What is Philosophy with Children ‘After Lipman’?

Introduction to the special issue on Philosophy with Children

Nancy Vansieleghem and David Kennedy

“if ‘turning toward’ is the movement of thought
toward truth, how could truth not also turn toward
thought? And how could truth itself not turn away
from thought when thought turns away from it?”

Introduction

Increasingly Philosophy for Children (P4C) appears to be a major concern in education in particular
and society as a whole. Illustrations of this evolution are not only the growing amount of manuals
published on this issue, but also the many workshops and teacher training courses that have been
organised to train educational practitioners, managers and teacher trainers on practical philosophy.
Pioneered by Matthew Lipman Philosophy for Children arises in the 1970s as an educational
programme that implies the idea to relate both notions philosophy and the child. In this Special Issue
we will focus on this event and more precisely the horizon through which it can be born and get
shape. We will focus on the arguments that make it reasonable to think the relationship between
philosophy and the child and what is its significance for teaching and learning today. The aim of this
special issue is twofold. First it will be an introduction into the educational ideas of an actual practice
and theory that is not well known in the field of philosophy theory and philosophy. However, this
issue will not only be about Philosophy for Children and Lipman’s ideas. At the same time it will be an
attempt and an invitation to think the relationship between philosophy and the child ‘after Lipman’.
Before introducing the different contributions to this issue, we will begin with an introduction to
some of the main arguments and ideas that gave shape to the idea of Philosophy for Children during
the last couple of decades. We will do this in line with Reed and Johnson (1999) by subdividing
Philosophy for Children into a first and a second generation. Characteristic for the first generation is
its emphasis on unity and stability, while a second generation breaks with this mode of thinking.
However, this subdividing is artificial, it only attempts to focus briefly on an ‘event’ that takes place
nowadays. As such, Philosophy for Children will not be envisaged as a system and a whole, but as an
assemblage of moving elements that forms a particular horizon. And thus, ‘some-thing’ that is in
movement and can turn toward thought (cf. Deleuze, 1994, p.38). Hence, in what follows we will not
focus on one particular author, what we will do is rather mapping the horizon against which
Philosophy for Children becomes attractive during the last couple of decades. In order to be able to
describe this horizon, it is necessary to draw attention to older lines of arguments in which
Philosophy for Children appeared as an important issue for reflection and thought.

On Philosophy for Children: a first generation

In Modelle und Perspektiven der Kinderphilosophie (1997) Englhart refers to three different horizons
through which Philosophy for Children, in the 1970s, becomes a matter of concern. First, we have
Matthew Lipman, characterized as the pioneer of Philosophy for Children. His line of arguments
indicates a way of critical thinking that is strongly influenced by the pragmatic philosophy of John
Dewey. More or less at the same time as Lipman, Garreth Matthews introduces his philosophical
dialogues. With his dialogues Matthews emphasizes the need to rethink the child, not as an ignorant
being, but as a rational agent who has the capacity to reason philosophical. Next to these
approaches, there are those which envisages Philosophy for Children as a means to discover invisible
mechanisms of power and to communicate and reflect upon personal interests, this way hoping for
the realization of moral actors. In what follows we give a brief overview of these different lines of
arguments.

P4C as a means to develop critical thinking skills in an environment

At the end of the 1970s there is a growing interest for critical thinking. It is argued that education
should be reformed and restructured. The idea to introduce philosophy into the curriculum becomes
a solution for addressing the importance of significant educational reform. Most important
representative of this approach is Matthew Lipman, who develops the philosophical novel Harry
Stottlemeier’s Discovery. With his novel Lipman attempts to provide a pedagogical tool that functions
as a model for critical thinking emulated by real life children. A similar approach is the Socratic
Method of the German philosopher Leonard Nelson. Even though the Socratic method (Nelson) or
the Socratic dialogue (Heckman, Horster) cannot be situated under what is globally considered as
P4C, both approaches share the basic argument that amongst pupils critical thinking should be
stimulated in order to think well. At the same there is a clear distinction to be made. This distinction
situates itself at the level of the objective they want to achieve. While Nelson’s ‘philosophical truth’
is to be found at the foundation of experience, similar to Kant’s Categories of Understanding, Lipman
considers it as a kind of evolutionary view of knowledge. In line with Kant Nelson believes that
knowledge from observation presupposes the application of categories that are not be found in
empiricism. It are, so he continues, categories that are already present in the person and that
determine the experience. Hence, the starting point is that thinking is not derived from our
experience, but that our experiences are structured and made possible by thinking. Influenced by
Kant it is stated that we know the categories of a priori thinking. However, Nelson differs from Kant
when he supposes that these a priori categories should not be proven. It is not just about observing
causality or the substance of things, external to us and that concerns the world which is knowable by
induction. Truth knowledge for Nelson is internal, concerned with conceptual presuppositions of
everyday experience and gained by regressive abstraction from these experiences. It is truth that can
brought to light by a ‘psychological factum’ (Nelson, 1994/1975). Using introspection and the
dissection of the own experience one tries to get insight into the ideas and connections that happen
in the experience of human beings . With this the psychology of a person becomes the starting point.
The search for a common order of things is no longer searched for on the level of human nature, but
based on the connection that materialise in the experience of a person. It is as if the truth is present
in everyone, but needs to be made transparent using the method of regressive abstraction. Here we
are dealing with a specific methodology that shows step by step how a person can achieve objective
knowledge concerning his/her own thinking.
For his interpretation of the Socratic method Lipman will not, contrary to Nelson, turn to Kant but to
pragmatism. Especially in the philosophical writings of Dewey do we find the roots of Lipman’s P4C
programme. Lipman takes over from Dewey the idea that there is no distinction between the mind
and the external world and, as a consequence thereof, between philosophical truth and scientific
truth (cf. Daniel, 1992; Mc Call, 2009, p.102). Influenced by Darwin, Dewey developed a kind of
evolutionary view of knowledge which means that it is always an adaptive human response to a
changing environment. As a consequence, and in line with Dewey, knowledge for Lipman is not
static, but an ongoing process. It is the product of an interaction with the environment in which we
continue to interact with. Dewey uses the word experience to explain this interaction and refers to
the knowledge of the consequences the individual ascertains by his actions. The reflection on this
experience is what Dewey calls thinking. In this respect Dewey writes: “Reflections involves not
simply a sequence of ideas, but a con-sequence – a consecutive ordering is such a way that each
determines the next as its proper outcome, while each outcome in turn leans back on, or refers to, its
predecessors” (Dewey, 1933, p.4). What this means is that thinking enables a person to realise the
consequences of actions. This does not imply, however, that success is guaranteed. Because we do
not have at our disposal something that offers us more certainty than reflexive action, we have to
focus to increase the reflexive quality of our actions. However, whereas Dewey connects this effort
to previous experiences and additional hypotheses and observations, Lipman will make use of formal
logic (Daniel, 1992). This is not merely about mapping diverse possibilities that can take place, but
the search for possible incorrect presuppositions in the activity of thinking. Accordingly, for Lipman,
critical thinking means being able to determine the facts or issues that cause a problem (including
idea’s, concepts and theories) in order to make hypotheses about how to solve them. Moreover, the
logic of the development of knowledge in an environment and the application of knowledge for the
improvement of the quality of living becomes the horizon against which Lipman’s Philosophy for
Children programme gets shape. Accordingly, the aim of P4C for Lipman “is not to turn children into
philosophers or decision makers, but to help them become more thoughtful, more reflective, more
considerate, and more reasonable individuals. Children who have been helped to become more
judicious not only have a better sense of when to act but also of when not to act” (Lipman ea., 1980,
p.15). Against this background, philosophy is no longer regarded as a theoretical substance. It is
regarded as a potential that has to (and can) be developed in order to get grip on one’s interactions
in an environment and to influence change.

P4C as a means to close the gap between the adult and the child
A second line of arguments that enters the discourse on philosophy for children at the end of the
seventies, is expressed by studies that focus on the gap between the child and the adult. In these
approaches, which are often described as romantic, the child is being problematised as merely being
understood as a prelude to adulthood. These studies predominantly represented by Gareth
Matthews, criticise traditional education for its focus on the transfer of knowledge which, so it
sounds, underrates the voice of the child. “Children can help us adults investigate and reflect on
interesting and important questions and [...] the children’s contributions may be quite as valuable as
any we adults have to offer” (Matthews, 1984, p. 3). Mathews explicitly strives for a symmetrical
relation between the adult and the child and envisages the child as an equal companion. Therefore
he does not speak about Philosophy for Children. He speaks of dialogues with children. In these
studies it is furthermore argued that children, just like philosophers are capable of making meaning
and actively asking philosophical questions. Children, so Matthews argues, ask the same questions as
famous philosophers do, although differently formulated. Against this background Piaget’s theory of
development is being criticised as being limited. It is argued that Piaget’s developmental stages do
not hold for the development of philosophical capacities. For the development of philosophical
capacities, so Matthews argues, we are dealing with an ‘evolutionary bias’. Which means that the
kind of questions children ask do not improve as they grow older. “The standard response is, in
general an unthinking and un-thought-out product of socialisation, whereas the nonconforming
response is much more likely to be the fruit of honest reflection. Yet Piaget would have the
nonconforming response discounted and eliminated on methodological grounds” (Matthews, 1980,
p. 38). Furthermore, it is argued that the central mission of the school should be to create spaces in
which children can express themselves and their interpretation of the world. Critical thinking
according to Matthews means being able to fantasize and to wonder, to demonstrate profound ideas
about the world and to meet problems concerning individual well-being. In this approach not in the
first place the development of logical thinking skills is at stake. What is emphasized here is that
children should get the opportunity to freely explore their thoughts and to get a chance to realise
themselves (Matthews, 1984). Accordingly, it is argued that education should not be only about
stimulating the cognitive development of the child, but about giving attention to non-linguistic
expressions and feelings. It is not so much the discovery of inconsistencies in thinking by use of
criteria based on logic that is at the heart of this research. What is important is that inner thoughts,
feelings and fantasies can be expressed, as well. Hence, asking philosophical questions is framed here
as a developmental problem that can be framed as an educational problem. In other words, P4C
appears as a solution for a shortcoming that manifests itself in the scientific thinking about the child.
In this sense a kind of knowledge different from developmental psychology introduces itself.
However, this knowledge about the child does not imply a radical split with the existing pedagogical
attitude towards the child, but predominantly asks to reconsider what is accepted as ‘normal’ and to
bring about a new equilibrium in the existing knowledge about the development of children.

P4C as a strategy to discover mechanisms of power and to communicate and reflect upon personal
interests
Although strongly related to the previous lines of reasoning, an approach that attempts to strive for a
more human world that is free from any prefixed orientation for human thinking and action offers a
third line (Englhart, 1997, p.138). Here philosophy appears as a method that stimulates a critical
reflection on existing power relations which are envisaged not as natural, but historical constructions
of human kind. An exploration of these constructions is pushed forward. It is argued that invisible
relationships of power have to be brought to light and neutralized in practical action. Accordingly a
form of education that is characterised by dialogue is considered to be of main importance. Dialogue
here means that one is not focused on profit or individual interests, but on clarifying essences,
postponing judgements and verifying personal ideas. In this regard and referring to Habermas one
speaks about the instalment of a free space in which all persons involved have an equal chance to
bring forward their arguments in order to create a rationally founded consensus. In this respect
Ekkehard Martens one of the proponents of this approach, writes that children need to learn that
there are different orientations possible, that no orientation can be claimed to be the only one and
that an introduction into philosophical inquiry is necessary in order to think well. That is being able to
understand the different points of view, acquiring knowledge concerning alternatives and clarifying
individual, often unclear interpretations (ibid.). Therefore one needs two things, so is stated: “on the
one hand orientating contents or ‘homeric themes’ as food for their souls to grow’, on the other
hand a critical method of thinking or a Socrates as ‘philosophical spoilsport’” (Martens, 1999, p.138).
One speaks in this regard about the value of philosophy in terms of its multiple historic and trans-
cultural knowledge – as a condition to come to a more detailed description, communicative action,
shared interpretation and judgement. More general, one speaks about the development of the art of
speaking (rhetoric), questioning (dialectic) and writing (grammar), starting from casuistic in order to
act ethical. As a consequence, thinking for oneself in this approach requires that one is responsible
for one’s actions and that philosophical knowledge and procedures are required in order to learn to
act in a responsible way. Hence, philosophy appears here as a means to increase the potential power
of children (who are essentially defined as powerless) in order to neutralize unequal power-relations
by strengthening processes of communication and cooperation.

A second generation Philosophy for Children: a ‘method’ becomes ‘a movement’

Today a second generation of ‘P4C-representatives’ is spoken of within the P4C-discourse. Important
names are among others Sharp, Kennedy, Murris, Kohan, Sasseville, Haynes, Glaser, Brenifier, Tozzi,
Santi, Weber, Cam, etc. With this new generation, old ideas are criticised and new ideas shape form.
Striking is that these new ideas are not considered as an attack against the first generation, but as a
necessary step that takes into account the changing circumstances of the environment and a form of
self-correction. In relation to this Reed and Johnson write for example: “Given the rise of post
modernity, one simply does not do philosophy the way one did it forty years ago. The assumption
about truth, perspective, nature and so on have, at least, been challenged, thereby forcing attempts
at justification and explanation that were considered unnecessary in previous days. To the extent
that philosophy has an impact on everyday experience, to that extent the debate has had practical
consequences” (Reed and Johnson, 1999, p. 64-65). Particularly the strong emphasis of Lipman on
reasoning and analytical thinking as a guarantee for critical thinking is put under pressure (cf. Van der
Leeuw, 2009, p. 111). “In the novels, but especially in the accompanying manuals, stress on analytical
skills, reasoning, categorizing, ordering, and so on, is pervasive. It is not immediately apparent,
however, how improvement of analytical skills is conductive to the discovery of meaning” (Van der
leeuw, 2009, p. 111). However, not only Lipman is being criticized, also the idea that “reflection and
reasoning, can’t be realized when we only reserve separate hours a week for a collective exploration
of philosophical questions” (ibid. p.112). Against the background of our changing knowledge society
it is argued that today “we expect people to be able to reflect rationally on human life, which include
a view on reality, on the place of the individual in society, on values and norms, on the meaning of
life, and so on. In the second place we expect them to be able to communicate these views with
others, because we live in a common reality, and this common reality has to be the subject of
common discourse and can even be regarded as a common construct” (van der Leeuw, 2009, p. 113).
Accordingly, philosophy is not perceived as the provider of the right answers. “Every generation has
to find answers, because the world is changing and widening” (Ibid. p.113). Answers as such have no
value at all and have to be found by the participants themselves in autonomous thinking. The basic
idea is that what is needed is an integrated (educational) system of infrastructure that offers
opportunities for reflective thinking and communication and to prepare mankind to a switch in the
attitude toward knowledge. Consequently, it is argued that the central mission of the school is to
teach the children how to think and communicate; to train them how to reflect upon knowledge on
their own.
As such, for the second generation, striving for unity, consistency and subjugation to logic or to
universal reason do no longer have an end in itself. Discussions are held about possible methods and
approaches in regard to the community in which particular problems appear: the exchange of
rational arguments and thoughtful opinions is supposed to be promoted. Different combinations of
methods and arguments are presented as different ways of reasoning depending on the environment
or the social community in which they operate. Hence, the line of arguments through which
Philosophy for Children currently gets shape, no longer is produced and legitimated by a the ideal of
analytic reasoning, but operates in terms of what works at a particular moment in the community: i.e
what produces contemplation, communication and reflection in the community? In this respect, the
second generation will no longer speak about Philosophy for Children in terms of a method. One
speaks about a movement and a mixture of approaches, each with their own methods, techniques
and strategies.
Now, it is not so difficult to apply the logic of ‘what works’ as the ruling structure of Philosophy for
Children that is marked by aspects of what since Foucault has been called the biopolitical structure of
society. Not the economy or the state represents freedom, but a particular work upon the self that is
focused on succeeding in fulfilling human needs or desires in a community. This means that
throughout the actual discourse on Philosophy for Children a particular subject(ivity) comes to the
fore, in terms of someone who looks at one’s life in terms of a process that can be managed and who
experiences philosophy as an efficient product in order to do so (cf. Vansieleghem and Masschelein,
2010). In this respect it could be said that Philosophy for Children, however its efforts not to do so,
has not remained unaffected by the general movement that replaced critic with sales promotion.
Biopower conducts a totality and Philosophy for Children is an effect and an instrument of this
power. A power that generates a totalizing vision for a child, a people and mankind as a whole.
This triumph of biopolitical labor, now, will be taken up in this Special Issue as an invitation and a
possibility to think about other forms of work upon the self. Forms in which philosophy puts itself at
work again: (re)thinking the question what is Philosophy for Children or what could it be about. Since
what Philosophy for Children could be about is not given, and always changes. In the words of
Deleuze we could say that it is created. Not formed. This is entirely what the shifts within Philosophy
for Children itself made clear. Each understanding of Philosophy for Children posits itself in itself-it is
self-positing. “It posits itself to the same extent that it is created” (Deleuze, 1994). In this line we
could say that the most subjective vision will be the most objective. As such in this collection of
papers, not only is taken note of the question what is Philosophy for Children, there are papers about
what determines its moment, its conditions and its unknown, as well. Not only at a theoretical level.
Also concrete educational practices are taken up. Furthermore, there are contributions of friends of
Philosophy for Children, but also of its enemy, as a confrontation and a challenge. As such the
following papers are not simply analyses, interpretations or clarifications of a concept. The work
involves that the line of thoughts that are presented in the papers are made convincing, as well. This
is why the result of this special issue is not a presentation of Philosophy for Children as an object of
knowledge. It attempts to be a presentation of a subject that is subjective. Therefore we would like
to describe this Special Issue as an attempt to think Philosophy for Children above presented
representations and to create a hyper-representation.
In line with this focus, the articles collected ….