Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2013)

International Political Economy Series
Series Editor: Timothy M. Shaw, Visiting Professor, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA
and Emeritus Professor, University of London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises impacts its organization
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Titles include:
Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman (editors)

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA
Leila Simona Talani, Alexander Clarkson and Ramon Pacheco Pardo (editors)
DIRTY CITIES
Towards a Political Economy of the Underground in Global Cities
Matthew Louis Bishop
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT
Xiaoming Huang (editor)
MODERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN AND CHINA
Developmentalism, Capitalism and the World Economic System
Bonnie K. Campbell (editor)
MODES OF GOVERNANCE AND REVENUE FLOWS OF AFRICAN MINING
Gopinath Pillai (editor)
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORA
Patterns of Socio-Economic Influence
Rachel K. Brickner (editor)
MIGRATION, GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE
Juanita Elias and Samanthi Gunawardana (editors)
THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HOUSEHOLD IN ASIA
Tony Heron
PATHWAYS FROM PREFERENTIAL TRADE
The Politics of Trade Adjustment in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific
David J. Hornsby
RISK REGULATION, SCIENCE AND INTERESTS IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE CONFLICTS
Yang Jiang
CHINA’S POLICYMAKING FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (editors)
DISCIPLINING THE TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY OF PEOPLE
Michael Breen
THE POLITICS OF IMF LENDING
Laura Carsten Mahrenbach
THE TRADE POLICY OF EMERGING POWERS
Strategic Choices of Brazil and India
Vassilis K. Fouskas and Constantine Dimoulas
GREECE, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE EU
The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction
Hany Besada and Shannon Kindornay (editors)
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER
Caroline Kuzemko
THE ENERGY-SECURITY CLIMATE NEXUS
Hans Löfgren and Owain David Williams (editors)
THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PHARMACEUTICALS
Production, Innovation and TRIPS in the Global South
Timothy Cadman (editor)
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POLICY REGIMES
Towards Institutional Legitimacy
Mark Hudson, Ian Hudson and Mara Fridell
FAIR TRADE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano and José Briceño-Ruiz (editors)
RESILIENCE OF REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Development and Autonomy
Godfrey Baldacchino (editor)
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIVIDED ISLANDS
Unified Geographies, Multiple Polities
Mark Findlay
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN REGULATING GLOBAL CRISES
Helen Hawthorne
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WTO
Special Treatment in Trade
Nir Kshetri
CYBERCRIME AND CYBERSECURITY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist (editors)
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
The Importance of Transformative Politics
Jeffrey D. Wilson
GOVERNING GLOBAL PRODUCTION
Resource Networks in the Asia-Pacific Steel Industry
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Diaspora Engagement
and Development
in South Asia
Edited by
Tan Tai Yong

Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
and
Md Mizanur Rahman
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies,
National University of Singapore
Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Tan Tai Yong and
Md Mizanur Rahman 2013
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2013
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Contents
List of Figures and Tables vii
Preface viii
Notes on Contributors x
List of Acronyms xv
Introduction: Diaspora Engagement and Development

in South Asia 1
Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman
1 From Germany to India: The Role of NRIs and PIOs in

Economic and Social Development Assistance 20
Pierre Gottschlich
2 Influencing from Afar: Role of Pakistani Diaspora in Public

Policy and Development in Pakistan 41
S. Akbar Zaidi
3 Afghan Diasporas in Britain and Germany: Dynamics,

Engagements and Agency 56
Carolin Fischer
4 The Global Circulation of Skill and Capital – Pathways of

Return Migration of Indian Entrepreneurs from the United
States to India 75
Manashi Ray
5 Bangladeshi Diaspora: Cultural Practices and

Development Linkages 103
A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah
6 From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Leveraging the Academic

Diaspora for Development in Bangladesh 124
Taiabur Rahman
7 Diaspora Engagement in Education in Kerala, India 145

Antony Palackal
v
vi Contents
8 Diaspora Volunteering and Development in Nepal 162

Prakash Khanal
9 Diasporic Shrines: Transnational Networks Linking South

Asia through Pilgrimage and Welfare Development 176
Virinder S. Kalra, Umber Ibad and Navtej K. Purewal
10 Intersecting Diasporas: Sri Lankan Buddhist Temples in

Malaysia and Development across the Indian Ocean 194
Jeffrey Samuels
11 Diaspora Engagement Policy in South Asia 212

Smita Tiwari
12 Pockets of the West: The Engagement of the Virtual

Diaspora in India 231
Kiran Mirchandani
Index 246
Figures and Tables
Figures
5.1 Ambivalent identity 105

5.2 Generation hierarchy 107
5.3 The culture–development linkages 115
5.4 Potential policy steps 118
5.5 Facilitating diaspora engagements 120
Tables
1.1 Top remittance-receiving countries (billion USD, est.) 24

1.2 Countries with highest total remittance to India (2010) 25
1.3 NRI deposits by source country in Europe (million USD) 26
1.4 NRI deposits from Germany (million USD) 26
1.5 Foreign direct investment inflows into India
(08/1991–03/2011, million USD) 29
1.6 Top ten investing countries (04/2008–03/2011,
million USD) 29
1.7 Selected social projects in India supported by the
Indo-German Society (DIG, 2011) 32
4.1 Motives for emigration to the United States 86
4.2 Profile of returnee transnational entrepreneurs in India 90
6.1 Some features of diaspora members (N40) 130
6.2 Components of the national innovation system in
Bangladesh 132
6.3 Engagement of academic diaspora 139
11.1 Strategic dashboard of policies for diaspora engagement 225
11.2 Top remittance-receiving countries in South Asia 226
vii
Preface
The global South Asian diaspora is currently over 50 million strong

and continues to grow. South Asian diaspora populations have been
increasingly influential on the global stage and capable of shaping the
development landscape of South Asia. Established in 2005, the Insti-
tute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at
the National University of Singapore, studies contemporary social and
economic issues of South Asia. In 2011, Ambassador Gopinath Pillai,
Chairman ISAS, envisioned the importance of South Asian diaspora as
a social and economic force to bring about changes in South Asia and
decided to focus on global South Asian diaspora as a research theme
of the institute. With the South Asian Diaspora Convention in July
2011, ISAS spearheaded the effort to connect the global South Asian
diaspora and promote economic integration between these overseas
communities and Asia.
In line with this emergent and growing interest in South Asian
diaspora, ISAS organized an academic workshop on ‘Diaspora Engage-
ment and Development in South Asia’ in September 2012. The aim of
the workshop was to explore the roles that global South Asian diasporic
groups play as a resource for development in their countries of ori-
gin in South Asia. The chapters in this volume were presented in this
workshop. We are indebted to the authors of the chapters for attending
the event and making the valuable contribution to this volume. This
book would not have been possible in such a short period without their
enthusiasm and support.
A multidisciplinary book project like this one has the risk of ending up
as a compilation of disconnected chapters. However, we have attempted
to reduce this danger by engaging all the contributors in an intensive
process of debate during the workshop and in subsequent rounds of revi-
sion of the chapters. Chapters that address key forms of engagement –
philanthropy, advocacy, volunteerism, entrepreneurship and virtual
engagement – are only included in this volume. We approach develop-
ment in a broad sense to include economic growth, poverty reduction,
social advancement, human empowerment and socio-economic equity.
Any individual and collective initiatives within the global South Asian
viii
Preface ix
diasporic communities have the potential to contribute to one or more

these dimensions of development in South Asia.
Organizing a workshop is not solely an individual effort; it involves
a number of key individuals whose assistance and support are equally
vital for the success of the event. We acknowledge the significant contri-
butions of Mamta Sachan Kumar and Hema Kiruppalini in organizing
the event successfully. A special word of thanks goes to Mr Johnson
Paul, Senior Associate Director of ISAS, for his support and cooperation
in organizing the event. The administrative and support team of the
workshop, Jacqueline Goh, Felicia Ho, Kirby Khoo, Muhammad Yusuf,
Kamarunnisa, Sithara Doriasamy, Samuel Neo and Florence Ho, also
deserve our sincere gratitude for their support and cooperation.
Zaara Zain coordinated all the contributors with hard work, dedi-
cation and a smile in the publication process. We thank her for her
endeavours.
We also owe our appreciation to Palgrave Macmillan for accepting this
project and turning out an attractive product in a reasonable time span.
This being the first volume of its kind, it is surely not free from gaps
and lapses. We will learn from them through the comments, reviews
and assessments of our readers and accordingly improve in the future.
We hope that this volume will be of use to those many inspired voices
who will continue to carry this line of research forward.
Tan Tai Yong

Md Mizanur Rahman
Contributors
Carolin Fischer is pursuing a DPhil in Development Studies at the

Oxford Department of International Development (ODID). In her
research she explores how Afghans based in Germany and Britain relate
to social change, conflict and development in Afghanistan. She is par-
ticularly interested in questions of causality and interactions between
structure and agency in diaspora formation and diaspora–home-country
relations. Carolin received a diploma degree in sociology from Bielefeld
University, Germany. For her diploma she investigated the peace-
promoting efforts of diaspora communities in homeland conflict, focus-
ing on activities of Afghan expatriates in Germany. During her studies
she did internships in the Israel Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation
and the German Foreign Office.
Pierre Gottschlich has been working as Assistant Professor at the

Chair of International Politics, Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Rostock, Germany, since 2004. In 2010, he successfully
defended his PhD thesis on the Indian diaspora in the United States.
His research focuses on South Asia and the political, socioeconomic and
cultural effects of transnational migration. He has published two mono-
graphs and numerous research articles on various subjects, ranging from
nuclear proliferation to workers’ remittances. Currently, he is involved
in research projects on Indian migration to the Mediterranean region
and on NRI/PIO in Germany.
Umber Ibad is Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology, Uni-

versity of Manchester, UK. Further, he has been teaching philosophy
and cultural history in GC University, Lahore, Pakistan, for the last six
years. His research interests are shrines-based practices, Sufism and the
development of postcolonial state.
Virinder S. Kalra is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of

Manchester, UK. His current research focuses on popular culture and
religion in shrines of Punjab, which is reflected in his forthcoming
x
Notes on Contributors xi
book: Sacred and Secular Musics: A Postcolonial Approach (Continuum).

His previous research has focused mainly on the South Asian diaspora
and he is the co-editor of A Postcolonial People: South Asians in Britain and
co-author of Diaspora and Hybridity.
Prakash Khanal is the Executive Director of Himalayan Development

International UK, promoting community cohesion and diaspora volun-
teering among the Nepalese community in the United Kingdom and
in Nepal. As a science and development journalist, he has contributed
to The Asia Times, The Economist and The Japan Times Weekly. He is a
recipient of the ‘Primo Rovis’, an international award for science writ-
ing. He is based in the United Kingdom and pursuing a PhD on Nepalese
migration to the United Kingdom at the University of Reading, UK.
Kiran Mirchandani is Associate Professor in the Adult Education &

Community Development Program at the University of Toronto,
Canada. She is Director of the collaborative programme in workplace
learning and change. Her research and teaching focus on gendered and
racialized processes in the workplace; critical perspectives on organiza-
tional development and learning; criminalization and welfare policy;
and globalization and economic restructuring. She is the author of Phone
Clones: Transnational Service Work the Global Economy (2012), co-author
of Criminalizing Race, Criminalizing Poverty: Welfare Fraud Enforcement in
Canada (2007) and co-editor of The Future of Lifelong Learning and Work:
Critical Perspectives (2008).
Antony Palackal teaches in the Post-Graduate Department of Sociol-

ogy, Loyola College of Social Sciences, Trivandrum, Kerala. He was a
visiting professor in Cleveland State University, Ohio, USA, and the
international consultant for syllabus revision in sociology in Peradeniya
University, Sri Lanka. He is the India Coordinator and Principle Inves-
tigator of the World Science Project that studies the effects of new
media (Information and Communications Technology) in develop-
ing countries. He is also Director, India, International Research and
Diaspora Studies, and Faculty Director for Social Sciences for the Inter-
national Institute for Scientific and Academic Collaboration (IISAC),
New Jersey, USA. Currently, Indian Council of Social Science Research
(ICSSR) has awarded him Senior Research Fellowship to study the land
issues in Kerala. He has published eight books and twenty research arti-
cles, including the latest edited book Introduction to Kerala Studies, a
compendium on Kerala in two volumes.
xii Notes on Contributors
Navtej K. Purewal is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of

Manchester, UK. She writes on gender and more recently religion. She
is the author of Son Preference: Sex Selection, Gender and Culture in South
Asia (2010) and Living on the Margins: Poverty and Social Access to Housing
in South Asia (1999).
Md Mizanur Rahman is a Senior Research Fellow at the ISAS, National

University of Singapore. He was a postdoctoral fellow at the Asia
Research Institute, NUS, in 2005–2006, and a research fellow at the
Department of Sociology, NUS, in 2007–2010. He has worked on a
Ford Foundation project on non-traditional security in South Asia and
was a visiting scholar at the Department of Sociology, University of
Western Ontario, Canada, and the Graduate School of Policy Science,
Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan. His work has appeared in leading
migration journals such as International Migration, Population, Space and
Place, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Journal of International Migra-
tion and Integration, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Asian Ethnicity
and Asian Population Studies.
Taiabur Rahman is Associate Professor and Chair of Public Admin-

istration at the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and
Strategic Research (KIMEP), Kazakhstan. Previously, he taught at the
University of Dhaka where, from 2006 to 2009, he was the chair of
Development Studies. He studied Public Administration at the Univer-
sity of Dhaka (BSS and MSS), University of Bergen (MPhil) and City
University of Hong Kong (PhD). He has published a book, several articles
in international journals and contributed chapters to a few edited books.
His research interests are in the broader areas of public administration,
comparative politics and development studies.
Manashi Ray is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social and

Behavioral Sciences at West Virginia State University, USA. She is inter-
ested in studying issues associated with the process of transnational
practices brought on by technological innovation, globalization and
international migration. Manashi received her PhD from the Michigan
State University in Spring 2010. Her dissertation, ‘Transcending National
Borders to Embrace the Beyond – A Study of Transnational Asian Indian
Entrepreneurs in the United States and India’, examines the motiva-
tions of and mechanisms by which Asian Indian immigrants, returnees
and non-migrant transnational entrepreneurs leverage cultural, human,
Notes on Contributors xiii
financial and social capital, and membership in networks to advance

their transnational entrepreneurship.
Jeffrey Samuels is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy

of Religion and Coordinator of Asian Studies at Western Kentucky Uni-
versity, USA. His research interests centre on the intersection of religion
and culture. He has published numerous articles and book chapters,
as well as edited a book and completed a monograph that explores
Buddhist monastic culture, pedagogical practices and fieldwork method-
ology in South and Southeast Asia. He is currently researching the topic
of Buddhism in Malaysia, focusing on the role that South and Southeast
diaspora communities (Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand) play in the
social history of the Theravada traditions in contemporary society.
Smita Tiwari is Guest Faculty at the University of Delhi, India, and

is taking courses on Indian and South Asian issues. She obtained her
PhD from South Asian Studies Division, School of International Stud-
ies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Her thesis was titled ‘India’s
Diaspora Policy 1999–2008: A Study of Evolution, Objectives and Princi-
ples’. Her areas of interests include the Indian and South Asian diasporas
and international migration, in the context of policy making. She has
also worked with the United Service Institution of India (USI), New
Delhi and Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, and
has been part of many research projects. She has contributed to Interpret-
ing the Indian Diaspora: Lessons from History and Contemporary Politics, an
edited book by Jayanta Kumar Ray.
A.K.M. Ahsan Ullah is Associate Director at the Center for Migration

and Refugee Studies and Assistant Professor of Global Affairs and Public
Policy at the American University in Cairo. He has two Master’s degrees
and a PhD in migration. He has contributed extensively to national and
international refereed journals, including among others, Development in
Practice; International Migration, Asian Profile; Asian and Pacific Migration
Journal; Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies; Development Review; and
the Journal of Social Economics. He has also contributed to a number of
edited collections and published 12 books in the fields of migration,
refugee and development studies. His latest book publication is entitled
Rationalizing the Migration Decision: Labour Migrants in East and South
East Asia. In addition to his academic work, Dr Ullah has worked for
national and international development and research organizations for
xiv Notes on Contributors
over 18 years. He has taught and researched at the Asian Institute of

Technology (AIT), Thailand; City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong;
Centre for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany;
Saint Mary’s University; McMaster University; and the University of
Ottawa, Canada.
Tan Tai Yong is Professor of History and Director of the ISAS and has
been an integral part of the institute since its inception. Professor Tan,
a historian, is concurrently Vice Provost (Student Life) at the National
University of Singapore. Prior to this, he was Dean of the Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore from 2004
to 2009. He has written extensively on South Asian history as well as on
Southeast Asia and Singapore. His recent books include Singapore – A 700
Year History (2009), Creating ‘Greater Malaysia’: Decolonisation and the
Politics of Merger (2008), Partition and Post-Colonial South Asia: A Reader
(co-edited, 2007), The Garrison State (2005), The Aftermath of Partition in
South Asia (co-authored, 2000) and The Transformation of Southeast Asia:
International Perspectives on De-colonisation (co-edited, 2003).
S. Akbar Zaidi is a Pakistani political economist. Apart from his inter-

est in political economy, he also has great interest in development, the
social sciences more generally, and increasingly in history. He has writ-
ten over 60 academic articles in international journals and as chapters
in books, as well as numerous books and monographs. His most recent
book, Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan (2011), exam-
ines the political economy of the Musharraf regime. He has taught at
Karachi University and at Johns Hopkins University, where he was a
visiting professor in 2004–2005. He holds a PhD from the University
of Cambridge and lives and works in Karachi. He is currently a visit-
ing professor at Columbia University, New York, where he has a joint
position at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and
at the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies
(MESAAS).
Acronyms
AIT Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand

BCAS Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
BCS Bangladesh Civil Service
BDMAUK Bangladesh Medical Association in the UK
BDRC Bangladesh Development Research Center
BIISS Bangladesh Institute of International and
Strategic Studies
BJP Bharatya Janata Party, India
BOP Balance of Payments
BPATC Bangladesh Public Administration Training
Centre
BPO Business Process Outsourcing
BUET Bangladesh University of Engineering and
Technology
CBS Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DESK Diaspora Education and Studies on Kerala
DFID Department for International Development
DIG Diplom Interessen Gruppe
DKN Diaspora Knowledge Network
DRC Development Research Centre
DV Diversity Visa
EFA Education for All
ENBS European Network of Bangladesh Studies
EWU East West University, Bangladesh
FBO Faith-based Organizations
FCNR Foreign Currency Non-Resident Accounts
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIRT German–Indian Round Table
HDI UK Himalayan Development International UK
HEC-Pakistan Higher Education Commission of Pakistan
HLC High Level Committee
xv
xvi List of Acronyms
ICSSR Indian Council of Social Science Research

ICT Information and Communications Technology
IDEA International Diaspora Engagement Alliance
IGCC Indo-German Chamber of Commerce
IISAC International Institute for Scientific and
Academic Collaboration
IISC Indian Institute of Science
IIT Indian Institute of Technology
IJMS International Journal of Multicultural Societies
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Indian National Congress
INO Indian Nationals Overseas
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPCS Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
ITES Information and Technology Essential Standards
JNU Jawaharlal Nehru University, India
KIMEP Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics
and Strategic Research
KIP Know India Programme
LBGT Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LUMS Lahore University of Management Sciences
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MESAAS Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and
African Studies
MHFA Mental Health First Aid
MMR Maternal Mortality Rate
MOIA Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
MPA Member of the Punjab Assembly
MPI Migration Policy Institute
NASSCOM National Association of Software and Services
Companies
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NDVP Nepali Diaspora Volunteering Programme
NELM New Economics of Labour Migration
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
NICOP National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistani
NIEP National Institute of Educational Policy and
Administration
List of Acronyms xvii
NMC Nursing and Midwifery Council

NRB Non-Resident Bangladeshi
NRE Non-Resident External Accounts
NRI Non-Resident Indians
NRN Non-Resident Nepali
NRNA Non-Resident Nepalese Association
NRO Non-Resident Ordinary Accounts
OCI Overseas Citizens of India
ODID Oxford Department of International
Development
OIS Department of Homeland Security’s Office of
Immigration Statistics
OPF Overseas Pakistanis Foundation
PBD Pravasi Bhartiya Diwas, India
PBO People of Bangladeshi Origin
PIO People of Indian Origin
POC Pakistan Origin Card
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
RNSL Robert Noyce Simulation Lab
SAF South Asia Foundation
SANSA South African Network of Skills Abroad
SIP Semester in India Programme
SIPA School of International and Public Affairs
SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies
SPD Social Democratic Party
SPDC Scholarships Programme for Diaspora Children
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics
TCS Tata Consultancy Services
UGMA Union of German Malayalee Associations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USI United Service Institution of India
VLSI Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit
VMS Volunteering Management Systems
VSO Voluntary Services Overseas
Introduction: Diaspora
Engagement and Development
in South Asia
Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman
Increasingly, countries with extensive diasporas have sought to con-

nect with the extended, transnational communities in order to tap into
the resources and networks they offer for the domestic developmen-
tal purposes. The myriad of approaches adopted for such engagements,
from raising awareness to offering incentives and providing mecha-
nisms for members of the diaspora to engage or re-engage with the
home country, have become part of the development strategy of many
emerging economies. The South Asian region offers many examples of
such practices. By focusing on the manner and means by which the
diaspora communities engage and contribute to their country of origin,
the chapters in this book seek to broaden the scope of diaspora studies
beyond migration and settlement. Rather than seeing the diaspora as an
outflow of human resources, this book shows how diaspora communi-
ties often serve as critical bridges that facilitate movements of capital
and funds, sharing of know-how and generate useful transnational
networks for various socio-economic initiatives.
This book particularly addresses a relatively new approach to diaspora
studies by shifting the focus from conventional diaspora studies, which
has so far been dominated by questions of how various diaspora groups
adapt to the social, economic and political domains in the countries
of settlement while seeking to maintain their own traditions and cul-
tures, to the ways in which diaspora communities engage with origin
countries and contribute to these countries economically and socially
over time. The current thinking by academics, policymakers and donor
agencies is to foster diaspora engagement to stimulate development in
origin countries. In line with this global thinking about diaspora engage-
ment, this book addresses the engagement of South Asian diasporas
and their implications on development in South Asia. While countries
1
2 Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia
in the region face different development challenges and have different

diaspora policies, questions of what roles their diaspora can play in the
development of their origin countries and how to leverage diaspora
engagement in development are now matters of concern. This book
deals with these concerns by exploring various forms of diaspora
engagement and its implications on development in South Asia.
The chapters in this book were presented at the two-day workshop
entitled ‘Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia’, held at
the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, in
September 2012. The participants examined how South Asian diaspora
communities involve in various forms of diaspora engagements with
their origin countries and how such engagements have created an
impact on development in South Asia. The papers together provide a
special lens on the implications of diaspora engagement on develop-
ment in South Asia. Our intention is to provide a truly South Asian
perspective on the diversity, richness and issues associated with diaspora
engagement – what is clearly a growing phenomenon in our global-
ized world. The geographic focus of this book is South Asia and the
book includes previously unpublished papers that cover major South
Asian countries, particularly India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Afghanistan and Nepal. A broad geographical spread and an attempt to
cover salient forms of diaspora engagement that South Asian countries
experience today provide much of the rationale for this book.
The term ‘diaspora’ usually refers to community or group of peo-
ple living outside the country of origin. However, what constitutes the
diaspora has been a subject of considerable debate. The term ‘diaspora’,
its uses and meanings have been discussed and illustrated by various
scholars in the global context (Clifford, 1994; Cohen, 1997; Butler,
2001; Dufoix, 2008; Esman, 2009) as well as in the South Asian context
(Raghuram and Sahoo, 2008; Koshy, 2008; Ghosh, 2007; Parekh et al.,
2003; Vijay, 2007; Bolognani and Lyon, 2011). Unfortunately, the term
still does not enjoy complete consensus in definition. Since the concept
has been comprehensively illuminated in existing literature, it may be
repetitive to revisit the debates here. However, for a broader understand-
ing of the term, we highlight a few essential features of a diaspora group
as identified in existing literature.
Alan Gamlen identifies three essential attributes of diasporas: disper-
sion to two or more locations, ongoing orientation towards a ‘home-
land’ and group boundary maintenance over time (Gamlen, 2011: 267).
While these essential features inform us of the group characteristics,
they do not capture the uses and meanings of the concept of diaspora,
Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman 3
which have undergone dramatic changes over time. Reviewing existing

definitions on uses and meanings of diaspora, Thomas Faist sums up
three characteristics of the term, each of these subdivided further ref-
erencing the older and newer usages of each term (Faist, 2010: 12–13).
The first feature refers to the causes of dispersal or migration, and he
reports that older notions denote forced (involuntary) dispersal while
newer notions simply suggest any kind of dispersal (voluntary as well as
involuntary). The second feature relates to cross-border experiences of
homeland with host country; older notions of this feature imply a return
to the homeland while newer notions replace return with dense and
continuous linkages. The third feature concerns the incorporation or
integration into host countries; older references to this feature indicate
that diasporas maintain boundaries vis-à-vis the majority group while
newer notions emphasize cultural hybridity.
Clearly, the older and newer uses of diaspora have demonstrated
how the term has evolved over time and yet remained a powerful ana-
lytical tool for studying people who live outside the home country.
We approach diaspora as an umbrella term and broadly include tem-
porary migrants as well as settled migrants who are still first-generation
emigrants settled in another country and descendants of such emigrants
who identify themselves as members of South Asian diaspora commu-
nities. Currently, there is no reliable estimate for the total number of
South Asian diaspora. This is probably due to the lack of interest of
the governments in South Asian countries as well as the nature and
scope of emigration from South Asia, which makes it administratively
challenging to monitor the actual outflow of emigrants. It is roughly
estimated that there might be around 25–30 million Indian diaspora,
7–9 million Bangladeshi diaspora, 5–7 million Pakistani diaspora, 2–3
million Sri Lankan diaspora, 4–5 million Afghan diaspora and around
2 million Nepali diaspora living around the world.1 In total, the global
South Asian diaspora thus might be over 50 million strong and contin-
ues to grow. The presence of this huge South Asian diaspora population
makes a compelling case for documenting the complex array of ways
that they engage with their countries of origin today.
South Asian diaspora engagement and development
As mentioned above, one essential feature of diaspora groups is the

ongoing orientation towards a ‘homeland’, which refers, as older
notions of diaspora indicated, to a desire to return to an (imag-
ined) homeland (Safran, 1991). However, old or new diasporas do not
normally want to return to their homeland or countries of origin per-

manently. Thomas Faist argues that newer uses often ‘replace return
with dense and continuous linkages across borders’ (Faist, 2010: 12).
This dense and continuous linkage with original countries is referred to
as diaspora engagement. The term ‘diaspora engagement’ has recently
gained currency in academic and public policy debates. However,
the engagement of diaspora communities with their countries of ori-
gin is not new. But, it is the recent developments in diaspora and
transnationalism studies that have heightened the interest in the links
between diaspora engagement and development (Boubock and Faist,
2010; Faist, Fauser and Kivisto, 2011; Merz, Chen and Geithner, 2007).
The term ‘diaspora engagement’ is widely used in several different
ways (Gamlen, 2011: 267–268). First, it refers to trans-local activities
of migrants and their associations (such as Home Town Associations),
regarding which Alan Gamlen argues that it is something that diasporas
do for the economic, social and political fields of their home coun-
try. Second, it refers to the context of top-down attempts by national
and international organizations to encourage this kind of engagement.
In this case, Gamlen argues it is done in the process of aided devel-
opment. In the third and final sense, it refers to the policies of migrant-
sending states towards their diasporas. Thus, we can identify three levels
of vertical engagement (local, national and international) that inter-
act with each other to promote development through the engagement
process.
The motivation for diaspora engagement is usually shaped by several
factors that include reasons for dispersal or migration, nature of migra-
tion (temporary or permanent migration), status of immigrants (regular
or irregular) and human capital composition of diasporas (skilled or
unskilled). Since we refer to South Asian diaspora populations and
their engagement with their origin countries, it is imperative to shed
light on the motivations for engagement of South Asian diasporas.
These motivations are usually the outcomes of family and commu-
nity needs and are often rooted in the geographic identification with
a region, religion or language. Therefore, the experiences of South
Asian diaspora engagement demonstrate enormous diversity and hold
substantial development potential for South Asia.
The literature on global South Asian diaspora is relatively diverse and
healthy (Angelo, 1997; Brown, 2006; Rai and Reeves, 2009; Jacobsen,
2008; Kalra, 2009; Clarke et al., 1990; Coward et al., 2000; Van Der Veer,
1995; Hinnels, 2007; Werbner, 2002; Jain, 2007; Petievich, 1999; Jain,
2011; Raghuram et al., 2008). However, most studies tend to address the
settlement and transnational aspects of South Asian diaspora. There is

little systematic work on forms of diaspora engagement and its develop-
ment potential in South Asia as a whole. However, this does not mean
that there has been no attempt to go beyond conventional diaspora
studies. We make a point that despite diverse and long engagement,
there exist relatively few studies that delve into the patterns of contem-
porary diaspora-mediated development implications in South Asia (for
instance, Kapur, 2010; Osella and Gardner, 2003; Geithner, Johnson and
Chen, 2004; Oda, 2004), and these studies provide a backdrop to this
book. This book attempts to close the gap in existing literature by shed-
ding light on various forms of contemporary diaspora engagement and
its role in stimulating development in South Asia.
Diaspora engagement has tremendous development implications for
the countries in South Asia individually and for the regional integration
in Asia (Burki, 2011a; Pandey et al. 2006). For instance, eminent South
Asian economist Shahid Javed Burki notes that only the US-based South
Asian diaspora has the capacity to invest as much as US$130 billion
annually in projects designed for the economic integration in South
Asia (Burki, 2011b). South Asian diaspora members usually maintain
strong social, economic and cultural connections with their countries
of origin while others vie for political rights such as dual citizenship
and the right to vote. They also engage in various causes and institu-
tions that directly benefit their home countries and the people. Diaspora
engagement therefore involves a myriad of dedicated activities directed
towards the origin country where the two entities – the ‘diaspora’ and
the ‘origin country’ – should be understood in a much more complex
and dynamic way (Newland, 2010b; Johnson, 2007; Kapur, 2010; Merz,
Chen and Geithner, 2007; Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Terrazas, 2010;
Sidel, 2007; Ketkar and Ratha, 2010; Terrazas, 2010b).
This book highlights diaspora engagement as a process and views
engagement-induced changes at the levels of the household, commu-
nity and region in terms of development process. This is closely in
line with Amartya Sen’s ‘human capability approach’ to development
that views development as a process of increasing the freedom of
the people, in short ‘development as freedom’ (Sen, 1999). Amartya
Sen views ‘development’ as an effort to promote human capability
through expanding the range of things that all people can choose
to be or do with their lives (Sen, 1999). This approach to develop-
ment seeks to remove development obstacles such as illiteracy, lack of
health care, lack of access to basic resources or lack of civil and polit-
ical freedom by expanding opportunity (Merz, 2007). The capability
approach thus covers the full terrain of human well-being (Merz,

Chen and Geithner, 2007). Barbara Merz argues that Sen by design
left the capability approach to human development ‘incomplete’ to
ensure ongoing relevance to a variety of social settings (Merz, 2007;
186). We approach development in a broad sense to include economic
growth, poverty reduction, social advancement, human empowerment
and socio-economic equity. Given this broader development context, it
seems reasonable to assume that any individual and collective initiatives
within the global South Asian diasporic communities have the potential
to contribute to one or more of these fields in South Asia.
In the recent years, two important initiatives to promote and stim-
ulate interest in and research on the development merits of diaspora
engagement have evolved that need mention here. First, the Global
Equity Initiative of Harvard University, which focuses on global philan-
thropy, has become increasingly interested in the dynamics of diaspora
communities in contributing to equitable development of their coun-
tries of origin. The Global Equity Initiative has published two important
volumes. The first volume, edited by Peter F. Geithner, Paula D. Johnson
and Lincoln C. Chen and entitled Diaspora Philanthropy and Equitable
Development in China and India, addresses the changing dynamics in the
relations between the diasporas and their countries of origin, the philan-
thropic contributions of the Chinese and Indian American communities
and the potential to increase the quantity and impact of their contribu-
tions for the development of China and India (Geithner, Johnson and
Chen, 2004). The second volume, edited by Barbara J. Merz, Lincoln
C. Chen and Peter F. Geithner and entitled Diaspora and Development,
deals with a major question about diaspora flows – whether global equity
is an inevitable consequence of diaspora transfers or these flows might
actually aggravate inequality (Merz, Chen and Geithner, 2007).
A second major initiative is the one that has been undertaken by the
Migration Policy Institute (MPI), in partnership with the US Agency
for International Development (USAID). The Migration Policy Insti-
tute published several research papers on various forms of diaspora
engagement. ‘Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Pol-
icy’, edited by Kathleen Newland of the MPI, explores channels of
diaspora engagement, philanthropy, volunteerism, heritage tourism and
nostalgia trade, entrepreneurship, investment in capital markets, and
advocacy (Newland, 2010a). The recently published Developing a Road
Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development, by Develyn Rannveig Agunias
and Kathleen Newland, is a handbook for policymakers and practi-
tioners at home and host countries (Agunias and Newland, 2012).
This roadmap may not be wholly applicable for the global diaspora
community; nonetheless, the fundamentals are in place and could be
tailored according to the context. The MPI, in partnership with other
international organizations, such as the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), regularly produces reports and policy briefs on var-
ious forms of diaspora engagement. Another highlight in the effort
to understand the diaspora engagement is the formation of ‘Interna-
tional Diaspora Engagement Alliance’ (IdEA) at the first ever Global
Diaspora Forum, Washington, DC, in May 2011. The IdEA is incubated
and managed by the MPI, Washington, DC, with institutional support
of the US Department of State. The goal of the IdEA is to support the
development of diaspora-centred partnerships that promote trade and
investment, volunteerism, philanthropy, diplomacy, entrepreneurship
and innovation in countries of origin and tap the diplomatic and
developmental potential of the US diasporas.
The IdEA promotes five core modes of diaspora engagement around
the world: volunteerism, entrepreneurship, philanthropy, social inno-
vation and diplomacy. Diaspora entrepreneurship supports diaspora
entrepreneurs in investing and building enterprises, as well as stim-
ulating trade in countries of origin. The focus of voluntarism is to
encourage the creation of platforms that facilitate diaspora volunteerism
in countries of origin. The philanthropy mode is aimed at cultivat-
ing diaspora contribution in areas of education, health, nutrition and
disaster relief in countries of origin, while social innovation fosters inno-
vative communication and information technologies such as mobile
banking and diaspora social networks to enhance and deepen engage-
ment. Finally, the diplomacy approach is aimed at strengthening the
natural role of diasporas in diplomacy, advocacy and peace-building
via non-traditional media, including culture, arts and sports (Newland,
2010a; Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010; Newland and Tanaka,
2010). Clearly, any form of these engagements by the diaspora has the
potential to advance growth and development in the origin country.
Structure of the book
The forms of engagement mentioned above are neither equally present

among all diaspora groups nor similarly effective for development in all
origin countries. Each diaspora community engages with their home
countries in many ways and each is shaped by history, time and
contexts. Similar to many other regions, South Asian diaspora commu-
nities are far from monolithic and reflect the diversity of their origin
countries – even within sub-national groups, such as states and regions

within national groups. Therefore, it is not surprising that diaspora
engagement with South Asian countries is characterized by diversity
in form and substance. Given the variations in diaspora engagement
and its development potential, this book addresses some selected forms
of diaspora engagement that are widely prevalent among South Asian
diaspora groups which have the potential to contribute significantly
to development in South Asia. The forms of engagement included in
this book are diaspora advocacy and activism, diaspora volunteerism,
diaspora entrepreneurship, diaspora philanthropy and virtual diaspora.
Most of the scholarship on South Asian diaspora is usually organized by
destination, by mode of migration, by historical period or by national
origin (Koshy, 2008: 2). In contrast to previous studies, this book is orga-
nized in line with the forms of diaspora engagements. However, the
division of chapters into the various forms of diaspora engagement is
not wholly clear cut; it often overlaps with one another.
Globally, many diaspora organizations and individuals advocate var-
ious causes, ranging from fixing the social, economic and political
problems in origin country to lobbying for origin country in the coun-
try of settlement. The diversity in South Asian diaspora populations has
facilitated the development of various diaspora advocacy groups. For
instance, the global Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora communities are work-
ing together to contribute to the reconstruction and peace-building in
Sri Lanka. Afghan diaspora in Europe is working towards peace and sta-
bility in Afghanistan. Pakistani and Bangladeshi diasporas are working
for democracy and rule of law in Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively.
Indian diasporas are involved in many local issues in India and inter-
national issues overseas. Indian diaspora in Australia, the United States
and the United Kingdom often lobby for India in international relations
issues (Viswanath and Dadrawala, 2004; Sidel, 2004).
In addition to serving as agencies for people-to-people networking
and taking on economic and social welfare roles, diaspora organizations
and individuals have also assumed responsibilities as advocates for eco-
nomic, social and political change in their respective countries of origin
in South Asia. In our book, we have three chapters that explore the role
of Indian diaspora, Pakistani diaspora and Afghan diaspora advocacy in
development. The first chapter, ‘From Germany to India: The Role of
NRI and PIO in Economic and Social Development Assistance’, by Pierre
Gottschlich sheds light on all the different forms of diaspora engage-
ment from Germany to India with emphasis on economic and social
development assistance. The roles of Non-resident Indians (NRIs) and
People of Indian Origin (PIO) are examined in this chapter, which looks
at different forms of ‘grassroots-oriented’ diaspora engagement from
Germany to India through economic and social development assistance
through remittances, foreign direct investments, business facilitation,
entrepreneurship, charity work and philanthropy, as well as political
support and lobbying efforts. His two case studies – the Indo-German
Chamber of Commerce and the German-Indian Round Table – amply
demonstrate how these institutions, by promoting trade and assistance,
have contributed to the economic and social development of India in a
significant manner.
S. Akbar Zaidi’s chapter on ‘Influencing from Afar: Role of Pakistani
Diaspora in Public Policy and Development in Pakistan’ investigates
how Pakistani professionals living outside the country influence public
policy and contribute to aspects of development in Pakistan. Although
Pakistan has experienced a brain drain, with many of its bright
young men and women living and working overseas, this professional
diaspora, many of whom occupy influential positions in international
financial institutions and think tanks in the West, members of the
diaspora – technocrats, economists, entrepreneurs and capitalists, have
been inducted intermittently by successive governments to serve in cab-
inets or run public institutions. Others who do not return to take up
official positions in the manner of the ‘old school’ form of engage-
ment have, nonetheless, continued to engage, influence, determine and
explain policies in Pakistan through various capacities in research insti-
tutions, universities, social science forums, the media and international
think tanks. As the author explains, the ‘intellectual capital created
by the Pakistani diaspora into [sic] such development agencies and
think tanks has been critical in framing donor and government pol-
icy towards Pakistan’. In a similar manner, Carolin Fischer’s chapter
on ‘Afghan Diasporas in Britain and Germany: Dynamics, Engagements
and Agency’ offers a comparative analysis of how Afghans based in
Germany and Britain organize and engage in concerted and coordi-
nated action for Afghanistan-oriented social and political change. The
author shows that ethnic and linguistic divisions, as well as inter-
generational relationships, determine the internal dynamics within the
broadly constituted Afghan diaspora.
Like diaspora advocate groups, diaspora entrepreneurs are also well
placed to identify opportunities in their countries of origin and
invest in potential fields to exploit such opportunities. Diaspora
entrepreneurship fosters business development, job creation and inno-
vation in the countries of origin. Studies suggest that diaspora members
are often more willing than non-diaspora investors to risk starting

or engaging in business activities with home countries because of
diasporas’ ties to their countries of origin and knowledge of the polit-
ical, economic and cultural environment of their origin countries
(Newland and Tanaka, 2010). The fourth chapter, ‘The Global Circu-
lation of Skill and Capital – Pathways of Return Migration of Indian
Entrepreneurs from the United States to India’, by Manashi Ray shows
the diverse and complex processes by which highly skilled returnee
entrepreneurs leverage their cultural, human and social capital to facil-
itate their return to India from the United States and advance their
global entrepreneurship and home country development. She further
demonstrates how returnee entrepreneurs navigate multiple institu-
tional, social and economic environments to ease their re-migration
by deftly utilizing global and diaspora networks available to them.
These global networks and social capital are defined by the institutions
of higher education these entrepreneurs attended in India and in the
United States, socio-economic class, work experiences, ethnicity and
family connections. By analysing these processes, the author provides
deeper explanations – micro dynamics – that explain the reverse flow of
migrant Indian entrepreneurs back to the home country.
While some diasporas are motivated by the spirit of advocacy and
entrepreneurship, there are other diasporas who are inspired by the
spirit of volunteerism and philanthropy. Many diasporas devote time
to community development projects and provide professional advice
and training to home institutions voluntarily. Diaspora volunteering has
been one of the main forms of diaspora engagement globally. In South
Asia, many professional diasporas provide medical care to underprivi-
leged sections of the society, teach at universities, train people in special-
ized, life-saving skills and provide advice to local professional colleagues
and enterprising people for career advancement. They also volunteer for
raising funds for relief and community development projects in their
countries of origin; relief funds accumulated for the recent floods in
Pakistan and Bangladesh are the best examples of such funds. Diaspora
volunteering often acts as an entry point to long-term engagement.
For instance, Terrazas demonstrates that some programmes that pro-
mote volunteering in the country of origin in fact increase volunteer’s
long-term engagement with their origin country via diplomacy, advo-
cacy, investment, entrepreneurship or even permanent return (Terrazas,
2010a).
The fifth chapter, ‘Bangladeshi Diaspora: Cultural Practices and
Development Linkages’, by A.K.M. Ahsan Ullah argues that diaspora
maintains a different kind of development link from that of the con-

ventional economic and temporary migrants with their origin country.
Ullah explores how culture, as time rolls down, remains among the dias-
poras and their next generations and plays a role in engagement with
the origin country. Unlike countries such as China and India, Ullah finds
that the conventional development linkage of investing at the origin
does not hold true for Bangladesh. Bangladeshi diasporas tend to lose
roots over time and orient towards their host country more than their
origin country. In the sixth chapter, ‘From Brain Drain to Brain Gain:
Leveraging the Academic Diaspora for Development in Bangladesh’ Taia-
bur Rahman explains the various forms and activities by which highly
skilled and educated overseas Bangladeshis contribute towards promot-
ing socio-economic development in the country. While a large working-
class diaspora provides a huge inflow of remittances to the Bangladeshi
economy each year, a fairly sizeable ‘academic diaspora’ plays the role of
‘reputation enhancer’ abroad and ‘extended civil society’ domestically
and supports critical knowledge capital development in the country.
However, the efforts of this group are not supported by official policies,
which remain focused on remittance-based engagement.
In a similar but more institutionalized manner, Antony Palackal’s
chapter, ‘Diaspora Engagement in Education in Kerala, India’, high-
lights the role of a diaspora organization located in the United States
in the development of Kerala, India. Antony Palackal offers an example
in the study of a diaspora organization’s contribution – the non-profit
International Institute of Scientific and Academic Collaboration (IISAC)
located in the United States and staffed by American academicians of
Indian origin – in the development of Kerala through education and
academia. A widely dispersed Kerala diaspora has emerged as a major
determinant in the development of the home state. Likewise, Prakash
Khanal, in his chapter on ‘Diaspora Volunteering and Development
in Nepal’, reports how the ‘Nepali Diaspora Volunteering Programme’,
with the help of the ‘Himalayan Development International UK’, con-
tributes to the socio-economic upliftment of the unprivileged sections
of the society in Nepal. Professional Nepali diasporas regularly visit
Nepal to conduct various training programmes on health-, science- and
technology-related themes and serve as a contact point for institutional
engagement between the United Kingdom and Nepal.
Another important form of diaspora engagement in South Asia is
diaspora philanthropy. Diaspora philanthropy plays an increasingly
important role in development efforts in South Asia. This is not only
because they are widely practised by South Asian diasporas but also
because they have the potential to make deeper impacts on the emerg-
ing affluence and well-being of South Asia. Philanthropy is part of the
cultural fabric of South Asian countries and is driven by complex indi-
vidual and social dynamics (Najam, 2007). Philanthropy does not mean
only general ‘giving’ to individuals but also more strategic involve-
ment/giving that has far-reaching implications for the society as a whole
(Johnson, 2007; Sidel, 2007). For instance, humanitarian and social
efforts by non-official agencies such as religious institutions often under-
take extensive philanthropic initiatives aimed at social and economic
development in their home countries and beyond. These activities are
not localized but involve transnational networks and cross-borders and
also multiple communities.
In their chapter on ‘Diasporic Shrines: Transnational Networks Link-
ing South Asia Through Pilgrimage and Welfare Development’, Virinder
Karla, Umber Ibad and Navtej Purewal show how major Sufi shrines
in Pakistan and India have been able to serve as nodal points of
transnational networks that not only facilitate religious pilgrimages
but also enable people-to-people contact across South Asian bound-
aries, unfettered by national rivalries and political constraints. Through
resources generated by donations from worshippers, these institutions
are able to conduct welfare work by providing medical and other forms
of assistance for the sick and needy in their locality. More signifi-
cantly, these shrines serve to connect an extensive Punjabi diaspora
on either side of the Indo-Pakistan border, and the larger diaspora that
the authors have called the ‘metropolitan Punjabi diaspora’. By tapping
into diasporic social networks, these shrines enable effective people-to-
people contacts in a region where religion united in history but divided
by political antagonism.
In a similar but less political vein, Jeffrey Samuel’s study on ‘Intersect-
ing Diasporas: Sri Lankan Buddhist Temples in Malaysia and Develop-
ment across the Indian Ocean’ highlights the roles of Buddhist temple
networks in the social and economic development in Sri Lanka, largely
through social welfare projects. His chapter highlights how increasing
numbers of ‘intersecting diasporas’ established through temple net-
works, as well as new local patrons drawn to these temples, have
generated resources to support social service projects not only in Sri
Lanka but through Buddhist temples across the Indian Ocean region.
His examples illustrate the manner in which multi-community religious
institutions run by Sri Lankan diaspora in Malaysia and elsewhere have
come together to stimulate development in their home country through
welfare projects such as medical clinics, scholarship funds, orphanages
and schools, and disaster relief.
Diasporas are often able to engage with the origin country because
of their government’s policy to woo them for the welfare of the origin
country. Diaspora engagement policy is a deliberate effort by the govern-
ments of origin countries to attract and promote diasporas’ sustained
engagement at home country. Generally speaking, South Asian coun-
tries have pursued at least a three-pronged strategy to reap the benefits
of diaspora engagement. Firstly, they organize workshops, seminars and
conferences on diaspora issues to raise awareness among academics and
policymakers about the importance of diaspora engagement, often with
the collaboration of national and international organizations; secondly,
they have opened up welfare desks for different groups of diaspora at
the overseas missions to serve the interests of the diaspora members
and court them; thirdly, they are promoting the institutionalization
of diaspora groups for collective engagement, giving birth to thou-
sands of diaspora organizations of South Asian origin. In Chapter 11,
Smita Tiwari’s comparative study on the engagement policies of India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh, three South Asian countries with extensive
diasporas, shows the approaches adopted by the respective governments
of these countries to harness the networks and resource potential of
their overseas communities whose connections with the home coun-
try have hitherto been limited to cultural and familial ties. Diaspora
engagements have gone beyond heritage issues and are seen as part of
strategic assets that could contribute to national development.
While diaspora networks remain essentially transnational in nature,
the nature of these groups and their dynamics has begun to morph with
technology. Physical dispersion and relocation might no longer be criti-
cal features of a diaspora–homeland relationship. In Chapter 12, ‘Pock-
ets of the West: The Engagement of the Virtual Diaspora in India’, Kiran
Mirchandani argues that workers employed in IT/ITES transnational
corporations as call-centre workers in South Asia are part of a ‘virtual
diaspora’. These workers are involved in a form of virtual migration
because of their engagement in sites that they refer to as ‘pockets of the
west’ even as they remain physically located in their home countries.
Mirchandani shows that these virtual diaspora communities engage
with and influence economic and social norms in South Asia in at least
two ways. First, transnational IT/ITES workers rely heavily on domestic
workers to manage their household and childcare responsibilities, result-
ing in the greater professionalization of domestic services. Second, the
virtual diaspora, which comprises more women than men, engages with
communities within India to challenge traditional social norms, spa-
tial conceptions of home and work, and patriarchal assumptions about
professionalism and respectability of work, especially for women.
New research agendas
The chapters in this book constitute an initial effort to bring together

studies on the major forms of contemporary diaspora engagement and
its implications on development in South Asia. While selective and
incomplete, these studies show that diaspora engagement has the poten-
tial to stimulate development in South Asia. Although the chapters in
this book largely examine the positive influences of diaspora engage-
ment, these processes are not without their negative influences. Some
studies have shown that diasporas tend to be more extreme than their
compatriots in home countries. The roles of diaspora groups in insti-
gating and sustaining separatist movements, religious militancy and
criminal organizations have been covered in the growing literature on
global diaspora. Such ideologically extreme expatriates can have a neg-
ative impact on democracy, secularism and peace-building initiatives in
South Asia. This is an area for further research.
While the collection in this book documents major forms of diaspora
engagement in South Asia, there is a need to closely examine every form
of diaspora engagement in each country in South Asia. For instance,
diaspora philanthropy, diaspora advocacy, diaspora volunteerism and
diaspora entrepreneurship are widely prevalent among global South
Asian diaspora communities and each of them can be a topic of research
of its own right in South Asia. Indeed, it should be interesting to exam-
ine the implications of each form of engagement in countries in South
Asia and such research is expected to produce a wealth of information
for academic investigation and policy formulation. Global Equity Ini-
tiative of Harvard University sets an example in this regard. The team
of the Global Equity Initiative addresses diaspora philanthropy in India
and China and its role in equitable development in these two coun-
tries. Similar initiative may be undertaken for other major forms of
diaspora engagement, such as diaspora advocacy, diaspora volunteering
and diaspora entrepreneurship in countries in South Asia.
This book seeks to go beyond the income-based approaches to devel-
opment by taking up a social development approach to study the
implications of diaspora. Social development relates to broader processes
that encompass the increase in incomes, accumulation of non-material
assets such as physical health, education and skills, and institutional
change that facilitate the transfer of these assets for welfare and
development purposes. Several chapters in this book highlight these
aspects and demonstrate that the channels for such transfers can be
religious institutions, universities and academic institutions, returnee
entrepreneurs or contributions from NRIs and PIO in general. However,

more research is needed to identify the effects of engagement on var-
ious dimensions of development in South Asia. For example, diaspora
philanthropy in the form of generous giving to orphanages or health-
care institutions is expected to have different implications from diaspora
volunteering in the form of sharing gained experiences in the West
with professional groups in home countries. The fields/dimensions of
development outcome vary with the forms of engagement and some
forms of engagement have more far-reaching implications and are more
needed for origin countries in South Asia than others. Further research
should identify the much-needed field of engagement and document
the broader development outcomes of engagement at the national and
regional levels in South Asia.
In addition to academic investigation of diaspora engagement, there
is also a need to closely study the phenomenon from public policy
perspectives. At the national level, some countries in South Asia are
recently showing considerable interest in diaspora engagement and
increasingly adopting diaspora engagement policies to attract resources
of their diasporas to stimulate development. However, these diaspora
engagement policies are often inadequate and do not fully recognize
the extent and contour of contemporary diaspora engagement. Exist-
ing policies in South Asia are mostly state-centric and serve the national
interests of the individual countries. As a result, such policies tend to
undermine the interests and priorities of diaspora communities them-
selves. More research is needed to understand the diasporas’ concerns
for origin countries and their priority areas of engagement and, for a
sustained and effective engagement in origin country, such concerns
and priorities should inform diaspora engagement policy in South Asia.
Finally, the chapters in the book demonstrate that diaspora engage-
ment can be an exciting field of academic study as well as a vibrant
field of policy study. Its multi-disciplinary dimensions and transnational
foci enlarge its scope and applicability across several domains. Our
hope is that this book will contribute to the growing field of diaspora
engagement in the academy and in the policy study.
Note
1. Estimated from various sources, Burki, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Khadria, 2000,
2010; Shah, 2010; Brown, 2006; Rai and Reeves, 2009; Jain, 2007; Kadekar,
Sahoo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Koshy, Susan and R Radhakrishnan (2008);
Rahman and Ullah, 2012; websites: Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare
and Overseas Employment, http://www.probashi.gov.bd/, accessed on the
14th February 2013; Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, www.moia.gov.

in, accessed on the 14th February 2013; Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis,
www.moops.gov.pk, accessed on the 14th February 2013; Ministry of For-
eign Employment Promotion and Welfare, www.foreignemployment.gov.lk,
accessed on the 14th February 2013; Ministry of Labour and Employment,
Department of Foreign Employment, Nepal; website: http://www.dofe.gov.np/
en/ accessed on the 15th February 2013.
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1
From Germany to India: The Role
of NRIs and PIOs in Economic
and Social Development Assistance
Pierre Gottschlich
Introduction
The Non-Resident Indian (NRI) and People of Indian Origin (PIO)

population in Germany is one of the less prominent Indian diaspora
communities. Despite its comparatively small size of only about
65,000–75,000 persons, this group plays a significant role in economic
and social development assistance from Germany to India. It does so
in many different ways. One of the most direct forms of economic sup-
port is the transfer of workers’ remittances. In 2010 alone, more than
USD 500 million have been sent from Germany to India as remittances,
which is particularly impressive given the relatively small size of the
Indian population in the country. Another important way of economic
engagement involves all sorts of foreign direct investments (FDI) and
Indo-German business entrepreneurship in India. Here, the NRI and
PIO population has helped in setting up some of the most central
supporting organizations, particularly the Indo-German Chamber of
Commerce (IGCC) which has been and continues to be of prime impor-
tance for the development of good business relations between India and
Germany. A less formal, recently established business network is the
German-Indian Round Table (GIRT). Another means of development
assistance can be found in a plethora of German charity organizations
that deal with economic and social challenges in India, mainly with
regard to poverty alleviation. Many of these groups have been ini-
tiated by NRIs and PIOs who are also very active in the day-to-day
work of these organizations both in Germany and in India. A case in
point is the association ‘Indienhilfe’ (‘Help for India’). Additionally,
grassroots translocal activities outside the network of charity groups,
20
Pierre Gottschlich 21
private donations and other forms of philanthropy do also play a major

role. A third, more indirect way of diaspora engagement for India
concerns activities in the realm of politics. Although a rather small
population group, the Indo-German community has three Members
of Parliament at a national level. These three and virtually all other
PIO politicians in Germany are particularly devoted to good relations
between the two countries. In doing so, they are not only committed to
economic affairs but also foster cooperation programmes in the health,
energy and education sector. Furthermore, lobby work can help secure
official development assistance programmes and financial aid for India
by the German government.
This chapter is designed as an empirical case study. It attempts to shed
light on all the different forms of diaspora engagement from Germany to
India mentioned above. It will start with a brief overall assessment of the
NRI and PIO population in Germany, including its recent history and
general profile. It will then proceed to analyze the many diverse ways
of financial, economic, social, charitable and political contributions this
specific diaspora group can offer for India.
Overview: The Indian diaspora in Germany
Although the history of Indian settlement in Germany dates back more

than one hundred years, the modern Indian diaspora in Germany only
came into being after the Second World War (Goel, 2007; Gottschlich,
2012a). In the 1950s, several thousand students from India came to
Western Germany, that is, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),
which was a result of the good diplomatic relations between the
two countries. Most of these students were technicians and engineers
who came from Indian universities or from Indian companies like,
for instance, the steel mill in Rourkela, Orissa. They were granted
scholarships for further education, and while many of them returned
to India after their studies, some stayed and formed the nucleus of an
Indian diaspora in Germany (Gosalia, 2002: 238). Most of the Indians
who stayed were able to establish themselves in the German middle
class. Due to their excellent education they usually worked in good jobs
and were integrated very well (Goel, 2007: 358–359). In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, close to 6,000 Indian nurses came to Germany in order
to find work at hospitals. Interestingly, these ‘angels from India’ were
mostly Catholic nurses from Kerala who were recruited through the
global network of the Catholic Church (Goel, 2002: 61–63). This led
to a huge disproportional share of Christian Indians in the diaspora in
22 From Germany to India
Germany, at least if compared to religion statistics in India (Schnepel,

2004: 117–118). Some of these nurses married Germans. Their chil-
dren are an important part of the German-Indian population (Gosalia,
2002: 238). In all, the Indian community in Germany formed itself
during that era as a community of professionals (e.g. nurses, doctors
and engineers), academics (e.g. students, scholars and scientists), and
businessmen and traders (Singhvi et al., 2001: 151–152). They mostly
adapted to life in Germany and integrated themselves into the German
society (Gosalia, 2002: 239). New impetus came in 2000 with the launch
of the Green Card initiative by the German government, which brought
a new wave of highly skilled Indian technicians, computer engineers
and IT specialists to the country. This has so far been the last major
influx of a specific immigrant group from India to Germany. However,
Germany has recently become a more popular destination for Indian
students and continues to attract Indian scholars and academics.
The Indian population in Germany is relatively small. According to
the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, there were 48,280 Indian citi-
zens living in Germany at the end of the year 2010. After a slight decline
between 2003 and 2004, the number of NRIs in Germany, which had
been around 35,000 for most of the 1990s, has been steadily growing
since. The major reason for this growth has been the increasing immi-
gration of Indians to Germany. In 2009, for example, 12,009 Indian citi-
zens came to Germany while only 10,374 left the country, resulting in a
net migration surplus of 1,635 persons. In 2008, the surplus was even
higher at 1,871, with 11,403 coming and just 9,532 leaving (Federal
Office for Migration and Refugees, 2011: 249–251). Since 1991, there
have been only two years (1994, 1998) in which the number of Indians
leaving Germany was slightly higher than that of Indians coming to
the country (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2011: 27–28,
249–251). For the overall picture, however, it is necessary to assess
not only the number of NRIs but also the quantity of PIOs living in
Germany. This is not always easy since there is hardly any specific sta-
tistical data on Indians after they have obtained German citizenship.
According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, more than 8,000
Indians were naturalized and officially became German citizens between
2002 and 2010 alone. The children of PIOs are not a part of any official
census, which makes it very difficult to measure the overall strength of
the Indo-German community exactly. However, there have been some
reliable calculations. In 2001, for instance, the High Level Committee
on the Indian Diaspora estimated the number of PIOs in Germany at
10,000 (Singhvi et al., 2001: 152). Given the further inflow of Indian
immigrants to Germany in the wake of the Green Card initiative and

the ongoing processes of naturalization, it seems to be justified to hold
this measurement as a mere minimum. In 2006, the number of PIO
card holders in Germany was estimated at roughly 17,500. More current
assessments have put the number of all PIOs as high as 25,000. Accord-
ing to data from the World Bank, the total migrant stock from India
in Germany was 67,779 persons in 2010. Unfortunately, however, there
is no definite measurement. Therefore, the overall number of NRIs and
PIOs remains somewhat obscure: The Indian community in Germany
numbers at least 65,000, probably 75,000, possibly even more than that.
The type of Indians migrating to Germany can be described overall as
highly skilled labour. Data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany
show that except for the immigrants under family reunification reg-
ulations, highly skilled professionals comprise the largest group of
NRIs living in Germany on a temporary residence permit, followed by
Indian students. More than a third of all immigrants from India come
into Germany explicitly for working purposes, most of them in the
highly skilled sector. The level of education among Indian immigrants
is relatively high. According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany,
migrants from South and Southeast Asia in general tend to be well edu-
cated, with approximately 40 per cent of them having at least completed
some sort of secondary school and another 25 per cent still in education.
What is more, the educational achievements of second- and third-
generation PIOs in Germany tend to be even higher than those of their
parents and grandparents (Gries, 2000). Not surprisingly, NRIs and PIOs
in Germany are economically well established and for the most part
employed in good positions. The percentage of low or semi-skilled work-
ers is relatively low and the proportion of highly skilled or self-employed
professionals is significantly higher compared to the occupational pro-
file of other immigrant groups from South and Southeast Asia. Indians
in Germany usually work in typical middle-class positions, for example
as clerks, doctors, scientists or businessmen (Gries, 2000). Their average
income is among the highest of all migrant groups, giving much room
to contribute to the development of their home country in financial
terms or in other forms.
Financial contributions: Remittances and NRI deposits
Besides direct expatriate investments, ‘inward remittances and non-

resident deposits form the two main sources through which the over-
seas Indian community has been supplementing India’s resources and
developmental efforts’ (Palit, 2009: 267). Particularly, remittances

‘directly contribute to the growth and development of the recipient
country’ and often times even exceed the amount of overseas develop-
ment assistance (ODA) and FDI a country receives (Kelegama, 2011: 3).
Remittances can be of prime importance to the macroeconomic sta-
bility since they tend to be more sustainable, reliable and predictable
than either ODA or FDI, especially after the economic crisis of 2008
(Agunias and Newland, 2012: 113, 125–126). In India, remittances have
had and continue to have a positive effect on the balance of payments
(BOP) although their relative share in India’s total foreign currency
assets is declining despite a continuing rise in absolute numbers (see
Table 1.1). Furthermore, remittances still are one of the main factors
in limiting India’s current account deficit (CAD) (Palit, 2009: 270–271).
Apart from this macroeconomic significance, remittances of course serve
as an important lifeline for millions of families on an individual level
(Agunias and Newland, 2012: 131).
With their impressive educational record, their unique professional
profile and their high household income, Indians in Germany fulfil
every prerequisite for an important remittance-sending diaspora com-
munity. According to estimates by the World Bank, remittances in the
volume of USD 511,711,400 have been sent from Germany to India
in 2010. With this amount, Germany ranks not even near the coun-
tries with the highest total remittance to India such as the United Arab
Emirates, the United States, the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia (see
Table 1.2). However, because of the comparatively small size of the
Indian population in Germany, the amount of remittance per emigrant
is relatively high at USD 8,144 a year and almost doubles the average
yearly sum of USD 4,841.
Table 1.1 Top remittance-receiving countries (billion USD, est.)
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
India 27.0 45.0 49.0 55.0 64.0 70.0

China 25.7 34.5 48.0 51.0 62.0 66.0
Mexico 25.0 26.2 22.0 22.6 24.0 24.0
Philippines 17.0 18.3 20.0 21.3 23.0 24.0
Source: World Bank data; S. Irudaya Rajan, ‘India,’ in Migration, Remittances and
Development in South Asia, edited by Saman Kelegama (New Delhi: Sage, 2011), p. 41; Dilip
Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra and Ani Silwal, ‘Outlook for Remittance Flows 2010–11,’ Migration
and Development Brief 12, April 23, 2010, p. 2; World Bank, Migration and Remittances
Factbook 2011 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), p. 13; Dilip Ratha and Ani Silwal,
‘Remittance Flows in 2011: An Update,’ Migration and Development Brief 18, April 23,
2012, p. 2.
Table 1.2 Countries with highest total remittance to India (2010)
Country Amount in Number of Remittance per

million (USD) emigrants emigrant (USD)
United Arab Emirates 15,879 2,185,919 7,264

United States 15,279 1,654,272 9,236
United Kingdom 4,629 657,792 7,037
Saudi Arabia 3,339 1,452,927 2,298
Kuwait 2,025 393,210 5,150
Australia 1,906 209,908 9,078
Singapore 1,167 157,114 7,427
Qatar 1,033 250,649 4,120
Oman 1,021 447,824 2,279
... ... ... ...
Germany 552 67,779 8,144
... ... ... ...
total (est.) 55,000 11,360,823 4,841
Source: World Bank data; Shafeeq Rahman, ‘Indians abroad are worth $55 billion,’ Tehelka,
August 8, 2011, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws080811Indians.
asp, accessed October 13, 2011.
Another important part of the financial linkages between migrants

from India and their homeland are NRI banking deposits. These spe-
cific deposits were first introduced in 1970 and have become very
popular, particularly in the last decades, due to higher interest rates,
relatively favourable tax treatment, comparatively easy operational con-
ditions and steadily lowering transaction costs (Palit, 2009: 266, 276;
Tumbe, 2012: 2). As one would expect, the United Kingdom with its
large NRI population is unrivaled in Europe as far as the quantity of
NRI deposits and the financial power is concerned. Germany, however,
while being a distant second to the United Kingdom, outdoes all other
European countries by a substantial margin (see Table 1.3). The UK
accounts for approximately 70 per cent of all NRI deposits within the
European Union, while Germany musters roughly 20 per cent, leaving
only a mere 10 per cent for all other EU countries (Tumbe, 2012: 7).
Hence, ‘it can be reasonably argued that outside of [the] UK, Germany
is the most important source of capital flows, and perhaps remittances,
from EU to India’ (Tumbe, 2012: 8).
In 2010, NRI deposits from Germany had a net worth of USD
1,550 million. Probably due to the economic and financial crisis, this
number was lower than the sums for 2009 (USD 1,868 million) and even
for 2008 (USD 1,633 million). Still, the sheer amount is very impressive.
It is also important to note that the vast majority of NRI deposits from
Table 1.3 NRI deposits by source country in Europe (million USD)
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
United Kingdom 5,134 7,749 6,061 4,924 5,476

Germany 387 1,012 1,633 1,868 1,550
Italy ND ND ND ND (est.) 300–500
France 80 70 165 134 306
Spain ND 135 154 255 ND
Belgium ND ND 49 69 146
Switzerland ND ND 126 151 121
Netherlands 55 74 163 87 97
Greece ND ND ND ND (est.) 50–100
Ireland ND ND ND ND (est.) 50–100
Luxembourg ND ND ND 5 3
Note: Non Resident Ordinary (NRO) deposits excluded. ND = No Data.

Source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data; Tumbe, ‘EU-India Bilateral Remittances,’ p. 8.
Germany are Foreign Currency Non-Resident (FCNR) bank accounts.

While the share between FCNR and Non-Resident External (NRE) Rupees
accounts was almost evenly divided in 2006, the growth of FCNR has
outpaced the development of NRE accounts by far since then (see
Table 1.4). This has substantial macroeconomic implications for India
since these capital inflows have been and continue to be crucial to
India’s foreign currency reserves (Palit, 2009: 266).
In 2010, the share of FCNR money within NRI deposits from Germany
was 88 per cent, the highest in years. While this number is unmatched
within the European Union, it is also true that the majority of
NRI deposits from the European Union are being held in foreign curren-
cies. On average, close to two-thirds (65 per cent) of all NRI deposits are
FCNR accounts. This is a stark contrast to other regions of settlement
for Indian emigrants such as the United States or the United Arab
Table 1.4 NRI deposits from Germany (million USD)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NRI (total) 387 1,012 1,633 1,868 1,550

NRE (share) 190 (49%) 180 (18%) 255 (16%) 366 (20%) 185 (12%)
FCNR (share) 197 (51%) 832 (82%) 1,378 (84%) 1,502 (80%) 1,364 (88%)
Note: Non Resident Ordinary (NRO) deposits excluded. NRE = Non Resident External Rupee
Accounts; FCNR = Foreign Currency Non Resident Accounts.
Source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data; Tumbe, ‘EU-India Bilateral Remittances,’ p. 14.
Emirates, where the share of FCNR deposits is just a little over a fourth
(26 per cent). Chinmay Tumbe offers two possible explanations:
(a) Emigrants in the European Union, as compared to those in the

United States or United Arab Emirates, treat NRI deposits as invest-
ment vehicles and seek to minimize exposure to currency risk during
repatriation rather than withdrawing funds for local use within
India.
(b) A relatively more ‘settled’ Indian population in Europe compared to
other regions such that the need to remit to families in India or use
funds for local use is lower (Tumbe, 2012: 7).
Despite these reservations, remittances through NRI deposits from

Europe in general and Germany in particular do play a major role in the
economic and social development of India. Beside the macroeconomic
significances, NRI deposits offer the opportunity of local withdrawals
or redemptions in India and, therefore, are another important source
of direct money inflow from the diaspora to the country of origin.
In lack of substantial statistical data on the country-wise distribution
of remittances from Europe to India, NRI deposits also play a signif-
icant role in assessing these transnational money flows: ‘Since these
deposits are increasingly used as a medium for channeling remittances
to India through local withdrawals, they serve as important indicators
of migrants’ remittances [and] signify important capital flows from emi-
grants’ (Tumbe, 2012: 7). There are, unfortunately, no reliable statistics
on the regional distribution of the remittances from Germany in India.
Given the comparatively high percentage of Malayalee immigrants, it
seems plausible to conclude that much of the money is destined towards
the state of Kerala. In order to assess the micro-level impact of these
remittances and local withdrawals in India, a case study can be useful.
In his thorough analysis of the impact of remittances in the state of
Kerala, S. Irudaya Rajan has described the ways in which remittances
were used. In general, of course, remittances ‘increase the disposable
income at the household level’ (Rajan, 2011: 53). Virtually all house-
holds that benefit from remittances use them primarily for subsistence
purposes and daily consumption. There are, however, various other, very
specific purposes for which this money is also being used:
• educational purposes, schooling and training

• debt repayment
• bank deposit
• acquisition or construction of houses

• improvement of houses, for example electrification or LPG
connection
• acquisition or improvement of land
• dowry payment (Rajan, 2011: 53–57).
These usage patterns of remittances are of great significance since they

tend to contain much more long-term and sustainable effects than
merely the use for daily consumption. Here, the foundation for eco-
nomic and social development can be laid, particularly with regard to
educational achievements, professional training, debt repayment and
land ownership (Gottschlich, 2012b: 66–68; Rajan, 2007: 76).
FDI, investment facilitation and business assistance
FDI are the third main financial avenue through which a diaspora
may contribute to the economic development of its home country.
In general, the diaspora can take on two roles regarding FDI. Firstly,
diaspora members might be directly investing in their home countries
in their own right. This can be of prime importance if other inter-
national investors show some reluctance to invest due to perceived
risks. Diaspora members ‘typically have a somewhat different risk pro-
file when it comes to investing in their countries of origin’, making
them more likely to take financial risks in order to help the homeland
(Agunias and Newland, 2012: 132). Secondly, a diaspora might func-
tion as a facilitator for investments by third parties, that is by firms in
their country of residence. This can be done through networks, orga-
nizational structures and specific business events. Prime examples in
Germany include the IGCC and the GIRT initiative.
Since the economic liberalization in 1991, Germany has been one of
the main sources of FDI inflows into India (see Table 1.5). Given its
financial power and business potential, however, a 2.5 per cent share
of all FDI inflows from August 1991 to March 2011 seems unimpres-
sive and underwhelming for an economic giant such as Germany. While
the FDI from Germany to India have been relatively stable during the
fiscal years 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 at 629 and 626 million USD,
respectively, there has been a sharp decline in the fiscal year 2010–2011
(see Table 1.6). With only 200 million USD, Germany accounted for a
mere 1.0 per cent of all FDI inflows into India during that time span,
a decrease of 68.1 per cent compared to the fiscal year of 2009–2010.
While there has been a general decline in FDI inflows by an average of
Table 1.5 Foreign direct investment inflows into India (08/1991–03/2011,

million USD)
Country FDI 08/1991–03/2011 Share of total FDI inflows
Mauritius 57,835 39.5%

Singapore 12,239 8.4%
United States 11,899 8.1%
United Kingdom 7,310 5.0%
Netherlands 6,328 4.3%
Japan 6,174 4.2%
Cyprus 4,838 3.3%
Germany 3,671 2.5%
France 2,544 1.7%
United Arab Emirates 1,901 1.3%
Source: Indo-German Chamber of Commerce, ‘FDI into India declines in 2010–2011’ (PDF
file), downloaded from IGCC website, http://indien.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_indien/Bilder/
2012_news_and_info/inv_fdi_into_india.pdf, accessed July 24, 2012a.
Table 1.6 Top ten investing countries (04/2008–03/2011, million USD)
Country 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Change Share of

over total FDI
2009–2010 2010–2011
Mauritius 11,229 10,376 6,987 −32.7% 36.0%

Singapore 3,454 2,379 1,705 −28.3% 8.8%
Japan 405 1,183 1,562 +32.0% 8.0%
Netherlands 883 899 1,213 +34.9% 6.2%
United States 1,802 1,943 1,170 −39.8% 6.0%
Cyprus 1,287 1,627 913 −43.9% 4.7%
United 864 657 755 +14.9% 3.9%
Kingdom
France 467 303 734 +142.2% 3.8%
United Arab 257 629 341 −45.8% 1.8%
Emirates
Germany 629 626 200 −68.1% 1.0%
Others 6,055 5,270 3,847 −27.0% 19.8%
Total 27,331 25,834 19,427 −24.8% 100.0%
Source: Indo-German Chamber of Commerce, ‘FDI into India declines in 2010–2011.’
24.8 per cent, none of the top ten FDI sending countries has witnessed
such a steep fall as Germany. Although there were positive signs of a
recovery in the fiscal year 2011–2012 (Indo-German Chamber of Com-
merce, 2012a), there is much room for improvement and still much
potential for growth, particularly given the recent reluctance of poten-

tial investors in Germany and beyond (Günsche, 2012). Investment
facilitators such as the IGCC can be valuable assets for such a positive
FDI development, and the NRI and PIO population in Germany can be
very helpful in supporting the Indo-German business community.
In 1956, the main business and investment facilitation organiza-
tion between Germany and India was established when the IGCC was
founded. Today, it is the largest bilateral institution of its kind in
Germany with more than 6,500 Indian and German members. Ever
since its founding, the main focus of the IGCC has been the develop-
ment of good business relations between India and Germany. In partic-
ular, the IGCC serves as an important advisory council for German firms
planning to invest in India in providing crucial information and assis-
tance (Matter and Helbig, 2009: 221–222). A less formal contact network
was established in 2001 when the GIRT initiative was launched. Today,
there are 13 local GIRT chapters in Germany, two of which are headed
by members of the Indian community. Through the GIRT network, NRIs
and PIOs in Germany can make a valuable contribution to the bilateral
relations between the two countries and support business opportunities
and entrepreneurship in India. Among other things, GIRT meetings pro-
vide information about the economic and legal prerequisites for FDI in
India. More importantly, they also serve as a forum to make contacts
between potential investors and members of the Indo-German business
community. Assessing the general prospects for business opportunities
between India and Germany, there are many win-win situations for both
countries that can be facilitated through the GIRT network.1
As another important part of general investment assistance efforts,
Indian expatriates in Western countries can function as crucial bridge-
builders, particularly if a company from, for instance, Germany is
trying to establish business connections with companies in India. Here,
NRIs and PIOs who work for companies or business organizations in
Germany may function as ‘pathfinders’ and make the start of joint
ventures between German and Indian businesses much easier: ‘[T]heir
cultural pre-exposure can be a real asset’ (Messner, 2009: 154). Hav-
ing experiences in both cultures and business frameworks, these Indian
expatriates can be valuable sources of knowledge and soft business
factors to their colleagues in Germany and India (Messner, 2009: 158).
Social projects, philanthropic initiatives and charity
Although there are some fairly large philanthropy and charity

organizations in Germany that are solely devoted to South Asia
and/or India, such as the well-known and very popular German group
‘Andheri-Hilfe’ (‘Help for Andheri’), NRIs and PIOs seem to be more
inclined to assist their homeland and particularly their home region in
other, more direct ways. Therefore, much development assistance in the
form of social projects, philanthropic initiatives and charity is chan-
neled through specific NRI and PIO organizations. Probably the most
important of these associations is the Indo-German Society (Deutsch-
Indische Gesellschaft’, DIG), a large umbrella organization that was
founded in 1953 as a central agency for all issues concerning the
Indian population in Germany. Today, the DIG has 33 local branches
all over Germany with more than 3,500 members (Deutsch-Indische
Gesellschaft, 2012a). Through its affiliated local societies, the DIG sup-
ports a plethora of different social projects in India and is one of the
most important bodies for development assistance from Germany to
India (see Table 1.7). Although the projects are mostly initiated by
NRIs, the donations are collected from all segments and strata of soci-
ety in Germany. For instance, the funds for the Vivekananda School in
Jogiwal, Uttarakhand, a project started and coordinated by the Indian
School Society Bonn and the DIG regional section Karlsruhe, come from
NRI/PIO sources and from German donors alike.2
Another important, although regionally focused, umbrella organiza-
tion is the Union of German Malayalee Associations (UGMA) which
does a lot of charity work in Kerala. For instance, the UGMA offers finan-
cial help for needy patients at cancer centres in Kakkanad/Kochi and
Kottayam and also supports heart and kidney operations for the poor
in Kerala (Union of German Malayalee Associations, 2012). There are
also many organizations that were set up through private initiatives and
that concentrate on very specific purposes in a local context in India.
A formidable case in point is the association ‘Indienhilfe’ (‘Help for
India’) which was founded in Germany by Rajulu Kata, a Catholic priest
from India, precisely because he wanted to assure that the donations
collected and the development assistance given would be helping his
home region in India directly.3 Reverend Kata came to Germany in 1993
from the Hyderabad region in Andhra Pradesh. While he was assigned
to Germany by his church because of a shortage of Catholic priests in
the country, he also saw an opportunity to earn money in order to
help his family and also people beyond that in India. Not being able to
find suitable assistance avenues in existing organizations, Reverend Kata
founded the association ‘Indienhilfe’ in 2003. It is interesting to note
that the motives for this initiative go well beyond religious and spiritual
beliefs. Besides the obvious family connection, there are other strong
bonds that link Rajulu Kata to his homeland and make him and other
32
Table 1.7 Selected social projects in India supported by the Indo-German

Society (DIG, 2011)
Project, location Main focus DIG branch,

partners
Johar Hospital – Asha Health Aachen,

Vihar Brunswick-Wolfsburg,
Bokaro District, Johar-Society
Jharkhand Germany
Foundation for Rural development, Aachen, Bochum,
Economic Rehabilitation education, professional Hanover, Luebeck,
of Rural Youth (FERRY) training Wuppertal
Kolkata, West Bengal
Gandhigram Rural development, Aachen
Madurai region, professional training
Tamil Nadu
Hospital Kondolia Health Aachen
Kondolia, West Bengal
Pasam Trust Health Aachen
Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu
Sani Zanskar Health, education Aachen
Zanskar valley, Jammu &
Kashmir
Society of Daughters of Health, education, Aachen
Mary Immaculate professional training
Chennai, Tamil Nadu
Friends of Rural development, Baden-Baden
India/Shantimalai Trust health, advancement of
Tiruvannamalai, women
Tamil Nadu
Children’s Garden Orphanage, education, Berlin
School health, poverty alleviation
Chennai, Tamil Nadu
Andheri Help for Poverty alleviation, Lake Constance
Children Andheri, West education (Bodensee)
Mumbai, Maharashtra
Ashakiran – Society for Rural development, Lake Constance
Rural Development and education, health (Bodensee)
Empowerment
Kondhmal District,
Orissa
Eye Hospital Indore Health Lake Constance
Indore, Madhya Pradesh (Bodensee)
Model School Dhabalgiri Education, health Lake Constance
Dhabalgiri, Orissa (Bodensee)
33
Maher – Interreligious Women’s refuge, health Lake Constance

Women’s Project (Bodensee)
Pune, Maharashtra
YRG Care Medical Centre Health, AIDS prevention Brunswick-
Chennai, Tamil Nadu Wolfsburg
Karunya Trust in Orphanage, education Darmstadt
Tiruvannamalai
Tiruvannamalai,
Tamil Nadu
Karunya Theeram Orphanage, education, Dormagen-Neuss
Balabahvan health, homeless shelter
Kollam, Kerala
BASIS Projects Rural development, Giessen
Kottayam, Kerala education
Education and Training Education, professional Hagen
Project training
Muvattupuzha, Kerala
Vivekananda School Education Karlsruhe, Indian
Jogiwala, Dehradun, School Society
Uttarakhand Bonn
Padhar Hospital Madhya Health Kiel, Dental Clinic
Pradesh Kiel
Calcutta Rescue Children’s refuge, Nuremberg
Kolkata, West Bengal education
Arunodaya Charitable Trust Health Remscheid
New Delhi
Vikash Indo-German Health, education Remscheid
Education-Centre for
Physically Handicapped
Youth at the Vikash Higher
Secondary School Shahbad
Shahbad-Tesil Tijara,
Rajasthan
Bal Ashram, Virat Nagar, Children’s refuge, Stuttgart
Jaipur education
Jaipur, Rajasthan
Help Projects Kattappana Homeless shelter Winsen
Kattappana, Kerala
Source: Deutsch-Indische Gesellschaft, ‘Die Projektarbeit der Zweiggesellschaften’ (PDF

file), downloaded from DIG website, http://www.dig-ev.de/cms3_cust/fckeditor_files/File/
Soziale%20Projekte/Die%20Projektarbeit%20der%20Zweiggesellschaften%202011.pdf,
accessed July 14, 2012.
NRIs and PIOs particularly sensible to India’s problems. Tellingly, he

still sees and defines himself as an NRI (and, consequently, as ‘Indian’)
although he has long acquired German citizenship. What is more, his
personal experiences of poverty, hunger and lack of clothing during his
own childhood in India are vivid memories that German activists sim-
ply do not have. These experiences and the connections to one’s own
life partly explain the desire to help that many members of the Indian
diaspora share.
Reverend Kata and all Indian and German members of his organi-
zation work as volunteers in an honorary capacity so that all dona-
tions can be devoted towards the projects in India. The association
‘Indienhilfe’ started its development assistance by donating water filters,
water pipes and even water wells to local farmers in Andhra Pradesh.
Providing clean drinking water is still a priority of the organization’s
work. The other main focus is education. In July 2005, construction
work began in order to build a school in rural Andhra Pradesh. After
the completion of the ground floor in 2006, the ‘Divya Bala School’ was
opened and classes started. However, there has been a steady expansion
over the years. In 2011, the impressive school complex was completed,
including a three-storey main building, a library, a large kitchen and
a residential school. Approximately 1,500 children study at the ‘Divya
Bala School’. The whole project is financed solely by donations that
Reverend Kata and his organization collect in Germany. It is notewor-
thy and significant that the association ‘Indienhilfe’ is not supported by
the Catholic Church. Children from different religious backgrounds are
listed in the school. It is one of the main pillars of the project that there
is no missionary work involved. It is an important goal to help as many
children as possible, regardless of their religion. There are 1,000 indi-
vidual sponsorships through which people in Germany can help a child
in India and finance his or her education in the ‘Divya Bala School’.
However, there is no financial or other support by Indian authorities.
As with other diaspora initiatives, there is much room for govern-
mental assistance in Germany and in India. By building on already
existing structures, relatively small amounts of financial or material sup-
port might lead to disproportionally advantageous effects, particularly if
funds and/or knowledge are made available in a local context with very
specific goals:
In working with diaspora partners, a number of donor governments

and consortia have found that the most successful projects and pro-
grammes are those that build on existing diaspora initiatives rather
than those started anew at the initiative of governments. [ . . . ] Of par-

ticular importance is ‘establishing links between diasporas and local
levels of government, given that diasporas’ contributions tend to be
geared toward their places of origin’.
(Agunias and Newland, 2012: 34–35)
Reverend Kata indicated that although his project is completely

financed through donations from Germany, some local support in India
would be helpful. This does not necessarily involve financial com-
mitments but may also be aimed at the provision of infrastructure,
know-how and best practice assistance in India.
Outside the structures of formalized organizations, there are also
many grassroots translocal activities of charity and philanthropy that
try to help directly on a personal level. Here, funds and/or material
resources are sent by individual NRIs and PIOs from Germany to India in
order to help very specific persons or causes. In some instances, Indians
in Germany may also function as bridges to channel private donations
from German individuals to particular recipients or organizational struc-
tures in India. One Indian family in Germany, for example, was asked by
a wealthy German to provide contact to an orphanage in India and to
assure that the private donations about to be given were used for charity
work in India (Ogale, 2003: 103).
Political support
Perhaps one of the greatest accomplishments for Indian immigrants

has been their political impact. With three Members of Parliament, the
comparatively small NRI and PIO community in Germany is by far
overrepresented and outdoes many more populous immigrant groups.
In 1998, the first politician of Indian origin came to national promi-
nence in Germany when Sebastian Edathy won his district for the
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and was elected to the Bundestag. Born in
Hanover in 1969, he became the first PIO representative in the German
parliament. His father, a Protestant pastor, came to Germany from
Kerala. Sebastian Edathy later shortened the original family name from
Edathiparambil to its current form. He has been re-elected three times in
2002, 2005 and 2009. In the German Bundestag, Sebastian Edathy has
served as the chairman of the German-Indian parliamentary organiza-
tion between 2003 and 2007 and has been fulfilling this function again
since 2010. Not surprisingly, Sebastian Edathy is particularly devoted to
good relations between Germany and India. Here, he not only focuses
on economic affairs and cooperation in the health or energy sector but

also works on student exchange programmes. A second Indian-German
representative joined Sebastian Edathy in 2002, when Josef Winkler
from the Green Party was elected. Josef Winkler is the son of one of
the many Catholic nurses from Kerala who came to Germany in the
1970s. He was born in Koblenz in 1974. Together with Sebastian Edathy,
Josef Winkler is active in the German-Indian parliamentary organiza-
tion, working for good relations between the German parliament and
the Indian Lok Sabha and, more generally, between Germany and India.
In 2009, a third PIO became a Member of Parliament when Raju
Sharma was elected for the Left Party. Raju Sharma was born in Hamburg
in 1964. His father was an Indian engineer who came to Germany in
order to work at the Hamburg shipyard. During his early childhood and
again during his law studies, Raju Sharma spent some time in Mumbai,
which he considers a second home city for himself. He is very aware
of his family origin and describes himself as a believer in Hinduism.
In a famous statement, Raju Sharma acknowledged that his mind is
German while his heart is Indian: ‘I very much think German, but
I strongly feel Indian.’4 Politically, he was a long-time member of the
Social Democrats before joining the Left Party in 2005. After his election
to the Bundestag in 2009, Raju Sharma became the speaker for religious
policies of the Left Party parliamentary group. He is also the federal party
treasurer. Just like Sebastian Edathy and Josef Winkler, Raju Sharma fre-
quently speaks out against racism and discrimination. He has become
a spokesperson not only for the problems and difficulties of NRIs and
PIOs in Germany but also for poverty alleviation and the overcom-
ing of development challenges in India. In particular, Raju Sharma has
been active in attempts to improve the living conditions of Adivasis in
Orissa. He has also donated money for disaster relief efforts after several
floodings in South Asia. Raju Sharma’s impressive personal efforts might
very well serve as a role model for activities in humanitarian aid and
development assistance for India among the NRI and PIO population in
Germany.
These three examples are just a case in point of how politically
important the relative small NRI and PIO community in Germany has
become. This is particularly striking compared to much larger groups
such as the Turkish community. Many significant ethnic groups have
not even had one representative elected on a federal level. With three
Members of Parliament, NRIs and PIOs are by far overrepresented. This
shows not only their own commitment and their will to integrate into
German society but also the trust and confidence Germans do put in
them. What is more, PIO politicians such as Raju Sharma can be valu-
able sources of political influence for India, particularly in the field of
governmental, state-financed development assistance which has been
under much scrutiny in Germany in recent years (Van de Sand, 2009:
235–264). However, there is no automatic or natural support. After all,
they are German politicians elected by German constituencies to repre-
sent German interests. Nonetheless, there are certain intangible benefits
that arise out of their ethnic origin. First and foremost, it is much easier
to get their attention for India-specific issues. PIO politicians are much
closer to all issues pertaining to Indian immigrants in Germany or India
in general than their colleagues in the German parliament. It can make a
significant difference if a politician who is to decide about financial sup-
port and development assistance to India knows about the hardships
of the slums of Mumbai or Kolkata or the problems in the energy sec-
tor first-hand, speaks the local language, has personal experiences in
India and family connections to the country. Secondly, access for the
NRI and PIO community might be easier to establish and to sustain.
This can be particularly valuable with regard to political and public
support of development initiatives, social projects or charity to India.
Although there are no guarantees for certain political outcomes, it is
important to make use of this privileged access to decision-makers in
Germany.
Conclusion
When assessing the potential of diaspora engagement in development

efforts, a recent article in the monthly magazine ‘Pravasi Bharatiya’,
funded by India’s Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), stated:
An Overseas community can and does serve as an important ‘bridge’

to access knowledge, expertise, resources and markets for the devel-
opment of the country of origin. The success of this bridge is
often predicated upon two conditions: the ability of the Diaspora
to develop and project a coherent, intrinsically motivated and pro-
gressive identity and the capacity of the home country to establish
conditions and institutions for sustainable, symbiotic and mutually
rewarding engagement.
(Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2011: 11)
Without a doubt, NRIs and PIOs in Germany do contribute to the

economic and social development in India in a considerable man-
ner. Neither their inner connection to India nor their motivation
can be questioned. However, much of their help tends to be
‘grassroots-oriented’ (Punnamparambil, 2008: 20), with little or no
central coordination. In addition, practical, infrastructural help in
making private initiatives work in India might lead to a substantial
improvement in the effectiveness of the many different charity and
philanthropic efforts brought forward by the Indian community in
Germany. While there is an impressive foundation of resources and
goodwill, it seems that even more could be done.
Notes
1. Rajnish Tiwari (head of the GIRT section Hamburg), interview by author,
July 23, 2012.
2. Dr Balbir Goel (chairman of the DIG regional section Karlsruhe), interview by
author, July 17, 2012.
3. Reverend Rajulu Kata (founder of the charity organization ‘Indienhilfe’),
interview by author, July 10, 2012.
4. Raju Sharma (Member of Parliament), interview by author, April 27, 2012.
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Singhvi, L. M., et al. eds (2001) Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian
Diaspora. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs.
Tumbe, Chinmay (2012) ‘EU-India Bilateral Remittances.’ CARIM-India Research
Report 2012/10.
Union of German Malayalee Associations (2012) ‘Charity Works.’ http://www.

ugma-germany.com/inner.php?url=charity-works, accessed July 12, 2012.
Van de Sand, Klemens (2009) ‘Deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit
Indien – Hilfe oder Partnerschaft?’ In Indien: Herausforderungen und Perspektiven,
edited by Michael von Hauff. Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag.
World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. Washington, DC.:
World Bank.
2
Influencing from Afar: Role of
Pakistani Diaspora in Public Policy
and Development in Pakistan
S. Akbar Zaidi
Introduction
It would be difficult to find the names of many Pakistani economists

or other public policy experts, who have served the Government of
Pakistan in the most senior of positions since the end of the 1970s, who
were not part of Pakistan’s extensive diaspora of public policy profes-
sionals, based abroad, usually in international financial or international
development organizations. Whether they were invited to become
Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Advisors to the Prime Minister or Finance
Minister, Minister of Planning and Development (Deputy Chairman
Planning Commission) or Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan
(Pakistan’s Central Bank), many have been part of Pakistan’s diaspora.
Moreover, there have even been two cases where two bankers, one from
the World Bank and the other from Citibank, both based abroad as part
of Pakistan’s diaspora, were asked to become – one directly and one after
becoming the Finance Minister first – Prime Ministers of Pakistan.
In fact, while there are of course a few, it does become difficult to
name many Pakistani economists and other public policy profession-
als at top government level who were actually based in Pakistan when
they were appointed on such senior positions. From the more famous
Mahbub ul Haq, a senior minister in the Ayub Khan military govern-
ment of the 1960s to his second coming in the 1980s under the military
dictator General Zia ul Haq, who invited him to join his Cabinet at the
time Mahbub ul Haq served in the United Nations, to the incumbent
Finance Minister, who worked for the World Bank and for private capital
investors abroad and was invited at first to join the government of
41
42 Diaspora, Public Policy and Development in Pakistan
Pakistan’s fourth military dictator General Musharraf, all have had many
years, often decades, of experience working in international institutions
as part of Pakistan’s diaspora.
It is not just economists alone who have been brought in from
international public policy institutions or from private firms but other
entrepreneurs, including some start-up capitalists and financiers, also
have been invited to join government in Pakistan and have ended up
playing a formidable role running public institutions – even such as
the Pakistan Cricket Board – in Pakistan, having a huge impact on the
direction and nature of public and social policy and development.
At least two aspects are striking about the induction of such individ-
uals. One, a large number of them are invited by military dictators to
strengthen the hand of military governments in Pakistan. Of course
this could only be on account of the fact that military dictators have
ruled Pakistan since the mid-1970s, when this phenomenon really got
underway, directly for 20 of the last 35 years, far more than civilian
governments. For much of the remaining 15 years, the military has
manipulated key decisions and appointments in Pakistan, and con-
tinues to do so even today, when democracy seems to be emerging
as a preferred option to military rule (Malik, 2012; Zia, 2012; The
News, Karachi).1 But the more important political economy reasons
could be that these technocrats work better under military govern-
ments outside the muddier electoral and democratic form of governing
Pakistan. This line of argument does not undermine the fact that there
are some very prominent technocrats who were invited by military
dictators when they worked in their international organizations and
stayed on in Pakistan, eventually joining political parties. The incum-
bent Pakistan Peoples Party in government since 2008, in particular,
in its earlier eras of government, of 1988–1990 and 1993–1996, also
followed the same pattern. As one former Governor of the State Bank
of Pakistan, a former IMF representative, himself imported to become
Governor and now violently anti-Peoples Party, stated: ‘The PPP has
always relied on “imported” finance ministers reflecting their naive
belief that technically more qualified imported finance team will be
able to find politically convenient economic solutions to the difficult
economic problems of the country . . .’ (Yaqub, 2012).
The second main observation from the crop of Pakistanis working
abroad – the diaspora – invited to come to Pakistan, is that those who are
invited are mainly technocrats, working in international organizations
and gaining first-hand international experience, and there are too few,
if any, academics who come to Pakistan to positions of public policy.
S. Akbar Zaidi 43
Some do return to teach, but they maintain a low public profile com-
pared to the technocrats who come back to positions of power, authority
and prominence. However, this is not always a military government’s
issue, for democratically elected governments also bring in diasporic
technocrat Pakistanis from abroad.
This chapter engages with the role and position of Pakistan’s diaspora,
not with regard to their financial contribution or providing remittances
or providing technical knowledge and skills, or through technical joint
ventures, as is the general thrust of such diaspora studies, and although
the contribution to the economy in the form of remittances by the
diaspora has been highly significant over the last few years – equivalent
to 50 per cent of Pakistan’s total exports – but with regard to another,
limited, aspect of diasporic influence. It explores aspects which deal
with how some key policy makers, usually economists working at
international financial institutions, continue to engage with Pakistan’s
economy and its public policy while they are abroad as diasporic indi-
viduals, and when some of them return to Pakistan for usually short
periods of time to work with government. The chapter is unable to pass
judgement on how these individuals performed when they worked as
technocrats in Pakistan – their ‘impact’ – but provides broad political
economy considerations and interpretations of their role as diasporic
public policy technocrats.
Moreover, given the fact that the growing and large Pakistani diaspora
in the West will continue to play a major role in Pakistan’s domestic
public policy, it becomes important to expand the nature of study of
an under-researched area in Pakistan. This is especially the case when at
the time of writing (August 2012) there was a move in Pakistan to debar
Pakistanis with dual nationalities from taking up positions of seniority
in government.
This chapter also makes the argument that the relationship between
the Pakistani diaspora and Pakistan is somewhat different from that
of other ‘traditional’ diasporic relationships. In this age of terror,
where Pakistan is in the eye of the storm, the relationship between
Pakistan’s diaspora and the homeland has been varied, diverse, trou-
bled and extremely complicated, all in addition to the normal streams
of diasporic interaction. With the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Americans
all having a marked presence in Pakistan, the Pakistani diaspora links
itself to anyone of these signifiers. Faisal Shahzad, the son of a very
senior Pakistan armed forces officer, born in Pakistan and a naturalized
American who tried to bomb Times Square in New York, is one such
example of Pakistani diaspora.2
The state of social science in Pakistan, yesterday and today
About a decade ago, a great deal of research on the state of the

social sciences took place in Pakistan (Robinson, 1967; Naseem, 1998;
Khan, 1998; Zaidi, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003). For the most part, it was
argued that its state was ‘dismal’, for a number of reasons. Most social
scientists agreed with the prognosis that the state of the social sciences
in Pakistan was in a depressingly decrepit state. They all agreed that not
much research of any quality took place in Pakistan, and the little that
was undertaken by Pakistani social scientists was by the few who lived
and worked in the West. Moreover, good quality research in Pakistan
produced by those based there was considered to be on account largely
of individual endeavour, anomalous to the main strand of researchers,
and that the contribution by the institution where they were located
was incidental.
Many social scientists argued that the failure of social sciences in
Pakistan was on account of the fact that patronage at the private and
at the state level had distorted the environment under which research
in the social sciences took place, developing a conformist, if not syco-
phantic, toadyist, mindset. Others felt that there was a bias against a
culture of dissent, debate and discovery, brought upon perhaps due to
state authoritarianism and military dictatorships, and due to the over-
developed nature of the bureaucratic arm of the state. Other, simpler
reasons included the fact that the incentive and salary structure in pub-
lic sector institutions was dwarfed by the visible freedom and economic
incentives in the vibrant private donor and NGO-supported sectors.
Clearly, all these reasons were very relevant.
For some of the reasons mentioned above, many of the best Pakistani
social scientists left for other countries, causing a haemorrhaging brain
drain. Hence, there was hardly any community of academics or schol-
ars left to interact with, to share ideas with, and also few journals and
almost no professional associations. Moreover, many Pakistani social sci-
entists felt that those Western social scientists who worked on Pakistan
were second-rate scholars at third-rate universities, a fact which did not
help the Pakistani social science cause either. That was the understand-
ing of the research which had been done on the state of the social
sciences a decade ago. Much has changed since then.
Unfortunately, there has not been substantive recent research on the
state of the social sciences in Pakistan for around a decade. There is
clearly an urgent need for such a study, to examine what has hap-
pened since. In the absence of such research, it is not possible to be
S. Akbar Zaidi 45
systematic or precise, and one is forced to depend on anecdotes and

observations. Nevertheless, there is some basis to make the claim that
the state of research in the social sciences is not as dismal as it was in
2002, and despite the claim made by some uninformed journalists who
do not conduct research themselves, things have improved a great deal
(Yusuf, 2012). The state of research and academics in Pakistan is still far
from satisfactory, but the important point that it has improved consider-
ably needs to be made. Just as there were numerous reasons why things
looked so bad in 2002, there have been reasons why things may have
improved.
In the period after 2000 the then military government of General
Parvez Musharraf set up a Higher Education Commission (HEC) and
gave it the task of developing Pakistan’s higher education in all dis-
ciplines. In the last decade, the HEC has provided scholarships and
funding to hundreds of thousands of Pakistani students studying in
Pakistan and abroad. Many of these fellowships and scholarships have
been in the social sciences. Moreover, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) which left Pakistan in 1993 also
returned in pursuit of its war on terror, and many hundreds of Pakistani
academics and teachers went to the United States for higher studies.
Added to this was the government’s overly generous, and perhaps lax,
strategy of granting university status in the private sector to those who
applied, which resulted in a boom in private sector university edu-
cation.3 Some private sector universities which came on line much
earlier are probably the best examples, and the Lahore University of
Management Sciences (LUMS), also after some years of being in the
higher education private sector business, started producing good-quality
students, many of whom continued for further education abroad.
There was also a noticeable growth in research organizations and
think tanks in Pakistan towards the end of the decade of the 2000s.
By all accounts, there was greater supply of Pakistani- and foreign-
trained social scientists. The quality of output – which this chapter does
not examine – is questionable in many cases, but by all accounts, the
numbers seem to have increased.
Research on Pakistan’s social sciences in the 2000s, and anecdotal evi-
dence since, suggests a few facts which have a bearing on the discussion
on the diaspora. First, much of the better quality of academic research
on Pakistan in the past came from Pakistani social scientists working
abroad, usually in universities, and often not working in Pakistan. Sec-
ond, many of the ‘brightest and best’ of the economists from Pakistan, as
well as some other social scientists, ended up working for international
financial institutions and development organizations abroad, since for

a number of reasons they were not willing to work in Pakistan; this
was due to a lack of opportunities, financial reasons, Pakistan’s socio-
cultural and political environment, and much more. The first of these
factors has changed now, and as more students have completed their
studies in Pakistan and have gone abroad – women have also become far
more mobile than in the past, going abroad more easily and frequently
now – there is a larger pool of Pakistani students working on Pakistan
than perhaps ever before.
Third, post-9/11, there has been a mushrooming of interest in
Washington and London, where the demand for Pakistani ‘experts’ has
increased a great deal. Many of these ‘experts’ are second-generation
Pakistanis – and even recent migrants – who work for international
research organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Fourth, many of the earlier crop of Pakistani economists who worked
for international financial institutions have now retired and returned to
Pakistan and are teaching and doing research in mostly private sector
universities in Pakistan, with some working in the public academic sec-
tor. They have had a positive impact on the scholarship and education
scene in Pakistan, further developing the social sciences.
Engaging from Abroad: The diaspora and us

at home – Three streams
This section argues that there have been at least three streams of
diasporic engagement with Pakistan.4 Stream One is composed of those
returning social scientists – mainly economists – who after many years
of service in international financial institutions have come back to
Pakistan, not in public policy positions, but to teach and do research, in
mainly private universities. Stream Two comes largely through the post-
9/11 Pakistani reality, where donors and think tanks largely dealing with
Islam and security have become a booming business. Stream Three is a
more conventional avenue, with continuities from the pre-9/11 world,
where senior Pakistani diasporic professionals have been invited back to
Pakistan to work for ‘their’ government.
Stream One: From international financial institutions

to post-retirement academia in Pakistan
This is a group of Pakistani economists who have retired from senior
positions in the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, IMF, ILO,
UNDP and such other organizations, and who have returned, after
S. Akbar Zaidi 47
some decades in some cases, to teach in mainly private universities in

Pakistan. They were part of the diaspora until recently, but perhaps are
better called expats rather than the former category, and after having
completed their professional tenure have returned to their second lives
and second jobs in Pakistan. Many of them are always potential candi-
dates for senior positions in Pakistan’s public policy circles, but they are
probably not still considered the ‘diaspora’, and are now settled into a
different category, unlike those in Stream Three, below.
Although it is best not to generalize, but it is probably not incor-
rect to say that given a general awareness and understanding of the
nature of the work many of these economists did, one can assume that
they may not have engaged directly with Pakistan, given their positions
and the nature of their duties when they were abroad. Unlike some of
the diaspora – particularly those who write regularly in the press on
Pakistan – some of these professionals may have disassociated them-
selves from public policy details and issues when they were working
for the international financial institutions abroad. Nevertheless, in this
large category, there are a handful who was first invited to Pakistan when
they were part of the diaspora to join government in Pakistan, and after
their stints they have now joined academia and think tanks in Pakistan.
Importantly, much of their current research is now Pakistan focused or
based on the region.
Stream Two: Experts on Islam and terrorism – co-optation

of the native informant
Given Pakistan’s particular situation in the region and the fact that
both Islam and nuclear warheads have almost resulted in Pakistan
being called a ‘rogue state’, the post-9/11 world has seen a booming
business on policy advice for and on Pakistan in the United States,
predominantly, but also in other countries of the Western world. It is
improbable that other countries have this particular component in
their universe of diasporic studies. For the most part, the heads of
research teams on Pakistan and heads at think tanks, in the tradi-
tion of a modern orientalism, are almost always white men – although
there are some women as well – usually American, but increasingly
assisted by the native informant, the Pakistani diasporic, either sec-
ond generation or recent graduate from a US university, helping their
‘team’ with knowledge which is also probably very far and distant.
Often these native informants speak one or the other of Pakistan’s
many languages, and their best use to these organizations is to provide
translation knowledge for their US ‘counterparts’. Not all of Pakistan’s
diaspora in the think-tank community is this younger first- or second-

generation Pakistani, and some are much older and more established
Pakistanis, who having retired from the IMF or some other organization
have decided to stay on in Washington (or London) and now work on
Pakistan.
Any sampling of reports, studies and even newspaper reports in any
of the international or Pakistani newspapers, on Pakistan by so-called
foreign experts on Pakistan, writing in the time of Islam and other
crises post-9/11, suggests a strong sense of know-it-all-ness, a sense
of self-righteousness bordering on the condescending and orientalist.5
Criticizing such simplistic views, which are not simply the prerogative
of American experts on Pakistan, but are also reproduced by many of
Pakistan’s diaspora, Nadeem Hussain rightly argues:
Policymakers and ‘experts’ tend to speak about Pakistan and its prob-
lems in a sensational way, and talk of their work as something that is
salvaging a country that is on the verge of collapse. The experts paint
everything as good or evil, and expect an end where the good – that
is, the US – will ultimately win against all the evil – that is, everything
in the ‘outside’ world . . . [M]any of the experts lose their objectivity in
analysis and end up making sweeping, generalised statements about
Pakistani culture, religion and society. Without nuance, they bash the
Pakistan Army and the country’s intelligence agencies without giving
much in evidence or conducting any serious research. They criticise
the massive corruption of the politicians without understanding why
they act in such a way.
(Hussain, 2012)
Much of this also applies to the Pakistani diaspora serving such think
tanks, who in order to be acceptable often support such superficial and
incorrect analysis. Without the support of such Pakistanis from the
diaspora working in and supporting their analysis, the authenticity of
think tanks would be incomplete.
In one of the few pieces of research looking at the work of the
Pakistani diaspora in constructing images of Pakistan, especially its
women and Islam, feminist scholar Afiya S. Zia, citing numerous pieces
of research funded by Western donor agencies on Pakistan, argues that
the Pakistani diaspora has been complacent in framing a certain view of
Pakistan and of Islam and that this diaspora has willingly collaborated
with the West and agreed to being co-opted in their larger design to fash-
ion Pakistan in an image of choice (Zia, 2011). Afiya S. Zia argues that
S. Akbar Zaidi 49
‘collaboration between western academia and Pakistani women at home

and in the diaspora has established a body of donor-funded research
with an exclusive focus on Islam’, and she continues:
Recourse to religion and a focus on faith-based organizations as a

point of entry for development initiatives has gained momentum in
recent years, with serious implications for women’s rights . . . When
post 9/11 propaganda targeted ‘oppressed Muslim women’ with bla-
tant hypocrisy, this led to an academic turn in the direction of explor-
ing, rescuing, and in some cases reinventing the agency of veiled
Muslim women, even in cases that signified pietistic acceptance of
discrimination.
This new scholarship has matured into a full-blown project to chal-

lenge and reject the viability of universal, liberal and indigenous
secular feminist possibilities in Muslim-majority countries as cultur-
ally inappropriate. This thinking permeates tangible development
policies and projects across Pakistan, as a celebrated confirmation of
the pragmatic possibilities of development subsumed and framed by
religion. Ironically, the policy-directed research espousing this frame-
work is often shaped and directed by priorities and actors – such
as foreign consultants or academics – removed from the collective
developmental, political or activist paradigms of the country itself.
Citing a number of examples from the United States and from the
United Kingdom, Zia implies that such co-optation, not just of the
diaspora, but given the large sums of money made available to
Pakistani-based researchers, results in a donor-driven agenda to res-
cue women from more traditional and quotidian forms of patriarchy
and oppression, and justifies and results in rescuing women in Iraq
and Afghanistan, through more extensive and armed interventions
as well.
The post-9/11 world has also created a revivalism of identities, partic-
ularly Islamic, amongst the Pakistani (and Muslim diaspora) in the West,
who like Faisal Shahzad have tried to re-connect and re-interpret Islam.
While some have found this reconnection in the form of preparing
bombs, Pakistani scholars in Western academia have argued that Islam
needs to be given greater agency in its own, naturalized, setting. This
revivalism results in an attack on those fighting for secular and liberal
values at home (in Pakistan) and in legitimizing Islam by many intel-
lectually born-again diasporic Pakistanis who live and teach in the West
and its academia. Since they are the true native informants who sup-
posedly understand Pakistan and Islam best, they are also co-opted into
the larger project of Western apologia for Islam, playing a critical role
in explaining indigenous Islam in Pakistan, as well as Pakistan more
generally, to their primarily Western interlocutors.
Stream Three: From international financial institutions

to positions of power in Pakistan
This Stream of diaspora and its relationship to Pakistan is what I call
the ‘old school’ form of engagement, where well-established profession-
als in international financial institutions have been plucked from their
lucrative jobs and asked to come and ‘serve’ Pakistan, often under mili-
tary dictators. These have been eminent professionals who have worked
at the IMF, World Bank, the United Nations and other international
organizations, but unlike their colleagues mentioned in Stream One
they were invited to senior public policy positions – Finance Minister,
Minister of Planning, Governor Central Bank, even Prime Minister –
usually while they were still serving or soon after retirement. While
those in Stream One from the same sort of professional backgrounds
have had a quieter return to Pakistan on retirement, this category has
been brought in at senior level in the very public policy field. And
because they are at such senior and influential positions, they can have
a significant effect – both positive and seriously negative – on pub-
lic policy while they are ‘on loan’ to Pakistan from their own, home,
institution.
It is difficult to say why each of these Pakistani professionals work-
ing at lucrative jobs at very senior positions would want to return to
Pakistan, but one can speculate that for many of them it is a chance of a
lifetime to be placed at positions of power and responsibility. Whether
they themselves want to ‘serve the nation’ is not clear, but one assumes
that many would accept such an offer – of course, from anecdotal evi-
dence and hearsay, many say that they do not do so. What is also
interesting is that many of these technocrats are invited in as tech-
nocrats in unelected governments. They do not have to go through
the messiness of Pakistani elections to ‘be able to serve’ and find the
comfort in the protection of the army under military dictatorships or
under caretaker governments. Some certainly do stay on for a few years
and take a part in governments which are elected, but they do this by
being appointed on seats reserved for technocrats in the Pakistani Sen-
ate. Nevertheless, their acceptance of electoral norms marks a departure
from those who, for whatever reason, prefer to return to their homes
S. Akbar Zaidi 51
abroad following the end of their tenure. Pakistan’s Prime Ministers who
were brought in from abroad took this option, while some who were
appointed in the Finance or Planning ministries stayed on.
Whether these diasporic Pakistanis were the appropriate people for
such high positions of power determining public policy is open to con-
jecture. Many of them may have been Pakistani by birth, and having
worked some of their earlier professional life in Pakistan, but gaug-
ing from their CVs and job descriptions, it does not seem if they were
involved in Pakistan’s public policy in their organizations. What made
them ‘experts’ on Pakistan is not clear, other than they were placed at
senior positions with vast international, though non-Pakistani, expe-
rience. It is also true that some had done some excellent policy and
academic work on Pakistan in earlier years, and had maintained links
with Pakistan and its professionals, and may still have been aware of the
nature of issues and debates going on in the vocal public policy sphere
in Pakistan.
This question of knowing what is happening in Pakistan and of
‘belonging to Pakistan’ is of critical concern and raises numerous
questions. Do these diasporic Pakistanis have any remaining roots or
long-term investment in any sense with Pakistan when they are asked to
return? Do they have a commitment to Pakistan, or is this just another
country to fiddle in and fix, like the many they have been managing in
the World Bank, IMF or United Nations? If they decide to come for a
short while and then return to their new homes, how can they be held
accountable for what they had done while in positions of authority in
Pakistan? Are they merely transient fly-by-night operators? These ques-
tions cannot be applied to all those who come, but they do raise issues
about legitimacy and accountability.
The Dual Nationality Bill under review in the legislature in Pakistan
today is trying to address similar concerns. Issues have been raised about
the Pakistani diaspora having two nationalities or passports and not
being committed to or accountable to Pakistan. The argument under
discussion is that dual nationality Pakistanis can disappear to their other
country and find protection under its laws and avoid legal proceedings,
if initiated, from Pakistan. The question of ‘going to war’ with their
other countries, while they are elected and serving public officials in
Pakistan, has also been raised: Where does their sympathy or allegiance
lie? Clearly, all these issues also address many of the expats or diasporic
Pakistanis who come in for a short term to ‘serve’ Pakistan.
The second concern about knowing anything about Pakistan, having
lived away, sometimes for decades, is also of interest.6 Are the appointed
representatives at all aware of developments taking place in Pakistan?

Or, are developing countries so similar that they can make one size fit
all? What local knowledge about issues and ideas do they have sitting
in Washington, or spending time in Nigeria, Beijing or Malaysia? They
have the advantage of seeing different types of developing nations, but
does the Pakistani context allow such translation?7
A recent public exchange between a Pakistani analyst who writes
in the press frequently and a retired Pakistani IMF official now based
in Washington is instructive of the continuing debates about ‘us’ and
‘them’. Ikram Sehgal writes:
Brought up in a cloistered environment with very little first-hand

knowledge of living conditions in the country before you left for the
IMF (and the US) four decades ago, you cannot be expected to have
much idea of the economic and personal challenges one confronts
as a common citizen on a day-to-day basis in Pakistan. You might
as well be on the moon! It is a no-brainer why the IMF has gone
wrong time and again in country after country. The Fund constantly
applies superior theoretical intellect like yours without matching it
to practical knowledge or experience of local conditions. An auto-
mechanic may not have his theory right, but he must get his hands
dirty working under the bonnet. In effect, laymen’s [sic] economics.
(Sehgal, 2012)
And the reply from Meekal Ahmed:
Thank you for inviting me to Pakistan to see the ‘reality’. While work-
ing for the IMF, I would travel to Pakistan four to six times a year. Now
that I have ‘separated’ from the IMF, I visit Pakistan less frequently
because I cannot afford it but I try to stay on top of developments.
The view that those of us who live abroad have no idea of ‘ground
realities’ is not only inaccurate but trite and hackneyed. There are
many Pakistani’s here who have an excellent grasp of the economy
and an abiding interest in the country of their origin.
(Ahmed, 2012)
Conclusion
As this chapter has argued, there is almost next to no research

in Pakistan on the influence of Pakistan’s diaspora on public pol-
icy in Pakistan. This is surprising given the very large and public
S. Akbar Zaidi 53
presence Pakistan’s diaspora has had in public policy intervention in

Pakistan. This absence is particularly surprising given Pakistan’s role
as a nuclear and Islamic threat to much of the region, and hence
the greater intrusion by Western capitals and the Pakistani diaspora
in public policy. One would have expected Pakistani social scientists
to study this aspect of influencing Pakistan from afar, but perhaps
the state of the social sciences in Pakistan is still not as buoyant as
one hoped.
Extensive research on Pakistan’s economists and other social scien-
tists, and on the state of the social sciences in Pakistan more generally,
has shown that many of Pakistan’s best minds have chosen to live and
work abroad, as part of the Pakistani diaspora, often for international
financial institutions and think tanks in the West. Many such schol-
ars have risen to very senior positions in their organizations and have
acquired a great deal of diverse and very wide international experience.
Many Pakistani diasporic professionals have also risen to very senior
and powerful positions in policy institutions and within government
in Pakistan – including the positions of Prime Minister and Finance
Minister – and continue to hold the influence to critically guide and
determine policy direction. Some of these professionals prefer to return
to their homes in the West after their tenure in government in Pakistan
comes to an end and retain their diasporic status. Moreover, it is not just
in official policy circles and institutions that diasporic Pakistani profes-
sionals have played a key role, but one look at Pakistan’s print media
will reveal that a significant number of prominent and highly respected
interlocutors on Pakistan are also diasporic Pakistanis. Their influence is
critical and cannot be denied.
With growing interest in the West, particularly in the United States
after the events of 9/11 in 2001, interest and research on Pakistan
have grown, and think tanks and donor organizations – such as USAID,
DFID and even universities – have begun projects at looking at Pakistan
in the wake of the war on terror and development, more gener-
ally. Projects have been commissioned where the education system in
Pakistan is studied, as is curricula development and the role of religion
and madrasas, all in a manner to intervene and reform such institu-
tions and practices. Donors have been critical in playing numerous
roles in Pakistan and have provided financial and policy input in such
endeavours.
This intellectual capital created by Pakistani diaspora in such develop-
ment agencies and think tanks has been critical in framing official donor
and government policy towards Pakistan. Many think tanks hire young
second-generation Pakistani researchers – as well as more senior-level

Pakistanis living in the West – who help explain Pakistan to their host
institutions and governments. Here too, the Pakistani diaspora plays an
important role in framing and explaining Pakistan for others, having
significant impacts on policy towards Pakistan.
This is an extremely under-researched field in diaspora studies gener-
ally, and particularly with regard to the influence of the Pakistan public
policy diaspora on policy in Pakistan. This chapter has attempted one
of the earliest exploratory exercise of its kind, looking at some examples
of how the Pakistani diaspora has been playing a role in policy making
in Pakistan. A limited first attempt is made to document and assess the
role of this diaspora. This study and its project offer wide scope to start
a distinct and different direction in diaspora studies more generally, but
specifically with regard to Pakistan. Since the Pakistani diaspora does
play such a significant role in policy making in Pakistan, and since their
role continues to be under-researched, subsequent studies need to be
undertaken to understand the influence they muster, both in Pakistan
and abroad.
Notes
1. Even the incumbent Finance Minister of Pakistan, originally from the
diaspora, and twice invited in from abroad to join government, is said to
be the ‘Army’s man’. See Mehreen Zahra-Malik (1 August 2012) ‘In Shaikh
We Trust’, The News, Karachi, and Amir Zia (6 August 2012) ‘The Inscrutable
Mr Shaikh’, Money Matters, The News, Karachi.
2. I do not look at the militant Islam links of Pakistanis in the West, since this is
a theme which requires a completely different Paper.
3. Although these are given certificates as ‘universities’, questions have been
raised regarding whether these institutions actually qualify to be a university
at all.
4. I am not including the diaspora’s link with militancy, radicalism, global jihad
or terrorism.
5. With so much written on Pakistan in the international press in the age of
war on terror, any sampling of stories on Pakistan carries the same tone by
experts. For a very recent piece, see Michael Kugelman, ‘Another Threat in
Pakistan, In Sheep’s Clothing’, New York Times, 3 August 2012, where claims
are made which suggest a pre-conceived notion of Pakistan, informed by
hearsay.
6. There are two anecdotes I am familiar with first-hand. One ‘imported’ Finance
Minister confessed that he knew nothing about Pakistan’s economy, but at
least had the honesty to admit this. He underwent a one-day intensive learn-
ing course at a think tank to give him basic understanding about the economy
he was asked to turn-around. Another Advisor on Finance has famously stated
that his unexpected invitation to join an unelected government allowed
S. Akbar Zaidi 55
him to spend the flight between Washington and Islamabad to catch up on

Pakistan and to prepare a road-map for the economy once he took over.
7. Shaukat Aziz who first became Pakistan’s Finance Minister and later Pakistan’s
Prime Minister on the invitation of the military ruler General Parvez
Musharraf worked with Citibank in East Asia and on numerous occasions in
public, and twice with me on television, stated that his first-hand experience
of working in the Tiger Economies was a great advantage while he served
Pakistan.
References
Ahmed, Meekal (1 August 2012) ‘Pakistani Experts and Ground Realities’, The
News, Karachi.
Haque, N. and M. H. Khan (1998) ‘The Economics Profession in Pakistan:
A Historical Analysis’, Pakistan Development Review, 37.4.
Hussain, Nadeem (6 August 2012) ‘When Experts Generalise’, Dawn, Karachi.
Naseem, S. M. (1998) ‘Economists and Pakistan’s Economic Development: Is there
a Connection?’, Pakistan Development Review, 37.4.
Robinson, E. A. G. (May 1967) ‘The Problems of Teaching Economics in Pakistan’,
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Monograph, Karachi.
Sehgal, Ikram (27 July 2012) ‘Theory and Real Life’, The News, Karachi.
Yaqub, Muhammad (8 May 2012) ‘What to Expect in the Next Budget’, The News,
Karachi.
Yusuf, Huma (6 August 2012) ‘Dearth of Research’, Dawn, Karachi.
Zahra-Malik, Mehreen (1 August 2012) ‘In Shaikh We Trust’, The News.
Zaidi, S. Akbar (2000) ‘The Business of Giving Advice: Pakistan Economy and
Society’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 19.
Zaidi, S. Akbar (2002) ‘The Dismal State of the Social Sciences in Pakistan’,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 35.
Zaidi, S. Akbar (ed.) (2003) Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s, Council of Social
Sciences Pakistan, Islamabad.
Zaidi, S. Akbar (26 September 1998) ‘The Intellectual Crisis’, Economic and Political
Weekly.
Zia, Afiya Sherhbano (January 2011) ‘Donor-driven Islam?’, openDemoc-
racy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/afiya-shehrbano-zia/donor-driven-
islam.
Zia, Amir (6 August 2012) ‘The Inscrutable Mr Shaikh’, Money Matters, The News,
Karachi.
3
Afghan Diasporas in Britain and
Germany: Dynamics, Engagements
and Agency
Carolin Fischer
Introduction
Relationships between diasporas and their countries of origin have

attracted vivid interests of academics and policy makers. Such relation-
ships are often analysed with a focus on diaspora activities and their
impact. There are many case studies of diaspora groups’ engagements
with their home country, including different channels through which
they are carried out. Prominent forms of diaspora involvement include
hometown associations (Mercer et al., 2008), remittance sending
(Lindley, 2009) and the transfer of social, cultural and political ideas
and artefacts (Levitt, 1998; Vertovec, 1999). Most studies, however, do
not answer why people coalesce into diasporas, how they frame their
relationship with their country of origin and why and how members
of diaspora communities choose to engage in homeland-oriented activ-
ities. Peoples’ agency and motivation to engage with their country of
origin seem to be taken as a given.
Migration and refugee studies as well as development research have
largely ignored the Afghan diaspora despite the fact that it is one of the
largest groups of refugees worldwide (Monsutti, 2008). There is a vast
scope for research on the lives of Afghans in the wider diaspora. However
this chapter concentrates on Afghan communities in two particular set-
tings: Britain and Germany. I seek to explore relationships between the
lives of Afghans in the diaspora and the way they relate to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan faced violent conflicts and rigid political and/or religious
regimes the last four decades. These led to multi-level deterioration,
leaving large extents of the economy and infrastructure in bad shape
56
Carolin Fischer 57
(Barfield, 2010). Some conclude that an end to Afghanistan’s depen-

dency on aid is not in sight (Goodhand, 2002). But how would Afghans
in the wider diaspora like to see Afghanistan change and develop?
We should not assume that diasporas per se are committed and capable
actors in home country affairs. Therefore I aim to dissect two pertinent
precursors of diaspora involvement in sending countries:
(i) The conception of diasporas as coherent social entities that engage

in concerted and coordinated action.
(ii) The assumption that Afghans in the diaspora have the agency nec-
essary to take up activities geared towards impacting development
and polity in Afghanistan.
Drawing on a series of in-depth interviews, I will focus on whether or

how Afghans in Britain and Germany organize and engage in action.
The interview material touches upon aspects that facilitate or restrict dif-
ferent engagements and explores how people relate to their own agency.
Research on diaspora engagement tends not to explicitly address ques-
tions of agency, although it places the acting human being at a centre
stage. I attempt to start filling this gap with a review of some of the
ways agency has been conceptualized in social theory. It allows me
to sketch out how concepts of agency could enhance our understand-
ing of Afghan diaspora communities and peoples’ relationships with
Afghanistan.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide some background
on migration from Afghanistan and the formation of Afghan com-
munities in Britain and Germany. Then, I will sketch out concepts of
agency which could be appropriate to these diasporic contexts. I use
these concepts to highlight three areas of concern in my empirical find-
ings: Afghan community dynamics in Britain and Germany, life in the British
and German societies and relationships to Afghanistan and engagements for
change and development in the country. Finally, I point at some implica-
tions of analysing my empirical findings from a theoretical perspective
that places concepts of agency at centre stage.
Background of research
Migration is an integral part of the Afghan social and cultural landscape

(Monsutti, 2008, p. 60). Constant upheaval in Afghanistan for over
three decades dramatically increased movements within and out of the
country (Schmeidl and Maley, 2008; Koser and Schmeidl, 2009). Afghan
58 Afghan Diasporas in Britain and Germany
refugees dispersed to various destinations in the near and wider diaspora

(Van Hear, 2003). There have been three distinct waves of migration
out of Afghanistan since 1979. The first period of mass migration was
triggered by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Further massive
refugee movements resulted from conflict during the Mujahideen era
(1989–1994) and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that was in place
between 1994 and 2001 (Change Institute, 2009). A third wave of migra-
tion occurred after the NATO average of 3,100 Afghans were granted
German citizenship in a year (Destatis, 2011). Most Afghan-born per-
sons in Germany either hold temporary or unlimited residence permits.
Asylum seekers are allowed residence for the duration of the individ-
ual asylum application procedure. Similar to Britain, the average age of
Afghan-born residents in Germany is estimated to be 32 years (Destatis,
2011). In Germany, Afghans live widely scattered across the country.
Hamburg is home to the largest Afghan community of nearly 12,000
people. Also the federal states of Hessen, Niedersachsen and Nordrhein-
Westfalen register large Afghan communities. Most Afghans live in
urban areas like Frankfurt am Main, Offenbach, Hannover, Düsseldorf
and Cologne.
A number of demographic differences between the Afghan commu-
nities in Britain and Germany may influence processes of diaspora
formation: (i) there is a difference in population size (ii) Afghans in
Germany are dispersed across the country while in Britain they are
mainly concentrated in and around London (iii) numbers of people
taking British or German citizenship differ. Also the setup of commu-
nity associations is different. The majority of Afghan associations in
Britain seem to be mainly concerned with supporting community wel-
fare in the receiving context. In Germany, many associations are jointly
run by people of Afghan origin and native Germans and aim to sup-
port humanitarian aid and specific development-oriented projects in
Afghanistan.
Diaspora and agency
I focus on questions of agency to better understand how people come

to see themselves as belonging (or not belonging) to an ‘Afghan
diaspora’ and why they engage (or not engage) in Afghanistan-oriented
action. Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) assume that people are usually
enmeshed in an environment constituted by ‘a rich plurality of cul-
tural [and social] formations’ (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; p. 1442).
For diaspora communities such social relations often stretch across
Carolin Fischer 59
geographical boundaries and different historical periods. At the same

time the people forming part of a diaspora are hardly just passive recip-
ients of the opportunities presented to them by their social relations in
origin and destination countries.
Sewell (1992, p. 20) defines human agency as ‘the capability of
exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which
one is enmeshed’. Accordingly, agency is seen as a relational property
(Bakewell, 2010). Agency shapes one’s ability to transform those social
relations to some degree. Sewell points out that the capacity for agency
is inherent in all humans. At the same time agency is contingent on a
specific range of cultural schemata and resources that particular social
milieus make available. Consequently, the control actors may exert over
social relations varies and so does the scope of actors’ transformative
powers. Sewell (1992) argues that all members of a society exercise
some measure of agency in the conduct of their daily lives. Members
of diasporas would, for example, express agency by specifying their
sense of belonging, or through active engagements with their country
of origin or their society of residence (Bakewell et al., 2011). How-
ever, Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) stress that we should be careful
not to confuse agency with social action. Actors are much more and,
simultaneously, much less than agents because empirical action is not
exclusively driven by human agency. Agency is deeply structured by
several ‘environments of action’, each of which ‘interpenetrates with
and gives shape and direction to the moment of human agency itself’
(Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994, p. 1443). This suggests that we should
conceive of empirical action as multiply determined and undertaken by
social actors who are situated in time and space. It implies for empirical
research that we need to disentangle how the social actors of interest are
situated in different environments of action. Consequently we need to
shift the focus from the individual person to the social environments
and relational settings that he or she is part of (Emirbayer and Mische,
1998, p. 963). We should then explore to what extent instances of empir-
ical action are nested in and determined by different environments of
action. This two-step procedure may help us to grasp how peoples’ social
environments ‘interrelate with social action itself and with the very
potential for human agency’ (Bakewell et al., 2011).
Theoretical accounts situate diasporas in settings that are strongly
determined by peoples’ relationships to their co-nationals as well as
their relationships to the countries of origin and residence (Van Hear,
1998; Brubaker, 2005; Cohen, 2008). In a first analysis of my tran-
scripts, I focused on (i) how informants describe their lives in Britain
and Germany and (ii) their interaction with Afghan communities in the
two countries. The characteristics I have identified as constitutive for
both environments of action may appear ideal-typical – they are at this
stage only indicative. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive account
for the complexity of Afghan communities, I contend that my analytical
categories give a clearer idea of the factors that determine the way people
are socially embedded but also their capacities to take action. Once the
constitutive elements of these environments of action have been identi-
fied, I attempt to sketch out how these environments shape and interact
with peoples’ agency and their engagements in Afghanistan-oriented
action.
Empirical approach
A series of 50 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with people of

Afghan origin living in both countries are my primary data. In-depth
interviews allow me to engage the narratives of Afghans in Britain and
Germany and capture their way of framing the dynamic relationship
between life in the diaspora and social change in Afghanistan (Lawson,
2000). In the United Kingdom, I conducted most interviews in the
Greater London area whereas my field sites in Germany were more
scattered across the country. I interviewed people in Hamburg, Berlin,
Frankfurt, the Cologne-Bonn area and in Munich. About two-thirds
of the interviewees are actively engaged in community organizations,
religious associations and initiatives that aim to contribute to the devel-
opment of Afghanistan. Persons with different ethnic backgrounds and
first- and second-generation immigrants are covered. In addition, I am a
participating observer at occasions that allow me to capture additional
facets of my informants’ social environment, including events organized
by Afghan community organizations in both countries.
Findings
(i) Afghan community dynamics in Britain and Germany

When focusing on the internal dynamics of Afghan communities in
Britain and Germany, I concentrate on how my informants refer to
interactions with other people of Afghan origin, and which factors influ-
ence these interactions. Also I try to tease out observable teleologies of
interactions.
Previous research has shown that members of diaspora groups are
not necessarily unified in their relationship with each other and their
Carolin Fischer 61
home country (Collyer, 2008). Conditions in which the home country

is a scene of war and conflict may create and amplify discontents
among different factions of the diaspora (Kapur, 2007). Such interplays
between political past and present are reflected in my interviews. The
conflict-ridden history of Afghanistan has prompted different waves of
migration which tend to coincide with specific political attitudes and
affiliations among those migrating (Schetter, 2003). Politically deter-
mined ties often extend over time and space in terms of shaping peoples’
interaction in the diaspora. But politics are not the only structuring fac-
tor. My informants corroborate earlier accounts of Afghan communities
as frequently marked by divisions occurring along ethnic and family
lines (Naby, 2005; Schlenkhoff, 2010). Languages often fortify such divi-
sions. Afghanistan has two official languages – Dari and Pashto – but not
all Afghans are bilingual. It may stir feelings of exclusion if one language
predominates specific settings.
Cohesion among Afghans is not as strong as in the case of other

immigrant communities [ . . . ]. Afghans tend to be much more indi-
vidualistic. But, on the other hand, there have been different phases
of migration as well. [ . . . ] I do not have any contacts to those who
came during the 90’s and even more recently. I don’t know them,
and . . . But we do have contacts to those who came here around the
same time as my family and I. They were refugees as well. We also
meet [them] at some [ . . . ] festive occasions that Afghans organise.
(Female, Germany, 40s)
Unfortunately they are divided along ethnic lines. Even in [city he
lives in] you can feel that. You know, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic
country like Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek and lots of other eth-
nic backgrounds. The people abroad, not just in Britain, in all of
Europe, the US and everywhere, they are following the ethnic lines
too much.
(Male, UK, 40s)
Relationships between first- and second-generation immigrants also

influence the dynamics of interaction between Afghans in the two coun-
tries. Some informants, for example, point out that the importance
attached to ethnic or political affiliation varies across the first and sec-
ond generation. Further inter-generational differences can be identified
when it comes to primary areas of concern. For the parents’ gener-
ation, Afghanistan is a recurrent subject of communication, whereas
discussions among second-generation Afghans concentrate more on

being Afghan in Britain or Germany.
If I look at the children of the first generation, depending on

what they have done . . . Well, we all went to school and many
then started a university degree. But you will see that, when we
are among ourselves, we also talk about such issues. We do not
necessarily talk about the situation in Afghanistan and things hap-
pening there. But we always talk about us being Afghans in Germany.
We share what happens to us, if we feel misunderstood as Afghans
in Germany . . . And you have to consider that many of us still see
themselves as Afghans in Germany and not as Germans.
Also, as this informant suggests, environments of action may be subtler

and operate in a manner that cannot be captured in clear terms of ‘here’
and ‘there’. Such instances of newly created and simultaneously blurred
identities would disappear if environments of action were defined too
rigidly.
Interactions between people are also affected by conflicting attitudes
and priorities in their day-to-day lives. It was stressed that time con-
straints and concerns such as unemployment affect social relationships.
Our society has become very materialistic and if there is no money in

it, nobody wants to be involved. And people wait for something to
become glorious until they want to be part of it. Once it is glorious,
then everybody wants to claim that they created the thing, that they
are the magic behind it. [ . . . ] Nobody is willing to give their time.
[ . . . ] If you want to bring about a huge social change, you need to
dedicate resources, you need to dedicate your time to be able to make
that happen.
(Male, UK, late 20s)
However, there are attempts to enhance more inclusive interaction

and cohesion among Afghans in Britain and Germany. There are sev-
eral organizations in both countries, which try to establish a com-
mon ground for people by providing cultural, religious and language
education or running sports activities.
This is why I have prepared the statutes and registered the Afghan
Cultural and Family Association in [town he lives in]. Our aim was to
Carolin Fischer 63
include everyone. For the first time in years I managed to organize

a new year’s party for 500 people. And there were Pashtuns, Tajiks,
Hazaras and of course also Germans. Representatives of left-wing
[Afghan] parties and of right-wing [Afghan] parties, also the Talib and
such people: everybody together. That was great, really great. And it
only happened because of our association’s efforts.
(Male, Germany, 60s)
More inclusive interaction also occurs in specific areas of concern.

Community support initiatives, for example, offer services like legal
consulting or organize festive and cultural events. Informants hold
that shared areas of concern help people to join force, bridge existing
divisions and benefit from togetherness.
There is also solidarity among Afghans. You hear that there is a new
Afghan family in town and they are invited to join the next meeting
at somebody’s house. And at the following meeting there will again
be new people. Of course this is more for the older generation to make
contacts. But the children are happy to be around other children too.
And that’s how it works in general. Well, at least in our case it has
worked that way and it still does today. Well, networks are being kept
alive and you get information about new families moving here and
joining the network.
While these informants emphasize the importance of scopes for com-

mon ground, the following quote indicates that some organizations or
groups of people also try – at least implicitly – to establish new divisions.
Such divisions may be especially relevant to the current life in Britain or
Germany but were less pertinent in Afghanistan.
The majority of the Afghans, because of the wars, because of the

problems they have faced [ . . . ] and the things that they hear about
Afghanistan and the Afghans, they are in a kind of sense of inferi-
ority. And when they come to places like this [the UK] they want
to get out of it, they just want to escape from their identity. And its
the majority of Afghans, you would find them trying their best to
integrate wherever they go: forget about their country, forget about
their culture and try . . . And in this process of doing so, they want
to be expressive, they behave in a way, they say things which they
don’t really mean, deep inside them. And that also includes talking
about, talking against Hazaras for instance, talking about Tajiks,

talking about Pashtuns and, yeah, that has been another problem.
Its unfortunate, its unfortunate . . .
(Male, UK, 40s)
My findings suggest that Afghan communities in Britain and Germany

are complex environments of action whose defining features signifi-
cantly influence peoples’ agency. Pertinent aspects are peoples’ ethnic,
political and family backgrounds. Being perceived in the light of their
specific background often seems to obstruct interactions between peo-
ple of Afghan origin and hinders their engagement in joint activities
within the wider community. Testimonies of perceived divisions also
call the overall idea of an ‘Afghan community’ into question. Perhaps an
Afghan community as a whole only exists for outside observers. It will
be interesting to further explore how particular groups interact with
other, non-Afghan communities. We could start by asking more focused
questions; for example, which dividing factors are at work under what
particular conditions. Also it seems that these factors play out differently
among first- and second-generation immigrants. Shared aims also influ-
ence interactions within the communities. Dynamics unfolding within
Afghan communities in Britain and Germany are likely to be influenced
by additional factors. However, the data at hand indicate that the aspects
influencing relationships between people and determining structures
of the wider community also have crucial impacts on peoples’ ability
to take part in shaping their social environment and exercising some
degree of agency.
(ii) Life in the British and German societies

In her cartographies of diaspora, Brah states ‘that diaspora space as
a conceptual category is “inhabited”, not only by those who have
migrated and their descendants but equally by those who are con-
structed and represented as indigenous’ (Brah, 1996, p. 209). It suggests
that a receiving society can be conceived as an environment of action
in its own right.
Most informants state that their lives in the British or German society
are strongly influenced by the extent they feel welcome and accepted.
Especially Afghans who arrived to Britain and to Germany more recently
do not tend to perceive themselves as part of the ‘mainstream society’,
although some might have had citizenship status for several years.
Well, I think London is very multicultural. In London you feel almost

at home. Having said that, that applies only to our relationships
Carolin Fischer 65
[to people] with similar background, BME [Black Minority Ethnic]

communities, not white British. [ . . . ] I think in terms of local council
and services, service providers as well. But in relation with social life,
it is difficult. [ . . . ] But with, say, Polish, Russian, Pakistanis or Iranians
we are fine. We feel we have someone to visit and to drink, to go to a
restaurant or even to a pub and socialize with them. In this [regard]
yes, they are British and I am British too, but I am not accepted when
it comes to white British. White British will see me as a refugee and it
doesn’t matter . . .
(Male, UK, 50s)
Obtaining or having either British or German citizenship is nevertheless

desirable and important for many.
‘I still love this country. Since I arrived in Germany I thought, this

is my country’ and I have been loyal until today. [ . . . ] I have not
[applied for German citizenship], unfortunately, because I did not
want to. The problem is, and we continue our struggle for dual
citizenship. You know, the problem is, if we abandon our Afghan
citizenship, we will be in trouble back home, for example when it
comes to inheriting something. We keep fighting for the right to be
dual citizens. It won’t be easy, unfortunately. Maybe one day . . .
Sometimes it is noticed that perceived lack of integration into the

German/British society has feedbacks on dynamics among the Afghan
population. Also, influencing on the way people feel about and commu-
nicate their Afghan identities are being observed. In many cases a lack
of integration restricts peoples’ opportunities in the British or German
society. For others, however, such circumstances provide opportunities
to exercise their own agency and offer a helping hand to those struggling
with life in the receiving society. The following quote illustrates how
low levels of integration can be restrictive and conducive to individual
agency at the same time:
Whoever I ask, they never refuse anything I ask them. Because I help
them [ . . . ] because they are in need. Anything I do is not for my
benefit but for their benefit. So I prove myself to them, whatever I do,
I prove myself to them. [ . . . ] So because of that there is not much
of an issue. I know there might be, but when I ask them [although
they might not like me because I am a Pashtun] but when I ask them
they never refuse because I help them. How can they refuse? Maybe
it is different in London or other parts. But in [town of residence],

because I have good relationships with them and I don’t mind who
they are [ . . . ] even if I know people who are against the Pashtuns, my
background, but I don’t see it that way. I know people in this country
only as Afghan, no matter which background we have in our country.
We are here only as Afghans, that’s what I tell other people.
(Male, UK, 40s)
Labour market integration and the recognition of qualifications are a

serious issue among Afghan immigrants, especially in Germany. During
the 1980s and 1990s, Germany received many members of Afghanistan’s
former educated and political elite. Once in Germany, however, such
Afghan émigrés struggled to get their qualifications recognized and
to find a satisfactory employment. It is common that people left
Afghanistan as skilled professionals. Living in Germany or Britain, they
tend to be either unemployed or working in low-skilled sectors. Former
government employees who now make their living as taxi drivers are
paradigmatic in both Britain and Germany. It seems no coincidence that
many of my second-generation informants stress the importance their
parents assign to education.
I have worked here for many years now. Unfortunately I work in a

completely different field than the one I used to work in at home [he
was employed by the Afghan Foreign Ministry and now works as a
taxi driver]. But it does not matter, my family and my children are
the only joy I have since I left home.
When I was young and went to school, our parents always told us
that ‘education is the key to everything in life’. And we were fed up
hearing this all the time. We always asked ourselves why our parents
kept saying that ‘education is everything’, while we had so many
other things in our minds. But now, after 20 years, I don’t know if
I would have acquired the same knowledge base, had I grown up
somewhere else.
The accounts suggest that the environments of action people expe-

rience in the British and German society as a whole have manifold
influences on agency. Whether or not informants feel accepted and
welcome in their host society may enhance or restrict their desire and
Carolin Fischer 67
opportunities to actively participate in social and political life beyond

their close communal setting. Having experienced rejection, people
may choose to withdraw and stay apart instead of making desperate
attempts to be accepted. Places that are more culturally or ethnically
heterogeneous, however, seem to make a difference. Big and cultur-
ally diverse cities like London, for example, convey a sense of being
one of many instead of the outsider or stranger. Obtaining British or
German citizenships enhances peoples’ agency in the sphere of formal
political participation. But informants are not necessarily eager to adopt
their host countries’ citizenship by all means. Agency is also expressed
when informants refuse to give up their Afghan nationality as long as
Germany does not provide opportunities for dual citizenship. It seems
that many informants who compromised a high-ranking position by
leaving Afghanistan are eager to invest much in their children’s educa-
tion and future prospects. Despite being restricted themselves, Afghan
parents mobilize resources for their children’s future as fully recognized
actors in British and German society. Such observations allude to basic
assumptions of ‘structure and agency’ debates according to which the
ability of actors to control social relations varies. However, it should not
be assumed that there is no instance in which social actors would be left
without at least some measure of agency (Sewell, 1992, p. 20). Overall,
Britain and Germany are very heterogeneous societies. It may there-
fore not be particularly useful to refer to the societies as a whole when
discussing environments of action and their interplay with peoples’
agency.
Relationships to Afghanistan and engagements for change

and development in the country
Looking at environments of action separately reveals impacts on and
scopes of individual agency. In the last empirical section I have described
how environments of action play out in peoples’ agency in engaging
with Afghanistan and ideas of change and development. Home country
engagement has been one of the most popular research objects in the
field of diaspora studies. Such engagements are assumed to involve dis-
tinct objectives and forms of action (Mohan, 2002). At the same time, all
social action should be interpreted as resulting from the conjunction of
the temporal/relational contexts of action and the dynamic element of
agency (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). In what follows I will sketch how
informants describe their relationships to Afghanistan. I then explore
how the observed perceptions and home country engagements are, at
least to some extent, determined by the environments of action.
For most informants who are first-generation immigrants, Afghanistan

is part of their day-to-day lives. Ties are maintained through personal
contacts but also by following events in the country and feelings of
nostalgia. The quote below is not only a general reflection of the rest-
lessness arising from life away from the conflict-ridden home. It also
indicates that the informant has an idea of how he could make some
contributions to change in Afghanistan.
As for my feelings, let me tell you the truth, up until now I am

thinking about home every moment. And every moment I ask myself
‘how can I do something?’, no matter what. For me it is very impor-
tant, for example, to work as a teacher with children and youth
[in Afghanistan] and to convey new ideas. These young people are the
generation which will build the country, not myself. They are respon-
sible for the future. If my ideas can help them to be good human
beings, it would be the greatest thing for me.
(Male, UK, 50s)
Personal involvement in processes of change is an issue for most infor-

mants. Some actively engage in certain projects while others speak about
their aspirations hypothetically and as subjects of unfulfilled condi-
tions. Informants also make direct references to who they think can and
should be acting for change and development in Afghanistan. Some also
express their belief in the ability of Afghans in the diaspora to render
valuable contributions to Afghanistan. But peoples’ personal back-
grounds and family affiliations decisively influence the nature of their
engagements and the social environment in which these engagements
take place. Engagements in Afghanistan-related action seem to be con-
tingent on personal backgrounds and affiliations, which may enhance
or restrict agency. People who engage in action rarely claim to represent
an inclusive Afghan diaspora. Often, particular commonalities among
those who run associations can be observed. Examples for such com-
monalities are peoples’ political backgrounds, which tend to coincide
with the period they left Afghanistan. Some informants, however, artic-
ulated their frustration about such particularistic structures and the lack
of an overarching Afghan or national identity.
Well, when looking at the Afghan Women’s Association, there really

is one Generation who have left Afghanistan in the 1980s. They
spent their childhood and youth in the country. Perhaps they
were also educated and worked in Afghanistan before emigrating to
Carolin Fischer 69
Europe . . . These people have completely different background infor-

mation and their engagement is different too. I rather happened to
come together with this group, although I am younger than most
oft them.
While exclusiveness can be seen as a problem in itself, it has also been a

reason for unraveling community associations and advocacy groups.
And the second thing is that [ . . . ] we don’t have this national inter-
est, unified national interests, yet. So it has been a hard task for me
to hold people together. One, these divisions, political divisions and
then personal divisions, problems that individuals have with each
other or get with each other . . . So, it’s really hard. It’s really hard to,
to . . . Well, working with Afghans is really hard. It’s the hardest thing.
(Male, UK, 30s)
But the heterogeneous nature of Afghan communities is not an obsta-

cle to inclusive action per se. Some initiatives were created for the mere
purpose of fostering inclusiveness and cohesion among Afghans in the
diaspora.
That’s why, when we started the student association, one of our aims
was to integrate Afghans into the larger communities. [ . . . ] We try to
integrate Afghans, not so that we don’t stick to just each other, but
also to the wider communities in the UK. [ . . . ] they were so positively
engaged. There were so many things going and it was all like ‘let’s do
good for our country’ and everybody was engaged.
(Male, UK, 20s)
Inter-generational relations and differences not only seem to affect how

informants relate to Afghanistan but also influence forms and ways of
Afghanistan-related engagement.
[The] older generation, they have been mislead in the past, they had
nothing to eat, they suffered a lot and they are not sure about the
future. They don’t contribute a lot. But the younger generation they
will, definitely, they will.
(Male, UK, 50s)
Things slowly start changing I see on facebook, on blogs, on other

social networks, because people, the diaspora, this is where you can
find them. I see school boys and girls, I see those in colleges, in
universities and professionals: they have slowly and gradually estab-
lished that attachment to Afghanistan which wasn’t there pre-9/11,
which wasn’t there post-9/11 in the early stages. [ . . . ] A lot of com-
munity organisations have been established post-9/11. So, I see that
thing is improving: Afghans outside Afghanistan are more Afghans
than there were a couple of years, or five years, or ten years ago.
So that sense of belonging is there.
(Male UK, 30s)
What we can see from the second of these two quotes is that genera-
tional differences not only shape forms and platforms of engagement
but may also lead to newly emerging environments of action, for exam-
ple part of online social networks. Online social networks and other
forms of new media allow Afghans in Britain and Germany to be closely
connected to Afghanistan and interact with a relatively broad range of
people there. Such means of communication may also provide opportu-
nities for individuals to bring themselves in more directly and yet over
great distances.
The accounts of my informants suggest that implications of the
Afghan community as an environment of action are not clear-cut.
Whether and how people take action are not only a question of the
identified structures and characteristics of Afghan communities. Rela-
tionships to Afghanistan also seem to be subject to living conditions in
a broader sense. The informant below for example states that living in
the diaspora may convey a sense of being in between in several regards.
Creating basis for daily lives in the receiving society is often challenging
and relationships with Afghanistan tend to remain a matter of ideas and
aspirations rather than concrete action.
All the people I know are constantly reading about what’s happen-
ing and constantly worrying about it, but [there is] not a lot of solid
action. [ . . . ] These people are already worried, don’t forget that these
people already left the country in fear of their lives, they are not going
to accept to go back with that same fear. [ . . . ] You know its not the
type of person that would stay there, so when the situation is now
like it is, which is uncertain, what can you expect from these people,
other than just sit there and watch and hope for things to change.
(Male UK, 20s)
Because when you are there in one country . . . even you have things
in your heart, you have things in your heart, but sometimes you
Carolin Fischer 71
cannot share it. You can’t share it and just keep it inside. This does
not mean that you have forgotten it. [ . . . ] It’s just that you know that
you can’t do anything about it, you can’t go back. So you feel like ‘you
know, just leave it’. Okay, one day you might share your memories.
But then you think ‘until when, until when am I going to do that’?
You know that you can’t bring the moment back and [therefore] you
have to just focus on your life here, right now. And that’s how it is.
(Female, UK, 20s)
When exploring activities that aim to influence the situation in

Afghanistan it seems useful to differentiate between involvements on a
level of general values and intentions and engagements through actual
practices. A demarcation between such forms of direct and indirect
engagement may not be clear-cut and instances of mutual dependence
are likely. Most informants find their scope of actual engagement con-
strained by the unstable situation in Afghanistan. While this can be
seen as restrictive to peoples’ agency, a much higher degree of agency
is exercised when degrees and areas of attachment are being defined.
One aspect to be further explored would be the effect of the diaspora or
host country environment on constructing teleological environments
of action.
Implications
Afghan communities in Britain and Germany do not correspond to con-

cepts of diasporas as coherent social entities. My informants provide
accounts of diasporic relations emerging along different lines and under
different conditions. When trying to grasp peoples’ engagements with
Afghanistan it is useful to distinguish between different environments
of action because environments of action shape and interact differently
with human agency. People are part of different social settings, which
enable or restrict them in multiple ways (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994,
p. 1441). I concentrated on two environments of action in my study of
Afghan diasporic communities: The Afghan community in either Britain
or Germany and the British or German society. My analysis built on
previous research on diasporas and their relationships to home- and
receiving countries. But to a large extent the identification of the two
environments was informed by the accounts of Afghans who migrated
to either Britain or Germany at different points in time. The material
revealed that different social formations exert different influences on
social actors and the transformative impact these actors have for their
own part (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994, p. 1442).
While a person’s agency may be restricted in one environment of

action, the same person may be able to exercise more agency in a dif-
ferent sphere. It is insufficient to focus on the agency of individuals
without taking the impact of broader social structures into account
(Bakewell, 2010, p. 1695). It would be misleading to assume that the
environments of action, which I describe, constitute self-contained
social arenas. Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994, p. 1444) suggest that ‘it
is precisely through empirical social action – multiply determined, and
undertaken by concretely situated historical actors – that these various
analytical environments relate to one another’. In a next step it would
be interesting to further elaborate how different environments of action
are interrelated and how this affects peoples’ agency. This, however,
requires us to define environments of action more precisely. One way
of achieving greater definitional clarity would be to focus more closely
on how environments of action emerge and how they are maintained
and altered over time.
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4
The Global Circulation of Skill
and Capital – Pathways of Return
Migration of Indian Entrepreneurs
from the United States to India
Manashi Ray
The phenomenon of return migration is ‘the great unwritten chapter in

the history of migration’ (King, 2000: 7). Although migration to high-
income OECD countries from poor developing nations has often been
considered to be permanent up to now, in fact it has always had an
element of impermanence, and more so at the present time because of
the accelerating globalization of the world economy and the constant
international migration of workers meeting the demands of emerging
global markets. This means that migration in the present century often
involves multiple migratory patterns, spread over a considerable period
of time, that entail the flow of ideas, capital, attitudes and the skill sets of
migrants themselves. As Faist (1997: 206) states, ‘leaving and returning
may not be decisions taken only once [but] occur repeatedly over the
life course of a mover’.
This chapter addresses this lacuna in contemporary migration liter-
ature. It examines the complexities of social, economic and political
macro-structural factors that provide support to transnational Indian
entrepreneurs for the necessary preparation in making decisions to
return to India from the United States. The chapter focuses on how the
dramatic shifts in Indian state policies since the 1980s, which created
an enabling economic and political environment, resonated with per-
sonal aspirations and ambitions of Indian migrants to encourage them
to return to their home country. It ascertains that the decision of return
migration is inspired by multiple intentions and the anticipation of
positive outcomes at a personal level.
75
76 Return Migration of Indian Entrepreneurs
Most literature relating to Indian migration to the United States has

focused on the immigration and employment networks of highly skilled
migrant Indian professionals and engineers in the United States and
their occupational integration in the American economy (Bagchi, 2001;
Saxenian, 2002, 2005; Chakravartty, 2006; Harvey 2008; Dossani 2012).
The very few existing studies on Indian return migrants from the United
States have dealt exclusively with technology entrepreneurs, and their
overwhelming concern has been with transnational entrepreneurship
between narrowly conceived regions in India and the United States,
namely, Silicon Valley and Bangalore (Saxenian, 2008). My chapter aims
to widen and diversify the conversation in the literature on Indian
returnee entrepreneurs by incorporating many more urban locations in
India that can now be called truly global, as well as by including the per-
spectives and experiences of returnee entrepreneurs in non-technology
businesses, along with those in the technology sector. In addition,
this chapter also dispels the myth, perpetuated by earlier studies, that
return migration is associated with ‘retirees’ or with those migrants
who have ‘failed’ in the host country for various reasons – failure
to assimilate in the host country, expiration of work permits – and
that both groups make little contribution to the development of their
home societies, implying that those who succeed prefer to stay over-
seas (Maron and Connell, 2008). Contradicting this notion, this chapter
shows that many contemporary highly skilled Indian migrants in the
United States view movement between sending and receiving countries
not in terms of losers and winners but as a global circulation of skill and
labour, and this significantly influences their motivation, preparation
for return, profile and return decisions (Mahroum, 2000). This concept
of return/circular migration was further encouraged by the develop-
ment of high-technology industries in India, such that the ‘returnee
entrepreneurs’ began to perceive India as a place of equal if not greater
promise (Wadhwa, 2012).
This chapter begins with a portrayal of Indian migrants in the United
States, followed by a summary of remarkable transformations that have
taken place in India since 1980. A review of the ‘network’ perspective
in the context of return migration is presented, where I explain how
strategic use of social and cultural capital brings about the formation
of essential global networks and ties/linkages that enhance the prepa-
ration and decision-making process for return migration to India. Next,
I explain the methods and data upon which this chapter is based. Fol-
lowing this introduction, I present findings that show how returnees’
social class, age, life-course transitions, familial responsibilities and
Manashi Ray 77
nationalism shape return migration decisions. I conclude by summa-

rizing the research findings and highlighting the essential contribution
of ‘networks’ to global mobility among highly skilled migrants.
Indian migration to the United States
Contemporary migration from India to the United States began in the

mid-1960s and has accelerated in the four subsequent decades. The revi-
sion of the US immigration laws in 1965 allowed for the first time
the admittance of a large number of skilled professionals from India.
Many highly trained Indian migrants took advantage of the VISA allo-
cation preference given to ‘priority workers; professionals with advanced
degrees, or aliens of exceptional ability’. These ‘persons of extra-ordinary
ability’ or ‘outstanding researchers’ were accused of playing a role in the
‘brain drain’ from India at that time. This movement of Indian immi-
grants corresponded to a significant gain for the United States in highly
trained and skilled personnel (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). Twenty-five
years later, a further revision of immigration law in the Immigration Act
of 1990 substantially increased the number of technical and specialty
temporary workers arriving in the United States under the temporary
H-1B visa programme, which has become the primary channel for the
arrival of huge numbers of skilled professional Indian migrants in the
past 20 years. It can be argued that the strategy of furthering the devel-
opment of advanced capitalism through innovation and science and
technology that has emerged in northern countries in the last decades
lay behind the revision of immigration law in 1990. The evolution in
capitalism had fuelled the attraction and retention of highly trained
professionals from all over the world. To that end, the United States
and other Western nations, including Germany, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Canada and Australia, have revised their immigration laws.
This strategy relies on the actual international transfer and utilization of
the human capital resources required to stay ahead in competition and
the economic growth curve (Khadria, 2001; Mahroum, 2005; Portes and
Rumbaut, 2006).
A great number of Indians also enter the United States as students
desirous of American higher education. India has remained one of the
leading countries of origin for international students in the United
States (The Institute of International Education, 2012). Consequently,
the major modes of entry of highly skilled Indian immigrants to the
United States create a positive image for this ethnic group, which com-
prised 2.2 million adult Indian Americans in 2010, having a median age
of 37 years (PEW Research Center, 2012). They join the US labour market
and benefit from the good character of the resident ethnic Indian com-
munity in the United States. The high labour force participation rate of
Asian Indian migrants (69.6 per cent of those who were 16 or older in
2008–2010) contributes to a positive context of reception for Indians in
the United States. The occupational profile of this ethnic group in the
United States, with 67.9 per cent employed in professional and manage-
rial occupations in 2008–2010, bears out the close association between
high levels of education (78 per cent have a bachelors degree or higher)
and their socio-economic location in American society (Allard, 2012).
Indian immigrants are likely to come from urban centres – which in
the Indian context indicates a certain modernity, Western orientation
and familiarity with the English language – and also from the mid-
dle and upper classes and castes and are typically trained in medicine,
economics, nursing, engineering or management. The ambitious young
people endowed with cultural, human and social capital are those that
leave for the United States in an attempt to reduce ‘the gap between
available salaries and work conditions in their own countries and those
regarded there as acceptable for people with their education’ (Portes and
Rumbaut, 2006: 18–19). This makes contemporary Indian migration a
selective process.
Understanding return migration
Like emigration, return migration is inherently risky and life-changing.

Often, migrants’ reasons for return are closely linked to those for depar-
ture. Return migration itself may be temporary; after returning home,
migrants may move back to the host country or to a new, third country.
Under the neo-classical approach, which considers wage and employ-
ment differentials to be the key determinants of migration, return
migration suggests that migrants failed abroad or received inadequate
rewards for their human capital. However, as a significant share of inter-
national migrants from poorer nations – economic migrants, refugees
and asylum seekers – return home or migrate to a third country even
when the host country offers higher wages and better employment
prospects, clearly no simple answer exists.
Departing from the neo-classical framework, which perceives
migrants as concerned with maximizing their earnings and the length of
their stay to achieve permanent residency and family reunification, the
new economics of labour migration (NELM) perspective defines return
migration as a ‘calculated strategy’ shaped by migrants’ household
Manashi Ray 79
needs. Migrants travel abroad until they succeed in providing their

household with the income and financial liquidity they had hoped for
(Cassarino, 2004). The skills and education acquired abroad are affected
by the probability of return.
Despite their differences, these two perspectives illuminate migrants’
motives and strategies for migrating, staying and returning home. As
Cassarino (2004: 256) states, ‘whether they are faced with market fail-
ures at home or with a need to compensate for wage differentials
between their countries of origin and their areas of destination, migrants
plan and try to respond to market uncertainties’. Jensen and Pedersen
(2007) clearly substantiate this. Their research examined immigrants’
incentives to leave or stay in Denmark and revealed that entry age, edu-
cation, home country, family ties and labour market success influenced
the decision to return, stay or move to a third country. When immi-
grants could acquire human capital faster in Denmark, or skills and
types of human capital that simply were not available at home, their
decision to return reflected their ability to re-enter their home country
at a higher relative point in the wage distribution. They also found that
immigrants from advanced countries were likely to leave, whereas those
from developing nations tended to stay.
Adhering to the NELM approach, Maron and Connell (2008) found
that Tongan migrants’ motivation to return to their village of Nukunuku
stemmed from their purchasing power and social standing upon their
return. Return decisions, they maintain, are often governed by the accu-
mulation of a target level of savings that would allow the migrants to
enjoy a certain lifestyle back at home, where prices are often lower.
Similarly, with a comprehensive data set covering return migration
from Sweden to Germany, Greece, Italy and the United States during
1968–1996, Klinthall (2003) established that return is likely if migrants’
earning potential increases due to their stay abroad or if the general
wage levels shift in favour of their home country.
Nevertheless, Cassarino (2004) finds major shortcomings in both
frameworks. First, each explains the migrant’s behaviour solely in finan-
cial and economic terms, neglecting how remittances and skills are
used in the home country. Second, neither mentions the home coun-
try’s social, economic and political environment, implying that return
is an isolated action. For example, the NELM framework analyses how
migrants plan and reshape their return strategies and timing, but it does
not look for explanations beyond the household or family.
To address these flaws, the structural approach examines the home
country’s social and institutional factors. In research on Italian returnees
from the United States, Cerase (1974) highlights the crucial role of con-
textual factors at home in making the return a success or a failure.
Similarly, Alberts and Hazen (2005) examined international students’
intentions to stay or return home. They established that professional
advancement and opportunities strongly motivated students to stay in
the United States, whereas personal and societal factors, such as a strong
attachment to their home culture, their family ties and their network,
significantly motivated them to return.
While the structuralist framework helps overcome the myopic view
that only the individual migration experience affects return migra-
tion, it focuses primarily on how returnees’ plans to innovate in their
home countries are likely to conflict with established local power. Scant
interest is given to the process of return migration. Further, as an ana-
lytical framework, it assumes negligible information and skills exchange
between the host and home societies. Its major weakness is that it does
not consider how the return migrant can acquire and deploy the skills
necessary for successful re-entry. Hence, overcoming the NELM and str-
ucturalist viewpoints’ failings requires us to think differently about
return migration – that is, not as the end of a migration cycle but as an
integral part of circular social and economic relationships and exchan-
ges which bring about the movement of people (Cassarino, 2004).
The scholarship on transnationalism and social network analysis,
which emphasizes the maintenance of regular and dynamic linkages
between the home and host societies, explains how influential these
linkages can be for return migration decisions. From the transnational
perspective, the migrants’ subjective perception of their homeland and
their self-definition drive their decision to return. Al-Ali and Koser
(2002) state that the social and economic network of transnational
migrants extends across many societies and nations, and the main char-
acteristic holding the members together is their common home country
or shared background. Their shared ethnicity, kinship linkages, lan-
guage and religious affiliation define the members’ identity and in-group
solidarity and dictate their transnational behaviour and practices. Con-
sequently, this perspective departs from the structuralists’ pessimistic
outlook and focuses on the ease with which returnees fit into the
home society at all levels, well equipped to take advantage of the ‘iden-
tity characteristic’ they attain overseas, while distinguishing themselves
from the locals.
In many ways, the network theory’s view is similar to that of
the transnational perspective, with one major difference: the cross-
border linkages or relationships are devoid of common attributes. This
Manashi Ray 81
difference broadens our understanding, allowing us to apply the com-

plexity of return migration across an extremely heterogeneous group of
return migrants. Further, network membership cannot be assumed, as
networks are selectively organized based on shared interests and require
the approval and support of other members, with a view to ensuring
resource flow and the effectiveness and maintenance of cross-border
linkages.
Network analysis focuses on interpersonal relationships per se, and
on the composition of the networks, which consist of linkage configu-
rations as well as a multiplicity of social structures. Accordingly, network
analysis serves as a relevant theoretical framework to grasp the dialectic
between individuals and structures in the context of initial migration
and return (Gu, 2012). Here, I follow Gold’s (2005) definition of a
network approach, which
emphasizes that migration is embedded in a series of political, ethnic,

familial, and communal relationships and environments, including
some that cross borders. Through it, we see that migrating popula-
tions remain connected to more than one national context . . . . A net-
work approach understands migration as a collective process shaped
by both agency and structure.
This analytical framework helps us appreciate how resources, capi-

tal, knowledge, information, goods and ideas flow through particular
configurations of social ties or bonds (Faist, 2000). It establishes a
socio-historical perspective, showing the influence of previous migra-
tory events on current and future ones. It reveals how migration systems
linking particular countries in precise relationships are shaped through
connections and ties developed from continuous human flows (Meyer,
2001), framing migration not as a one-way path but as a dynamic
process (Mahroum, Eldridge and Daar, 2006).
Like interpersonal relationships, networks provide resources crucial
to returnees’ initiative and success once they return. Such resources lie
embedded in social capital, defined as ‘the ability of actors to secure
benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social
structures’ (Portes, 1998). Social capital therefore is an intangible univer-
sal resource inherent in relationships and presents itself as information
(potential or real) or linkages to other network members, who may be
sources of support or control (Bashi, 2007). However, return migrants
are not homogeneous – they include entrepreneur returnees, migrant
students, refugees and asylum seekers, and highly skilled migrants – so
the context in which social capital is situated and the circumstances

under which it is generated must be considered (Kadushin, 2004), as it is
responsible for various motivations for return. Rogers (1984) states that
broadening the return migration spectrum results in not only diverse
return motivations but also various forms of resource mobilization
depending on migrants’ social locations and characteristics, including
institutional, political and economic conditions in the home country,
labour markets, the welfare system, the business and entrepreneurship
sector, the time spent abroad, legal status, social class, gender, ethnicity
and race, and sexual orientation (Gold, 2005: 260).
What follows is an explanation of the preparedness, motivation
and decision-making process among Indian migrant entrepreneurs who
have returned to India. I do this by analysing how social structures
influenced returnees’ access to networks and the resources they deliver,
which played a decisive role in their actions.
Data sources and sample
The data presented in this chapter is drawn from multi-sited ethno-

graphic field work and 42 in-depth interviews conducted in 2007 and
2011 with Indian migrant and returnee entrepreneurs in multiple urban
centres in the United States and India. As Indian migrants are a widely
dispersed population in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006),
the best way to obtain a fairly representative sample of immigrant and
returnee entrepreneurs from wide-ranging business sectors was to seek
multiple data sources.
First, I gathered information on migrant and returnee entrepreneurs
in both countries by extensively participating and volunteering in
numerous community activities among Indian migrants for 3–4 years
prior to 2007. I attended TiE (The Indus Entrepreneurs) chapter meet-
ings in Chicago and Detroit and social gatherings for Hindu festivals
such as Holi, Navratri, Diwali and so on. On all these occasions, I kept
extensive notes of my observations. Second, I exhaustively used per-
sonal networks of family, kin and friends to gather information about
transnational entrepreneurs residing in both countries. Third, beginning
in 2003 I used public data sources on the web and the mailing lists
of Indian professional and business associations to build a master ros-
ter of potential respondents’ names, office addresses and type/sector of
transnational business in the United States and India.
In India, I visited the office of NASSCOM1 in New Delhi, where I had
lengthy conversations with the secretary and officials of this premier
Manashi Ray 83
trade institution of the IT-BPO industries in India. Finally, to supple-

ment the primary data from interviews, I used secondary data from
the 2000 and 2010 US Decennial Census, the Department of Home-
land Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) for 2010–2011, the
American Community Survey report of 2010, World Bank documents,
Government of India Reports, Pew Research Center and Migration Pol-
icy Institute research publications, newspapers and online articles to
analyse transnational business trends among Indians in the United
States and India.
The next step of the data collection process was to select suit-
able respondents from the master roster, which had information on
more than one hundred entrepreneurs at the time of my initial field-
work in 2007. In order to incorporate multiple perspectives into the
analysis, I employed a stratified purposeful sampling strategy. I cre-
ated a semi-structured interview schedule that contained open- and
closed-ended questions (Legard, 2003) which focused on three major
themes: (a) immigration and return migration (b) the societal or institu-
tional structures that contributed towards respondents’ cultural, human
and social capital, and (c) the respondents’ utilization of diverse net-
works. Follow-up questions were asked to encourage detailed descrip-
tion and in-depth interpretation. The language used in the interviews
was English. The interviews, which ranged in duration from one to
two hours, were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Names have been
changed to protect identity.
The findings presented in this article are from two data sets, compris-
ing 36 men and 6 women. The small number of women in the sample
is due to the difficulties of recruiting women who had been full-time
transnational entrepreneurs for more than five years. A major hurdle
faced by several women entrepreneurs who had chosen to go back
to salaried employment was the strain of balancing frequent foreign
travel with family responsibilities. All subjects of this study were born in
India and were owners and founders or partners in private transnational
businesses for more than five to seven years.
Further, more than half (25 of 42, or 60 per cent) of the respondents
were below the age of 50 or had migrated to the United States in the
period 1980–1999, whereas 40 per cent (17 of 42) were above the age
of 50 or had migrated to the United States between the years 1965 and
1979. One can infer that the imbalance in the ages of the respondents in
this study is reflective of the demographic characteristics of the Indian
population, where 75 per cent of the Indian population is below 35 years
of age (Haub and Sharma, 2006). The two time frames were selected to
capture the influence of the macroeconomic policy changes in India

since it broke from its socialistic past, particularly in assessing respon-
dents’ motivation for migration to the United States and return to India.
India since the 1980s
The death of the formidable Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984

marked the end of socialist-leaning policies in India, replaced by an
embrace of ‘pro-business’ development strategies. The Indian state grad-
ually became highly interventionist2 (Kohli, 2007) by giving precedence
to economic growth as a national goal. But, unlike many of the high-
growth economies in East Asia, the Indian economy has grown within
the framework of a democracy. Its meteoric development was also
accompanied by major changes in foreign policy and outward orienta-
tion which have made India a significant player in the global economy.
Between the 1980s and 2005, the dramatic adjustments in political, eco-
nomic and social policies have transformed the Indian economy from
the world’s 50th largest, in nominal US dollars, to the 10th largest
(Ahmed and Varshney, 2012). Further, Ahmed and Varshney (2012) state
that ‘when income is measured with regard to purchasing power parity,
the Indian economy occupies 4th place, after the United States, Japan
and China’. Concerns over India’s ability to sustain an annual growth
rate of 6 per cent have been replaced by prospects for increasing this
growth rate to 8 per cent (Ahmed, 2007).
One important contributing factor in this phenomenal growth has
been the involvement of Indian expatriates in the United States and
elsewhere in the diaspora, who have played a crucial role in the process
of India’s global integration through the transfer of technology as well
as social and financial remittances (Cheng 1999; Saxenian, 2006, 2008;
Gold, 2007). Today, India is the top international remittance-receiving
nation in the world. During the period 2000–2010, remittances to India
increased from USD 13 billion to an estimated USD 55 billion, an
increase of close to 300 per cent (Guha, 2011). One can claim that
India’s emergence as a top global innovator for high-tech products and
services in the recent years has considerable role to play in the importa-
tion of the technological skills of overseas Indians, which is perceived as
imperative to building India’s national capacity. The Indian state wishes
to maximize ‘brain gain/circulation/return’ and make effective use of
foreign-trained Indian immigrants and nationals as a magnet for foreign
and diasporic investments in knowledge-based industries (Kapur and
Ramamurti, 2001).
Manashi Ray 85
In accordance with this reasoning, the Indian government’s primary

commitment during the 1980s was to achieve economic growth by
establishing Indian businesses. The significant change during this period
was the state’s active participation in promoting the growth of industries
like information technology. The changes in Indian economic policy
during the 1980s and the state’s pro-business attitude generated higher
private investment and an enhanced role for the private sector in the
Indian economy. These internal structural changes in the private sector
set the stage for further reforms in state policies in the 1990s (Ray, 2011).
The notable features of the reforms in the 1990s were in the area of
India’s external economic relations, including trade, foreign investment
and financial relations. Starting in 1991 import quotas were lifted (albeit
not fully until 2001), tariffs declined steadily, the currency was deval-
ued, the foreign investment regime was liberalized and restrictions on
external financial transactions were eased. These were significant macro-
policy changes because they meant that the Indian state had entered
into a new social contract with Indian businesses, putting its full weight
behind them with the understanding that they had to become more
competitive in the international arena.
This opening up of the Indian economy to the global markets
presented a unique opportunity to the overseas Indian migrant com-
munity, and particularly to Indian migrants in the United States in
the technology and financial sectors, to invest and establish business
with India. Given their own professional success and resources, some
members of the Indian migrant community in the United States felt
compelled to actively participate in the economic growth and develop-
ment of India. So by 2002, the combination of a recession in Silicon
Valley, enormous difficulties with complicated and outdated immigra-
tion laws (Wadhwa and Salkever, 2012), and growing professional and
entrepreneurial opportunities in India prompted for the first time a
sustained interest among US educated Indians in STEM fields in return-
ing to India (Saxenian, 2008). The ‘brain drain’ of earlier decades was
reversed, creating the perfect ‘brain gain/circulation’ opportunity for
Indian immigrants in the United States.
‘Time to Go West . . .’: Rationale for migration
Unlike resource-poor immigrants who have a clear motive for migra-

tion, the majority of the respondents in this study, particularly those
who migrated in the 1980s and 1990s, did not perceive their move to the
United States or elsewhere as being for permanent settlement. To ‘return
home’ after a period of time abroad was presumed as the next step. Thus,
to understand their motives for migration it becomes necessary to exam-
ine the migrants’ economic, social and human capital at the time of
entry to the United States – their personal and familial ties and obli-
gations and previous business/work affiliations – all of which provide
information about the existence of various networks that enabled their
migration to the United States and facilitated their return migration to
India (Table 4.1).
Seeking education is the primary motive for migration, accounting
for 50 per cent of the sample. In addition nearly 30 per cent of migrants
relocated through a company transfer to the United States. A smaller
proportion moved to the United States to re-unite with family mem-
bers. The higher proportion of younger Indians choosing to migrate
to the United States for advanced educational opportunities clearly
reveals the extent of macro-structural influence at the individual level,
explained by Cheng and Yang (1998) as the ‘articulation of higher edu-
cation between poor and rich countries since the 1970s’. One result
of the global articulation of higher education has been higher lev-
els of migration from poor to advanced countries by foreign students
who want to pursue global business opportunities or be employable
internationally. Indians are no exception to this phenomenon. A large
number of respondents in the study had attended private English
medium schools in India, and the desire for international mobility as
young adults was a natural extension of the cosmopolitan character
that was cultivated during their school and undergraduate college years
in India. The aspiration for American higher education and personal
ambition was also defined significantly by the economic class of their
birth family. Being a member of the upper or middle class in India
shaped their cultural and moral boundaries3 (Lamont et al., 1996). As a
result the Indian migrant entrepreneurs had cultivated an ambition for
Table 4.1 Motives for emigration to the United States
Motive for emigration Frequency Per cent
Post-graduate training (second degree or 21 50

qualification, masters degree, PhD)
Relocation by company transfer 12 29
Reunification with family 9 21
Total 42 100
Note: This table reflects all 42 respondents of the study.

Source: M. Ray, 2007 & 2011.
Manashi Ray 87
a particular lifestyle, which was tempered by an overarching aware-

ness of the progressive internationalization of science and engineering.
The perceived value of American educational opportunities in science
was summarized by Deepak, a returnee entrepreneur above 50 years
of age.
I came to the US for post-graduate education, because higher education

in Engineering and in any field of Science is considered to be the best here
than anywhere else. I wanted to think big. Studying in IISC4 makes you very
hardworking. You have got to be that way in order to survive there, and it
also opens opportunities for you to grow. But, in the US you learn things a
little differently and at an international level. I learned to cultivate ‘critical
thinking’ about issues. In fact, it becomes a second nature to think out of
the box.
A factor of considerable importance in the context of facilitating

the return decisions of migrant entrepreneurs in the United States is
the strong peer bonding that had grown among different cohorts of
migrants during their undergraduate years in the top-tier undergradu-
ate colleges – like the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)5 and the
professional four-year-degree colleges of State universities. This con-
tributed towards developing migration networks, which assisted in their
initial move to the United States. This college peer network was an
influential source of motivation for the aspiring migrants, who were
largely men. Indian graduate students in US universities encouraged
their peers in India to migrate and established a sort of information sys-
tem guiding their efforts for admission, graduate assistantships, housing
and accommodation and so on. Here is Akash describing the persua-
sive and powerful influence of college peer networks on his desire
to pursue mobility opportunities abroad soon after he completed his
undergraduate studies in India.
After graduating from IIT, I felt a need to go to the US. It was a herd men-
tality. The peer pressure is very high. And, in IITs one gets so many signals
from your seniors [including those who had migrated] and especially
faculty while you are living in the IIT campus that you develop a mindset
for migrating to the US for higher education. Parents too exert the same
pressure. I think I would have got the same education in India that I got
at Virginia Tech, but that would not have changed the way I had thought
then. We are almost brainwashed to go to the US, after having done an
undergraduate degree in engineering at IIT.
With the passage of time the migration networks and the peer bond-
ing among migrants which had assisted in bringing them to the
United States evolved into transnational business networks with the
establishment of resourceful, ethnicized global organizations for Indian
entrepreneurs (such as TiE) or alumni organizations (such as Pan IIT).
The 29 per cent of migrants who moved to the United States on behalf
of the Indian multinational companies they worked for were sent for
the purpose of expanding their companies’ American operations. For
the migrants themselves, the rationale behind their move from India
was to advance their career goals and the ability to provide their chil-
dren international education and exposure. Often the idea of relocation
was floated by the migrants themselves and later supported by their
peers and superiors in their company, both in India and their com-
pany’s overseas operations. Therefore, the social capital embedded in
personal relationships that originated among close friends in India and
abroad was employed in forming these respondents’ migratory network
configurations.
Very few Indian women entrepreneurs in the sample migrated to the
United States for higher education while single. These women stated
that the motive for their migration was linked to their fiancés, who were
in the United States at the time of their migration. Their decision to
move to the United States was guided by the presence of their future
husbands. So the general trend of ‘migration through education’ (Gu,
2012) played out differently for men and women. Of those migrants in
the sample who moved for the purpose of family reunification, far more
migrant women in this category entered the United States as spouses.
Conventional gender roles certainly interfered with autonomous female
migration, as Indian women are assumed to place their reproductive
and household duties before the pursuit of higher education that could
enable them to obtain a leadership role in workplace.
It is interesting to note that although it might appear that the move
to the United States by the highly skilled immigrants in this sample
was an independent and voluntary decision, it was in fact guided to
a large extent by the social capital derived from the strong 6 (Harvey,
2008) or interpersonal ties7 (Poros, 2001) of friendship embedded in
their social migration networks. Their actions were directed by the nor-
mative content of trust and obligatory assistance of college peers and
family members. Primarily, these norms of reciprocity, trust and iden-
tity had developed among the Indian migrants through their common
experiences as undergraduate students at the same institutions in India.
Manashi Ray 89
To stay or not to stay: Rationale for return
The Indian migrant entrepreneurs in this research can be character-

ized according to the decades in which they migrated, with a distinct
division between two periods: from 1965 until the end of the 1970s
and from the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s. The migrants who
moved during the former period were typically between 51 and 65 years
old at the time of interview, had left India to improve their quality of
life and had for the most part settled in the host country. Migrants
in the later period were younger, with most being below 50 years of
age, and included a large contingent of return migrants. The returnee
entrepreneurs in particular perceived American higher education as a
way to build their competitive advantage at an international level.
For the returnee entrepreneurs, therefore, leaving for the United States
and subsequently returning to India was an expected progression of
life events for the advancement of their global entrepreneurship, as
expressed by Kapil:
The word migration is strong in my case. I don’t think I migrated. I trav-

eled to the US for higher education. I worked for a couple of years so that
I could build my financial capital and business network before returning
home. I had always wanted to come back to India to start my business.
No question about it.
Out of the entire sample of 42 migrants to the United States, 12 men

and 5 women migrants decided to return to India between 1988 and
2002 (see Table 4.2). All but three returnee entrepreneurs had received
graduate education in an American university. Six of the returnees
were above the age of 50 at the time of interview, and 11 respondents
were younger. The transnational business sectors of returnees covered
a wide range of fields, including pharmaceuticals, international finan-
cial services, crafts and textiles, car sales, entertainment, publishing and
building/construction. Only three returnees had retired from their long
careers as salaried professionals in government and private sector jobs
in the United States, contradicting much of the literature on return
migration, which typifies returnees as retirees. Six of the respondents
had lived in other countries besides the United States, five of them hav-
ing travelled to these other countries before entering the United States.
All the returnees were married and had children. Many of the children
were born abroad. The returnees had spent between 5 and 20 years
90
Table 4.2 Profile of returnee transnational entrepreneurs in India
Name Age Sex Class Year of Year of Destination Overseas education/ Current
migration return to and length of employment business sector
India time overseas in India
Gowri <50 Female Middle 1995 2000 USA 5 University/IT company Bio-science
Rukmini >50 Female Upper 1983 1995 Germany 3 UK Housewife/university/ Publishing
2 USA 7 multinational services in
publishing company scientific,
medical and
technical fields
Kavita <50 Female Middle 1990 2000 USA 10 University/ Pharmaceuticals
pharmaceutical
company
Radha <50 Female Middle 1989 1999 Japan 5 USA 5 Housewife/university/ Textiles and
consultant craft
Simi >50 Female Middle 1977 1990 UK 3 USA 10 Housewife/furniture Craft and
company/interior carpets
decoration
Kapil <50 Male Rich 1985 1997 USA 12 University/bank and International
IT company Finance
Sanjay <50 Male Middle 1988 2002 USA 14 University/ IT
multinational company
Akash <50 Male Middle 1981 1992 USA 11 University/IT company IT
Ravi >50 Male Middle 1976 1995 Canada 8 Multinational Agro-industry
USA 11 company/businessman/
social and
environmental activist
Suraj >50 Male Middle 1972 1988 USA 16 University/ Agro-industry
multinational agro
company
Amar <50 Male Middle 1981 2001 USA 20 IT company/university/ IT
IT entrepreneur
Kunal >50 Male Rich 1980 2000 UK 7 University/IT company/ IT
Switzerland 5 IT entrepreneur
USA 8
Madhav <50 Male Rich 1990 2000 USA 10 University/family Real estate and
business construction
Raj <50 Male Middle 1992 2000 USA 8 University/auto Auto industry
company
Shekar <50 Male Middle 1991 2002 USA 11 University/global Author/technical
publishing company/ publishing
environmental activist
Girish <50 Male Middle 1995 2002 USA 7 University/ Advertising
entertainment and event
company management
Deepak >50 Male Rich 1986 2001 USA 12 University professor/ International
Ireland 3 bank/financial finance
consultant
Source: Ray, 2011.

91
overseas – as graduate students, salaried professionals, or entrepreneurs

and consultants – before making the decision to return to India.
Diverse and varied networks were employed by returnee entrepreneurs
in the different business sectors for their preparation and return to
India. For the eight returnee entrepreneurs in the technical sector, the
significant contributions of the earlier cohort of pioneer migrants can
be credited for facilitating the return to India. Indian migrants who
had moved to the United States in the 1970s and founded technol-
ogy companies in Silicon Valley and elsewhere in the United States had
the foresight to establish global entrepreneurial networks – for exam-
ple, TiE – which have proven to be an extremely valuable mechanism
for global business in the technology sector for immigrant and returnee
entrepreneurs in many countries, including India and the United States.
Over the years, TiE has become a formidable platform to allow success-
ful Indian immigrant entrepreneurs in the technology sector to share
their resources, information and knowledge with other aspiring Indian
entrepreneurs.8
At another level, technology entrepreneurs who immigrated in the
1970s and who had graduated from top-tier educational institutions in
India made serious efforts and commitments to the growth and develop-
ment of entrepreneurial networks involving alumni of their alma mater,
such as the Pan IIT networks. I argue that the transnational alumni and
global professional networks (Vertovec, 2002) served as a bridgehead in
encouraging the return of migrants in the high-tech sector from the
United States to India in the 1990s and afterwards, just as it had assisted
them in migrating to the United States a decade or two before.
For the younger generation of returnee entrepreneurs, returning to
India made perfect business sense when considering the economic fac-
tors in India that would support their enterprises: the availability of
cheaper skilled labour, a booming Information Technology industry,
access to financial capital and – above all – a stable, open, complemen-
tary macro-political and economic environment. This macro-structural
combination was just right to allow them to compete in the tough global
environment. The entrepreneurial atmosphere in India had changed
significantly from the state-controlled socialism prior to the 1980s.
The prevailing atmosphere of neo-liberalism enabled the growth of
middle- and small-scale indigenous entrepreneurship among new and
first-generation Indians who had no political access or capital but
plenty of verve and ambition to challenge old monopolies owned
by business families (Nilekani, 2009). Consequently, the perception
among the returnee entrepreneurs and across Indian industries was that
Manashi Ray 93
they were in a position of unique strength in the international econ-

omy (Kamdar, 2007; Nilekani, 2009; Bardhan and Kroll, 2012). This
perception was based on the success of domestic IT firms – Infosys,
Wipro, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) – in the international mar-
ket, infra-structural investment in research and development, as well as
outsourcing of software projects by established multinational firms like
Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, Texas Instruments9 (Saxenian,
2012) and others because of the recession in the Silicon Valley around
2000.10 Return migrants’ enthusiasm for the high quality of business
and work opportunities and the promise of more career growth in India
was expressed by Sanjay as follows:
This is the third wave for India. The first wave was to build software
applications for back end functions, the second wave was all around BPO
services [business process outsourcing], and the third wave is what is
happening now where start ups and established players are building their
products in India. Today we have all the leading software industries in the
US as our clients, be it Google, Oracle, Yahoo etc. If I had remained in the
US, I would have missed the bus.
Although a similar sentiment was shared by migrant entrepreneurs who

were above the age of 50 years, they preferred to express it from afar.
Many of the migrants in this age group felt abandoned and neglected
by the Indian state, until the last few years. It is true that traditionally
India had maintained a distance from the Indian diaspora and thwarted
the gestures of goodwill and support for development from its emigrant
community up to the time it embarked on the path of global integration
in 1990 (Khanna, 2007).
Migrants’ decision and act of return were preceded by the necessary
‘preparation’ phase. Several returnee migrants in IT or IT-related busi-
nesses functioned as business partners, consultants/advisors or angel
investors11 for technology firms in India prior to their return. In the
role of business contact in the United States, these entrepreneurs pro-
vided Indian technology companies with critical contacts, information
and cultural know-how that linked the companies to the United States
and global economies. These kinds of transnational business connec-
tions expanded the returnee entrepreneurs’ social networks and business
relationships, which in turn made their decision to return easier. Many
of the returnees in the technology field had cultivated enduring infor-
mal and formal ties with start-up Indian tech companies even while
working at salaried jobs in the United States. For example, this is how
Kunal – who typifies others in the sample – described the role of pre-
return connections and preparations in his decision to return to India.
Returning to India permanently was not a big decision for me. I had got
married to a woman from Pune, who had mentioned at the time of our
wedding she would want to live in India. I finished my doctoral studies
and got a job almost immediately, then we had our first child . . . I had
everything going for me actually . . . But, my wife felt very strongly about
returning to India [but] I was ambivalent. But, I must say returning to
India fitted well with my plans of starting a tech company of my own. So,
when the opportunity came my way to join P . . . as a board member, I was
delighted and grabbed it. P . . . was a fledging technology company of my
buddies I had known at IIT. Linking up with my college friends made the
transition to India easy . . . I had left for the US in 1980, as part of the herd
from IIT. I had mentioned to my parents that I would return to India [in]
4–5 years. What changed was the number of years got extended, but I had
not totally abandoned the idea of returning to India.
Therefore, return migrants in the tech sector were not simply mov-
ing in a vacuum between supply and demand situations in India
and the United States. Their movements and entrepreneurial activities
resulted from the collective actions of many others who shared a com-
mon cultural and social capital that can be historically and physically
contextualized (Meyer, 2001).
On the other hand, the return entrepreneurs in the non-tech sectors –
agro business, crafts, textiles, the auto industry, real estate and con-
struction, advertising and entertainment – mainly used family business
connections and ethnic, religious, trade and peer networks to facili-
tate their return to India. Most of the return migrants in this category
belonged to medium and big business families in India, in which migra-
tion to the United States and return was perceived as a family strategy
and a business plan for expanding the markets for their products and
services. Their movement across countries and eventual return to India
adheres to the theoretical concepts of the NELM (discussed earlier).
Similar to the entrepreneurs in the tech sector, the men in this group
had migrated to the United States in pursuit of higher education; the
women, however, had emigrated as spouses. The women migrants later
obtained American higher education degrees or had an apprenticeship
with business firms in the United States, which emboldened them to
start their own business enterprise. For the women returnees, migra-
tion and return were ‘tied moves’, reflecting both patriarchal and family
Manashi Ray 95
connections. Quite similar to Chamberlain’s (1997) research focusing on

West Indian (Barbadian) migration to Britain and back, in this case too,
the family played a significant role as both the end goal and the means
to achieve global migration and return.
For both men and women in this group their economic activities
and personal behaviour were shaped and controlled by their respective
ethno-religious business community in the Indian diaspora, such as the
the Sindhi, Sikh and Gujarati diasporas. If the migrants in such diasporas
did not meet their community’s expectations, they would run the risks
of loss of financial resources and close ties, and so on. Hence the deci-
sions to return to India to some extent were dictated by the solidarity
and expectations of their family business and community ties upon the
occurrence of some significant event, like the death of a family member
or the expansion and diversification of the family business. Conse-
quently, return migrants in non-tech sectors relocated with their fam-
ilies close to the cities and regions where their family business was situ-
ated, for example, in Varanasi, Lucknow, Kolkata and Bombay. Respon-
dents Simi, Radha and Suraj relocated because the physical sites for
their business in India were places of traditional skill and craft, or con-
tained natural resources that was required for preserving and nurturing
their consumer goods. These entrepreneurs conceived of their location
as the locus from which global networks originated. In the words of one
of them:
My parents and my team of workers with whom I set up this business were
located in Y . . . I have never dreamt of taking my business anywhere else.
If I had to set up my business in any other city in India I would have faced
major competition. Besides, I am close to all the villages where I work, and
live close enough to factories where all the stuff [hand crafted textiles
and crafts] that I sell is made. Why on earth should I go elsewhere?
While available peer, community and family business networks were

essential, there were other decisive factors the returnee entrepreneurs
took into consideration in coming to the decision to return to India. The
return migrants’ new ways of imagining migration and return and future
work were guided as much by their own personal life-stage transition
issues, nostalgia for the Indian way of life and feelings of nationalism as
by the possibility of taking advantage of business opportunities in India,
thanks to support from their well-established entrepreneurial networks,
the enabling macro-business environment in India and their personal
endowment of human and social capital. So, for the return migrant
entrepreneurs it was the convergence of a set of factors at the most

opportune time that prompted their decision to return.
Kavita, a woman returnee entrepreneur, expressed that her decision
to return with her family was motivated as much by her desire to
give her children an Indian education and knowledge of Indian cul-
ture and languages as well as to care for her elderly parents as by career
considerations.
My daughter was young when we decided it was time we moved back to

India. That is why we had not bought any property in the US, nor had
any investment. All our money was in stocks. If I had waited until my
child went to middle or high school it would be difficult for her to adjust to
Indian schools. It’s a combination of reasons which prompts you to decide
where you want to do your business, so it wasn’t just one reason.
It is evident that for some returnees having children abroad did not
necessarily prevent return migration, but those with children in their
teens or older were obviously hesitant to move back to India. Indian
migrants who had left India in the mid- or late 1970s often expressed
that it would be an uphill battle for their older children to fit into Indian
society and the education system. So, by the time other circumstances
might have induced them to return to India, it was too late.
Some returnees indicated that their feelings about distance and their
stage of life played a role in their decision to return to India. For
return migrants of both genders, territorial meanings, identification and
attachment proved to be a powerful incentive to live in India. They
perceived their act of return as a chance to fulfil their nationalistic
and other dreams, as conveyed by Kunal, a senior returnee who had
lived overseas for 20 years in the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the
United States, and who had started his transnational business in the
United States in 1985, before deciding to return to India permanently
in 2000.
Very soon after graduating with a PhD in Economics, I had a job and
within the next two to three years I had everything going for me. So, my
thoughts of making an impact on India came back. Thankfully, this was
the time when the IT revolution was taking off in India. So with the coming
of Information Technology age, I felt I got the opportunity for what I had
long since wanted to do that is to integrate work with other aspects of life –
a holistic approach to living. In order to make the broadest impact I settled
on doing what one would consider low tech work. It allowed me to create
Manashi Ray 97
plenty of jobs in those segments of the population which was unemployable

in India at that time.
The age of the migrants in the context of life-course transitions is sig-

nificant, as it was factored in their decision-making about returning to
India. Most of the return migrants, particularly those younger than 50,
felt strongly that they were at a stage in life that entailed unique rela-
tionships and roles, such as caring for elderly parents or being a parent,
that went along with certain responsibilities that could be best fulfilled
in India. Although family roles and responsibilities are not the only type
of relationships that were important for the returnee entrepreneurs, they
did assume a prominent place in the definition of this stage in their
individual lives (Elder 1998; White and Klein, 2002; Elder, Johnson and
Crosnoe, 2003). When analysed from a life-course perspective (Lauer
and Wong, 2010), the historically unique cultural and contextual forces
that the migrants interacted with, such as patriotism and parenthood,
set the trajectory of this life stage.
Conclusion
In this research, using the case of returnee transnational entrepreneurs

migrating from the United States back to India, I provide evidence that
return migration is a diverse and a complex process, where multiple
social, economic and cultural factors come into play both in emigra-
tion from India and in returning to the home country. I emphasize
how migratory and global entrepreneurial, college alumni and family
networks functioned as a source of social capital which facilitated the
entry of highly skilled Indian migrants to the United States and later
the return of these migrants to India. However, underlying the general
pattern of migration, there were social and cultural differences between
subgroups of migrants from different business sectors, which had a bear-
ing on migrants’ return decisions. In addition, the age and gender of
the returnees weighed appreciably in their considerations. Further, it is
obvious that macroeconomic changes in India altered the factors that
had motivated migrants to leave their home country, often resulting
in a shorter duration of stay overseas compared to migrants who had
emigrated before 1980.
The findings from this study suggest a new understanding of the rela-
tionship between emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving countries
in this current moment of capitalism. In doing so, the chapter shifts the
debate beyond the macro push-and-pull factors in different countries
to micro-meso level dynamics as major explanatory factors of what

actually motivates migration and return decisions.
Notes
1. National Association of Software and Services Companies. As of 2008 it had
a membership of 1,300 Indian and multinational companies, who have a
broad presence in India in the businesses of software development, software
services, software products, consulting services, business process outsourcing
(BPO) services, e-commerce and web services, engineering services, off
shoring, animation and gaming.
2. A. Kohli, ‘State, Business, and Economic Growth in India’, Studies in Compar-
ative International Development 42, no. 1–2 (2007): 87–114, on 89, defines an
‘interventionist state’ to be one that prioritizes economic growth as a state
goal and that therefore ruthlessly supports capitalists, represses labour, mobi-
lizes economic nationalism to act as a social glue and channels firm activities
to produce both for protected domestic markets and for exports.
3. M. Lamont et al., ‘Cultural and Moral Boundaries in the United States:
Structural Position, Geographic Location, and Lifestyle Explanations’, Poetics
24 (1996), on 34, explain that ‘cultural boundaries [are] based on self-
actualization (including intellectual curiosity), manners, tastes, education,
and appreciation of high culture. Those who feel superior towards peo-
ple who are less culturally sophisticated than themselves are said to draw
cultural boundaries.’ Similarly, moral boundaries are drawn on the basis
of moral character. Character is comprised of qualities such as honesty,
work ethic, personal integrity, sexuality, religiosity and consideration for
others.
4. IISc is the Indian Institute of Science, a premier institution of higher
education and scientific research in India.
5. These are a group of autonomous public institutes of higher education in
engineering. There are seven IITs at present.
6. W.S. Harvey, ‘Strong or Weak Ties? British and Indian Expatriate Scientists
Finding Jobs in Boston,’ Global Networks 8, no. 4 (2008), on 456–457, defines
‘strong ties’ as relationships with close friends, family members, spouses,
close office/work colleagues, school or college mates or peers, whereas
‘weak ties’ are relationships with business associates from other companies,
acquaintances or people who are less well known to the individual.
7. M.V. Poros, ‘The Role of Migrant Networks in Linking Local Labor Mar-
kets: The Case of Asian Indian Migration to New York and London’, Global
Networks 1, no.3 (2001), on 245, distinguishes between interpersonal and
organizational ties. Interpersonal ties are social relationships with fam-
ily members, relatives and friends. Organizational ties are the mediating
structures of firm/organization/school networks, which include social rela-
tionships with colleagues, fellow alumni, supervisors and so on. Sometimes
interpersonal ties of family and friendship exist within organizations.
8. The founding members of TiE included three of the most successful older
Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley: Suhas Patil, former MIT professor
and founder of Cirrus Logic; Prabhu Goel, founder of Gateway Design
Manashi Ray 99
Automation; and Kanwal Rekhi, founder of Exelan, which merged with

Novell. At present, TiE has 53 chapters in 12 countries spread across five
continents. Source: TiE.
9. Saxenian (2006), The New Argonauts, on 274–287, states that in the 1980s and
1990s a small but significant cohort of US-educated Indian engineers (NRIs)
played a critical role in convincing the management of their respective US
corporations that India was the best location for their software development
centres and encouraged the use of Indian firms as outsourcing partners. They
also initiated an ongoing dialogue with Indian policy makers and laid the
foundation for cooperation between Indian government officials and the
successive generation of American multinationals.
10. The economic recession in the early 2000s was felt mostly in Western coun-
tries, and affected the United States mostly in 2002 and 2003. This sequence
of events is also commonly known as the IT boom of the 1990s followed by
the IT bust of 2000, when many service jobs were outsourced to India.
11. An angel investor is an affluent individual who provides capital for a business
start-up, usually in exchange for ownership equity.
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5
Bangladeshi Diaspora: Cultural
Practices and Development
Linkages
A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah
Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a growing recognition of the
contribution that diaspora makes to the economic development of their
country of origin. This is largely due to the fact that their contributions
form a significant source of external capital for developing countries.
However, the general assumption is that the diasporic community trans-
fers less money than the economic migrants. The stunning change
in the diaspora linkage in China and India, in terms of the flow of
investments and social links, has dispelled this long-standing assump-
tion, setting a precedent for many developing economies in the world.
More than 70 million Chinese and 30 million Indian diaspora are liv-
ing abroad permanently, whereas about only 2 million Bangladeshis
are living abroad permanently. While 70 per cent of the Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) flow in China came from the overseas Chinese (Sinha,
Kent and Shomali, 2007), Bangladesh has experienced a declining trend.
Garbin pinpoints the dwindling flow of investments to the shifts in
the financial relationships of Bangladeshi diaspora with their kin in
Bangladesh (Garbin, 2005). During the 1960s and 1970s, 85 per cent of
them were remitting their savings back home. However, it took a dras-
tic drop to 20 per cent in 1995. I argue that the obvious erosion of the
roots of the first generation and further erosions of the second genera-
tion with the origin may explain this diminishing trend. Holding on to
the roots and maintaining the linkage (development or otherwise) are
largely related to holding on to the origin culture.
103
104 Bangladeshi Diaspora, Culture and Development
Diaspora is a significant agent in the economic development for their

origin countries because of their monetary inputs. Although they are
far away from their homeland, they are still connected to it in differ-
ent ways. Diaspora has become one of the critical factors in the realm
of international, political and economic landscape since it encompasses
relations between governments and their residents who live in the coun-
try or who live abroad, and at the same time it covers the mutual
relations between host countries and the sending ones.
This chapter does not intend to distinguish Bangladeshi diaspora and
transnational Bangladeshis. Of course, this is more of a conceptual dis-
course. However, for obvious reasons, economic migrants are not part
of the debate in this chapter. In terms of social and cultural needs, they
build and maintain relationships with Bangladesh. Garbin (2005: 2)
argues that transnational ties are not only limited to Bangladesh but
they go beyond to North America, Middle East and many other places.
However, the ties they maintain with Bangladesh are connected to fil-
ial feeling, culture and altruism. These ties can also be linked to many
aspects such as religious rituals, exchange of gifts, online communi-
cation and matrimonial links. The host country reaps benefits from
economic and human resources (IOM, 2004: 8). Diaspora members are
connected to the host state by their physical existence and to their
homeland virtually. This was made possible through the advent of new
technologies. Diaspora plays a significant role in the development of the
country of origin and it is a mutual responsibility between diaspora and
governments of homeland.
The chapter highlights that diaspora maintains a ‘different’ kind of
development linkage from that of the conventional economic and tem-
porary migrants with their origin. With time, as diaspora members
establish themselves financially in the host country, they tend to lose
connection with their roots. The conventional development linkage of
investing at the origin holds true for countries like China and India.
State policy has to be accordingly in place in order to attract direct
investment from the diaspora.
Against this backdrop, this chapter argues that Bangladeshi diaspora
maintains weaker linkage with their country of origin than the Indian
and Chinese diaspora. It goes on to argue that their linkage obviously
is weaker than the other classes of migrants, and it gets weaker for
the next and next generations (see Figure 5.1), which will impact the
contribution to development.
This chapter explores why Bangladeshi diaspora linkage, despite the
reputation of altruism and family ties, has been decaying and how the
A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah 105
One parent
from
country A
One parent
from Reside in
country B country D
Child born
in country
C
Figure 5.1 Ambivalent identity
decaying trend in linkage has impacted development in Bangladesh.

This study further delves into the trend from cultural decaying to
cultural demise across generations of South Asian diaspora in North
America, especially in Canada. While doing so, the chapter presents
interesting practices of cultural traits among Bangladeshi diasporas in
Canada. A set of policy recommendations have been made so as to ini-
tiate linkage building with the diaspora to make them a part of the
national development process.
This chapter is based on both qualitative and quantitative
research. Due to logistical inconvenience, the scope of the research has
been limited to Bangladeshi-Canadians only. Both diaspora and eco-
nomic migrants have been included in this study. In-depth interviews
were conducted through a well-designed questionnaire with both open-
and closed-ended questions for analysis.
Cultural decay and development impact
Human beings move to places where they face different culture, eth-
nic, social, economic and political differences (Rai & Sankaran, 2011: 5),
and that is how diverse communities come into place. However, the
community members do not lose their identities; rather, they are deeply
interlinked with their own identities. In this circumstance, the role of
a family is critical in forming bridges between generations by being

supportive of their children. Evidence shows that cross-cultural mar-
riages or relationships are often not accepted by parents and result in
violence, honour killing and forced marriages (Thomson, 2007: 3).
It is a fact that some interesting and emerging dynamics of migration
research escapes the attention of migration scholars, and diaspora is one
such aspect. Few issues arise when we talk about the host and homeland.
King and Christou (2010) have refined the phenomenology of the sec-
ond, third and next generations. Primarily, the questions arise when the
second generation is the offspring of parents of two different immigrant
national origins; second, how does one define host-country-born indi-
viduals when one parent is first generation and the other second? Given
the practice among many ethnic communities of seeking spouses for
the second generation in the home country and then ‘importing’ them
through ‘marriage migration’ (Ullah, 2012), this category of offspring is
becoming increasingly common and is sometimes between second and
third generation (King & Christou, 2010). Third, how do we describe
individuals who are born in the host country but are then sent back to
their ‘home’ countries for part of their schooling? How should a child be
culturally lessoned when he or she is born to parents from two different
countries, living in a third country where the child was born and later
on settled in another, perhaps fourth country? The child obviously faces
challenges in terms of identity; there is confusion regarding what lan-
guage is to be spoken, what cultural mores are to be adopted and what
religion is to be followed.
The deeper one is culturally engaged with the country of origin, the
higher is the likelihood of maintaining linkage with the origin by ways
of investing and communicating with friends and relatives. This com-
munity serves as fertile locations for the development of hybrid cultures,
that is, cultures that incorporate elements from both the home and host
cultures (Oh & Kilduff, 1997).
Some parents make great efforts to keep their children abreast of the
culture and language – ‘Wherever you live in, Bangladesh is your ances-
tral place, your root and origin, you cannot forget it.’ In my interview with
the second generation of Bangladeshis, I noticed that they pronounced
the word ‘Bangladesh’ differently (kind of Bengladish), and it sounded
queer and even disrespectful. Their spoken language was peppered with
English and Bengali, which sounded awkward to me.
This hierarchy may not apply in the case of those placed in the
ambivalent identity (Figure 5.2). The orientation of the generation, who
grew up in an ambivalent condition, is different from those who grew
First
generation
Second Decay trend

generation
Third
generation
Fourth
generation
...
Figure 5.2 Generation hierarchy
up in the non-ambivalent condition. Therefore, the strength of cul-

tural ties would vary between these two groups. There have been serious
debates on whether the theory of assimilation and the theory of melt-
ing pot have anything to do with the linkage with the origin. Social
scientists argue that melting pots are created when there are oppor-
tunities for better life in a foreign land. The notion comes from the
pot in which metals are melted at great heat, melting together into
new compounds, with great strength and other combined advantages.
These opportunities were considered tantamount to assimilation tech-
nology. This technology would transform immigrants of different ethnic
and religious groups into a single group sharing a common culture –
developing common attitudes, values and lifestyles (Bisin and Verdier,
2000). Laura (2000) echoes this point, stating that societies formed by
immigrant cultures, religions and ethnic groups produce new hybrid
social and cultural forms. During my interview, I noticed that some of
the respondents from the first generations totally disagreed with the
concept. They considered this idea an insult to them. In their words,
they said, ‘We remain as we were. We have not changed. We do not
want to change. This country will rather change to our culture.’ There
are arguments and counter-arguments that assimilation is a racist termi-
nology, based on the notion that each immigrant’s or family’s culture of
origin is respected as independent; hence, they are not expected to melt.

Some argue that melting character, in fact, results in assimilation (Laura,
2000). The notion of assimilation implies the ability of new or subordi-
nate groups to affect the values of the dominant group. Sometimes, it
is referred to as amalgamation, as opposed to both, assimilation and
pluralism.
One respondent was quick to point out the usage of French language
in Canada. ‘Look, since French people are here, the Canadian government
is forced to accept this French as the second language. French people are not
forced to speak English.’ Truly, this fact dispels the melting pot theory.
This implies that diaspora has influenced host-country culture. Now a
question may arise as to why the assimilated people have to maintain
linkage with their country of origin? Though they are assimilated, it
does not necessarily mean that they are totally free from discrimina-
tion and prejudices in the host country. The differences in the diaspora,
with regard to skin colour and ethnic origin, from the host denizens are
reasons for discrimination. In their attempt to compensate, Bangladeshi
diaspora population tends to live more lavishly than they can afford. For
instance, unemployed people, who live on government social services,
buy expensive cars to show off during social gatherings. This implies
that they are in a way struggling in their country of destination. In this
circumstance, how fair and logical is it to invest in the country of origin?
There are members of diaspora who desire to invest in the country
of their ancestors primarily because they want to stay connected or
get reconnected. Some want to spend their retired life in their country
of origin. They find their life in the host country to be too mechan-
ical, devoid of human feelings. According to a respondent, ‘I find no
taste in food; no heart among people, only fake laugh; and pretend
to be happy.’ The Sylheti community in the United Kingdom is an
excellent example for this. Individually, the Sylheti community brought
about development in this district by building and renovating houses
through the remittances sent by the Sylheti diaspora in the United
Kingdom. In this instance, had there been appropriate guiding poli-
cies, Sylhet could have been an industrialized zone in Bangladesh today.
Development is defined, in a broad sense, as the sustainable economic
growth, poverty reduction, social advancement, human empowerment
and socio-economic equity. Individual or collective initiatives within
a diasporic community can contribute to one or more of these goals.
However, the sentimental attachment diaspora may harbour for their
countries of birth may not automatically engender mutually beneficial
outcomes. For this to occur, appropriate and timely policies need to be
put in place to recognize and harness the potential contributions and

the beneficial interaction with diaspora in support of development and
growth in both their home and host countries.
Prior to formulating a policy, to link diaspora to the development pro-
cess of origin country and engaging in activities with expatriates and/or
their associations, policy makers should have a clear idea of their own
development needs and gaps that need to be bridged and the potential
contributions diaspora could make to achieve these goals, as well as of
the diaspora’s own development agenda. Such considerations must be
accommodated within a broad context that accords due consideration
to both home- and host-country perspectives. Seen from that perspec-
tive, diaspora development policies are at the cross-roads of home- and
host-country interests.
‘Diasporic communities’ may hold multiple homes. I coin this
as ‘hyphenated national’; for instance, American-Indians, British-
Bangladeshi, Chinese-Filipino and Canadian-Bangladeshis. This implies
that this community may take a confused identity and carry a blurred
tie with their origins. Nonetheless, they tend to believe that the desti-
nation nations are their primary and permanent countries of residence.
Therefore, they are not obligated in any way towards the development
of their country of origin. This may not hold true for the first genera-
tion, who were probably not born in the destination countries, but this
is very applicable for the future generations.
Nonetheless, some diaspora groups have been heavily involved in
investing in their home countries in different ways. For example,
70 per cent of the total FDI in China is constituted by investments
from the Chinese diaspora (Sinha, Kent and Shomali, 2007). However,
overseas Bangladeshis generally remit for purposes like maintaining
household and family expenses for own or extended families, neigh-
bours and friends; to undertake social welfare activities; for charity; or
to support during natural disasters. This means that there are no capital
inflows contributing to the development of their home countries.
Diaspora engagement classified
In my informal interview about intentions to invest in Bangladesh,

I observed the emergence of three groups of diaspora in Canada: totally
disinclined to invest, indecisive but have potential and those who have
already invested. The totally disinclined group does not find any good
reason to maintain linkage of any kind with their country of origin.
Although, I would not say all of their rationales for extreme reluctance
about Bangladesh are fair, there are no strong counter-arguments to

dissipate their rationales either. Interestingly, this group constitutes of
people from the first generation. They wondered why they should invest
in the country that they left with resentment and discontentment.
Many of them had investments in Bangladesh before they moved over
to Canada, but their life was marred by local hooligans who used to
threaten or forcefully shut their companies and also demand tolls. Law
enforcement agencies, unfortunately, were on the side of hooligans.
At some point, they had to sell off their company before leaving for
Canada.
My brother is a businessman in Australia. I asked him for money to

invest jointly and he did. I also started a business in Ashulia, Dhaka
and I invested about TK 100,000,000. The company could not move
forward as we had to wait for a year for gas connection. We could not
take the shock of the loss.
This respondent further added that he had to sell most of his assets to
pay the salary of his employees for one year and also for bribes to gov-
ernment officials to have the gas supply connected. He sold his factory
with a loss of about 30 per cent. He questioned, ‘why should I go back
there? What has it given me, except pain and more pain? We even had to pay
bribes at the airport. No more, enough’, some others voiced out,
we have cut off the connection totally. No more. It gives pain. Two
of my brothers were killed by opposition party leaders. No one was
arrested. They were at large. Law enforcement agencies knew who
the killers were. Our family used to receive death threat every day
from the killers. Police kept saying that they were investigating. Every
moment in Bangladesh was like a hell for us.
For the group that was indecisive yet had potential, investment required
specialist expertise and orientation which was lacking in them. They
would consider investing if more conducive conditions are created in
Bangladesh. Unfortunately, the investment climate in Bangladesh is
adverse in terms of infrastructure, political instability unpredictable
inflation, uncertainty of gas and electricity supply and frequent pol-
icy changes in tandem with election of new governments. Also, this
group considers themselves non-entrepreneurial. They fear the volatile
political climate in the country. ‘I was seriously considering putting some
investment in the country. A feasibility assessment was done, talked to a
number of friends and relatives. Frankly, I was not given any assurance. I was
discouraged.’
This group constitutes of both first and second generations. It was
clear that the second generation was unenthusiastic because they were
not sure how to start a business in a country which they never lived
in. However, I met some who are already investors, and interestingly
they started out by investing in the stock exchange market as a test case.
These existing investors lost their capital in stock market investment
and they clearly mentioned that the government had underhandedly
manipulated the market. Some of them said that their investments have
jeopardized their lives in their country. Another reason for their reluc-
tance in investing in Bangladesh was the widespread corruption and
hassle. According to one Canadian-Bangladeshi, who invested in an air-
line business in 2010, he was not able to start his business because of
government corruption and lack of support as he refused to offer bribes.
He had invested huge amounts of money buying aircrafts but had to
phase out his business and leave the country. This case has received
wide media coverage in late 2011 and this may have an impact on future
diaspora investments.
There are binary subgroups of entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs with capi-
tal and non-entrepreneurs with capital. Other than in Bangladesh, most
entrepreneurs with capital have also invested elsewhere which means
that their investment linkage has nothing to do with patriotism or
altruism. They will do it if they have to. The other subgroup, the non-
entrepreneurs with capital, lacks opportunities in their host countries,
so they explore avenues to invest in their home countries and uncover
many competitive advantages.
Those who are already in business are disillusioned and fear for the
future of their business. One respondent mentioned how he invested
in a clinic, in partnership with his physician friends. He gradually lost
interest as he was not making any profits and running into losses.
I started garment business in Bangladesh almost 10 years ago. My pri-

mary intention was to be a part of the business development. This is
a profit oriented business but today I am tired of it . . . I want to phase
it out. The Chittagong port is a hub of crimes and bribes and the
shipment is taking longer to arrive. In most cases, my company fails
to meet the deadlines from the buyers. I am just tired.
Diaspora and development are intensely connected. This correlation has

many approaches such as remittances, expertise, entrepreneurship and
investment by diaspora themselves or investors at the host country.

However, the role of the government in the homeland is important since
its policies and procedures have a critical role in facilitating this develop-
ment. A crucial external source for developing countries is remittances
which come from diaspora who send them to their social ties such as
families or national projects. These remittances in many cases can be
more than what is received by the origin country in the form of fund
or aid. The trend of benefitting from diaspora for economic develop-
ment is relatively new. In the past, diaspora was seen as ‘embodying
the brain drain’ which reflects on the skills of the country. Even for
the remittances they send, they were seen as a means of ‘conspicuous
consumption rather than investment’. There was also a fear of political
influence of diaspora as they were seen to be contributing to conflict
and corruption (Bakewell, 2009: 1). There are opinions that say depar-
ture of highly skilled people is a massive cost on people who remain
at home. This cost depends very much on the nature of local labour
markets such as ‘the prevalence of unemployment among the emigrat-
ing category’ (Lucas, 2001: 2). Investment and development should be
reciprocal among the diaspora and the destination country. One-sided
effort is not a viable option. Despite serious risks (or losses) of investing
in Bangladesh, many diaspora members still continue to invest. It must
be noted that if there is war or civil conflict in a country, only the
diaspora group has the courage to invest in such a risky environment
(Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 2).
The most prevalent scheme could be how to get benefits from diaspora
and how they can effectively add to their home of origin. While per-
sons living in diaspora are one group, they represent a variety of
traits such as language, culture and ethnicity. However, one goal that
unites all diaspora is to support their homeland, yet they sometimes
fail to achieve that goal because of governmental barriers (Gueron and
Spevacek, 2008: 3).
With time, the ties and bonds get weaker among generations. The
weaker the tie, the lesser is the development linkage. Some countries
like China and India perceived this fact. In order to tap the development
potential of the diaspora community, these countries made some poli-
cies that made an environment conducive to investment. Investment in
fact has more development impact on the origin economy than the peri-
odic remittances sent by economic migrants. The investment has mul-
tiplier effect on the economy by the fact that most diaspora investment
goes to setting up industries. This creates jobs, attracts more investment
and creates more spending power among the people in the respective
area. There is a sharp difference in the periodic remittances from eco-

nomic migrants and remittances from diaspora. Periodic remittances
are generally need based while diaspora remittances are demand ori-
ented and investment based. The impact of periodic remittance is slow
and short term while diaspora remittances have long-term, fast and
multiplier impact. The noticeable role diaspora plays in the devel-
opment of their homeland is in the professionalism, experience and
knowledge. They are a prosperous source of skills and expertise when
they return either temporarily or permanently (Gueron and Spevacek,
2008: 3).
It was previously observed that remittances play a greater role in sus-
taining the Bangladesh economy, far more than either foreign aid or
foreign investments. While most of this remittance is directed at the
household level, a very small portion is transferred to charity or com-
munity development (Johnson, 2007). Diaspora associations are formed
around many principles, the most common ones being shared geo-
graphical, ethnic and professional characteristics at the initial stage;
these groups respond to the needs and the priorities of their mem-
bers for social networking, the observation of cultural traditions and
so forth. Though philanthropy is not usually the focus, it can also be an
important activity.
Cultural and development linkage are inextricably important in fur-
thering engagement in the development role. In addition to their share
in the investment, diaspora is an encouraging tool and ‘a powerful force
that can mobilise tangible foreign assistance efforts – a force that cannot
be ignored by mainstream development actors’ (Gueron and Spevacek,
2008: 4). They could be the best mediator in any matter related to their
homelands, such as culture and ethnic issues. Also, they have a good
and credible access to homeland through their families and friends.
Thus, they can influence capital flows for their homeland by convinc-
ing other partners in host countries or home countries to enter into
commercial investments (Lucas, 2011: 3). However, it is important to
note that development is not solely the responsibility of diaspora but
also depends on their country of origin through policies, laws and the
internal status of the country itself.
Hegemony, activism and cultural correlates
The interplay between expansion diffusion, spatial diffusion and relo-

cation diffusion in terms of culture has occupied significant space in
the contemporary diaspora discourse. More than 200 million diaspora
have significant command on value system across the world. Obviously,

cultural ecology, environmental determinism and possibilism are pow-
erful forces in shaping individuals’ cultural traits and development.
Culture is passed on from generation to generation through imitation,
instruction and paradigms. However, the culture passed on from first
generation to the future ones experiences a natural diminishing trend.
Though the first generation intends to hold on to their original culture
as long as they can, somehow the grip is lost over the next generations’
intention to hold on to it. The hyphenations, of course, carry a dichoto-
mous and confusing state of cultural values and belief. Some of them
chose not to carry confusing identity. This chapter also explores how
and in what state this value system, as time goes by, will remain with
the diaspora and their future generations.
The level of cultural erosion categorized into three groups in diaspora:
totally disinclined, failed yet potential and those strictly maintaining
their culture, who are examined to demonstrate the differences in level
of intention to uphold their cultural roots. The first group, the totally
disinclined group, finds no good reason to maintain cultural attach-
ment to the origin, except for development engagement. The potential
group has strong feelings for their culture but almost failed to uphold it,
and the last group has been trying to uphold their ancestral culture and
transmit it to their next generations. To the cultural bafflement, diaspora
community and their generations are at the crossroads to choose to
live in a mixed culture or accept a ‘leave one and take one’ situation.
The emancipation from the struggle between uprooting of the ancestral
value and belief system and taking on the host value and belief systems
is not easy. The challenge for policy makers is to address a nation with
multicultural identities where liberal approaches are recognized as stan-
dards, in order to provide them with a flexible cultural environment for
the diaspora.
Some were found to be very critical about the adage ‘ghorer o na, ghater
o na’ – meaning (metaphorically) you neither belong here (origin) nor
there (destination), and some were found to hold on to this. Living
in one culture and practising the other may put generations into an
ambivalent situation. Some believe that there is no meaning to hold on
to the destination culture. ‘It is not ours. Our culture is the best. We have
brought our culture with us. We will continue with this.’ Some believe that
they moved to another country with a belief that they would remain
there. ‘We can stay here, we can accept their services, we can accept their edu-
cation system, what’s wrong if we accept their culture? If we cannot then we
should go back.’ This demonstrates the level of acceptance and tolerance,

however, at the cost of their own culture. Some say that the cost and
benefit analysis is an affair of their own (Figure 5.3).
In every province in Canada, there exist different kinds of associations
of Bangladeshi diaspora: associations of business persons, academics,
students, people from certain districts, alumni from certain universities
(Dhaka University Association of Toronto, for instance) and Bangladesh
Engineers’ Association in Canada. These associations offer opportunities
for the diaspora community to get to know each other through gather-
ings at various occasions. It is interesting to observe that the gatherings
are often used as platforms to ‘show off’. I use the term ‘show off’ to
mean the hegemon that some members of diaspora community tend to
establish that they are on the upper rung of the social hierarchy. The
study revealed a number of ways in which the community shows off
their wealth, status and social standing at these gatherings. Generally,
someone will start the conversation. The topics that dominate the con-
versation, in most cases, are the model of the car and its price; location
of the home and the price; whether the house was bought on credit or
with full payment; the level of their English and their accent; number
of credit cards in possession and the limit of the amount; who are/were
their relatives back home; what profession the person had while in
Bangladesh; and if their children speak Bengali. Children who forgot
Bengali or not inclined to learn Bengali are often considered ‘good’ chil-
dren. Parents boast of their children for successfully adopting Canadian
Cultural erosion
Weakening linkage
Development linkage
Development impact
Figure 5.3 The culture–development linkages

accent and forgetting their language of origin. Some of the members

showed an exception to this social behaviour. They believed that the sec-
ond generation (referring to their children) would automatically be inte-
grated in the host society and therefore it is their responsibility to help
them to hold on to their origin culture as much and as long as they can.
At home, the parents converse in Bengali with their children. Strong cor-
relation is, therefore, clearly found between two components: holding
on to the origin culture and engagement in development of the origin.
Social gatherings are a common, informal platform where
Bangladeshis meet frequently on different occasions. Some of these
occasions include birthdays, visits of eminent relatives and government
officials, examination results of siblings, children, buying a car, get-
ting a job, launching a business, buying a house,wedding, post-wedding
get-together and so on. These gatherings can be either heterogeneous
(regular) or homogenous (selective). The former are generally open to
all relatives, friends, neighbours and others, forming huge crowds. The
latter are generally attended by homogenous groups, like doctors, engi-
neers, bankers and business, where their conversation tends to be very
close to their hearts.
The most interesting part of gatherings are the topics of discussion,
the most dominant of them being politics. The political climate of the
country of origin is a hot debatable topic which usually ends in verbal
attacks and splits among the groups. There were occasions when the
host had to call the police to bring the situation under control. Divi-
sive politics, in Bangladesh, is very prominent among the diaspora in
Canada.
Academic and scholarly ideas as topics of discussion take place only
when the gathering is dominated by academics, such as university pro-
fessors. There is, however, a visible divide among the professionals.
Homogenous gatherings are generally dominated by ridiculing the other
groups. Yet, other groups indulge in backbiting others, by ridiculing and
undermining their professions. The objective is, perhaps, to show ‘who
I am’. One individual, armed with a degree in aeronautical engineer-
ing from Central Asia, failed to secure a job in his field. He later got
a diploma in petroleum studies and secured a job in the Middle East.
He holds a tendency to undermine everyone, saying, ‘Medical doctors
in the West earn the highest salary though they possess mediocre cal-
iber. A super caliber like me earns as high as one medical doctor in
the West.’ This means that he lacked a sense of respect towards others.
In gatherings he asks about other members’ salary and also discloses his
own. His attitude has isolated him from other members of the diaspora
community. The implication is that he deprives himself of the collective

thoughts and ideas about potential and profitable investment in the
country. Of course, expression of ‘who I am’ varies from individual to
individual.
Bangladeshi diaspora’s giving and philanthropy patterns are found to
be different from others. The study bears out that this is largely because
of the cultural and political division. Although scattered efforts exist
among Bangladeshi diaspora, expected yield could not be achieved. For
instance, there are small Bangladeshi groups who have created a small
fund to help out poor students in Bangladesh. This is obviously a great
example of diaspora giving; however, this at the same time reveals that
these groups are looking for a broader outlet through which they can
contribute more efficiently and in broader ways. It has been observed
that when Bangladesh faces a national crisis, a concerted effort could
not be made for helping to overcome the crisis due to their failure to
arrive at a consensus. Thus, the basic fabric of diaspora philanthropy
and giving are jeopardized.
Discussions and conclusions
This chapter argues that diaspora maintains a different kind of devel-

opment link from that of the conventional economic and temporary
migrants with their origin. As time passes, they tend to lose roots and
they try to be better established financially. The conventional devel-
opment linkage by investing at the origin holds true for countries
like China and India. Therefore, state policies have to be in place in
order to attract direct investments from the diaspora and also support
development linkage (Figure 5.4).
Appropriate policies should be in place in order to attract diaspora
groups who have profound interest in the development issues in their
country of origin. Also, policy makers should be aware of areas of
interest which diaspora might be interested in and how that relates
to the planned policies by governments. Thus, policy makers need to
adapt and adjust their plans to match connections and interests that
diaspora has. Good governance is an important element in development
since governments with good reputation and lack of corruption are
positively related to high rates of successful business. In addition, acces-
sibility to financial capital is another element facilitated by governments
which correlates to the pushing of development by diaspora members,
irrespective of whether the business is large or small (Newland and
Tanaka, 2010: 8).
Identify goals and capacities
Know your diaspora
Build trust
Mobilize the diaspora

for development
Effective engagement of
diaspora in development
Figure 5.4 Potential policy steps
Diaspora entrepreneurship is a way of creating job opportunities

through the successful business they run in the country. They are the
gateway for trade, capital and knowledge, especially for poor countries,
which are isolated from the global scene. Thus, diaspora members rep-
resent the link between their countries of origin and the host country.
The familiarity of local culture and language by diaspora members gives
them additional benefit to build trust and open up opportunities for
investment. Not all kinds of entrepreneurship are positive and result
in successful development. There are two kinds of entrepreneurship,
namely ‘necessity entrepreneurs’ and ‘opportunity entrepreneurs’. The
former are ‘those who are simply self-employed’ while the latter are
‘those who reform or revolutionize the pattern of production’.
In terms of the effects on the development, necessity entrepreneurship
has no outcome at all. All that they do is reduce overt unemploy-
ment and facilitate people to help themselves. On the other hand,
opportunity entrepreneurs have significant influence on development
in a positive way, since ‘skilled individuals’ who specialized in high
demand and rapidly growing sectors of the knowledge-based econ-
omy can create huge economic opportunities and profits for business
and their countries (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 4). However, most
developing countries adopt necessity type rather than opportunity one.
Long-term strategy is beneficial for the country instead of a short-term
one that provides jobs in short runs. An example is the important role of
Indian diaspora members in the IT industry that has served to enhance
India’s economic development (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 6). A robust
and legal environment is a necessary draw for individuals to venture

into business. Newland and Tanaka (2010) argue that failures in some
government projects or sector can be a source of encouragement for
business. An example is that of Somalia’s ruined telecom sector, which
was revived and re-established by the diaspora community.
It is the responsibility of the respective governments to devise strate-
gies to attract diaspora community to be part of the economic develop-
ment. Hence is the need for policies. Therefore, many governments have
devised their policies on large-scale contract labour placement from
overseas in order to ease employment crisis. However, many countries
these days are recalling their diaspora back home to involve them in
development.
The second step is very important. Agunias and Kathleen (2012)
emphasize that knowing the diaspora is crucial in order to be able to
engage them in development. However, lack of data remains a seri-
ous problem when drafting appropriate polices. Agunias and Kathleen
(2012) presented the example of India, where the government tasked a
High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora to analyse the location,
situation and potential development role of the estimated 20–30 million
non-resident Indians (NRIs) and persons of Indian origin (PIOs).
The third step (Figure 5.5) is building trust which refers to mutual trust
and good communication between the diaspora and origin government.
The trust should be built to dispel the long-standing notion that govern-
ment believes that diaspora communities are cash cows. The third step
emphasizes on partnerships while the fourth one is the mobilization
of the diaspora for development. Strategies for diaspora mobilization
may include high-profile events that would be attended by all diaspora
members. This may require the creation of new institution in the gov-
ernment or the revitalization of existing institutions. The Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) uses a number of techniques
to mobilize diaspora groups for development in their countries of origin.
It directly funds development projects, executed by diaspora groups, and
an example is that of the Association of Haitian-Canadian Engineers and
Scientists (Agunias and Kathleen, 2012).
A few initiatives to Facilitate Diaspora Engagement Citizenship laws
have become an important factor in facilitating the diaspora and its
descendants to obtain dual or multiple citizenships. This act keeps the
door open for them to return in case they choose to invest in their coun-
try of origin. Agunias and Kathleen (2012) observed that the number of
countries allowing their citizens to hold dual citizenship has more than
doubled in the past 20 years. Political right is another significant factor
Flexible citizenship
laws and
residency and visa
requirements
General laws Political rights
Special property
Portable benefits rights
Tax
incentives
Figure 5.5 Facilitating diaspora engagements

Source: Adopted from Agunias and Kathleen, 2012.
that determines whether or not diaspora would be willing to engage

in development. Neither diaspora nor economic migrants (altogether
7 million) have political rights overseas, although the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), in their 2007
review, identified 115 states and territories that offer overseas voting
provisions.
Agunias and Kathleen (2012) proposed another factor, the special
property rights, which is a popular means to fully engage diaspora.
They felt that placing limitations on foreign nationals’ ownership of
real estate and property would jeopardize initiatives to engage them.
Foreigners cannot purchase land in the Philippines, but they are allowed
to purchase condominium units. In India and China, resident foreign-
ers can purchase homes with permission from government authorities.
Tax exemption on diaspora’ belongings would be a great incentive
for them to return or to invest. The lack of portability is believed
to discourage more engagement with countries of origin, primarily
by inhibiting temporary and, especially, permanent return. Therefore,
offering portable benefits to their diaspora, particularly those relating to
pensions, medical and life insurance, is important. Lastly, recognition
of diaspora and making them part of the national development plans

would facilitate diaspora engagement in development (Agunias and
Kathleen, 2012).
I would argue that Bangladesh should follow the Indian or Chinese
model to attract the huge number of diaspora. Building relationships is
an effective tool in development efforts. The governments of the ori-
gin countries may consult with diaspora groups when creating national
development plans and acknowledge the contribution of diaspora to
development in order to increase communication between diaspora
and governments. This will lead to lasting partnerships for develop-
ment. Although the diaspora is willing to help and support their
homeland, there are some factors that hinder this willingness. The gov-
ernment of any country requires certain procedures for development
and investment which in most cases are complex and difficult. Thus,
individuals become reluctant to invest and engage in development by
going through complex procedures (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 2).
They may lack the organizational and management skills to offer their
assistance. Therefore, governmental assistance should be provided to
them to facilitate their interest. Also, financial support should be pro-
vided through legal entity or official diaspora groups, as one of the
reasons that hinder this support is the lack of this feature (Gueron and
Spevacek, 2008: 5).
Also, development agencies and NGOs can advance diaspora in the
development movement. These measures can be seen in
scaling up research efforts to better understand how diaspora groups

can be more effectively involved, including systemic investiga-
tions on non-financial influences, gender differences in remittance
behaviour, and other issues related to Diaspora and development;
engaging in formal and informal discussions between Diaspora
and mainstream development agencies (together with implement-
ing partners). In order to further promote Diaspora involvement
in foreign assistance initiatives; endorsing financial support to
development-oriented diaspora groups; and fostering institution
building between diaspora and home country governments.
(Gueron and Spevacek, 2008: 6)
Diaspora scholars generally emphasize on building effective relation-

ships with the diaspora. They suggest a number of instruments in order
to better shape the relationship. However, the major role has to be
played by the country of origin. One of the instruments suggested is
the diplomatic advocacy through which the origin state can influence
the policies of the host state, thus serving the cause of the diaspora.
A number of hints can be useful for Bangladesh in order to benefit
from its diaspora which are
having a strong home country institution to facilitate diaspora

exchanges with a comprehensive global database of NRBs for both
individuals and groups; ensuring engagement is mutually beneficial
to both NRBs and the home country. This entails ensuring that NRBs
have not only investment opportunities but confidence and clarity
on issues like repatriation and sufficient knowledge to make informed
investment decisions; host governments and the multilateral agen-
cies can play an important role in both funding and facilitating the
growth of vibrant diaspora networks.
(Islam, 2009: 1)
More specifically, to promote development and how governments can

effectively benefit from their migrants, they have to identify poten-
tial development projects for diaspora to invest in. Above all, they
should offer bank accounts with favourable interest rates for members
of diaspora.
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6
From Brain Drain to Brain Gain:
Leveraging the Academic Diaspora
for Development in Bangladesh
Taiabur Rahman
Introduction
Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated nations in the world.

At present Bangladesh has a total population of nearly 160 million out
of which more than 110 million (73 per cent) people live in rural areas.
Bangladesh’s per capita income is USD 750, ranking in UNDP’s Human
Development Index (HDI) index as 146 among 187 countries (UNDP,
2011). Poverty is prevalent in Bangladesh and a substantial portion of
the common populace (20 per cent) lives in extreme poverty and suffers
from illiteracy, ill health, unemployment and lacks access to essen-
tial services provided by government. However, its achievement in the
socio-economic (poverty reduction, primary school, enrolment, gender
equity, reduction in infant mortality and fertility, higher access to safe
water and sanitation) sphere is remarkable. The economy of Bangladesh
has experienced an average GDP growth rate of over 5 per cent per
annum during the last two decades. Bangladesh is now considered as
the best performer among the countries defined as the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) by the United Nations. Goldman Sachs investment
bank and economist Jim O’Neill in a research paper (Goldman Sachs,
2007) named Bangladesh among the Next 11 (N-11) countries having
a high potential of becoming the world’s largest economies in the 21st
century along with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa).
Bangladesh has labour surplus and encourages its skilled and semi-
skilled labour to seek employment abroad to mitigate the problem of
unemployment at home. While the policy of exporting manpower has
124
Taiabur Rahman 125
temporarily reduced the burden of unemployment, it has also created a

void in several critical areas of development; for example, the country
is facing extreme shortage of skilled teachers to run its education pro-
grammes (from primary to tertiary) and also doctors and nurses to run
their public health programmes. Bangladesh needs an estimated 22,000
PhDs for 88 public and private universities (each university needs an
average of 250 PhDs) whereas the country has approximately 2,000.
It has a major shortfall in academic talent. Shortage of skilled labour
is particularly felt in the manufacturing and service industries (Naim
and Iftikhar, 2010).
The issue of brain drain has been critical for many developing coun-
tries, including Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s position in the Brain Drain
Value Rank is 113 (out of 144 countries) and it received 2.8 in scale
between 1 and 7, where 1 = No, the best and the brightest normally
leave to pursue opportunities in other countries, and 7 = Yes, there
are many opportunities for talented people within the country (GEF,
2012). Emigration rate of tertiary-educated population from Bangladesh
is 4.3 per cent (World Bank, 2011).
Public education in Bangladesh is heavily subsidized, and in most
cases highly talented students do not pay a single Taka (name of
Bangladesh currency) as tuition fee (insignificant) for their education.
On the contrary, they receive a handsome amount of scholarship from
government and private companies. Unfortunately, a sizeable number
of these meritorious students, especially from the top rungs, leave the
country to pursue higher studies and on completion prefer to stay back.
A large number of Bangladeshi scholars and professionals have been
living abroad and making significant contributions in their respective
fields. Having completed their higher studies at reputed overseas univer-
sities, many Bangladeshi students take on lucrative jobs in their respec-
tive host countries and settle there permanently. Many Bangladeshi
reputed academics leave the country on extraordinary leave/sabbatical
to teach at foreign universities and do not return and settle perma-
nently in foreign countries, particularly in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, as well as European and Middle
Eastern countries.
The Bangladesh government seems indifferent to the potential of
these highly qualified resources and does not even have any reli-
able statistics about the Bangladeshi scholars or professionals living
abroad. Most of the highly skilled academic diasporas do not intend
to return to Bangladesh permanently. However, they are eager to con-
tribute back to the well-being of Bangladesh. Private universities, banks
126 From Brain Drain to Brain Gain in Bangladesh
and hospitals are playing catalytic roles in facilitating the temporary

and semi-permanent return of an increasing number of Highly Skilled
Individuals (HSIs) (DRC, 2008; Rahman, 2010).
Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the contribution of aca-
demic diasporas to Bangladesh’s development in general and knowledge
capital development in particular and analyses the key forms and
activities they engage in while staying in situ. Currently an estimated
7.7 million people are living outside of Bangladesh, majority of who are
short-term migrant workers. According to a rough estimate, 1.2 million
(Siddique, 2004) Bangladeshis are living abroad permanently, either as
citizens or with other valid documents. They make up the ever-growing
Bangladeshi diaspora. Debate about academic mobility has continued
for the last quarter century in Bangladesh. However, there has been
hardly any scientific and empirical enquiry academic diaspora’s con-
tribution to Bangladesh’s development. This chapter attempts to fill
this void.
The chapter is organized into four sections. Following a brief intro-
duction about contextualization of Bangladesh’s diaspora, this chapter
presents socio-demographic profiles of respondents in the next section,
followed by an overview of literature on the role of diaspora in the
development of their homeland, and addresses this issue with reference
to an ongoing debate of turning brain drain into brain gain. The sec-
ond part of this section is devoted to explaining the suitability and
relevance of Diaspora Option theory (Meyer et al., 1997; Gaillard and
Gaillard, 1997) as a theoretical lens to explain the heterogeneous notion
of diaspora and its role in promoting the socio-economic development
of their countries of origin. ‘Diaspora Option’ theory conceptualizes the
brain drain and emigration of scientific personnel less as a permanent
exodus to homeland but more as a form of transnational brain circu-
lation where talent goes abroad but contributes back substantially to
the individual’s country of origin, eventually through physical or vir-
tual networking. The third section takes stock of the current state of
Bangladesh’s academic diaspora development and the ways they engage
themselves and contribute towards Bangladesh’s development in gen-
eral and knowledge capital development in particular. Questionnaire
survey, personal observations and interview results are embedded in
the discussion of this section. The final section analyses the problems
and prospects of academic diaspora staying in situ and comes up with
a number of policy recommendations, particularly for the government,
private sector, NGOs and development partners of Bangladesh, on how
to overcome the barriers, face the challenges and tap on diasporas’
Taiabur Rahman 127
contribution and engagement for the development of Bangladesh and

concludes the chapter.
The chapter draws heavily on an extensive review of relevant sec-
ondary literature in the field and a comprehensive questionnaire survey
of 40 international academics of Bangladeshi origin spread all over
the globe followed by small-scale interviews, CV analysis and per-
sonal observation. This survey was conducted between March and
August 2012.
Theoretical overview
The primary mode for understanding the migration of skilled profes-

sionals has been through the notion of ‘brain drain’. Through the 1960s
and 1970s, skilled migration was understood and analysed as ‘brain
drain’ migration (Bhagwati, 1976). It can be conceptualized as a territo-
rial or geographical exit upon failure of the state or other institutions to
deliver well-being and human security (Hirschman, 1970). The impacts
of these movements were measured as gains and losses within the con-
text of the nation-state (Mejia et al., 1979), as brain drain for some
was perceived to be countered by brain gain for others. Emigrants are
thus mirrors of national development, reflecting the migratory pushes
of national crises and the pull of the global economy.
In an early anthology of papers, two prominent economists, Harry
Johnson and Don Patinkin debate on the brain drain (Adams, 1968).
The internationalist model of Johnson (1968) states that international
movement of human capital is beneficial to the world because it reflects
individual free choices and because it is up to the countries to make
themselves attractive for individuals; accordingly, countries should not
offer education for free but provide loans to allow individuals to pursue
their own paths to success without feeling indebted to any particu-
lar country. The nationalist model of Patikin (1968) is concerned with
what a middle-income country must do to limit brain drain. For him,
migrants must be educated in the spirit of identification with the devel-
opment of the country as part of their individual development and that
countries must set several centres of attraction within them to create
critical masses, so that those centres (e.g. world impact universities) are
prepared for the international competition for human capital (Patikin,
1968).
Traditionally, it has been argued that the permanent departure of a
country’s most educated and best-trained population and of its young
working age people (through brain drain) represents a major and
permanent loss to the country of origin. Such individuals are particu-

larly expensive to educate, and the limited budgets of countries of origin
in the global South that can be devoted to education mean that the
loss of this cream of the national talent is keenly felt (Findlay, 2001;
Kapur, 2003; Welch and Zhena, 2008: 520). Most importantly, it might
affect a country’s capacity to build domestic institutions, increasingly
recognized as the critical variable for development. If people of talent
and drive are essential for building institutions, then their loss can have
severe consequences (Kapur and McHale, 2005).
There has been a major change with shifts in ideas, from ‘brain drain’
in the 1970s to ‘brain gain’ in the 1990s. Originally, the goal of these
developing societies was to trigger a ‘reverse brain drain’, whereby the
talented would bring back their knowledge and enhanced human cap-
ital, putting it to work for their home country (Zweig et al., 2008).
Theoretically, the two main ways of implementing brain gain are the
return option and the diaspora option (Meyer et al., 1997). The return
option involves the physical return of the expatriates to their countries
of origin. It has been successfully realized in various countries, including
Singapore, Korea, India and China. The relative success of this option in
these countries has been attributed to the opening of their economies
and policies to foster domestic investment in innovation as well as
research and development (Ite, 2002: 76–77).
The diaspora option refers to the remote mobilization and association
of the expatriates to the development of their countries of origin. The
‘diaspora option’ reconceptualizes the brain drain and the migration of
scientific personnel, seeing it less as a permanent exodus or loss to the
home country, but more as a form of ‘brain circulation’, where talent
goes abroad but circulates information back to the individual’s coun-
try of origin. Through scholarly, business and educational exchanges,
educational migrants who prefer to stay in the host country are find-
ing ways to participate in the economic and scientific development at
home. This way, scientific collaboration ensues without people in the
diaspora uprooting their lives and moving back home (Gaillard and
Gaillard, 1997). This diaspora option can be instrumental in lessening
the brain drain by turning a potential loss into a significant gain (Meyer
and Brown, 1999; Meyer et al., 2001). The world scientific community
and people who study the brain drain see the diaspora option as having
advantages. It is relatively inexpensive, allows expatriates to contribute
to their home society without giving up their overseas situations and
yet mitigates feelings of guilt (Gaillard and Gaillard, 2003). It assumes
that the professionals are not likely to return. For Dickson (2003), the
Taiabur Rahman 129
high cost of the brain drain and the difficulty triggering a reverse brain
drain in much of the Third World makes the diaspora option a moral
necessity.
Many of the policies that have become standard elements of the
diaspora option are selectively based upon the diaspora policies devel-
oped by Israel in the 1950s, and China and India in the 1980s and 1990s.
Proponents of the diaspora option often attribute the techniques, meth-
ods and processes that these countries used to mobilize their diaspora
as instrumental to their ability to reduce poverty and stimulate trade
and industrial expansion. Studies, such as Saxenian’s examination of the
contributions of skilled immigrants from India, China and Taiwan in
Silicon Valley to economic growth in their homelands (Saxenian, 2006),
have played a significant role in generating a new consensus around the
best practices for mobilizing diaspora.
In the professional and academic engagement with origin country,
diaspora networks of highly skilled play a significant role – bringing
together exceptional (in one way or another) individuals and insti-
tutions (Kuznetsov, 2006: 279). Diaspora knowledge networks (DKNs)
have conceptually subverted the traditional ‘brain drain’ migration out-
flow into a ‘brain gain’ skills circulation (Meyer et al., 2001). These net-
works facilitate the flow of knowledge and financial resources between
home and host countries (Salt and Findlay, 1989; Findlay, 1990; Koser
and Salt, 1997). This shifted the traditional emphasis on embedded
knowledge of potential returnees in a human capital approach (return
option) to a connectionist approach where social capital, including tech-
nical and institutional links, is crucial (Meyer, 2001). Much has been
written about networks’ contribution to migration and brain drain (but
networks also facilitate knowledge development and transfer/exchange.
Indeed, Meyer (2001) argues that it is through intellectual diaspora
networks that brain drain is transformed into brain gain. Colombian
Network of Researchers Abroad (Red Caldas) and South African Network
of Skills Abroad (SANSA) proved the feasibility of a diaspora option, that
is, the real existence of off-shore extensive human resources that could
be mobilized by the country of origin. In this broader context of DKNs
and its development potential for the origin country, this study sheds
light on selected Bangladesh DKNs.
Socio-demographic profiles of academic migrants
Following is a brief description of the socio-demographic profile of the

respondents of the survey. All respondents of the sample held PhDs
Table 6.1 Some features of diaspora members (N40)
Categories Number Categories Number
Host Countries of Occupational Sectors of

Academic Diaspora Academic Diaspora
United States of America 7 Social Sciences 14
United Kingdom 4 Business Studies 8
Norway 1 Natural Sciences 7
Canada 6 Engineering 6
Australia 5 Medical Sciences 5
New Zealand 2
Pre-migration Work
Malaysia 5
Experiences in Bangladesh
Brunei 3
Public Universities 30
Singapore 1
Medical Colleges 5
Thailand 1
Bangladesh Public 1
Japan 2
Administration Training
Saudi Arabia 3 Centre(BPATC)
Bangladesh Civil Service 3
(Administration) Cadre,
Bangladesh Institute of 1
International and Strategic
Studies (BIISS)
from reputed universities in North America, Europe and Asia. Nearly

89 per cent of the respondents hold PhDs from Western universities
located in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe. Eleven
per cent did their PhDs from reputed universities mostly located in East
Asia, that is, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Japan (Table 6.1).
However, majority of these academics completed their bachelor’s and
master’s degrees from public universities in Bangladesh. Most of these
academic migrants are male and all of them are married. Eighty-six
per cent of the respondents have got spouse of Bangladeshi origin while
the remaining 14 per cent are married to foreigners. The average number
of children of the academic migrants is two.
The average annual income of the respondents is nearly USD 72,000.
They belong to well-off class of the host countries. Average year of stay
in the host countries is 15 years. Most of the respondents are working
and living in the Western countries. Only 38 per cent of the respon-
dents are living and working at the universities in Asia. Most of the
migrants have got previous experience of working at public universi-
ties/institutes in Bangladesh. Others worked for research institutions,
such as Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC),
Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) and
Taiabur Rahman 131
Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). Those who are from the BCS did their
PhD from Western universities and decided to stay back and work for
universities in the host countries. The occupational sector in which
most (55 per cent) of the respondents belong to is social sciences and
business studies, and the remaining 45 per cent belong to natural
sciences, engineering and medicine. The above demographic character-
istics (age, education, spouse, religion, work experience) of the academic
diaspora indicate their strong root in the country of origin.
Engagement of academic diaspora in Bangladesh
Bangladeshi academic diaspora engage with Bangladesh in a wide array

of ways covering six major roles: enhancing reputation, strengthen-
ing research tradition and national innovation system in Bangladesh,
enriching tertiary education sector in Bangladesh, offering financial
support and promoting the career of Bangladeshis abroad. Table 6.3
depicts these major modes of engagement of academic diaspora for
Bangladesh’s development in general and knowledge capital develop-
ment in particular.
Academic diaspora can play a catalytic role in enhancing the reputa-
tion of the country of origin. Individually, they can serve as reputation
‘ambassadors’ by simply demonstrating their skills and competences at
their workplaces (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002), and as a group, they can
help diffuse information regarding the quality of the human capital in
their countries of origin and the local possibilities (Kapur, 2001). This
is how they create positive image of their countries of origin before the
world community and lift their reputation to a different height.
Strong national innovation system and research tradition are pre-
requisite to the economic development of any nation. Reputed public
universities (Dhaka University, Bangladesh University of Engineering
and Technology, Dhaka medical College) have lost their previous
glory/reputation to a great extent due to politicization and govern-
ment intervention. The quality of education is on decline and aca-
demic environment is appalling. Upon graduation from universities,
students find their education irrelevant/useless in their professional
and practical life. Meritorious scholars suffer. Salary of public uni-
versity professors/research institution is low; promotion is based on
ascription rather than merit, performance and achievement. Research
infrastructure does not exist. They get frustrated and leave the country
in search of better future. The country is left with the mediocre and the
national innovation system suffers. Table 6.2 manifests the sorry state
Table 6.2 Components of the national innovation system in Bangladesh
Global Competitiveness Indicator Rank (out of 142) Score (1–7)
Higher Education and Training 126 2.8

Pay and Productivity 95 3.6
Quality of the Educational System 85 3.4
Availability of Research and Training Services 133 2.7
Extent of Staff Training 121 3.3
Source: Prepared by the author from World Economic Forum (2012).
of Bangladesh’s national innovation system. The academic diaspora

working at renowned universities abroad can minimize this void and
contribute enormously towards strengthening the national innovation
system in Bangladesh and moderate the flow of brain drain.
Intelligencia in a developing country like Bangladesh cannot play
the role of a vibrant civil society because of their dependency on gov-
ernment, private sector and the donors. They cannot provide their
independent intellectual input in the public policy process of the coun-
try. Academic diaspora throughout the world can play an important
role in enhancing the strength and growth of civil society in their
homeland through their writing in national dailies and expressing their
informed opinion about issues of national importance in the electronic
media. They can express their independent expert views without fear
and favour due to their location away from the home country.
The academic diaspora can contribute towards strengthening the uni-
versity education in their countries of origin too. They can teach at
universities while on a sabbatical. Home country colleagues and stu-
dents will get immense benefits due to their physical presence. They can
introduce new ideas, techniques and technology to the students and col-
leagues in the home countries. They can be the linchpin between home
and host university in terms of undertaking collaborative research and
student exchange programmes. They can help improve the syllabus and
curriculum of the home universities. Introduction of Western grading
system and use of technology at the universities in Bangladesh is a rele-
vant example of increased interaction between academics of home and
host countries over the last one decade.
One of the major contributions of diaspora is in the form of
remittance, which accounts for 13.68 per cent of Bangladesh’s GDP
(Siddiqui and Billah, 2012). The bulk of the remittances are sent by
Bangladeshi migrant workers rather than members of the Bangladeshi
diaspora. The inflow has been on increase for long. Lion’s share of
Taiabur Rahman 133
money is coming through formal banking channels. They can involve

themselves in philanthropy by funding a school/hospital/library or
mosques in their village, sponsoring the education of a poor relative,
building houses for their parents or purchasing apartment in major
cities in their home country. Many take the Bangladesh Biman to travel
back and forth to Bangladesh at least once in a year and keep it on
business.
Academic diaspora can play the role of career promoters for the stu-
dents/relatives from their home countries in a number of ways. These
include providing important information about scholarships abroad,
sponsoring students and supervising master’s and PhD programmes,
training the students to do research and writing reference letters to get
them enrolled at overseas universities and secure jobs abroad. They can
be instrumental in getting them an opportunity to pursue higher edu-
cation or finding a job aboard which may appear as a turning point for
any individual’s life.
Majority of the respondents studied at home academic institutions
almost free of costs, served the public universities for 4–5 years and went
abroad on scholarship to pursue their higher education. Sixty per cent
of the respondents are circular migrants. Upon completion of their PhD
most of the scholars returned home and served the home university for
7–8 years and then left. The reasons include low salary, absence of min-
imum teaching and research infrastructure and environment, lack of
career prospect due to politicization of universities, concerns about child
education and health and in sum a future that is full of uncertainties,
insecurity, frustration and helplessness stemming from political instabil-
ity of the country. Initially, symptoms of brain drain (knowledge drain
and remittance gain occurred simultaneously) were apparent. They cre-
ated a vacuum of intellectuals at the universities that were filled by the
mediocre.
Not a single respondent wants to return permanently to Bangladesh
while they are active in their service. Only 20 per cent want to
come back and settle permanently after retirement. These respondents
have their roots in the rural areas. Deteriorated law and order and a
strong feeling of insecurity prevent academics from returning home
even for short-term stay, let alone permanent/semi-permanent stay in
Bangladesh. They are panicked by the news published in Bangladesh
media of missing people and abduction of children for ransom. On the
contrary, 100 per cent of the academic diaspora are eager to engage
themselves in the socio-economic development of their homeland.
They think that diaspora option (rather than return option) is a better
strategy for mobilizing Bangladeshi diaspora and contributing back to

the development of Bangladesh.
The Bangladeshi diaspora took advantages of the ICT and Internet in
getting connected with their homeland, especially local colleagues. They
widely use Internet, mobile phone, telecentres, electronic and print
media in order to communicate with local scholars and share their ideas
and express their informed opinion on matters of national significance.
Nearly 90 per cent of the respondents did their PhD from Western uni-
versities and the topics of their PhD were on a plethora of burning issues
about Bangladesh. Many of them got their PhD published as books
from Bangladeshi publishing houses (particularly Unversity Press Lim-
ited and Dhaka University Press). Each interviewee supervised at least
one master’s/PhD student (Bangladeshi) at his/her overseas university.
Many Bangladeshi students have been trained by the Bangladeshi aca-
demic diaspora abroad and this paved the way for doing joint research in
future. They sent valuable materials (books, articles) to their colleagues
back home and helped them enrich their research paper. At times, they
developed the theoretical framework and their Bangladeshi counterparts
took care of data collection. This is how they helped each other and
multiplied the benefits.
Academic exchange programme between Rikkyo University and
Dhaka University, training programme for mid-level government offi-
cials of Bangladesh by the Monash University, Australia, Joint Mas-
ters Program by North South University and Bergen University’s
joint research project between Dhaka University and Aston Univer-
sity (funded by British Council) are some examples of collaborative
research/project between Bangladeshi institutions and overseas univer-
sities where professors of Bangladeshi origin have been instrumental in
preparing the project and materializing it. A professor of Bergen Uni-
versity (of Bangladesh origin) took the initiative to start a scholarship
programme in 1998 (Quota and NORAD) for Bangladeshi students at
Bergen University, and since then at least 35–40 students did their Mas-
ter’s from Bergen University, most of whom went back home to serve
the nation. More than 40 per cent of these Bergen University graduates
did their PhD later at other international universities, and many of them
are working as faculties at universities both at home and abroad. Some
of them are working for the Bangladesh government too.
The Bangladeshi diaspora contributed enormously through their
scholarly publications on Bangladesh and Bangladeshi affairs (garments,
micro-credit, NGOs, tourism, food, cricket, private university boom,
mobile and TV penetration, climate change and so on) in major reputed
Taiabur Rahman 135
international journals and publishing houses to create a positive image

of Bangladesh (from basket case to a development model), present-
ing Bangladesh as a highly talented and resilient nation in front of
the world community. They have spread Bangladesh’s success stories
across the world, enhancing its reputation. Two examples suffice in
this regard. Professor Iqbal Z. Quadir who is currently the Founder and
Director of the Legatum Center for Development and Entrepreneurship
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) revolutionized
the telecommunication system in Bangladesh in collaboration with
Dr Mohammad Yunus’s (a Nobel laureate and return migrant from the
United States) Grameen phone in Bangladesh. GrameenPhone Ltd is
still the largest telephone company in Bangladesh. It has 16 million
subscribers and provides telephone access to more than 100 million peo-
ple, covering 60,000 villages. It generates revenues close to $1 billion
annually. Professor Quadir founded Emergence BioEnergy to increase
electricity production in Bangladesh. Dr Maqsudul Alam, a professor
in the University of Hawaii, has decoded (mystery of origin of jute)
the jute’s genome with his research team (Dr Kamal Uddin of Jute
Research Institute, Professor Haseena Khan of Dhaka University and
Mahboob Zaman of Datasoft Bangladesh in Bangladesh). With the suc-
cessful sequencing of the jute genome, Bangladesh becomes the second
country after Malaysia, among the developing nations, to achieve such
a feat (Siddiqui nd).
The academic diaspora has kept the fragile degenerating public uni-
versity research in Bangladesh alive by co-authoring papers with their
Bangladeshi colleagues, majority of who were sojourners. On the back-
drop of highly politicized and fractured civil society (a civil society
by design which is just an appendix of donors and cannot contribute
independently due to their dependency on donors and political par-
ties) in Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi knowledge diaspora contributed
towards building informed opinion on critical development issues in
Bangladesh. They do not depend on the donors, the politicians or
other pressure groups in the country and play the role of an unbiased
extended civil society for Bangladesh.
Besides, the transfer of skills and knowledge, the academic diaspora
have sent remittances back to Bangladesh as well. However, the trans-
fer of remittance has been sporadic, hovering between USD 1,000 and
USD 10,000 per annum. The remittance was sent mostly for monthly
allowances for parents, building houses for them and purchasing of land
and apartment in Dhaka, Chittagong and other cities. Some transfers
were philanthropic and sent with the intention of building schools,
clinics and student hostels, giving scholarships to needy but talented

students and sponsoring close relatives for studying abroad. They (along
with their family members) used to travel back to Bangladesh at least
once in a year for vacation/tourism/meeting parents and relatives.
Many of them travelled by Bangladesh Biman (the national carrier of
Bangladesh).
Bangladesh represents 13 per cent of the identified DKNs in Asia and
approximately 60 per cent of the identified networks are active (Meyer
and Wattiaux, 2006). In fact, the number of networks now is much
larger than identified and they are more active than before. Following
are some of the Bangladeshi networks that are contributing towards the
development of Bangladesh.
American Association of Bangladeshi Engineers and Architects, Inc.,
(AABEA) (www.aabea.org) is a not-for-profit professional organization
established in 1984 in the United States. AABEA offers educational and
research support to improve the technical education in Bangladesh so
that its graduates can compete in the world market. AABEA, in col-
laboration with Intel Engineers and Intel Foundation matching grant,
developed a new state-of-the-art computer lab at the Bangladesh Uni-
versity of Engineering and Technology (BUET) in Bangladesh. This effort
included development of the laboratory, as well as a modern curriculum
for undergraduate engineering programme, and initiating Very Large-
Scale Integrated Circuit (VLSI) area graduate programme. AABEA also
developed the Robert Noyce Simulation Lab (RNSL) and Linux Lab
for BUET with necessary Ansoft SW design package license. It also
established a Joint Research Center for Advanced System Engineering
(JRCASE) project to facilitate education, Research & Development (R&D)
on VLSI circuit at East West University (EWU). AABEAs latest initiative
was the inauguration of another VLSI lab for the Chittagong Univer-
sity and Technology on 10 January 2012. AABEA, in collaboration with
the World Bank has also developed marketing tools for Bangladeshi
IT companies to sell their products in the US market.
Bangladesh Medical Association in the United Kingdom (BDMAUK) raises
money and donates it to different organizations and hospitals in
Bangladesh. It supplies books, journals and equipments to medical col-
leges in Bangladesh. The association had the privilege of being a trustee
of the Bangladesh Centre, Bangladesh’s National Heritage, in the United
Kingdom by contributing large sums of money to its purchase. The Asso-
ciation has donated money to build an orphanage in the ‘Sidr’ affected
area of a remote village named Bagbaria in the district of Pirozpur in
Bangladesh.
Taiabur Rahman 137
The European Network of Bangladesh Studies (ENBS) is established as

a framework to improve contacts between European researchers who
work on Bangladesh and their Bangladeshi colleagues. The network
connecting European researchers with Bangladesh is currently based in
Europe, with colleagues in Bangladesh. The network serves as a focal
point of communication with other research and development organi-
zations in Europe and Bangladesh. It aims to provide a stimulus to the
dialogue between social scientists, government officials, consultants and
NGOs. This dialogue is extremely important in view of the many links
between Europe and Bangladesh, especially in the field of development
co-operation.
ScholarsBangladesh (http://www.scholarsbangladesh.com) founded in
2005 by Mr Shamim an expartiate from the United States is devoted
to building a bridge of NRB worldwide. It has given a platform for net-
working among the Bangladeshis staying all over the world. It organized
the ‘First Non Resident Bangladeshi Conference’ (NRB/PBO) in Dhaka
in 2007.
The Bangladesh Development Research Center (BDRC) is a non-profit
research organization located in the United States with the specific pur-
pose of undertaking and disseminating research on development issues
relevant to Bangladesh in order to foster the peaceful development in
the country. The BDRC is interested in cooperating with developmental
research organizations, think tanks and foundations in Bangladesh and
elsewhere. It has collaborated with the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced
Studies (BCAS) in 2007 for a project.
The Bangladeshi diaspora associations as evident from the above
discussion are diverse and organized along different professional sub-
groups such as doctors, engineers, academics, lawyers and students.
The needs and expectations of these heterogeneous groups and the
mode of their engagement with the home country will be challenging.
Home-country institutions to coordinate and link these diverse over-
seas networks in order to leverage their contribution to Bangladesh’s
development are also missing.
Diaspora knowledge network is not always homogeneous in its
pursuits of goals and interests. Clashes in opinion and pathways to
engagement among individual diaspora members are not rare, plagu-
ing adequate use of potential of network-based engagement. Apart from
this, the absence of corresponding network at home also cause delay
and even discouragement for many potential engagement possibilities,
especially in the applied science and relatively new social science disci-
plines. As a result, individual-level initiatives come to play a prominent
role. Individual membership in virtual social network platforms such as

Facebook, Linkedin and Twitter bring individual academic diaspora in
touch with other Bangladeshi academics in Bangladesh or abroad. The
connection often starts with two individuals in the beginning through
co-authoring papers and attending seminars, and then it takes the shape
of institutional engagement through student exchanges and collabo-
rative research projects between the two institutions where they work
(Table 6.3).
Conclusion and recommendations
This chapter has reported how Bangladeshi academic diaspora engage

with Bangladesh academics and their institutions and contribute mainly
to the knowledge capital development in Bangladesh. The study has
shown six major areas of engagement and ensuing developmental
implications for the country. They contributed enormously through
their scholarly publications on Bangladesh and Bangladesh affairs in
major reputed international journals and publishing houses to create
a positive image of Bangladesh and to present Bangladesh as a highly
talented and resilient nation in front of the world community. They
have spread Bangladesh’s reputation and success across the world and
hence they are image enhancers. They have kept the fragile degen-
erating public university research stream in Bangladesh alive through
co-authoring articles/books with their Bangladeshi colleagues and send-
ing research materials to them. They also contributed enormously
towards strengthening the national innovation system in Bangladesh.
On the backdrop of highly politicized and fractured civil society in
Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi knowledge diaspora contributed towards
building informed opinion on critical development issues in Bangladesh
and playing the role of an extended civil society for Bangladesh. More-
over, they sent a substantial amount of remittance to Bangladesh and
engaged themselves in various philanthropic activities. They enriched
the tertiary education sector in Bangladesh by teaching at the uni-
versities in Bangladesh while on sabbatical and establishing faculty
and student exchange programmes between Bangladeshi universities
and the universities in the host countries. Moreover, they wrote rec-
ommendation letters in support of many Bangladeshis’ application
for scholarship and teaching job abroad and helped promote their
career.
This study reveals that engagement of academic diasporas have made
substantial headway in the Bangladeshi society. While their individual
Taiabur Rahman 139
Table 6.3 Engagement of academic diaspora
Role Mode of contribution
Reputation • Doing PhD on a critical issue about Bangladesh

Enhancer • Publishing books and articles on Bangladesh issue
with international publishing houses and journals
• Presenting paper on Bangladesh in international
conference/seminar
Strengthening • Publishing with Bangladeshi publishing house
Research Tradition • Co authoring with another Bangladeshi at home and
and National abroad,
Innovation • Sending research materials to academics back in
System in Bangladesh
Bangladesh • Supervising Bangladeshi MPhil/PhD students at
overseas universities
• Establishing joint research/project with a Bangladeshi
university/research institution
• Being instrumental in getting Bangladeshi qualified
students scholarship for doing higher study abroad
Enriching Tertiary • Making short visit to a Bangladeshi university/spend
Education Sector their sabbatical in Bangladesh
in Bangladesh • Establish faculty/student exchange programme with
Bangladeshi university.
Financial Support • Sending remittance back to Bangladesh (monthly
allowances for parents, building houses for them,
purchase of land and apartment in Dhaka, Chittagong
and other cities) and doing Philanthrophy (building
schools, clinics, student hostels, giving scholarships
to needy but talented students, sponsoring close
relatives for studying abroad)
• Travel back to Bangladesh by Bangladesh Biman for
vacation/tourism/meeting parents and relatives
Extended Civil • Contribute to Bangladeshi newspapers on nationally
Society significant issues
Career promoter • Being referees of Bangladeshis for scholarship,
teaching or other jobs abroad
and collective engagement is an eye-opener for other professional

diasporas who might be interested in engaging in their respective fields,
the formalization of such engagements at the government level is much
desired and potential to generate much benefits for the country as a
whole. Presently, there is little institutional or formal system in place
through which Bangladeshi knowledge diasporas can get encouraged to
contribute to Bangladesh’s development. In fact, most of the initiatives

are in fact individualistic and informal.
The chapter has shown that government is not mindful of the enor-
mous prospect of diaspora engagement. The government has been
aggressively pursuing a policy of sending out migrant workers abroad
and using them as an instrument of earning remittance without devel-
oping any safety net for the workers who contribute to a major portion
of Bangladesh’s GDP and foreign earning. All the governments in
Bangladesh hitherto miss the point that knowledge generation is a
vital component of development of the country. The surest path to a
country’s economic growth and development is to harness and leverage
its human capital. The provision of dual citizenship, the formation of
Ministry of Expatriate welfare and the Probashi Kollyan Bank (Diaspora
Welfare Bank) are targeted towards mobilizing migrant workers and
helping the migrants overseas to repatriate when they are in trouble.
No specific efforts are made to attract the knowledge diaspora to come
back home for short stay or for permanent stay. Private universities have
been a blessing in the sense that a good number of academicians are
back to teach at home universities (Rahman, 2010). Some academicians
come back to spend their sabbatical or teach for a semester and so on.
The Bangladesh government’s remittance-focused policies (geared
towards low-skilled workers) can contribute to making the transfer
of private funds safer and more efficient but will not maximize the
potential of highly skilled diasporas or of second-generation expatriates
eager to invest, transfer know-how to home countries or encourage
transnational exchanges. While there have clearly been some efforts
(dual citizenship, establishment of Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare
and Overseas Employment and Probashi Kollyan Bank, introduction of
remitter cards and CIP award, opportunity to purchase denationalized
industries at discount price, honouring important NRBs) at tapping the
diaspora in terms of their financial, intellectual and social capital, for
the most part these efforts seem to have been rather piecemeal and have
lacked a holistic framework or a proper institutional structure.
While individuals (who possess deep psychological attachment with
their roots) are crucial to initiate the process, home-country organi-
zations are what sustain it. Diaspora contributions are relevant and
sustainable only if there is strong local interest in collaborating and
the government and other relevant organizations include the diaspora
in their plans to create and sustain programmes. The government
can undertake a number of initiatives in order to get its academic
diaspora on board as partners in development. The government can
Taiabur Rahman 141
create post-doctoral positions at home universities (both public and

private), fund scientific research for excellent overseas returnees/short-
term visit or teaching, introduce UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge through
Expatriate Nations (TOKEN) project, build a good number of world-class
universities with a provision of 20 per cent faculty positions reserved for
highly qualified diaspora, set the public academic institutions free from
narrow politics and set up green channel for overseas talent, awards
for 20 members of the Bangladesh diaspora who have made significant
national and global contributions.
The first step the Bangladesh government can undertake is to
develop a reliable database to identify the pool of qualified highly
skilled Bangladeshi migrants residing abroad and their geographic
and skill-wise configuration and adopt strategies accordingly to uti-
lize them for Bangladesh’s development. It can work with orga-
nizations such as BDRC, RMMRU, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
(NRBvoice) and ScholarBangladesh in order to develop a database of
Bangladeshi experts abroad. Bangladesh can also collect information
about renowned Bangladeshi expatriates and their realm of expertise
through Bangladeshi embassies abroad. It needs to be strategic in devel-
oping its brand. It should consider linking its diaspora (unutilized
strategic resources) outreach programme to create a truly global brand.
The country has a lot of success stories – from health to microfinance
and women empowerment, to unparallel growth in mobile phone and
television penetration and pharmaceutical industry.
In order to tap the potential of academic diaspora, we need to look
into the current critical juncture through which Bangladesh is pass-
ing. The issue should be looked at from a holistic perspective. Lopsided
and symptomatic solutions will not sustain in the long run. Major
burning issues such as the political uncertainty, nose-diving law and
order situation, insecurity feelings, hartals, perennial electricity short-
age, unprecedented traffic jam in capital city (Dhaka), shortage of key
utility services – water, gas that are crucial for living a decent life – need
to be factored in while adopting strategies for harnessing the poten-
tial of diaspora for homeland development. Otherwise, the efforts of
engaging diaspora in national development may appear instrumental
and self-defeating.
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7
Diaspora Engagement in Education
in Kerala, India
Antony Palackal
There is growing recognition of the potential of diaspora communities

in stimulating development in their countries of origin. In recent years,
migration and development literature has increasingly been examining
measures to maximize the potential of diaspora contributions towards
the development of the country of origin, as well as the role of govern-
ments in creating a favourable environment for diaspora engagement.
From a policy perspective, diaspora communities have been largely
recognized as powerful actors whose activities affect the economic,
political and social dynamics of their home countries (Lahneman,
2005; Haas, 2006; Sunil, 2011). Consequently, diasporas have gained
greater momentum in the political and academic arena in the recent
past. The most immediate and growing form of diaspora engagement
is remittances. Migration and development intersect vis-à-vis family
remittances, because the money that migrants send home to their fam-
ilies and communities has become a key source of family incomes for
several developing countries.
However, remittances are not the only vehicle for diaspora engage-
ment with their home countries. The diaspora is also a major source
of foreign direct investment (FDI), market development (including
outsourcing of production), technology transfer, philanthropy, tourism,
political contributions, and more intangible flows of knowledge, new
attitudes and cultural influence. Diasporic associations are becom-
ing increasingly important actors in diasporic politics, governmental
policies and programmes or civil society engagements (Newland and
Patrick, 2004; Kapur, 2010). Thus, the economic and social contribu-
tions of diaspora members and associations to the development of home
countries need to be treated with equal importance.
145
146 Diaspora Engagement in Education in Kerala
In the last decade there has been a major shift in the concept and
practice of international system of higher education, caused primarily
by globalization aided by the developments in information and com-
munication technologies (Anandakrishnan, 2000). From the vantage
point of diaspora studies, it has been observed that internationaliza-
tion is one of the major forces shaping higher education, as it is to
meet the challenges posed by globalization in the twenty-first century.1
Internationalization of education seems to incorporate the policies and
practices that are undertaken by academic systems and institutions –
and even individuals – to cope with the global academic environment.
In this context, diaspora engagement in the educational sector in the
country of origin gains greater significance and critical importance.
The discourses on diasporic relations with the home countries propose
diverse perspectives (Vertovec, 2000; Oonk, 2007: 18).2 The diaspora as
a mode of cultural production seems to capture the currents of diasporic
engagements as transnational social and cultural phenomena. It empha-
sizes the movements of cultural objects, images and meanings back
and forth, and the way these transcend and change according to the
nature of the intersections of the diaspora players. It may be argued that
diaspora engagement, especially in education and academia, is basically
regarded as a cultural construct endowed with cultural traits of both
environments, that is, the host as well as the origin countries, and at the
same time embedded and punctured in different cultural spaces. This
view highlights the point that location, identity and time are important
factors in the construction of socio-cultural realities of people.
The concept of ‘reagency’ is employed to understand the conceptual
and substantive roles of this form of diasporic engagement as a cultural
product. A reagent has the capacity to induce a reaction and bring about
subsequent changes in an existing phenomenon. Similar to Giddens’
Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1984) that suggests interdependence
between agency and structure, the concept of ‘reagency’ is distinct in
that it considers multiple structures and agencies interacting within
flows of time and over multiple spaces. Diasporic initiatives, particu-
larly in education, create a response, that is, a reaction on the part of the
actors involved and sets in chains of events. ‘Reagency’, as a conceptual
framework, accounts for the temporal orientations of actors possessing
distinct identities and situated in specific structural contexts. The con-
cept, ‘reagency’, was first used in the context of examining the effects
of Internet in globalizing science (Shrum, 2005). This understanding of
‘reagency’ builds on three dimensions of agency: (1) it is structurally
embedded social engagement (2) unfolding within the flow of time and
Antony Palackal 147
(3) with any given action, exhibiting orientation to its past, present and
future component. It is submitted that diasporic educational engage-
ment as a cultural construct has the potential to ‘reagentize’ the culture
of a society in general and the educational sector in particular, which
has implications to the course of development in a region.
The chapter, therefore, examines the question whether or not, as a
reagent, diasporic engagement in Kerala influences and conditions the
internationalization of education in the receiving region, generating
structures and systems which can impact on the state’s development.
To this end, the chapter will basically delineate the structures and meth-
ods of a distinctive engagement in education in Kerala, by a diaspora
organization, namely IISAC (International Institute for Scientific and
Academic Collaboration) based in New Jersey, USA. The purpose is to
unveil the reagentive potentials of diasporic educational engagements in
an effort at internationalization of education which gives rise to newer
systems and agencies in the state, implicating the unique course of its
development.
The next section will introduce the state of Kerala followed by the
case study of IISAC’s educational engagements in Kerala. The case pre-
sentation is conceived as a thick narrative, elaborating the various
educational programmes of this diasporic engagement. The following
section will discuss the reagentive potentials and prospects of these
educational programmes towards internationalization of education and
cross-cultural learning in the state of Kerala from a developmental angle.
Qualitative data gathered with the help of a semi-structured interview
guide from two dozens of the participants of diverse batches of those
educational programmes organized by IISAC have been intermittently
used in this section to empirically support the arguments. The final
section concludes the chapter with some policy recommendations.
Kerala – God’s own country
The State of Kerala is a narrow strip of land on the South-western tip

of the Indian peninsula. Comprising of only 1.18 per cent of the total
land area and 2.75 per cent of the population of India, Kerala lies
between the mountainous belt of the Western Ghats on the east and
Arabian Sea on the west, with a geographical area of 39,863 sq. km and
width of 32–120 km. This green land,3 often referred to as ‘God’s Own
Country’, is breathtakingly beautiful with natural endowments like tran-
quil beaches, soothing backwaters, exhilarating hill stations, enchant-
ing waterfalls, historic monuments, spectacular art forms, rejuvenating
health packages, exotic wildlife and year-round festivals. The State has a
complex topography with high mountains, low hills, valleys and ridges
and presents an array of varied climatic regions and habitats (Sabina and
Varghese, 2012).
Kerala, one of the 28 states in India, however, holds a distinctive
position in the developmental map of the world as a region that demon-
strates unique patterns of development. As a result, ‘The Kerala Model
of Development’, as it is popularly known, has been a much-debated
topic in the academic circles and policy discourses. The Kerala Model
of Development began to receive attention about four decades ago with
the publication of a UN study in 1975 on poverty, unemployment and
development policy in Kerala (United Nations and Centre for Develop-
ment Studies, 1975). The report showed that Kerala, while having low
levels of per capita income and high levels of poverty, as expected in
a developing region, experienced striking progress on its social devel-
opment front, including high levels of literacy and life expectancy, low
levels of fertility, infant and adult mortality, posing new questions to the
development discourse. Thus, the development experience of Kerala in
the 1970s demonstrated a paradoxical development pattern, with high
social achievements on a weak economic basis. The most obvious com-
ponent of this ‘Kerala paradox’ is a set of statistical indicators for quality
of life that brought Kerala closer to high-income developed countries
than to its counterparts in the low-income world (Palackal, 2012).
Kerala was drafted into India’s migration map from the beginning of
the early twentieth century when colonial plantations were developed
in different parts of the world. Today, there is hardly any part of the
world where Malayalis are not found. Almost 60 per cent of the house-
holds in Kerala have at least one migrant working abroad. The high level
of education, literacy and political awareness coupled with acute unem-
ployment and underemployment enabled the state to send many people
to other states in India as well as to other countries in the world. It is
observed that non-residents from Kerala (NRKs), who account for one-
fifth of the Indian diaspora of 25 million people spread across the globe,
are critical to the task of repositioning India on the central stage of the
world economy (John, 2012). The reason is that NRKs wield considerable
financial power as a community, accounting for more than 30 per cent
of the money remitted to India every year. A substantial part of migrants’
earnings are either remitted regularly or brought back as savings at the
end of the period of migration (Marie Percot and Irudaya Rajan, 2007:
318). In fact, the prosperity, wealth and modern lifestyle brought to
Antony Palackal 149
the state by its diaspora, particularly from the Gulf, over the past four
decades have dramatically transformed the social and economic fabric
of the state.
IISAC and the educational engagements
Kerala with its rich topographical features potent with biodiversity, and
high social indicators in literacy, life expectancy, mortality and fertil-
ity rates, and the socio-political factors such as social medicine, land
reforms, education, diverse religions, gender equality, vibrant politics,
unique customs and traditions and the attendant ills and contradic-
tions has always been a highly fertile domain for academicians and
knowledge seekers. Realizing this as early as 1998, IISAC pioneered a
diasporic engagement in the field of education in Kerala. IISAC was insti-
tuted with the considered goals of facilitating cultural understanding,
international education, faculty-led programmes, experiential learn-
ing, youth-enrichment activities and international research in India
and more specifically in Kerala (www.iisac.org). IISAC’s major educa-
tional initiatives are the Semester in India programmes, faculty-led
month-long courses and experiential learning programmes.
During the last 12 years, IISAC has initiated various collaborative
efforts in higher education, research and youth empowerment between
the United States and India, specifically Kerala. Some of the major
aspects of this diasporic educational engagement include the following:
• Identifying the professionals, especially the academicians of the

United States and India who are interested in and committed to
sharing knowledge and expertise.
• Organizing programmes such as seminars, conferences, study tours
and internships for students from the United States.
• Collaborating with institutions in India and Kerala which offer
compatible systems of education for foreign students.
• Developing academic courses with universities in India to introduce
studies on Kerala for students from the United States and Canada.
• Publishing reference-cum-textbooks and journals for students who
wish to undertake in-depth studies on Kerala.
• Mobilizing academicians and students to Kerala, through faculty-led
programmes.
• Helping institutions and organizations in Kerala to conduct classes
and workshops on leadership development, financial management,
ethics and public relations for elected officials and executives of

Governments.
• Developing a system that will help professionals, academics and
students to interact with their counterparts in both the countries.
IISAC’s educational programmes emphasize experiential, participatory,

interactive learning pedagogy. It employs an ethnographic approach to
knowledge-building process, wherein the learners are physically present
in the locale and can engage with the object of learning. A wide range
of activities, such as internships, research projects, volunteering, ser-
vice learning and short-term work, are available to students and they
may select the kind of activities in tune with their requirement and
orientation.
IISAC’s Semester Abroad programme provides opportunity to students
from US universities to pursue one semester in India. It is a 15-credit
programme for which IISAC has developed a flexible academic model
allowing the students to work out their own curriculum. The courses
are divided into core, departmental and individualized courses. Students
are to choose only a minimum of two core courses and the remain-
ing courses may be opted as electives from various departments, thus
making the curriculum highly interdisciplinary. The core courses are
expected to provide a framework to understand the historical, social,
economic, political and cultural complexities of the region within the
larger framework of India and South Asia. Courses cover five subject
areas with special emphasis on society, culture, language, literature,
religion, philosophy and foreign policy.
Individualized courses are designed for students to explore a particu-
lar topic in depth, where they can choose a topic of their interest and
work with a professor. This allows students to break away from the set
syllabus and personalize their study experience. In addition to these
courses, students also participate in a series of conferences, seminars,
workshops, concerts, exhibitions and cultural shows and enrich their
academic and socio-cultural experience in India. Intensive fieldwork,
lasting for about two weeks in Kerala is an integral part of the Semester
in India programme. The field trip and hands-on experience take the
students through tropical forests and wild life, biodiversity hotspots,
ecosystems, aquatic resource settings, agricultural fields and places of
socio-cultural and political significance.
In-depth research work in areas of ecosystem, biodiversity, social
anthropology, sociology, women studies and development can last for a
few weeks to one year for variable research credits. Students are allowed
Antony Palackal 151
to work with a faculty in their research labs and the field, to con-
duct meaningful research for the completion of their course at graduate
or undergraduate levels. IISAC works closely with prospective students
and their universities in developing such research projects. If needed,
proposals may be submitted for funding from prestigious scholarship
agencies like ‘Fulbright’ in the United States. Students in the past have
used Full Bright scholarships to carry out short-term research activities
in India with the help of IISAC.
IISAC also organizes short-term programmes for summer or winter
field studies in tropical biodiversity, culture, society and gender for high
school and college students. This is a condensed four-week programme
for three credits. The main objective of these short-term programmes
is to provide experiential learning to the students so that they can
gain a realistic understanding of the society in Kerala in terms of its
tropical biodiversity and developmental experience. The curriculum
includes lectures, field trips, lab exercises and service learning focusing
on biodiversity, culture, society and/or gender in Kerala. Accordingly,
the programme introduces tropical biodiversity of various ecosystems
through field trips and exposes the students to various facets of socio-
cultural, religious and political life in Kerala. Also, students are given
numerous opportunities to interact with the local communities, stu-
dent groups and key informants and practitioners, and live with farmers
in the villages to understand farming activities, interact with nature
clubs of local schools and colleges, tutor local children and develop
relationships with the local community.
An important feature of IISAC’s educational engagement in Kerala is
the close collaborative networks developed with various institutions,
organizations, academicians and practitioners, both within and outside
Kerala. In addition to these institutional and organizational networking
and collaborations, IISAC works in close association with a large number
of academicians and researchers who are experts in various fields related
to IISAC’s educational involvement in Kerala.
Cross-cultural learning
IISAC’s educational engagements in Kerala, spanning over a decade,

have definitely contributed to the impending projects of modernizing
and standardizing education in the state by enhancing cross-border
learning pedagogies and cross-cultural knowledge building and skill
development. An analysis of the qualitative data on the ‘Before and
after Study Abroad Programmes in Kerala, India’, gathered from the
participants, bears testimony to this. Listed below are some sentiments

expressed before the students set out for their academic sojourn in
Kerala:
I believed India to be a very diverse country that held a grand ancient

history. I was excited to be immersed into such a different culture.
(Student from St. Mary’s College, Maryland,
Spring 2012 batch)
With regards to my opinions on Kerala, I literally knew nothing about

the state before I went to India. I’m not sure if I had even heard the
name before. [ . . . ] I had also heard a lot of negative things about how
it was ‘dirty and full of diseases.’
(Student from Miami University, Spring 2012 batch)
I did not have much of an opinion on Kerala before going to India.
[ . . . ] My opinion of India was that it was an underdeveloped country,
but it was rich in culture and history.
(Student from St. Mary’s College, Maryland, Fall 2010 batch)
I was nervous about how different the culture might be from my

own . . ..
(Student from Grand Valley State University, Fall 2010 batch)
I knew there were elephants, awesome music, plenty of philosophy,

and delicious food . . .
These typical remarks, some of which are bordering on ethnocentric

mindset, clearly reveal the dispositions that are quite natural to students
who belong to a different culture and educational system, particularly
in the West. They also point to the kind of world view being inculcated
in a formal academic and socialization system in the world over. It is
in the backdrop of this ethnocentric learning environment that the
idea of internationalization of education, particularly in the developing
countries, gains greater scope and relevance.
With respect to the transformative power of the cross-border cultural
learning and environment that IISAC has provided, the students made
the following comments:
Kerala feels like India’s exception; my world changed dramatically for

the better.
Antony Palackal 153
After visiting Kerala, I think it is a beautiful place. It’s like a tropical

paradise.
I enjoyed most talking with and becoming friends with Indian
students and learning about their customs or beliefs.
(Student from St. Mary’s College, Maryland,
Spring 2012 batch)
I met people from all over the world and learned so much about cul-
tures that I previously knew nothing about. The experience sparked
my interest in travel and cultures so much that I have decided to
make a career out of it.
I think the best thing about the program from my perspective was
the sense of community I had in the Foreign Students Hostel. I have
never met a group of people who I admired more or had more in
common with, than the other American students in the SIP (Semester
in India Programme), and living in close quarters with other similar
students bonded us together like a family.
(Student from Spring 2012 batch)
I had such an amazing experience here; it flew by far too fast. This
will definitely be one of the highlights of my life that I will forever
cherish. Thank you for providing such a great program!
(Student from Finger Lakes Community College,
Spring 2012 batch)
The transformative power and learning effects of the study abroad pro-
grammes in Kerala appeared to be so enriching that some students spoke
about its enduring and futuristic impact on their life and career thus:
Of course, it has influenced my future! I have always had a passion for

learning about different cultures and travel. But Kerala solidified this
love for me. I will use my Psychology degree in a different way than
I had previously intended. Now I am focusing more on International
Education and trying to discover ways that I can continue to travel
and learn from the eastern world.
Yes, it will greatly impact my future studies because after my final year
of education back in the States, I will be returning for about 3 years
to do collaborative research with a professor. I hope to take that as an

opportunity to also do my own research in the field of anthropology
and become published. There is also a great future for working in the
embassy.
(Student from St. Mary’s College, Maryland, Spring 2012 batch)
Yes. I want to study Indian culture more and eventually come
back to India, whether that be in a few years or ten years. It may
also influence my studies in philosophy. I want to pursue studying
Hinduism, and maybe eventually teach Hinduism in a philosophy
class if I become a professor.
(Student from Grand Valley State University,
Spring 2012 batch)
These affirmative propositions from the students clearly point to the

fact that IISAC’s educational engagement in the state opens up avenues
for promoting Kerala as the international destination for higher edu-
cation, which would result in economic and social development of
the state. The State Higher Education Council, in fact, recognizes the
great need for changing the perceptions about the state among the
global community to make them look at Kerala as a prospective higher
education destination.4 A student of Fall 2012 batch described IISAC’s
programme as ‘one of the greatest experiences’ in her life, which in a
way summarizes the general experience of the participants.
Honestly, I recommend this program to anyone who is looking for

an enriching and life-changing experience. This program is not for
the faint of heart, it can be challenging. But the reward of the pro-
gram outweighs any of the uncomfortable experiences you might
encounter from being in such a different place from the US. I con-
sider it to be one of the greatest experiences of my life. I learned more
in those few months than I have during my entire college career. That
sounds drastic, but it is genuinely true.
The organic linkages, networks and the learning strategies that IISAC
adopted in the educational programmes seems to have facilitated effec-
tive diffusion of the basic attributes consisting of structures, organiza-
tion, governance, content, quality, standards, approaches and practices
into the higher educational settings of the state. It is a positive sum
process by which the best practices of one country are adopted by
others. Hence, IISAC’s educational programmes, it appears, can con-
tribute greatly to the attempts at standardization of the structures,
methods, practices and policies of the state. It can also help in
Antony Palackal 155
setting up benchmarks in the academic systems and institutions, at

the institutional or individual levels, in coping with the global aca-
demic environment as well as positioning Kerala as a prospective higher
education destination in the global community.
The idea is that the higher education in the state must be brought
to international standards without compromising its cultural heritage
so that the benefits are experienced by society at large. In the efforts at
reorienting and repositioning the higher education sector in Kerala, first
and foremost priority seems to be attached to the aspects of internation-
alization. Internationalization of higher education denotes the process
of integrating an international/intercultural dimension into the teach-
ing, research and service functions of the institution. IISAC’s educational
engagement assumes greater significance in this renewed policy priority
of internationalization of education in the state.
Reagentive effect
From the theoretical perspective of ‘reagency’, IISAC’s academic

engagements seem to act as a medium causing a chain of reactions lead-
ing to the development of structural and institutional linkages across
systems of diverse academic and research environments. They enable
the learning community and thereby the academic institutions and
systems abroad to map the developmental experience of a develop-
ing region. Understanding of the varied notions and practices of social
development and growth trajectories of a different region would pave
the way for collaborative learning and researches on issues of develop-
ment in both the regions. The developmental experience of the state is
disclosed to the academic community and learners from a completely
different cultural and developmental setting. The following sample of
deliberations on the learning experience of the student participants of
these programmes brings home this aspect of unveiling the dynamics,
issues and challenges related to the question of development and social
progress of the region:
Kerala is different from other areas of India, especially the southern

parts of India. It is far more developed and has a different atmosphere
about it. Everything is a bit cleaner and more comfortable. It is easier
to communicate with people in Kerala because it is more developed.
It seems to me that India is a place of contradictions. While you have

a rapidly industrializing region and lots of modern buildings, right
next to development you still see the very traditional third world
India. The culture has managed to remain intact despite all the devel-
opment, and Kerala is a place of tradition blended with modernity.
My academics led me to a deeper understanding of Indian and Asian

foreign relations which I think has expanded my mind and likely my
academic, if not professional career. For a second insight I came to see
how social capital, which is very strong at least in Kerala, can affect a
society for the better.
(Student from Finger Lakes Community College,
Fall 2010 batch)
These deliberations point to the fact that IISAC’s educational pro-

grammes act as cultural constructs in generating, producing and dissem-
inating knowledge about a society in a systematic and scientific manner
through establishing organic linkages and associations with various
actors in dispersed locations. It may, therefore, be surmised that IISAC’s
academic engagements created great possibilities, as true reagents, for
developmental and research endeavours in this part of the developing
world. These reagentive effects of IISAC’s academic engagements further
resulted in the development of four novel ventures in Kerala. These are
novel developments, especially because all four ventures are directly or
indirectly linked to the educational system as well as the institutions
of development and have bearings on both the systems. These novel
structures and establishments which are born out of IISAC’s original
educational programmes are in a way part of IISAC’s attempt to build
standardized systems and structures in a given diasporic engagement in
the region of origin which has developmental implications.
Tropical Green School (www.tropicalgreenschool.org) is a field study
model that IISAC has developed in association with other collaborative
institutions in Kerala, especially for those professors and students from
all over the world who wish to visit Kerala for nature, culture, society
and gender studies. It is designed and developed for guided exposure
to Kerala’s geographical, ecological and cultural landscape and systems.
This unique curriculum is offered for varying academic credits with field
skills necessary for career building. The School offers different models of
programmes suited for various durations.
Root Tourism is a special form of tourism developed by IISAC for
Malayali high school and college students in diasporas to get acquainted
with the society, culture, history, traditional values and art forms of
Antony Palackal 157
Kerala. The purpose of the programme is to explore their roots so

as to develop a sense of belonging and appreciation for their inher-
ited culture of collectivism, family, religious and social values and to
experience their homeland’s language, art, literature and cuisine. The
programme combines the fun of tourism with educating the students
about their ancestral land. After a series of lectures on Kerala by eminent
professors, the participants embark on an intensive field trip, visit-
ing heritage centres, monuments, forests and rural areas. During the
tour, through scenic areas, students engage in various group activities
promoting group dynamics, bonding, personality and leadership skill
development. Camp fire and cultural enrichment programmes are also
part of these fun-filled learning programmes. Hands-on training in mar-
tial arts, Ayurveda, Yoga, Classical and Folk dances, Classical music and
Musical instruments are also made available. After the tour, students
may wish to stay back for more rigorous training in Malayalam lan-
guage, performing arts and other Kerala-related topics, according to their
interest. IISAC works with various diaspora Malayali associations for the
organization of such root tourism in Kerala.
Introduction to Kerala Studies: A Reference cum Text Book on Kerala is a
milestone in the history of IISAC’s diasporic engagement in education.
This pioneering book is an attempt to bring Kerala to the academic and
non-academic circles across the world. The book is perceived as a win-
dow to the world that attempts to uncover the magic, wonder and myth
about Kerala and opens up its identity with beauty and realism. This
two-volume book of more than 1400 pages has been edited by eminent
professors and the chapters have been contributed by more than 100
scholars of Kerala studies from different parts of the world.
IISAC has worked with academicians, researchers and other experts
across the world for about three years to put together this reference cum
text book on Kerala. It is IISAC’s immense contribution to the knowl-
edge heritage and education on Kerala, particularly for the diaspora
Malayalis across the world. The book has 13 units and 87 chapters,
covering wide subject areas such as geography, biodiversity, agriculture,
wildlife, fisheries, floristic wealth, culture, history, politics, economics,
sociology, anthropology, religion, arts and a host of others. The worth
and relevance of the book becomes more conspicuous when one real-
izes the fact that a comprehensive book on Kerala which uncovered the
uniqueness and the charm of this land with all its legacies and para-
doxes was nearly absent before this. Further, there was also a lack of
reliable source for the diaspora Malayalis, particularly for the younger
generation to know about their roots.
From the point of view of IISAC’s diasporic engagement, the book

offers substantial contribution to three interrelated areas: (1) develop-
ment studies (2) diaspora studies and (3) higher educational sector in
Kerala and India. The book has a few excellent chapters delving on the
ramifications of the unique pattern of development of the region with
all its strengths and limitations, which will enable students, academi-
cians and policy makers to pursue a line of development studies on
Kerala which will have national and international bearings. The book
also has a section on ‘Kerala diaspora’, comprising of chapters dealing
with the life and world of Malayalis living in different parts of the globe.
This section throws innumerable challenges and scope for diaspora edu-
cation and studies on Kerala, particularly from a developmental angle.
Finally, in the context of the concerted efforts at revamping and restruc-
turing the curricula and pedagogy of higher education in the state with
a view to upgrade the quality and excellence to match international
levels, the book serves as a valuable resource for the universities and
institutions of higher education in Kerala.5 Before this volume, there
was no integrated book on Kerala that included a general introduction to
the landscape, social structure, history and culture from a developmen-
tal perspective. This book on Kerala will fill this serious gap in higher
education and learning in general and degree studies in particular.
Diaspora Education and Studies on Kerala (DESK) is a non-profit regis-
tered body of academicians and researchers instituted for the promotion
of diaspora education and studies on Kerala. In fact, DESK is a by-
product of IISAC’s book on Kerala. In the course of the long-standing
association and networking with academicians and researchers in Kerala
and abroad, IISAC has brought together a team who is interested
in undertaking specifically diaspora education and researches vis-à-vis
Kerala. In a way, it is a consolidation of the networking and linkages
that IISAC has built in the course of its academic and educational
engagements in Kerala for more than a decade and more specifically
during the three-year long book project on Kerala.
DESK has been instituted mainly with two objectives: (1) collabo-
rate and network with universities, institutions, scholars, community
leaders of diaspora Malayalis and organize educational and academic
programmes on Kerala diaspora and (2) undertake research on issues of
non-resident Keralites and return Malayali migrants. In view of these
considered objectives, DESK has set out some concrete programmes to
be initiated as part of their immediate and gradual undertakings. They
include introducing a course on Malayalam language and Kerala stud-
ies, particularly for Malayalis in the Asian Study Centres of Universities
abroad, organizing international and national seminars, workshops and
Antony Palackal 159
conferences on themes and topics related to diaspora, conducting lead-

ership and personality development training camps and workshops for
high school/college students of Malayali diaspora during summers in
Kerala, establishing collaborative research on issues and questions on
Kerala diaspora with foreign universities and finally publishing a journal
on diaspora studies with special reference to South Asia. IISAC envisages
that DESK will emerge as a model for international collaboration in aca-
demic and research fields as it fosters joint educational and academic
programmes between professors, scholars and researchers of Kerala with
their international counterparts, more particularly those in the South
Asian and Western countries.
Conclusion
Delving on the unique experiences in diaspora engagement of IISAC

as a case study, and examining its potentials for developmental and
research endeavours in the state of Kerala, the chapter focused on edu-
cational diaspora engagement for the development of the homeland,
Kerala. The chapter has highlighted the fact that diaspora engagements
in education assume greater significance, especially in the context of the
considered efforts at the internationalization of higher education in the
state. While elaborating the pedagogy, methods and strategies of IISAC’s
educational engagement in Kerala, it emphasized on the increasing need
for exploring the scope and relevance of diaspora engagements further
in the field of education and academia. The transformative effects of
the educational programmes of IISAC illustrated that such standardized
cross-border learning systems and pedagogies are critical in revamp-
ing and upgrading the educational system in the homeland. Tropical
Green School, Root Tourism, Book on Kerala and DESK – the quadru-
ple ventures that were born out of the networks and linkages that IISAC
established in the course of its continuous and sustained educational
programmes in the State may be viewed as ‘reagentive’ effects of such
diasporic engagements in education. It is likely that those ‘reagentive’
products of IISAC’s diaspora engagement may result in affirmative con-
sequences to the higher education which could create far-reaching
developmental impacts on the state.
Notes
1. Recognizing the need for bringing excellence in higher education, the Gov-
ernment of Kerala organized an International Education Meet (IEM) on the
theme ‘Kerala Reaching out: Repositioning Higher Education Sector for Global
excellence’ during February 6–7, 2006 at Kochi. The Meet proposed to analyse,
discuss, debate and develop appropriate intervention strategies for moderniza-

tion and internationalization of higher education in the state. The delibera-
tions in the Meet emphasized the increasing need for internationalization of
education in the state. For details, see Kerala Calling, pp. 9–10.
2. Steven Vertovec (2000) proposes three meanings of diaspora: (1) a social form,
(2) a type of consciousness and (3) a mode of cultural production. Cited in
Gijsbert Oonk 2007: 18.
3. In fact, Kerala’s identity is primarily defined by its ecology and topogra-
phy: the name ‘Kerala’ is derived from the word Kera meaning coconut, and
alam means land, hence Keralam is ‘the land of coconut’; and its language
Malayalam, which again is a word derived from its ecology – mala (the hill
and mountain) alam (the land) – hence, ‘the land of hills and mountains’.
Therefore, the people of Kerala are known as Malayalis.
4. The present Vice Chairman, State Higher Education Council, Government
of Kerala, has shared this idea with Prof. Sunny Luke, Director, Programme,
IISAC, in a recent conversation with him during which the author was also
present.
5. In the context of the recent initiatives of the Kerala State Higher Education
Council (KSHEC), for the semesterization of degree studies, it has been noted
that degree programmes in Kerala should necessarily include an introductory
course on the state of Kerala which will familiarize the students with the social
history, geography, biodiversity and culture of the state so as to develop a deep
sense of belonging and commitment to their native region and generate an
interest in its development and welfare.
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Sunil, S. Amrith. (2011) Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia, 1970–2010:
Vertovec, Steven (2000) The Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Patterns. London and
New York: Routledge.
8
Diaspora Volunteering and
Development in Nepal
Prakash Khanal
Although the Nepalese have a long tradition of emigration to

neighbouring lands, the growth of the Nepali diaspora community in
the West is a relatively new phenomena taking place over the last two-
and-a-half decades. This growth has largely been influenced by various
migration policies adopted by different countries, such as the Diversity
Visa (DV) adopted by the United States, the point-based immigration
systems of skilled migrants adopted by Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom and the student visa opportunities in different colleges and
universities in Europe, North America and Oceania. Student migration
is seen as a key pathway to permanent settlement and the formation of
diaspora community in the West. Another prominent group of Nepali
diaspora is the ex-Gurkha soldiers and their families who are settled in
the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong.
According to the Non-Resident Nepalese Association,1 over 2.5
million Nepalese are currently living in over 56 countries around
the world. Of these, 860,755 are currently living in the Middle East;
824,200 in Asia; 150,000 in North America; 76,050 in Europe; 32,700 in
Oceania; 1,100 in South America; and 195 in Africa. The population of
Nepali migrants in the Middle East, mostly labour migrants, represents
44.3 per cent of the whole Nepali population living abroad (Adhikari,
2009).
The Non-Resident Nepalese Association (NRNA) was formed in 2002
by overseas Nepalese migrants, and formally established in Kathmandu,
Nepal, in October 2003. The NRNA is an association committed to cre-
ating a global network of Nepali migrants and streamlining their energy
and resources to make the diaspora a catalyst of economic and social
transformation of Nepal (Sharma, 2009). Over time, the NRNA has
emerged as the central organization that represents Nepalese migrants
162
Prakash Khanal 163
residing around the world. In its bid to extend the global network of
non-resident Nepalese, the NRNA has been successful in establishing the
National Coordination Councils (NCCs) in 56 countries. Since its estab-
lishment in 2003, the Nepalese government has recognized the NRNA’s
significance for connecting the Nepalese overseas and supported various
activities of the association, including promulgating various legislations
in favour of non-resident Nepalese.
Nepali professional diasporas in the West united under a diaspora
organization called ‘Nepali Diaspora Volunteering Programme’ (NDVP).
Under the aegis of NDVP, Nepalese professionals living in the United
Kingdom and other parts of Europe, Africa, America and Oceania are
encouraged to go on a volunteering mission to Nepal. The NDVP has
adopted ‘Transferring Skills, Transforming Societies’ as the main motto
of the programme – just one initiative for all the Nepalese living in
the United Kingdom and rest of the world. Thus a professional volun-
teering opportunity was created in the form of NDVP for the diaspora
community, which provided them with the unique chance to get con-
nected to Nepal and contribute to the development programmes by
transferring their skills and expertise. This offered them the opportu-
nity to transfer cutting-edge technology to Nepal by training people
and getting involved in policy-level dialogue at all levels. While NDVP
is the opportunity, Connect for Change/Himalayan Development Inter-
national UK is the charitable organization that facilitates the transfer of
creative excellence of Nepali professionals to help fight the disadvan-
tages and marginalization and thus contributing to the fulfilment of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nepal.
This study investigates the role of the NDVP in the socio-economic
development of Nepal. The next section describes the initiation of
the NDVP, followed by sections on areas of need and planned volun-
teering, the engagement of diaspora volunteers and the achievements
of the diaspora volunteers. The final section concludes with policy
recommendations.
Initiation of the Nepali Diaspora Volunteering Programme
Volunteerism is not new to Nepali people and society. It is deeply

ingrained and widely practised by different communities in Nepal, albeit
in different forms. One can find examples of volunteering in Nepal in
the form of support to neighbours during the harvesting season, orga-
nizing community feasts, cultural events, the sustainable management
of irrigation channels, distribution of water, management of community
164 Diaspora Volunteering and Development in Nepal
forestry, natural resource management and so on (Neupane, 2001).

Nepal is very dynamic and diverse in terms of the ethnic composition
of the society. For instance, there are over 100 different ethnic groups
in Nepal, each of which practice a different set of cultural and reli-
gious practices. One would discover a wide range of volunteering models
developed and practised over the centuries by each community.
The idea of the NDVP germinated in early 2007. The author of this
chapter shaped the idea for NDVP in 2006, in consultation with the
Executive Director of Connect for Change (CfC), when he was working
as a volunteer for CfC. CfC is a British Asian charitable organization that
works predominantly in India. Once the idea of the programme was
conceived, CfC showed willingness to support the idea and the funds
were raised to implement the idea. After the initial discussion with CfC
regarding NDVP, a number of meetings were organized between Volun-
tary Services Overseas (VSO) in the United Kingdom and CfC. At that
time VSO (in the United Kingdom) had already initiated the idea of sup-
porting the development of a diaspora volunteering programme in the
United Kingdom and had funded a few Asian and African charities for
preliminary study. Thus, VSO provided technical and financial support
to conduct a feasibility study and needs assessment among the Nepali
diaspora in the United Kingdom, as well as among the possible partners
of the programme in Nepal. The CfC received financial support from the
UK Government’s Department for International Development (DfID) to
launch NDVP.
The NDVP was launched with the main objective of encouraging
Nepalese professionals living in the United Kingdom to take up volun-
tary placements to engage in development activities in Nepal, which
would allow them to transfer the skills and knowledge that they learned
in the United Kingdom to their home country. One primary concern of
NDVP was not to duplicate efforts already underway in Nepal but rather
to support them as well as to work in partnership with local charitable
organizations, community organizations, international development
agencies, civil society as well as the government, to contribute towards
the MDGs. The NDVP’s special focus was to find professional volunteers
in the United Kingdom and other parts of the world who would work
on, or contribute directly to, the need-based programmes as identified
by its partners who had the experience of managing international as
well as local volunteers.
For the efficient use of volunteers, Himalayan Development Interna-
tional UK (HDI UK) has developed Volunteering Management Systems
Prakash Khanal 165
(VMS) to recruit, train, facilitate and manage the flow of volunteers in

an organized way to Nepal. The Nepalese Diaspora Volunteering Pro-
gramme recognizes the contributions made by the Nepalese diaspora
over the years and believes that, in future, the diaspora community can
contribute more largely. The Himalayan Development International UK
expects that the NDVP would inspire more Nepalese professionals and
others to take up volunteering placements in Nepal. The Himalayan
Development International UK hopes to facilitate the flow of volunteers
to support Nepalese government in meeting global obligations to eradi-
cate poverty and establish inclusive governance powered by people from
all walks of life, representing all communities that inhabit Nepal. Thus,
diaspora volunteering opens up the window of opportunity to all those
concerned about the perils in Nepal, to make a practical contribution in
any area of development in the country.
Areas of need and planned volunteering
Nepal faces enormous challenges in meeting the MDGs by 2015. How-

ever, it is heartening to note that efforts are being made by the gov-
ernmental, non-governmental and international developmental orga-
nizations working in Nepal to meet the target in several areas. The
Himalayan Development International UK has been working with and
supporting the programme activities of the Government of Nepal, and
every government ministry and every other agency, which is work-
ing towards meeting MDG targets. However, due to limited funds, the
relative newness of the organization and to make an effective contri-
bution, the Himalayan Development International UK decided to focus
its involvement on the areas of education, health and the community
development sector.
Education
In Nepal, half of the country’s children have no access to primary edu-
cation. Around 3 million children work in extreme hardships and more
than 30,000 child labourers’ work in 1,600 stone quarries while others
work as dishwashers or domestic servants. Nepal is the world’s 6th child
labour-intensive country. Altogether 5.5 million students are enrolled in
those schools and colleges who are served by more than 150 thousand
teachers, the number of women going to school is far less compared to
boys because girls have less access to education than boys. Many are not
allowed to go to school and those that do often leave before the age of 12
despite efforts to keep them at school by giving them scholarships and

other incentives. Enrolment of girls is less than 35 per cent in secondary
schools. While the country’s educational system has made progress over
the years, there is still much to be done. Primary education is free in
Nepal since 1975, but government schools are often inadequate, too far
away, overcrowded and lack teachers as well as supplementary teach-
ing materials. These problems have made the goal of Education For All
(EFA) a challenge for the country. In this sector Himalayan Development
International UK and its partners in Nepal want to engage the volunteers
to train teachers, School Administrators, School Managers, members
of School Management Committees (SMCs), Educational Development
Planners, Teacher Trainers, Head Teachers and so on.
Health
Another area requiring critical attention in Nepal is health services to
its population. Nepal has accepted the universal recognition of ‘Health:
people’s basic right’ and established people’s health as the responsibility
of the State, by owning this concept in the Interim Constitution in 2007.
Nepal still faces difficult challenges in terms of providing health care
to its population who remain scattered in over 40,000 villages. Infant
mortality rate in Nepal is 46 deaths per 1000 live births (NewEra, 2011).
Patient/doctor ratio in Nepal is 1:18,000 and patient/bed ratio is 1:5000.
Worse off are children who have to share one bed among a quarter of a
million of them. Nearly 90 per cent of the women in Nepal give birth
at home and most of them suffer pregnancy (anti-natal) complications.
Nepal has long suffered from one of the world’s worst levels of maternal
mortality rate (MMR) of 539 per 100,000 live infant births in 2001.2
However, a survey done by Nepalese Ministry of Health and Population
revealed that the figure has gone down to 281 now.
The Nepalese government needs to focus on increasing hospitals,
health posts and training of health workers. Children and the elderly are
the most affected as health-care services required by them are extremely
limited. Also, the people in rural areas suffer as doctors avoid taking
up assignments in those areas. HDI UK and its partner organizations
in Nepal planned to engage specialists from different fields of health
and medicine to provide training to people in the area of medical
emergencies, healthy ageing (geriatrics), care workers, physiotherapists,
psychiatry, palliative care, stroke, mental health and old age psychia-
try, midwives, maternal and child-care specialists, nursing education,
occupational health, paediatrics, neurology, hospital and health-post
management training and so on.
Prakash Khanal 167
Community development
Nepal’s First Five Year Plan, started in 1956, emphasized building
the country’s transport, communication and infrastructure. This trend
continued until the Fifth Five Year Plan (1975–1980), when a vari-
ety of issues were addressed, including the energy sector. The Eighth
Plan (1992–1997) addressed poverty alleviation and reducing regional
inequality as two of the main goals. In subsequent years the problems of
drinking water, sanitation, health, housing and primary education were
addressed. However, the political instability in the country since 2006
has further exacerbated with the increase in factional partisan politics
and violence. The government of Nepal adopted in 2007 a three-year
interim development plan for a period 2007/2008 to 2010/2011. The pri-
mary goal of this plan is poverty alleviation, specifically to bring down
poverty to below 30 per cent of the population.
The HDI UK and its partner institutions in Nepal had identified com-
munity development as one of the areas where the diaspora volunteers
could contribute substantially by training people in the area of inte-
grated community development, resettlement and development, tissue
culture to grow rare herbs and medicinal plants in the local community
for their economic self-reliance, social enterprise, monitoring and eval-
uation, business management, organizational development, proposal
writing and fundraising.
Engagement of diaspora volunteers
In his report entitled ‘Connected through Service: Diaspora Volunteers

and Global Development’ (Terrazas, 2010) cites ‘Philanthropic Links
between the Chinese Diaspora and the People’s Republic of China’, a
paper by Nick Young and June Shih, to highlight how Chinese diaspora
physicians in the United States, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia
travel to mainland China to provide pro bono hands on training to
Chinese doctors. Likewise, Nepalese physicians, psychiatrists, geriatri-
cians and learning disability consultants volunteer to give lectures in the
medical colleges, organize training for doctors and nurses, speak to the
parents and provide consultations to the patients in hospitals. In this
manner diaspora members offer unique advantages in their efforts to
contribute to the homeland (Brinkerhoff, 2006).
The Nepalese diaspora volunteers who were recruited in the United
Kingdom were engaged in planning and organizing training pro-
grammes to meet the needs identified by the partner organizations
in Nepal and the beneficiaries whom they provided their services
to. Before heading out on a volunteering assignment the volunteers

would be given necessary information regarding their intended activ-
ity. Such activities would receive priority based on the needs identified
by the partner organizations in the country. There would be mutual
understanding regarding the consultation process between the vol-
unteers and the local partners. Thus the diaspora volunteers would
be engaged in a number of ways as per their expertise and training
method which is also influenced by the availability of local resources
such as computers, power supply and overhead projectors. In general,
the diaspora volunteers fulfil the following responsibilities during their
placement.
Training Specialists – The volunteers know that their primary respon-
sibility during the placement is to provide skill-related training in
the field. Such training sessions would normally be conducted in the
area of health and medicine, education and organizational/community
development.
Special Advisors – The volunteers would also work as special advi-
sors on special occasions for the Ministry of Health and Population
at their request. The volunteers also worked as advisors for partner
organizations as per their need and helped them with programme plan-
ning, implementation and assessment or performance evaluation of
their organization. Such placements were of varying duration, long or
short as well as repetitive volunteering, meaning the volunteers took
up the placement at certain intervals within a given project time line
and visited Nepal from the United Kingdom a few times to provide fur-
ther training, supervise, implement the programme, and to evaluate the
effectiveness and impact of the training provided.
Development Specialists – The volunteers with work experience in the
area of organizational and community development such as setting up
the administrative systems, financial management systems, record keep-
ing systems, information and documentation systems, fundraising and
local resource mobilization systems, monitoring and evaluation, report
writing and project proposal writing were appointed as development
specialists to a partner organization or to a number of partner organiza-
tions at the same time dividing their time between them. The primary
responsibility of the volunteers was to help any partner – charitable,
national or community-based organizations – to improve their perfor-
mance and meet their objectives. Some volunteers had more than one
skill. The volunteers with multiple skills were the ones who were placed
strategically in order to benefit more than one partner organization.
Prakash Khanal 169
Activities and achievements of diaspora volunteering
‘Connect for Change’ and ‘Himalayan Development International UK’

have placed over 50 professional diaspora volunteers in Nepal in 2009
and 2010. The diaspora volunteering programme continues even today.
The volunteers have carried out a wide range of development-related
activities in Nepal as per the needs expressed by the partner organiza-
tions. This section highlights a brief description of some of the major
activities and achievements so far:
Healthy Ageing – Care for the Older People of Nepal – Nepal is experienc-
ing gradual growth in elderly population. According to the 2011 census,
the percentage of elderly population has increased to 9.1 per cent (male
4.6 and female 4.5 per cent) (CBS 2012). To create public awareness
about ageing population, Connect for Change/Himalayan Development
International in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Popula-
tion (MoHP) and the Institute of Medicine (IoM), Tribhuvan University
Teaching Hospital, organized a three-day national training seminar on
‘Healthy Ageing – Care for the Older People of Nepal’ in 2009. The train-
ing seminar was taken as a first step in improving the quality of life of
the ageing Nepalese population. As the first step towards establishing
geriatric care in Nepal, the training programme introduced a health-care
system for older people, focussing on the timely diagnosis and treatment
of illnesses, thereby improving the quality and standard of lives of the
older Nepalese population.
The training programme was primarily organized with the objective
of providing introductory training on geriatrics to medical profession-
als working in hospitals. The other objective was to make the general
public and the policy makers aware of the need and importance of
a dedicated geriatrics care service in the Nepalese health-care centres.
Altogether three training programmes in the area of healthy ageing were
organized in Kathmandu, Biratnagar in Eastern Nepal and in Nepalganj
in the west. During these three training programmes 60 medical doc-
tors and specialists and over 100 nurses and social workers were trained
in the area of providing health-care services to the ageing population
in Nepal. This training heralded a wave of awareness and sensitized
Nepalese civil society, politicians and bureaucrats to the need for estab-
lishing health-care facilities for the elderly population as well as to
address their concerns by enacting special policies.
Creation of a Geriatric Ward in Nepal – A long-awaited and much needed
dedicated health-care facility for the elderly and vulnerable Nepalese
citizens has been established for the first time in Nepal. The efforts of
HDI UK and its diaspora volunteers have urged the Nepalese govern-
ment to establish a geriatric ward in Nepal at the Patan Hospital, a major
tertiary hospital in the capital, and have earmarked a modest annual
budget towards this activity. The training for the health professionals at
this ward was organized by a diaspora volunteer who is a geriatrician,
together with his colleagues in Aberdeen Hospital. There is a plan to
organize skill development training in Nepal in the near future when
two geriatric nurses from Aberdeen plan to travel to Kathmandu to run
an in-house training for a month in Patan Hospital.
Mental Health-Related Training in Nepal – Mental health is another area
in which Nepal has not been able to progress very far which is why
HDI UK together with its partner organizations like the Centre for Men-
tal Health – Nepal has been organizing training programmes for the
benefit of community mental health trainers and workers. The HDI UK
has provided training to over 100 such community-based mental health
trainers who provide training to the community mental health work-
ers and Female Community Health Volunteers (FCHVs) who live in the
rural villages of Nepal and serve a very important role of primary con-
tact between the patients and the health-care services in the rural areas
of Nepal. The professional diaspora volunteers have conducted over 10
mental health-related training programmes in Nepal in partnership with
its partner organizations in Nepal.
Mental Health First Aid (MHFA) – A step towards training teachers and
ordinary citizens to recognize and refer mental health cases to proper
care has been going on in Nepal since 2010 when Betty Kitchener
and Professor Tony Jorm, two Australian professionals who developed
the Mental Health First Aid (MHFA) programme, were brought to
Kathmandu to run a training workshop. The MHFA is now recognized
and adopted in 17 countries, including Nepal. MHFA is help offered to
a person developing a mental health problem or experiencing a mental
health crisis. The first aid is given until appropriate professional help is
received or until the crisis is over. Betty Kitchener and Professor Tony
Jorm came to Kathmandu in November 2010 to introduce MHFA in
Nepal. Since then, the Mental Health First Aid Manual has been adopted
and translated into the Nepali language.
The standard MHFA is taught by qualified instructors, covering top-
ics such as the definition, prevalence and impact of mental illness,
the signs and symptoms of common mental health problems includ-
ing depression, anxiety disorders, psychosis and substance misuse, the
range of effective interventions and treatments, and how to talk with
Prakash Khanal 171
and help a person to access appropriate help and support. A four-

day MHFA training workshop was organized in Kathmandu from 30
November to 3 December 2010 by Nepalese diaspora volunteers, the
HDI UK in collaboration with SAF-Nepal and the National Health
Training Centre of the Ministry of Health and Population. Over 25 par-
ticipants from a number of non-governmental organizations working
in the mental health sector received the training. It has been planned
that MHFA training will be gradually provided to 5000 selected group of
people, including primary care health workers, teachers, female health
volunteers and the police force at all 75 district head quarters of Nepal.
Community Health Post-Management Training – The Nepalese govern-
ment has handed over the health posts and community health-care
centres and hospitals to the local community for management, whereby
a Hospital Management Committee comprising of various individuals
from the community will manage these hospitals and health posts.
Members of the Health Post/Hospital Management Committee have no
experience of running such a facility, so the HDI UK sends volunteers
to organize training on Hospital and Health Post management at the
local level in the rural areas for the benefit of members of the commit-
tee responsible for the day-to-day management of these centres. Over
80 members of such hospital and health post-management committees
have received training from diaspora volunteers in different regions of
Nepal.
Fundraising and Organizational Development – The Himalayan Devel-
opment International UK recruited volunteers in the United Kingdom
with skills in the area of institutional development, local resource
mobilization and fundraising. The volunteers were placed with part-
ner organizations in Nepal to organize training programmes for the
members of partner organizations as well as other non-governmental
organizations in the area of fundraising, local resource mobilization and
proposal writing training. Training opportunities were especially created
for people working in smaller charitable organizations in Nepal. The
HDI UK organized three trainings from which over 90 people directly
responsible for fundraising and organizational development and their
organizations benefited, as they were successful in obtaining funds to
support their programmes.
Monitoring and Organizational Evaluation – The HDI UK sent diaspora
volunteers from the United Kingdom who were able to help several
institutions in evaluating their performances over the years and chart
out a way forward. Similarly, the volunteers also trained the local
project staff of one of the partner organizations to carry out monitoring
and evaluation of an educational project that they had launched in

Dailekh district, in the mid-western hills of Nepal. The same expert also
organized training programmes to help some other partner organiza-
tions such as Siddhi Memorial Foundation Hospital in Bhaktapur and
Rato Bangala Foundation in Kathmandu to evaluate their performance
over the years which helped them to develop programmes to address
discrepancies that were uncovered during the evaluation exercise.
Dementia Care Training – It is estimated that more than 500 Nepalese
nurses have joined Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) in the United
Kingdom since 2005 (Hausner, 2011). Whatever may be their number it
is a fact that a huge number of Nepalese nurses and other health pro-
fessionals have migrated to the United Kingdom over the years under
various schemes introduced by the UK Government. Many of the nurses
with over 10 years of experience in Nepal have not been able to work
as nurses in the United Kingdom due to communication problems. The
HDI UK recruited some nurses with skills in the area of dementia and
elderly care to place them with partners in Nepal. These volunteers orga-
nize training programmes for housewives from families affected by such
diseases as Alzheimer’s and dementia. Such training programmes were
highly appreciated by the participants because no such training was ever
organized in Nepal.
Special Programme on Learning Disability – Learning disability among
the children as well as adults is one of the grossly neglected and lit-
tle developed areas in Nepal. The HDI UK recruited diaspora volunteers
with experience in the area of learning disabilities. These volunteers car-
ried out several special training and educational programmes in various
hospitals and cities in Nepal. The volunteers organized special pro-
grammes for the benefit of doctors and nurses in a hospital in Dharan.
Similarly, the volunteers also visited other schools run by a local charity
in Biratnagar, east Nepal, and spoke with the parents of children with
learning disabilities. In Kathmandu also the volunteers conducted spe-
cial training sessions for parents of children with learning and other
mental disabilities and learning disorders. They also organized several
consultation programmes in schools for the parents of children with
learning disabilities.
Special Lectures to Medical Students and Professionals – Some of the
HDI UK volunteers have given special training and shared their special-
ist knowledge with medical doctors at the Institute of Medicine (IoM),
Kist Medical College, National Planning Commission and Nepal Med-
ical Association on topics such as endoscopy and portal hypertension,
kidney failure, stroke and geriatrics, Alzheimer’s disease and dementia.
Prakash Khanal 173
Communication Training for Nursing Students – The HDI UK nurse vol-

unteers with special skills in the area of medical communication and
occupational health organized training for the benefit of medical doc-
tors, nurses, trainee nurses and other health professionals in several
hospitals in the capital, Kathmandu.
Teachers Training – The HDI UK volunteers, with extensive teach-
ing backgrounds from Nepal as well as from the United Kingdom,
were recruited to organize specialized teacher training in Nepal. The
Himalayan Development International UK volunteers have introduced
various advanced ideas such as differentiation in the class to provide
good learning opportunity to all the students. They have also banned
punishment in schools. Teacher training was organized at ‘A School for a
Community’, a community education initiative under which the whole
village is being developed as a school for learning, in Pharping, around
16 km south of Kathmandu. This initiative has been very effective. Sim-
ilarly, training related to the Internet and email, the use of Internet as a
teaching resource and so on in Kathmandu and Pokhara (200 km west of
Kathmandu) has been highly appreciated by the teachers who received
the training. Some of the teacher training programmes were run by the
volunteers in the hilly and rural areas of Nepal where teachers hardly
ever receive such training opportunities.
Conclusion
Diaspora volunteering is a definitive way of transferring the skills and

knowledge or technology to transform the society. During informal dis-
cussions with some diaspora professionals they expressed a kind of guilt
for emigrating and settling abroad. They feel they have not fulfilled
their responsibility towards society in the country of their origin. They
express happiness for the initiation of the NDVP, as it will create oppor-
tunities for them to give something back to their country. Their desire to
do something in the country of their origin, or to take up volunteering
placements there, is related to their desire to identify themselves with
their homeland. It seems that if any formal opportunity is created for
them to be able to offer their services as a volunteer or otherwise, they
will definitely take it up depending on the availability of time. So it is
not whether the diaspora community will come forward to share their
skills and expertise with their country of origin, it is a question of creat-
ing mechanisms that will facilitate them to take up the opportunity and
stand up to the challenge. The Himalayan Development International
UK is in its infancy and lacks resources to continue with the Nepalese
Diaspora Volunteering Programme to encourage knowledge and skills

transfer programmes as it did in the past. However, the Himalayan
Development International UK knows that the diaspora community
can give something back to the society through volunteering and the
diaspora community has widely accepted this. It is just the question of
finding more resources to support them in fulfilling their desire, which
in return will allow them to contribute to the development prospects of
their country of origin. In the absence of funds to support the diaspora,
volunteers agree to spare a few days of their time and conduct training
programmes when they visit the country on family businesses.
The diaspora community is sending more money in the form of
remittances to their countries of origin than their countries receive
in development aid – in fact, twice as much. The other things that
they remit along with financial remittances are knowledge, skills, social
values, attitudes, political values and professionalism that they have
acquired abroad but that have not been fully recognized. The brief expe-
rience of promoting diaspora volunteering in Nepal and its impact has
confirmed that the diaspora professionals could indeed be the agent
of knowledge/technology transfer. All those concerned development
agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other
international donor organizations as well as the developed countries
that provide development aid should support the diaspora and other
organizations that promote diaspora volunteering.
Notes
1. Website for Non-Resident Nepali Association, www.nrn.org.np
2. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nepal%20demographic
%20and%20health%20survey%202011.pdf
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9
Diasporic Shrines: Transnational
Networks Linking South Asia
through Pilgrimage and Welfare
Development
Virinder S. Kalra, Umber Ibad and Navtej K. Purewal
Introduction
The majority of the literature on diaspora has hitherto focused largely

on flows, nodes and places that privilege links between the ‘West and
the rest’ (Hall 1992). In a more subtle manner, this lens refers to net-
works of metropolitan cities and peripheral sites. Connections between
Southall and Jalandhar may be a case in point, or Bradford and Mirpur,
or New Jersey and Gujranwala, connected through people, commodi-
ties and institutions to form a ‘diasporic space’ (Brah 1996). However,
there are various cases where the idea of diaspora does not include the
West, constituted by places that are connected across a divided region.
One such context is that of India and Pakistan. The formation of these
two nation states was accompanied by mass migration, mostly forced,
but also some voluntary (Kaur 2007). It resulted over a period of time
in a hardening of the border around the time of the 1965 Indo-Pak
war and thereafter which mostly sealed the national territorial bound-
aries, making it difficult to move across for ordinary citizens (Purewal
2006). The inability to travel across the border has created a distinct, if
small amount of creative outpouring in the field of literature, film and
music, firstly lamenting the violence that created the border, but also the
subsequent loss of contact between co-habitants. For Punjabis this fell
along the lines of religion, with Punjabi Muslims effectively cut off from
Hindus and Sikhs and vice-versa.1 In a sense, this parallels the exile of
Palestinians from their homelands, as those living in Jordan, Lebanon
176
Virinder S. Kalra et al. 177
or Syria who are in a similar linguistic and cultural paradigm but do

not necessarily feel they belong within those nation states.2 Purewal
notes how those who moved across both sides of the Punjab border were
always rendered as outsiders and have, in various ways, had to negotiate
this in their subsequent settlements. Similar to other diasporic contexts
there is little doubt that any opening of the border between India and
Pakistan would not result in a mass return movement of people, just as
there is little indication that large numbers of South Asians intend to
return from Canada or Europe. But this does not mean that there is no
desire to cross the border, to visit the village or family home, or to see
those streets that are described and passed on through oral history. It is
the restriction, the inability to visit, that heightens the sense of loss and
desire for return.
It is useful to view the Punjabi diaspora in particular in this way
because of the co-incidence with other transnational travels that mark
this community in the colonial and postcolonial era. Those in Malaysia
and Singapore in 1947 found themselves without home and country
as the line that split India and Pakistan rendered villages, people and
histories asunder. If we think of the Punjabi diaspora in the context of
India and Pakistan, then what work is enabled by adopting this con-
ceptual framework. At its most base level it alerts us to the activities
and desires of groups of people rather than the machinations of the
two states and their history of antagonisms and rapprochement (Talbot,
2000; Oldenburg, 2010). In turn the desire of those sitting in Amritsar
to visit Lahore, a distance of only 60 km mirrors those who are in
exile and cannot visit or return, those persecuted and those otherwise
barred. The more specific literature on diaspora, religion and develop-
ment also needs to be adapted and moulded to provide insight into
this situation. Perhaps it is useful to distinguish between what might
be called the metropolitan Punjabi diaspora and that which is divided
between East and West Punjab. At least at the level of access, being
in the metropolitan Punjabi diaspora facilitates communication and
travel across the Indo-Pak border. The cost of a phone call between
Amritsar and Lahore is about Rs 25 per minute, whereas the cost of a
call from the United Kingdom to Amritsar is only Rs 1.5 per minute and
to Lahore about Rs 3 per minute. A European or North American pass-
port enables a circumvention of the barriers erected by the visa regime
directed towards making it almost impossible for Indians and Pakistanis
to cross by land at the Wagah border (Kalra and Purewal, 1999). Internet
technologies open up the possibilities of communication but are acces-
sible via forums and in the language of the metropole. Encounters and
178 Diasporic Shrines in South Asia
interactions between Indians and Pakistanis, East and West Punjabis are
more frequent and more likely in Southall, Vancouver and Berlin than
in Lahore, Amritsar, Delhi or Islamabad. Nonetheless, it could be argued
that the role of those engaged in transnational links across the Indo-Pak
border are engaged in a type of Track III people-to-people diplomacy
that has greater longer term implications than the more frequent inter-
actions in metropolitan diaspora spaces. One mechanism by which this
facilitation takes place is through the pilgrimage to religious sites and
shrines across the border.
After the partition of land and people in 1947, subsequently the divi-
sion of many other things took place between India and Pakistan. The
Punjab University in Lahore spawned a twin, first located in Simla, then
with a final home in Chandigarh. The books of the University library
were split and divided. Similarly, the collection of works in the Lahore
Museum was divided and spread over a few museums in East Punjab.
However, what could not be divided were those fixed sites of religious
significance to various congregations. The birthplace of Guru Nanak,
the Katas Raj Temple and the Gorak Nath Dera were all left in Pakistan,
while innumerable Sufi shrines, such as Roza Shareef, were left in India.
These could not be split or lifted or recreated. To fulfil the desire of pil-
grims to visit, a special visa regime for Pilgrims was established in the
early 1990s. At the time of Diwali, Vaisakhi and Guru Nanak’s birth-
day, group visas would be issued to organized pilgrim parties. Over time
these pilgrims would be the main source of interaction between former
co-habitants and thus their significance as a source of people-to-people
contact became more important. The next section will explore how
this movement might be conceptualized in the existing literature on
diaspora.
Diaspora, religion and development
As diasporas form and cohere, it is necessary that the question of nation-

alism and belonging come into tension. For some, this results in the
creation of formations that celebrate the past in the present, or the
‘there and here’ through the creation of hybrid identities such as British-
Indian and Punjabi-Canadian. In East Punjab this is seen in shop fronts
with the name Lyallpur Clothes Shop, or Lahore Band Baja; similarly,
in West Punjab the Jalandhari and Ludhianvi remain epithets to peo-
ple’s names and naming that refers to that which was left behind and
exists on the ‘other side’. However, a trend that has been noted in the
more recent literature on diaspora is the role that religion plays as a
national formation, something that is inherently oriented towards the

universal and away from the particularity of nationalism. In a sense
religion resolves the inherent tension that is always present in the invo-
cation of an X–Y formulation when X and Y are nation states in their
own right, as the question of loyalty to one or other nation is always
demanded. Religion therefore provides an identity formulation which
can sit within the locality without an inherent tension as it is always
self-referring as universal. In that sense the emergence of British-Sikhs,
American-Muslims and Caribbean-Hindus should not be seen in any
sense as a return to a more essential religious South Asian form of
identity formation but rather as a response to the demands from the
minorities of various liberal states. This question has been addressed in
the literature in a number of ways. From a functionalist perspective,
religion is a useful resource for tackling complex and challenging situ-
ations. Religion is also available to be translated into the new context.
Whereas the often parochial and idiosyncratic culture of the migrant
cannot be understood, the very universality of religion enables it to be
valued. In an early classical study of differences amongst migrant gener-
ations, Herberg mates the salient point: ‘What the son wishes to forget
the grandson wishes to remember. But what he can remember is obvi-
ously not his grandfather’s foreign culture; it is rather his grandfather’s
religion’ (Herberg, 1955: 64). For the Punjabi in Lahore, the religion of
the grandfather is present in the everyday, but the streets and lanes of
Amritsar are absent. But there is also a common religious practice that
is absent, that of the shared celebrations of Diwali and Eid. Yet for both
the Amritsari and Lahori, religion has become a much more significant
form of identification than it was pre-partition. The process of immi-
gration itself can be argued to be a ‘theologizing experience’ (Duderija,
2007: 143). Especially in a context where the materiality and lived real-
ity of multi-religious living is lost, the coalescing of identities around
a particularly literalist or scripturalist form provides a rationale for the
presence of a hard border.
This religiosity plays out at the level of economic transfers also. The
metropolitan diaspora provides remittances to the establishment and
embellishment of religious institutions. The re-guilding with gold leaf
of the dome of the Harimandir in Amritsar at an estimated cost of
Rs 90 crore was managed and largely paid for through donations from
the metropolitan diaspora. The renovation of Guru Ram Das’s birth-
place, Gurdwara in Chuna Mandi Lahore, is being carried out by a Sant
from Tarn Taran, East Punjab, with donations from Sikhs in India and
the metropolitan diaspora. Similarly the main shrines at Qadiyan of
the Ahmediyyas are maintained by the group in Lahore with financial

support from other diasporic spaces. The literature on diaspora and
development, however, remains largely focused on remittances from the
metropole to the South. These claims can be summarized in the state-
ment that migration and the resultant remittances those migrants send
‘back home’ (i.e. the flows of money, knowledge and universal ideas)
can have a positive effect on what is called ‘development’. There is
another element to the role that metropolitan diasporas are called on
to perform which is of relevance to the Indo-Pak context. In conflict sit-
uations a diasporic group can serve as interlocutors – the premise being
that residence in the West will have inculcated some of the values that
are being promoted through development discourse. For example, the
United States called upon the skill set of the Afghani and Iraqi diaspora
settled in the United States, after its imperialist intervention in these
nation states, to be involved in post-war reconstruction (von Carlowitz,
2004). This involvement rests on the premise that the diaspora is in
agreement with the intervention in the first place or even the nature
of liberal democratic social formations that underpins much develop-
ment practice. In reality of course diasporic groups even in post-conflict
settings are much more interested in channelling money to family or
local community concerns rather than in line with broader develop-
mental aims (Van Hear, 2011). Where donations or skill transfer takes
place to larger concerns, this is often for the building of a school or
health centre, for the improvement of a house or for reconstruction in
the wake of a disaster (Kalra and Rehman, 2006). What is of further sig-
nificance about diasporic giving is the informal, often haphazard and
non-state nature of the donations (Dusenbery and Tatla, 2010). It is
this chaotic element which is in fact its greatest strength as it is able
to circumvent the restrictions that conflicting nation states may place
on these movements. When this is combined with the special place that
religious shrines have in South Asia, quite unusual occurrences can take
place. A recent example is illustrative of the way in which individual
giving to a shrine can work even at the highest level of politics. On the
8th of April 2012, Asif Ali Zardari, President of Pakistan, paid a pri-
vate visit to Ajmer Sharif in Rajasthan. This was an entirely private visit
though it was facilitated by the Indian state in terms of security. On the
visit Zardari announced a donation of one million dollars for the shrine
as an entirely personal gesture. Given that the tension between India
and Pakistan has remained relatively high since the Mumbai attacks of
2008, the fact that a visit of this kind and a donation of this size can be
made demonstrates the way in which religious institutions in particular

contexts are able to overcome entrenched political positions.
It is perhaps ironic that shrines are a site of such reconciliation when
religion was mobilized in the violence and boundary making that frames
partition. The ambivalent role that religion can play in social matters
is also present in much contemporary development discourse. On the
one hand, there is a recognition that faith-based organizations (FBO)
provide material benefit in those places where the state does not func-
tion well or at all. At a broader level religious conviction is often the
motivation behind those engaged in charitable activities (Jawad, 2009).
Though at the formal level, development discourse is more inclined to
those aspects of FBO activities that coincide with secular aims and pro-
grammes. On the other hand, there are almost always certain points
where secular modernist development discourse clashes with religious
traditions; this is most notably when it comes to women and sex-
ual rights. Restrictions on women’s mobility and persecution of LBGT
(Lesbian, bisexual, gay and transgender) groups are often justified in the
name of religious traditions. It is in the arena of personal ethics and
morals that religion and development discourse are most likely to clash
(Hope and Timmel, 2003; Swami, 2003). There are positive examples of
what might be called faith-based diplomacy having a positive impact on
a conflict situation, the civil war in Mozambique being one of the most
notable examples. Yet in the Rwandan genocide the Catholic Church
was deeply implicated in the colonial differences created between Hutus
and Tutsis (Hayne, 007). What is perhaps most clear from these exam-
ples is the potential that religion contains, to intervene in the provision
of social welfare, to act as a motivation for those willing to engage in
social work and as a mediator in situations of conflict. It is not, how-
ever, outside of any particular context possible to ascertain whether
religious ideology or institutions will have a positive or negative impact
on any given situation. There is nothing inherent about religion as an
ethical and moral system (alongside humanism, socialism, etc.) that will
necessitate a more humane outcome.
Sufi shrines and welfare
Shrines form a ubiquitous parallel universe of piety in rural and urban

Punjab, far outnumbering the formal institutions of Mosque, Mandir or
Gurdwara. Every village has some form of shrine that in the West Punjab
takes the hue of a Sufi saint, known or unknown, living or deceased, but
always with some associated miracle or achievement. In East Punjab,

the shrines to Gugga Pir and Sitla Devi sit alongside innumerable
do-it-yourself sites of worship, large and small. In pre-partition Punjab
formal religious identity rarely interfered with popular spiritual practices
involving shrines, whether of Sufis or of local deities. These practices
were associated with local textual sources, most famously Heer Ranjha
(Mir, 2010) but also Gugga Bani (Bhatti, 2000) and various other texts
associated with a particular spiritual figure. As these shrines grew larger
they attracted more and more followers with the culmination of an
annual cycle of events being a mela. For the Sufi saints this would be
marked in terms of a death anniversary but for others it might mark a
birth or a particular event.
The institutionalization of the shrine in Punjab is perhaps best exam-
ined through the Sufi case, though the process is also the same for
Bhakti saints and the Sikh Gurus. As wandering Sufis from the West
came to Punjab, they settled and found followers. Centres were estab-
lished around the graves of these early itinerants (famously such as Data
Sahib in Lahore in the eleventh century) by their spiritual successors and
their followers. These sites served not only a spiritual function but also a
practical one, forming what were known as Khankas or abodes for wan-
dering spiritual figures or for those who were also followers but lived at
a distance from the shrine. Regardless of religious affiliation, the estab-
lishment of what might generically be called deras shared some common
features. Firstly, they would welcome any traveller, regardless of partic-
ular religious affiliation as long as they paid respect to the particular
religious figure to whom the shrine was devoted to. Secondly, travellers
would find food at these places and this would again be part of a com-
munal kitchen run by followers of the spiritual figure. Some of these
institutions, as they grew larger, would appoint khalifas or deputies who
would go to nearby towns and villages, and sometimes further afield,
and establish links with the central shrine, providing continuities for
those who lived at too much of a distance to visit often.
Though little is known about how these shrines were embedded
within the Moghul Empire, Gilmartin (1988) hypothesizes, on the basis
of their role in the British Empire, that they formed part of a network
linking the local with the imperial centre. By providing patronage to
the Sufi Pirs, often the ancestors of the original saint, shrines ended
up owning land sometimes running into the thousands of acres. The
income from this land would maintain the shrine and pay for the food
and activities of the Pir. However, this also meant that the Pir and their
families would often be wealthy. This material and spiritual power was a
potent force in rural Punjab and one that was recognized by the British.
They maintained a disdain for shrine-based religion, seeing it as a hin-
drance to rural uplift and a superstitious decay of true Islam (Thorburn,
1874). However, soon, the practical necessities of governance in rural
areas meant that they continued with much of the patronage practices
of the Mughals. The initial distaste transferred into a policy of collabo-
ration and distance transferred into a policy of providing and preserving
lands to an already strong Pir (Talbot, 1998).
With the formation of Pakistan, the role of the landed Pirs was main-
tained and they have come to prominence in the political sphere (see
Ansari, 1992). A most recent example of this is the Prime Minister of
Pakistan Yusaf Gilani who comes from a long line of Pirs from Multan
who were part of the British colonial establishment, having legisla-
tive assembly seats from the beginning of local governance in Punjab.
Nonetheless, like many other postcolonial states, the effectiveness of
the Pakistani state in delivering social and health services was limited
by a range of factors and the space opened up by the absent state was
taken up by a number of actors. Most notably, Islamic political parties
began to enhance and develop their social and welfare role, explicitly,
in the absence of being able themselves to achieve state power. The
is perhaps the most notable in this regard, but by no means the only
group to act in this way Jamaat-i-Islami. Indeed as part of its political
outlook tackling social inequality is seen as a duty for Muslims. The
Jamaat runs various welfare organizations that are ostensibly indepen-
dent but are all linked back to the central party. The most prominent
of these is the Al-Khidmat Foundation, but there are also specific orga-
nizations in specific fields, for example the Al-Ghazali, Al-Arkam and
Al-Hira Trust which operate schools and fund scholarship programmes
(Deneulin, 2009). This extensive welfare work has not translated into
general political collateral for the Jamaat but has given them consid-
erable credibility, especially when it comes to disaster relief. All of this
development work is seen as an aspect of doing God’s work rather than
worthwhile within itself, which is the main distinction between secular
and religious development (Jawad, 2009).
Partly the nature of the Pakistani state means that even though it is
constitutionally a religious state, in practice there is a great deal of sepa-
ration of the state from religious affairs. Even though zakat is the wealth
tax within Islam, in Pakistan it is viewed much more as a donation to
charitable and good causes. Income tax, property tax, sales tax and so
on are charged separately and are seen necessary for the running of the
state. Zakat collection and distribution is therefore much more ad hoc
and utilized for short-term immediate relief rather than for long-term
or infrastructural development. A similar situation exists for the gifts of
land or Waqf (Endowments), whereby property or money is given to a
shrine or to a Pir. This again is for non-commercial use for the good of
the ‘community’. But Waqf is subject to a wide range of uses and abuses
and is deeply entwined with market and state practices, while main-
taining an ostensibly charitable purpose (Malik, 1996). The involvement
of the state in a direct manner in shrine management has reduced the
agency and increased their bureaucratization, yet the large Sufi shrines
of South Asia still play a significant role in providing welfare in their
localities as is demonstrated by the case of Mian Mir in Lahore.
Mian Mir
The shrine of Mian Mir is ostensibly built up around the place of the
tomb of the spiritual figure Mian Mir who lived from 1550–1635, hav-
ing moved to Lahore in 1575 where he spent the rest of his life until
his death. While there is much to be said about the shrine as a sacred
space in terms of the ways in which it is venerated, there is also much
to be said about how it functions as a space of sociality. By reflecting
upon fieldwork that was carried out in 2008–2010, and briefly in 2012,
some aspects of the social life of the shrine ties together a number of
different themes about the shrine’s significance in worshippers’ lives;
in particular, the role that the shrine plays in providing welfare of a
material and spiritual variety. Indeed, the distinction between mate-
rial and spiritual well-being is fundamentally questioned by the uses
of the shrine and links closely into the debates about the role of reli-
gion and development. Beyond the individual accounts of the shrines’
function, the formal management of the shrine also explicitly engages
in providing health and education facilities, though it remained slow
and in need of improvement. These are tied into the state through
the Auqaf department but remain outside of the formal state provision
of the health and education departments. Finally, the structure of the
shrines’ management, as with most large religious institutions, is con-
tested. It is through this contestation that a transnational space emerges
in which the Punjabi diaspora of various religious affiliations is able to
engage with the shrine outside of the political disputes of the Indian
and Pakistani state.
The current shrine at Mian Mir is located in the working-class part
of Mian Mir Cantonment, which is otherwise also home to some of
Lahore’s more wealthy residents. This area was developed by the British
Indian Army, allegedly on the Waqf (Endowed) land of Mian Mir shrine,
and still carries the appellation Cantonment. The shrine itself is a large
complex with an inner courtyard, the central focus of which is the hous-
ing of the tomb and a mosque to one side with its own large prayer hall.
Worshippers (zaireen) offer prayers at the shrine and engage in a range
of rituals. They also provide income to the shrine through donations.
Though it is fairly difficult to ascertain the income of the shrine as the
Auqaf department is rather opaque when it comes to financial matters,
the manager of the shrine did provide some details of the number of
employees and the budget from two periods of time from 1995 to 1996
and 2008 to 2009. In both of these cases the income of the shrine was
less than the overall expenditure, but perhaps more significantly the
income had risen from about Rs 2.2 million to Rs 6.75 million annu-
ally over that period of time, which reflects the extent to which the
shrine attracts followers and those willing to contribute to its running
and upkeep.
It is this funding that enables a range of social welfare activities to
take place. The following are the social services one can find at the
shrine of Mian Mir: Dastakari (embroidery) School; Library; Dispensary,
Hospital of 130 beds (under Construction), Water Cooler (outside the
shrine). Each of these provides facilities to the local population and on
the occasion of the annual death anniversary (Urs) to a wider popu-
lation also. The social life of the shrine revolves around the week in
which Thursday attracts the most worshippers, with the weekend being
busy also. Thursday is the day that individuals come to pray, to offer
food for other worshippers, socialize, meet the Pir and in the evening
to listen to Qawaali. Indeed, food is one of the main ways in which the
shrine acts as a source of welfare for the poor. There is a large Langar (free
food) Hall recently constructed adjacent to the outer wall of the shrine,
though within the Waqf land of the shrine. The need for a Langar Hall
was reflected through the need for catering to the tens of thousands
of visitors that are attracted to the shrine at the time of the Urs/death
anniversary of the Saint.3 In addition to the shrine providing and more
often facilitating the provision of food, there are also health facilities.
The shrine has a medical dispensary within its own premises situ-
ated in a small room, at the end of the Eastern part of the shrine. The
dispensary is an extension of the Data Darbar hospital, which is attached
to the shrine of Data Sahib, also in Lahore and perhaps the shrine with
the most income in the whole of Pakistan. It is managed by the hospi-
tal’s medical staff whenever needed. Most of the time medicines come
from Data Darbar hospital and are provided freely to the patients. The
dispensary was initiated in the 1970s and provides basic medicines on a

daily basis to worshippers. It is a first point of call for the worshippers as
it also carries the potential of healing associated with the saint. Indeed,
the facilities at the dispensary are basic and anything complicated is
referred to the Data Darbar hospital, but the importance of the spiritual
connection to healing and health is crucial. Many of the hagiographical
tales from Mian Mir’s life illustrate the healing power of the saint:
One day a man in a very restless mood came to Mian Mir and told
that saint of his sick child. The man told of how his child was becom-
ing worse and worse and that his only hope rested in the Saint giving
blessing and returning his son to health. After hearing the sad story,
Mian Mir become very restless and after a while he asked to bring a
pot of water and asked that man to take this water home and give
this to his son to drink. After drinking the water suddenly the boy
started feeling well.
Another man took his son to Mian Mir and told him: My son is now
7 years old and he still can’t speak a single word. Mian Mir prayed
for the boy and then said to the boy to read ‘Bismillah’ which the
boy read out loud. With the blessings of Mian Mir the boy became a
Hafiz-e-Quran (one who can recite the Quran by rote). (p. 179)
Hazrat Mian Mir said once upon a time a Pathan came to visit me and
he was very upset and requested me to pray for him. Seeing his dis-
tress I prayed for him and advised him to feed the hungry people and
give clothes to the needy. I told him: If you do this I guarantee you
that your wishes will be fulfilled by the virtue of these good virtues.
After hearing this advice the Pathan set off for this home on his
return journey he saw a hungry man. The Pathan gave him his ring so
that he could buy food. After a little more distance, the Pathan saw
some people with barely enough clothes to cover their bodies. The
Pathan provided them clothing. When he was about to reach home,
he met a neighbor and expected bad news. But the neighbor said that
the Pathan’s relative had made a miracle recovery. The Pathan came
back to me with some money and Halwa (pudding). I asked the rea-
son of all these things. He said due to your prayer my family member
who was ill has become healthy. I distributed the Halwa among the
mendicants (Darvesh) and returned the money to him. (p. 183)
These stories are then reflected in the personal narratives that were told
to us in interviews:
(Mr. Fazal narrates his story): Once I was suffering from ear pain.
It was so severe that it was shattering my mind. My grand father
brought me to the shrine of Mian Mir. He putted a little bit of dust
from the floor of the shrine into my ears and recited some words.
Suddenly I felt my pain vanish and I was relieved.
(Interview was conducted with an old lady): My daughter was ill.
I went to a doctor and they said it is cancer but another man said it
is just like a Zahir Bad (big pimple). I felt relief about my daughter’s
trouble after praying at Mian Mir shrine. Another lady told me that
the same case happened with her. We prayed at Mian Mir shrine and
now the problem is ok. I have been coming to Mian Mir shrine for
the last 25 years . . . . Some years ago ago it was a jungle and only a few
people came here. But now a lot of people come, they all have some
troubles to share, a lot of women come. Women come here because
they know about the real problems they face in the household, more
than men. So they came here to pray.
The role of the shrine in providing psychological as well as material sup-

port cannot be fully appreciated and to some extent pushes thinking
about development activities into the direction of well-being in a total-
izing sense. The state, the spiritual power and authority of the saint and
the material and welfare needs of the community all meet in the shrine.
The medical dispensary is a clear case of the funds from the shrine being
used for philanthropic purposes; however, the location and accessibility
of the shrine means that welfare activities which involve other char-
itable organizations as well as other departments of the state are also
homed there. While small-scale activities remain within the manage-
ment of the shrine, larger projects have to involve departments of the
government and can therefore get embroiled in local politics and the
changing machinations of the state. A good example of this is the hos-
pital, which is not within the boundary wall of the shrine but is on
the Waqf land allocated to the shrine. The hospital got its inception
due to the efforts of the local member of the Punjab Assembly (MPA).
The locals of the area pressured him to build a hospital as there was a
large tract of land lying vacant around shrine. With the efforts of the
MPA, a pact between District Government and Auqaf department took
place according to which the Auqaf department would provide land on
lease basis for 33 years. The District Government would spend all the
rest of the money to construct and run the hospital. The idea material-
ized after three years of efforts in 2005. The construction however took
further delays and the construction got started at the end of 2006. The
construction was to end in 2009, however, the hospital project took far
more time than anticipated and it still seems will only be completed by
2014. This involvement of the local state with the shrine resulted in the
same kind of bureaucratic difficulties and political delays that behest the
rest of the state. The involvement of NGOs has on the other hand been
more successful.
The social space of the shrine operates outside of the norms that deter-
mine women’s patterns of mobility and practice. At Mian Mir there is no
forced gender segregation and it is only the inner sanctum of the shrine
that is deemed off limits.4 Indeed, women are allowed much greater
freedom in the shrine than would be imagined on the street outside
(Purewal and Kalra, 2010). The fact that women are allowed to come to
the shrine and it is often a refuge for working class and outcaste women
has meant that NGOs have seen this as a site to carry out certain types
of activities. At Mian Mir there is a vocational Dastkari (embroidery)
school for women, which is adjacent to the dispensary. It is run by the
Upper Mall Scheme Society with the permission of the Auqaf depart-
ment and was established in 1970. A retired Brigadier is the head of the
society and generates funds for running the school. Students are not
charged a fee and the school offers short courses of 3–6 months in a
range of vocational pursuits. This combination of the Auqaf with an
outside organization is also present in the running of the Library which
is present inside the complex. Though the library is formally run by the
shrine’s manager and comes under the control of the Religious commit-
tee, which is appointed to oversee the activities of the shrine, it also has
the involvement of another trust, based in Faisalabad (about 100 miles
distant from Lahore). Sufi Barkat Ali Ludhianvi was a devotee of Mian
Mir and used to come to the shrine every day for many years spending
most of his time in the library. After his death special permission was
given for running the library and keeping books written by Sufi Barkat
Ali to the trust developed at Sufi Barkat Ali’s shrine. This kind of part-
nership has enabled the Mian Mir shrine to enhance and develop its
activities.
Transnational ties
One of the main tensions in the organization of the shrine is between

the hereditary Pirs (or gaddi nashins – literally, those sitting on the seat)
and the Auqaf department. Even though Mian Mir himself did not
have any children, his close followers took over the management and
running of the shrine, and it is those families that were managing the
shrine before the formation of Pakistan. The state, through the Auqaf
department, took over the formal management of the major Sufi shrines
in the 1960s (Malik, 1990) with the result that hereditary Pirs were side-
lined. In the case of Mian Mir this has meant that the gaddi nashin or
his sons come to the shrine on Thursdays where they are greeted by
those worshippers who have long standing relations with the family.
By and large, they are peripheral to the main activities at the shrine
which are funded and managed by the state. The family has however
set up their own shrine in their family house on Walton Road in Lahore
where they claim to have artifacts of Mian Mir and of the Sikh Gurus
who were said to be his friends. The family also set up a charitable trust
in the name of Mian Mir (mianmir.org), headed by Chan Pir (formally
known as Makhdom Syed Chan Pir Al-Gillani Al-Qadri). The fact that
the Auqaf department is part of the government necessarily restricts its
activities when it comes to Sikh and Hindu pilgrims from India (and the
metropolitan diaspora), whereas the Mian Mir trust can act with relative
freedom as an independent body.
At the time of the visitations of Sikhs on the occasions of Guru
Nanak’s birthday and Vaisakhi, Mian Mir is one site that those staying
at the Dera Sahib Gurdwara in Lahore come to visit. According to the
manager of Mian Mir, in 2011 about 300 Sikhs came in formal groups
to visit the shrine. On these occasions, the local police provide security
and the Langar Khana (food hall) which is usually only opened at the
time of the Urs is made available. These formal occasions are part of
the general management of pilgrimage that is organized by the Indian
and Pakistani states. However, due to the international network that the
Mian Mir Trust has managed to develop and in particular the presence of
the trust in East Punjab, they also facilitate visits for those who wish to
visit the shrine and Lahore more generally. This network encompasses
those nodes of the Punjabi diaspora which include Muslims, Sikhs and
Hindus. Manchester, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Amritsar and Lahore are
the places that encompass the diasporic space of Mian Mir. Whereas the
Auqaf board can control access to the actual shrine and also provide
services to large groups of pilgrims, small scale people-to-people con-
tact is facilitated by organizations like the Mian Mir Trust. By utilizing
the legitimacy of the religious shrine they are able to circumvent the
bureaucratic and often purposefully obtuse machinations of the Indian
and Pakistani state.
Indeed, the representative of the Trust in India, Harcharan Singh Brar,
sees himself as part of a process of facilitation for people who want to
go to Lahore or come from Pakistan to India. This process began only

after he visited Pakistan as part of an official delegation and came across
the gaddi nashin of Mian Mir. This is therefore a two-way process, as
Brar also hosts those who visit from Pakistan, liaising with the Indian
authorities to enable the granting of visas. Though religious persons and
those closely allied to a particular shrine are able to apply for pilgrimage
on various routes that traverse South Asia, most notably to visit the main
Chisti tombs, Ajmer in Rajashtan (India) and Baba Farid in Pak Pattan
(Pakistan), there are often restrictions when it comes to Punjab due to its
strategic location as a border region. What is significant about the work
of the Mian Mir Trust is the way that it facilitates ordinary worshippers
who have historic links to the shrine to visit. This interview was carried
out with two visitors from East Punjab at the shrine in 2009:
My name is Surjit Singh and my friend is Harish Jain . . . we are from

Gurdaspur . . . . Our elders told us that they would come to Mian Mir
every year before partition . . . We always wanted to visit but you know
that the Akalis [Sikh political party] reserve so many of the places on
the pilgrim visits that it is too hard to get on . . . then we found out
about the Mian Mir Trust in Amritsar and we got in touch and they
helped us to come here . . . we are so happy to finally visit where our
ancestors once came . . .
It would be naïve to assume that these organizations and their

engagements escape the attention of the Indian and Pakistani states
or other forms of controversy.5 Nonetheless, by tapping into diasporic
social networks they do provide an alternative route for people-to-
people contact in a zone of conflict. Perhaps what is even more notable,
particularly in the example of the shrine of Mian Mir, are the ways in
which ‘development’ and welfare activities are provided, delivered and
availed of within a context of religious congregation. The shrine of Mian
Mir in Pakistan highlights the continuing significance that the spiritual
and social dimensions shrines have in contemporary South Asia, which
goes beyond servicing the mere locality but also drawing upon networks
in order to transcend the immediate national and religious boundaries.
Conclusion
The benefits of diaspora for development have been mainly couched

in terms of the ways in which settled groups in metropolitan locations
can aid their homelands at a political, social and economic level. This
perspective also tied in with the role that religion is seen to play in the
discourse of development, an ideology that is close to the people who
are subject to policy and can give legitimacy to initiatives. However, in
both of these endeavours, what underpins this is a certain utilitarian
attitude towards diasporas and the role of religion, indeed this is what
can be seen as a link. The haphazard nature of diaspora giving is not
therefore deemed compatible with organized state to state planning, but
potentially fits in with a more neo-liberal NGO led discourse. Similarly,
religious giving and the role of religious groups in implementing for-
mal development goals have come to be recognized, but with the caveat
that there are certain issues such as gender and sexuality which can be
sources of tension.
In this chapter this literature has been stretched by evoking the idea
of the diaspora across the Indo-Pak border. Rather than the metropo-
lis being the central node in the transnational circulation, peripheries
as sites of desire come to the fore. Here we need to pay account to the
way in which Ludhiana and Faislabad, Lahore and Amritsar, Karachi and
Mumbai create desiring populations who in multiple ways recreate (both
negatively and positively) images drawn from memory and crystallized
by forced and enforced separation. One method by which the border
is circumvented is through the relatively easy movement of pilgrims
to shrines. This is organized by the state and managed through vari-
ous intermediary bodies. However, the legitimacy on people-to-people
contact that is enabled through pilgrimage opens up a space in which
organizations such as the Mian Mir Trust can arrange for individuals and
groups to travel and meet. Though this kind of contact may not yield
immediate political change and results it does demonstrate the role that
religious institutions can play in ameliorating conflict.
Notes
1. Though of course small populations of both communities remained, Sikhs
in Lahore/Nanakana Sahib and a more substantial population of Muslims in
Malerkotla.
2. Though of course there are specific institutional factors that prohibit
Palestinians from holding citizenship in these neighbouring countries that
do not exist in the South Asia case.
3. Indeed, the growth of the Mian Mir complex could be illustrative of the robust
nature of shrine based Islam in the face of more literalist approaches, though
it could also be reflective of the burgeoning Pakistani population.
4. This was also seen as a development that came after the 1980s Zia period.
5. In 2005, Brar was accused of embezzling funds from would be travellers and
the Mian Mir Trust in Pakistan distanced itself from the Amritsar group.
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10
Intersecting Diasporas: Sri Lankan
Buddhist Temples in Malaysia
and Development across the
Indian Ocean
Jeffrey Samuels
When I first began researching Buddhism in Malaysia in 2009,

I remember feeling astonished at the range of social welfare projects
being carried out at the Sri Lankan Buddhist temples there. Although
I encountered a number of monks in Sri Lanka engaged in social work
during my ten years of research on the island (see, for instance, Samuels,
2003), the range of activities in Malaysia far surpassed anything I had
witnessed in Sri Lanka. Moreover, while the projects in Sri Lanka were
mostly targeted to specific communities and villages there, the geo-
graphical reach of the projects in Malaysia as well as the social networks
that gave rise to that reach were far more expansive. What roles are
the temples in Malaysia playing in the development of Sri Lanka? What
accounted for the differences regarding social welfare work between the
temples in Malaysia and those in Sri Lanka?
Focusing on three Sri Lankan temples in Malaysia, this chapter seeks
answers to these questions. Beginning first with the causes that resulted
in the establishment of Sri Lankan temples in Malaysia in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and continuing with an
exploration of the factors that led to the growth and development of
the temples’ social welfare enterprises during the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, this chapter examines the role that Buddhist temples in
Malaysia are playing in the development of Sri Lanka. By drawing par-
ticular attention to the intersecting diasporas that make the temples’
social service enterprises possible, this chapter seeks not only to com-
plement current understandings about diaspora and development in
194
Jeffrey Samuels 195
South Asia but also to propose one possible answer concerning why
such vast differences regarding development work organized through
Buddhist temples exist across the Indian Ocean.
Moving east: The Sri Lankan diaspora in Malaysia
As I have noted elsewhere (Samuels, 2011), Sri Lankan migrants came to

Malaya in several waves. While there is evidence for their presence in the
port cities of Penang, Melaka and Singapore during the early nineteenth
century, it was with the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Crown
Colony in 1867 that migration between the two British colonies was
actively encouraged. Many Sri Lankans who came around this period
were ‘traders in jewelry and gems, goldsmiths and confectioners. Many
of them chose the port cities of Singapore, Penang, and Melaka as their
home, a place from which they could easily keep in contact with their
families in Ceylon and from where they could send over remittances’
(Arseculeratne, 1991: 16).
The second wave of Sri Lankans came after the signing of the Pangkor
Engagement or Treaty in January 1874. The Treaty provided the British
access to the hinterlands. To develop what was, up until then, thick
jungle, the government of the Straits Settlements needed a new and
different type of immigrant: those who could build and manage a much-
needed infrastructure (Samarawickrama, 2003: 7f). Looking westward,
Sri Lanka was an obvious place from where recruits could be sent as
their knowledge of English and, more importantly, familiarity with the
British colonial machinery made them an invaluable workforce.
With the growth of Malaya and the tin industry also came the need
for a system of transportation. The British, turning to their own civil
servants already working abroad, asked J.W.W. Birch to move from
Sri Lanka to Malaya in the 1870s. With him came two divisions of the
Ceylon Pioneer Corps who were charged with building the first rail line
in Malaya. More Sri Lankans came to work on the railway after 1891
when C.E. Spooner, a man who would later become the first General
Manager of the Malay States Railway, arrived to Malaya from Sri Lanka.
Following Spooner’s decision to establish, in 1901, a single railway
administration – the Federated Malay States Railways – a central work-
shop to service the entire network of trains was established in Sentul,
Kuala Lumpur, to where a number of Sri Lankans – Sinhalese as well as
Tamils – moved.
Many Sri Lankans were recruited through the colonial offices in
Sri Lanka and Malaya. Along with them, Sri Lankan traders and
196 Intersecting Diasporas
businessmen – tempted by stories about the El Dorado or the Land of

Gold (Svarnabhumi) lying just eastward – continued to make it over
on their own accord. Attracted to what they saw as opportunities for
wealth, many Sinhalese immigrants gravitated towards the port cities of
Penang and Singapore as well as the larger cities of Taiping, Ipoh, Kuala
Lumpur, Melaka and Klang.1
The founding of Sri Lankan temples in Malaya
The first Sri Lankan temples were established in Malaya in the late nine-
teenth century to serve the religious and social needs of Sri Lankan
immigrants who chose to stay in the Land of Gold.2 The immigrants’
decision to remain in Malaya brought new sets of challenges, including
finding comfort during more difficult times when a sense of uncertainty
and meaninglessness – such as death – filled their minds and hearts (de
Silva 1998: 23). Although Sri Lankan Buddhists living in other areas in
Malaya (e.g., Kedah and Kelantan) tended to seek solace in the Thai
temples that dotted the region, the absence of such temples in Kuala
Lumpur3 as well as the seeming foreignness of Chinese temples (with
their focus on ancestral worship and the prevalence of Chinese deities) –
led the Sinhalese in Kuala Lumpur and Taiping to establish more familiar
places of worship.
Following the establishment of the first Sinhalese Buddhist temple in
Malaya in 1889 – Bodhi Langka Ram Vihara in Taiping, Perak – a second
temple was built in 1895 to serve the growing number of Sri Lankans
living in Kuala Lumpur. The location chosen for the temple – Buddhist
Maha Vihara – was the cosmopolitan section known as Brickfields, an
area of Kuala Lumpur where the Public Works Department factory was
located and where a number of Sri Lankan Sinhalese and Tamils civil
servants lived.
The temple in Brickfields was soon followed by a third one, located
on the island of Penang. Shortly after the arrival of the Sinhalese monk
Ven. A. Pemaratana to Batu Lanchang Cemetery (off of Green Lane in
Penang) in 1918, a small group of devotees began to form around him.
After Ven. Pemaratana expressed a wish for a Sri Lankan Buddhist temple
on the island, a Sinhalese businessman, Mr M.V. Gregory, bought a piece
of land and, on it, a small shrine room was constructed. In 1921, a new
piece of land was purchased for the temple, this time on Kampar Road
where the temple sits today.
The fourth Sri Lankan temple, called the Sri Lankan Buddhist temple,
is located in a different area of Kuala Lumpur known as Sentul. With the
Jeffrey Samuels 197
establishment of the central workshop for the Federated Malay States

Railways in Sentul, 100 quarters were constructed for the railway work-
ers. A large number of Sri Lankans occupied them, thus creating a need
for a more nearby place of worship.
Although feelings of absence led some Sri Lankans in Malaya to return
home, the same emotions compelled some of those who stayed to find
ways not only to make the unfamiliar familiar but also to keep the col-
lective memory of the community’s past inscribed on the hearts and
minds of future generations of Sinhalese. Complete with its calendric
rites, rituals, festivals, celebrations, as well as religious and language
schools, the Sri Lankan Buddhist temples in Malaysia provided its devo-
tees with the social context from which the group’s ethnic and social
identity and memory could be kept alive.
Like for many Chinese communities in Malaya (DeBernardi, 1994,
2004), many Sri Lankans living on the peninsula drew a close connec-
tion between their ethnicity and their religion. In that regard, then,
it is not surprising to find that the Sri Lankan temples in Malaya and
the recently arrived Sinhalese monks to the temples attracted the inter-
est of the diaspora community as they were seen, in the words of one
prominent layman in Kuala Lumpur, Vijaya Samarawickrama, as an
embodiment of all that was Sinhalese (personal communication, 2011).
New patrons, new directions
The Sri Lankan temples in Kuala Lumpur and (to a lesser extent)
Penang were initially built to serve the religious and social needs
of the Sri Lankan diaspora community living there.4 They did not,
however, remain solely sites of ethnic memory for long. With the
arrival of K. Gunaratana to Mahindarama (Penang) in 1933, Ven.
K. Dhammananda to Buddhist Maha Vihara (Brickfields, Kuala Lumpur)
in 1952, and Ven. B. Saranankara to the Sri Lankan Buddhist Temple
(Sentul, Kuala Lumpur) in 1984, the three temples began attracting new
groups of patrons, the largest being English-speaking Chinese. These
monks regularly organized dharma tours; the systematic distribution of
free publications and charismatic personalities of the head monks had a
profound impact on the temples’ demographics.
The activities of these monks proved to be a boon for the tem-
ples: with the rapidly growing number of Chinese patrons came deeper
pockets that would come to support the temples’ flurry of activities,
including building projects. Other changes also came in their wake.
With an increase in temple resources during the 1980s and 1990s,
Buddhist patrons and monastic leaders in all three institutions began

turning their energy to serving society in ways that were not only lim-
ited to propagating the teachings (dharmaduta). In the following three
sections, I examine the range of social welfare activities taking place
at these three Sri Lankan temples, paying particular attention to the
ways in which the Sri Lankan temples have been involved in providing
resources and aid to Sri Lanka.
On the ground networks: Buddhist Maha Vihara

and Ven. K. Dhammaratana
The head monk of Buddhist Maha Vihara, Ven. K. Sri Dhammananda,

played an instrumental role in propagating Buddhism throughout
peninsular Malaysia. During his career in Malaysia (1952–2006), Ven.
Dhammananda devoted his time and energy to teaching people about
Buddhism through countless talks, Buddhist Sunday schools, pam-
phlets, periodicals, courses and books. It was through such efforts that
Ven. Dhammananda was able to increase the patronage of Chinese
Malaysians at his temple from four to five families in the 1950s to
over 95 per cent Chinese in the subsequent decades (Yan and Gee,
1989: 47).
Ven. Dhammananda’s nephew, K. Dhammaratana, has been less inter-
ested in continuing his uncle’s legacy of dharma propagation. Focusing,
instead, on the social needs of poor, aged and destitute people, Ven.
Dhammaratana has directed his efforts towards a flurry of social wel-
fare activities. While his social work began in the mid-1990s, Ven.
Dhammaratana became even more active in his endeavours after becom-
ing the new head monk of Buddhist Maha Vihara when his uncle passed
away in 2006.
Ven. Dhammaratana’s welfare work has been undertaken through two
separate organizations. The first one is the temple itself. While the prin-
cipal aim and resources of the temple – which is registered with the
government as a Buddhist Society – is to educate Buddhists through
its Sunday School programmes and a wide array of free publications,
it is also engaged in several social welfare projects that are organized
and executed through the temple’s charitable arm called ‘Friends of the
Vihara’: a senior citizen club (which caters to retired people by offer-
ing them yoga classes, other types of courses, and excursions); a project
that provides 150 homeless people in downtown Kuala Lumpur with a
weekly hot meal and a loaf of bread (bought from a bakery run by deaf
people); a programme that provides food, dry goods and clothing to
Jeffrey Samuels 199
approximately 400 homeless people around Kuala Lumpur several days

before the country’s major religious holidays (Deepavali, Christmas,
Vesak, Ramadan, Chinese New Year); an annual project (held in August)
that provides very poor people living in the country’s plantations (the
majority of whom are Tamil) with money, food and other donated items;
as well as several other ad hoc activities.
While such programmes have been ongoing for several years, they
have a much less permanent structure than the welfare activities that
fall under Ven. Dhammaratana’s second foundation: Ti-Ratana Wel-
fare Organization. This organization was established in 1994 and, as a
tax-exempt entity, receives many more donations than ‘Friends of the
Vihara’. The extent of Ti-Ratana’s projects and assets is far more encom-
passing: three orphanages (the first one established in 1997), two old
folks homes, one shelter for abused women, four community centres
and a mobile medical clinic. The orphanages and old folks homes serve
280 children/orphans and 50 senior citizens respectively.5 Ti-Ratana also
has a number of paid staff: doctors, nurses, caretakers, administrators
and so on.
Although largely focused on Malaysia and Malaysians, Ti-Ratana Wel-
fare Organization and the temple itself have also responded to a number
of international crises and social needs, particularly in the wake of
natural disasters. These include providing rural aid to Africa, assisting
those affected by cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and building a commu-
nity centre for untouchables in India. The greatest response, however,
has been to the 2004 Boxing-day tsunami that ravaged many parts of
South and Southeast Asia. Using the temple as a collection centre for
tsunami victims, the temple distributed 50 large shipping containers
of clothes, blankets, body bags, food, medical supplies, diapers, small
ovens, tents, bottled water and so on to Sri Lanka and Aceh; another
four containers were shipped to Phuket in the month following the dis-
aster (Rahman Daros, 2005; see also n.a. 3 January 2005). Conversations
with those present at the temple in the weeks following the disaster as
well as newspaper reports (e.g., Fadzil, 2005), reveal huge crowds turn-
ing up at the temple to donate items for the victims. Besides supplies
that filled the temple’s large assembly hall, Ti-Ratana collected over RM
2,000,000 (over $625,000 USD) to aid victims of the disaster.
Collecting money and material goods was only one part of the pro-
cess; without a systematic method of distribution, aid may not reach
its intended targets. In order to coordinate the distribution of goods
in Sri Lanka, Vens. Dhammananda and Dhammaratana worked closely
with a monastic friend of theirs in Sri Lanka: Ven. Vimala.6 Working
with a point person on the ground in Sri Lanka proved essential in

ensuring that the shipping containers would clear Sri Lankan customs
and arrive at their intended destinations. Ven. Vimala – who carries the
title of Chief Sangha Nayaka of the United States and Canada and is
highly regarded by the Sri Lankan government – was able to utilize his
social capital in mobilizing a large network of resources in Sri Lanka,
including the Sri Lankan Army. This network provided Ven. Vimala with
access to all of the affected areas in Sri Lanka, including the Eastern
provinces, which were, at the time, less accessible as a result of the ongo-
ing civil war. As a result of his social connections, Ven. Vimala was able
to distribute goods to the hardest hit areas as well as fund the recon-
struction of two Hindu temples. Finally, it is important to note that as
the point person in Sri Lanka, Ven. Vimala was also able to commu-
nicate specific needs and requests directly to Buddhist Maha Vihara in
Malaysia. This communication was important in targeting each area’s
specific needs, including those areas populated by Sri Lankan Tamil
Hindus, Christians and Muslims.
Social work environment: The Sri Lankan Buddhist temple

and Ven. B. Saranankara
The other Sri Lankan temple in Kuala Lumpur also provided aid to
Sri Lanka’s tsunami victims. Besides functioning as a collection site
for donated goods, the Sri Lankan Buddhist Temple in Sentul, Kuala
Lumpur, played a more long-term role in developing Sri Lanka.
As noted earlier, the Sri Lankan Buddhist Temple was first established
in 1921 to cater to the religious, social and cultural needs of the Sri
Lankan community living in and around Sentul (Sri Jayanti Association
2000: 6ff). With the arrival of Ven. B. Saranankara in 1984, however, the
temple began to take on a new form: physically and organizationally.
What had been a small run-down structure was soon replaced with a
new temple (Sri Jayanti Association 1991: 23ff.). With construction work
mostly completed in 1996, Ven. Saranankara began turning his atten-
tion to welfare work which he ran through the temple’s two welfare
organizations: the Sri Jayanti Welfare Organization and Yayasan Maha
Karuna.7
As the temple’s new head monk in 1984, Ven. Saranankara reg-
ularly encountered many poor people living in Sentul, an area of
Kuala Lumpur that was quite impoverished at the time. Respond-
ing to their needs, Ven. Saranankara set up a free medical clinic at
the temple (personal conversation 2009). In 1991, Ven. Saranankara
Jeffrey Samuels 201
established Sri Jayanti Welfare Organization to administer and develop

the temple’s social welfare activities. Through it, Ven. Saranankara
was able to increase the breadth and reach of his social service.
With the establishment of the ‘Caring and Sharing’ and Educare pro-
grammes, Ven. Saranankara began reaching out to the area’s elderly
and youth by providing them with financial and social relief. The for-
mer programme soon developed into the Metta Care Centre, which
provides welfare assistance to neglected seniors (Sri Jayanti Association
2004: 19ff.).
Despite this impressive range of social welfare activities, Sri Jayanti
Welfare Organization’s most important function has always been
providing Buddhist education to (mostly English-speaking Chinese)
Malaysians through its Sunday school programmes and through the
free distribution of religious material.8 With the arrival of more and
more families to the temple as a result of Ven. Saranankara’s charisma
and the temple’s burgeoning Sunday School, different visions about
the temple’s role in contemporary society emerged. With those visions
came a new and different type of welfare organization that, while tied
to Ven. Saranankara, was not connected to the actual temple and its
Sri Lankan identity. Established in 2001 and registered with the govern-
ment as a non-profit welfare foundation, the purpose of Yayasan Maha
Karuna (Great Compassion Foundation) is – according to Jacob Chan,
the foundation’s president – to help the sick, aged, needy and home-
less irrespective of religious affiliation (personal conversation, 2010).
The range of programmes associated with Yayasan Maha Karuna include
Educare, a programme that distributes school items (uniforms, bags,
shoes, books and stationary) to needy schoolchildren (est. 2001);9 a
mobile free clinic, which provides medical outreach (consultations and
free medication) to poor people living in rural areas, particularly Tamil
plantation workers in Selangor (est. 2006);10 a senior citizen home; and
a centre for the terminally ill and homeless.
Although the majority of Ven. Saranankara’s welfare work has focused
on Malaysia, the economic and human resources made available
through Yayasan Maha Karuna has enabled him to extend his social
welfare work to Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, China and India. Turning
to the issue of diaspora and development, particularly with regard to
the temple’s South Asian heritage, we find a number of ongoing welfare
projects being conducted in Sri Lanka. Through its Educare programme,
for instance, the foundation has been distributing shoes, school bags,
uniforms and supplies to poor Sri Lankan children (Jacob Chan, per-
sonal interview, 2010). Yayasan Maha Karuna has also provided financial
assistance and medical aid to the poor in Sri Lanka as well as cash
vouchers for monks and nuns in Sri Lanka to buy books. Yayasan Maha
Karuna has also allocated RM30,000 for the purpose of building wells
and installing water pumps in poor areas (e.g., in Delgoda).11
On 14 March 2012, Ven. Saranankara, accompanied by numerous
patrons of the Sri Lankan Buddhist Temple and Maha Karuna Buddhist
Society, travelled to Sri Lanka to celebrate the opening of Sri Jayanti-
Maha Karuna Youth Centre, located in Delgoda (approximately 25 km
southeast of Colombo). A project that was in the making since 2006,
the youth centre provides shelter to orphans, irrespective of race and
religion. The centre itself – which costs approximately RM3.5 million
($1.1 million USD) – consists of an administration building, multipur-
pose hall, training centre, lecture hall, library, shrine hall, meditation
hall, classrooms, dining hall and kitchen. By fulfilling the children’s
social, cultural and spiritual needs, volunteer workers and paid staff
at the centre seek to transform homeless children into economically
self-sustaining citizens by offering them training in a variety of fields
(IT, culinary arts, nursing, housekeeping and foreign languages).
Even though the centre is primarily focused on orphans, it seeks to
create a unique environment where monks and nuns are taught about
social welfare work through engaging in hands-on work at the centre.
Moreover, Ven. Saranankara intends that the centre’s services not only
be limited to its residents; when fully operational, Ven. Saranankara
hopes to use the clinic to provide free medical assistance to the area’s
poor; he also envisions that the centre’s multipurpose hall would also
be used as a community centre for the area’s residents.
International networks: Mahindarama Buddhist temple

and Ven. E. Indaratana
Another Sinhalese monk in Malaysia who has been actively involved in

the development of Sri Lanka is Ven. E. Indaratana. Once he became the
head monk of Mahindarama in 1995, Ven. Indaratana worked to stem
the declining numbers of patrons and visitors to his temple. After notic-
ing that the majority of people showing up at the temple (apart from
those attending the temple’s Sunday school classes) came to receive
blessings from the temple’s monks as well as to invite them to per-
form Buddhist rituals at their home or at the bedside of their ailing
or dying friends and family members, Ven. Indaratana began focusing
on a panoply of welfare projects: a free medical clinic which he ran
out of the temple every Sunday (1996);12 a Buddhist funeral service to
Jeffrey Samuels 203
console grieving families (1998); a diabetes centre, which was added to

the free medical clinic in recognition of the growing presence of diabetes
in Malaysia (1998); an old folks home (1999) and a cancer-counselling
centre (2005). Through these projects, Mahindarama became a more
active place where visitors – including the sick, dying and old – could
fulfill a variety of social needs as well as where volunteers could prac-
tice ‘compassion in action’. Ven. Indaratana believed that the range of
medical, social and apotropaic services provided by and through the
temple would also increase people’s interest in Buddhist teachings; he
explained: ‘First thing they need is health, before the teachings. They
need health. I must promote health. Then they can come to the temple.
Then they can maintain [religious] things’ (personal communication,
2012).
Although largely concerned with people living in Penang (and, later,
in other cities such as Ipoh), Ven. Indaratana soon began to set his sights
beyond Malaysia. Concerned with the needy living in his own place
of origin, Ven. Indaratana founded a Sri Lankan branch of Amata Free
Medical clinic at Gangaramaya Temple in Kohalwila, Kelaniya in 2001.
Like the Amata Free Clinic that was initially run out of Mahindarama
Temple, the goal he had for the clinic in Sri Lanka was to provide free
medical treatment to sick and poor Sri Lankans. Serving the poor also
led Ven. Indaratana to set up a school scholarship programme the fol-
lowing year, with patrons of Mahindarama paying RM182.50 annually
to sponsor a child’s education: books, clothing writing material, shoes
and so on.
To secure a greater infusion of capital to fund his projects, Ven.
Indaratana set his sights beyond Malaysia. In 2002, for instance, Ven.
Indaratana set up a branch of Amata Foundation in Japan. This Japanese
non-profit NGO soon functioned as a channel through which medical
supplies and money could be gifted directly to Sri Lanka.
Prior to the Foundation’s establishment in Japan, Ven. Indaratana
paid a visit to the country at the invitation of a long-time Sri Lankan
friend of his living there, Mr Pala Madampe. While that trip was simply
a personal visit, it helped facilitate the founding of Amata Japan. After
Ven. Indaratana returned to Penang, Mr Suzuki – a Japanese business-
man who was given Ven. Indaratana’s contact details by Mr Madampe –
paid a visit to Mahindarama. During his visit, Mr Suzuki came to know
about Ven. Indaratana’s social service projects in Malaysia and Sri Lanka.
Once Mr Suzuki expressed a wish to help, Ven. Indaratana began dis-
cussing with him about Amata’s wish to have a mobile medical unit in
Sri Lanka. Mr Suzuki suggested that they set up a non-profit foundation
in Japan through which such a donation could be gifted. With the foun-
dation in place, Mr Suzuki invited Ven. Indaratana to Japan where he
publically donated a used ambulance to Amata (Indaratana, personal
communication; see also Indaratana et. al., 2004: 80).
Ven. Indaratana’s work in Sri Lanka continued. Not forgetting his own
biological and institutional roots, Ven. Indaratana established another
branch of Amata in February 2004. That branch was based at the temple
in Ven. Indaratana’s native village where Ven. Indaratana first donned
saffron robes: Purān.a Rājamahāvihāra at Elgiriya (Matara District).
While the clinic was supposed to mirror the work being done by Amata
in Kelaniya, it took on a somewhat different role ten months later.
On 26 December 2004, a devastating tsunami hit the west and east
coasts of Sri Lanka; the major cities of Matara (where Amata II is located)
and Galle – as well as their surrounding villages – were ravaged. Through
Amata and Mahindarama in Penang – which were linked to Amata
Japan – the Amata branch at Elgiriya (along with Amata in Kelaniya)
became distribution centres that would, during the months following
the tsunami, apportion 14 shipping containers full of medical supplies,
food and clothing to Sri Lanka.
Alongside these forms of disaster relief, Ven. Indaratana and the sup-
porters of his Mahindarama temple participated in a groundbreaking
ceremony in Matara in February 2005 for a ‘tsunami village’ (see n.a.
26 February 2005). The village itself would consist of 50 low-cost homes.
Now completed, the village has a community centre where the village’s
residents could participate in birthday celebrations, funeral services, reli-
gious rituals and other community events. Each house also has a small
garden where the residents are encouraged to grow their own vegetables.
Ven. Indaratana has also sponsored a monk living in a nearby temple
to conduct religious services as well as run the village’s Sunday school
programme at no charge.
In 2006 Ven. Indaratana established a third branch of Amata
in Sri Lanka: at Sunandarama Rājamahāvihāra at Tolangamuwa,
Warakapola (Kegalle District). The three Amata clinics see a total of 300
patients (100 patients per clinic) on a weekly basis or, even more remark-
ably, over 15,000 annually (many of whom also receive free medication
which is funded through the Mahindarama Temple).13
In 2011 a unique event that was organized by Ven. Indaratana was
held in Sri Lanka: a temporary ordination ceremony. Although this
event seems quite irrelevant to any discussion of economic develop-
ment and social welfare work, it is not. Before discussing the connection
between temporary ordination and social welfare, a brief background
highlighting the uniqueness of this event is necessary.
Jeffrey Samuels 205
Unlike Thailand, Burma and Laos where temporary ordination is the

norm, ordination into the monastic order is considered to be a lifelong
(yāvajīvam) vocation in Sri Lanka. While no one has the power to bar
boys and men from leaving the monastic order or sangha, those who
leave the sangha – particularly those who live in and will return to more
rural areas – are sometimes stigmatized.
While the majority of temples in Sri Lanka have no system of tempo-
rary ordination, patrons of the Sri Lankan temple in Brickfields (Kuala
Lumpur) began asking for one in the 1960s. Aware that such a system
already exists at the Thai temples in the northern Malaysian provinces
of Kelantan and Kedah, several Chinese patrons of the Brickfields tem-
ple approached Ven. Dhammananda to request temporary ordination.
Ven. Dhammananda, seeing the benefits of instilling a taste of monastic
life and knowledge of the Buddha’s teaching (dhamma) in his patrons,
began holding temporary ordinations, at first on an ad hoc basis.14
The temporary ordination programme introduced at Buddhist Maha
Vihara was subsequently adopted by the Sri Lankan temples in Penang,
Sentul and Melaka, as well as at other Theravada temples in Malaysia
(e.g., Sāsanarakkha Buddhist Sanctuary, Vihara Buddha Gotama and
Aloka). While the Mahindarama temple began conducting temporary
ordination ceremonies in 1999, the one that Ven. Indaratana organized
in 2011 was markedly different. From 27 May to 7 June, Ven. Indaratana
organized the first temporary ordination of Chinese Malaysians in
Sri Lanka.15 The programme – which included regular lectures on
Buddhist doctrine, morning meditation, Buddhist chanting and wor-
ship rituals, and alms-rounds – was conducted by a group of monks,
both local and from Malaysia. These ‘temple’ activities, which actually
took place in the comfort of an upscale hotel (Hotel Sudu Araliya) rather
than a temple, were complemented by pilgrimages to various religious
sites in the ancient capitals of Polonnaruva, Anuradhapura and Kandy
as well as the cave temples at Dambulla. Sixty people attended the pro-
gramme (20 men and 40 women). Their ages ranged from 12 to 70 years
and the majority hailed from Penang.
Relevant to our current discussion of diaspora and development is the
role that the programme played in Ven. Indaratana’s social welfare enter-
prises in Sri Lanka. In addition to many of the temporary ordination
participants donating school supplies to poor children through local
temple networks, several gave money to support Ven. Indaratana’s social
work in Sri Lanka. Alongside one family giving Rs 278,000 (approx.
2500.00 USD or RM7,700) to the Amata clinics, several other partici-
pants donated a total of approximately Rs 300,000 (approx. 2,700.00
USD or RM8,300.00).
Ven. Indaratana organized a second temporary ordination ritual in

Sri Lanka the following year. This one was held at the Tree of Life
Hotel, just outside of Kandy. Eighty participants attended the event.
Although the majority of attendees came from Penang, several hailed
from Australia, Hong Kong and Japan (Tilakavardhana, 2012). Like the
previous year, the event resulted in sizeable donations given to support
various social enterprises in Sri Lanka: in addition to Amata free med-
ical clinic receiving 100,000 rupees, and Amata elderly home (which
is currently under construction) receiving money as well, several hun-
dred thousand rupees (as well as food supplies) were donated to the
government’s army camp hospital for injured soldiers.
Intersecting diasporas: Development across

the Indian Ocean
The three case studies presented above illustrate some of the roles that
diasporic communities may play in stimulating development in their
countries of origins. Although the amount of capital sent from the tem-
ples in Malaysia to Sri Lanka may pale in comparison to other flows of
capital (e.g., remittances, trade in native products and business invest-
ments), the Malaysian case studies complement current understandings
of diaspora and development in South Asia by highlighting the role
that religious institutions and networks play in the development pro-
cess. Indeed, from monetary donations to various types of social welfare
projects, Sri Lankan temples in Malaysia are playing an increasingly
visible role in Sri Lanka since 2002.
Along with complementing current scholarship on diaspora and
development, the three case studies also challenge certain assumptions,
including the very concept of diaspora. Whereas diaspora and develop-
ment are mostly understood in terms of a single diasporic community
spurring growth in its country of origin, the three case studies pre-
sented above complicate this somewhat. In order to develop their ‘origin
country’, the head monks must draw together and work with multiple
diasporas simultaneously. According to all three head monks, the devel-
opment work undertaken by the temples would not be possible without
the help of other diasporic communities.
The head monks in all three temples are able to draw multiple
communities together by deemphasizing their own ethnicity and by
stressing, instead, their Buddhist identity. As a broad imagined commu-
nity no longer limited to a particular ethnic tradition (e.g., Sri Lankan,
Thai, Burmese, Chinese) or Buddhist school (e.g., Theravada, Mahayana
Jeffrey Samuels 207
or Vajrayana), the temples’ Buddhist identity provides the space for

other Buddhists interested in welfare work to find meaning and express
their Buddhist ideals. As we saw with Ven. Indaratana, moreover, such
communities may also extend beyond the borders of a single nation
state. Even though the international assistance that Ven. Indaratana
receives is currently limited to Japan, it is conceivable that the involve-
ment of Buddhists from Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore in Ven.
Indaratana’s temporary ordination in 2012 will have an effect on his
future projects. Indeed, similar to Mr Suzuki, it is not difficult to imag-
ine that other participants in the temporary ordination programme –
who now have a visual and emotional connection to Sri Lanka, Ven.
Indaratana and his social welfare projects – may follow Mr Suzuki’s path
by contributing money and material goods to Ven. Indaratana’s welfare
projects in the future.
Lastly, the Malaysian case studies point to a system of diaspora devel-
opment in which a top-down approach is intersected by an equally
important bottom-up model. In many ways, the welfare organizations
associated with the three Sri Lankan temples are the outcome of each
head monks’ vision about their temples’ role in contemporary society as
well as their own personal ties to Sri Lanka. By cultivating national and
international networks, the three head monks have been able to address
specific needs that each regard to be important. It is, largely, their ability
to communicate to others their own ideas about what needs to be done
in Sri Lanka that mobilizes a substantial workforce and level of capital
across the Indian Ocean.
At the same time as a top-down approach, there is also a bottom-
up force emerging from the temples’ welfare organizations. Although
the head monks at all three temples are the spiritual advisors of
the welfare organizations, the organizations themselves are run by
autonomous boards that include Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Secretaries
and Treasurers. Moreover, the fact that two of these organizations –
Maha Karuna and Ti-Ratana – are located outside of the temple and
remain independent from the temple’s governing board (Sri Jayanti
Association and Sāsana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society respectively)
means that they are not only more flexible with regard to the range of
welfare projects but also more able to influence the temples’ head monks
as they consider and rethink the boundaries of meaningful welfare and
development work.
In 2009, I interviewed Lim Kooi Fong, the founder of the international
Buddhist news website, The Buddhist Channel. During our conversa-
tion I expressed my astonishment at the range of social service work
currently being carried out at the Sri Lankan temples in Malaysia.

In response, Kooi Fong provided some background. Referring to the
Chinese diasporic communities in Malaysia, he explained: ‘As immi-
grants here, we have been ingrained to take care of ourselves. No one
will take care of us. When we came here, we worked in the tin mines
and tapped rubber. We established clan associations, kongsis. Those
kongsis helped set up schools. They set up clinics [where] traditional
medicine [was practiced]. We helped each other. It is ingrained [in us].’16
The ingrained propensity to help others, the deep connection drawn
between generosity and moral worth, and the shifting emphasis among
Chinese Buddhist to ‘this-worldly activity’ (see, for instance, Pittman,
2001; Huang, 2005, 2008) have certainly had an effect on the Sri Lankan
temples. As sites where different diasporas intersect, the temples in
Malaysia have become a natural places where multiple communities
are able to embody such Buddhist concepts as compassion (karuna),
loving-kindness (metta) and giving (dana) across and beyond the Indian
Ocean.
Acknowledgement
I wish to thank a number of colleagues and organizations for making the

research and writing of this chapter possible. Firstly I wish to express my
appreciation to Venerables Saranankara, Indaratana and Dhammaratana
for opening their temples to me and for taking time from their busy
work schedule to answer my many questions. I also wish to thank Vijaya
Samarawickrama, Sumanananda Premseri, Jacob Chan, Doris and other
friends in Malaysia for sharing their vast knowledge with me. I presented
an early draft of this chapter at the Works in Progress series at the Asia
Research Institute; I learned much from those who participated, espe-
cially Philip Fountain, Michael Feener, Mayfair Yang and Janet Hoskins.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the financial assistance I received from
Western Kentucky University, the American Academy of Religion and
the Asia Research Institute (where, as a senior research fellow, I wrote
an earlier draft of this chapter). Any errors or oversights remain solely
my own.
Notes
1. The forces motivating people to migrate can rarely be reduced to a single
factor. While economic opportunities were alluring to many who risked
much to travel across the Indian Ocean, it is also worth bearing in mind
that moving to a new country often offers people freedom from their
Jeffrey Samuels 209
past. S.N. Arseculeratne’s book on Sinhalese Immigrants in Malaysia and

Singapore 1860–1990, for instance, mentions several people who came to
Malaya from Sri Lanka to escape repercussions from their involvement in
the Sinhalese-Muslim riots of 1915. Other people came simply to break free
from Sri Lanka’s more rigid social culture. As no documents were needed
to travel from Sri Lanka to Malaya, people were freely able to seek differ-
ent types of employment than was available to them in Sri Lanka and, by
changing their names – a clear marker of their caste status – overcome cer-
tain social liabilities that previously hindered their chances for economic
advancement.
2. For a more developed description of the founding of Sri Lankan temples in
Malaysia, see Samuels (2011).
3. Currently, there are two Thai temples in Kuala Lumpur: Wat Meh
Liew (est. 1929) and the much larger Wat Chetawan (est. 1957). While
Arseculeratne (1991: 154) notes that Wat Meh Liew was established by a
Chinese woman who married a Sinhalese man, temple records indicate that
the woman was Thai (personally communication, Phrakhru Sirik Panjavud,
head monk of Wat Meh Liew). Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu
belonged to Thailand prior to 1909; thus, there are many Thai communities
and Thai temples there. There were a number of Sinhalese living in Kelantan
and Kedah during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of
whom married Thai wives (see Arseculeratne 1991: 131).
4. Unlike the two Sri Lankan temples in Kuala Lumpur where membership on
the temple’s board is largely restricted to people of Sri Lankan descent, the
temple in Penang has been more open to other ethnic communities from
the beginning. The temple’s openness is largely the result of the fewer num-
ber of Sri Lankan families in the area; with less support, the temple’s head
monks relied on the participation and support of different communities.
Although the temples in Kuala Lumpur became more open in the 1960s–
1980s, Mahindarama openness occurred much earlier, as is evident in the
fact that K. Gunaratana (Chief Incumbent of Mahindarama from 1933–1964)
used to preach in both English and Hokkien.
5. The number of battered women it shelters varies greatly from month to
month.
6. Ven. Vimala runs his own temple, the Triple Gem Society, in New Jersey, USA.
7. Yayasan Maha Karuna was created due to social tensions among the different
groups of the temple’s devotees.
8. Sri Jayanti Welfare Organization also provides tuition classes to poor students
seeking to advance in their secular studies.
9. In 2001, 800 needy children received aid from Educare. That number
increased to 10,000 in 2011 and 2012.
10. Though most of its services are rendered in the areas that surround Kuala
Lumpur, the free mobile clinic services the rural communities in Kuala
Selangor, Dengkil, Sepang, Batu Arang, Teluk Intan and Carey Island.
11. The vouchers, school supplies, and cash are usually distributed each
December when Ven. Saranankara and members of Yayasan Maha Karuna
make their annual visit to Sri Lanka.
12. At first, Ven. Indaratana travelled with the doctors to the patients’ homes to
provide care. Later he established a permanent home for the free medical
clinic at the temple. In 2000, the clinic moved to a larger premises to

accommodate a growing number of patients.
13. The medication, while funded by Mahindarama Temple, is purchased in
Sri Lanka.
14. The earliest known ordination ceremony on record is one in which the four
sons of Eu Eng Hock became novices (de Silva 1998: 243). Dato Eu Eng Hock
later sought temporary ordination himself; being a close friend of the Prime
Minster of Malaysia at the time, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Eu’s ceremony was
attended by over six hundred people (ibid.: 244).
15. Although this was the first temporary ordination ceremony that was orga-
nized in Malaysia and held in Sri Lanka, this is not the first temporary ordi-
nation held abroad. In 2009, Ven. Mahinda – a Chinese Malaysian Theravada
Buddhist monk who was trained under Ven. K. Sri Dhammananda – con-
ducted a temporary ordination ritual at various Buddhist holy sites in India
and Nepal (personal communication, Ven. Mahinda, July 1, 2007).
16. While the inclination to ‘help each other out’ was confined to specific groups
or clans through the kongsis (Wang, 1994; Yen, 2008, 1981), shantangs (Tan,
2012), language associations, and religious communities (Topley, 1961), the
recipients of aid became further broadened in the 1980s.
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11
Diaspora Engagement Policy
in South Asia
Smita Tiwari
Modern diasporic communities – which live outside but maintain links

with their country of origin – are getting larger and stronger and influ-
encing both domestic politics and foreign relations of a state. In an
era of accelerated globalization, the relationship between diaspora and
economic and social development of many countries is increasingly rel-
evant. Globalization has greatly expanded the means through which
people in one country can remain actively involved in another country’s
cultural, economic and political life. Governments of many developing
countries and other international agencies are acknowledging diasporas’
potential contribution to economic development. A diaspora can be a
direct source of advantage to the country of origin when its members
have the desire and ability to trade with, invest in and outsource to
domestic businesses (Kapur, 2010: 186). The persistence of ‘home bias’
indirectly explains the behaviour of diasporas and their social prox-
imity (Kapur, 2010: 186). A diaspora can also be an indirect source of
advantage to the country of origin when its members act as intermedi-
aries – matching trading partners, supporting contracting by leveraging
long-term relationship with people from the new and former homes and
most importantly overcoming negative national stereotypes through
demonstrations of their capabilities abroad (Kapur, 2010: 186). They also
tend to introduce and implement new technologies in their country of
origin.
The principal focus with respect to the economic effects of diaspora
on the country of origin has been on their substantial financial contri-
butions through remittances – private transfers from migrants to their
families. There is now increasing evidence that in large number of
low-income countries, remittances are the single largest source of net
foreign exchange flows (Kapur, 2005: 238). Of all transfer flows to the
212
Smita Tiwari 213
developing countries over the past decade, only migrant remittances

showed a positive growth tendency, while flows into capital markets,
foreign direct investment (FDI) and public development aid tend to
have receded (Ludger, 2007: 302). It is because movements of people
are a continuous phenomenon, and they keep supporting their families
and kins back home, through remittances. However, remittances are just
one mechanism through which the diaspora has a political impact on
the country of origin. Diasporas, given their ‘international location’, are
also capable of ‘providing information’ (Yossi and Barth, 2003: 462) to
the foreign policymakers of the country of origin. They are also able to
influence the policies of country of settlement towards the country of
origin. The importance of this mechanism increases with the degrees of
political cleavages between the diaspora and governing regime in the
country of origin.
Looking at their importance in the development in the origin coun-
tries and their status as permanent feature in the international system,
there are growing interests in diaspora for academics and policymakers
around the world. Besides academic research, policymakers are inter-
ested in understanding and reacting to the world which is being greatly
transformed by diaspora engagement. This chapter explains the exist-
ing state policies or lack of policies to engage their diasporas in selected
South Asian countries. It focuses specifically on economic and politi-
cal dimensions of states’ policies of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in
the last decade (2001–2010). Also, it looks at the implications of engag-
ing or not engaging diasporas in the development of the region as a
whole. The next section provides theoretical issues related to the rela-
tionship between state and diasporas, followed by a brief discussion on
South Asian diaspora in general. The following sections shed light on
diaspora engagement policies in three South Asian countries, namely
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The final section concludes with some
policy recommendations for South Asian countries.
State and diaspora: An analytical framework
Diasporas are often referred to as products as well as drivers of glob-

alization. Today, they are able to leverage the effects of globalization,
in order to become directly involved in the politics and economic
developments of countries of origin. Simultaneously, countries of origin
have become increasingly aware of the fact that their nationals residing
abroad represent new opportunities and challenges and consequently
work to co-opt or limit their political influence. Here, in this section,
214 Diaspora Engagement Policy in South Asia
two approaches – ‘interest’ approach and ‘rational choice’ approach –

have been used to understand the state–diaspora relationship.
Countries always act and react to meet their goals of national inter-
est. Countries of origin consider diaspora engagement policies as an
opportunity to further their national interests. Specific types of policy
can enhance flows of remittances, investments, knowledge transfers and
political influence through diaspora groups back into their homelands
(Gamlen, 2008: 7). Countries hope that engaging diaspora will help
them to leverage powerful diaspora to upscale their concerns into global
arenas. According to Qstergaard-Nielsen, countries of origin have three
main interests from its nationals abroad: (1) economic support (2) polit-
ical support and (3) social capital upgrading, integration of the citizens
abroad and strengthening of their sense of belonging in their country of
origin (Qstergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 211).
The potential importance of a diaspora to the country of origin
depends on several factors. First and foremost is the size of the diasporic
community. If the size of diaspora is too small and insignificant, the
country of origin may not develop huge interest in its diaspora. But a
large diaspora naturally attracts the attention of its country of origin.
The second factor is education and skills (Page and Claire, 2010: 102).
Highly educated and skilled professionals’, such as engineers, medical
and IT workers, migration to the developed world, taking advantage of
the opportunity provided by global-level markets, is often perceived in
terms of ‘brain drain’ (Page and Claire, 2010: 103). But a country may
take interest in its highly skilled and well-placed diaspora for ‘brain gain’
or ‘brain circulation’ and may consider that the benefits of remittance
received often outweigh the cost of loss of human resources (Page and
Claire, 2010: 103). The return migration as well as temporary and cir-
cular migration can promote the circulation and exchange of skills and
know-how (Keeley, 2010: 118).
Another important factor is economic activities by low-skilled
diaspora community and remittances received from them by coun-
try of origin. The remittances received from low-skilled diaspora are
important for a country, particularly developing ones, mainly for three
reasons (Keeley, 2010: 117) – first, low-skilled workers tend to send
proportionately more money home in remittances than professionals.
Second, low-skilled workers tend to come from poorer families, and
any economic benefits from their departure, as remittances, will tend
to go to families with the greatest needs. And third, depending on the
unemployment level in the home country, the departure of low-skilled
workers will either boost the wages of those left behind or create new
Smita Tiwari 215
job opportunities for them. Further, the political set-up of a country

where diaspora resides is also a factor for the country of origin to take
interest. If the political set up of a country, where diaspora resides, is lib-
eral and democratic, it would be easier for the country of origin to use its
diaspora for lobbying some political or economic cause. Thus, diaspora-
engagement policies are fundamentally about interests. The intended
benefit may be economic or political.
The ‘rational choice’ approach helps us to understand how and why
the country of origin engages its diaspora with careful decision-making
and cost–benefit analysis. Rational choice approach, as explained by
Duncan Snidal (1985), uses a specific and narrower definition of ‘ratio-
nality’, simply to mean that a state acts as if balancing costs against
benefits to arrive at action that maximizes its advantage. From the
perspective of rational choice theorists (Friden Jeffry, 1996), any ratio-
nal actor model assumes that actors (such as decision-makers) make
choices that they believe will lead to the best feasible outcomes for
them as defined by their personal values or preferences. The interests
of the decision-makers may or may not include enhancing something
called the national interest. Decision-makers connect alternatives con-
sistently in relation to preference or indifference; they take constraints
such as impediments in nature and the anticipated actions of oth-
ers into account and act in a manner that is consistent with their
desires and beliefs. It is a powerful tool in understanding the process
of decision-making.
Thus, the above-mentioned two approaches – ‘interest’ and ‘rational
choice’ – aptly explain a country’s engagement with its diaspora. The
two approaches are not exclusive and often come across each other in
their explanation of the phenomenon. There are also some drawbacks in
both approaches. ‘Interest’ is a relative term and is perceived differently
by different governments in the same country. It creates a gap in pol-
icy planning. Further, interest is also a dynamic concept which needs
to be modified with changing circumstances. The pitfall of ‘rational
choice’ approach is that it is guided by subjective calculations and some-
times ignores objective realities. Despite these shortcomings, these two
approaches help us to understand the state’s attitude towards diaspora.
South Asian diasporas
Though migration is a natural and continuous phenomenon, any

migrant, displaced and dispersed population cannot automatically be
identified as a diaspora. The existence of diasporas requires more than
a mere population of expatriates. It requires members of a commu-

nity to continue to identify with their homeland and to cultivate ties
between themselves and homeland. What distinguishes diaspora peo-
ple from migrants are their on-going or re-awakened attachment and
loyalty to their earlier culture and specifically to their homeland (Sahoo
and Maharaj, 2007: 113). The crucial elements that make the concept
meaningful and legitimate to use are their self-mobilization around
their awareness of themselves as diaspora (Sahoo and Maharaj, 2007:
113). Diaspora, as described by Steven Vertovec, refers to any popu-
lation . . . which is ‘de-territorialized’ or ‘transnational’ (Vertovec, 1999:
229). It means any population which has originated in a land, other
than which it currently resides in, and whose social, economic and polit-
ical networks cross the border of nation-states. McGown has defined
diaspora ‘as a space of connections’ between ‘elsewhere’ (country of ori-
gin) and ‘here’ (country of settlement) (McGown, 2007–2008: 8). Thus
the term diaspora has been modified over a period of time, in a way,
adjusting and accommodating various aspects of migrants’ life. But the
core of the term has remained the same, that is, being dispersed and yet
connected with the root in some way or the other.
In that sense, South Asian diaspora encompasses those people who
have migrated from South Asia. Today, South Asian diasporas consti-
tute a significant and successful economic, social and cultural force in
the world. Its vastness and diversity, at an international level, grew out
of a variety of causes – mercantilism, colonialism and globalization –
and over several hundreds of years of migration in different waves.
The origins and roots of the migrations have been different and the
routes and patterns of the migration and settlement have been diver-
gent. The level of their interaction with the new country of settlement
and the emergence of new identities make the South Asian diaspora
unique. It reflects a growing self-consciousness that has been further
strengthened by the development of new communication technolo-
gies. With increasing globalization, the South Asian diaspora is growing
and becoming more visible and influential world wide. It has become
a transnational network and their potentials have been recognized in
their countries of origin as well as settlement. Yet, it is difficult to
speak of one South Asian diaspora. It involves great diversity – people
from different socio-economic background, reflecting different religions
from the subcontinent, speaking different languages and from differ-
ent nation-states. The manner and the extent of South Asian diaspora
engagement, with their specific country or the region, are marked by
their own experience. I have focused on three South Asian countries –
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and from now onwards, for the purpose
Smita Tiwari 217
of this chapter, the term South Asian diaspora should be understood in

context of these three countries.
In the Indian context, the term ‘Overseas Indians’ is employed to
designate both the ‘Indian Nationals Overseas’ (INO) and the ‘People
of Indian Origin’ (PIOs) (Sahadevan, 1995: 1). There is marked dif-
ference between these two categories of the migrants, regarding their
political status, which they receive in their countries of settlement, and
the pattern, purpose and duration of their migration and their popu-
lation characteristics. The term ‘Indian Nationals Overseas’ is generally
referred to as Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). Holding of Indian passport
and duration of stay are important elements to constitute the status of
NRI (Sahadevan, 1995). On the other hand, ‘a person ceases to be NRI,
on acquiring citizenship of the country of its settlement because there is
no provision for dual citizenship under the Constitution of India’ (The
Citizenship Act of India, 1955).1 Another category of overseas Indians
community is referred to as ‘People of Indian Origin’, who are mainly
descendents of the emigrants of indentured labour, especially those who
were engaged in various plantations, sent by the British in the nine-
teenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. They are citizens of
their country of settlement and are connected with India by descent.
The Pakistani diaspora refers to a Pakistani citizen who has migrated
to another country or a person of Pakistani origin who is born outside
Pakistan. The term Overseas Pakistani is officially recognized by the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan. The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis was established
in 2008 to exclusively deal with all the matters and affairs of the over-
seas Pakistanis, such as attending to their needs and problems, intending
schemes and projects for their welfare and working for resolution of
their problems and issues. The Bangladeshi diaspora consists of people
of Bangladeshi descent who have immigrated to or were born in another
country. The diaspora can be divided into two segments (Chowdhury,
2012): the non-resident Bangladeshis (NRBs), the early settlers mostly
in the United Kingdom and North America, and migrant workers. The
NRBs include second- and third-generation Bangladeshis, many assimi-
lated in their host societies. The migrant workers live mostly in the West
Asian countries.
The phases of South Asian migration can be broadly classified into
two: colonial and modern (Jain, 1993). During the colonial period,
much of the migration to the other colonies was as ‘indentured labour’2
and ‘passage’ or ‘free emigration’3 (Tinker, 1993), for plantations and
mines in the Atlantic, Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. The modern
phase begins after the Second World War when India and Pakistan
gained independence and its people began to move, to participate in
the modern mercantile and industrial world. Migration in this phase

was voluntary and mostly individual in nature. Broadly, two patterns
of emigration were identified in modern or post-independent period:
first, the emigration of professionals to the industrially advanced coun-
tries like the United States, Canada, England and other West European
countries; second, the emigration of semi-skilled and unskilled labourers
to the West Asian countries. In the first stream, with second and subse-
quent generations having emerged, and immigrant population enjoying
economic prosperity and socio-cultural rights in multi-cultural polities,
there have emerged vibrant South Asian diasporic communities. In the
second stream, the trends and conditions are determined by labour mar-
ket varieties and especially concentrated in the countries in the Middle
East and Southeast Asia. Diasporic communities, here, are without any
prospect of settlement.
Diaspora engagement policy in South Asia
Before looking at South Asian countries’ diaspora policy, it is impera-

tive to understand what are diaspora policies? Alan Gamlen has defined
diaspora policies as state institutions and practices that apply to mem-
bers of that state’s society who reside outside its borders (Gamlen,
2008). These range from state-sponsored celebrations and awards for
expatriates, to bureaucratic units dedicated to the diaspora, to external
voting rights and bilateral agreements on social security and pen-
sion transferability, right through to the range of mechanisms through
which origin states attempt to extract finances, expertise and influ-
ence from their diasporas (Gamlen, 2008). Gamlen identifies three types
of diaspora engagement policies by the country of origin (Gamlen,
2006: 5) – first is ‘capacity building’, aimed at discursively producing
‘state-centric’ diasporas and developing a set of corresponding state
institutions; second is ‘extending rights’ to the diasporas, thus play-
ing a role that befits a legitimate sovereign; and third is extracting
obligations from the diaspora, based on the premise that they owe loy-
alty to this legitimate sovereign. In short, diaspora policies are most
often interpreted as facets of ‘external’ or ‘extra-territorial citizenship’
(Schiller, 2005). By incorporating the diaspora into the state, these poli-
cies redefine or reconfigure what it means to be a member of ‘national
society’.
Imperial legacy of the Indian subcontinent had led to the creation
of South Asian diaspora. During colonial period, India’s nationalist
leadership first turned its attention to the issues of Indian overseas as
Smita Tiwari 219
far back as 1890 (Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006: 82). Racial discrimination
and restrictive immigration policies in the colonies were forging emo-
tional bond between Indians overseas and emerging nationalist leader-
ship. Both groups considered themselves engaged in opposing colonial
regimes. Before independence, the Indian National Congress (INC)
demanded equal rights and status to the Indian nationals with the
local people of the land (Sahadevan, 1995). The British had the inter-
est in only replacing ‘slavery’ by recruiting ‘indentured’ labour from the
Indian subcontinent (Dubey, 2003). Until 1908, the Congress ardently
asked the Imperial government to adopt a tough attitude towards those
self-governing colonies which were ruthlessly dealing with Indian inter-
ests by denying them their just rights as the citizens of the Empire
(Zaidi, 1985). In its annual sessions in 1911 and 1912, the INC asserted
its solidarity with Indian settlers in Africa, and in 1916 at Lucknow, it
expressed its ever growing sense of dissatisfaction at continued ill treat-
ment of Indian settlers (Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006: 83). The Congress also
raised the issue of their conditions of labour. For the INC leadership,
the cause of Indians overseas was an extension of the anti-imperialist
struggle in other parts of the empire and presented an opportunity
to highlight colonialism’s underlying racist dimension. In 1929, the
INC institutionalized this aspect by setting up an Overseas Department
under Jawaharlal Nehru, who showed special interest in international
affairs (Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006). The 38th Indian National Congress
Annual Session in December 1923 declared that unless India became
independent, the grievances of Indian diaspora could not be properly
remedied (Tinker, 1993).
On the other hand, the expatriate Indians also made a contribution
to the movement for independence. The Indian community published
papers and generated political and public opinion in America to favour
India’s freedom struggle (Sheffer, 1986: 111). Funds from the diaspora
supported the movement, demonstrating that the solidarity was mutual
(Lall, 2001). At the same time, several efforts were made to improve
the condition of Indian nationals abroad, but nothing substantial was
achieved. Even Gandhi, who initially made India’s diaspora a major
issue, shifted his energy towards gaining freedom from British rule
(Sheffer, 1986). Hence, the attainment of India’s independence was con-
sidered as a pre-condition for the effective protection and improvement
in the status of Indians abroad. The settlement of the problems of Indian
community abroad was set to decide on the basis of ‘mutual agreement
with independent countries’ (Zaidi, 1985: 118). Thus, the first half of
the twentieth century marked the beginning and strengthening of a
vital ideological link between Indian political leadership and overseas

Indians.
Post-colonial policies
India’s independence in August 1947 was a result of the long-term strug-
gle of Indians against British colonialism. All Indians contributed in this
struggle, whether they resided in India or elsewhere. India’s indepen-
dence was a matter of delight among Indian emigrants, because they
were still ruled by British. They hoped that India’s independence would
bring a relief to their plight. Contrary to the expectations of expatriate
community, the Indian independence in 1947 did not prove to be any
relief to their miserable condition (Lall, 2001). India’s policy towards
them changed after the withdrawal of the colonial power. India’s for-
eign policy makers adopted a policy which was different from the policy
of pre-independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, after taking the leadership of
India in post-independence, advised the expatriate community of India
to be loyal to their country of residence in order to maintain national
sovereignty, amicable international relations, non-interference in the
affairs of other nations and for the pursuit of non-alignment. He not
only excluded the issue of expatriate Indians from Indian foreign and
domestic policy formulation but also actively encouraged the diaspora
to integrate into their host societies (Lall, 2003). This happened even in
the ‘face of persecution and expulsion’ (Singh, 1979) of overseas Indians.
As in the case of Kenya, Uganda, Fiji and Burma, the Government of
India showed its helplessness to favour the overseas community (Lall,
2001).
After India gained independence, the definition of India shifted from
an identity based on nationalism to an identity based on territory (Lall,
2001). Nehru maintained that Overseas Indians should decide whether
they would continue as Indian nationals or adopt the nationality of the
country of their domicile (Sahadevan, 1995). He further stated ‘if they
opted for the former, all they could claim abroad was most favoured
alien treatment’ (Lok Sabha Debate, 1957).4 He added ‘if they opted
for the latter (i.e. foreign nationality), they should be given all rights
of citizenship and India’s connection with them will be cultural and
not political’ (Lok Sabha Debate, 1957).5 This way Nehru had made ‘the
expatriate Asians aliens in a legal sense’ (Lall, 2001), and their status
did not allow for any special relationship between them and the Indian
state.
In the case of Pakistan (integrated), post-independence scenario was
one of changed realities. Pakistan emerged as a new nation and got
Smita Tiwari 221
involved in the process of nation-building. The old diaspora, who

migrated from the Indian subcontinent, largely remained India-centric
in terms of expectations. The political condition of South Asia, at the
time of partition, was such that the overseas community did not find
a place in the foreign policy formulations of India or Pakistan. For
Pakistan, domestic challenges to integrate its diverse population were
equally high as a self-perceived threat from a neighbouring country. Fur-
ther, its alliance with the United States during the Cold War period made
it economically and militarily secure. Thus, at that time, assistance from
overseas Pakistanis was not an urgent need. Though the era of the 1950s
and then 1970s witnessed a significant flow of economically motivated
Pakistani emigrants towards Europe and West Asian countries, there was
hardly any initiative in terms of policy formulation.
Although Bangladesh came into existence only in 1971, by this time
it had developed strong ties with West Asian countries. At the time of
the country’s independence in 1971, the size of Bangladeshi migrants
was not more than 300,000 (Chowdhury, 2012). A vast majority of
them were from the north-eastern district of Sylhet, with its strong and
historical migratory culture. This expatriate community contributed sig-
nificantly to the independence movement of Bangladesh in 1971 by
strongly lobbying for support among the British and American polit-
ical parties and media, as well as raising funds (Chowdhury, 2012).
By the time Bangladesh gained independence, overseas communities or
diaspora itself started gaining attention at national and international
levels.
Thus, policies towards diaspora in South Asia, during the Cold War
period, were governed by several internal as well as external compul-
sions. Whereas India shaded its pre-independence connection with its
diaspora, Pakistan and Bangladesh were yet to develop a relationship
with their overseas. This period is marked by ‘brain-drain’, without
much effort from any country to control or regulate it.
New diaspora policies

In the post-Cold War period foreign policies of South Asian countries
have undergone a drastic change. Several domestic and international
incidents took place which compelled India to reformulate its for-
eign policy and which motivated Pakistan and Bangladesh to start a
comprehensive policy for their overseas communities. As the world
developed, changing from a bi-polar to multi-polar place, emphasizing
on economic aspects rather than political, a shift in domestic policy
of South Asian countries took place in the light of global changes.
The foreign policies priorities changed from global and ideological to

regional and realistic. The closed South Asian economy was opened rel-
atively due to domestic compulsions. This made an impact on their
policies towards diaspora. The objectives behind new diaspora policies
were to strive on economic development, to find a place in the changed
global environment and to utilize changed diaspora profile for scientific
and technological know-how.
Change not only was noticed in the foreign policy of these coun-
tries but it was also clearly visible in the diaspora’s profile, particularly
NRIs. Wherever they were settled, they were influential in economy, ser-
vices, academics, politics, health sector, entrepreneurship and so on.
Huge salaries, higher education, professional skills and technological
advancement made them settled and secure enough to look back to their
country of origin and to contribute to its development.
Political dimension
There is a long history of diasporas engaging in political activities in the
country of origin. They participate in the politics of the country of origin
in variety of ways. They influence the politics through policy changes –
in particular, on issues and areas where the diaspora has strong eco-
nomic interest, and if it enjoys legitimacy and points of contacts with
decision-making elites, their influence increases further (Kapur, 2010).
Additionally, they can affect politics in the country of origin by way of
financial contributions to the parties and the candidates. The impact of
these contributions depends on their relative magnitude as well as on
the groups and parties to which they are made. The general claim is
that people in diaspora have a greater average income than those in the
country of origin, and this increased income gives them greater finan-
cial capacity to influence the politics of their country of origin. However,
the possibility that diaspora might finance and support relatively more
extremists’ organizations makes this aspect of diasporic involvement
in the country of origin’s politics both more significant and politically
more dangerous (Kapur, 2010).
The advent of BJP-led NDA government brought about a radical shift
in the policies of the Government of India. The PIO Card was launched
by the Ministry of Home Affairs in March 1999 to reinforce the emo-
tional bonds of Indians who have made other countries their home,
but who are still willing to renew their ties with the land of their ori-
gin. In September 2000, the NDA government constituted a High Level
Committee (HLC) on Indian Diaspora. The Committee was expected
to look after the role of diaspora in India, the rights and facilities
Smita Tiwari 223
extended to them and also examine the conditions of their existence,

including their rights in the countries of their residence. One of the
compulsions behind the appointment of the HLC and the high-profile
attention given to the NRI and PIO issue is the apparent lack of interest
among Indians abroad in investing in India. The HLC recommended
celebration of Pravasi Bhartiya Diwas (PBD). A new ministry – the
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) – was established in 2004.
The MOIA is the nodal Ministry for all matters relating to overseas
Indians comprising PIOs, NRIs and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI).
The Mission of the Ministry is to promote, nurture and sustain a mutu-
ally beneficial and symbiotic relationship between India and overseas
Indians.
Further, in response to long and persistent demand for ‘dual citizen-
ship’, particularly from the diaspora in major industrialized countries,
the Government of India has started an innovative Overseas Citizen-
ship of India (OCI) Scheme. Under this scheme, the PIOs are granted
Indian citizenship and get all benefits, but they cannot vote in Indian
elections and cannot hold constitutional posts such as President, Vice-
President, Judge of Supreme Court and High Court (Gangopadhyay,
2005). Political rights constitute core or fundamental element in the
concept of citizenship. But this innovative scheme cleverly promotes
and facilitates economic investment from overseas Indian community
without providing them political rights. Several other schemes such as
Diaspora Knowledge Networks (DKNs), Know India Programme (KIP),
Scholarships Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC), Bilateral Secu-
rity Agreements (BSAs) and Protection of Emigrants against Exploitation
in Gulf are being considered as major steps to involve Indian diaspora.
Recently, extending voting rights to the NRIs has also been considered
by the Government of India. In the last decade, the transformation of
the ideological climate in India and the success of the diaspora, espe-
cially in the United States, have instilled much greater confidence in
both. The resulting lack of defensiveness has been an important rea-
son for the growing links and stronger bonds which have transformed
relations between India and its diaspora.
The Government of Pakistan has also taken some major initiatives
to integrate its diapsora in its development programmes. Realizing the
importance of Pakistani diaspora and to give them their due status, the
Government of Pakistan has upgraded the Overseas Pakistanis Division
into the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis in November 2008. Accord-
ingly the Ministry has formulated a Draft National Policy for Overseas
Pakistanis. The main emphasis of the policy is to give due respect
to Overseas Pakistanis, utilize their knowledge, skills, experience and

expertise in our National economy and development. Further, National
Identity Card for Overseas Pakistani (NICOP) and Pakistan Origin Card
(POC) have been issued to Pakistani diaspora. The Overseas Pakistanis
Foundation (OPF) was established in July 1979 with the objective to
advance the welfare of the Pakistanis working or settled abroad and
their families in Pakistan by identifying their problems and contribut-
ing to their solutions. The Government of Pakistan has also proposed a
National Emigration Policy in 2009, which is still under consideration.
The Government of Bangladesh, with the intention to facilitate and
to assist those who were migrating to work with the construction indus-
try in Middle East countries with the process of migration, has created
a separate Ministry of Overseas Employment and Expatriate Welfare
(Chowdhury, 2012). Several other initiatives have been taken by the
government in terms of economic incentives to harness diasporic invest-
ments as well as remittances. It was mandated to organize short-term
migration, negotiate memoranda of understanding with the host coun-
try and upgrade worker skills through 37 mostly newly opened training
centres (Chowdhury, 2012). Remittances from the workers going abroad
were very high. Officials and media, in Bangladesh, began to refer
to these workers as the nation’s ‘unsung heroes’ (Chowdhury, 2012)
(Table 11.1).
Economic dimension
The South Asian diaspora constitutes an important and unique force
in the world economy. In recent years, it is playing a growing role in
its source economy. Its contributions include long-term investments,
technology and knowledge transfer in fields such as science, IT and
medicine, influencing host country companies to enter into joint ven-
tures and technology licensing arrangements with companies in their
countries of origin. The money that migrants send home is impor-
tant not only to their families but also to their country’s balance of
payments. In many developing countries, remittances represent a sig-
nificant proportion of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as
foreign exchange earnings (see Table 11.2). While skilled migration con-
tinues and has been on the rise in the past few decades, the thinking
on such flows has shifted significantly, away from the concept of brain
drain to concepts of brain gain, brain exchange and brain circulation.
More and more countries are now looking at their skilled overseas
diaspora as an asset that can be tapped for economic, social, cultural
and political gains.
Smita Tiwari 225
Table 11.1 Strategic dashboard of policies for diaspora engagement
Diaspora Status of policies

engagement
action India Pakistan Bangladesh
Flexible No dual citizenship, Dual citizenship Dual citizenship

citizenship laws, PIO and OCI Card in 16 countries;
residency and Scheme NIC, NICOP, POC
visa schemes
Political rights Restoration of voting In demand In demand
rights for NRIs
Special property PIO and OCI cards NA NA
rights give right to
purchase property in
India (except farm
and plantations)
Tax incentives Reduced customs Provision for Provision for transfer
duty regime for transfer of funds of funds and tax
transfer of residence and tax exemption
of overseas Indians, exemption
provisions for
transfer of funds for
philanthropy and tax
exemption
Portable SSAs (Social Security NA SSAs (Social Security
benefits Agreements) benefits Agreements) benefits
for workers and for workers in Gulf
professionals abroad
General laws Special incentives for Economic Economic incentives,
bank deposits, incentives, special provisions for NRBs
investments in share provisions for for FDI
markets, special overseas
provisions for FDI Pakistanis for FDI
Source: Didiar Singh, A. (2012) ‘Diaspora for Development – Policy Perspectives from India’,
Working Paper No. 376, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, available at http://
www.iimb.ernet.in/research/sites/default/files/WP%20No.%20376.pdf, accessed in Novem-
ber 2012.
(The table has been revised in the South Asian Context).
India has provided special savings, investment schemes and instru-

ments for their non- resident population to bring in capital in various
forms into their home countries. These instruments include non-
resident local as well as foreign currency accounts and bonds which
offer attractive interest rates and tax benefits to facilitate investments
and savings by the diaspora population (Chanda, 2008). NRIs have been
Table 11.2 Top remittance-receiving countries in South Asia
World ranking Countries USD (in billions) Remittances as a

share of GDP (%)
1 India 70 3.4
7 Pakistan 14 5.8
8 Bangladesh 14 10.9
Source: Migration and Remittances Factbook 2012 and Migration and Remittance
Data, Development Prospects Group, World Bank, available at www.worldbank.org/
prospects/migrationandremittances.
permitted to move capital freely between their home and host countries
without much bureaucratic constraint. There are, for instance, non res-
ident ordinary accounts in rupees (NRO) which are non-repatriable
as well as repatriable non-resident external accounts in rupees (NRE),
and repatriable foreign currency non-resident accounts (FCNR) (Min-
istry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2010). The two latter accounts enable
NRIs to bring in large sums of money to start businesses in India and
be exempt from taxes on interest earnings. Portfolio investments have
also been facilitated for NRIs by making income from such invest-
ments repatriable and by not requiring NRI investors to report their
transactions to the Reserve Bank of India (Ministry of Overseas Indian
Affairs, 2010). As a result of such incentives and schemes, through the
1990s and also in recent years, the skilled Indian diaspora population
has remitted and invested substantially through the formal banking
channels and through the stock market. For example, the Reserve
Bank of India launched instruments such as the Resurgent India Bonds
scheme in 1998 and the India Millennium Deposits scheme in 2000
(Chanda, 2008).
The role of the Indian diaspora with regard to FDI has been much
smaller than in the case of remittances and deposits. According to
official estimates, during 1991–2001, the amount of NRI investment
approvals stood at US$ 2.5 million or a little under 4 per cent of total
FDI approved during this period (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs,
2010). Actual FDI by NRIs accounted for a little over 9 per cent of actual
FDI inflows and for 37 per cent of total FDI approvals. This discrep-
ancy between approvals and actual inflows from NRIs and the rather
limited role of the NRIs in total FDI flows has been attributed to vari-
ous bureaucratic and procedural reasons and lack of policy clarity. The
single biggest beneficiary of FDI by the Indian diaspora has been the
IT and BPO industry. The Indian diaspora has provided start-up capital
Smita Tiwari 227
to this industry and helped mobilize capital from well-established

entrepreneurs.
One sector where the trade impact is clearly visible is India’s IT sector.
During the 1990s, nearly 96 per cent of India’s software services exports
were from the on-site provision of IT services (Chanda, 2008). Many of
these IT providers remained behind in the United States. The emergence
of an Indian IT diaspora in the United States during the 1990s combined
with the earlier generations of Indian engineers who had settled in the
United States helped in the growth of India’s software services exports
as this overseas community provided contracts to Indian IT companies,
provided seed capital, influenced their companies to set up operations in
India and aided the off shoring of various back-end operations to India
and thus growth in India’s BPO exports (Chanda, 2008).
The contribution of Pakistani diaspora collectively and individu-
ally goes far beyond just crucial financial assistance to the national
economy. By a 2010 estimate, Pakistani diaspora remitted over US$
8 billion through legal transactions to Pakistan (Akbar, 2011). After
exports, worker remittances are the highest source of foreign exchange
for their homeland (Akbar, 2011). In Pakistan’s diaspora perspectives,
remittances gain a place of eminence because of the crucial role
they have come to play in Pakistan’s challenged economic structure.
Pakistan’s economy has benefited a great deal from foreign exchange
remitted by its emigrants (both diasporas and short-term contractual
labour workers), as they have sent back around US$ 70 billion since 1970
till 2007 (State Bank of Pakistan, 2009). From 1978 onwards remittances
started stagnating, which continued for long almost till 2001. Pakistanis
abroad, however, expressed their commitment in another way. They
opened foreign currency deposit accounts in the reformed banking
sector of Pakistan and raised the level of banking asset to 12 billion
dollars by May 1998, when the Nawaz Sharif-led government decided
to explode nuclear bombs in response to similar action from India
(Akbar, 2011). Presently, Pakistani diaspora is the biggest asset and is
contributing for the development of the country in various fields.
The demand for skilled and professional personnel is increasing.
These are one of the major sources of the foreign currency earning
that maintains balance of payment in Bangladesh. So the government
should give more emphasis to increase the flow of remittances. To boost
the flow of remittances the government should establish more tech-
nical institutes, develop new foreign policy, encourage the utilization
of remittances in productive investment and create enabling environ-
ment to invest remittances in capital market. But Bangladesh is still far
behind to export skilled and professional personnel than some other
top remittance-recipient countries. The major future challenges that are

identified for Bangladesh in harnessing remittances for economic devel-
opment are lack of skilled and professional personnel, foreign policy,
utilization of remittances in non-productive investment and regulatory
constraint for Micro-finance Institutes (MFIs) and Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to transfer remittances and offer diversified sav-
ings and credit products to families of migrants. The future growth of
Bangladesh will depend on promoting export, sustaining remittances
and triggering FDI.
Conclusion
Countries (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) are keen to exploit their

potential. Because of this, several diaspora-engaging policies have been
initiated by these countries. The new policies certainly have doses of
pragmatism that are trying to economically and politically harness the
South Asian network and resources that till now only existed in only
cultural domain through extended familiar relations and the nostalgic
search for roots. The socio-economic profile of South Asian diaspora
is also changing with their newly acquired financial strength. For the
governments and the people alike, the overseas community support
has come to stand for national economic development. The economic
consequences of diasporas have been mixed for India. The migra-
tion of less skilled labour (to Gulf countries) has had positive effects
because of large-scale migration and inflow of huge remittances. How-
ever, the migration of high-skilled people has had more ambiguous
consequences. Their cross-national networks facilitate flow of tacit infor-
mation, commercial and business ideas and technologies to India. The
loss of significant numbers of the highly skilled has had negative effects
as well. The political effects of diaspora creates opportunities as well as
challenges to India’s foreign policy, which depends on the combina-
tion of factors such as nature of country of settlement, the relationship
between Indian government and diaspora and the nature of India’s
domestic politics.
Policy changes in South Asia and global trends portend a potentially
large increase in international migration. There is a significant potential
for the diaspora to emerge as an important strategic asset for South Asia
in the foreseeable future. But for this to happen, South Asian countries
need to institute politically difficult policy changes. At the same time,
the diaspora needs to put its money as well as change its priorities on the
choice of strategic investments in the country of origin. Policies towards
Smita Tiwari 229
the diaspora have to be formulated with regard to policies towards other

foreigners and the country’s own residents so as to ensure that they
do not create opportunities for arbitrage that inadvertently subvert the
goals behind the policies.
Notes
1. http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf
2. Indentured System: It was a system of contract by which the emigrants agreed
to work for a given employer for a specific period and perform the task
assigned to him/her for a specific wage.
3. ‘Passage’ or ‘free emigration’: In this pattern, emigrations were not officially
sponsored, they themselves paid their passage and they were free in all the
sense that they were not bound by any contract.
4. http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/debates/DebateArchive.aspx
5. http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/debates/DebateArchive.aspx
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12
Pockets of the West: The
Engagement of the Virtual
Diaspora in India
Kiran Mirchandani
Introduction
I’m working in a very very different industry and I’m talking

to American people. I’m getting, you know . . . a touch of how
American life is.
The young man quoted above is amongst the 2.5 million workers
employed in Information Technology (IT) and IT-enabled service firms
in India (NASSCOM, 2008). The fastest growing segment of this labour
force are service workers, who communicate daily with customers in
the West, helping clients living in the United States, Britain, Canada
and Australia with transactions such as managing their insurance
plans, computer systems, phone plans and banking requests. Workers
employed in transnational corporations as call-centre workers in South
Asia are part of the ‘virtual diaspora’. Rather than physical relocation,
they engage in virtual migration as they live and work in their home
countries but in sites which are seen as pockets of the West. During
their long workdays (which are often nights in India), transnational call-
centre workers participate in networks, follow employment schedules
and serve customers in the West. This chapter explores the diasporic
engagement of these virtual migrants (Aneesh, 2006) with their ‘home-
land’. It is based on a qualitative study of customer service work-
ers employed by transnational corporations in three cities in India
(Mirchandani, 2012). I argue that these virtually diasporic workers
engage with and influence economic and social norms in South Asia in
important ways. Theorists have argued that the IT/ITES sector in India
has led to the emergence of a new middle class in India (Radhakrishnan,
231
232 Engagement of the Virtual Diaspora in India
2011) which not only has economic influence but also impacts broadly
held societal and cultural expectations of progress and success. Using
the experiences of IT/ITES workers as a starting point, I explore the ways
in which they form a virtual diaspora and challenge particular norms
while entrenching others in the homeland.
The notion of diaspora is, in many ways, useful to capture the expe-
rience of virtual migrants who, like physical migrants, are occupied
with issues of belonging, homeland and border crossing. Without leav-
ing their countries, they become people who ‘represent multiple loci of
identity’ (Ogden, 2008). Much of the literature on diaspora has focused
mainly on communities which have physically crossed national borders.
Such a focus on physical migration has fostered approaches to diaspora
which continue to prioritize the notion of a ‘scattered seed’, making
essential the country of origin. As a result of the often static construction
of host and home locations in diasporic studies, many of the debates
on diasporic engagement have been limited to economic analyses of
the value of immigrant human capital, philanthropy and remittances
(Sahoo and Patnaik, 2010). While these are important dimensions of
engagement, literature in the past decade has demonstrated the utility
of developing a more multifaceted notion of diaspora which allows for
better documentation of the multiple arenas of diasporic engagement.
In a provocative essay written close to two decades ago entitled
‘Diasporas Old and New’, Gayatri Spivak (1996) poses the question –
which are the groups that have historically been excluded from the
notion of ‘diaspora’ yet play a vital role in global processes? In her essay,
Spivak provides an example of such ‘strategic exclusions’, noting that in
Western feminism, ‘although diasporic third world women offer large-
scale support, through homeworking, to Italy’s post-industrial base,
and Benetton is one of the leaders in the field of post-fordist femi-
nization of transnationality, these women and this phenomenon were
never mentioned’ (Spivak, 1996). Spivak refers specifically to people
who participate in, and indeed enable the emergence of, the global
economy without physically migrating. Included in this group are
the virtual diaspora, who are traditionally excluded from notions of
diaspora because they do not physically migrate, but nonetheless cross
borders of home and away. Focus on these groups, I argue, allows for a
richer, more complete analysis of diasporic engagement.
In making this argument, I draw from a community of scholars who
have been exploring the notion of the diaspora ‘at home’. Charusheela,
for example, notes that ‘groups may enter the diasporic experience
without travelling’ (Charusheela, 2007: 279). Rather than the focus on
physical migration, the notion of diaspora can be used to refer to the
Kiran Mirchandani 233
ways in which people move across boundaries and ‘come to occupy

a place between two nations’ (Charusheela, 2007: 284). She describes
occupying such a place as a Tamil woman in Mumbai where she
belonged to a city which was not her home. In the context of the Shiv
Sena-ization of Mumbai, Tamilians were seen to be backward and tra-
ditional as well as accused of stealing jobs from legitimate Bombayites.
Such a construction, supported by state, media and schooling curric-
ula, led to Charusheela’s experience of existing on the wrong side of
the boundary of the image of the modern, West-oriented, cosmopoli-
tan city core. As a result, she experienced Bombay much like many
immigrants to the West, and she describes this experience as ‘a classic
immigrant/diasporic experience’ (Charusheela, 2007: 293). She shows
how boundaries between nations can, in fact, occur within a nation.
Exactly such a process occurs in transnational service work in India,
where workers migrate daily into a space overtly constructed as modern
and Western during their working hours. Rituals such as transportation
by van, identity checks to access heavily guarded offices, the use of
pseudonyms and the celebration of Western holidays mark this journey.
As a CEO of a large Indian IT firm comments, ‘when you come to our
campus [workplace], you are leaving India behind’ (Nadeem, 2009: 108).
Aneesh (2006) characterizes this process of ‘leaving India behind’ in
transnational service work as ‘virtual migration’ and notes that it has
a very different relationship to both home and host nations compared
to more conventional forms of labour migration. He notes that under
the system of virtual migration, ‘labour bypasses the state borders while
the immigrants’ body stays within national temporal spaces’ (Aneesh,
2006: 65). Workers therefore migrate and remain simultaneously, and, in
this, perform ‘border work’ in relation to both the nation to which they
migrate and the nation within which they stay. Exploring the engage-
ment of virtually diasporic communities with their ‘homelands’, with
which they have daily, immediate, constant connection due to their
physical proximity, allows for a consideration of how ‘home’ is experi-
enced, borders are created and exclusion and inclusion exercised. In the
sections below, diasporic engagement and its limits are explored, based
on a study which focused on the experiences of transnational customer
service (call-centre workers) in India.
Methods
This study is based on a decade of field research in India which includes

100 interviews with call-centre workers, trainers, team leaders and
human resource managers. Compared to software programmers, these
workers often have less specialized education and hold more routine and
structured jobs. While programmers may work with stable teams with
colleagues in the West, call-centre workers’ encounters with Westerners
occur through minute-long telephone conversations where they provide
support for products or services. Often workers adopt Western names to
make it easier for customers to pronounce them, and spend considerable
effort speaking in American, British or convent Indian accents which
are deemed easy to understand. In these ways, their work processes,
spaces and performance expectations are explicitly defined as ‘Western’,
and they follow the clocks and calendars of their customers – working
at night and celebrating Christmas and Thanksgiving. As Poster notes,
working in Indian call centres necessitates a host of activities broadly
characterized as ‘national identity management’ (Poster, 2007, p. 271).
This includes adopting an American accent, using a Western alias and
becoming familiar with American popular culture. Workers are required
to construct appropriate self-identities as part of their jobs. Many are
known by one name and speak in a particular way at home, and are
known by another name and speak in a different way at work. Their
diasporic journeys occur on a daily (or nightly, since many work in night
shifts) basis.
Data were collected through in-depth, qualitative interviews con-
ducted between 2001 and 2011. Workers were contacted through news-
paper advertisements and they were free to share their experiences in a
non-organizational space with complete anonymity. The focus of inter-
views was on how workers constructed and experienced their work, and
their engagement in local and transnational communities. Of the inter-
viewees 54 were men and 46 women, and three-quarters of the sample
comprised of front-line customer service workers (those taking calls).
Workers provided customer support in a wide range of sectors such as
technical help with computers and internet connections, bill collection,
insurance claims, credit card inquiries, catalogue sales, airline reserva-
tions and bank transactions. They were employed in a wide range of
organizations in New Delhi, Pune and Bangalore. Workers described
their career histories, the nature of their work, the training they received
and their work processes and experiences.
Almost all the 78 front-line call-centre workers interviewed were sin-
gle and in their twenties; however, even within this group there were
demographic diversities in terms of class and regional backgrounds.
Three workers were over 30, and 9 were married or engaged. In addi-
tion, most respondents had bachelor’s degrees, and several had master’s
degrees or additional diplomas. Interestingly, however, this tendency
towards higher education was much lower in interviews conducted in

the latter years of this project when many workers reported that they
started their jobs after completing high school. In terms of their com-
pensation, workers earned between Rs 5,500 and Rs 30,000 per month
(US$120–US$650). On average, entry-level workers in international call
centres earn three times the monthly Indian minimum wage. They earn
twice as much as high school teachers, accountants or marketing profes-
sionals with a graduate degree. Workers earn a fraction of the earnings of
their counterparts doing similar work in the West, although wage differ-
entials between Western and Indian call-centre workers are reported to
be diminishing with the increasing prominence of immigrant workers
in low-wage call-centre jobs in the West. Of the 78 front-line call-
centre workers interviewed for this project, 43 were men and 35 were
women.
Defining modern and traditional
Bright, well-lit workplaces with impressive, heavily guarded and spotless

entrances comprise call-centre workers’ places of work. Most workers
work at night when customers in the West are awake. Workers’ bags
are checked upon entry, and all those who gain access to the organiza-
tional site (managers, clients, workers, cleaners, security guards, visitors,
etc.) are tracked and name-tagged. In the context of the widespread
prevalence of security and surveillance in many Western societies, these
strategies are familiar to potential clients. The physical space of organi-
zations, associated with modern North American architecture in both
scale and cleanliness, is no doubt one of the central mechanisms
through which contracts are obtained and call-centre jobs are con-
structed as desirable. Such space also, however, serves to distinguish
the call-centre environment from the local Indian context. As Shashi
Tharoor (2007) notes:
The call centre has become the symbol of India’s newly globalised
workforce: while traditional India sleeps, a dynamic young cohort
of highly skilled, articulate professionals works through the night,
functioning on US time under made-up American aliases, pretending
familiarity with a culture and climate they’ve never actually experi-
enced, earning salaries that were undreamt of by their elders (but a
fraction of what an American would make) and enjoying a lifestyle
that’s a cocktail of premature affluence and ersatz westernisation
transplanted to an Indian setting.
Indeed, the physical infrastructure of many large corporate offices serves

to emphasize their distinction from their Indian setting. Buildings have
impressive glass facades, marbled interiors and immaculate washrooms
with detailed cleaning schedules prominently posted. Some companies
are housed within IT parks with perfectly manicured lawns. Others are
in buildings which jar in their extravagance in relation to structures
around them. Surrounding these Western ‘transplanted’ spaces is the
Indian setting which stands in stark contrast. Basic infrastructural prob-
lems such as poor roads, improper drainage, unorganized waste disposal
and temporary housing are rampant. With little improvement in public
infrastructure, IT/ITES buildings provide an inescapable visual reminder
of urban inequality. As noted by Tharoor in the quote above, IT/ITES
firms symbolize the ‘modern’, which is surrounded by the backward
‘traditional India’. Workers cross these boundaries between modern and
traditional daily, having enough English-medium education and expo-
sure to work in transnational firms, but not earning enough to entirely
escape their Indian settings. Those who migrate to cities without fami-
lies for their jobs often live in hostels, sharing their rooms with three or
four others. While some have the opportunity to spend much of their
income on the same leisure activities as their customers in the West, oth-
ers are sole income earners who support families in one-bedroom flats,
and live all parts of their non-work lives within the ‘traditional India’
to which Thadoor refers. Workers rely on van services for transportation
to and from work – a perk which can add hours to their workday given
the unpredictable road conditions. In their diasporic journeys between
home and work, therefore, workers also travel between traditional and
modern on a daily basis.
Gendered migrations
These constructions of spaces of tradition and spaces of the modern are

overlaid with social norms associated with home and work. Women and
men migrate daily between their homes and their workplaces, moving
between cultures deemed ‘traditional’ at home (joint or nuclear fami-
lies where women hold responsibilities for household work) to cultures
deemed ‘gender neutral’ at work (where gender is said to matter little
and individual achievement and entrepreneurism is valorized). Both
in terms of spatial structures and in terms of social norms, workers
make sense of their migration by often referring to it as a movement
between traditional and modern. Naming the ‘home/homeland’ as tra-
ditional, however, not only serves to characterize it as backward, but
also limits the potential to challenge gender divisions of labour which

situate women as caregivers. It leads to a situation where women claim
their right to engage in paid work in call centres and spend considerable
energy dispelling the conventional association between night work and
sex work, but yet many are unable to challenge the gendered assign-
ment of domestic work, where women are expected to take on primary
responsibility for marriage and family work.
Despite the glamour of the IT/ITES sector in India as well as the
relatively well-paid employment in the sector, there remains a social
stigma associated with customer service work, particularly since it occurs
primarily at night. Workers spend a considerable amount of energy dis-
pelling negative social perceptions about call-centre work. One young
woman reflects:
Even after so many years, call centres in India socially is not accepted
as a mainstream job. Even today when we say we are working in a
call centre they see it as a part time job . . . They don’t take it seriously.
They don’t say that this person is very serious about his career or
something . . . [People] feel like anybody can do this job. This is not
true at all.
Other workers report that call centres are often seen as organizations
which sanction consumerism, partying, close interaction between sexes,
promiscuous behaviour, smoking and drinking. Many women report
needing to challenge these stereotypes held by parents and other family
members:
[My parents] did not agree for me to join a call centre . . . Once they
got to know that it was a call centre job and I have to go for night
shift and all, initially, they were reluctant. They didn’t want me to go,
they were like, how can you manage night shift. Your lifestyle will be
changed altogether . . . Only when I told you have lots of security and
I have my [childhood] friend . . . they were like, OK.
Women note that transportation and high security appease parents’

fears, but call centres continue to be perceived at best as transitional
employment, as noted by one worker in her mid-twenties:
We were a conservative family. [My mom], in the beginning was a

little bit nervous. She was a person who won’t allow me to go out
of the house at all . . . [Now] my parents are actually forcing me to
get married . . . I convinced them I am not getting married right now,

I need some more time.
In these ways, women working as call-centre agents continually nego-

tiate mobility/morality norms in dealing with resistance to their night
work (Patel, 2010). In 2008, a local radio station (Radio Mirchi) reported
that an AIDS control society had recommended the installation of
condom-vending machines in call centres. One woman comments on
this report:
I have friends where I live and [they] say that people who work in
BPOs are not good girls . . . I have people talking of moral ethics, like
people who work in BPOs coming late night . . . have you heard Radio
Mirchi? [They say] people should start wearing condoms, people
working in BPOs.
The historical association of night work and sex work is difficult to

shake:
In Indian society, if you tell somebody that you’re working in a call

centre, they look at you like, oh my God, because you’re working
at nights and everybody knows the kind of people who work there.
Nobody really, from the watchman to your neighbour to your par-
ents, nobody would really respect you so much if you’re working in
a call centre.
Workers challenge these assumptions by drawing attention to the

professional and respectable nature of their work. One woman reports:
It’s that serious, believe me. Where I work, I have to be in a trouser

and in a shirt every single day . . . you always have to be prim and
proper. You have to be your best, you have to look your best when
you go to work . . . [C]ome see the code of conduct. Come see the kind
of people there are. Come see the kind of discipline – you won’t find
it in any other organization.
One of the symbols of the progressive and professional nature of call-

centre workplaces is the professed gender equity in place. Both male
and female workers point to the fact that their organizations are, by and
large, gender balanced. Workers asked about the gender stratification in
their call centres say:
It’s OK. It’s equal. In the call centre it hardly matters. It hardly mat-
ters . . . Girls are there, [and] boys are there. No discrimination. You
are taken care [of] equally whether you’re a girl or boy. Doesn’t
matter . . . There’s no discrimination as such.
Workers stress that their professional organizational norms translate

into opportunities for merit-based advancement. As the worker below
explains, this is in stark contrast to norms in place in families:
Everyone is treated equally in call centres. See, even I am working in

the same post, she is a graduate, I am undergraduate. She is also work-
ing on the same post . . . [T]he best part of call centres which I like, you
know, there is no partiality. See, you belong to a same rule, I belong
to a same rule. There’s nothing called ‘Auntie, aap kar sakte ho mere
liye.’ [Auntie, can you do this for me?] No way! I never say: ‘Boss, can
I do this?’, ‘Boss, can I . . . do this?’ No. Call him name. He is elder to
you or younger to you. Forget it. All guys are equally treated. The best
part is that.
The employment networks based on kinship or caste are identified as

pre-modern and traditional, in contrast to professional, Western work
norms based on entrepreneurship and self-actualization. Family objec-
tions to gender mixing and night work are labelled as ‘conservative’ or
‘backward’ as expressed by a young woman who initially experienced
significant resistance to her job:
A few weeks it was little difficult. Because I was out at night and
especially, Gujaratis are supposed to be like a little, what do you say,
kind of backward people . . . So my mom was a little apprehensive. She
[said] How can you go late at night? What will the society say? And
all that stuff. But then again slowly and gradually they got used to it
again.
Rather than being defined by social norms, workers refer to work norms
identified as Western and modern which are based on individual per-
formance. One worker interviewed for this project who had travelled to
the United States for training observes:
I think the way they have set up the workspace is pretty much similar
to that they have in North America. Because I have seen offices in
North America, there’s not much of a difference. You have a monitor,
you have the whole setup in front of you, you have your own desk in
there, you have your own notice board.
This worker refers not only to the organizational order (where every-
thing has its place) but also to the opportunity for self-expression (where
one has one’s own notice board) which is part of one’s work as a
call-centre worker.
Workers do not, however, name their acceptance of Western leisure
activities and dress codes as a betrayal of Indian culture; rather, many
note that the expectation that they adopt Western accents or profes-
sional norms at work does not undermine Indian nationalism or culture.
One worker notes:
We Indian people have some great regards, we are being respected by

our tradition and culture. We have to maintain it. You are just talking
to an U.K. customer . . . you cannot adopt their culture. If you are in
India, you have to follow your culture.
It is possible to be a respectable call-centre worker (adopting Western

accents and organizational norms) and yet be a proud Indian. In a
similar way, one woman notes:
We may work in the American culture but the Indian human being
can never change. That’s what I believe. I would never change.
Though I dress up in a Western outfit like an American, but I am
an Indian I cannot change my way of thinking. Never.
As noted earlier, women feel particular pressure to ‘follow their culture’

and not to change ‘ways of thinking’. Many report needing permis-
sion from parents, in-laws and husbands to continue their employment.
One woman, who is engaged to be married, talks about the difficulty of
working at night, especially in the context of joint families:
[My in-laws] wouldn’t want me to work in the night shift . . . . Living

with parents, of course, that will be a problem . . . If someone’s com-
ing, they’ll want us to be at home . . . When it’s a new family you’re
going into, you don’t [pause], and, of course, my parents will never
want me to be in a call centre after marriage.
In defining themselves as proud Indians who can be trusted to under-

take night work within a transnational firm, women clearly distinguish
between professional and social norms. While they embrace Western

work norms whereby women and men work alongside one another in
a meritocracy-based structure, they also plan to follow Indian social
norms within which they expect to ask parents and in-laws for permis-
sion to continue with their employment. In this sense, women expect
gender-neutral treatment at work but do not extend this expectation to
their households.
As a result, call-centre workers with children note that they work
alongside men in the organization but experience little change in
the gendered expectations at home. One woman, with a young child
describes her schedule.
[I] reach [home] at 7:30 or 8:30 a.m., then, means I don’t sleep that
time. I have a kid. So . . . means like he goes to school. So I just like
help my mother-in-law . . . three or four hours go in household work,
like to clean the house, wash clothes, and all . . . In the afternoon,
I will have to sleep two or three hours. That’s it . . . My son comes from
school. So when he comes in, sometimes I have to take his home-
work also . . . After one or two years, we become irritable . . . . Like on
small issues, we get angry a lot . . . I am planning to now discontinue
this job.
Others who have household responsibilities report they rely on par-

ents or employing domestic workers. As Patel notes, although women
gain independence and access to income through their paid work in
call centres, there is little evidence that gendered divisions of household
labour are changing. Instead, elderly women in the household, such as
mothers and mothers-in-law, assume the role of household managers,
and domestic workers are frequently hired by those who can afford
this option. In the final analysis, Patel argues that ‘under the guise of
economic development and women’s liberation, the bodies of elderly
women are used to fuel the career aspirations of some younger women’
(Mukherjee, 2008; Patel, 2011). In line with this, rather than considering
a gendered sharing of household responsibility, men respond by express-
ing a desire for a stay-at-home wife to help out. A young man explains
his upcoming wedding as a household strategy to provide support for
his mother:
I usually try to avoid [the] thought of my mother especially

because . . . it’s crucial for us to work and me, my brother, and my
sister-in-law, all three of us are in call centres. And all three of us have
different timings. For a lady who is 65, and all three of us coming at
different timings and opening the doors for us is really troublesome.
Despite women’s economic gains, therefore, the reliance on parents and

domestic helpers further entrenches the devaluation of work associated
with social reproduction. While workers engage with and challenge the
gendered divisions of labour at work, and many in fact refer to their
gender balanced organizations with pride, there remain limited shifts
in the sharing of household work where women in India continue to
be expected to assume 90 per cent of household work. As Sudarshan
notes, women in India spend an average of 35 hours and men 4 hours
per week on care and household maintenance (Sudarshan, 2009). For
call-centre workers, the women’s diasporic journeys involve making
sense of daily transitions from gender expectations at home to gender
neutrality at work.
Given the expectation that women will continue to hold primary
responsibility for childcare and housework and as a result of their long
hours and night work, transnational IT/ITES workers rely heavily on
domestic workers as well as kin to manage their household and child-
care responsibilities. Transnational workers are required to learn the
importance of time discipline and performance measurement and they,
in turn, instil similar expectations on those they employ within their
homes. This trend has led to the greater professionalization of domes-
tic service which has traditionally been a highly informal, poorly paid
and unorganized sector in India (Raka and Qayum, 2009). The demand
for domestic workers from the transnational middle class has led to
the emergence of professional associations and agencies which serve as
employment agents and advocate for better wages for domestic workers.
Rather than feudal relations of servitude, domestic workers now often
operate as contract workers, changing the landscape of household work
in India as a whole. In this sense, women IT/ITES workers’ engagement
leads to a rethinking of women’s involvement in paid work across sec-
tors. Yet, it does not lead to a fundamental rethinking of the women’s
role in the household.
Conclusions
Recent theorists have noted that the term diaspora has itself been ‘dis-
persed’ and has proliferated to mean a condition, a process as well
as a field of inquiry (Brubaker, 2005: 1–19). So too, must our under-
standings of diasporic engagement. Rather than a focus on a particular
pre-imagined and physically static homeland, Brubaker argues that three

characteristics unify the ideas captured under the term diaspora. First is
dispersion, which can propel people across national borders, or cause
them to remain within the borders of a nation. Second is a notion of
homeland, which can be real, imagined or culturally constructed. Third
is a process of boundary maintenance through which individuals distin-
guish themselves from those in the host land as well as those remaining
at home (Brubaker, 2005: 5–6). Rather than a narrow focus on migration,
diasporas have to be understood as movements that far predate contem-
porary immigration. Spivak asks, ‘What were the old diasporas, before
the world was thoroughly consolidated as transnational? They were the
results of religious oppression and war, of slavery and indenturing, trade
and conquest, and intra-European economic migration which, since the
nineteenth century, took the form of migration and immigration into
the United States’ (Spivak, 1996: 243). In this she provokes us to think
of diaspora as a phenomena which has a much longer history, and
much more complex composition than just the physical immigration
of workers across national borders.
Many writers have noted that the diasporic experience often involves
the drawing of, making sense of, and negotiating borders. These bor-
ders, which frequently take the form of divisions between that which
is classified as modern and that which is classified as traditional, are
deeply embedded within social relations. Anthias (1998) observes that
disaporic communities enter into and affect social relations of gender,
race and class, and these communities are formed in relation to these
mechanisms of social stratification. Charusheela reflects on the creation
of borders within Mumbai by observing that coolies born and brought
up in Mumbai remain excluded from the city’s cosmopolitan cultures.
With the Shiv-senization and influx of global capital in Mumbai, the
Muslim urban poor population historically based in the city did not
cross a national border but yet the border “crossed them” ’ (Charusheela,
2007). In a similar way, Brah puts forward the notion of a ‘diasporic
space’ which comprises both those who move and those who do not.
She notes that there is an entanglement of genealogies of dispersion
with those of ‘staying put’ (Brah, 1996). Different groups of workers
move and ‘stay put’ in different ways. Transnational service workers stay
nationally put but also cross national borders. In their staying and cross-
ing, they engage with their homelands by challenging or reifying class,
race or gender hierarchies.
While engagement has largely been conceptualized as a positive force,
and many times it is, diasporic communities, may, for also at times,
strive to enhance their class positions and in so doing entrench other

social norms within the homeland. Without doubt, transnational ser-
vice workers in India use their jobs to establish themselves as part of the
new middle class. Women and men transnational service workers who
comprise the virtual diaspora engage with their communities within
India to challenge traditional gender norms by constructing night work
as professional and respectable work for women workers. Yet, they chal-
lenge neither the patriarchal expectation that women should assume
the major responsibility for childcare and domestic maintenance nor
the class expectation that poor workers should be available to close the
caring gap which results from their long work hours and night work.
In the context of patriarchal assumptions about the association between
night work and sex work (Patel, 2010), transnational service workers
negotiate cultural norms to assert the safety of night space for middle
class, professional women, and advocate for women’s right to the public
sphere. They do this, however, in ways which re-enact and reassert the
distinction between the ‘modern/Western’ and the traditional through
their construction of their ‘work’ and ‘home’ spaces. In this context,
the ‘home’ becomes a space of refuge for the tradition and culture,
both of which are deeply imbued with notions of women’s responsi-
bility for the family. In the final analysis, in their engagement with
their homeland, these members of the virtual diaspora remain unable
to challenge, at least at present, the patriarchal social norms of social
reproduction.
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Index
Note: The letters ‘f’, ‘n’ and ‘t’ following locators refer to figures, notes and tables
abused women, 199 inter-generational differences, 61

academia, post-retirement, 46 migration, 57
academic exchange programme, 134 nationality, 67
academic migrants, 129–31 new media, 70
Adams, W., 127 official languages, 61
Adhikari, Jagannath, 162 personal involvement, 68
advancement political backgrounds, 64
professional, 80 population, 65
social, 6, 108 relationships between
technological, 222 immigrants, 61
Afghan Cultural and Family rigid religious regimes, 56
Association, 62 social networks, 70
Afghanistan Soviet invasion, 58
associations in Britain, 58 student association, 69
-born residents, 58 unemployment, 62
in Britain and Germany, 60–7; violent conflicts, 56
citizenship, 64–5, 67; labour Afghan Women’s Association, 68
market integration, 66; Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig, 6, 24, 28,
structure and agency, 67; 35, 119, 120, 121
working in low-skilled Ahmed, Meekal, 52
sectors, 66 Ahmed, S., 52, 84
citizenship, 65 Ahsan Ullah, A. K. M., 10, 103–22
community support initiatives, 63 aid
conflict-ridden history, 61 financial, 21
cultural events, 63 foreign, 113
cultural schemata and resources, 59 humanitarian, 36
dependency on aid, 57 AIDS control society, 238
development-oriented projects, 58 Ajmer, 180, 190
diaspora and agency, 58 Akalis, 190
engagements for change and Akbar, Muhammad-Najm, 227
development, 67–70 Al-Ali, N., 80
ethnic background, 64 Al-Arkam, 183
family background, 64 Alberts, H. C., 80
festive events, 63 Al-Ghazali, 183
first-generation immigrants, 68 Al-Hira Trust, 183
generational differences, 70 Al-Khidmat Foundation, 183
heterogeneous nature of Allard, M. D., 78
community, 69 alma mater, 92
identities, 65 Al-Qaeda, 43
immigrants, 66 altruism, 104, 111
246
Index 247
Alzheimer disease, 172 Baba Farid, 190

Amata Foundation, 203 Bagchi, A. D., 76
Amata Free Clinic, 203 Bakewell, O., 59, 72, 112
ambivalent identity, 105f balance of payments (BOP), 24, 227
American Association of Bangladeshi Bangladesh
Engineers and Architects, academic and scholarly ideas, 116
Inc., 136 academic diaspora, 126, 131–8;
American higher education, 77, 86, academic exchange programme,
89, 94 134; career promoters, 133;
Amritsar, 177–9, 189, 191 engagement of, 139t; ICT and
Anandakrishnan, M., 146 Internet, 134; intelligencia, 132;
Andheri-Hilfe (‘Help for Andheri’), 31 national innovation system,
Andhra Pradesh, 31, 34 131–2; remittances sent by
anecdotal evidence, 45, 50 migrant workers, 132; research
Aneesh, A., 231, 233 tradition, 131; scholarly
Angelo, Micheal, 4 publications, 134; scholarship
animation and gaming, 98n programme, 134; social network
Ansari, Sarah, 183 membership, 138; student
antagonisms, 177 exchange programmes, 132
Anthias, F., 243 activism, 113–17
anthropology, 157 ambivalent identity, 105f
social, 150 balance of payment, 227
anxiety disorders, 170 brain drain value rank position, 125
Arabian Sea, 147 building effective relationships, 121
armed intervention, 49 conceptual discourse, 104
Arseculeratne, S. N., 195, 209n3 conventional development
articulation, global, 86 linkage, 104
Asian Development Bank, 46, 174 corruption, 111
assets cross-cultural marriages, 106
foreign currency, 24 cultural correlates, 113–17
non-material, 14 cultural decay, 105–9
strategic, 13 cultural erosion, 114
assimilation technology, 107 cultural values and belief, 114
assimilation, theory of, 107 culture–development linkages, 113,
assistance 115f
financial, 227 development, 126–7, 131, 134,
free medical, 202 136–7, 140–1
governmental, 121 development impact, 105
international, 207 diaspora engagements, 120f
obligatory, 88 diaspora entrepreneurship, 118
Association of Haitian-Canadian diplomatic advocacy, 122
Engineers and Scientists, 119 dual citizenship, 119
asylum seekers, 78, 81 economy, 11
attachment engagement classified, 109
cultural, 114 familiarity of local culture, 118
psychological, 140 family ties, 104
re-awakened, 216 financial support, 121
Auqaf board, 189 forced marriages, 106
Ayurveda, 157 generation hierarchy, 107f
248 Index
Bangladesh – continued Bashi, V. F., 81

governmental barriers, 112 BCAS, see Bangladesh Centre for
government corruption, 111 Advanced Studies
hegemony, 113–17 BCS, see Bangladesh Civil Service
honour killing, 106 BDMAUK, see Bangladesh Medical
host-country-born individuals, 106 Association in the United
independence movement of, 221 Kingdom
investment climate, 110 BDRC, see Bangladesh Development
knowledge diaspora, 135, 138–9 Research Center
labour surplus, 124 beliefs, spiritual, 31
language of origin, 115–16 Bhagwati, J. N., 127
manpower exporting policy, 124 bhakti saints, 182
marriage migration, 106 Bhattacharya, G., 15n1
migrants, 132, 141, 221 Bhatti, Harvinder, 182
mobilization strategy, 119 BIISS, see Bangladesh Institute of
non-resident, 217 International and Strategic Studies
philanthropy patterns, 117 bilateral agreements, 218
political right, 119 bilateral security agreements, 223
positive image, 135, 138 Billah, M., 132
potential policy steps, 118f biodiversity
property rights, 120 hotspots, 150
public education, subsidized, 125 tropical, 151
publishing houses, 134 Birch, J. W. W., 195
remittances from economic Bisin, A., 107
migrants, 113 BJP-led NDA government, 222
reputation, 138 Bodhi Langka Ram Vihara, 196
resentment and Bolognani, Marta, 2
discontentment, 110 BPATC, see Bangladesh Public
skilled teachers shortage, 125 Administration Training Centre
social gatherings, 116 Brah, Avtar, 64, 176, 243
volatile political climate, 110 brain circulation, transnational, 126
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced brain drain, 9, 77, 85, 125–9, 132–3,
Studies, 137 214, 221, 224
Bangladesh Civil Service, 131 to brain gain, 11, 125
Bangladesh Development Research embodying, 112
Center, 137, 141 haemorrhaging, 44
Bangladesh Engineers Association, 115 migration, 127, 129
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 141 reverse, 128–9
Bangladesh Institute of International turning, 126
and Strategic Studies, 130 brain exchange, 224
Bangladesh Medical Association in the brain gain, 84–5, 126–9, 214, 224
United Kingdom, 136 skills circulation, 129
Bangladesh Public Administration Brazil, 124
Training Centre, 130 bribes, 110–11
Bangladesh University of Engineering Brickfields, 196–7, 205
and Technology, 136 BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
Bardhan, A. D., 93 South Africa), 124
Barfield, T., 57 Brinkerhoff, J., 167
Barth, A., 213 British colonialism, 183, 195, 220
Index 249
Brown, Judith M., 4, 15n1, 128 capital

Brown, M., 128 circulation of, 10, 75
Brubaker, R., 59, 242, 243 inflows, 26, 109
Buddhism, 194, 198 capitalism, 77, 97
Buddhist Channel, 207 advanced, 77
Buddhist chanting, 205 evolution in, 77
Buddhist concepts, 208 capital markets, 6, 213
Buddhist doctrine, 205 care
Buddhist funeral service, 202 medical, 10
Buddhist ideals, 207 palliative, 166
Buddhist identity, 206–7 cash cows, 119
Buddhist Maha Vihara, 198–200 Cassarino, J. P., 79, 80
Buddhist patrons, 198 Catholic Church, 21, 34, 181
Buddhist rituals, 202 Catholic nurses, 21, 36
Buddhist school, 206 Catholic priests, 31
Buddhist Society, 198, 202 Centre for Mental Health, 170
Buddhist teachings, 203 Cerase, F. P., 80
Buddhist temples, 12, 194–5, 197 Ceylon Pioneer Corps, 195
BUET, see Bangladesh University of CfC, see Connect for Change
Engineering and Technology Chakravartty, P., 76
bureaucratization, 184 Chamberlain, M., 95
Burki, Shahid Javed, 5 Chanda, Rupa, 226, 227
business Chan Pir, 189
agro, 94 charity organizations, 30
airline, 111 Charusheela, S., 232, 233, 243
domestic, 212 Cheng, L., 84, 86
garment, 111 China
non-technology, 76 diaspora policy, 129
private sector, 45 equitable development in, 6
transnational, 82–3, 88–9, 93, 96 skilled immigrants, 129
business process outsourcing, 98n and South Africa, 124
Butler, Kim D., 2 Chinese Buddhist, 208
Chinese deities, 196
calendric rites, 197 Chinese Diaspora, 167
call centres, 231–42 Chinese New Year, 199
agents, 238 Chinese temples, 196
gender stratification, 238–9 Chinmay Tumbe, 27
gendered expectations at home, 241 Chisti tombs, 190
international, 235 Chittagong, 111, 135–6
job, 235, 237 Chowdhury, Iftekhar A., 217, 221, 224
negative social perceptions, 237–8 Christou, A., 106
prevalence of security, 235 CIDA, see Canadian International
social norms, 239 Development Agency
workers, 13, 231, 233–5, 241–2 CIP award, 140
Cambodia, 201 Citibank, 41
Canadian International Development citizens
Agency, 119 dual, 5, 65, 67, 119, 140, 217, 223
capability approach, 5–6 extra-territorial, 218
capacity building, 218 self-sustaining, 202
250 Index
civil conflict, 112 crises

civil society, extended, 11, 135, 138 international, 199
Claire, M., 214 national, 127
Clarke, Colin, 4 Crosnoe, R., 97
classical music, 157 cross-border linkage, 80–1
Clifford, James, 2 cross-cultural knowledge building, 151
climate change, 134 cross-cultural marriages, 106
clinic Crown Colony, 195
free medical, 200, 202–3, 206 culinary arts, 202
mobile medical, 199 cultural decay, 105
closed-ended questions, 83, 105 cultural domain, 228
Cohen, Robin, 2, 59 cultural ecology, 114
Cold War period, 221 cultural erosion, 114
Collyer, M., 61 cultural events, 63, 163
Colombian Network of Researchers cultural fabric, 12
Abroad (Red Caldas), 129 cultural heritage, 155
colonialism, 216 cultural hybridity, 3
colonial plantations, 148 cultural objects, 146
colonial regimes, 219 cultural paradigm, 177
communities cultural values, 114
diaspora, 4, 243 current account deficit, 24
ethnic, 106 curricula development, 53
immigrant, 61 customer service work, 231, 234, 237
non-Afghan, 64
community development, 167
community feasts, 163 Daar, A., 81
community health-care centres, 171 Dadrawala, Noshir, 8
compulsions dastkari, 188
domestic, 222 Data Sahib, 182, 185
external, 221 David, H. Kent, 103, 109
condom-vending machines, 238 DeBernardi, Jean., 197
conflict situations, 180 debt repayment, 28
confused identity, 109 dementia, 172
Connect for Change, 164 demographic differences, 58
Connell, J., 76, 79 demographic diversities, 234
Constitution of India, 217 Deneulin, Severine, 183
construction industry, 224 Dera Sahib Gurdwara in Lahore, 189
consulting services, 98n De Silva, H. M. A., 196, 210n14
consumerism, 237 DESK, 158–9
conventional gender roles, 88 Deutsch-Indische Gesellschaft (DIG),
corruption, 48, 111–12, 117 31, 33
cosmopolitan character, 86 Dhammaratana, Ven. K., 198–200
cosmopolitan city core, 233 Ti-Ratana Welfare Organization, 199
cosmopolitan section, 196 welfare work, 198
cost-benefit analysis, 215 see also Buddhist Maha Vihara
Coward, Harold, 4 dharma propagation, 198
credit cards, 115 diaspora advocacy, 8, 14
credit products, 228 diaspora-centred partnerships, 7
Index 251
diaspora communities, 1, 6, 15, 20, donor-agencies, 1

56–8, 119, 145 donor-funded research, 49
South Asian, 2–3, 7, 14 donor governments, 34
Sri Lankan Tamil, 8 donor organizations, 53, 174
virtual, 13 Dossani, R., 76
diaspora engagement, 1–9, 11, 13–15, dress codes, 240
21, 37, 57, 120–1, 140, 145–6, Dual Nationality Bill, 51
159, 213–14, 216, 218, 225 Dubey, Ajay, 219
academic investigation of, 15 Duderija, Adis, 179
development implications, 5 Dufoix, Stephane, 2
forms of, 2, 5–8, 10, 14, 21 Dusenbery, Verne, 180
importance of, 13
motivation for, 4 East West University, 136
policy, 13, 218
e-commerce and web services, 98n
top-down attempts, 4
economic benefits, 214
trans-local activities of migrants, 4
economic consequences, 228
diaspora entrepreneurship, 7–9,
economic growth, 6, 77, 84–5, 98,
14, 118
108, 129, 140
diaspora-homeland relationship, 13
economic liberalization, 28
diaspora knowledge network, 129,
economic self-reliance, 167
137, 223
economy
diaspora mobilization, 119
global, 84, 127, 232
Diaspora Option theory, 126
knowledge based, 118
diaspora philanthropy, 8, 11,
education
14–15, 117
Buddhist, 201
diaspora policies, 2, 129, 218, 221–2
defined, 218 English-medium, 236
new, 222 excellent, 21
diaspora remittances, 113 internationalization of, 147,
diaspora volunteering, 7–8, 10, 14–15, 152, 155
164–5, 169, 173–4 language education, 62
Diaspora Welfare Bank, 140 nursing, 166
diasporic communities, 6, 71, 109, post-graduate, 87
206, 208, 212, 218, 233, 243 primary, 165
diasporic engagement, 46, 146–7, 149, standardizing, 151
156–8, 231–3, 242 technical, 136
Dickson, David, 128 Education For All (EFA), 166
diplomacy, 7 Elder, G. H., 97
disaster relief, 7, 12, 36, 183, 204 Eldridge, C., 81
diversity visa, 162 Emergence BioEnergy, 135
Divya Bala School, 34 emigrants, first-generation, 3
see also Indienhilfe in the European Union, 27
Diwali (Deepavali), 82, 199 motivated Pakistani, 221
see also India emigrating category, 112
domestic policy formulation, 220 Emirbayer, M., 58, 59, 67, 71, 72
donations employment agents, 242
monetary, 206 employment crisis, 119
private, 21, 35 employment differentials, 78
sizeable, 206 employment schedules, 231
252 Index
ENBS, see European Network of foreign direct investment, 20, 145, 213
Bangladesh Studies in China, 103, 109
energy sector, 36–7 India, 29t
engagement policy investing countries, 29t
cost–benefit analysis, 215 by NRIs, 226
economic dimension, 224–8 foreign exchange, 212, 224, 227
economic support, 214 foreign policy, 84, 150, 213, 220–2,
financial contributions through 227–8
remittances, 212 Friden, Jeffry A., 215
interest approach, 214 fundraising, 10, 167–8, 171, 221
low-skilled diaspora funds development projects, 119
community, 214
new diaspora policies, 221–2 gaddi nashins, 188
Gaillard, A., 126, 128
political dimension, 222–4
Gaillard, J., 126, 128
political support, 214
Gamlen, Alan, 2, 4, 214, 218
post-colonial policies, 220–1
Gandhi, Indira, 84
rational choice approach, 214–15
Gandhi, Mahatma, 219
remittances received, 214
Gangopadhyay, Aparajita, 223
social capital upgrading, 214 Garbin, D., 103, 104
engineering services, 98n Gardner, K., 5
entrepreneurism, 236 Geithner, Peter F., 4, 5, 6
entrepreneurship, 6–7, 9–10, 14, 30, gendered migrations, 236–42
76, 82, 89, 92, 111, 118, gender neutrality, 242
222, 239 German-Indian Round Table (GIRT),
global, 10, 89 9, 20, 28, 30
small-scale indigenous, 92 Germany
transnational, 76 Catholic nurses from Kerala, 36
environmental determinism, 114 Catholic priests from India, 31
Esman, J. Milton, 2 charity organizations, 20
Europe, NRI deposits in, 26t citizenship, 22, 34, 58, 65, 67
European Network of Bangladesh economic liberalization in 1991, 28
Studies, 137 Green Card initiative, 22–3
ex-Gurkha soldiers, 162 IGCC and the GIRT initiative, 28
see also Nepal Indian diaspora in, 21–3; academics,
22; business assistance, 28–30;
businessmen and traders, 22;
Fadzil, Kamal S., 199 business opportunities, 30;
Faisalabad, 188, 191 Catholic nurses, 21; charity,
Faist, Thomas, 3, 4, 75, 81 30–5; Christian Indians, 21;
faith-based organizations, 181 diplomatic relations, 21; FDI,
Fauser, M., 4 28–30; financial linkages
female community health between migrants, 25; foreign
volunteers, 170 currency non-resident bank
Findlay, A., 128, 129 accounts, 26; immigrant group,
folk dance, 157 22; Indians migrating, 23;
forced marriages, 106 investment facilitation, 28–30;
Foreign Currency Non-Resident NRE accounts, 26; NRI deposits,
(FCNR) accounts, 26, 226 23–8; nucleus of, 21;
Index 253
philanthropic initiatives, 30–5; Hazen, D., 80

professionals, 22; remittances, Helbig, J., 30
23–8; social projects, 30–5 Herberg, William, 179
-Indian parliamentary organization, Hewlett-Packard, 93
35–6 highly skilled individuals, 126
parliament, 35–7 Himalayan Development
non-resident Indian, 20 International, 11, 163–6, 169,
People of Indian Origin, 20 171, 173–4
political support, 35–7 Hinduism, 36
Ghosh, Papia, 2 Hinnels, John R., 4
Giddens, A., 146 Hirschman, A., 127
Gilmartin, David, 182 Holi, 82
GIRT, see German-Indian Round Table see also India
Global Diaspora Forum, 7 homeland, cross-border experiences, 3
global networks, 10 homeland development, 141
Goel, Balbir, 38n2 Home Town Associations, 4
Goel, Urmila, 21 Hong Kong, academic migrants, 130
Gold, S. J., 82, 84 honour killing, 106
Goldman Sachs, 124 Hope, Anne, 181
Goodhand, J., 57 Huang, C. Julia, 208
Goodwin, J., 58, 59, 71, 72 human capability approach, 5
Gorak Nath Dera, 178 human capital, 4, 77–9, 86, 127–9,
Gosalia, Sushila, 21, 22 131, 140, 232
Gottschlich, Pierre, 8, 20–38 human development index, 124
governmental assistance, 34 human empowerment, 6, 108
Grameen phone, 135 humanitarian aid, 58
see also Bangladesh Hussain, Nadeem, 48
Great Compassion Foundation, see hypocrisy, 49
Yayasan Maha Karuna
Green Card initiative, 22–3 IDEA, see Institute for Democracy and
Green Party, 36 Electoral Assistance
Gries, Marie-Luise, 23 IdEA, see International Diaspora
group boundary maintenance, 2 Engagement Alliance
group visas, 178 identity characteristic, 80
Gu, C. J., 81, 88 identity revivalism, 49
Gueron, J., 112, 113, 121 ideological climate, 223
Guha, P., 84 Iftikhar, Zainab, 125
Günsche, Karl-Ludwig, 30 IGCC, see Indo-German Chamber of
Guru Nanak, 178, 189 Commerce
IISAC, see International Institute of
Haas, de Hein, 145 Scientific and Academic
Hafiz-e-Quran, 186 Collaboration
Hall, Stuart, 176 ILO, 46
Haq, Zia ul, 41 IIT, see Indian Institutes of Technology
Harimandir, 179 IMF, 42, 46, 48, 50–2
see also Amritsar immigrants
Harvey, W. S., 76, 88, 98n6 first-generation, 61
Haub, C., 83 second-generation, 60–1, 64
Hausner, S. L., 172 skilled, 88, 129
254 Index
Immigration Act, 77 settlement in Germany, 21

immigration law, 77, 85 pro-business attitude, 84–5
INC, see Indian National Congress radical shift in policies, 222
income-based approaches, 14 remittance to, 25t
Indaratana, Ven. E., 202–6 repositioning, 148
Amata Free Clinic, 203 return/circular migration, 76
Buddhist funeral service, 202 returnee entrepreneurs, 76, 90t
cancer-counselling centre, 203 return migration, 78–82
diabetes centre, 203 since the 1980s, 84–5
disaster relief, 204 skilled immigrants, 129
free medical clinic, 202–3 social development of, 9, 27
old folks home, 203 social projects by Indo-German
ordination programme, 205 Society, 32t
Purān.a Rājamahāvihāra, 204 software services exports, 226–7
India structural changes in the private
BPO exports, 227 sector, 85
current account deficit, 24 traditional, 235
diaspora policy, 129 virtual diaspora, 13, 231
economic liberalization (1991), 28 VISA allocation preference, 77
equitable development in, 6 India Millennium Deposits
ethno-religious business scheme, 226
community, 95 Indian Institutes of Technology, 87
external economic relations, 85 Indian National Congress, 219
FDI inflows, 28, 29t Indian Nationals Overseas, 217
freedom struggle, 219 Indienhilfe (Help for India), 20, 31, 34
growth rate, 84 Indo-German Chamber of Commerce,
international remittance, 84 9, 20, 29
IT-BPO industries in, 83 Indo-Pak border, 12, 177–8, 191
IT-enabled service firms, 231 diaspora across, 191
labour force participation rate, 78 travel across, 177
macro-business environment, 95 Indo-Pak war, 176
migration; motives to US, 86t; Infosys, 93
rationale, 88; rationale for INO, see Indian Nationals Overseas
return, 89–97; education, 88; to Institute for Democracy and Electoral
United States, 77–8; women Assistance, 120
entrepreneurs, 88 Institute of Medicine, 169, 172
movement for independence, 219 institutional development, 171
nationalist leadership, 218 Intel, 93, 136
Christian, 21 International Diaspora Engagement
demographic characteristics, 83 Alliance, 7
elections, 223 International Institute of Scientific
emigrants, 26, 220 and Academic Collaboration, 11
engineers, 227 International Organization for
family in Germany, 35 Migration, 7
immigrants, 22–3, 35, 37, 77–8, international transfer, 77
84–5 Internet, 134, 146, 173, 177
industries, 92 intra-European economic
migrants, 75–8, 82, 85, 88, 92, 96–7 migration, 243
overseas, 217, 220 Introduction to Kerala Studies, 157
Index 255
investments Kenya, 220

commercial, 113 Kerala
diasporic, 84, 224 Catholic nurses, 21, 36
foreign, 113 cross-border learning systems, 159
long-term, 224 cross-cultural learning, 151–5
strategic, 228 cultural production, 146
investors DESK, 158–9
international, 28 development, 11, 148
non-diaspora, 10 globalization aided by the
potential, 30 developments, 146
private capital, 41 higher education destination, 154–5
IoM, see Institute of Medicine IISAC and the educational
IOM, see International Organization engagements, 149–51
for Migration internationalization of
Irudaya Rajan, S., 24, 27, 148 education, 152
Islam, I., 122 migrants’ earnings, 148
Islamabad, 178 personality development training
Islamic political parties, 183 camps, 159
Islamic threat, 53 population, 147
Islam, superstitious decay of, 183 reagency, 146–7
Israel, diaspora policy, 129 reagentive effect, 155–9
IT boom (1990s), 99n root tourism, 156–7
Ite, U. E., 128 topography with high
mountains, 148
Jacobsen, Knut A., 4 transformative power, 153
Jain, Anupama, 4 Tropical Green School, 156
Jain, Prakash C., 4 Ketkar, Suhas L., 5
Jamaat-i-Islami, 183 Khadria, Binod, 15n1, 77
Japan, academic migrants, 130 Khan, Ayub, 41
Jawad, Rana, 181, 183 Khan, M H., 44
Jensen, P., 79 Khankas or abodes, 182
John, Issac, 148 Khanna, T., 93
Johnson, M. K., 97 kidney failure, 172
Johnson, H., 127 Kilduff, M., 106
Johnson, Paula Doherty, 5, 6, 12 King, R., 75, 106
jute genome, 135 KIP, see Know India Programme
Kivisto, P., 4
Kadekar, Laxmi Narayan, 15n1 Klein, D. M., 97
Kadushin, C., 82 Klinthall, M., 79
Kalra, Virinder S., 4, 176–91 Know India Programme, 223
Kamdar, M., 93 knowledge-based economy, 118
Kapur, Devesh, 5, 61, 84, 128, 131, knowledge capital development, 11,
145, 212, 222 126, 131, 138
Karachi, 42, 191 knowledge development, 129
Kata, Rajulu, 31 Kohli, A., 84
Katas Raj Temple, 178 Koser, K., 57, 80, 129
Kaur, Ravinder, 176 Koshy, Susan, 2, 8, 15n1
Keeley, Brian, 214 Kroll, C. A., 93
Kelegama, Saman, 24 Kuznetsov, Y., 129
256 Index
labour Mahroum, S., 76, 77, 81

child, 165 Malaysia, academic migrants, 130
contractual, 227 Maley, W., 57
household, 241 Malik, Jamal, 184, 189
migration, 78, 162, 233 Maron, N., 76, 79
participation rate, 78 Massachusetts Institute of
skilled, 23, 92, 125, 228 Technology, 135
surplus, 124 master roster, 82–3
unskilled, 218 maternal mortality rate, 166
Lahneman, J. William, 145 Matter, Dirk, 30
Lahore University of Management McGown, Berns Rima, 216
Sciences, 45 McHale, J., 128
Lal, Brij V., 219 MDGs, see Millennium Development
Lall, M. C., 219, 220 Goals
Lamont, M., 86, 98n4 media
Lauer, S. R., 97 coverage, 111
Lawson, V. A., 60 electronic, 132
leadership skill development, 157 non-traditional, 7
learning disabilities, 172 Mejia, A., 127
Legard, R., 83 melting pot, theory of, 107
Lesbian, bisexual, gay and transgender Mental Health First Aid, 170–1
groups, 181 mercantilism, 216
leverage diaspora engagement, 2 Mercer, C., 56
Levitt, P., 56 merit-based, 239
liberal democratic social formations, 180 Merz, J. Barbara, 4, 5, 6
Lincoln, C. Chen, 6 Messner, Wolfgang, 30
Lindley, A., 56 Metta Care Centre, 201
linguistic paradigm, 177 Meyer, J. B., 81, 94, 126, 128, 129, 136
lobbying efforts, 9 Mian Mir, 184–8
local labour markets, nature of, 112 dastkari (embroidery) school for
Lucas, R., 112, 113 women, 188
Lyon, Stephen M., 2 function, the formal
LUMS, see Lahore University of management, 184
Management Sciences funding, 185
healing power, 186
macro push-and-pull factors, 97 langar (free food) Hall, 185
Maharaj, Brij, 216 medical dispensary, 185
Mahindarama Buddhist temple, 202–6 role of the shrine, 187
Amata Free Clinic, 203 social life, 184–5
Buddhist funeral service, 202 social services, 185
cancer-counselling centre, 203 micro-finance institutes, 228
diabetes centre, 203 Microsoft, 93
disaster relief, 204 migrants
free medical clinic, 202–3 autonomous female, 88
old folks home, 203 circular, 133
ordination programme, 205 contemporary, 75
Purān.a Rājamahāvihāra, 204 economic, 78, 103–5, 112–13, 120
Sunandarama Rājamahāvihāra, 204 framing, 81
welfare projects, 202 imagining, 95
Index 257
international, 75, 228 Naim, S. T. K., 125

intra-European economic, 243 Najam, Adil, 127
Malayali, 158 Nanakana Sahib, 191n
marriage, 106 Naseem, S. M., 44
mass, 58, 176 National Health Training Centre, 171
motivated, 97 National Identity Card for Overseas
permanent, 4 Pakistani, 224
physical, 232 national identity management, 234
return/circular, 76 national interest, 15, 69, 214–15
returnee, 76, 93 nationalism, 77, 95, 178–9, 220
short-term, 224 Navratri, 82
skilled, 77, 81, 127, 162, 224 see also India
temporary, 3, 11, 117 Nawaz Sharif-led government, 227
transnational, 80 NDVP, see Nepali Diaspora
virtual, 13, 231–3 Volunteering Programme
Migration Policy Institute, 6 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 219–20
military dictators, 42, 50 NELM approach, 79
see also Pakistan Nepal
military governments, 42–3 ethnic composition, 164
Millennium Development Goals, 163 maternal mortality rate, 166
Mir, Farina, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, planned volunteering, 165–7;
188, 189, 190, 191 education, 165–6; health, 166
Mirchandani, K., 13, 231–44 pregnancy (anti-natal)
Mische, A., 59, 67 complications, 166
Mishra, Vijay, 2 volunteering activities, 169–73; care
MIT, see Massachusetts Institute of for the older people, 169;
Technology communication training for
modern orientalism, 47 nursing students, 173;
Mohan, G., 67 community health
Mohapatra, Sanket, 24 post-management training, 171;
monastic order, 205 creation of a GeriatricWard,
Monsutti, A., 56, 57 169–70; dementia care training,
morning meditation, 205 172; fundraising and
mortality organizational development,
adult, 148 171; Mental Health First Aid
infant, 124 (MHFA), 170–1; mental
Mozambique, civil war in, 181 health-related training, 170;
MPI, see Migration Policy Institute monitoring and organizational
Mujahideen era, 58 evaluation, 171–2; Special
Mukherjee, S., 241 Lectures to Medical Students
Mumbai, 36–7, 180, 191, 233, 243 and Professionals, 172–3;
Munster, R., 7 Special Programme on learning
Musharraf, Parvez, 42, 45 disability, 172; teachers
see also Pakistan training, 173
Muslim women, veiled, 49 volunteering programme, 163–5
Myanmar, Nargis cyclone, 199 volunteers engagement, 167–8;
development specialists, 168;
Naby, E., 61 special advisors, 168; training
Nadeem, S., 233 specialists, 168
258 Index
Nepalese health-care centres, 169 Oracle, 93

Nepalese migrants, 162 Orissa, Adivasis, 36
Nepalese nurses, 172 orphanages, 12, 15, 199
Nepalese professionals, 163–5 Osella, Filippo, 5
Nepali Diaspora Volunteering outcaste women, 188
Programme, 163–5, 173–4 outsourcing, 93, 145
Nepali migrants, 162 Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), 223
network approach, 81 overseas communities, 13, 221
network theory, 80 Overseas Indians, 217, 220
Neupane, B. D., 164 Overseas Pakistanis Division, 223
new economics of labour Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, 224
migration, 78
Newland, Kathleen, 5, 6, 7, 10, 24, 28, Page, Ben, 214
35, 112, 117, 118, 119, 121, 145 Pakistan
NICOP, see National Identity Card for American experts on, 48
Overseas Pakistani diasporic engagement, 46
night work and sex work, 238 diasporic technocrat, 43
Nilekani, N., 92, 93 dual nationality, 43, 51
NMC, see Nursing and Midwifery economy, 43
Council elections, 50
non-alignment, 220 failure of social sciences, 44
non-resident Bangladeshis, 217 financial contribution, 43
Non-Resident External (NRE) rupees foreign currency deposit
accounts, 26, 226 accounts, 227
non-resident Indians (NRIs), 8, Islam and terrorism, 47–50
119, 217 military dictatorship, 44, 50
Non-Resident Nepalese Association, military governments, 42
162–3 overseas, 217, 223–4
non-residents from Kerala (NRKs), post-retirement academia in
148–9 Pakistan, 47
NRNA, see Non-Resident Nepalese power positions, 50–2
Association private sector universities, 45
nuclear bombs, 227 professionals, 9, 50, 53
nuclear warheads, 47 remittances, 43
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 172 role and position of, 43
Nyberg-Sorensen, N., 131 socio-cultural and political
environment, 46
occupational integration in the state of research and academics, 45
American economy, 76 state of social science, 44–6
Oda, Hisaya, 5 technocrats, 42–3, 50
off shoring, 98n Western donor agencies, 49
Ogale, Sujata, 35 women oppression, 49
Ogden, C., 232 Pakistan Cricket Board, 42
Oh, H., 106 Pakistan Origin Card, 224
Oldenburg, Philip, 177 Pakistan Peoples Party, 42
Oonk, Gijsbert, 146, 160n2 see also Pakistan
OPF, see Overseas Pakistanis Palackal, Antony, 11, 145–60
Foundation Palit, Amitendu, 24, 25, 26
opportunity entrepreneurs, 118 Pandey, Abhishek, 5
Index 259
Parekh, Bhiku, 2 rapprochement, history of, 177

Patel, R., 238, 241, 244 Ratha, D., 5, 24
Patikin, D., 127 rational choice approach, 214–15
Patnaik, D., 232 Rato Bangala Foundation, 172
patriotism, 97, 111 Ray, M., 85
Pedersen, P. J., 79 reagentive effect, 155–9
pension transferability, 218 Reeves, Peter, 4, 15n1, 219
People of Indian Origin, 9, 20, refugee movements, 58
119, 217 refugees, 56, 58, 61, 78, 81
people-to-people networking, 8 Rehman, S., 180
Percot, Marie, 148 relief funds, 10
Petievich, Carla, 4 religious oppression and war, 243
philanthropic efforts, 38 remittance-receiving countries,
philanthropy, 6–7, 9, 11–12, 14, 21, 24t,226t,227
30, 35, 113, 117, 133, 145, 232 remitter cards, 140
Pilgrimage and Welfare Reserve Bank of India, 226
Development, 12 resource mobilization, forms
PIO, see People of Indian Origin of, 82
Pittman, Don A., 208 Resurgent India Bonds
Poros, M. V., 88, 98n7 scheme, 226
portal hypertension, 172 return/circular migration, concept
Portes, A., 77, 78, 81, 82 of, 76
postcolonial era, 177 return migrants
Poster, Winifred R., 234 community’s expectations, 95
post-fordist feminization, 232 complexity of, 81
poverty reduction, 6, 108, 124 culture and languages, 96
Pravasi Bharatiya, 37 foreign investment regime, 85
Pravasi Bhartiya Diwas, 223 import quotas lifting, 85
private funds, 140 neo-classical approach, 78
Probashi Kollyan Bank, 140 network analysis, 81
professionalism, 13, 113, 174 in non-tech sectors, 94
Punjabi diaspora, 12, 177, 184, 189 personal and societal factors, 80
Punnamparambil, Jose, 38 promise of more career growth, 93
Purewal, Navtej, 12, 176–91 social network analysis, 80
structural approach, 79
Qayum, Seemin, 242 structuralist framework, 80
Qstergaard-Nielsen, Eva, 214 in tech sector, 94
Quadir, Iqbal Z., 135 technology entrepreneurs, 92
questionnaire survey, 126 women returnees, 94
right to vote, 5
Radhakrishnan, S., 231–2 Robert Noyce Simulation Lab, 136
Radio Mirchi (radio station), 238 Robinson, E. A. G., 44
Raghuram, Parvati, 2, 4 Rogers, R., 82
Rahman, Md Mizanur, 1–16 rogue state, 47
Rahman, Shafeeq, 126, 140 root tourism, 156–7, 159
Rahman Daros, Muhamad, 199 RNSL, see Robert Noyce
Rai, Rajesh, 4, 15n1, 105, 219 Simulation Lab
Rajan, S. Irudaya., 24, 27, 28, 148 Rumbaut, R. G., 77, 78, 82
Ramamurti, R., 84 Rwandan genocide, 181
260 Index
Sabina, C. A., 148 Shomali, H., 103, 109

Safran, William, 3 Shrum, W., 146
Sahadevan, P., 217, 219, 220 Siddhi Memorial Foundation
Sahoo, Ajaya Kumar, 2, 216, 216 Hospital, 172
Sahoo, S., 232 Siddique, T., 126
Salkever, A., 85 Sidel, Mark, 5, 8, 12
Salt, J., 129 Sikh and Hindu pilgrims, 189
Samarawickrama, Vijaya, 195, Sikh Gurus, 182, 189
197, 208 Silicon Valley, 76, 85, 92–3, 98, 129
Samuels, Jeffrey, 194–210 Singapore, academic migrants, 130
Sankaran, C., 105 Singh, I., 220
SANSA, see South African Network of Singhvi, L. M., 22
Skills Abroad Snidal, Duncan, 215
Saranankara, Ven. B., 200–2 skilled migration, 127, 224
‘Caring and Sharing’ and Educare skin colour and ethnic origin, 108
programmes, 201 small-scale interviews, 127
Sri Jayanti Welfare social advancement, 6, 108
Organization, 200 social capital, 10, 81
welfare work, 200–2 Social Democratic Party, 35
Yayasan Maha Karuna, 200 social gatherings, 82, 108
Sāsana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana socialism, 92, 181
Society, 207 social networks, 7, 12, 69–70, 81, 93,
Saudi Arabia, 24 190, 194
Saxenian, A., 76, 84, 85, 93, 99n9, 129 social service enterprises, 194
Schetter, C. J., 61 socio-cultural right, 218
Schiller, N. Glick, 218 socio-economic development, 11, 126,
Schlenkhoff, A., 61 133, 163
Schmeidl, S., 57 socio-economic equity, 6, 108
Schnepel, Burkhard, 22 software products, 98n
ScholarBangladesh, 137, 141 software services, 98n
scholarship funds, 12 South African Network of Skills
Scholarships Programme for Diaspora Abroad, 129
Children, 223 SPDC, see Scholarships Programme for
Sehgal, Ikram, 52 Diaspora Children
Sen, Amartya, 5 special property rights, 120
senior citizen club, 198 Spevacek, A., 112, 113, 121
senior citizen home, 201 Spivak, Gayatri, 232, 243
Sentul, 195–7, 200, 205 Spooner, C. E., 195
separatist movement, 14 Sri Jayanti-Maha Karuna Youth
Sewell, W., 59, 67 Centre, 202
sexual rights, 181 Sri Jayanti Welfare, 200–1
Shah, M. Nasra, 15n1 Sri Lankan Buddhist temple, 200–2
Shahzad, Faisal, 43, 49 Sri Lankan temples, 196–8
Sharma, H. R., 162 Batu Lanchang Cemetery, 196
Sharma, O. P., 83 Bodhi Langka Ram Vihara, 196
Sharma, Raju, 36, 37 Buddhist Maha Vihara, 196
Sheffer, Gabriel, 219 New patrons, new directions, 197–8
Silwal, Ani, 24 Sri Lankan Buddhist temple, 196
Shiv Sena-ization of Mumbai, 233, 243 state authoritarianis, 44
Index 261
state-centric diasporas, 218 Tilakavardhana, Dharma Sri., 206

Straits Settlements, 195 Timmel, Sally, 181
strategic exclusions, 232 Tinker, Hugh, 217, 219
stroke and geriatrics, 172 Ti-Ratana Welfare Organization, 199
Structuration theory, 146 Tiwari, Rajnish, 38n1
student exchange programmes, 36, TOKEN project, 141
132, 138 Topley, Marjorie, 210n16
Sufi Barkat Ali, 188 tourism, 6, 134, 136, 145, 156–7
Sufi Pirs, 182 transfer remittances, 228
Sufi shrines and welfare, 181–90 transnational networks, 12, 176,
Dera Sahib Gurdwara, 189 233, 244
Gugga Pir, 182 transnational space, 184
institutionalization of the shrine in transnational travels, 177
Punjab, 182 transnational workers, 242
Mian Mir, 184–8; dastkari Tropical Green School, 156, 159
(embroidery) school for tsunami village, 204
women, 188; function, the Tumbe, Chinmay, 25, 26, 27
formal management, 184;
funding, 185; healing power, UNDP, 46, 124, 141
186; Langar (free food) Hall, Union of German Malayalee
185; medical dispensary, 185; Associations (UGMA), 31
role of the shrine, 187; social United Arab Emirates, 24, 27
life, 184–5; social activities, 185 Upper Mall Scheme Society, 188
Sitla Devi, 182 US Agency for International
transnational ties, 188–90 Development, 6, 45
Waqf, 184 US immigration laws, 77
Sunday school programmes, 201 utilization of the human capital
Sunil, S. Amrith, 145 resources, 77
Sylheti community, 108
Swami, Agnivesh, 181 Van Hear, Nicholas, 58, 59, 180
Varghese, A., 148
Taiwan, 129, 167 Varshney, A., 84
Talbot, Ian, 177, 183 Veer, Peter van der, 4
Taliban, 43, 58 Verdier, T., 107
Tan, Chee-Beng, 210 vertical engagement, 4
Tanaka, H., 5, 7, 10, 112, 117, 118, Vertovec, Steven, 56, 92, 146,
119, 121 160n2, 216
Tata Consultancy Services, 93 very large-scale integrated circuit, 136
Tatla, Darshan S., 180 virtual diaspora, 8, 13, 231–2, 244
technology transfer, 145, 174 virtual migration, 13, 231, 233
telecentres, 134 virtual networking, 126
television penetration, 141 visa allocation preference, 77
temporary migrants, 104 visa regime, 177–8
Terrazas, A., 5, 7, 10, 167 visa regime for pilgrims, 178
Texas Instruments, 93 Viswanath, Priya, 8
Tharoor, S., 235, 236 voluntarism, 7
Thorburn, S. S., 183 voluntarism, focus of, 7
TiE (The Indus Entrepreneurs), 2, 88, Voluntary Services Overseas, 164
92, 98–9 volunteering assignment, 168
262 Index
volunteering management system, women empowerment, 141

164–5 women entrepreneurs, 83, 88
volunteerism, 6–7, 10 women migrants, 89, 94
volunteers women oppression, 49
female health, 171 Wong, Q., 97
flow of, 165 World Bank, 23–4, 41, 46, 50–1, 83,
local, 164 136, 174
professional, 164
recruited, 171 Yan, Cornelius Koh Beng, 198
Von Carlowitz, Linden, 180 Yang, P. Q., 86
voting rights, external, 218 Yaqub, Muhammad, 42
Yayasan Maha Karuna, 200–2
Wadhwa, V., 76, 85 Yen, Ching-Hwang, 210n16
Wagah border, 177 yoga, 157
wage differential, 79, 235 Yossi, Shain, 213
Wang, Tai Peng, 210n16 Yusuf, Huma, 45
waqf (Endowments), 184–5, 187
Wattiaux, J.-P., 136 Zahra-Malik, Mehreen, 54n1
wealth tax, 183 Zaidi, A. M., 219
Welch, Anthony R., 128 Zaidi, Akbar S., 9, 41–55
welfare organizations, 183, 200, 207 zakat, 183
Werbner, Pnina, 4 Zaman, Mahboob, 135
western academia, 49 Zardari, 180
Western feminism, 232 Zhena, Zhang, 128
Western grading system, 132 Zia, Afiya S, 49
White, J. M., 97 Zia, Amir, 42, 54n1
Wipro, 93 Zweig, D., 128

Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2013)

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Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2013)

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International Political Economy Series

Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman (editors)

International Political Economy Series

Tan Tai Yong

List of Figures and Tables vii

Introduction: Diaspora Engagement and Development

1 From Germany to India: The Role of NRIs and PIOs in

2 Inﬂuencing from Afar: Role of Pakistani Diaspora in Public

3 Afghan Diasporas in Britain and Germany: Dynamics,

4 The Global Circulation of Skill and Capital – Pathways of

5 Bangladeshi Diaspora: Cultural Practices and

6 From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Leveraging the Academic

7 Diaspora Engagement in Education in Kerala, India 145

8 Diaspora Volunteering and Development in Nepal 162

9 Diasporic Shrines: Transnational Networks Linking South

10 Intersecting Diasporas: Sri Lankan Buddhist Temples in

11 Diaspora Engagement Policy in South Asia 212

12 Pockets of the West: The Engagement of the Virtual

5.1 Ambivalent identity 105

1.1 Top remittance-receiving countries (billion USD, est.) 24

The global South Asian diaspora is currently over 50 million strong

diasporic communities have the potential to contribute to one or more

Tan Tai Yong

Carolin Fischer is pursuing a DPhil in Development Studies at the

Pierre Gottschlich has been working as Assistant Professor at the

Umber Ibad is Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology, Uni-

Virinder S. Kalra is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of

book: Sacred and Secular Musics: A Postcolonial Approach (Continuum).

Prakash Khanal is the Executive Director of Himalayan Development

Kiran Mirchandani is Associate Professor in the Adult Education &

Antony Palackal teaches in the Post-Graduate Department of Sociol-

Navtej K. Purewal is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of

Md Mizanur Rahman is a Senior Research Fellow at the ISAS, National

Taiabur Rahman is Associate Professor and Chair of Public Admin-

Manashi Ray is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social and

ﬁnancial and social capital, and membership in networks to advance

Jeffrey Samuels is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy

Smita Tiwari is Guest Faculty at the University of Delhi, India, and

A.K.M. Ahsan Ullah is Associate Director at the Center for Migration

over 18 years. He has taught and researched at the Asian Institute of

S. Akbar Zaidi is a Pakistani political economist. Apart from his inter-

AIT Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand

ICSSR Indian Council of Social Science Research

NMC Nursing and Midwifery Council

Increasingly, countries with extensive diasporas have sought to con-

in the region face different development challenges and have different

which have undergone dramatic changes over time. Reviewing existing

South Asian diaspora engagement and development

As mentioned above, one essential feature of diaspora groups is the

normally want to return to their homeland or countries of origin per-

settlement and transnational aspects of South Asian diaspora. There is

approach thus covers the full terrain of human well-being (Merz,

Structure of the book

The forms of engagement mentioned above are neither equally present

countries – even within sub-national groups, such as states and regions

are often more willing than non-diaspora investors to risk starting

maintains a different kind of development link from that of the con-

New research agendas

The chapters in this book constitute an initial effort to bring together

entrepreneurs or contributions from NRIs and PIO in general. However,

14th February 2013; Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, www.moia.gov.

Gamlen, Alan (2011) ‘Diasporas in global migration governance’ in Alexander

The Non-Resident Indian (NRI) and People of Indian Origin (PIO)

private donations and other forms of philanthropy do also play a major