Main Article

Transfer
2017, Vol. 23(2) 207–223
Towards collective protections for ª The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
crowdworkers: Italy, Spain and sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1024258916688863
journals.sagepub.com/home/trs
France in the EU context

Annamaria Donini
Department of Legal Studies, University of Bologna, Italy

Michele Forlivesi
Department of Legal Studies, University of Bologna, Italy

Anna Rota
Department of Legal Studies, University of Bologna, Italy

Patrizia Tullini
Department of Legal Studies, School of Law, University of Bologna, Italy

Summary
The ‘sharing economy’ and the collaborative economy are shaping new forms of employment in
which digital platforms enable multilateral work relationships. This article discusses some initiatives
aimed at the collective protection of crowdworkers. The first section investigates whether it is
possible to extend EU labour protection – in particular, collective rights – to independent digital
contractors. The second section looks at whether the national level may offer more effective
measures for economically dependent digital workers or for distance workers, by comparing three
selected countries: Italy, France and Spain. The article then explores the possibility of extending to
crowdworkers the protections offered by collective bargaining and addresses how trade unions
could have a role in implementing guarantees for crowdworkers. Comparative analysis is used to
show how different constitutional systems recognise freedom of association, especially in relation
to ‘subordinated’ workers. A strategy of viewing collective rights as human rights could be applied
in order to reduce the contractual weakness of self-employed workers on digital platforms – and
might even form the basis of a bill of rights.

Corresponding author:
Annamaria Donini, Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, Alma Mater Studiorum, Università di Bologna, via Zamboni 27–29,
40126, Bologna, Italy.
Email: annamaria.donini2@unibo.it
208 Transfer 23(2)

Résumé
L’« économie du partage » et l’économie collaborative créent de nouvelles formes d’emploi où des
plates-formes digitales permettent des relations de travail multilatérales. Cet article examine
certaines initiatives visant à la protection collective des « crowdworkers ». La première section
explore les possibilités d’élargir la protection du travail existant dans l’UE – en particulier les droits
collectifs – aux entrepreneurs digitaux indépendants. La seconde section examine si le niveau
national peut offrir des mesures plus efficaces pour les travailleurs digitaux salariés ou pour les
travailleurs à distance, en comparant trois pays : l’Italie, la France et l’Espagne. L’article analyse
ensuite la possibilité d’élargir aux crowdworkers les protections offertes par la négociation collective
et examine comment les syndicats pourraient jouer un rôle dans la mise en place de garanties pour
ces travailleurs. L’analyse comparative est utilisée pour montrer comment différents systèmes
constitutionnels reconnaissent la liberté d’association, en particulier s’agissant des travailleurs
« subordonnés ». Une stratégie axée sur une conception des droits collectifs comme faisant partie
des droits humains pourrait être appliquée pour réduire la faiblesse contractuelle des travailleurs
indépendants sur les plates-formes numériques, et pourrait même former la base d’une déclaration
des droits.

Zusammenfassung
Die ’’Sharing Economy“ und die ’’kollaborative Ökonomie“ prägen neue Formen der Beschäfti-
gung, in denen digitale Plattformen multilaterale Arbeitsbeziehungen ermöglichen. Dieser Artikel
diskutiert verschiedene Initiativen, die kollektive Schutzmöglichkeiten für Crowdworker zum Ziel
haben. Der erste Abschnitt geht der Frage nach, ob auf nationaler Ebene effektivere Maßnahmen
für wirtschaftlich abhängige digitale Arbeitnehmer oder für Telearbeiter möglich wären und ver-
gleicht dazu drei ausgewählte Länder: Italien, Frankreich und Spanien. Anschließend wird die
Möglichkeit untersucht, den Schutz von Tarifabkommen auf Crowdworker auszudehnen und wie
Gewerkschaften eine Rolle dabei spielen könnten, Garantien für Crowdworker umzusetzen.
Mithilfe von vergleichenden Analysen wird gezeigt, wie unterschiedlich verfasste Systeme mit dem
Recht der Vereinigungsfreiheit umgehen, insbesondere in Bezug auf ’’abhängige“ Arbeitnehmer.
Um die vertraglich schwache Position von freiberuflichen Arbeitnehmern auf digitalen Plattformen
zu stärken, könnte eine Strategie angewandt werden, die Kollektivrechte als Menschenrechte
ansieht – und dies könnte sogar zur Basis einer Grundrechtecharta werden.

Keywords
Crowdworking, collaborative economy, digital platforms, employment protection, collective
bargaining, collective rights, economic freedom, EU labour law

Introduction
This article discusses how the rights of crowdworkers can be protected, looking at the combination
of legislation and collective bargaining and how this fits into the EU competition framework. The
research aims to ascertain whether national or European labour regulation could be applied to
platform workers.
As concerns the European level, the article analyses the definition of a ‘worker’ on the basis of
rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and examines the possibility of
including crowdworkers within the scope of European labour law.
Donini et al. 209

Given the limited application of European regulations beyond the scope of ‘subordination’, it
seems appropriate to investigate the national level and, in particular, whether it would be possible
to extend some or all of the collective agreement guarantees currently afforded to employees – and
whether these are sufficiently responsive to the needs of a platform worker. The research also
considers regulatory provisions for other emerging forms of employment with similar features,
such as the employment of economically dependent workers or distance workers.
In seeking reliable comparisons, it seems particularly appropriate to consider three European
countries with similar socio-demographic workforce profiles and analogous normative systems:
Italy, Spain and France.
A comparison of EU countries that have other social and economic characteristics and different
labour market structures could yield other results. In Nordic countries with high union density, for
instance, crowdworker protection could easily be achieved through collective bargaining or
through self-regulation implemented by the platforms themselves under pressure from unions
(Däubler, 2016: 499–501).

Crowdworkers: who are they?

Working as part of a ‘crowd’ via a ‘digital’ platform is an instance of major change resulting from
the digitalisation of the economy. The spread of working through online platforms has the potential
to increase the transparency of the labour market, the traceability of payments and the taxation of
income, actively contributing to formalising certain sectors of the economy. At the same time,
digitalisation may cause an epoch-defining migration of work – in the broadest sense – from the
formal to the informal economy (Bronzini, 2016: 92 and, contra, Huws, 2016),1 since crowdwork-
ing lacks heteronomous regulation and functions on the basis of terms and conditions set by the
platform used.
‘Crowd employment’ can cover all forms of ‘paid work organised through online labour
exchanges’ (EU-OSHA, 2015: 1) in which the platform selects, organises, evaluates and remune-
rates workers (according to De Stefano, 2016: 2, as far as both ‘crowdwork’ and ‘work-on-demand
via apps’ are concerned; see Valenduc and Vendramin, 2016: 33; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016),
matching labour supply to demand. Within this broad classification, further distinctions relate to
the professional status of service providers, whether they are self-employed or employed, whether
their workplace is online or offline and whether the client is a private individual or a business (EU-
OSHA, 2015: 1).
Since there is certainly confusion about the various activities labelled as ‘crowdworking’, it is
worthwhile examining the characteristics of this new form of employment (Eurofound, 2015). For
example, a recent Communication of the European Commission (European Commission, 2016a:
5–7; European Commission, 2016b: 22–24) deals with problems related to the work of ‘collabora-
tive platforms’ which provide ‘services normally . . . for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’ (and these problems are in addition to
the tax and market regulation issues they raise).
To establish a clear distribution of obligations and responsibilities, it is crucial to distinguish
between the various contractual relationships behind each platform’s business model. To grasp the
opportunities created by digitalisation while averting the risk of ‘reification of human labour’

1 Cf. International Labour Organization (2002): ‘the term “informal economy” refers to all economic
activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently
covered by formal arrangements’.
210 Transfer 23(2)

(Tullini, 2015: 13), we need to define the work carried out via these platforms, avoiding the use of
definitions such as ‘e-commerce’2 and separating it from the contiguous phenomenon of ‘the
sharing economy’ (Botsman, 2015).
From a labour law perspective, the main problem lies in classifying the relationship between the
client and the platform.
Work done via digital platforms is covered by a blend of different legal models: employment/
self-employment, procurement, labour market intermediation. Platforms may be regarded as
‘temporary work agencies, labour exchanges, social enterprises, service providers ( . . . ),
advertising platforms or just online directories’ (EU-OSHA, 2015: 4). Sometimes, intermedia-
tion is the sole function, in other cases the prevalent one (Donini, 2015: 433–458). ‘Services
provided tend to be intermediation services but can also be ancillary services, e.g. facilitation of
payments’ (European Commission, 2016b: 13), accompanied by other activities, such as
organisation or procurement of equipment.
Especially in the case of low-skilled digital work,3 the platform may play a larger role in the
organisation and integration of labour: it defines and directs the work by means of Tayloristic
hetero-direction (‘ . . . is akin . . . to a certain form of digital Taylorism’, see Degryse, 2016: 36; see
also Scholz, 2013; Cherry, 2016: 594–602). Online work ‘is widely exchanged across borders in a
similar way to merchandise trade’ (European Commission, 2016b: 23), and this may lead to an
employer-employee relationship (for a case study, see Aloisi, 2016).
In some cases, work activities are assigned to providers operating with a certain amount of
independence, in both virtual services (Upwork and Freelancers platforms) and locally provided
real-world services (TaskRabbit platform). Even where the worker can be considered independent,
the platform often retains a considerable role in organising and controlling the work.
According to the European Commission’s Communication, platforms are invariably providers
of ‘information society services’ as defined in the eCommerce Directive,4 while also sometimes
directly providing ‘underlying services’ (European Commission, 2016a: 5–7) such as transport and
other offline services. The supplier of the service is the platform rather than the worker, and, for
this reason, workers who provide their activities ‘for’ the digital organisation,5 irrespective of their
self-employed or employee status, need legal protection in relation to the platform.

Crowdworkers and their employment relationship: the application

of European labour law
In trying to identify the most appropriate regulatory framework, it is worth considering whether or
not crowdworkers are covered by EU legislation.

2 Some general terms and conditions define the parties as ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ (freelancers.com). See also
Ruling no. 12/2013 of the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies.
3 According to EU-OSHA (2015), ‘manual or low-skilled clerical work’ belongs to the subordinate model,
whereas in ‘the case of more highly-skilled freelance workers, further tests would have to be applied to
establish whether workers are genuinely self-employed’.
4 Article 2 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’); and Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of
information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services.
5 See UK Employment Tribunals, Case no. 2202551/2015 & Others, Aslam, Farrar and Others v. Uber,
judgment of 28 October 2016, paragraph 29.
Donini et al. 211

The only concept of ‘workers’6 available at EU level is the one laid down by the CJEU with
regard to freedom of movement under Article 45 TFEU. The definition is based on the actual
characteristics of the services rendered personally, on the control exercised by the receiver of the
service and on the nature of the payment agreement.7
For a long time, the CJEU focused its attention not so much on distinguishing between self-
employed and employed workers, but on whether the services performed were genuine and
effective. Freedom of movement (and rights conferred by it) were extended to ‘on-call
workers’8 and to workers in certain types of training.9 This distinction excluded citizens
performing marginal or ancillary services of no economic significance, in the aim of limiting
the movement of economically inactive citizens and safeguarding Member States’ social
security systems.
The judgment in FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media10 reaffirmed this concept, clarifying that
a worker falling within the scope of EU law is someone who cannot choose his work schedule,
place and content, does not participate in business risk and is integrated into the enterprise,
forming an economic unit with it (paragraph 36). Similarly, under the judgment in Haralambi-
dis,11 the European definition of ‘worker’ ‘excludes organisational independence for the
worker, implying, on the contrary, that the worker cannot offer services directly on the market
or to other potential clients’ (Ichino, 2015: 575). This ‘negative’ definition of workers was
created in order to exempt a collective agreement which sets minimum fees for self-employed
service providers from competition rules (Article 101 TFEU: Rules on competition applying to
undertakings), because they are ‘service providers in a situation comparable to that of
employees’12 (see also the opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee in EESC,
2010, 2013).
When recent trends in CJEU judgments are taken into account, the EU concept of a worker
seems sufficiently wide as to include digital platform workers where they perform activities that
require remuneration, have economic value and character and are not marginal or ancillary. This is
the case with a digital platform that does not give the worker the responsibility of determining
independently how the service will be performed because ‘that person . . . forms an integral part of
the employer’s undertaking, so forming an economic unit with that undertaking’.13

6 CJEU judgment of 19 March 1964, Unger, C-75/63, EU:C:1964:19, operative part of the judgment: ‘the
term “workers” [has] . . . a Community meaning’, and this prevents Member States from modifying the
meaning of the concept of ‘migrant worker’ and excluding certain groups of people from the Treaty
guarantees.
7 CJEU judgments of 23 March 1982, Levin, C-53/81, EU:C:1982:105; of 3 July 1986, Lawrie-Blum, C-
66/85, EU:C:1986:284; of 31 May 1989, Bettray, C-344/87, EU:C:1989:226; of 14 December 1989,
Agegate, C-3/87, EU:C:1989:650; of 8 June 1999, Meeusen, C-337/97, EU:C:1999:284; and of 23 March
2004, Collins, C-138/02, EU:C:2004:172.
8 CJEU judgment of 26 February 1992, Raulin, C-357/89, EU:C:1992:87, in which the Court deals with
the Dutch ‘oproepcontractˇ or ‘on-call contract’.
9 CJEU judgments of 3 July 1986, Lawrie-Blum, C-66/85, EU:C:1986:284, and of 21 June 1988, Brown,
C-197/86, EU:C:1988:323; see also CJEU judgment of 15 December 1995, Bosman, C-415/93,
EU:C:1995:463.
10 CJEU judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media, C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411.
11 CJEU judgment of 10 September 2014, Haralambidis, C-270/13, EU:C:2014:2185, paragraphs 28 and 33.
12 CJEU judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media, C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411,
paragraph 31.
13 CJEU judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media, C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411,
paragraph 36.
212 Transfer 23(2)

According to the European Commission, the criterion for the existence of a subordination link14
can be viewed as met when the digital platform not only acts as a network bringing workers and
enterprises together and providing underlying services (payment services, for example) but also
determines the choice of activities to be performed, the remuneration and the working conditions
(European Commission, 2016a: 11–12).
Workers covered by the European Union’s concept of ‘subordination’, which is closely tied to
the non-occasional performance of economically significant work, are offered a minimum set of
rights based on EU citizens’ freedom of movement and connected with access to social security
systems. This set of rights is broader than the one afforded to citizens tout court and ‘tends to
influence, in particular, equal treatment and health and safety’ (Giubboni, 2009: 42).15
The CJEU has also held that the EU definition of a ‘worker’ is to be used in determining the
scope of certain directives,16 but that, in most cases, the definition of which workers are subject to
EU provisions is to be left to the interpretation of national legislators.

Health and safety

Although most supranational legislation in this field is aimed at protecting the safety of
employees, there are numerous examples of provisions aimed at improving health and safety
for self-employed workers and for any kind of work which takes place within the context of
organised economic activity.
Unlike Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to
encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (the Occupational Safety
and Health Framework Directive), which is consistent with the European concept of ‘worker’ as
established by the CJEU in relation to freedom of movement, Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June 1992
on the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile con-
struction sites requires that certain regulations concerning work equipment and protective devices
are applied to the self-employed. Provisions of this kind were extended by Directive 2002/15,
which focuses specifically on road transport drivers, even self-employed ones. More recently, they
have also been implemented in regard to EU strategies on workplace health and safety (European
Commission, 2007).
Since the trend towards extending health and safety measures to autonomous work is justified
by the nature of the asset to be protected17 or by the risks found in specific sectors of activity
(Council of the European Union, 2003), there is no reason to exclude the possibility of extending
legal guarantees designed to safeguard fundamental rights (see the Charter of Fundamental Rights

14 ‘[T]he service provider must act under the direction of the collaborative platform, the latter determining
the choice of the activity, remuneration and working conditions. In other words, the provider of the
underlying service is not free to choose which services it will provide and how, e.g. as per the contractual
relationship it entered with the collaborative platform. Where the collaborative platform is merely
processing the payment deposited by a user and passes it on to the provider of the underlying service, this
does not imply that the collaborative platform is determining the remuneration. The existence of sub-
ordination is not necessarily dependent on the actual exercise of management or supervision on a
continuous basis.’
15 On equal treatment, see CJEU judgment of 1 October 2015, O, C-432/14, EU:C:2015:643.
16 On the Working Time Directive, see CJEU judgment of 14 October 2010, Union syndicale Solidaires
Ise`re, C-428/09, EU:C:2010:612, paragraphs 27 to 29.
17 For a broad interpretation of the Directives, see CJEU judgments of 6 July 2000, Dietrich, C-11/99,
EU:C:2000:368, of 3 October 2000, Simap, C-303/98, EU:C:2000:528.
Donini et al. 213

of the European Union, Article 3, Right to the integrity of the person, and Article 31, Fair and just
working conditions) to crowdworkers.
In the light of the recent considerations put forward by the European Agency for Safety and
Health at Work (EU-OSHA) (EU-OSHA, 2015: 4–6), it is evident that legislation covering work
on digital platforms needs to be enacted without delay, not only to avoid competitive advantages to
the detriment of companies which observe economic and legislative obligations laid down in
regard to employees, but also to prevent the infringement of inviolable human rights.
It is also possible to argue this position on the basis of the principles stated in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the articles that recognise health (Article
35) and workplace safety (Article 31) as fundamental assets, as well as Article 53, which prohibits
restrictive interpretations of human rights and of fundamental freedoms.

Collective rights
CJEU rulings leave room for the possible exemption of digital workers from anti-competition
regulations and, consequently, for specific collective negotiations on their behalf.
The CJEU’s position18 demonstrates that restrictions on competition can legitimately be pur-
sued if they are justified by ‘imperative reasons relating to the public interest’ and are compatible
with EU law and if they do not disproportionately limit economic freedom. In addition to the
grounds explicitly mentioned in Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(public order, safety, safeguarding health, safeguarding the environment), the concept of ‘reasons
of public interest’ also covers collective social rights, since these are fundamental rights resulting
from the constitutional traditions shared by the Member States and are thus protected by Article
6(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).19
Article 6(1) TEU endows the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union with the
same legal value as the Treaties (Caruso, 2010; Caruso and Alaimo, 2010): in so doing, it both
recognises the primary value of the right to collective bargaining and action (as set out by Article
28 of the Charter) and endorses the principle of the greatest possible extension of fundamental
rights (Article 53).
These provisions could constitute a legal basis for extending the area in which collective rights
operate to cover all cases where non-salaried services are provided in situations of contractual
weakness – for instance, in the case of an employing platform which, by imposing contractual
conditions unilaterally, is in a position to impair the crowdworker’s self-determination.
The idea of extending collective rights to economically dependent workers also seems to be
supported by the most recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The
ECtHR is increasingly tending to include both social and trade union rights under its jurisdiction,

18 Cf. CJEU judgment of 25 July 1991, Sa¨ger, C-76/90, EU:C:1991:331, paragraphs 12 and 15.
19 This paragraph states that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law: CJEU judgments
of 23 November 1999, Arblade and Others, C-369/96 and C-376/96, EU:C:1999:575, paragraph 36; of
15 March 2001, Mazzoleni and ISA, C-165/98, EU:C:2001:162, paragraph 27; of 25 October 2001,
Finalarte and Others, C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, EU:C:2001:564,
paragraph 33; of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Sea-
men’s Union (‘Viking’), C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772, paragraph 77; of 18 December 2007, Laval un
Partneri, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809, paragraph 103; and of 18 September 2014, Bundesdruckerei,
C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235, paragraph 31.
214 Transfer 23(2)

drawing them both into the human rights perspective (Merino, 2007: 463–492; Zagrebelsky, 2006:
297–311). Starting from the premise of the indivisibility of human rights, the Court has gradually
come to consider workers’ rights and trade union rights as intrinsic human rights (Bronzini, 2009:
975–983; Marguénaud and Mouly, 2009: 739–742; Bruun and Lörcher, 2012: 397–400).
Although the ECtHR’s understanding of the right of association derives originally from an
individualistic standpoint, it has relied on Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) as the legal basis for international protec-
tion of the right to negotiate and to take collective action (Novitz, 2010: 409–439; on Article 11
ECHR, see Ridola, 2001: 350–368). In UNISON v. the United Kingdom and Federation of Offshore
Workers’ Trade Unions and Others v. Norway,20 the right to engage in collective bargaining and
the right to strike were held to be subject only to the limits expressed in Article 11(2) ECHR, i.e.
those measures necessary to guarantee ‘national security or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others’. In Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, the ECtHR asserted the indissoluble nexus
between freedom of association and collective bargaining: thus, it implemented a synergistic
reading of international and European sources of law, seeing them as integrated interpretative
parameters21 (Bücker et al., 2011: 315–360; Dorssemont et al., 2014; Ewing and Hendy, 2010: 48).
If the trend towards viewing collective social rights as a part of human rights were to be
consolidated, it would open the way for the further extension of collective rights to independent
workers whose position is weak, since there would be no justification to prevent access to a human
right solely on the basis of employment status (Aloisi, 2016; De Stefano, 2015: 25).

Collective protection for digital workers: a comparative analysis

The regulatory landscape of digital platforms is sketchy: contributions to the discussion are mostly
descriptive, aiming simply to bring the issue to the attention of national and European decision-
makers. If we are to find more effective measures to support economically dependent digital
workers, we need to focus on the national level.
It is worth considering the possibility that legislation and collective bargaining may be combin-
ing to set rules in this sector. The earliest legislative proposals have focused on sharing economy
platforms,22 and the issue of employment has hardly come to the fore in this sector as yet (see next
section). But, as national legislators have not yet laid out any prescriptive indicators, perhaps it is

20 UNISON v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 53574/99, ECHR 2002-I and Federation of Offshore
Workers’ Trade Unions and Others v. Norway (dec.), no. 38190/97, ECHR 2002-VI. See also Willis v.
the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, ECHR 2002-IV and Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], nos.
52562/99 and 52620/99, ECHR 2006-I.
21 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 146, ECHR 2008 states that ‘increasingly high’
standards for the protection of fundamental rights must be taken into account ‘with greater firmness’
when assessing breaches of the ECHR, and that any limitations on fundamental rights must, as far as
possible, be ‘construed restrictively’. See also Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v. Turkey, no. 68959/01, § 24, 21
April 2009.
22 In Italy, Proposta di legge: Disciplina delle piattaforme digitali per la condivisione di beni e servizi e
disposizioni per la promozione dell’economia della condivisione (the ‘Sharing Economy Bill’: Regu-
lation of digital platforms for the sharing of goods and services and measures for promoting the sharing
economy, Draft Law no. 3564/2016 of 2 March 2016, http://www.makingspeechestalk.com/ch/com-
ment_sea/); in France, Article 60 of the Loi travail (the Labour Act, known as the ‘El Khomri Law’, Law
no. 1088 of 4 August 2016), of which Chapter II, Adaptation du droit du travail à l’ère du numérique
(Adapting labour law to the digital age), amends Article L. 7342 of the Code du Travail (Labour Code).
Donini et al. 215

useful to analyse collective bargaining outputs in order to ascertain whether any kind of collective
protection for crowdworkers has been achieved through this avenue. Further useful indications
may be found in legal provisions covering forms of employment which have a number of
relevant similarities to digital platform working.

Italy
According to rulings of the Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale) from the 1970s onwards,23
economically dependent workers – even those who are self-employed – have access to freedom of
association, which is enshrined in Article 39 of the Italian Constitution. However, in the absence of
implementing legislation, there is some uncertainty about the access of crowdworkers to collective
rights.
Some collective agreements in force in Italy do mention the use of technologies at work as
offering greater flexibility of time and place.
Experiments in ‘agile working’24 seek to create a better work-life balance while, at the same
time, boosting productivity and reducing business costs (Dagnino et al., 2016).25 Collective agree-
ments at company level sometimes offer the opportunity for employer and employee to make a
specific agreement for the latter to work from home (or another location) for between one and three
days a week, with the worker taking responsibility for data security and safety.26
These agreements do not attempt to adapt the way contracts are structured in order to reflect the
current transformation of work (Tiraboschi, 2016: 4), and their main impetus is to focus entirely on
the same needs as those of teleworking. These agile working experiments are supported by
legislation and, where their goal is to improve labour productivity, they have free access to tax
incentives linked with performance-based bonuses.27
A recent collective agreement (Bassilichi SpA., Florence, 1 April 2016) promoted a plan for
‘teleworking plus co-working’ following closure of a branch office, in order to avoid having to transfer
workers to another city. This agreement demonstrates some potential for remote working through an
intermediate technological co-working structure, as part of a corporate restructuring project.28
In addition to projects promoting flexibility on the basis of the use of technology, it is
worth mentioning collective agreements dedicated to self-coordinated continuous collabora-
tion, by virtue of Article 409(3)(1) of the Italian Civil Procedure Code.29 These collective

23 See Italian Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale) Judgment no. 222 of 1975.
24 ‘Smart’ or ‘agile working’ refers to employment that combines flexibility, autonomy and collaboration,
aiming to optimise the working environment and afford the company concerned greater efficiency.
25 The collective agreements we analysed are introducing spatial flexibility in the name of smart, flexible or
agile working. Examples of similar agreements are: the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Agreement of
24 December 2015; the Sisal Agreement of 21 January 2016; the Finmeccanica Agreement of 2 February
2016; and the Food Industry National Collective Bargaining Agreement of 5 February 2016, which
leaves the introduction of agile working for agreement at company level.
26 See Zurich Group Memorandum of Understanding, 23 September 2015.
27 An Interministerial Decree of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and the Ministry of the
Economy and Finances of 25 March 2016 refers to agile working as one of the instruments to be used to
achieve productivity gains in implementation of Article 1(182), (189) and (190) of the Legge di stabilità
2016: Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio annuale e pluriennale dello Stato (the ‘Stability’ or
Budget Act for 2016, Law no. 208 of 28 December 2015).
28 The costs of the co-working space are to be shared between the workers (paragraph 7 of the Agreement).
29 Article 409(3) of the Italian Codice di procedura civile (Civil Procedure Code) provides some protection
for ‘quasi-subordinated workers’, as economically dependent workers.
216 Transfer 23(2)

agreements introduce rules on remuneration, contract termination, rest periods and health and
safety in call centres,30 universities,31 market research32 and other sectors33 (Imberti, 2016:
399–417).
These agreements open up embryonic collective bargaining discussions, as the self-
employed enter into relationships with an enterprise; at the same time, they may exclude the
possibility of applying current employment regulations. Article 2(1) of the Decreto Legisla-
tivo: Disciplina organica dei contratti di lavoro e revisione della normativa in tema di man-
sioni (Framework regulation of employment contracts and review of regulations on job tasks,
Legislative Decree no. 81/2015 of 15 June 2015 – a ‘Jobs Act’ decree) provides for the
application of employment contract protections to collaborations in which the worker has
no control, from various points of view, over organisation of the work.34 However, the
possibility remains for collective bargaining to lead to opt-out from labour law regulation
(Article 2(2)).
This new legislation leaves room for widely differing interpretations of which situations should
be covered by the regulations on subordinate work (in the case of collaborations organised in a
variety of ways, see Article 2 of the Decree n. 81/2015) and which should not. It may be that a
‘settling-down’ period will be required, while the courts produce a body of case-law from which
precedents may emerge.
Some labour protection might also be extended to crowdworkers on the basis of an existing
collective agreement of 1 August 2013: ‘Collective agreement for the regulation of project-
based collaborations in the business of selling goods and services and credit recovery by out-
bound call centres’.35 Article 1 of this collective agreement identifies the following parties: a
client who entrusts the call centre developer with the task of selling but has no direct contact
with the worker; the call centre developer, who is commissioned to sell services on behalf of a
third party (the client); and the worker – who completes this triangle in a similar way to that
required by the activities of a digital platform. The protection provided by this collective
agreement may be adaptable to the crowdworker relationship, especially if the general terms
and conditions of a given platform make the collective agreement binding on user-buyers and
user-providers.

30 Collective agreements of 30 July and 22 December 2015 between Assocontact (National Association of
Outsourcing Contact Centres) and Asstel (Association of Telecoms Companies) and SLC-CGIL, FISTel-
CISL, UIL COM-UIL (the industry unions). In some sectors of the industry, there are problems arising
from competing collective agreements signed by different unions: see Ruling no. 27/2015 of the Ministry
of Labour and Social Policies, requested by Assocontact.
31 Collective agreement of 10 December 2015 between LUISS and other Universities and FLC-CGIL,
CISL Università, UIL RUA (unions in this sector).
32 Collective agreements of 6 and 26 November 2015 between Assirm (Market Research Forum) and
NIDIL-CGIL, FeLSA-CISL, UIL Tem.p@-UIL (unions in this sector).
33 Debt recovery companies, cultural institutions, private research institutes, private nursing homes and
clinics, private schools.
34 Article 2(1) of this Jobs Act decree refers to contractual relationships based on autonomous collaboration that
result in ‘continuous work activities performed exclusively by the contracted person, where the methods of
implementation are organised by the client with regard to, among other things, the timings and the place of
work’.
35 The collective agreement referred to here is the Telecommunications National Collective Bargaining
Agreement of 1 August 2013, as consolidated on 30 July 2015.
Donini et al. 217

While collective bargaining at company level tries to introduce forms of agile and flexible
working, legislative measures are under discussion in Parliament. A bill36 currently being
discussed in the Italian Parliament promotes the introduction of forms of ‘smart working’
aimed at supporting business competitiveness. Once this has been passed into law, it will be
possible to enter into agreements about labour relationships organised on the basis of phases,
cycles or objectives without any constraints of time or place and on the basis of the potential
use of technological tools partly on corporate premises and partly externally, without any
fixed location.
A further legislative initiative being studied by the Italian Parliament would provide a legal
framework for the exchange of goods and services on digital platforms.37 The proposal includes
rules for the management and functioning of platforms operating on a bilateral market, in order
to ensure ‘new opportunities for growth, employment and entrepreneurship’. The aim of pro-
moting employment, however, seems to be contradicted by Article 2(1)(a) of the same draft
legislation, which states that ‘there is no subordinated employment relationship between plat-
form managers and users’ – and seems to leave no room for any other, alternative kinds of
employment contract.

Spain
In Spain, the debate about digital working and crowdworking is still in its early stages (Todolı́
Signes, 2015: 3, 1–25).
The Spanish Constitution may be argued to support collective bargaining, in that its Article
28(1) states that ‘everyone has the right to unionise freely’ – which leaves definition and inter-
pretation of the area and scope of the constitutional norm to the legislature or the courts respec-
tively. This was implemented by the Ley Organica de Libertad Sindical (Framework Act on Trade
Union Freedom, 11/85 of 2 August 1985), whose Article 1(1) provides collective rights exclusively
for salaried employees – although Article 3(1) establishes that contractors and micro-entrepreneurs
may affiliate with workers’ unions.
It is clear how conflict of collective interest can arise between service providers and platforms
or final buyers/clients (Sepúlveda Gómez, 2005: 194–195). The online contractors’ interests are
completely the opposite of those of the enterprise for which they are providing the service, and in
many cases there may actually be a contractual imbalance, similar to the situation of regular
employees (Reyna, 2006: 37–49).
Spain’s unique approach has yet to produce adequate coverage, since the extension of Article
3(1) of the Framework Act on Trade Union Freedom, which favours freedom to organise unions for
‘weak’ independent workers, includes only a small part of the collective rights reserved for
employees – which, taken as a whole, make up the constitutional principle of freedom for unions;
these independent workers have no right to exclusive and specific trade union activity or collective

36 Disegno di legge: Misure per la tutela del lavoro autonomo non imprenditoriale e misure volte a favorire
l’articolazione flessibile nei tempi e nei luoghi del lavoro subordinato (Bill to implement measures for
the protection of self-employed non-business people and to promote employment flexibility in terms of
time and place, Draft Law no. 4135/2016, placed before the Senate on 3 November 2016) results from
the merger of Draft Law no. 2233/2016 and Draft Law no. 2229/2016, http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/
Schede/Ddliter/47418.htm.
37 The Sharing Economy Bill: see Note 22. The Parliamentary Intergroup on Innovation, which presented
this bill, has submitted it to public consultation, collecting comments via an online platform.
218 Transfer 23(2)

bargaining (Palomeque López, 2000: 429–444). Nevertheless, the explicit recognition of indepen-
dent workers (Article 3(1)) opens the way to possible ‘solidarity bargaining’ (Penalva, 2009: 201),
which could extend some contractual rights – usually offered only to hired employees – to
independent workers who do not have employees and who are members of the trade unions
negotiating the collective agreement – among whom there could definitely be some digital plat-
form workers.
A possible obstacle to extending the content of collective agreements to digital workers emerges
from Article 37(1) of the Spanish Constitution, which limits the effectiveness of collective agree-
ments to areas of application in terms of persons (who must be hired employees in a specific
category) and geography (nationally or at the level of the Autonomous Communities, regions,
provinces, municipalities) (Cruz Villalón, 2000: 542).38 In essence, all clauses of a collective
agreement that go beyond the given area of application are to be considered inapplicable.
The provisions of Article 3(1) of the Framework Act may be quite useless for crowdworkers, at
best amounting to a mere variation on freedom of association (Article 22 of the Spanish Consti-
tution), rather than extending trade union freedom (Article 28 of the Constitution). Under Article
82.3 of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute, Consolidating Text approved by Royal
Legislative Decree 1/1995 of 24 March 1995), the application of collective agreements is tied to
individual contracts of employment: as long as only hired employees and their employers come
within the scope of collective bargaining, a contract negotiated collectively can never be an
effective normative tool for independent crowdworkers – not even when they derive their income
exclusively from the digital platform.
Despite these significant problems, there are some encouraging signs for ad hoc collective
regulation for platform workers in the Estatuto del Trabajador Autónomo (Self-Employed
Workers’ Statute, Law no. 20/2007 of 11 July 2007), which sets out a specific mechanism
for the collective protection of contractors who are economically dependent.39 This initiative
allows unions to negotiate collective ‘professional interest’ agreements (acuerdos de intere´s
professional, or AIPs). While these agreements are not the same as collectively negotiated
contracts, they do make it possible for economically dependent workers to claim the right to
contracts that are objectively more effective, as they expressly state that any clauses contained
in individual contracts will be invalid if they run counter to the provisions of the AIP
accepted by the worker.
These legal provisions cannot be said to give adequate and proper protection to economically
dependent workers: nevertheless, they have begun to create a system of specific collective regu-
lations (Cruz Villalon and Valdés Dal-Re, 2008) with regard to pricing, location, timing and the
way in which independent contract work is carried out40 (Castro Argüelles, 2011: 34–80).
This system of specific protective regulations could offer a model of regulation for independent
digital platform workers, either through specific professional agreements or by extending the effect

38 See Article 82 of the Workers’ Statute, which limits the effectiveness of a collective agreement to
employees and employers in a given category and for a specific territory.
39 Under Article 3.1 of the Framework Act on Trade Union Freedom and Article 1 of the Self-Employed
Workers’ Statute, ‘economically dependent contractors’ are workers who receive more than 75 per cent
of their earnings from one client.
40 Collective agreements such as the DSV Road Spain AIP of 1 January 2009, the Panrico AIP of 4 April
2009, the Sertrans Catalunya AIP of 1 May 2009 and the Lonzano Transportes AIP of 28 July 2009 have
established weekly rest periods, minimum wages, working times and places of work for economically
dependent self-employed workers.
Donini et al. 219

of collective agreements for economically dependent self-employed workers, at least to include a

guaranteed minimum wage.

France
In the French context, specific attention has been paid to crowdworking. The first acknowledge-
ment of the issue came in the Mettling Report, Transformation nume´rique et vie au travail
(Mettling, 2015), requested by the Minister for Labour, Employment, Vocational Training and
Social Dialogue in order to look at the effects of digital change on the labour force. This high-
lighted the need to implement effective strategies and a social dialogue along the lines of initiatives
in Germany, where trade unions and employers’ organisations have started discussing the statutes
applying to digital workers.41
Article 60 of the Loi travail (the Labour Act, known as ‘the El Khomri Law’, Law no. 1088 of
4 August 2016) proposed the establishment of statutes to protect independent workers who
operate on the kind of platforms mentioned in Article 242 bis of the Code général des impôts
(General Tax Code). The latter was introduced by the 2016 Budget Act42 and applies to workers
who receive a specific amount of income, established by special government decree, from these
online platforms. In particular, when the platform determines the characteristics of the work and
sets the remuneration, independent digital platform workers become entitled to certain guaran-
tees usually applied to employees.
Articles L. 7342-1 to L. 7432-6 of the Labour Code (as amended by the El Khomri Law)
extend protection in the case of injury sustained or disease contracted during work or work-
related training, charging the cost to the digital platform. Further, there is recognition of trade
union rights, with the right to form a union and the right to strike, except where the exercise of
these rights is abusive. This confirms the part of the Preamble to the French Constitution of
1946 which does not make any distinction between independent and salaried employment.
Similarly, Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘Right
of collective bargaining and action’) gives any worker the right to negotiate and conclude
collective agreements and, where there is conflict of interest, to take collective action, includ-
ing strike action.
Conferring social responsibility on a digital platform does not eliminate the power of a judge
to reclassify an individual crowdworker as an employee where certain defining conditions are
met (client direction of the actual performance of the work; subordination to the employer’s
controls and discipline). Making the platform responsible only for those crowdworkers who
have already taken out their own workers’ insurance against accidents and occupational disease
may incentivise companies to prefer recruiting independent contractors who are not covered by
occupational injury insurance. It is also important to take into account that the El Khomri Law

41 Reporting on the German context, a document of June 2015 compares the position of the major con-
federations of employers (BDA and BDI), which refuse to view crowdworkers as employees, with that of
the trade unions, which favour the introduction of a specific statute with social standards. IG Metall has
also launched faircrowdwork.org, a digital platform offering consultancy and other services for
crowdworkers (Planet Labor, 2015).
42 Article 87 of the Loi de finances pour 2016 (the 2016 Budget Act, Law no. 2015-1785 of 29 December
2015) states: ‘Companies that, regardless of their place of establishment, put people in touch remotely by
electronic means with a view to the sale of goods, supply of services or exchange or sharing of goods and
services, are required to give . . . clear and transparent information on the tax and social security obli-
gations incumbent on people who make business transactions through these intermediaries’.
220 Transfer 23(2)

does not subject these independent workers to other forms of regulation – in particular, those
governing workplace safety, office hours and the right to disconnect from company communi-
cations43 (Favennec Héry, 2015: 119).

Concluding remarks
Following this comparative analysis, we find multiple approaches at the legislative level: while
Spanish and Italian policy-makers are still far from defining specific legislation for crowdworking,
France has outlined a first attempt at heteronomous regulation. The main obstacle to protecting
digital platform workers through legislation is the rigid dichotomy between employment and self-
employment – the limits of which seem increasingly evident in both national and European legal
systems. Comparative analysis of the situation in southern European countries also reveals some
difficulties connected to the intermediate status of economically dependent workers (specifically,
in Italy and in Spain; Tullini, 2017: 151). A more favourable approach might be an alternative form
of legal regulation that would take into account the actual need for protection and promote the idea
of benefiting ‘the person’ rather than ‘the worker’.
From the collective bargaining standpoint, there are numerous visible limitations on the poten-
tial for introducing protective measures, in particular the fact that constitutional systems allow only
employees full trade union access.
To avoid the risk of stratification of undeclared work, there is an undeniable need for collective
protections and for the creation of a minimum core of human rights for crowdworkers.
Perhaps a useful strategy would be to follow the ECtHR’s latest rulings relating to Article 11
ECHR, which recognise collective bargaining and trade union action in the area of non-subordinate
work. This strategy could be applied in situations where contractual weakness means that the
stronger party can unilaterally impose terms and conditions, thus impairing the service provider’s
self-determination.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.

References
Aloisi A (2016) Commoditized workers: case study research on labour law issues arising from a set of ‘on-
demand/gig economy’ platforms. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 37(3): 653–690.
Botsman R (2015) Defining the sharing economy: what is collaborative consumption – and what isn’t?
Available at: http://www.fastcoexist.com/3046119/defining-the-sharing-economy-what-is-collaborative-
consumption-and-what-isnt (accessed 4 March 2017).
Bronzini G (2009) Diritto alla contrattazione collettiva e diritto di sciopero entrano nell’alveo protettivo della
CEDU: una nuova frontiera per il garantismo sociale in Europa? Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro II:
975–983.

43 Several collective agreements have established a right to disconnect, including the AREVA Group CA of
31 May 2012 (Article 20) and the National Interprofessional Agreement on Improving Quality of Life at
Work of 19 June 2013 (Article 17): see Ray (2015: 519–520). In fact, this right was introduced by the El
Khomri Law (Article L. 2242-8); it is also included in Article 16 of the Italian Bill (Draft Law no. 4135/
2016), cited in Note 36.
Donini et al. 221

Bronzini G (2016) Il futuro (giuridico) del lavoro autonomo nell’era della share-economy. Rivista Italiana di
Diritto del Lavoro III: 75–94.
Bruun N and Lörcher K (2012) Innovazione sociale: la nuova giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo sui
diritti fondamentali del lavoro. Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro 2: 397–400.
Bücker A, Dorssemont F and Warneck W (2011) The search for a balance: Analysis and perspective. In:
Bücker A and Warneck W (eds) Reconciling Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms after
Viking, Laval and Rüffert. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 315–360.
Caruso B (2010) I diritti sociali fondamentali dopo il Trattato di Lisbona (tanto tuonò che piovve). Massimo
D’Antona Centre for the Study of European Labour Law Working Paper, International Series 81.
Caruso B and Alaimo A (2010) Dopo la politica i diritti: l’Europa ‘sociale’ nel Trattato di Lisbona. Massimo
D’Antona Centre for the Study of European Labour Law Working Paper, International Series 82.
Castro Argüelles (2011) Los acuerdos de interés profesional: un balance de la negociacion llevada a cabo al
amparo del estatuto del trabajo autónomo. Anales de derecho 29: 34–80.
Cherry M (2016) Beyond misclassification: the digital transformation of work. Comparative Labor Law &
Policy Journal 37(3): 577–602.
Council of the European Union (2003) Council Recommendation of 18 February 2003 concerning the
improvement of the protection of the health and safety at work of self-employed workers (2003/134/
EC), OJ L 53, 28.2.2003, pp. 45–46.
Cruz Villalón J (2000) La tutela colectiva por los trabajadores autónomos de sus intereses profesionales.
Relaciones Laborales I: 542.
Cruz Villalón J and Valdés Dal-Ré F (2008) El Estatuto del Trabajo Autonomo. Madrid: La Ley.
Däubler W (2016) Challenges to labour law. In: Perulli A (ed.) L’idea di diritto del lavoro, oggi: in ricordo di
Giorgio Ghezzi. Padua: Wolters Kluwer/CEDAM, pp. 485–506.
Dagnino E, Tomassetti P and Tourres C (2016) Il ‘lavoro agile’ nella contrattazione collettiva oggi. Adapt
Working Paper 2.
Degryse C (2016) Digitalisation of the economy and its impact on labour markets. ETUI Working Paper 2016.
02. Brussels: ETUI.
De Stefano V (2015) Non-standard workers and freedom of association: a critical analysis of restrictions to
collective rights from a human rights perspective. Massimo D’Antona Centre for the Study of European
Labour Law Working Paper, International Series 123.
De Stefano V (2016) The rise of the “just-in-time workforce”: On-demand work, crowdwork and labour
protection in the “gig-economy”. ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Service Series 71.
Donini A (2015) Il mercato del lavoro sul web: regole e opportunità. Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali 2:
433–458.
Dorssemont F, Lörcher K and Schömann I (eds) (2014) The European Convention of Human Rights and the
Employment Relation. Oxford: Hart publishing.
Drahokoupil J and Fabo B (2016) The platform economy and the disruption of the employment relationship.
ETUI Policy Brief 5/2016. Brussels: ETUI.
EESC (2010) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on New trends in self-employed
work: the specific case of economically dependent self-employed work (own-initiative opinion) SOC/344.
EESC (2013) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Abuse of the status of self-
employed (own-initiative opinion) INT/628.
European Commission (2016a) A European agenda for the collaborative economy. Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, COM(2016) 356 final, 2 June 2016, Brussels.
European Commission (2016b) Commission Staff Working Document: European agenda for the collabora-
tive economy – supporting analysis, SWD(2016) 184 final, 2 June 2016, Brussels.
222 Transfer 23(2)

European Commission (2007) Improving quality and productivity at work: Community strategy 2007-2012 on
health and safety at work. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007), 62 final,
21 February 2007, Brussels.
EU-OSHA (2015) A review of the future of work: online labour exchanges or ‘crowdsourcing’: implications
for occupational safety and health. Discussion paper, Bilbao.
Eurofound (2015) New Forms of Employment. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Ewing KD and Hendy J (2010) The dramatic changes of Demir and Baykara. International Labor Journal
39(1): 2–51.
Favennec Héry F (2015) Qualité de vie au travail et temps de travail. Droit Social 2: 113–120.
Giubboni S (2009) La nozione comunitaria di lavoratore subordinato. In: Sciarra S and Caruso B (eds) Il
lavoro subordinato. Vol. 5 in series Trattato di diritto privato dell’Unione Europea, Ajani G and Benac-
chio GA (eds). Turin: Giappichelli, pp. 35–75.
Huws U (2016) Logged in. The new economy makes it harder than ever to untangle capitalism from our daily
lives. In: Jacobin. Available at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/01/huws-sharing-economy-crowd
source-precarity-uber-workers/ (accessed 4 March 2017).
Ichino P (2015) Sulla questione del lavoro non subordinato ma sostanzialmente dipendente nel diritto europeo
e in quello degli stati membri. Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro II: 573–580.
ILO (2002) Resolution concerning decent work and the informal economy, 1 June 2002.
Imberti L (2016) L’eccezione è la regola?! Gli accordi collettivi in deroga alla disciplina delle collaborazioni
organizzate dal committente. Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali 2: 393–430.
Marguénaud JP and Mouly J (2009) L’avènement d’une Cour européenne des droits sociaux. Recueil Dalloz
11: 739–742.
Merino M (2007) Le renforcement de la protection de la liberté syndicale par la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme en question. Revue Trimestrelle des Droits de l’Homme, 70: 481–492.
Mettling MB (2015) Transformation nume´rique et vie au travail, September 2015. Available at: http://www.
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/154000646/ (accessed 4 March 2017).
Novitz T (2010) Protection of workers under regional human rights systems: An assessment of evolving and
divergent practices. In: Fenwick C and Novitz T (eds) Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and
Regulation. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, pp. 409–438.
Palomeque López MC (2000) El trabajo autónomo y las propuestas de refundación del Derecho del Trabajo.
Relaciones Laborales 1: 429–444.
Penalva AS (2009) La negociación colectiva de los trabajadores autónomos. Revista de Derecho Social 46:
195–201.
Planet Labor (2015) Allemagne: la ligne de fracture patrons-syndicats entre flexibilité et protection du travail
dans le contexte de digitalisation de l’économie s’esquisse nettement. Article no. 9120, 8 June 2015.
Ray JE (2015) Actualité des TIC. Tous connectés, partout, tout le temps? Droit Social 6: 516 –527.
Reyna S (2006) Politicas para el fomento y la promoción del autoempleo individual. Documentacio´n Laboral
7: 37–49.
Ridola VP (2001) Commento art. 11 CEDU. In: Bartole S, Conforti B and Raimondi G (eds) Commentario
della Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle liberta` fondamentali. Padua: Wolters
Kluwer/CEDAM, pp. 350–368.
Scholz T (ed.) (2013) Digital Labor: The Internet as Playground and Factory. New York: Routledge.
Sepúlveda Gómez M (2005) Derechos colectivos y de representación de los trabajadores no asalariados.
Temas Laborales 81: 194–195.
Tiraboschi M (2016) Lavoro agile e contrattazione collettiva: lo stato dell’arte. In: Il‘lavoroagile’ nella
contrattazione collettiva oggi. Adapt Working Paper 2.
Donini et al. 223

Todolı́ Signes A (2015) El impacto de la ‘Uber economy’ en las relaciones laborales: los efectos de las
plataformas virtuales en el contato de trabajo. IUSLabour 3: 1–25.
Tullini P (2015) C’è lavoro sul web? Labour and Law Issues 1: 1–20.
Tullini P (2017) Quali regole per il lavoratore utente del web? Scambio economico e tutele. In: Tullini P (ed.)
Web e lavoro. Profili evolutivi e di tutela. Turin: Giappichelli, pp. 141–164.
Valenduc G and Vendramin P (2016) Work in the digital economy: sorting the old from the new. ETUI
Working Paper 2016.03. Brussels: ETUI.
Zagrebelsky G (2006) Corti costituzionali e diritti universali. Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico 2:
297–311.