes. A new government is exempt from laws?
obligation of treaties entered into by the previous A: Political Laws -
government only with respect to those whose GR: Suspended!
subject matter is political in nature. The ★ Subject to revival under jus postliminium
facilitation of entry by Balerian contract workers – i.e., once the legitimate authority
to Islamabad is non political. Hence, the treaty returns, the political laws are revived
embodying such agreement is binding on the new
government of Islamabad. Nor may the new ★ Jus Postliminium – roman law concept. If
government evade its international obligation on a Roman Citizen is captured, he loses his
the ground that the agreement is contrary to its rights as a Roman citizen, but once he
Plasmatic law. The rule is settled that a state returns to Rome, he recovers all those
cannot evade its international obligation by rights again
invoking its internal law. It is presumed that the XPN:
treaty is in conformity with its internal law. (a) Laws of Treason – Not suspended!
D. Sovereignty – ★ Preservation of allegiance to sovereign
★ the supreme and uncontrollable power does not demand positive action, but
inherent in a State by which that State is only a passive attitude or forbearance
governed. May be legal or political from adhering to the enemy by giving the
★ KINDS: latter aid and comfort (Laurel v. Misa)
1. Legal and Political Sovereignty
(b) Combatants – not covered by said rule
Legal - ★ Thus, AFP members still covered by
☀ the authority which has the power to National Defense Act, Articles of War,
issue final commands etc. (Ruffy v. Chief of Staff)
☀ Congress is legal sovereign ★ Rule applies only to civilians
External - Non-political
☀ the power of the State to direct its ★ remains valid
relations with other States ★ EX.: Conviction for defamation
☀ also called “Independenc”e
EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY
Characteristics of Sovereignty 1. Political Laws are deemed ABROGATED.
1. permanent Q: Why?
2. exclusivity A: They govern relations between the State
3. comprehensiveness and the people.
4. absoluteness
5. individuality 2. Non-Political Laws generally continue in
6. inalienability operation.
7. imprescriptibility Q: Why?
A: Regulates only private relations
13 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the RIGHTS OF THE STATE
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Notes:
Fundamental Rights of States [ S P E E D ]
1. Right to Sovereignty
Thus, a state’s sovereignty cannot in fact and in
and Independence;
reality be considered absolute. Certain
2. Right to Property and
restrictions enter into the picture:
Jurisdiction;
Limitations imposed by the very nature of 3. Right to Existence
membership in the family of nations; and and Self-Defense
Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. 4. Right to Equality
5. Right to Diplomatic
Thus, when the Philippines joined the UN as one Intercourse
of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict
its sovereign rights under the “concept of RIGHT OF EXISTENCE AND SELF-DEFENSE
sovereignty as AUTO-LIMITATION.” ★ The most elementary and important right of a
State
The underlying consideration in this partial ★ All other rights flow from this right
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal ★ Recognized in the UN Charter, Article 51:
commitment of the other contracting states in
granting the same privilege and immunities to the “Nothing in the present charter shall impair
Philippines, its officials and its citizens. the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the UN, until the SC has taken
Clearly, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
measures necessary to maintain international
without violating the Constitution, based on the
peace and security. Measures taken by
rationale that the Philippines “adopts the
Members in the exercise of this right of self-
generally accepted principles of international law
defense shall be immediately reported to the
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
SC and shall not in any way affect the
policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all
authority and responsibility of the SC under
nations.”
the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to
Principle of State Continuity maintain or restore international peace and
State is not lost when one of its elements is security.”
changed; it is lost only when at least one of its
elements is destroyed. State does not lose its ★ Art. II, Sec. 2 – “The Philippines renounces
identity but remains one and the same war as an instrument of national policy…”
international person notwithstanding changes in ★ This prohibits an offensive/aggressive war
the form of its government, territory, people, or ★ But, it allows DEFENSIVE WAR!
sovereignty. See Holy See vs. Rosario (238 SCRA ★ Thus, when attacked, the Philippines can
524) exercise its inherent right of existence and
self-defense
From the moment of its creation, the State ★ This right is a generally accepted principle of
continues as a juristic being, despite changes in international law – thus, it is part of our law
its elements. EX.: of the land, under the Incorporation Clause
(1) Reduction of population due to natural (Art. II, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)
calamity
(2) Changes in territory Q: State the occasions when the use of force
However, the disappearance of any of the may be allowed under the UN Charter.
elements causes the extinction of the state. A: There are only two occasions when the use of
force is allowed under the UN Charter. The first is
Q: In the famous Sapphire Case, Emperor Louis when it is authorized in pursuance of the
Napoleon filed damage suit on behalf of France enforcement action that may be decreed by the
in an American Court, but he was deposed and Security Council under Art. 42. The second is
replaced as head of State pendent elite. Was when it is employed in the exercise of the
the action abated? (Bar) inherent right of self-defense under conditions
A: No, because it had in legal effect been filed by prescribed in Art. 51. (Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in
France, whose legal existence had not been an article entitled “A New World Order” written in
affected by change in head of its government. his column “Separate Opinion” published in the
Napoleon had sued not in his personal capacity March 30, 2003 issue of the Philippines Daily
but officially as sovereign of France. Hence, upon Inquirer)
recognition of the duly authorized representative
of the new government, the litigation could Q: Not too long ago, “allied forces”, led by
continue. Amercian and British armed forces, invaded Iraq
to “liberate Iraqis and destroy suspected
15 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
weapons of mass destruction.” The Security disarmament process,” giving Iraq “a final
Council of the United Nations failed to reach a opportunity to comply with its disarmament Notes:
consensus on whether to support or oppose the obligations.” This resolution was in the process of
“war of liberation.” Can the action taken by implementation; so was Iraq’s compliance with
the allied forces find justification in such disarmament obligations.
International Law? Explain. (2003 Bar)
A: The United States and its allied forces cannot Q: On 31 October 2001, members of Ali Baba, a
justify their invasion of Iraq on the basis of self- political extremist organization based in and
defense under Article 51, attack by Iraq, and under the protection of Country X and
there was no necessity for anticipatory self- espousing violence worldwide as a means of
defense which may be justified under customary achieving its objective, planted high-powered
international law. Neither can they justify their explosives and bombs at the International Trade
invasion on the ground that Article 42 of the Tower (ITT) in Jewel City in Country Y, a
Charter of the United Nations permits the use of member of the United Nations. As a result of
force against a State if it is sanctioned by the the bombing and the collapse of the 100-story
Security Council. Resolution 1441, which gave twin towers, about 2000 people, including
Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face serious women and children were killed or injured and
consequences, did not authorize the use of armed billions of dollars in property were lost.
force.
Immediately after the incident, Ali Baba,
Alternative A: In International Law, the action speaking through its leader Bin Derdandat,
taken by the allied forces cannot find admitted and owned responsibility for the
justification. It is covered by the prohibition bombing of ITT, saying that it was done to
against the use of force prescribed by the United pressure Country Y to release captured
Nations Charter and it does not fall under any of members of the terrorist group. Ali Baba
the exceptions to that prohibition. threatened to repeat its terrorist acts against
Country Y if the latter and its allies failed to
The UN Charter in Article 2(4) prohibits the use of accede to Ali Baba’s demands. In response,
force in the relations of states by providing that Country Y demanded that Country X surrender
all members of the UN “shall refrain in their and deliver Bin Derdandat to the government
international relations from the threat or use of authorities of Country Y for the purpose of trial
force against the territorial integrity or political and “in the name of justice.” Country X refused
independence of any state, or in any other to accede to the demand of Country Y.
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.” This mandate does not only What action or actions can Country Y legally
outlaw war; it encompasses all threats of and acts take against Ali Baba and Country X to stop the
of force or violence short of war. terrorist activities of Ali Baba and dissuade
Country X from harboring and giving protection
As thus provided, the prohibition is addressed to to the terrorist organization? Support your
all UN members. However, it is now recognized as answer with reasons. (2002 Bar)
a fundamental principle in customary
international law and, as such, is binding on all A: (1) Country Y may exercise the right of self-
members of the international community. defense, as provided under Article 51 of the UN
Charter “until the Security Council has taken
The action taken by the allied forces cannot be measure necessary to maintain international
justified under any of the three exceptions to the peace and security.” Self-defense enables
prohibition against the use of force which the UN Country Y to use force against Country X as well
Charter allows. These are: (1) inherent right of as against the Ali Baba organization.
individual or collective self-defense under Article
51; (2) enforcement measure involving the use of (2) It may bring the matter to the Security Council
armed forces by the UN Security Council under which may authorize sanctions against Country X,
Article 42; and (3) enforcement measure by including measure invoking the use of force.
regional arrangement under Article 53, as Under Article 4 of the UN Charter, Country Y may
authorized by the UN Security Council. The allied use force against Country X as well as against the
forces did not launch military operations and did Ali Baba organization by authority of the UN
not occupy Iraq on the claim that their action was Security Council.
in response to an armed attacked by Iraq, of
which there was none. Alternative A: Under the Security Council
Resolution No. 1368, the terrorist attack of Ali
Moreover, the action of the alleged allied forces Baba may be defined as a threat to peace, as it
was taken in defiance or disregard of the Security did in defining the 11 September 2001 attacks
Council Resolution No. 1441 which set up “an against the United States. The resolution
enhanced inspection regime with the aim of authorizes military and other actions to respond
bringing to full and verified completion the to terrorist attacks. However, the use of military
16 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
force must be proportionate and intended for the will not retroactively legalize that invasion, which
purpose of detaining the persons allegedly was, legally speaking, null and void ab initio. Notes:
responsible for the crime and to destroy military (Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in an article entitled “A
objectives used by the terrorists. New World Order” written in his column
“Separate Opinion” published in the March 30,
The fundamental principles of international 2003 issue of the Philippines Daily Inquirer)
humanitarian law should be respected. Country Y
cannot be granted sweeping discretionary powers Q: State B, relying on information gathered by
that include the power to decide what states are its intelligence community to the effect that its
behind the terrorist organizations. It is for the neighbor, State C, is planning an attack on its
Security Council to decide whether force may be nuclear plan and research institute, undertook
used against specific states and under what a “preventive” attack in certain bases on State
conditions the force may be used. C located near the border of the two states. As
a result, State C presented the incident to the
Q: Is the United States justified in invading Iraq UN General Assembly but the latter referred it
invoking its right to defend itself against an to the UN Security Council as a matter, which
expected attack by Iraq with the use of its disturbs or threatens “international peace and
biological and chemical weapons of mass security”. State B argued that it was acting
destruction? within the legal bounds of Article 51 of the UN
A: The United States is invoking its right to Charter and that it was a permitted use of force
defend itself against an expected attack by Iraq in self-defense and against armed attack. Is
with the use of its biological and chemical State B responsible under International Law?
weapons of mass destruction. There is no Did State B act within the bounds set forth in
evidence of such a threat, but Bush is probably the UN Charter on the use of force in self-
invoking the modern view that a state does not defense? (1985 Bar)
have to wait until the potential enemy fires first. A: An armed attack is not a requirement for the
The cowboy from Texas says that outdrawing the exercise of the right of self-defense. However,
foe who is about to shoot is an act of self- the attack of State B on State C cannot be
defense. justified as an act of self-defense under Art. 51 of
the UN Charter considering that the danger
Art. 51 says, however, that there must first be an perceived by State B was not imminent. State B
“armed attack” before a state can exercise its ought to have exhausted peaceful and pacific
inherent right of self-defense, and only until the methods of settlements instead of resorting to the
Security Council, to which the aggression should use of force.
be reported, shall have taken the necessary
measures to maintain international peace and Q: Who can declare war?
security. It was the United States that made the A: No one! The Constitution has withheld this
“armed attack” first, thus becoming the power from the government. What the
aggressor, not Iraq. Iraq is now not only Constitution allows is a declaration of a “State of
exercising its inherent right of self-defense as War”. Under Art. VI, Sec. 23(1) – “Congress, by a
recognized by the UN Charter. (Justice Isagani A. vote of 2/3 of both Houses, in joint session
Cruz, in an article entitled “A New World Order” assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
written in his column “Separate Opinion” power to declare the existence of a state of war.
published in the March 30, 2003 issue of the This means that we are already under attack
Philippines Daily Inquirer)
Q: What are the effects when Congress declares
Q: Will the subsequent discovery of weapons of a state of war?
mass destruction in Iraq after its invasion by the A: 1. Art. VI, Sec. 23 – “In times of war…the
US justify the attack initiated by the latter? Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
A: Even if Iraq’s hidden arsenal is discovered – or a limited period and subject to such restrictions
actually used – and the United States is justified as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
in its suspicions, that circumstance will not and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
validate the procedure taken against Iraq. It is Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
like searching a person without warrant and Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
curing the irregularity with the discovery of adjournment thereof.”
prohibited drugs in his possession. The process
cannot be reversed. The warrant must first be 2. Art. VII, Sec. 18 – “The President shall be the
issued before the search and seizure can be Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces…and
made. whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress…
The American invasion was made without invasion…In case, invasion…when the public safety
permission from the Security Council as required requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding 60
by the UN Charter. Any subsequent discovery of days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
the prohibited biological and chemical weapons
17 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof While the intervention was upon
under martial law…” invitation, it was still condemned Notes:
because the Hungarian government
☀ This is in line with the UN Charter, which was a mere Soviet puppet
also renounces war
☀ As charter-member of the UN, our 3. By UN Authorization and Resolution
Constitution also renounces war as an ★ EX.: 1. Korean War
instrument of national policy In fact, it is UN itself that intervened
may call upon the Members of the UN to apply State, if such an operation, because of its scale
such measures. These may include complete or and effects, would have been classified as an Notes:
partial interruption of economic relations and of armed attack rather than as a mere frontier
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other incident had it been carried out by regular armed
means of communication, and the severance of forces. But the Court does not believe that the
diplomatic relations.” concept of 'armed attack' includes not only acts by
armed bands where such acts occur on a
Art. 42 – “Should the SC consider that measures significant scale but also assistance to rebels in
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or the form of the provision of weapons or logistical
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such or other support. Such assistance may be regarded
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be as a threat or use of force, or amount to
necessary to maintain or restore international intervention in the internal or external affairs of
peace and security. Such action may include other States.”
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the UN.” RECOGNITION
3 LEVELS
In the exercise of right of self-defense, against A. Recognition of State
armed attacks – Art. 51: B. Recognition of Government
C. Recognition of Belligerency
“Nothing in the present charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective RECOGNITION OF STATE
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 2 Schools of Thought
a Member of the UN, until the SC has taken Constitutive School
measures necessary to maintain international - recognition is the act which gives to a
peace and security. Measures taken by political entity international status as a
Members in the exercise of this right of self- State;
defense shall be immediately reported to the - it is only through recognition that a State
SC and shall not in any way affect the becomes an International Person and a
authority and responsibility of the SC under subject of international law
the present Charter to take at any time such - thus, recognition is a legal matter—not a
action as it deems necessary in order to matter of arbitrary will on the part of
maintain or restore international peace and one State whether to recognize or refuse
security.” to recognize another entity but that
where certain conditions of fact exist, an
NOTE: There is a limited definition of armed entity may demand, and the State is
attacks – Nicargua v. United States under legal duty to accord recognition
Q: Explain, using example, the Declaratory (2) Once recognition of state is accorded, it is
Theory of Recognition Principle. (1991 Bar) generally irrevocable. Recognition of Notes:
A: The declaratory theory of recognition is a government, on the other hand, may be withheld
theory according to which recognition of a state is from a succeeding government brought about by
merely an acknowledgment of the fact of its violent or unconstitutional means.
existence. In other words, the recognized state
already exists and can exist even without such Criteria for Recognition
recognition. For example, when other countries 1. Objective Test –
recognize Bangladesh, Bangladesh already existed ★ government should be EFFECTIVE and
as a state even without such recognition. STABLE
★ government is in possession of State
Q: Distinguish briefly but clearly between the machinery
constitutive theory and the declaratory theory ★ there is little resistance to its authority
concerning recognition of states. (2004 Bar)
A: The constitutive theory is the minority view 2. Subjective Test –
which holds that recognition is the last element ★ WILLINGNESS and ABILITY
that converts or constitutes the entity being ★ the government is willing and able to
recognized into an international person; while the discharge its international obligations
declaratory theory is the majority view that ★ 2 Doctrines
recognition affirms the pre-existing fact that the
entity being recognized already possesses the Tobar or Wilson Doctrine
status of an international person. In the former ☀ suggested by Foreign Minister Tobar
recognition is regarded as mandatory and legal (Ecuador); reiterated by President
and may be demanded as a matter of right by any Woodrow Wilson (US)
entity that can establish its possession of the four ☀ recognition is withheld from governments
essential elements of a state; while the latter established by revolutionary means –
recognition is highly political and discretionary. revolution, civil war, coup d’etat, other
forms of internal violence, UNTIL, freely
elected representatives of the people
have organized a constitutional
government
A: Innocent passage means the right of continuous A: The claim of the master of the vessel and the
and expeditious navigation of a foreign ship owner of the cargo is not meritorious. Although Notes:
through the territorial sea of a State for the their claim of transit passage and innocent
purpose of traversing that sea without entering passage through the Balintang Channel is tenable
the internal waters or calling at a roadstead or under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,
port facility outside internal water or proceeding the fact that they attached special hooks and nets
to or from internal waters or a call at such to their vessel which dragged up red corrals is
roadstead or port facility. The passage is innocent reprehensible. The Balintang Channel is
so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good considered part of our internal waters and thus is
order or security of the coastal State. within the absolute jurisdiction of the Philippine
government. Being so, no foreign vessel,
Extent and Limitations of Right of Innocent merchant or otherwise, could exploit or explore
Passage any of our natural resources in any manner of
☀ Extends to ALL ships – merchant and warships doing so without the consent of our government.
☀ Submarines must navigate on the surface and
show their flag Q: What is the extent of the territorial sea?
☀ Nuclear-powered ships, ships carrying nuclear A: 1. Formerly, 3 nautical miles from the low
and dangerous substances must carry water mark based on the theory that this is all
documents and observe special safety that a State could defend. This has been
measures practically abandoned.
Q: En route to the tuna fishing grounds in the 2. 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea provides
Pacific Ocean, a vessel registered in Country TW the maximum limit of 12 nautical miles from the
entered the Balintang Channel north of Babuyan baseline.
Island and with special hooks and nets dragged
up red corrals found near Batanes. By Q: What is the baseline?
International Convention certain corals are A: Depends on the method:
protected species. Just before the vessel 1. Normal Baseline Method
reached ☀ Territorial sea is drawn from the low-
the high water mark.
seas, the ☀ Q: What is the low-water mark?
Coast A: The line on the shore reached by the
Guard sea at low tide. Otherwise known as the
patrol “baseline.”
comprised therein are regarded as internal superjacent waters of the sea-bed and the
waters. resources of the sea-bed and subsoil; Notes:
2. sovereign rights with respect to the other
2. Contiguous Zone activities for the economic exploitation and
★ zone adjacent to the territorial sea, over exploration of the zone or EEZ, such as
which the coastal State may exercise such production of energy from water, currents
control as is necessary to: and winds;
Prevent infringement of its customs, 3. jurisdictional right with respect to
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws establishment and use of artificial islands;
within its territory or territorial sea; 4. jurisdictional right as to protection and
Punish such infringement preservation of the marine environment; and
☀ extends to a maximum of 24 nautical miles 5. jurisdictional right over marine scientific
from the baseline from which the territorial research
sea is measured. 6. other rights and duties provided for in the
Law of the Sea Convention. (Article 56, Law
3. Exclusive Economic Zone of the Sea Convention)
☀ a maximum zone of 200 nautical miles from
the baseline from which the territorial sea is These treaty provisions form part of the Philippine
measured, over which, the coastal State Law, the Philippines being a signatory to the
exercises sovereign rights over all the UNCLOS.
economic resources of the sea, sea-bed and
subsoil 4. Continental Shelf
Q: Explain the meaning of continental shelf.
Rights of other States in the EEZ (1991 Bar)
(a) Freedom of navigation and overflight A: The continental shelf comprises the seabed and
(b) Freedom to lay submarine cables and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
pipelines the territorial sea throughout the natural
(c) Freedom to engage in other internationally prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge
lawful uses of the sea related to said of the continental margin; or to a distance of
functions more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines
form which the breadth of the territorial sea is
Rights of Land-locked States measured where the outer edge of the continental
Right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the shelf does not extend up to that distance.
exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus
of the living resources of the EEZ of the coastal Rights of the Coastal State
States of the same sub-region or region ☀ sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting its natural
Distinguish briefly but clearly between the resources
contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone. ☀ rights are exclusive – if the State does
(2004 Bar) not explore or exploit the continental
The contiguous zone is the area which is known as shelf, no one may do so without its
the protective jurisdiction and starts from 12th express consent
nautical mile from low water mark (baseline),
while the EEZ is the area which ends at the 200th
nautical mile from the baseline. In the latter, no Archipelagic Doctrine
state really has exclusive ownership of it but the 2 Kinds of Archipelagos:
state which has a valid claim on it according to 1. Coastal Archipelago
the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas ☀ situated close to a mainland, and
agreement has the right to explore and exploit its may be considered part of such
natural resources; while in the former the coastal mainland
state may exercise the control necessary to a)
prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal 2. Mid-Ocean Archipelago
immigration or sanitary regulations within its ☀ groups of islands situated in the
territory b) punish infringement of the above ocean at such distance from the
regulations within its territory or territorial sea. coasts of firm land (mainland)
☀ EX.: Philippines
Q: Enumerate the rights of the coastal state in emphasizes the unity of land and waters
the exclusive economic zone. (2005, 2000 Bar) by defining an archipelago either as:
A: The following are the rights of the coastal state A group of island surrounded by
in the exclusive economic zone: waters; or
1. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring A body of water studded with islands
and exploiting, conserving and managing the thus, baselines are drawn by connecting
living and non-living resources in the the appropriate points of the outermost
27 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
islands to encircle the islands within the this purpose, it requires that baselines be drawn
archipelago. by connecting the appropriate points of the Notes:
outermost islands to encircle the islands within
Rules Governing the Baselines the archipelago. The waters on the landward side
(a) Such baselines should not depart radically of the baselines regardless of breadth, or
from the general direction of the coast, or dimensions are merely internal waters.
from the general configuration of the
archipelago Article I, Sec. 1 of the Constitution provides that
(b) Within the baselines are included the main the national territory of the Philippines includes
islands an area with a maximum water area the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
to land area ratio of 9:1 and waters embraced therein; and the waters
(c) Length of baselines shall not exceed 1— around, between, and connecting the islands of
nautical miles the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
XPN: Up to 3% of the total number of dimensions form part of the internal waters of the
baselines may have a maximum length of Philippines.
125 nautical miles
5. The regime of the High Seas
Effect of the Baselines ★ belongs to everyone and to no one – both res
(a) The waters inside the baselines are commones and res nullius
considered internal waters; ★ everyone may enjoy the following rights over
(b) The territorial sea, etc. are measured from the high seas:
such baselines; (a) Navigation
(c) Archipelagic State exercises sovereign rights (b) Fishing
over all the waters enclosed by the baselines (c) Scientific research
(d) Mining
Limitation – Archipelagic Sealanes (e) Laying of submarine cables or
☀ Archipelagic State must designate sea lands pipelines; and
an air route for the continuous and (f) other human activities in the open
expeditious passage of foreign ships and sea and the ocean floor
aircraft through or over its archipelagic ★ the freedoms extend to the air space above
waters and adjacent territorial sea the high seas
Passage only for continuous,
expeditious, and unobstructed Doctrine of Hot Pursuit
transit between 1 part of the high ☀ The pursuit of a foreign vessel undertaken by
seas or an EEX to another part of the the coastal State which has “good reason to
high seas or an EEZ believe that the ship has violated the laws
Q: What if none are designated? and regulations of that State.”
A: Right of archipelagic sealane ☀ The pursuit must:
passage may still be exercised 1. Be commenced when the ship is within the
through the routes normally used for pursuing State’s:
international navigation a. Internal Waters;
b. Territorial Sea; or
The Philippines adheres to the c. Contiguous Zone
Archipelagic Doctrine – Art. I, 1987 2. May be continued outside such waters if the
Constitution: pursuit has not been interrupted
“The waters around, between, and 3. Continuous and unabated
connecting the islands of the 4. Ceases as soon as the foreign ship enters the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth territorial sea of:
and dimensions, form part of the internal a. Its own State; or
waters of the Philippines.” b. That of a 3rd State
5. Be undertaken by:
Also embodied in the 1982 Convention of a. Warships; or
the Law of the Sea, Art. 47 b. Military aircraft; or
UNCLOS became effective on 16 Nov. c. Other ships/aircraft cleared and
identifiable as being in the government
1994, after its ratification by more than
service and authorized to that effect
the required 60 of the signatory States
☀ Also applies to violations of laws and
regulations of the coastal State applicable to
Q: What do you understand by the archipelagic
the EEZ and to the continental shelf.
doctrine? Is this reflected in the 1987
Constitution? (1989, 1979, 1975 Bar)
Deep Sea Bed
A: The archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity
☀ The sea-bed beyond the continental shelf
of land and waters by defining an archipelago
either as a group of islands surrounded by waters
or a body of water with studded with islands. For
28 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
☀ Under the UNCLOS – resources of the deep the right to sail ships on the seas which is open to
sea-bed are reserved as the “common all States and land-locked countries Notes:
heritage of mankind”
General Rule: vessels sailing on the high seas are
Q: In the Pacific Ocean, while on its way to subject only to international law and the laws of
Northern Samar to load copra, a Norweigian the flag state
freighter collides with Philippine Luxury Liner
resulting in the death of ten (10) Filipino Exceptions: a) foreign merchant ships
passengers. Upon the Norweigian vessel’s violating the laws of the coastal State; b)
arrival in Catarman, Northern Samar, the pirate ships; c) slave trade ships; d) any ship
Norweigian captain and the helmsman assisting engaged in unauthorized broadcasting; and e)
were arrested and charged with multiple ships without nationality, or flying a false flag
homicide through reckless imprudence. Apart or refusing to show its flag.
from filing a protest with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Norweigian Embassy, through a local Flag State
counsel helps the accused in filing a motion to the State whose nationality (ship’s registration)
quash. It is pointed out that the incident the ship possesses, for it is nationality which gives
happened on the high seas, the accused were the right to fly a country’s flag
on board a Norweigian vessel and only a
Norweigian court can try the case even if the Flags of Convenience –
death occurred on a Philippine ship. Resolve registration of any ship in return for a payment
the motion stating the reason for your decision. fee
(1986 Bar)
A: The motion to quash should be sustained. In Q: Distinguish briefly but clearly between the
the Lotus case [PCIJ Pub 198i2 Series A No 10 flag state and the flag of convenience. (2004
p.25], a French mail steamer, Lotus, collided with Bar)
a Turkish collier, Boz Kourt. As a result, eight (8) A: Flag state means a ship has the nationality of
Turkish subjects died. The collision took place in the flag state it flies, but there must be a genuine
the Aegean Sea, outside of Turkish territorial link between the state and the ship. (Article 91 of
waters. The Lotus proceeded to Constantinople the Convention of the Law of the Sea.) Flag of
where its officers were tried and convicted for convenience refers to a state with which a vessel
manslaughter. The French government protested is registered for various reasons such as low or
on the ground that Turkey had no jurisdiction over non-existent taxation or low operating costs
an act committed on the high seas by foreigners although the ship has no genuine link with that
on board foreign vessels whose flag state has state. (Harris, Cases and Materilas on
exclusive jurisdiction as regards such acts. The International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p. 425.)
dispute was referred by agreement to the
Permanent Court of International Justice which AERIAL DOMAIN
held in a split decision that Turkey had “not acted ★ the airspace above the territorial and
in conflict with the principles of International maritime domains of the State, to the limits
Law,” because the act committed produced of the atmosphere
affects on board the Boz Kourt under Turkish flag, ★ does not include the outer space
and thus on Turkish territory. The principle that
vessels on the high seas are subject to no 1. Air Space
authority except that the flag State whose flag ★ the air space above the State’s terrestrial and
they fly was thus affirmed. maritime territory
★ “…Every State has complete and exclusive
NOTE: Justice Jorge Coquia, in his book however, sovereignty over the air space above its
opined that the ruling in the Lotus case is no territory”
longer controlling in view of Art. 97 of the UN ★ Convention on International Civil Aviation
Convention on the Law of the Sea which provides –“Territory” – includes terrestrial and
that in the event of collision or any other incident maritime territory
of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, ★ thus, includes air space above territorial sea
involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of ★ NOTE: NO right of innocent passage!
the master or any other person in the service of ★ the air space above the high seas is open to
the ship, the penal or disciplinary proceedings all aircraft, just as the high seas is accessible
may be instituted only before State of which such to ships of all States
person is a national. For this purpose, no arrest - the State whose aerial space is violated
or detention of the ship, even as a measure of can take measures to protect itself, but
navigation shall be ordered by the authorities it does not mean that States have an
other than those of the flag state. unlimited right to attack the intruding
aircraft (intruding aircraft can be
Freedom of Navigation ordered either to leave the State’s air
space or to land)
29 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
3. Functional Approach
The legal regime governing space
activities are based, not on a boundary
line, but on the nature of the activities
Specialized Agencies – not part of the UN, but members of the TC and all the members of
have been brought into close contact with it the ESC, and with the SC selects the judges of Notes:
because of their purposes and functions, such as: the ICJ; also participates in the amendment
1. World Health Organization of the Charter.
2. International Monetary Fund 4. Budgetary – controls the finances of the UN
3. Technical Assistance Board 5. Constituent – amendment of the charter.
UN General Assembly
GA Main Committees
This is the central organ of the UN. The principal Most questions are then discussed in its six main
deliberative body of the organization and is committees:
vested with jurisdiction over matters concerning 1st Committee - Disarmament &
the internal machinery and operations of the UN. International Security
2nd - Economic & Financial
GA Composition 3rd - Social, Humanitarian & Cultural
Consists of all the members of the UN. Each
4th - Special Political & Decolonization
member is entitled to send no more than 5
5th - Administrative & Budgetary
delegates and 5 alternates and as many technical
and other personnel as it may need. 6th - Legal
The reason for this system of multiple delegates is
to enable the members to attend of several Some issues are considered only in plenary
meetings that may be taking place at the same meetings, while others are allocated to one of the
time in the different organs or committees of the six main committees. All issues are voted on
Organization. through resolutions passed in plenary meetings,
usually towards the end of the regular session,
However, each delegation is entitled only to one after the committees have completed their
vote in the decisions to be made by the GA. consideration of them and submitted draft
resolutions to the plenary Assembly.
GA Sessions
1. Regular sessions – every year beginning the Voting in Committees is by a simple majority. In
third Tuesday of September. plenary meetings, resolutions may be adopted by
2. Special sessions – may be called at the acclamation, without objection or without a vote,
request of the SC, a majority of the member or the vote may be recorded or taken by roll-call.
states, or one member with the concurrence While the decisions of the Assembly have no
of the majority. legally binding force for governments, they carry
3. Emergency special session – may be called the weight of world opinion, as well as the moral
within 24 hours at the request of the SC by authority of the world community.
vote of any 9 members or by a majority of the
members of the UN. The work of the UN year-round derives largely
from the decisions of the General Assembly - that
Some Important Functions of the GA is to say, the will of the majority of the members
1. Deliberative – discuss principles regarding as expressed in resolutions adopted by the
maintenance of international peace and Assembly. That work is carried out:
security and may take appropriate measures a. by committees and other bodies established
toward this end. by the Assembly to study and report on
2. Supervisory – receives and considers reports specific issues, such as disarmament,
from the other organs of the UN. peacekeeping, development and human
3. Elective – important voting functions are also rights;
vested in the GA, such as the election of the b. in international conferences called for by the
non-permanent members of the SC, some Assembly; and
32 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
c. by the Secretariat of the UN - the Secretary- The SC is required to function continuously and to
General and his staff of international civil hold itself in readiness in case of threat to or Notes:
servants. actual breach of international peace. For this
purpose, all members should be represented at all
¯°º°¯ times at the seat of the Organization.
UN Security Council
SC Voting Rules
An organ of the UN primarily responsible for the Each member of the SC has 1 vote, but distinction
maintenance of international peace and security. is made between the permanent and the non-
Their responsibility makes the SC a key influence permanent members in the decision of substantive
in the direction of the affairs not only of the questions.
Organization but of the entire international
community as well. Yalta Voting Formula
a. Procedural matters – 9 votes of any of SC
SC Functions and Powers: members
1. to maintain international peace and security b. Substantive matters – 9 votes including 5
in accordance with the principles and permanent votes.
purposes of the UN;
2. to investigate any dispute or situation which No member, permanent or not, is allowed to vote
mightlead to international friction; on questions concerning the pacific settlement of
3. to recommend methods of adjusting such a dispute to which it is a party.
disputes or the terms of settlement;
4. to formulate plans for the establishment of a Rule of Great-Power Unanimity: a negative vote
system to regulate armaments; by any permanent member on a non-procedural
5. to determine the existence of a threat to the matter, often referred to as “veto”, means
peace or act of aggression and to recommend rejection of the draft resolution or proposal, even
what action should be taken; if it has received 9 affirmative votes.
6. to call on Members to apply economic - Abstention or absence of a member is not
sanctions and other measures not involving regarded as veto
the use of force to prevent or stop
aggression; Procedural and Substantive Matters
7. to take military action against an aggressor; Distinguished
8. to recommend the admission of new Procedural matters include:
Members; a. questions relating to the organization and
9. to exercise the trusteeship functions of the meetings of the Council;
UN in "strategic areas"; and b. the establishment of subsidiary organs; and
10. to recommend to the General Assembly the c. the participation of states parties to a dispute
appointment of the Secretary-General and, in the discussion of the SC.
together with the Assembly, to elect the
Judges of the International Court of Justice. Substantial matters include those that may
require the SC under its responsibility of
SC Composition maintaining or restoring world peace to invoke
Composed of 15 members, 5 of which are measures of enforcement.
permanent. The so-called Big Five are China,
France, the European Union, the United Kingdom, What is the role of a Member of the UN but not
and the United States. a member of the Security Council?
Although not a member of the SC, it may
The other ten members are elected for 2-year participate (without vote) in the discussion of any
terms by the GA, 5 from the African and Asian question before the Council whenever the latter
states, 1 from Eastern European states, 2 from feels that the interests of that member are
Latin American states, and 2 from Western specially affected. Such member is likewise to
European and other states. Their terms have be invited by the Council to participate (without
been so staggered as to provide for the retirement vote)in the discussion of any dispute to which the
of ½ of them every year. Member is a party.
These members are not eligible for immediate re- Q: Loolapalooza conducted illegal invasion and
election. conquest against Moooxaxa. The UN Security
Council called for enforcement action against
Chairmanship of the SC is rotated monthly on the Loolapalooza. Does enforcement action include
basis of the English alphabetical order of the sending of fighting troops?
names of the members. A: NO. Compliance with the resolution calling for
enforcement action does not necessarily call for
SC Sessions the sending of fighting troops. There must be a
33 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
special agreement with the SC before sending of b. by virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e.,
fighting troops may be had and such agreement typically, when they are parties to a treaty Notes:
shall govern the numbers and types of forces, containing a provision whereby, in the event
their degree of readiness and general locations, of a disagreement over its interpretation or
and the nature of the facilities and assistance to application, one of them may refer the
be supplied by UN members. dispute to the Court. Several hundred treaties
or conventions contain a clause to such
effect; or
International Court of Justice c. through the reciprocal effect of declarations
made by them under the Statute whereby
International Court of Justice each has accepted the jurisdiction of
Composition the Court as compulsory in the event of a
Qualifications dispute with another State having made a
Jurisdiction similar declaration. The declarations
Functions of International Court of Justice of 65 States are at present in force, a number
Procedure of them having been made subject to the
exclusion of certain categories of dispute.
¯°º°¯
In cases of doubt as to whether the Court has
International Court of Justice jurisdiction, it is the Court itself which decides.
The International Court of Justice is the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. Its seat is at Term of Office
the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). It Term of 9 years, staggered at three year year
began work in 1946, when it replaced the intervals by dividing the judges first elected into
Permanent Court of International Justice which three equal groups and assigning them by lottery
had functioned in the Peace Palace since 1922. It terms of three, six and nine years respectively.
operates under a Statute largely similar to that of Immediate re-election is allowed. The President
its predecessor, which is an integral part and the Vice President elected by the Court for
of the Charter of the United Nations. three years, may also be re-elected. Terms of
office of 5 of the 15 members shall expire at the
ICJ Composition and Qualifications end of every 3 years.
The Court is composed of 15 judges elected to
nine-year terms of office by the United Nations How members of ICJ are chosen
General Assembly and Security Council sitting 1. Nomination made by national groups in
independently of each other. It may not include accordance with the Hague Conventions of
more than one judge of any nationality. Elections 1907. No group shall nominate more than
are held every three years for one-third of the four persons and not more than two of whom
seats, and retiring judges may be re-elected. The shall be of their own nationality.
Members of the Court do not represent their 2. Candidates obtaining an absolute
governments but are independent magistrates. majority in the GA and SC are considered
elected. In the event that more than 1
QUALIFICIATIONS OF JUDGES national of the same state obtain the
1. They must be of high moral character; requisite majorities in both bodies, only the
2. Possess the qualifications required in eldest is chosen.
their respective countries for appointment to 3. In cases when membership is not
the highest judicial office or are jurists of completed by the regular elections, a joint
recognized competence in international law; conference shall be convened. If this still
and fails, the judges elected shall fill the
3. As much as possible, they must represent remaining vacancies.
the main forms of civilization and the
principal legal systems of the world. ICJ Sessions
The Court shall remain permanently in session at
When the Court does not include a judge the Hague or elsewhere as it may decide, except
possessing the nationality of a State party to a during the judicial vacations the dates and
case, that State may appoint a person to sit as a duration of which it shall fix.
judge ad hoc for the purpose of the case.
Procedure in the ICJ
ICJ Jurisdiction The procedure followed by the Court in
The Court is competent to entertain a dispute contentious cases is defined in its Statute, and in
only if the States concerned have accepted its the Rules of Court adopted by it under the
jurisdiction in one or more of the following ways: Statute. The latest version of the Rules dates
a. by the conclusion between them of a special from 5 December 2000. The proceedings include
agreement to submit the dispute to the a written phase, in which the parties file and
Court; exchange pleadings, and an oral phase consisting
34 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
of public hearings at which agents and counsel On receiving a request, the Court decides which
address the Court. As the Court has two official States and organizations might provide useful Notes:
languages (English and French) everything written information and gives them an opportunity of
or said in one language is translated into the presenting written or oral statements. The Court's
other. advisory procedure is otherwise modelled on that
for contentious proceedings, and the sources of
After the oral proceedings the Court deliberates applicable law are the same. In principle the
in camera and then delivers its judgment at a Court's advisory opinions are consultative in
public sitting. The judgment is final and without character and are therefore not binding as such on
appeal. Should one of the States involved fail to the requesting bodies. Certain instruments or
comply with it, the other party may have recourse regulations can, however, provide in advance that
to the Security Council. the advisory opinion shall be binding.
T
The Court discharges its duties as a full court but, Only organizations can request advisory
at the request of the parties, it may also establish
opinions [Article 65(1)]: The Court may give
a special chamber. A Chamber of Summary
an advisory opinion on any legal question at
Procedure is elected every year by the Court in
the request of whatever body may be
accordance with its Statute. In July 1993 the
authorized by or in accordance with the
Court also established a seven-member Chamber
Charter of the UN to make such a request.
to deal with any environmental cases falling
within its jurisdiction
There is no rule of stare decisis.
ICJ Voting Rules
All questions before the Court are decided by a Q: A, a citizen of State X, was arrested and
majority of the judges present, the quorum being detained for several years without charges or
nine when it is sitting en banc. In case of tie, the trial. He brings his case to the courts of State
President or his substitute shall have a casting X, but to no avail. He desires to seek redress
vote. from any international forum. He goes to you
as counsel to file his case with the International
Rule for Inhibition of Judges Court of Justice. Will the action prosper?
No judge may participate in the decision of a case (1978 Bar)
in which he has previously taken part as agent, A: No! Only States may be parties in contentious
counsel or advocate for one of the parties, or as a cases before the International Court of Justice. In
member of a national or international court, or of fact, only States which are parties to the statute
a commission of injury, or in any other capacity. of the ICJ and other states on conditions to be
laid down by the Security Council may be such
Functions of ICJ parties. Therefore, a private individual like A
The principal functions of the Court are: cannot bring an action before it.
2. to decide contentious case; and
3. to render advisory opinions. Q: May the United States be sued in our courts for
the value of private properties requisitioned by its
Who may file contentious cases? Army during the last World War, as well as Japan
Only states can file contentious cases and both for the “Mickey Mouse” money in payment for
must agree to the court’s jurisdiction. Only States private properties, which have not been
may apply to and appear before the Court. The redeemed until now? May the suit be brought to
Member States of the United Nations (at present the ICJ? (1979 Bar)
numbering 191) are so entitled. A: No! Even foreign states are entitled to the
doctrine of state immunity in the local state. The
Article 34(1): Only states may be parties
suit may not be brought before the ICJ without
in cases before the Court.
the consent of the United States as jurisdiction of
2. Article 36(1): The jurisdiction of the the ICJ in contentious cases is based upon the
Court comprises all cases which the parties consent of the parties.
refer to it and all matters specially provided
for in the Charter of the UN or in treaties and Q: The State of Nova, controlled by an
conventions in force. authoritarian government, had unfriendly
relations with its neighboring state, America;
Advisory Opinions Bresia, another neighboring state, had been
The advisory procedure of the Court is open solely shipping arms and ammunitions to Nova for use
to international organizations. The only bodies at in attacking America. To forestall am attack,
present authorized to request advisory opinions of America placed floating mines on the territorial
the Court are five organs of the United Nations and waters surrounding Nova. America supported a
16 specialized agencies of the United Nations group of rebels organized to overthrow the
family. government of Nova and to replace it with a
friendly government. Nova decided to file a
35 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
case against America in the International Court America violated the principle against the use of
of Justice. force and the principle of non-intervention. The Notes:
1) What grounds may Nova’s cause of defense of anticipatory self-defense cannot be
action against America be based? sustained because there is no showing that Nova
2) On what grounds may America move to had mobilized to such an extent that if America
dismiss the case with the ICJ? were to wait for Nova to strike first it would not
3) Decide the case. (1994 Bar) be able to retaliate.
A: 1) If Nova and America are members of the UN, However, if jurisdiction over America is not
Nova can premise its cause of action on a established, the case should be decided in its
violation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter, which favor because of the principle of sovereign
requires members to refrain from threat or use of immunity.
force against the territorial integrity of political
independence of any state. If either or both Q: The sovereignty over certain island is
America and Nova are not members of the UN, disputed between State A and State B. These
Nova may premise its cause of action of violation two states agreed to submit their disputes to
of the non-use of force principle in customary the ICJ.
international law which exist parallel as to Art. 1) Does the ICJ have the jurisdiction to
2(4) of the UN Charter. take cognizance of the case?
2) Who shall represent the parties before
In the case concerning the Military and the Court?
Parliamentary activities in and against Nicaragua 3) What language shall be used in the
(1986 ICJ Report 14), the International Court of pleading and the oral arguments?
Justice considered the planting mines by one 4) In case State A, the petitioner fails to
state within the territorial waters of another as a appear at the oral argument, can State
violation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. If the B, the respondent, move for the
support provided by America to rebels of Nova dismissal of the action? (1994 Bar)
goes beyond the mere giving of monetary or A: 1) The ICJ has jurisdiction because the parties
psychological support but consist in the provision have jointly submitted the case to it and have
of arms and training, the acts of America can be thus indicated their consent to its jurisdiction.
considered as indirect aggression amount to 2) Parties to a case may appoint agents to appear
another violation of Art. 2(4). before the ICJ in their behalf, and these agents
need not be their own nationals. However, under
In addition, even if the provision of support is not Art. 16 of the Statute of ICJ, no member of the
enough to consider the act a violation of the non- Court may appear as agent in any case.
use of force principle, this is a violation of the 3) Under Art. 39 of the Statute of ICJ, the official
principle of non-intervention in customary languages of the Court are English and French. In
international law. the absence of an agreement, each party may use
the language it prefers. At the request of any
Aggression is the use of armed force by a state party, the Court may authorize a party to use a
against the sovereignty or territorial integrity or language other than English or French.
political independence of another state or in any 4) Under Art. 51 of the Statute of ICJ, whenever
other manner inconsistence with the UN Charter. one of the parties does not appear before the
court or fails to defends its case, the other party
2) By virtue of the principle of sovereign may ask the Court to decide in favor of its claim.
immunity, no sovereign state can be made a party However, the Court must, before doing so, satisfy
to a proceeding before the ICJ unless it has given itself that it has jurisdiction and that the claim is
its consent. If America has not accepted the well-founded in fact and in law.
jurisdiction of the ICJ, it can invoke the defense
of lack of jurisdiction. Even if it has accepted the PIMENTEL, JR., v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
jurisdiction of the ICJ but the acceptance limited SECRETARY
and the limitation applies to the case, it may 462 SCRA 622, 6 July 2005
invoke such limitations of its consent as a bar to En Banc, Garcia J.
the assumption of jurisdiction.
If the jurisdiction has been accepted, America can This is a petition for mandamus to compel the
involve the principle of anticipatory self-defense Office of the Executive Secretary and the
recognized under customary international law Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the
because Nova is planning to launch an attack signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
against America by using the arms it brought from International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Bresia. Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
§21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
3) If jurisdiction over America is established, the
case should be decided in favor of Nova, because
36 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
The Rome State of the International Criminal Bianca Hacintha Roque and Harrison Jacob Roque,
Court aged two (2) and one (1), respectively, at the Notes:
The Rome Statute established the International time of filing of the instant petition, and suing
Criminal Court which “shall have the power to under the doctrine of inter-generational rights
exercise its jurisdiction over person for the most enunciated in the case of Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
serious crimes of international concern x x x and 224 SCRA 792 (1993) and a group of fifth year
shall be complementary to the national criminal working law students from the University of the
jurisdictions.” (Article I, Rome Statute) Its Philippines College of Law who are suing as
jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes taxpayers.
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression as defined in the Statute (Article 5, Xxx
Rome Statute). The Statute was opened for
signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1988 We find that among the petitioners, only Senator
and had remained open for signature until Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant
December 31, 2000 at the United Nations suit. The other petitioners maintain their
Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed standing as advocates and defenders of human
the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge rights, and as citizens of the country. They have
d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine not shown, however, that they have sustained or
Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, will sustain a direct injury from the non-
however, require that it be subject to ratification, transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute
acceptance or approval of the signatory states to the Senate. Their contention that they will be
(Article 25, Rome Statute). deprived of their remedies for the protection and
enforcement of their rights does not persuade.
Issues The Rome Statute is intended to complement
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient
of a treaty, under both domestic law and remedies are available under our national laws to
international law, is a function of the Senate. protect our citizens against human rights
Hence, it is the duty of the executive department violations and petitioners can always seek redress
to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute for any abuse in our domestic courts.
to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion
with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that
petitioners submit that the Philippines has a “to the extent the powers of Congress are
ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under impaired, so is the power of each member
treaty law and customary international law. thereof, since his office confers a right to
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the participate in the exercise of the powers of that
Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain institution.”[Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement
from acts which would defeat the object and and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485 (2000)]
purpose of a treaty when they have signed the Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain
treaty prior to ratification unless they have made inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
their intention clear not to become parties to the vested by the Constitution in their office and are
treaty (Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law allowed to sue to question the validity of any
of Treaties). official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar
invokes the power of the Senate to grant or
On Locus Standi of Petitioners withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into
The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome
Pimentel, Jr. who asserts his legal standing to file Statute. The petition seeks to order the
the suit as member of the Senate; Congresswoman executive branch to transmit the copy of the
Loretta Ann Rosales, a member of the House of treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such
Representatives and Chairperson of its Committee authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the
on Human Rights; the Philippine Coalition for the institution, certainly has the legal standing to
Establishment of the International Criminal Court assert such authority of the Senate.
which is composed of individuals and corporate
entities dedicated to the Philippine ratification of The Substantive Issue
the Rome Statute; the Task Force Detainees of the The core issue in this petition for mandamus is
Philippines, a juridical entity with the avowed whether the Executive Secretary and the
purpose of promoting the cause of human rights Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial
and human rights victims in the country; the duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, Rome Statute signed by a member of the
a juridical entity duly organized and existing Philippine Mission to the United Nations even
pursuant to Philippine Laws with the avowed without the signature of the President.
purpose of promoting the cause of families and
victims of human rights violations in the country;
37 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
☀ Art. 14, NCC only the members of the crew and is of such a
petty nature as not to disturb the peace of the Notes:
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION – local state.
☀ often claimed by States with respect to
so-called continuing offenses where the B. Nationality Principle
commission of the crime has started in ☀ a State may punish offenses committed
one State and is consummated in by its nationals anywhere in the world.
another. Under such situation, both ☀ vest jurisdiction in state of offender
states have jurisdiction. ☀ Art. 15, NCC; tax laws
may punish it. Nor does it matter that the crime signed by the parties in Jakarta. Marikina Shoe
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile Expo was able to deliver only 200,000 pairs of Notes:
limit of a foreign state for those limits, though combat boots in Jakarta by October 30, 1990
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes. and received payment for 100,000 pairs or a
total of $3,000,000. The Ministry of the Army
DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY promised to pay for the other 100,000 pairs
already delivered as soon as the remaining
Under this doctrine, a state enjoys immunity from
300,000 pairs of combat boots are delivered, at
the exercise of jurisdiction by another state. The
which time the said 300,000 pairs will also be
courts of one state may not assume jurisdiction
paid for.
over another state.
Q: Marikina Shoe Corporation failed to deliver
Restrictive Application of the Doctrine of State any more combat boots. On June 1, 1991, the
Immunity Republic of Indonesia filed an action before the
Q: The Republic of Balau opened and operated RTC of Pasig, to compel Marikina Shoe
in Manila an office engaged in trading of Balau Corporation to perform the balance of its
products with the Philippine products. In one obligation under the contract and for damages.
transaction, the local buyer complained that the In its Answer, Marikina Shoe Corporation sets up
Balau goods delivered to him were substandard a counterclaim for $3,000,000 representing the
and he sued the Republic of Balau before the payment for the 100,000 pairs of combat boots
RTC of Pasig for damages. (1996 Bar) already delivered but unpaid. Indonesia moved
a) How can the Republic of Balau invoke its to dismiss the counterclaim asserting that it is
sovereign immunity? Explain. entitled to sovereign immunity from suit. The
b) Will such defense of sovereign immunity trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
prosper? Explain. issued two writs of garnishment upon
Indonesian Government funds deposited in the
A: a) By filing a motion to dismiss in accordance PNB and BPI. Indonesia went to the Court of
with Section 1 (a) Rule 16 of the Rules of Court on Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule
the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over 65 of the Rules of Court. How would the Court
its person. of Appeals decide the case? (1991 Bar)
A: The Court of Appeals should dismiss the
According to the case of Holy See vs. Rosario, in petition in so far as it seeks to annul the order
Public International Law, when a state wishes to denying the motion of the Government of
plead sovereign immunity in a foreign court, it Indonesia to dismiss the counterclaim. The
requests the Foreign office of the state where it is counterclaim in this case is a compulsory
being sued to convey to the court that it is counterclaim since it arises from the same
entitled to immunity. In the Philippines, the contract involved in the complaint. As such, it
practice is for the foreign government to first must be set up, otherwise, it will be barred.
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of Above all, as held in Froilan vs. Pan Oriental
immunity. In some case, the defense of sovereign Shipping Co. 95 Phil 905, by filing a complaint, the
immunity is submitted directly to the local court state of Indonesia waived its immunity from suit.
by the foreign state through counsel by filing a It is not right that it can sue in the courts of the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has Philippines if in the first place it cannot be sued.
no jurisdiction over its person. The defendant therefore acquires the right to set
up a compulsory counterclaim against it.
b) No. The sale of Balau products as a contract
involves a commercial activity. As held by the However, The Court of Appeals should grant the
Supreme Court in the case of USA vs. Ruiz and USA petition of the Indonesian Government insofar as
vs. Guinto, it was stated that a foreign state it sought to annul the garnishment of the funds of
couldn’t invoke immunity from suit if it enters Indonesia, which were deposited in the PNB and
into a commercial contract. The Philippines BPI.
adheres to restrictive Sovereign Immunity.
Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction of a foreign
In February 1990, the Ministry of the Army, court does not involve waiver of the separate
Republic of Indonesia, invited for a bid for the immunity from execution. (You can look but you
supply of 500,000 pairs of combat boots for the can’t touch.)
use of the Indonesian Army. The Marikina Shoe
Corporation, a Philippine Corporation, which Thus as held in the case of Dexter vs. Carpenters,
has a branch office and with no assets in P2d 705, it was held that consent to be sued does
Indonesia, submitted a bid to supply 500,000 not give consent to the attachment of the
pairs of combat boots at $30 per pair delivered property of sovereign government.
in Jakarta on or before October 1990. The
contract was awarded by the Ministry of the Exemptions from Jurisdiction
Army to Marikina Shoe Corporation and was 1. Doctrine of State Immunity;
41 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
2. Act of State Doctrine – court of one state will Passive right of legation – receive diplomatic
not sit in judgment over acts of government representatives Notes:
of another state done in its territory.
3. Diplomatic Immunity; Resident Missions
4. Immunity of UN Specialized agencies, other Classes of heads of missions [ A N E M I C ]
International Organizations, and its Officers; a. Ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads
5. Foreign Merchant vessels exercising the right of State and other heads of missions of
of innocent passage; equivalent rank;
6. Foreign armies passing through or stationed in b. Envoys ministers and internuncios accredited
the territory with the permission of the State; to Heads of State;
7. Warships and other public vessels of another c. Charges d’affaires accredited to Ministers for
State operated for non-commercial purposes. Foreign Affairs.
Q: Is the state obliged to maintain diplomatic Sometimes the state may appoint special
relations with other states? diplomatic agents charged with either political or
A: No, as the right of legation is purely ceremonial duties, such as the negotiation of a
consensual. If it wants to, a state may shut itself treaty or attendance at a state function like a
from the rest of the world, as Japan did until the coronation or a funeral.
close of the 19th century. However, a policy of
isolation would hinder the progress of a state Q: How are the regular diplomatic
since it would be denying itself of the many representatives classified?
benefits available from the international
A:
community. i. Ambassadors or nuncios accredited to
heads of states
Active right of legation – send diplomatic ii. Envoys, ministers and internuncios
representatives
accredited to heads of states
42 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
iii. Charges d’ affaires accredited to ministers The functions of diplomatic mission consist inter
for foreign affairs alia in: Notes:
a) Representing the sending state
The diplomatic corps consists of different in the receiving state.
diplomatic representatives who have been b) Protecting in the receiving state
accredited to the local or receiving state. A doyen the interests of the sending state and its
du corps or a dean, who is usually the member of nationals.
the highest rank and the longest service to the c) Negotiating with the
state, heads it. government of the receiving state.
d) Ascertainment through lawful
In Catholic countries, the dean is the Papal means of the conditions and developments in
Nuncio. the receiving state and reporting thereon to
the government of the sending state.
Q: How are diplomatic representatives chosen? e) Promoting friendly relations
A: The appointment of diplomats is not merely a between the sending and receiving state and
matter of municipal law for the receiving state is developing their economic, cultural and
not obliged to accept a representative who is a scientific relations.
persona non grata to it. Indeed, there have been f) In some cases, representing
cases when duly accredited diplomatic friendly governments at their request.
representatives have been rejected, resulting in
strained relations between the sending and Pointers on Diplomatic Immunities and
receiving state. Privileges
The more important are the following:
To avoid such awkward situation, most states now a) The person of a diplomatic
observe the practice of agreation, by means of agent shall be inviolable and he shall not be
which inquiries are addressed to the receiving liable to any form of arrest or detention. The
state regarding a proposed diplomatic receiving state shall treat him with due
representative of the sending state. It is only respect and shall take all appropriate steps to
when the receiving state manifests its agreement prevent any attack on his person, freedom or
or consent that the diplomatic representative is dignity.
appointed and formally accredited.
b) A diplomatic agent shall enjoy
Q: What is agreation? immunity from the criminal, civil and
A: It is a practice of the states before appointing administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
a particular individual to be the chief of their state, except in certain cases as, for
diplomatic mission in order to avoid possible example, when the civil action deals with
embarrassment. It consist of two acts: property held by him in a private or
i. The Inquiry, usually informal, proprietary capacity.
addressed by the sending state to the
receiving state regarding the acceptability of c) The diplomatic premises shall be
an individual to be its chief of mission; and inviolable, and the agents of the receiving
ii. The agreement, also informal, state may not enter them without the
by which the receiving state indicates to the consent of the head of the mission. Such
sending state that such person, would be premises, their furnishings and other property
acceptable. thereon and the means of transportation of
the mission shall be immune from search,
Letter of Credence (Letre d’ Creance) requisition, attachment or execution. (See
The document, which the envoy receives from his movie “Red Corner” starring Richard Gere).
government accrediting him to the foreign state
to which he is being sent. It designates his rank d) The archives and documents of
and the general object of his mission and asks the mission shall be inviolable at any time
that he be received favorably and that full and wherever they may be.
credence be given to what he says on behalf of his
state. e) The receiving state shall permit
and protect free communication on the part
Letter Patent (Letre d’ Provision) of the mission for all official purposes. In
The appointment of a consul is usually evidenced communicating with the government and
by a commission, known sometimes as letter other missions, and consulates of the sending
patent or letre d’ provision, issued by the state wherever situated, the mission may
appointing authority of the sending state and employ all appropriate means, including
transmitted to the receiving state through diplomatic couriers and messages in code or
diplomatic channels. cipher. The official correspondence of the
mission shall be inviolable.
Functions of diplomatic representatives
43 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
regarding the venue of lawsuits is not necessarily (even if they are not Philippine nationals or
a wavier of sovereign immunity from suit. It residents) as set out in Article 37(3), if at the time Notes:
should be interpreted to apply only where Italy of the arrest they were in “acts performed in the
elects to sue in the Philippine courts or waives its course of their duties.” If a driver was among the
immunity by a subsequent act. The contract does said rank and file employees and he was arrested
not involve a commercial activity of the while driving a diplomatic vehicle or engaged in
ambassador, because it is connected with his related acts, still he would be covered by the
official functions. [Republic of Indonesia v. immunity.
Vinzon, 405 SCRA 126 (2003)]
Q: A foreign ambassador to the Philippines
Q: A group of high-ranking officials and rank and leased a vacation house in Tagaytay for his
file employees stationed in a foreign embassy in personal use. For some reason, he failed to pay
Manila were arrested outside embassy grounds the rentals for more than one year. The lessor
and detained at Camp Crame on suspicion that filed an action for the recovery of his property
they were actively collaborating with in court.
“terrorists” out to overthrow or destabilize the a) Can the foreign ambassador invoke his
Philippine Government. The Foreign diplomatic immunity to resist the lessor’s
Ambassador sought their immediate release, action?
claiming that the detained embassy officials and b) The lessor gets hold of evidence that the
employees enjoyed diplomatic immunity. If ambassador is about to return to his home
invited to express your legal opinion on the country. Can the lessor ask the court to
matter, what advice would you give. (2003 Bar) stop the ambassador’s departure from the
A: I shall advise that the high ranking officials and Philippine? (2000 Bar)
rank and file employees be released because of A: a) No, the foreign ambassador cannot invoke
their diplomatic immunity. Article 29 of the the diplomatic immunity to resist the action,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations since he is not using the house in Tagaytay City for
provides: the purposes of his mission but merely for
vacation. Under 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention
“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent has
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of no immunity in case of a real action relating to
arrest or detention.” private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State unless he holds it
Under Article 37 of the Vienna Convention on on behalf of the sending State for purposes of the
Diplomatic Relations, members of the mission.
administrative and technical staff of the
diplomatic mission, shall, if they are not nationals b) No, the lessor cannot ask the court to stop the
of or permanent residents in the receiving State, departure of the ambassador from the Philippines.
enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention, a
Article 29. diplomatic agent shall not be liable to any form of
arrest or detention.
Under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, the remedy is to declare the Q: The United States Ambassador from the
high-ranking officials and rank and file employees Philippines and the American Consul General
personae non gratae and ask them to leave. also in the Philippines quarreled in the lobby of
Manila Hotel and shot each other. May the
Alternative A: Under the Vienna Convention on Philippine courts take jurisdiction over them for
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent “shall trial and punishment for the crime they may
not be liable to any form of arrest or detention have committed? (1979 Bar)
(Article 29) and he enjoys immunity from criminal A: The Ambassador is immune from prosecution
jurisdiction (Article 31). for all crimes committed by him whether officially
or in his private capacity.
This immunity may cover the “high ranking
officials” in question, who are assumed to be The consul is immune from criminal prosecution
diplomatic officers or agents. ONLY for acts committed by him in connection
with his official functions.
With respect to the “rank and file employees”
that are covered by the immunity referred to
above, provided that are not nationals or
permanent residents of the Philippines pursuant
to Article 37(2) of the said Convention.
Q: The Ambassador of State X to the Philippines receiving state may resort to the more
bought in the name of his government drastic method of dismissal, by means of Notes:
two houses and lots at Forbes Park, which the offending diplomat is
Makati. One house is used as the summarily presented with his passport
chancery and residence of the and asked to leave the country.
ambassador, and the other as quarters
for nationals of State X who are Q: Will the termination of diplomatic relations
studying in De La Salle University. The also terminate consular relations between the
Register of Deeds refused to register sending and receiving states?
the sale and to issue Transfer A: NO. Consuls belong to a class of state agents
Certificates of Title in the name of distinct from that of diplomatic officers. They do
State X. Is his refusal justified? not represent their state in its relations with
A: The prohibition in the Constitution against foreign states and are not intermediaries through
alienation of lands in favor of aliens does not whom matters of state are discussed between
apply to alienation of the same in favor of foreign governments.
governments to be used as chancery and They look mainly after the commercial interest of
residence of its diplomatic representatives. The their own state in the territory of a foreign state.
receiving state is under obligation to facilitate the
acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its They are not clothed with diplomatic character
laws, by the sending state of premises necessary and are not accredited to the government of the
for its mission, or to assist the latter in obtaining country where they exercised their consular
accommodation in some other way. Therefore, functions; they deal directly with local
the refusal of the Register of Deeds to register the authorities.
sale and the issuance of TCT in the name of state
X is unjustified. 2 Kinds of Consuls
b) consules missi – professional or career
However, in so far as the house and lot to be used consuls who are nationals of the sending
as quarters of the nationals of State X who are state and are required to devote their
studying in De La Salle University are concerned, full time to the discharge of their duties.
the Register of Deeds correctly refused c) consules electi –may or may not be
registration. Here, the prohibition in the nationals of the sending state and
constitution against the transfer of properties to perform their consular functions only in
parties other than the Filipino citizens or addition to their regular callings.
corporation 60% of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens should be followed. Q: Where do consuls derive their authority?
A: Consuls derive their authority from two
Termination of Diplomatic Relation principal sources, to wit, the letter patent or
A diplomatic mission may come to an end by any letter ‘de provision, which is the commission
of the usual methods of terminating official issued by the sending state, and the exequator,
relations like: which is the permission given them by the
receiving state to perform their functions therein.
Under Municipal Law: [ R A D A R ]
a) Resignation Q: Do consuls enjoy their own immunities and
b) Accomplishment of the purpose privileges? Explain.
c) Death A: Yes, but not to the same extent as those
enjoyed by the diplomats.
d) Abolition of the office
e) Removal Like diplomats, consuls are entitled to the
inviolability of their correspondence, archives and
Under the International Law: [ W E R ] other documents, freedom of movement and
a) War - the outbreak of war between the travel, immunity from jurisdiction for acts
sending and receiving states terminates performed in their official capacity and
their diplomatic relations, which is exemption from certain taxes and customs duties.
usually severed before the actual
commencement of hostilities; However, consuls are liable to arrest and
b) Extinction - extinction of either the punishment for grave offenses and may be
sending state or the receiving state will required to give testimony, subject to certain
also automatically terminate diplomatic exceptions.
relations between them; OR
c) Recall – may be demanded by the The consular offices are immune only with respect
receiving state when the foreign to that part where the consular work is being
diplomat becomes a persona non grata to performed and they may be expropriated for
it for any reason. Where the demand is purposes of national defense or public utility.
rejected by the sending state, the
46 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
Q: Discuss the differences, if any, in the c) Can E ask the court to stop D’s departure
privileges or immunities of diplomatic envoys from the Philippines? Notes:
and consular officers from the civil and criminal A: a) Yes Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
jurisdiction of the receiving state. (1995 Bar) Diplomatic Relations provides:
A: Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention of
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent shall “A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity
enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
the receiving state. He shall also enjoy immunity state. He shall also enjoy immunity from its
from its civil and administrative jurisdiction civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in
except in the case of: the case of: A real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory
a) A real action relating to private of the receiving state, unless he holds it on
immovable property situated in the territory behalf of the sending state for the purpose
of the receiving state, unless he holds it on of the mission.
behalf of the sending state for the purpose of
the mission; The action against the ambassador is a real action
involving private immovable property situated
b) An action relating to succession within the territory of the Philippines as the
in which the diplomatic agent is involved as receiving state. The action falls within the
executor, administrator, heir or legatee as exception to the grant of immunity from the civil
private person and not on behalf of the and administrative jurisdiction of the Philippines.
sending state;
Alternative A: No, the action will not prosper.
c) An action relating to any Although the action is a real action relating to
professional or commercial activity exercised private immovable property within the territory of
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state the Philippines, nonetheless, the vacation house
outside of his official functions. may be considered property held by the
Ambassador in behalf of his State (Kingdom of
On the other hand, under Article 41 of the Vienna Nepal) for the purposes of the mission, and
Convention on the Consular Relations, a consular therefore, such is beyond the civil and
officer does not enjoy immunity from the criminal administrative jurisdiction of the Philippines,
jurisdiction of the receiving state. Under Article including its court.
43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, consular officers are not amenable to b) No, E cannot ask for the attachment of the
the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative personal properties of the Ambassador. Article 30
authorities of the receiving state in respect of and 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
acts performed in the exercise of consular Relations provide that the papers, correspondence
functions. and the property of the diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable. Therefore, a writ of attachment
However, this does not apply in respect of a civil cannot be issued against the furniture and any
action either: personal property. Moreover, on the assumption
that the Kingdom of Nepal grants similar
a) Arising out of a CONTRACT protection to Philippine diplomatic agents,
concluded by a consular officer in which he Section 4 of RA 75 provides that any writ or
did not enter expressly or impliedly as an process issued by any court in the Philippines for
agent of the sending state. the attachment of the goods or chattel of the
b) By a third party for DAMAGES ambassador of a foreign state to the Philippines
arising from an accident in the receiving state shall be void.
caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.
c) No, E cannot ask the court to stop the
Q: D, the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Nepal departure of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of
to the Philippines leased a house in Baguio City Nepal from the Philippines. Article 29 of the
as his personal vacation home. On account of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
military disturbance in Nepal, D did not receive provides: “The person of a diplomatic agent shall
his salary and allowances from his government be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form
and so he failed to pay his rental for more than of arrest or detention.
one year. E, the lessor, filed an action for
recovery of his property with the RTC of Baguio Q: Explain, using example, the meaning of
City. (2000, 1989 Bar) exequator. (1991 Bar)
a) Can the action of E prosper? A: Exequator is an authorization from the
b) Can E ask for the attachment of the receiving state admitting the head of a consular
furniture and other personal properties of d post to the exercise of his functions. For
after getting hold of evidence that D is example, if the Philippines appoint a consul
about to leave the country? general for New York, he cannot start performing
47 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
his functions unless the President of the United b) Yes, Under Article 40 of the Vienna Convention,
States issues an exequator to him. if a diplomatic agent is in the territory of a third Notes:
state, which has granted him a passport visa if
Q: X, a secretary and consul in the American such was necessary, while proceeding to take up
embassy in Manila, bought from B a diamond his post, the third state shall accord him
ring in the amount of P 50,000, which he later inviolability and such other immunities as may be
gave as a birthday present to his Filipino required to ensure his transit.
girlfriend. The purchase price was paid in
check drawn upon the Citibank. Upon
presentment for payment, the check was MUNICHER v. CA
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Because G.R. No. 142396, 11 February 2003
X’s failure to make good of the dishonored
check, B filed a complaint against X in the If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for foreign government done by its foreign agent,
violation of BP 22. After preliminary although not necessarily a diplomatic personage,
investigation, the information was filed against but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
X in the City Court of Manila. X filed a motion could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
to dismiss the case against him on the ground sovereign from suit without its consent.
that he is a Secretary and Consul in the
American Embassy enjoying diplomatic Q: Adams and Baker are American citizens
immunity from criminal prosecution in the residing in the Philippines. Adams befriended
Philippines. If you were the judge, how would Baker and became a frequent visitor at his
you resolve the motion to dismiss? (1997 Bar) house. One day, Adams arrived with 30
members of the Philippine National Police,
A: The motion to dismiss should be granted. As armed with a Search Warrant authorizing the
consul, X is not immune from criminal search of Baker’s house and its premises for
prosecution. Under paragraph 3 of Article 41 of dangerous drugs being trafficked to the United
the Vienna Conventions, a consular officer is not States of America.
immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state. In Schneekenburger vs. Mora, 63 The search purportedly yielded positive results,
Phil 249, it was held that a consul is not exempt and Baker was charged with Violation of the
from criminal prosecution in the country where he Dangerous Drugs Act. Adams was the
is assigned. prosecution’s principal witness. However, for
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
However, as a secretary in the American Embassy, doubt, Baker was acquitted.
X enjoys diplomatic immunity from the criminal
prosecution. As secretary, he is a diplomatic Baker then sued Adams for damages for filing
agent. Under paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the trumped-up charges against him. Among the
Vienna Convention, a diplomatic agent against defenses raised by Adams is that he has
enjoys immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of diplomatic immunity, conformably with the
the receiving state. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. He
presented Diplomatic Notes from the American
Q: a) A consul of a South American country
Embassy stating that he is an agent of the
stationed in Manila was charged with serious
United States Drug Enforcement Agency tasked
physical injuries. May he claim immunity from
with “conducting surveillance operations” on
jurisdiction of the local court? Explain.
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines
b) Suppose after he was charged, he was believed to be the source of prohibited drugs
appointed as his country’s ambassador to the being shipped to the U.S. It was also stated that
Philippines. Can his newly gained diplomatic after having ascertained the target, Adams
status be a ground for the dismissal of his would then inform the Philippine narcotic
criminal case? Explain. (1995 Bar) agents to make the actual arrest. (2005 Bar)
(a) As counsel of plaintiff Baker, argue why his
A: a) No, Under Article 41 of the Vienna complaint should not be dismissed on the
Convention, consuls do not enjoy immunity from ground of defendant Adams’ diplomatic
the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. immunity from suit.
He is not liable to arrest or detention pending the (b) As counsel of defendant Adams, argue for
trial unless the offense was committed against his the dismissal of the complaint.
father, mother, child, ascendant, descendant or A: (a) As a counsel of Baker, I shall argue that
spouse. Consuls are not liable to arrest and Baker has no diplomatic immunity, because he is
detention pending trial except in the case of not performing diplomatic functions.
grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the
competent judicial authority. The crime of Alternative A: (a) As a counsel for Baker, I will
physical injuries is not a grave crime unless it is argue that Adam’s diplomatic immunity cannot be
committed against the above-mentioned persons. accepted as the sole basis for the dismissal of the
48 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
deliver up such fugitives to another; and though we hold for the procedural due process required
such delivery was often made it was upon the by a given set of circumstances “must begin with Notes:
principle of comity x x x.” (Dissenting Opinion, a determination of the precise nature of the
Puno, J., in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. government function involved as well as the
Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc) private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.” The concept of due
Q: What is the nature of an extradition process is flexible for “not all situations calling
proceeding? Is it akin to a criminal proceeding? for procedural safeguards call for the same kind
Held: [A]n extradition proceeding is sui generis. of procedure.” (Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En
operation all the rights of an accused as Banc [Puno])
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with,
the process of extradition does not involve the Q: Will the retroactive application of an
determination of the guilt or innocence of an extradition treaty violate the constitutional
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged prohibition against "ex post facto" laws?
in the court of the state where he will be Held: The prohibition against ex post facto law
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights applies only to criminal legislation which affects
that are only relevant to determine the guilt or the substantial rights of the accused. This being
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an so, there is no merit in the contention that the
extraditee especially by one whose extradition ruling sustaining an extradition treaty’s
papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by retroactive application violates the constitutional
the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis: prohibition against ex post facto laws. The treaty
is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal criminal procedural statute. (Wright v. CA, 235
prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards SCRA 341, Aug. 15, 1994 [Kapunan])
that accompany a criminal trial in this country do
not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to Q: The Philippines and Australia entered into a
a valid treaty.” (Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Treaty of Extradition concurred in by the Senate
Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater of the Philippines on September 10, 1990. Both
Constitutional Procedural Protections To Fugitives governments have notified each other that the
Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 requirements for the entry into force of the
Michigan Journal of International Law 729, 741 Treaty have been complied with. It took effect
[1998], citing United States v. Galanis, 429 F. in 1990.
Supp. 1215 [D. Conn. 1977])
The Australian government is requesting the
There are other differences between an Philippine government to extradite its citizen,
extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Gibson, who has committed in his country the
An extradition proceeding is summary in natural indictable offense of Obtaining Property by
while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown Deception in 1985. The said offense is among
trial. In contradistinction to a criminal those enumerated as extraditable in the Treaty.
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an
extradition proceeding allow admission of For his defense, Gibson asserts that the
evidence under less stringent standards. In terms retroactive application of the extradition treaty
of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a amounts to an ex post facto law. Rule on
criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable Gibson’s contention. (2005 Bar)
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited “upon showing of the A: The contention of Gibson is not tenable. The
existence of a prima facie case.” Finally, unlike prohibition in Section 22, Article III of the
in a criminal case where judgment becomes Constitution refers to ex post facto laws. An
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition treaty is not a criminal law. [Wright v.
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge CA, 235 SCRA 341 (1994)]
an individual extraditable but the President has
the final discretion to extradite him. The United Q: Discuss the rules in the interpretation of
States adheres to a similar practice whereby the extradition treaties.
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in Held: [A]ll treaties, including the RP-US
balancing the equities of the case and the Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light
demands of the nation's foreign relations before of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna
making the ultimate decision to extradite. Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory provides that “a treaty
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
character and the evaluation stage in an with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary terms of the treaty in their context and in light of
investigation, the due process safeguards in the its object and purpose.” X x x. It cannot be
latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines
50 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
Even if William were in the territorial jurisdiction Q: Patrick is charged with illegal recruitment
of Republic A, he may not be extradited because and estafa before the RTC of Manila. He
inciting to sedition, of which he is charged, jumped bail and managed to escape to America.
constitutes a political offense. It is a standard Assume that there is an extradition treaty
provision of extradition treaties, such as the one between the Philippines and America and it
between Republic A and Republic X, that political does not include illegal recruitment as one of
offenses are not extraditable. the extraditable offenses. Upon surrender of
Patrick by the US Government to the
Alternative A: Republic B can deny the request Philippines, Patrick protested that he could not
the request of Republic X to extradite William, be tried for illegal recruitment. Decide. (1998
because his offense was not a political offense. Bar)
On the basis of the predominance of A: Under the principle of specialty in extradition,
proportionality test, his acts were not directly Patrick cannot be tried for illegal recruitment
connected to any purely political offense. since this is not included in the list of extraditable
offenses in the extradition treaty between the
Q: On November 1, 1976, A, B, C and D, self Philippines and the United States, unless the
styled Moro rebels long wanted by the United States does not object to the trial of
authorities for the fatal ambuscade of a bus Patrick for illegal recruitment.
load of innocent civilians, hijacked a PAL lane
on its Manila-Davao flight which they forcibly Q: The Extradition Treaty between France and
diverted to, and landed in Jakarta Indonesia. In the Philippines is silent as to applicability with
that country, A, B, C and D sought political respect to crimes committed prior to its
asylum, invoking the UN Declaration on Human effectivity.
Rights. Reacting, the Philippine Government, a) Can France demand the extradition of A, a
through proper diplomatic channels sought after French national residing in the Philippines,
their extradition. May Indonesia grant asylum for an offense committed in France prior to
or should it extradite A, B, C and D to the the effectivity of the treaty? Explain.
Philippines. (1976 Bar) b) Can A contest his extradition on the ground
that it violates the ex post facto provision
Q: Sergio Osmeña III and Eugenio Lopez Jr. both in the Philippine Constitution? Explain.
charged with attempted assassination of (1996 Bar)
President Marcos before the military tribunal, A: a) In Clough vs. Strakesh, 109 Fed 330, it was
escaped from military custody, flew to Hong held that an extradition treaty applies to Crimes
Kong and then to California USA where they are committed before its effectivity unless the
reportedly seeking political asylum. There is no extradition treaty expressly exempts them. As
extradition treaty however between the Whiteman points out, extradition does not define
Philippines and the United States.Assuming that crimes but merely provides a means by which a
the Philippine Government desires the state may obtain the return and punishment of
surrender of the above-named fugitives to the persons charged with or convicted of having
Philippines to face trial before the military committed a crime who fled the jurisdiction of
tribunal, how can this be legally done under the state whose law has been violated. It is
International Law? (1978 Bar) therefore immaterial whether at the time of the
A: The Philippines may only request and cannot commission of the crime for which extradition is
demand the surrender of the two fugitives. As sought no treaty was in existence. If at the time
territorial sovereign, the United States is not of extradition is requested there is in force
obliged to return them but may decide to do so between the requesting and the requested state a
for reasons of comity. This is likely, however, treaty covering the offense on which the request
because the escapees are sought for political is based, the treaty is applicable.
offense and can claim the right of asylum under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
52 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
b) No, as held in WRIGHT vs. CA, 295 SCRA 341, extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the
the prohibition against ex post facto laws in capacity and the willingness of the other state to Notes:
Section 22 of Article III of the Constitution applies protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
to penal laws only and does not apply to extradited. That signature signifies our full faith
extradition treaties. that the accused will be given, upon extradition
to the requesting state, all relevant and basic
Extradition of War Criminals and Terrorists rights in the criminal proceedings that will take
(Violators of crimes against international law) place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not
As violators of crimes against international law, have been signed, or would have been directly
war criminals are subject to extradition in 1946, attacked for its unconstitutionality.
the UN General Assembly passed a resolution
recommending to members and calling upon all
The Proceedings Are Sui Generis.
non-members to extradite war criminals,
including traitors.
THIRD, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice vs.
Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal
Attentat Clause in nature. In criminal proceedings, the
A provision in an extradition treaty that stipulates constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in
that the murder of the head of a foreign extradition, which is sui generis - in a class by
government or the member of his family should itself – they are not.
not be considered as a political offense.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the
Doctrine of Reciprocity
extradition court is not called upon to ascertain
If the requesting state is shown to be willing to the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to
surrender its own nationals for trial by the courts be extradited. Such determination during the
of another country, the detaining state must also extradition proceedings will only result in
surrender its own citizens for trial. needless duplication and delay.
SECOND, an extradition treaty presupposes that Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
both parties thereto have examined and that both comply in good faith with our obligations under
accept and trust each other’s legal system and the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver
judicial process. More pointedly, our duly the accused to the requesting country if the
authorized representative’s signature on an conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth
53 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
in the Treaty, is satisfied. In other words, the received the summons fail to answer within the
demanding government, where it has done all that time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case Notes:
the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled or set another date for the hearing thereof.
to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government is (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the
under obligation to make the surrender.” warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in served each upon the accused and the attorney
a position to deliver the accused, should it be having charge of the case.”
found proper.
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s
There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight act of immediately setting for hearing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the
FIFTH, persons to be extradited are presumed to negative:
be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience of the executive
branch nothing short of confinement can ensure A. On the Basis of the Extradition law
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of
the requested state in order to thwart their It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate”
extradition to the requesting state.
to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
“qualification would be rendered nugatory by
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings
would not even begin, if only the accused were opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments
from them, and giving them time to prepare and
willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. Prior acts of herein respondent: present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
c) Leaving the requesting state right before the considered “immediate”. The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but on
conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and the whole as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of
d) Remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
his return and that the crimes he is charged
with are bailable - eloquently speak of his By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law
further conveys that accuracy is not as important
aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid as speed at such early stage. The trial court is
not expected to make an exhaustive
them at all cost.
determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filling of the
These circumstances point to an ever-present,
underlying high risk of flight. He has petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the
will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to to get a good first impression - a prima facie
finding - sufficient to make a speedy initial
stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from
fleeing a second time? determination as regards the arrest and detention
of the accused.
Q: Is the respondent in extradition proceeding
entitled to notice and hearing before the We stress that the prima facie existence of
issuance of a warrant of arrest? probable cause for hearing the petition and, a
A: Both parties cite section 6 of PD 1069 in priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
support of their arguments. It states: evident from the petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already
“SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest, determined therefrom that a prima facie finding
Hearing, Service of Notices - did not exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing
(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the upon motion of Jimenez.
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and Moreover, the law specifies that the court se a
to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure
in the order. He may issue a warrant for the of the accused to answer after receiving the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be summons. In connection with the matter of
served any where within the Philippines if it immediate arrest, however, the word “hearing” is
appears to the presiding judge that the immediate notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had
arrest and temporary detention of the accused the holding of a hearing at that stage been
will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt intended, the law could have easily so provided.
of the answer, or should the accused after having It also bears emphasizing at this point that
54 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
In Webb vs. De Leon, the Court categorically It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a will not apply to a case like extradition, where
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest: the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
“Again, we stress that before issuing The provision in the Constitution stating that the
warrants of arrest, judges merely “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
determine personally the probability, not privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
55 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
suspended” does not detract from the rule that It is also worth noting that before the US
the constitutional right to bail is available only in government requested the extradition of Notes:
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the respondent, proceedings had already been
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas conducted in that country. But because he left
corpus finds application “only to persons judicially the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or those proceedings could be completed, it was
directly connected with invasion.” Hence, the hindered from continuing with the due processes
second sentence in the constitutional provision on prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in process now has thus become hollow. He already
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the instead of taking it, he ran away.
right is available even in extradition proceedings
In this light, would it be proper and just for the
that are not criminal in nature.
government to increase the risk of violating its
treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to
be extradited are bailable in the United States is Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time
that it takes to resolve the Petition for
not an argument to grant him one in the present
case. To stress, extradition proceedings are Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation
of liberty without the due process that he had
separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply previously shunned pales against the government’s
interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court. obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
Q: Will Mark Jimenez detention prior to the “constitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum;
the due process rights accorded to individuals
conclusion of the extradition proceedings not
amount of his right to due process? must be carefully balanced against exigent and
palpable government interests.”
A: Contrary to his contention, his detention prior
to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven
does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We reiterate the familiar doctrine that for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead
of facing the consequences of their actions,
the essence of due process is the opportunity to
be heard but, at the same time, point out that choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be
good policy to increase the risk of violating our
the doctrine does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. Where the treaty obligations if, through overprotection or
excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to
circumstances—such as those present in an
extradition case – call for it, a subsequent be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape
from our custody. In the absence of any provision
opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to - in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in
be heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of
not granting them bail, as a general rule, would
no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness. be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming
to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no prosecutors.
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation
of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his The denial of bail as a matter of course in
extradition cases falls into place with and gives
arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is
sufficiently ensured by: life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice
would encourage the accused to voluntarily
1) The DOJ’s filing in court of the Petition with surrender to the requesting state to cut short
their detention here. Likewise, their detention
its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request pending the resolution of extradition proceedings
would fall into place with the emphasis of the
meets the requirements of the law and the
relevant treaty; Extradition Law on the summary nature of
extradition cases and the need for their speedy
2) The extradition judge’s independent prima disposition.
facie determination that his arrest will best
serve the ends of justice before the issuance Q: What are the exceptions to the “No Bail”
Rule in Extradition Proceedings?
of a warrant for his arrest; and
A: The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter
of right in extradition cases.
3) His opportunity, once he is under the court’s
custody, to apply for bail as an exception to
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
the no-initial-bail rule.
to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as
well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
56 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, People vs. Jalosjos, the Court has already
we believe that the right to due process is broad debunked the disenfranchisement argument xxx. Notes:
enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
It must be noted that even before private
extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every
person. It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable to respondent ran for and won a congressional seat
in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that
every situation calling for its application.”
the United States was requesting extradition.
Hence, his constituents were or should have been
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice,
we believe and so hold that, after a potential prepared for the consequences of the extradition
case against their representative, including his
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and detention pending the final resolution of the case.
Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing of the following: are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling
1) That, once granted bail, the applicant will reason to grant him bail.
not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and 2. Anticipated Delay
2) That there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a Respondent Jimenez further contends that
because the extradition proceedings are lengthy,
matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it it would be unfair to confine him during the
pendency of the case. Again we are not
grants provisional liberty in extradition case
therein. convinced. We must emphasize that extradition
cases are summary in nature. They are resorted
3) That, the extraditee will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. to merely to determine whether the extradition
petition and its annexes conform to the
Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or
Since this exception has no express or specific innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
from general principles of justice and fairness, available to the accused in a criminal action. We
the applicant bears the burden of proving the are not overruling the possibility that petitioner
above two-tiered requirement with clarity; may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings.
precision and emphatic forcefulness. This is another matter that is not at issue here.
Thus, any further discussion of this point would be
The Court realizes that extradition is basically an merely anticipatory and academic. However, if
executive; not a judicial, responsibility arising the delay were due to maneuverings of
from the presidential power to conduct foreign respondent, with all the more reason would the
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to
nature of police assistance amongst states, which delay by considering it as a special circumstance
is not normally a judicial prerogative. for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It
exercise of this power should be characterized by would also encourage him to stretch out and
caution, so that the vital international and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
bilateral interests of our country will not be even more. This we cannot allow.
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short,
while this Court is ever protective of “the 3. Not a Flight Risk?
sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the
limits of its own prerogatives and the need to Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk.
fulfill international obligations. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned
of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are has not fled the country. True, he has not actually
special circumstances that are compelling enough fled during the preliminary stages of the request
for the Court to grant his request for provisional for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken
release on bail. We have carefully examined to mean that he will not flee as the process moves
these circumstances and shall now discuss them. forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
footsteps of the requesting government inching
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from
the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he
will stand his ground and still be within reach of
While his extradition was pending, Respondent our government if and when it matters; that is,
Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In for and granted by the trial court at anytime after
57 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
the applicant has been taken into custody and there exist a special, humanitarian or compelling
prior to judgment, even after bail has been circumstances. The grounds used by the highest Notes:
previously denied. In the present case, the court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
extradition court may continue hearing evidence therein may be considered, under the principle of
on the application for bail, which may be granted reciprocity as a special circumstance.
in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right;
Discuss the Ten Points in it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
Extradition proceedings. the peculiar facts of each case.
2) By entering into an extradition treaty, the 7) This Court will always remain a protector of
Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark
the reliability or soundness of the legal and of democracy and the conscience of society.
judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in But it is also well aware of the limitations of
the ability and the willingness of the latter to its authority and of the need for respect for
grant basic rights to the accused in the pending the prerogatives of the other co-equal and
criminal case therein. co-independent organs of government.
through diplomatic channels, is not only time- the administrative stage to the execution stage
consuming but also leakage-prone. There is depending on factors that will come into play. In Notes:
naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private
who get an intimation of the pending request for respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a
their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier soft retrains on his right to due process which will
initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an decide to resist the request for his extradition to
accepted practice for the requesting state to rush the United States. There is no denial of due
its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic process as long as fundamental fairness is assured
cable, the practically of the use of which in a party.
conceded. even our own Extradition Law (PD
1069) allows the transmission of a request for
provisional arrest via telegraph. In the advent of GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
modern technology, the telegraph or cable have ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. JUDGE OLALIA, JR.
been conveniently replaced by the facsimile AND MUÑOZ,
machine. Therefore, the transmission by the Hong GR No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Kong DOJ of the request for respondent’s
provisional arrest and the accompanying Bail Can Be Granted to Potential Extraditee on
documents, namely, a copy of the warrant of Basis of Clear and Convincing Evidence
arrest against respondent, a summary of the facts
of the case against him, particulars of his birth
and address, a statement of the intention to In its petition, Hong Kong sought the nullification
request his provisional arrest and the reason of the Manila RTC’s December 20, 2001 Order
therefor, by fax machine, more than serves this allowing Muñoz to post bail, and April 10, 2002
purpose of expediency. Order denying the motion to vacate the said Order
filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of Philippine Department of Justice. Hong Kong
the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling alleged that both Orders were issued by the judge
that the private respondent has no right to due with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
process at all throughout the length and breath of or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due the Constitution granting bail to a potential
process requires a determination of what process extraditee.
is due when it is due and the degree of what is
due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination
should be made as to whether procedural A potential extraditee may be granted bail on the
protections are at all due and when they are due, basis of clear and convincing evidence that the
which in turn depends on the extent to which an person is not a flight risk and will abide with all
individual will be condemned to suffer grievous the orders and processes of the extradition court.
loss,’ We have explained why an extraditee has
not right to notice and hearing during the Thus held the Supreme Court in dismissing the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. As petition of the Government of Hong Kong Special
aforesaid, P.D. 1069 xxx affords an extraditee Administrative Region to nullify two orders by a
sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowing a
against him once the petition is filed in court. The potential extraditee to post bail.
time for the extraditee to know the basis of the
request for his extradition is merely moved to the In a unanimous decision penned by Justice
filing in court of the formal petition for Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez in Government of
extradition. The extradites right to know is Hong Kong v. Judge Olalia, Jr. and Muñoz (GR No.
momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage 153675), the Court also remanded to the Manila
of the extradition process to accommodate the RTC, Branch 8 to determine whether Juan Antonio
more compelling interest of the State to prevent Muñoz is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear and
escape of potential extradites which can be convincing evidence.” If Muñoz is not entitled to
precipitated by premature which can be such, the trial court should order the cancellation
precipitated by premature information of the of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
basis of the request for his extradition. No Less thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings
compelling at that stage of the extradition with dispatch.
proceedings is the need to be more deferential to
the judgement of a co-equal branch of the
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
governments, the Executive, which has been
with three counts of the offense of “accepting an
endowed by our Constitution with greater power
advantage as agent,” in violation of sec. 9 (1) (a)
over matters involving our foreign relations.
of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
Needless to state, this balance of interests is not
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven counts of the
a static but a moving balance which can be
adjusted as the extradition process moves from
60 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the trial to determine the guilt or innocence of
common law of Hong Kong. potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil Notes:
action, but one that is merely administrative in
Citing the various international treaties giving character. By Jay B. Rempillo (SC website)
recognition and protection to human rights, the
Court saw the need to reexamine its ruling in
Government of United States of America v. Judge The Right of Asylum
Purganan which limited the exercise of the right Every foreign State can be at least a provisional
to bail to criminal proceedings. asylum for any individual, who, being persecuted
in his home State, goes to another State. In the
It said that while our extradition law does not absence of any international treaty stipulating the
provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, contrary, no state is, by international laws,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from obliged to refuse admission into its territory to
filing a motion for bail, a right under the such a fugitive or in case he has been admitted,
Constitution. to expel him or deliver him up to the prosecuting
state.
“The time-honored principle of pacta sunt The right of asylum is not a right possessed by an
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its alien to demand that a state protect him and
obligations under the Extradition grant him asylum. At present, it is just a privilege
Treaty….However, it does not necessarily mean granted by a state to allow an alien escaping from
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the the persecution of his country for political reasons
Philippines should diminish a potential to remain and to grant him asylum.
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are Q: Explain the right of asylum in international
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also law. (Bar)
by international conventions, to which the A: The right of asylum is the competence of
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, every state inferred from its territorial supremacy
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, to allow a prosecuted alien to enter and to remain
provided that a certain standard for the grant is on its territory under its protection and thereby
satisfactorily met,” the Court said. grant asylum to him.
Q: What is ratification? Discuss its function in §21, A.VII, 1987 Phil. Constitution
the treaty-making process. No treaty or international agreement shall be Notes:
Held: Ratification is generally held to be an valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
executive act, undertaken by the head of state or 2/3 of ALL the Members of the Senate.
of the government, as the case may be, through
which the formal acceptance of the treaty is §20, A.VII, 1987 Phil. Constitution
proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic The President may contract or guarantee foreign
legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. loans on behalf of the RP with the prior
The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject
is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty to such limitations as may be provided by law.
provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise The MB shall, within 30 days from the end of
established that the negotiating States agreed every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
that ratification should be required, (c) the Congress a complete report of its decisions on
representative of the State has signed the treaty applications for loans to be contracted or
subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the guaranteed by the Government or government-
State to sign the treaty subject to ratification owned and controlled corporations which would
appears from the full powers of its have the effect of increasing the foreign debt,
representative, or was expressed during the and containing other matters as may be provided
negotiation. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang by law.
Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc §4, A.XVIII, 1987 Phil. Constitution
[Buena]) All exiting treaties or international agreements
which have not been ratified shall not be renewed
Accession or Adherence or extended without the concurrence of at least
When a State, who has NOT SIGNED a treaty, 2/3 of ALL the Members of the Senate.
accedes to it.
§25, A.XVIII, 1987 Phil. Constitution
Binding Effects of a Treaty After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
As a rule, a treaty is binding only on the between the RP and the USA concerning the
contracting parties, including not only the original Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
signatories but also other states, which, although facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
they may not have participated in the negotiation except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
of the agreement, have been allowed by its terms Senate and, when the Congress so requires,
to sign it later by a process known as accession. ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
Non-parties are usually not bound under the people in a national referendum held for that
maxim of pacta tertiis nec noceat nec prosunt. purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
Q: Enumerate instances when a third State who
is non-signatory may be bound by a treaty. NOTE: This section prohibits, in the absence of a
A: treaty, the stationing of troops and facilities of
1. When a treaty is a mere formal foreign countries in the Philippines. However, it
expression of customary international law, DOES NOT INCLUDE the temporary presence in the
which, as such is enforceable on all civilized Philippines of foreign troops for the purpose of a
states because of their membership in the combined military exercise. Besides, the holding
family of nations. of combined military exercise is connected with
defense, which is a sovereign function.
2. Under Article 2 of its charter,
the UN shall ensure that non-member States Q: Discuss the binding effect of treaties and
act in accordance with the principles of the executive agreements in international law.
Charter so far as may be necessary for the Held: [I]n international law, there is no
maintenance of international peace and difference between treaties and executive
security. Under Article 103, obligations of agreements in their binding effect upon states
member-states shall prevail in case of concerned, as long as the functionaries have
conflict with any other international remained within their powers. International law
agreement including those concluded with continues to make no distinction between treaties
non-members. and executive agreements: they are equally
binding obligations upon nations. (BAYAN [Bagong
3. The treaty itself may expressly Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary
extend its benefits to non-signatory states. Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000,
En Banc [Buena])
4. Parties to apparently unrelated
treaties may also be linked by the most- Q: Does the Philippines recognize the binding
favored nation clause. effect of executive agreements even without
the concurrence of the Senate or Congress?
66 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
the duty of courts of justice to “determine Q: Senate Bill No. 1234 was passed creating a
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of joint legislative-executive commission to give Notes:
discretion amounting to lack or excess of on behalf of the Senate, its advice, consent and
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or concurrence to treaties entered into by the
instrumentality of the government,” it is clear President. The bill contains the guidelines to
that this provision does not do away with the be followed by the commission in the discharge
political question doctrine. It was inserted in the of its functions. Is the bill constitutional? (1996
Constitution to prevent courts from making use of Bar)
the doctrine to avoid what otherwise are A: NO, the bill is not constitutional. The Senate
justiciable controversies, albeit involving the cannot delegate its power to concur to treaties
Executive Branch of the government during the ratified by the President.
martial law period. On the other hand, at this
stage, no justiciable controversy can be framed to Q: Can the House of Representatives take active
justify judicial review. I would therefore advice part in the conduct of foreign relations,
the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition to resort to particularly in entering into treaties and
the media to launch a campaign against international agreements? (1996 Bar)
Agreement A: NO. As held in US v. Curtiss Wright Export
Corporation 299 US 304, it is the President alone
Subject Matter of Treaties who can act as representative of the nation in the
1) Political Issues conduct of foreign affairs. Although the Senate
2) Changes in National Policies has the power to concur in treaties, the President
3) Involve International Agreements of a alone can negotiate treaties and Congress is
Permanent Character powerless to intrude into this. However, if the
matter involves a treaty or an executive
Subject Matter of EAs agreement, the HR may pass a resolution
1) Have transitory effectivity expressing its views on the matter.
2) Adjustment of details carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions Reservations
3) Arrangements of temporary nature A unilateral statement, however phrased or
4) Implementation of treaties, statutes, well named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
established policies. accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal
Q: How does a treaty differ from executive effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
agreement? application to that State.
A: An executive agreement is not a treaty in so
far as its ratification may not be required under When Reservation cannot be made
the Constitution. However, the distinction is a) If the treaty itself provides that NO
purely municipal and has no international reservation shall be admissible, or
significance. From the standpoint of international b) the treaty allows only specified reservations
law, “treaties and executive agreement are alike which do not include the reservation in
in that both constitute equally binding obligations question, or
upon the nations.” (FB Sayre, 39 Columbia Law c) the reservation is incompatible with the
Review, p. 75, 1939) object and purpose of the treaty.
Form and Time of Reservation
An executive agreement is NOT a treaty. As such, Written statement or declaration recorded at the
concurrence by two-thirds vote (2/3) of all the time of signing or ratifying or acceding to the
members of the Senate is not necessary for it to treaty.
become binding and effective.
Objected Reservations
Q: Is VFA a treaty or a mere executive Parties to the treaty may object to the
agreement? reservations of a State entering the treaty. A 1951
A: In the case of Bayan vs. Zamora, VFA was Advisory Opinion of the ICJ held that a reserving
considered a treaty because the Senate concurred State may be a party to a treaty notwithstanding
in via 2/3 votes of all its members. But in the that one or more parties to the convention, but
point of view of the US Government, it is merely not all, objects to its reservations and such
an executive agreement. reservations are not contrary to the object and
purpose of said convention.
Q: What is the implication if only the senate of REGISTRATION & PUBLICATION
the Philippines concur but not the senate of Article 102, UN Charter
USA? 1. Every treaty and every international agreement
A: None, it is only a matter of policy and the same entered into by any Member of the UN after the
is governed by their respective Municipal Law. present Charter comes into force shall as soon as
possible be registered with the Secretariat and
published by it.
68 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
X x x The entitlement of the 10% rate by U.S. necessity to state this rule of reparation
firms despite the absence of matching credit in the treaty itself because they are Notes:
(20% for royalties) would derogate from the design indispensable complement of failure to
behind the most favored nation clause to grant comply to one’s obligations.
equality of international treatment since the tax
burden laid upon the income of the investor is not TAÑADA V. ANGARA (1997)
the same in the two countries. The similarity in
the circumstances of payment of taxes is a One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
condition for the enjoyment of most favored international law is pacta sunt servanda -
nation treatment precisely to underscore the need international agreements must be performed in
for equality of treatment. good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding
2 Types obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has
a) Unconditional – any advantage of whatever kind contracted valid international obligations is bound
which has been or may in future be granted by to make in its legislations such modifications as
either of the contracting parties to a third State may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
shall simultaneously and unconditionally be obligations undertaken."
extended to the other under the same or
equivalent conditions as those under which it has
been granted to the third State. SEC. OF JUSTICE V. LANTION (2000)
b) Conditional – advantages are specified and The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest
limited not universal. and most fundamental maxims of international
law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
CIR V. JOHNSON & SON, INC. (1999) agreement therein in good faith. The observance
of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the
The purpose of a most favored nation clause is to
grant to the contracting party treatment not less Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
favorable than that which has been or may be
granted to the "most favored" among other adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land,
countries. The most favored nation clause is
intended to establish the principle of equality of and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
international treatment by providing that the
citizens or subjects of the contracting nations may nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of
enjoy the privileges accorded by either party to
those of the most favored nation. the land and no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere (citing Salonga & Yap, Public
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA (PSS) International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
(AGREEMENT MUST BE KEPT)
Means that treaties must be performed in good
faith. One of the oldest and most fundamental CIR V. ROBERTSON (1986)
rules of international law.
"The obligation to fulfill in good faith a treaty
Q: Explain the “pacta sunt servanda” rule. engagement requires that the stipulations be
Held: One of the oldest and most fundamental observed in their spirit as well as according to
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda – their letter and that what has been promised be
international agreements must be performed in performed without evasion, or subterfuge,
good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere honestly and to the best of the ability of the party
moral obligation but creates a legally binding which made the promise." (citing Kunz, The
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has Meaning and Range of the Norm (Pacta Sunt
contracted valid international obligations is bound Servanda, 29 A.J.I.L. 180 (1945); cited in
to make in its legislations such modifications as Freidmann, Lisstzyn, Pugh, International Law
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the (1969) 329). Somehow, the ruling becomes an
obligations undertaken.” (Tanada v. Angara, 272 anacoluthon and a persiflage.
SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 [Panganiban])
AGUSTIN V. EDU (1979)
Influences to ensure observance to PSS
a) national self-interest
b) a sense of duty t is not for this country to repudiate a
c) respect for promises solemnly given commitment to which it had pledged its word.
d) desire to avoid the obloquy attached The concept of pacta sunt servanda stands in the
to breach of contracts way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at
▪ Breach involves the obligation to make war with the principle of international morality.
reparations. There is, however, no
70 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
REBUS SIC STANTIBUS (RSS) c) the change has radically transformed the
(THINGS REMAINING AS THEY ARE) extent of the obligations still to be performed Notes:
This doctrine involves the legal effect of change under the treaty.
in conditions underlying the purposes of a treaty.
Simply stated, the disappearance of the
foundation upon which it rests. When FC cannot be invoked
a) if the treaty establishes a boundary
Authors, jurists, and tribunals are varied in the b) if the FC is the result of the breach by the
application of this doctrine. A majority, however, party invoking it of an obligation owed to any
hold that “the obligation of a treaty terminates other party to the treaty.
when a change occurs in circumstances which
existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty SANTOS V. NORTHWEST AIRLINES (1992)
and whose continuance formed, according to the
intention or will of the parties, a condition of the Obviously, rejection of the treaty, whether on the
continuing validity of the treaty.” The change ground of rebus sic stantibus or pursuant to
must be vital or fundamental. Also, under this Article 39, is NOT a function of the courts but of
doctrine, a treaty terminates if the performance the other branches of government. This is a
of obligations thereof will injure fundamental political act. The conclusion and renunciation of
rights or interests of any one of the parties. treaties is the prerogative of the political
departments and may not be usurped by the
Explain the "rebus sic stantibus" rule (i.e., judiciary. The courts are concerned only with the
things remaining as they are). Does it operate interpretation and application of laws and treaties
automatically to render a treaty inoperative? in force and not with their wisdom or efficacy.
Held: According to Jessup, the doctrine
constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal
principle which would justify non-performance of
a treaty obligation if the conditions with relation
to which the parties contracted have changed so PNCC V. CA (1997)
materially and so unexpectedly as to create a
situation in which the exaction of performance The principle of rebus sic stantibus neither fits in
would be unreasonable. The key element of this with the facts of the case. Under this theory, the
doctrine is the vital change in the condition of the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing
contracting parties that they could not have conditions, and once these conditions cease to
foreseen at the time the treaty was concluded. exist, the contract also ceases to exist. This
theory is said to be the basis of Article 1267 of the
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not Civil Code, which provides:
operate automatically to render the treaty
inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act
“ART. 1267. When the service has become so
of rejection, usually made by the head of state, difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
with a statement of the reasons why compliance
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also
with the treaty is no longer required. (Santos III be released therefrom, in whole or in part.”
v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, June
23, 1992)
This article, which enunciates the doctrine of
Limitations to RSS unforeseen events, is NOT, however, an absolute
a) It applies only to treaties of indefinite application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus,
duration; which would endanger the security of contractual
b) The vital change must have been unforeseen relations. The parties to the contract must be
or unforeseeable and should have not been presumed to have assumed the risks of
caused by the party invoking the doctrine. unfavorable developments. It is therefore only in
c) It must be invoked within reasonable time; absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances
and that equity demands assistance for the debtor
d) It cannot operate retroactively upon the
provisions of a treaty already executed prior EFFECT OF TERRITORIAL CHANGES
to the change in circumstances. (1978 CONVENTION ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN
RESPECT TO TREATIES)
Rules Governing Termination of RSS
a) a fundamental change (FC) must have Dispositive Treaties
occurred with respect to circumstances These are treaties which deal with rights over
existing at the time of the conclusion of the territory and are deemed to run with the land and
treaty; are not affected by changes of sovereignty. e.g.
b) the existence of those circumstances treaties dealing with boundaries between States.
constituted the basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty; and
71 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
individual which confers upon the State the right Israel from the anti-Semitic atmosphere in the
of diplomatic protection. region, refugees fleeing to Israel in avoidance of Notes:
the Darfur conflict were jailed in the interest of
Doctrine of Genuine Link national security. After some 200 were
The bond of nationality must be real and effective determined to not be a threat, usual repatriation
in order that a State may claim a person as its guidelines could not be followed in part due to
national for the purpose of affording him non-refoulement principles. Many of them were
diplomatic protection. NOTTEBOHN CASE 1955 released to Israeli collective farms called
ICJ * kibbutzim and moshavim to work until the
conflict subsides enough for their return. (Source:
Doctrine of Effective Nationality Wikipedia)
When a person who has more than one nationality
is within a third State, he shall be treated as if
had only one – either the nationality of the FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
country which he is habitually and principally a 174 SCRA 245, 23 June 1989
resident or the nationality of the country with
which in the circumstances he appears to be most
closely connected – without prejudice to the The Nottobohm Case is not relevant in the
petition before us because it dealt with a conflict
application of its (3rd State’s) law in matters of
personal status and of any convention in force. between the nationality laws of two states as
decided by a third State. No third State is
ART. 5, HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1903. *
involved in the case at bar, in fact, even the US is
not claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole
☀ These two doctrines are used
interchangeably by authors and question presented to us is WON Frivaldo is a
citizen of the Philipines under our own laws,
commentators without any effort to
make a distinction between the two. It regardless of other nationality laws. We can
decide this question alone as sovereign of our own
may be treated alike.
territory, conformable the Sec. 1 of the Hague
Convention (1903) which provides: “it is for each
Q: What is the “doctrine of effective
nationality” (genuine link doctrine)? State to determine under its laws who are its
nationals.”
Held: This principle is expressed in Article 5 of
the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws as follows: 3 Modes of Acquiring Nationality
1) Birth
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more a. jus sanguinis (by blood)
than one nationality shall be treated as if he had b. jus soli (by place)
only one. Without prejudice to the application of
its law in matters of personal status and of any 2) Naturalization
convention in force, a third State shall, of the a. naturalization proceedings
nationalities which any such person possesses, b. marriage
recognize exclusively in its territory either the c. legitimation
nationality of the country in which he is habitually d. option
and principally resident or the nationality of the e. acquisition of domicile
country with which in the circumstances he f. appointment as
appears to be in fact most closely connected. government official
(Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245, June 23,
1989) 3) Resumption or Repatriation – recovery of
the original nationality upon fulfillment
Non-Refoulement Principle of certain conditions.
Non-refoulement is a principle in international
law, specifically refugee law, that concerns the 5 Modes of Losing Nationality
protection of refugees from being returned to 1) Release
places where their lives or freedoms could be 2) Deprivation
threatened. Unlike political asylum, which applies 3) Expiration
to those who can prove a well-grounded fear of 4) Renunciation
persecution based on membership in a social 5) Substitution
group or class of persons, non-refoulement refers
to the generic repatriation of people, generally §1, AIV, 1987 Phil. Constitution
refugees into war zones and other disaster areas. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
An example of the non-refoulement principle can the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
be found in the 2007 issue of Israel jailing 320 2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
refugees from the Darfur conflict in Western of the Philippines;
Sudan. Due to laws erected for the protection of
74 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship of the laws passed by the state or to the manner
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution in which such laws are administered and Notes:
of 1935; enforced.
4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law. For example, a law imposing death penalty for a
petty theft would fall short of the international
Exhaustion of Local Remedies standard. So to would one calling for the arbitrary
Rule: The alien himself must have first exhausted punishment of accused persons without
the remedies provided by the municipal law, if compliance with the usual requisites of due
there be any. process.
volition. In this case, the government troopers iv. the nature or extent of the reparation to
immediately pursued the rebels and killed several be made for the breach of an Notes:
of them. international obligation.
2. YES. Victorious rebel movements are
responsible for the illegal acts of their forces n Dispute v. Situation
the course of the rebellion. The acts of the rebels A dispute can properly be considered as a
are imputable to them when they assume as duly disagreement on a matter at issue between two
constituted authorities of the State. or more States which has reached a stage at
which the parties have formulated claims and
counterclaims sufficiently definite to be passed
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes upon by a court or other body set up for the
purpose of pacific settlement. A situation, by
Nature contrast, is a state of affairs which has not yet
International Dispute Defined assumed the nature of conflict between the
Optional Clause parties but which may, though not necessarily,
Types come to have that character.
1. Negotiation
2. Good Offices Optional Clause
3. Mediation [OPTIONAL JURISDICTION CLAUSE]
4. Enquiry The following are deemed legal disputes:
5. Conciliation 1. Interpretation of a treaty;
6. Arbitration 2. Any question of international law;
7. Judicial Settlement 3. The existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of
¯°º°¯ an international obligation; and
4. The nature or extent of the reparation to
Nature be made for the breach of an
It is well established in international law that no international obligation.
State can, without its consent, be compelled to
submit its disputes with other States either to TYPES OF Pacific Settlement
mediation or arbitration, or to any other kind of I. Negotiation
pacific settlement (PS). (PCIJ on STATUS OF The legal and orderly administrative process by
EASTERN CARELIA.) which governments, in the exercise of their
unquestionable powers, conduct their relations
Dispute – is a disagreement on a point of law or with one another and discuss, adjust and settle
fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between their differences.
two persons. The mere denial of the existence of The chief and most common method of settling
a dispute does not prove its non-existence international disputes. By this method, the
because disputes are matters for objective parties seek a solution of their differences by
determination. direct exchange of views between themselves.
This is the very essence of diplomacy.
International Dispute – if the dispute arises
between two or more States. II. Good Offices
An attempt of a third party to bring together the
▪ The charging of one State and the denial of disputing States to effect a settlement of their
another of the dispute as charged, creates disputes. This is NOT to be regarded as an
an international dispute as “there has thus unfriendly act.
arisen a situation in which the two sides hold
clearly opposite views concerning the Tender of good office
questions of the performance or non- A tender of good office may be made by:
performance of their treaty obligations. a) Third State
Confronted with such a situation, the Court b) international organs such as the UN;
must conclude that international disputes or
have arisen.” ICJ Reports 1950 c) Individuals or eminent citizens of a
third State.
Legal Dispute – the following are deemed
constitutive of a legal dispute: III. Mediation
i. interpretation of a treaty; This is the action of a third party in bringing the
ii. any question of international law; parties to a dispute together and helping them in
iii. the existence of any fact which, if a more or less informal way to find a basis for the
established, would constitute a breach of settlement of their dispute.
an international obligation;
Mediation v. Good Offices
76 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
In good offices, once the parties have been ☀ compromis d’ arbitrage – the agreement
brought together, the third party tendering to arbitrate. It is the charter of the Notes:
good offices has no further functions to arbitral tribunal. Contains the following:
perform. In mediation, on the other hand, a) the questions to be settled;
the third party mediates and is the more b) the method of selecting arbitrators
active one, for he proposes solution, offers and their number;
his advice and in general attempts to c) venue;
conciliate differences. d) expenses;
e) the arbitral award;
IV. Enquiry f) rules of procedure; and
Enquiry is the establishment of the facts involved g) the law to be applied.
in a dispute and the clarification of the issues in
order that their elucidation might contribute to VII. Judicial Settlement
its settlement. This means settlement by a permanent
international court of justice, in accordance with
▪ Basis – it rests on the theory that certain judicial methods. Arbitration proceedings may be
disputes could be settled if the facts of the similar to the functions and process of judicial
case were established. settlement but the arbitral tribunal is NOT a
permanent body as compared to the body referred
▪ Object of Enquiry - to ascertain the facts to in this type of PS.
underlying a dispute and thereby prepare the
way for a negotiated adjustment or
settlement of the dispute. Forcible Measures Short of War
II. Retorsion
77 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
belonging to the armed forces or forming part 1) Neutralized areas or zones – these are zones
of the irregular forces. If captured, they are in the theater of operations established by Notes:
not entitled to the status of prisoners of war. special agreement between the belligerents
for treatment of the wounded and civilians.
Mercenaries – considered as NPC EX: Aland Islands, the Spitzbergen, the
Those who, having been recruited in another Magellan Straits, the Suez Canal and Panama
country, from military forces for “personal Canal.
gain,” are not covered by protection.
2) Open towns – also known as “non defended
Spies – A soldier employing false pretenses or locality.” A place free of combatants.
acts through clandestine means to gather
information from the enemy. A soldier not 3) Cultural property and places of worship
wearing uniform during hostilities runs the
risk of being treated as a spy and not entitled 4) Civil defense – includes personnel, buildings
to prisoner of war status. When caught, they and assets, clearly indicated by a blue
are not to be regarded as prisoners of war. triangle on an orange background distinctive
Military Scouts are not spies. sign.
Q: What are the core crimes in IHL? TAN SE CHIANG v. DIRECTOR OF POSTS
A: The core crimes in IHL are genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Belligerent occupation becomes an accomplished
These core crimes are specified in the Statues fact the moment the government of the invaded
of the ICC (or the Rome Statute for an ICC) which territory is rendered incapable of publicly
describes them as the most serious crimes of exercising its authority and the invader is in a
concern to the international community as a position to substitute and has substituted his own
whole. These crimes are within the jurisdiction of authority for that of the legitimate government of
the ICC. the occupied territory.
NOTE: Although the Philippines has signed but not
yet ratified the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, NOTE: Belligerent occupation is different from
Military occupation.
the ICC Statute’s and definitions of the core
crimes are authoritative statements for us since
Rights & Duties of a Belligerent Occupant
they are practically lifted from customary
international law sources and from the Geneva to continue orderly government
to exercise control over the occupied
Conventions of 1949 and other treaties to which
we are parties. (IHL: A Field Guide to the Basics, territory and its inhabitants.
The 2007 Metrobank Lecture on International
Law, 22 Nov. 2007 by Associate Justice Adolfo S. NOTE: The belligerent occupant cannot compel
the inhabitants to swear allegiance to him.
Azcuna)
Q: Is guerilla warfare recognized under Q: Can the belligerent occupant impose and
International Law and may a captured guerilla collect taxes or contributions?
demand treatment afforded a prisoner of war A: YES. Under the Hague Regulations, the
under the 1949 Geneva Convention? Explain. occupant is empowered to collect taxes, dues and
A: Yes. Under Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva tolls, as far as possible in accordance with “the
Convention on Prisoners of War, guerilla warfare, rules of assessment and incidence in force,” and
which consists in hostilities conducted in territory he is bound to defray the “expenses of
occupied by the enemy by armed bodies of men administration” out of the proceeds.
84 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
to evade capture. The maximum length of stay An operation of war carried out by belligerent
permissible is 24 hours, unless the neutral state seacraft or other means, for the purpose of Notes:
has prescribed otherwise in their municipal laws preventing ingress and egress of vessels or aircraft
or unless the nature of repairs to be done or the of all nations to and from the enemy coast or any
stress of weather would require a longer time. part thereof.
RIGHT OF ANGARY
A right of a belligerent to requisition and use, Consequences of contraband carriage
subject to certain conditions, or even to destroy Neutral States are not under obligation to prevent
in case of necessity, neutral property found in its their subjects from carrying contraband to
territory, in enemy territory or in the high seas. belligerents. However, Neutral States have the
duty to acquiesce in the suppression by
3 Conditions belligerents of trade in contraband.
a. there must be an urgent need for the
property in connection with the offensive Doctrine of Infection
or defensive war; Under the British and American practice, the
b. the property is within the territory or penalty for carriage of contraband would be
jurisdiction of the belligerent; confiscation of the contraband cargo. Innocent
c. compensation must be paid to the owner. cargo belonging to the same owner would also be
subject to confiscation. Innocent cargo belonging
NOTE: A neutral subject within the territory of a to another owner would be released, but without
belligerent is not entitled to indemnity from compensation for delay and detention in the Prize
either side against the loss of property occasioned Court.
by legitimate acts of war.
Doctrine of Ultimate Consumption
BLOCKADE Goods intended for civilian use which may
ultimately find their way to and be consumed by
86 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2008
END
a. Is the Philippines under an obligation to extradite Lawrence? State the applicable rule and its rationale.
b. Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines adopted its anti-hacker legislation. Will
that change your answer?
2007 BAR. In 1993, historians confirmed that during World War II, "comfort women" were forced into serving the
Japanese military. These women were either abducted or lured by false promises of jobs as cooks or waitresses, and
eventually forced against their will to have sex with Japanese soldiers on a daily basis during the course of the war,
and often suffered from severe beatings and venereal diseases. The Japanese government contends that the "comfort
stations" were run as "onsite military brothels" (or prostitution houses) by private operators, and not by the Japanese
military. There were many Filipina "comfort women."
a. Name at least one basic principle or norm of international humanitarian law that was violated by the
Japanese military in the treatment of the "comfort women."
b. The surviving Filipina "comfort women" demand that the Japanese government apologize and pay them
compensation. However, under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Agreement -the legal instrument that ended
the state of war between Japan and the Allied Forces -all the injured states, including the Philippines,
received war reparations and, in return, waived all claims against Japan arising from the war. Is that a
valid defense?
c. The surviving Filipina "comfort women" sue the Japanese government for damages before Philippine courts.
Will that case prosper?
EN BANC
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January
issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of pe
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate
of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), repres
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Ca
0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marco
pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more tha
US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held
following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Ma
couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are froze
Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Ma
filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements 6 dated December 28, 199
executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets
Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said
agreements and for the enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all as
presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General Agree
specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federa
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principl
Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supre
affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioner's request for legal assistance. 7 Con
declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that th
frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Resp
Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mr
Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand,
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or
on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motio
summary judgment."
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval o
Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for
immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcos
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich
granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subseque
respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB
allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted t
motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and Jan
2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion
summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE
PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND O
SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTE
OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO
GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THU
WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.8
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment
funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which opposition was late
adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.
In a decision9 dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully
acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the
respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2
together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State. 10
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferd
Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4,
adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
In a resolution11 dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying pe
motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss
belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the M
of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and o
judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and t
is now being set for further proceedings.12
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2
decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that --
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECT
AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GEN
ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
III
IV
V
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTIC
THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.13
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion fo
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise state
incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Feder
Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation
Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by the
Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a "decisive issue" before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss Fed
Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the conclusiv
and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the M
constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After several m
for extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs
Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.14
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of th
resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of th
decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos,
petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a
speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its
before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case for further proceedings cann
should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT
ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents' Answer and other documents
long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel
laches had already set in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 Ma
1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waive
whatever right it had to move for summary judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS N
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the e
elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against
petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with
to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple alleged
"acquired during their incumbency".
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple "acquired" or own the Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been proven, petition
categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how much of the Swiss funds was acquire
the incumbency" of the Marcos couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has fa
establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired property of the Marcos
over and above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c) 15 (d),16 and (e)1
Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisiti
Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY P
RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS" SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CAS
JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as we
other written and testimonial statements submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being ad
in evidence against private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record
would be a demonstrable showing that no such "judicial admissions" were made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A P
FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL
ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN
NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGME
CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FAC
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very
requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court matters, is
and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matter
that pertaining to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent as far as this C
concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested pe
have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our known language. She says the authenticated official English ve
the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Th
respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fa
are impertinent and improper before this Court.
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's ac
certiorari under Rule 6519 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21
should be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petition
certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. 20 But whe
case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is al
notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. 21
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-got
wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business asso
Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after th
of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Governm
(PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by for
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in th
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled
them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or usin
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this C
Republic vs. Lobregat22:
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initia
only out of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were emp
nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicaliti
formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cas
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parti
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almo
decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of the
and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities
annoying procedural sidetracks.23
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact wh
would either justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case fo
forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petition
Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo 24, summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render be
but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depo
or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits,
depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and find
there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been serv
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all o
part thereof.25
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. 26 The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrate
affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in disp
with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
xxx
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public o
several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and
President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of t
people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM du
14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to
peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batas
Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in conc
capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budg
total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1
1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settl
from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
xxx
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under T
Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identificatio
6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the "Marcoses are summarized and attach
the reports in the following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule B:
Schedule C:
Schedule D:
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or
US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are
follows:
15. FM's official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount of P15,93
and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand,
reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The re
indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allow
from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Counci
Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96%
represents "receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Rev
Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a Presiden
being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, h
still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to h
ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from clie
much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing
withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client a
no known law office. As previously stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The
income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referre
his return as "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations." There is no indication of any payor of the
dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements which
subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pe
records on file with the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax transactions of sp
Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue
No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collecto
Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of capital gains tax return involving s
FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which
represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or
US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred fo
subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of P567,09
represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total deductions in the amount of
P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77.
the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings and
investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and additio
exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the years 1966
1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth of spouses,
Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondent's Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immed
preceding their ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM de
as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income approach was utilized. U
approach, the beginning capital is increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the inco
earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for
years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income from legal practice is
valid x x x.
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon laye
foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts
agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank
accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret ac
as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identi
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a suppleme
separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of
Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO
Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto
empowering him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mand
AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA
Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the Board of Trustees of
foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second
beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In
Australia, as the foundation's first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14, 1971.
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. T
change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of
remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDA
and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the
"Reference OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate ent
effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board of Tr
The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made
to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the secu
the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUN
as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed.
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial succe
VERSO FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDAT
notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the b
accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the
liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation's funds to another account or bank
was prevented by the timely freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents ob
by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that t
beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Rabe
shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos Familie"
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zuric
the General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) gro
under the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FM's benefit, eventually joined togethe
became one (1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and Imeld
the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn when they bought t
Central Bank's dollar-denominated treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA
an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 2
his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank using an Am
sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in Malacañang shortly after they
Hawaii in haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for "Declaration/Specim
Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption "signature(s)" Ferdinand and Imelda sign
real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated and
maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970 and th
balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron a
Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on Mar
1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulatio
signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first benefici
the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children – Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbon
Irene – as equal third beneficiaries.
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board
Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. P
Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop t
liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST
COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Lim
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. T
account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner
AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary. However, t
securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31,
were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of Decembe
1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S
December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as of Decem
1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is
AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to
US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents
received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial own
AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates th
Avertina Foundation is owned by the "Marcos Families."
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM throug
dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and E
Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, act
founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM
was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in accordance with the han
instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S
Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remain
same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its asse
transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account "Reference OMAL"
Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June 25, 1981.
40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundation's Board of D
The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundat
not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of securities in the
deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed
safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certa
the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Sw
Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers fr
foundation's German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM 29
and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the Spinus Foundation as of F
3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 show
the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Schel
SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundation's directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the
foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated Au
1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children Imelda (Im
Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as me
of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundatio
note that the foundation's capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited against the accou
Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to w
information from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer
the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. Ho
transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the a
Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she is
written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofman
favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the account "Reference Dido," Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and
was liquidated on August 3, 1981.
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the Foundation's Board of Dir
The account was officially opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not m
known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of s
in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Found
of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the same securities were listed. Under the
circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Trinidad Foundat
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under Gene
Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck statin
the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the s
Palmy Foundation is owned by "Marcos Familie".
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation w
executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained sever
accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe m
from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transferred to Agu
Corporation's (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Accou
53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, Firs
President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated Septembe
1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law
to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no change of beneficial owner
involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Agu
Corporation Account No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations was found amon
Malacañang documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the Company's assets will be for sole and f
disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts am
their children. Another Malacañang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imeld
pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and
administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the
document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and Imel
issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be transmitted with regard
Maler will be signed with the word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will have the same value as the couple's ow
personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis.
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank
documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories.
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a foundation. Lik
the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets was left t
The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be the sam
articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the power of
for the management of its assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co.,
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundation's Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 N
amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until De
31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was subsequently
transformed into a foundation.
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred F
Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex "R-5" hereto attached as integral part hereof.
xxx x x x.27
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer,
the following:
5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and othe
processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter
that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel A
Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a
as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they canno
remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.
12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.
13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on
of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption
allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alle
ITRs or the attachments thereto.
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information suff
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the con
the alleged ITRs.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely sta
the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate
for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of kn
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy
transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent
R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petitio
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respond
not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exa
the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifica
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowled
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy t
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the sam
occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers th
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge o
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy t
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the sam
occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers th
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably f
tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently la
substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity
"(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acq
are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to
compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious defense:
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19, 1
Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestat
dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the o
respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsiderati
October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconside
dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000
Marcos children;
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in
manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could n
because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the ba
such assertions.
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whene
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and materia
shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a beli
the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of
denial.28
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the all
of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this
avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, th
reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,29
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending p
and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits
duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state th
ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in
answer with the other respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired" without detailing how exactly these funds were
supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired rem
bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that inde
funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is with
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The question
however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We d
think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,30 this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party w
having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical
express denial must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should
positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged. 31
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon laye
foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts
agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank
accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret ac
as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identi
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a suppleme
separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise. 32
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely sta
the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corpora
entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. 33
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is,
pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
an admission of the averments it was directed at.34 Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expressio
carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language a
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances al
denied while the fact itself is admitted.35
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by responden
paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in parag
of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the sam
layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents' answer was thus a denial pre
with admissions of the following substantial facts:
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US
million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to S
11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx. 36
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions of t
substantial facts alleged in the Republic's petition for forfeiture:
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of kn
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy
transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent I
R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition fo
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents we
privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with exac
same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically reme
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge o
information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the sa
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remem
the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge an
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the sam
occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers tha
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer pertained to the creation of five groups of acc
well as their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petitio
forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the f
involved were lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforc
earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 mil
Swiss bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 4737 and 4838 of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the deposi
Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a 39 of the said petition with respect to the sum o
Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. T
respondents did not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the
funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,40 if a defendant's denial is a negativ
pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents' denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficien
a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was just a pretense. Mrs. M
privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of the vital documents 41 attached to the petitio
forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules. 42
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by res
Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. As
correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of
Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the First and Second benefic
are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the n
the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust
liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongl
indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using th
Foundations as dummies.43
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the Swiss b
deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded a
participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to exp
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Ret
(ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeitur
well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or informatio
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial wa
really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By r
their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs a
balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Offic
President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plai
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial.
unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insuff
constitute an effective denial.45
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the p
of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made fo
purpose of delay.46 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempt
mislead and deceive this Court by presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or me
knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.47 Respondents' ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and t
averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matt
relied upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could
logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue. 48
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or inf
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions" cannot rightfully b
accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are there
bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the
involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acqui
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegation
Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall conta
among others:
xxx
xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies. 49
It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the number o
witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as w
disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of th
testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particula
of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise
parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put the
matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action. 50
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
xxx
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional witne
may be necessary in the course of the trial.
xxx
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be ne
in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of witnesses n
nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had
previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the
was not made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, sin
genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment.
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic wa
adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by a
depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days
hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affida
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.51
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republic's m
only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more, resp
merely made general denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereb
to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his clie
just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or in
the funds.
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos a
Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando
Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly ob
from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos he
That's your statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
PJ Garchitorena:
That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate o
own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
Atty. TECSON:
PJ Garchitorena:
Atty. TECSON:
PJ Garchitorena:
Atty. SISON:
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.55
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they wou
or what issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were leading petiti
Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondent
either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything
happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawfully acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, m
respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the
beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late Pre
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of the
assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the sai
deposits.
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownersh
Swiss funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The "facts" pleaded by respondents, while os
raising important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance
constituted no genuine issues for trial.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if o
face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genu
then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.56
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient t
genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. 57 A summary judgment is one granted upon m
a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits
there are no important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter
motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because
are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by th
of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy.58 Summary judgment is a
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issu
any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues r
trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court i
justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner.59
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who had
knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under the nam
five groups or foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In the
answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations against
without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus ju
a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations
witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer w
false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the sembla
defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to allow
respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the p
of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents' good fa
should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation
have ended a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered are foxy respon
"lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago" or, as to Mrs.
"the funds were lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege
only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Mar
contend that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2
petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever righ
to move for summary judgment."60
We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a mo
summary judgment.
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cr
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been s
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all o
part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross
asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions o
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours) 61
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in ans
the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How el
one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been served?"
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this matter. T
being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our law
rules were copied, is in order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cr
claim may move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or
claim is asserted may move for summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a motion fo
summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served. 62 Und
rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.63 No fix
prescriptive period is provided.
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a motion for summary judgment may
made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary
judgment.64 And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for sum
judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by a
to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stag
litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh, 65 the New York Su
Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case w
submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days a
final adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the plaintif
for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment
Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proce
to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that the answer and the opposin
affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Spec
granted both motions and the defendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule
the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a
for summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to summari
determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no limitation o
power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to
this does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary judgment." 66
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation o
evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner "wa
right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Eck
defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that pl
had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court,
was allowed to move for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more so should w
it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules
Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triabl
exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A
contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham
or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial." 68
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the proceedin
hope that a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their favor. T
rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt dispositi
cases. That is why the law and the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Sum
judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of tim
trial, we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents' an
was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did
any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by res
Marcoses.
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedur
the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive di
of every action and proceeding."69
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer and other docume
had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches h
already set in against petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that wh
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandon
right or declined to assert it.70 In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people w
slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original par
their successors-in-interest". 71
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case agains
respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because
pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses
ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for summary judgment now under consideration
Court. It was the subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from
the questioned motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for sum
judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some un
injury to them might result unless the action is barred. 72
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the S
deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be ad
affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not a
when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. 73 Nor can estoppel validate an act that contrav
law or public policy.74
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequ
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 75 Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not
barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic was able to pr
case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amoun
value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 137976 provide:
xxx xxx
Section 2. Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumben
amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee a
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed
facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Judgment – If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor
State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the State. Prov
That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months
any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Departme
administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of
Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in
name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to,
legitimate income of the public officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case was never i
dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petitio
forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as
Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to Fe
25, 1986.77 Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal
circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 198
Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986. 78
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for
which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. 79 The combined
accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Ministe
Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.80 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and
R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to F
1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.
dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said s
were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US doll
1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for St
Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 4. – Judicial admissions – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showin
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 81
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial eith
verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case
facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents,
respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with suc
admissions.83
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any State
Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 193
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of
subdivisions and instrumentalities".84 Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "no
during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." 85 In fact, his management of business
the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other
except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate dir
indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any cont
or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court infer
court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in an
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, age
instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Se
11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage
business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be p
by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existen
prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since
to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its
provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent
Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other lawful income or income from legitimately acquired
for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know
were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have
specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the k
lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the
the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 m
out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement
and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation
and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings and documents we
It is of record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss ban
deposits in their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia dated May
and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan
unanimous in holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted ownership thereo
Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer stated:
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely
the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corpora
entities for being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
(emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership the
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath the genuinen
due execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Sectio
Rule 886 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitte
not specifically denied.
The General87 and Supplemental88 Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 further bo
the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and
1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 2
that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalitie
met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of convictio
the PRIVATE PARTY.
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to t
equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of respo
to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with th
Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to an
concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements we
and void.89 They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them because they s
the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27, Rule 130 90 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide
civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offero
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following constituti
statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitme
exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the
government's undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganba
other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even
on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents' admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, h
made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the s
Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castañeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 c
have been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did no
from the admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in sai
agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents. 91
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not itself eff
the purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not bei
signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although the
be unenforceable.92
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval of the Compromise
Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted owne
the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.'s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
PJ GARCHITORENA:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against
family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind
agreement between the Philippine government and the Marcos family. The discussions that led u
compromise agreement were initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x. 93
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are very
always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and any approach that has been made
have entertained. And so my reaction was the same as what I have always … why not? Maybe th
one that will finally put an end to this problem.94
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the banks in Swit
which may necessarily be not cash.95
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was forwarded throug
Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then, subsequently, to me. I was a little s
because we hadn't really discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accoun
the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the PCGG is conce
that the agreement was perfected and that we were beginning to implement it and that was a sou
satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end. 96
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents' recognition of
ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party, as a
deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a judicial admission. 97 It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.'s t
that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the prob
besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on the
The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party tes
clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge. 98
In her Manifestation99 dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the following:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the
beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late Pre
Ferdinand E. Marcos;
Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as sunlight.
claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of th
documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to
specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders" and "Jane
which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifical
the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount
judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 100 of t
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia101 dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement
subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following manifestations:
2. The Republic's cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found t
gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have
inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the Republ
yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied)
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less fortu
the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in fir
abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the US
150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation respecting the ow
of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imelda's admission of the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss deposits as
"the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta
motion102 on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed
custodia legis or within the Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner
a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate rig
the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said dep
Lastly, the Undertaking103 entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999, confirm
Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the hum
rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-plaint
aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment a
said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the funds he
escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to d
under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests o
US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or o
Swiss funds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out
context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiali
implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented
parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admis
Owing to the far-reaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and examined, individually and
the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and
jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted owner
the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
making such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsi
therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not. 104 This doctrine is embodied
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proc
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 105
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposit
definitely binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 o
Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party wit
scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence ag
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The s
rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with th
party.106
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, o
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.107
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant a
party, the term "privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in rights. 108 Consequently, an admission of one in privity
party to the record is competent. 109 Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several c
parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent aga
all.110
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish a prima fac
for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings and conc
were not borne out by the voluminous records of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been un
acquired. x x x"
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearl
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. Th
Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss acc
were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suff
comply with the second element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the
officer's salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a prim
presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incum
but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five differe
foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acqu
the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stat
petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 millio
representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legi
income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawfu
of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficien
petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their tota
government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. – Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material possessions of those
persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known la
income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing evide
the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima f
proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must st
proved.111
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable p
without whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic
implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise
judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss
government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied them their rights
the Swiss constitution and international law.112
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 199
of Civil Procedure,113 taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the compulsory
of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit
However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensa
parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to rend
decision even in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party. 114
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated fro
of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decre
have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence w
inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the
party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? 116 There is, howeve
fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts o
particular suit or litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the
Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10% be
to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.117 Viewed against this admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable parti
non-participation in the proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and according full relie
petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the $356 million was neither inimical to the foundations' interests
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was alre
generally known: that the foundations were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from p
Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of the as
question.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned a nominal share of the assets. 118 But this was already refuted by
than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set b
Swiss court. The directive given by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the purpo
protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownersh
subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their partic
the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,119 this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the action was unnecess
"And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation
or other illicit conduct – in other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in
action, the res thereof – there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on
strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing o
part…
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convinc
does not, without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question with the person who formed or m
of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth – at the
not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to recover
wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring members or
stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement,
asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause of action for recovery; their creation or organiz
was merely the result of their members' (or stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the il
origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the
of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to im
them as defendants in said actions."
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally ac
funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not ha
impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them w
curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:120
"Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead
sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said firms were alle
used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public fu
property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nev
lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules – e.
Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or
conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule
respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the R
Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such
"is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and
particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the
of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to im
them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, whe
appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit
annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a groun
dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of
is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3122 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground
joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through mot
order of the court on its own initiative. 123
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3 124 on indispensable parties
copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the m
party full relief.125 Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as th
is excusable.126 Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan
void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the ab
of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not on the absent party.127 If she really felt that sh
not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion, which
allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcose
to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotte
and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment.─ If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawful
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State
virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena committ
abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and th
authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from th
unofficial translation of one of these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the motion to r
US$150 Million to the human rights victims.
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might nevertheless not be any rea
belabor the issue. The presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not
rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan's decisi
not dependent on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Court's.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said
belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in fa
either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations
Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002
ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank i
estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor o
petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and T
concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result
Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
Carpio, J., no part.
Footnotes
1
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By An
Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.
2
E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the country, c
the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resourc
allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates, bo
and abroad.
3
E.O. No. 2 – issued twelve (12) days later, warning all persons and entities who had knowledge of poss
ill-gotten assets and properties under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibiting them from concealin
transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the gov
4
E.O. No. 14 – Series of 1986, as amended by E.O. No. 14-A.
5
Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases, whether c
criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General. The law also d
that the civil actions for the recovery of unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other c
action under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos
may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of eviden
6
Declared null and void by this Court on December 9, 1998 in the case of "Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG
Magtanggol Gunigundo", docketed as G.R. No. 130716.
7
In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2, the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG filed a request f
mutual assistance with the Swiss Federal Police Department, under the procedures of the International M
Assistance in Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to freeze the bank deposits of the Marcoses located in Switze
IMAC is a domestic statute of Switzerland which generally affords relief to the kind of request from foreign
governments or entities as authorized under E.O. No. 2.
The various Swiss local authorities concerned granted the request of petitioner Republic, and ordered the
deposits to be "blocked" until the competent Philippine court could decide on the matter.
8
Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195.
9
Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchito
and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.
10
Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218.
11
Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena with the separate concurring opinions of Associat
Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr
Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both wrote their respective dissenting opinions.
12
Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
13
Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62.
14
Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605.
15
Sec. 3 – the petition shall contain the following information
xxx
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present o
and employments.
16
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.
17
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately
acquired property xxx.
18
Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654.
19
Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of Court.
20
Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996].
21
Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972].
22
240 SCRA 376 [1995].
23
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316 [1997].
24
69 SCRA 524 [1976].
25
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
26
Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970].
27
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37.
28
Substantially the same as Section 10, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
29
16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910].
30
197 SCRA 391 [1991].
31
Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246 [1973].
32
Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236.
33
Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064.
34
61A Am. Jur., 172-173.
35
Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1995 ed.].
36
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court.
37
Supra.
38
Supra.
39
"All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred F
Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex 'R-5' hereto attached as integral part hereof."
40
22 SCRA 48 [1968]
41
XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a) Contract for opening of deposit dated March 21, 196
Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated March 3, 1970; (d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated Febru
1970; (e) Letter of instruction dated March 10, 1981; (f) Letter of Instructions dated March 10, 1991.
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION: (a) Management agreement dated August 28, 1990; (b) Lette
instruction dated August 26, 1970 to Markers Geel of Furich; (c) Approval of Statutes and By-laws of Trin
Foundation dated August 26, 1990; (d) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated August 28, 1970; (e
Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation prepared by Markers Geel dated August 28, 1970; (f) Letter of Ins
to the Board of Rayby Foundation dated March 10, 1981; (g) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Trinida
Foundation dated March 10, 1981.
MALER ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a) Rules and Regulations of Maler dated October 15, 1968;
of Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to Barbey d Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to Muler to Swiss Ba
October 19, 1968.
42
"Where an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresp
pleading xxx, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
party under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts xxx."
43
Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194.
44
Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941, 43 F. Supp. 281.
45
Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L- 31869, Aug. 8, 1973.
46
Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G. 3109-3111.
47
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 [1991].
48
28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969].
49
Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but the change(s) had no adverse effects on the rights
private respondents.
50
Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49410, 169 SCRA 409 [1989].
51
Substantially the same as Section 3, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
52
adopted by the Marcos children.
dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos; dated October 5, 2000 as jointly filed by Mrs. Mano
53
Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental motion for reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manot
Ferdinand, Jr.;
54
dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000 as filed by the Marcos children.
55
TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999.
56
Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses Antera and Virgilio Soriano, April 20, 2001.
57
Plantadosi vs. Loew's, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, June 2, 1943.
58
Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000].
59
Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 348 [1989].
60
Rollo, pp. 2659-70.
61
Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
62
Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an answer is served in an action to recover a debt or a liquidate
demand arising,
the answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or
other person having knowledge of the facts, verifying the cause of action and stating the amount claimed
belief that there is no defense to the action; unless the defendant by affidavit or other proof, shall show su
as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend. (emphasis ours)
63
73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
64
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II. (1996), pp. 183-184.
65
19 NYS2d 250 [1940].
66
73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
67
Supra.
68
Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion, et. al., 71 SCRA 523 [1976].
69
Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 1 of the old Rules of Court.
70
Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983].
71
Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956].
72
Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958].
73
Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764, October 4, 2002; Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Con
74
Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124 Phil. 472 [1966].
75
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].
"An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquire
76
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor", approved on June 18, 1955.
77
Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081.
78
Ibid.
79
Id., p. 1062.
80
Exhibit "S."
81
Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court.
82
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1997 ed., p. 650.
83
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V, 1980 ed., p. 64.
84
Section 9, Article VII.
85
Section 4(1), Article VII.
86
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court.
87
Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098.
88
Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100.
89
Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998].
90
Substantially the same as Section 24, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court.
91
Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205.
92
31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721.
93
Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178.
94
Ibid, p. 1181.
95
Ibid, p. 1188.
96
Ibid, p. 1201.
97
29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.
98
31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795.
99
Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261.
100
Substantially the same as Section 8, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
101
Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507.
102
Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256.
103
Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289.
104
Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974].
105
Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court.
106
Substantially the same as Section 26, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court.
107
Substantially the same as Section 28, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court.
108
29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.
109
31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817.
110
Ibid, p. 814.
111
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857.
112
Rollo, pp. 2255-2265.
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties in interest without whom no final determ
113
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section 7, Rule 3 o
Rules of Court.
114
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties §97 (2000).
115
Supra note 3 § 13 (2000).
116
Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786, 199 SE2d 223.
117
Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:
"Comes now undersigned counsel for the respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Cour
respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject-matter of the above-entitled case, being the
beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various Foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject-matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the Estate of the late Pre
Ferdinand E. Marcos;"
118
Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18, 2000 memorandum of respondent Mrs. Marcos:
"On the other hand, the opponent to the appeal, formally the owner of the assets to be seized and restitu
not been involved in the collecting procedure pending in the Philippines. Even though such opponent is n
but a legal construction to hide the true ownership to the assets of the Marcos family, they nevertheless a
entitled to a hearing as far as the proceedings are concerned with accounts which are nominally theirs. T
guarantees of the Republic of the Philippines therefore must include the process rights not only of the de
but also of the formal owners of the assets to be delivered."
119
240 SCRA 376, 469 [1995].
120
Supra.
121
Id at 470-471.
122
Substantially the same as Section 11, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
123
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or o
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined part
be severed and proceeded with separately.
124
Same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
125
Supra note 3 § 265 (2000)
Id citing Gentry vs. Smith (CA5 Fla) 487 F2d 571, 18 FR Serv 2d 221, later app (CA5 Fla) 538 F2d 109
126
reh (CA5 Fla) 544 F2d 900, holding that a failure to request the joinder of a defendant was excused wher
moving party's former counsel, who had resisted the joinder, abruptly withdrew his appearance and subs
counsel moved promptly to join the corporation.
127
Supra note 3.
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