Natural Gas distribution networks: how failures’

databases can improve existing safety performances

Bianchini A., Guzzini A., Pellegrini M., Saccani C.
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AGENDA

INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS

THE REQUIRED SOLUTION

EXISTING GAPS

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS

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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS
Europe:
Total length of pipelines: 2.214.471 km
Number of customers: 67.830.000 #
Italy outlook:
Italian surface: ≈ 300.000 km2
Inhabited areas: 6,1% [Istat, 2013]
Total length of Italian gas networks: ≈ 290.000 km [ARERA, 2018]
Networks’ density on the territory:
≈1 km 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 290.000 𝒌𝒎
≅ = = 𝟏𝟓, 𝟖
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 300.000 × 6.1% 𝒌𝒎𝟐

NG distribution safety represents a very complex research topic due to

networks’ size and number of customers. In fact, the highest density
≈1 km
(km/km2) is in the occupied areas where the risk is the highest.

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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS

About safety performances?

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ

From a qualitative comparison of safety trends in natural

gas distribution systems, it is evident that an asymptotic
trend is present around 1,6 x 10-5 accident / km. More than
250 years are necessary to reach the goal of 1 × 10−5.

A new approach is therefore required to significantly

improved safety performances.

Bianchini, A.; Guzzini, A.; Pellegrini, M; Saccani, C. Natural gas distribution system: A statistical
analysis of accidents data. Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping. 168, pag. 24-38.

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THE REQUIRED SOLUTION
The database has to be structured and managed to ensure the statistical analysis of the collected information and the
characterization of failures, emergencies and near missings.

But, what information have to be recorded?...

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EXISTING GAPS
1. Definition of the events to be recorded – Structural barrier
Efforts have to be spent to propose an international accepted definitions of the events to be recorded in order to guarantee a
quantitative comparison between resulting trends. Currently, in fact, no common definition of accident is present.
Does it exist a definition of accident Accident definition
Country
in natural gas distribution?
A gas event involving the gas distributed through networks, which interests any part of the distribution system and / or of customers’ installations, including such
apparatus for use, and that results in the death or serious injury or damage to property with a value not less than € 5,000.00, caused by one of the following:
1. A gas dispersion;
Italy YES
2. An uncontrolled combustion;
3. Poor gas combustion in a gas equipment, including that due to insufficient aeration;
4. An insufficient evacuation of combustion products in a gas equipment
Germany YES A gas release
France NO NO definition exists
Two categories of accidents are defined:
Category 1. All the events characterized by at least:
a) A death or an injury
b) A fire or an explosion
Netherlands YES c) At least 250 people evacuated
d) At least 250 customers involved
Category 2. All the events characterized by at least:
a) At least 10 people evacuated
b) At least 10 customers involved
United Kingdom YES A gas release resulting in a fire or explosion, or an event responsible for the exposure carbon monoxide (CO)
Spain NO No definition exists
An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline that results in one or more of the following consequences:
a) A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization;
United States YES b) Estimated property damage of $50,000 or more, including loss to the operator and others, or both, but excluding cost of gas lost;
c) Unintentional estimated gas loss of three million cubic feet or more;
d) An event that is significant in the judgment of the operator, even though it did not meet the criteria above

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EXISTING GAPS
2. Definition of the information to be recorded – Technical barrier
Two examples are reported for data recording in case of gas accidents: Italy VS USA

The report consists of 9 parts

and subsection (18 pages)
High number of information

[ARERA, RQDG-Annex A, 2018]

[CIG, Guideline 15, 2017]

VERY FEW INFORMATION

IMPOSSIBLE TO CHARACTERIZE THE EVENT [https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages]

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EXISTING GAPS
2. Definition of the information to be recorded – Technical barrier
About near missings, what do we know? Attention, only qualitative comparison is currently possible with no common definitions…
Percentage [%] – mains
Corrosion Excavation Pipe, weld or Equipment Incorrect
Year Natural force
failure damage joint failure failure operation
2004 36.0 8.1 16.2 7.8 4.1 1.0
2005 36.9 8.2 16.6 7.1 4.9 1.0
2006 36.5 7.5 16.5 6.9 5.0 2.5
2007 36.4 8.5 15.4 7.0 6.8 2.5
2008 38.4 8.1 13.2 7.5 6.6 2.9
2009 39.7 9.2 10.1 8.1 7.9 2.3
2010 36.9 8.1 11.4 9.0 8.8 1.6
2011 35.6 9.3 11.8 7.7 9.1 1.6
2012 37.0 7.9 12.2 7.6 10.3 1.3
2013 35.3 9.6 12.0 8.5 11.2 1.6
2014 34.4 11.2 10.4 8.1 11.4 1.6
2015 35.4 10.2 11.9 10.6 11.8 2.1
2016 35.1 8.2 13.8 11.5 12.4 2.4
2017 34.4 8.4 13.2 12.1 12.5 2.7

MANY INFORMATION THAT MAKE

VERY POOR INFORMATION TO POSSIBLE ACCURATE ANALYSIS
CHARACTERIZE THE EVENT Leaks and hazardous leaks are recorded (an existing or probable hazard to person or
property that require an immediate repair or a continuous action until it is no longer
hazardous) - PHMSA F-7100.1-2

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EXISTING GAPS
2. Information to be recorded and steps to be followed

Post failure analysis and database

Event characterization Risk analysis
update

General information (GPS

coordinates, date, etc.)

Data Analysis
Environment
characterization

Trench characterization
(buried systems)

Failed system/device
characterization

Failure characterization

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EXISTING GAPS
3. Who should be involved? – Regulatory barrier
A three level database should be considered:
1. First level. Natural gas Distribution System Operators (DSOs) are
indispensable for the creation of the database. High level detail
information should be recorded by DSOs and inserted in proprietary
databases.
2. Second level. The second level databases should communicate with a
national database the main information and criticalities observed at DSO
level to assess the performance of national grids, to evaluate anomalies,
to evaluate development strategy.
3. Third level. An international database should collect all the information
deriving from national databases. Policy makers, International technical
committee and Authorities should use these information to define future
strategies able to improve safety performances.

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EXISTING GAPS
4. Data quality – Technical barrier
Data management will represent a crucial point for the success of the proposed approach.
To monitor “how good is data quality?”, data quality metrics have to be used and continuously
monitored.
↓↓
Data quality is a multidimensional concept based on the subjective and the objective
perceptions of the individuals involved (Pipino et al., 2002)
↓↓
Work in progress….
1. To identify the most suitable metrics for the purpose through literature review
2. To define a method to monitor their quality
3. To propose thresholds for data acceptability

Pipino, L.L.; Lee, Y.W.; Wang, R.Y. Data Quality Assessment.

Communication of the ACM, 2002. 45, pag. 211-218.

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CONCLUSION
A new approach aimed to identify a common safety regulatory framework is required to ensure a significant improvement of NG
distribution performances. In fact, safety indexes currently present an asymptotic trend.
Therefore, Authors believe that a structured and organized database approach is required as soon as possible.
For the purpose, Authors future research activities aim to solve:
1. Structural gaps as the absence of a common internationally accepted framework for gas distribution accidents, emergencies
and near missing shall be solved;
2. Several technical barriers hinder at the moment the application of the proposed solutions. Among these, particular attention
should be given to: identification of the information to be recorded, data quality management, data security, methods to
elaborate data
3. Regulatory gaps should be eliminated through the collaboration of all the national and international involved stakeholders
(Distributor System Operators, energy Authorities, policy makers) that should contribute to improve networks performances
and to reduce possible risks to the public;
4. New skills and resources should be allocated to make possible the database approach.

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