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CHAPTER I
THE HUMAN EQUATION

The longer I coach, the more I work with boys, the more clearly I understand
that the seemingly small incidents - often chance happenings - are largely
responsible for those decisions that shape an individual's career. In my own
case, it took a great team, and the master coach of them all, Knute Rockne, to
convince me that football was for me, that coaching was a profession requiring
the same kind of intense study and lifelong devotion demanded of teachers,
lawyers and even of doctors.

No, I never played for Rockne. I played against him, or against his 1924 team
that included the celebrated Four Horsemen, Elmer Layden, Harry Stuhldreher,
Jim Crowley and Don Miller. It happened in Palmer Stadium on a sunny
October twenty-fifth and never before in my life had I spent such a frustrating,
disappointing afternoon. We were beaten, 12-0, and the final score could have
been 28-0, or possibly higher. The score didn't bother me - it was the way in
which Rockne's men handled us, particularly me.

The 1924 Princeton team was a better-than-average Princeton team. We had

beaten Navy, we later turned back Harvard, 34-0 and lost to a sound Yale team,
10-0. Yet against Notre name I felt as if we were being toyed with. I was
backing up the line and I don't believe I made a clean tackle all afternoon.
There would come Layden, or Miller, or someone. I would get set to drop the
ball carrier in his tracks and someone would give me a nudge, just enough to
throw me off balance, just enough pressure to make me miss.
I played the whole game that way, giving a completely lackluster performance.

We were walking up the chute to the dressing-rooms after the game and I
actually felt ready for another two hours of contact. I wasn't tired, nor was I
beaten down physically as I generally was after a big game. Others walking with
me agreed. As we pieced together our individual reactions to our defeat, we
began to see that we had met something new, something we had never
anticipated. We, and I am writing this in retrospect, had been subjected to our
first lesson in what might be called the science of football.

These Rockne-inspired thoughts stayed with me for a long, long time. I

completed my studies at Princeton the following June and jumped directly to
the New York Yankees for a summer try-out, which, if it proved nothing else,
proved to me that I wanted no part of professional baseball and undoubtedly
demonstrated to the Yankee powers-that-were that one Charles Caldwell was
far from a polished ballplayer. Instead of staying with the minor league club to
which I had been demoted, I rusticated for a period on a Georgia peach farm,

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wrestling with agrarian problems and with my own ideas about the future.

There was no getting around it. I had been sold - hook, line, and sinker – by
Rockne and his kind of football. I wanted to coach and, more important at the
time, I wanted to learn everything I could about coaching a sport in which
there were apparently a hundred and one opportunities to advance new
thoughts, to develop partially explored theories and to blend the traditional
with the unorthodox. Just as football was entering the so-called modern era, I
was an eager green pea, willing to try and yet not entirely sure that I had the
qualifications for any kind of a coaching assignment.

As I did so many times before his death in 1933, I turned for advice to one of
the finest men I have ever known, Bill Roper, my coach at Princeton and the
person who still symbolizes for me all of the ideals and fine qualities that we
like to associate with intercollegiate athletics. Bill, then one of the country's
veteran coaches, with nearly a quarter-century of experience behind him, was
nearing the end of his long reign at Princeton and, was one of the first to sense
that football in the middle 1920's was undergoing tremendous changes, none of
which he endorsed.

Bill, you may recall, was a lawyer, a city councilman in Philadelphia and an
insurance man - all in addition to being a wonderfully inspirational coach. He
didn't have any particular system, insisted that football was ninety percent fight
and will always be remembered for popularizing the slogan coined by Johnny
Poe: "A team that won't be beaten can't be beaten.” Nonetheless, he clearly
saw, possibly after the 1924 game with Notre Dame, that the football he had
known and loved was not the same game that was being taught by
perfectionists like Rockne.

There chanced to be an opening on the Princeton staff and he offered me an

assistant's job, with the warning that I was thinking of a precarious way of
making a living. Later he told me, after I had worked with the freshmen for a
season, that coaching would require more and more time and, if I was going to
be a successful coach, I would have to concentrate upon coaching to the
exclusion of everything else. I have since often wondered whether or not he
was disappointed when I agreed with him wholeheartedly.

For three years, 1925, 1926 and 1927, I was a "seasonal coach," a phenomenon
that has almost disappeared from the coaching scene in view of the ever-
increasing complexities of the sport. I reported to Bill early in the fall, lived

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football for three months and then headed for Georgia where, with my father, I
struggled in the peach business. It wasn't the best of possible starts because of
my necessarily divided interests, but at least I had taken a long step and
fortunately was working with a staff and for an institution with whose
objectives and methods I was familiar.

My beginning or formative seasons as a coach were literally worth their weight

in gold. My primary duty was with the freshman backs, many of whom had had
little more than a smattering of football fundamentals in secondary school. It
meant lots of pick-and-shovel work and gave me a chance to experiment with
teaching techniques. In fact, those early years at Princeton were much like post-
graduate courses in education, for I certainly learned more about the “do’s and
don't's” of coaching than my backfield candidates did about the fine points of
football.

For one thing, it soon became apparent that a coach, like any teacher, must
know and “have the feel” of the college institution which he serves. If he
doesn't understand just how the curriculum operates, what challenges his
players are facing in other phases of university life, and the balance effected
between athletics and the primary purposes of higher education, he is in for
trouble. From my standpoint, football players are first college undergraduates
and then football players. Consequently, coaching methods, or perhaps the
philosophy of coaching, must be part of the total educational process.

During my three-season apprenticeship with the Princeton freshmen, several of

us - Bill Roper, Al Wittmer, Stan Keck and myself - used to talk “long and
loud” about the advisability or inadvisability of installing a standardized system
starting with freshman fall and carrying right through the full varsity cycle. I
was in the minority in that I wanted to systematize in the broad sense and
adjust only within a given framework to the material and problems at hand.
The others advocated more flexibility, varying coaching principles from fall to
fall and making allowances for a coach's prerogative to improvise.

In working day to day with the freshman, I was impressed the urgency of
stretching every hour to the limit, of making minutes count. We had
approximately ten hours of practice-time a week and it seemed only logical to
correlate freshman training with the varsity program, so that the transition
from freshman to varsity competition would be similar to graduating from an
elementary to a more advanced subject. I was interested in dovetailing the
varsity and freshman curricula rather than running the risk of having them

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overlap and duplicate one another in time-consuming details.

To strengthen my point, I then argued - and still do –that personnel shortages

created by graduation and other causes beyond your control mold your
approach to a freshman squad. The fundamentals of any given system remain
constant, but you must have physically qualified, trained manpower to make the
system click. The varsity coaching staff knows what it will need most the
following year and the freshman coaches must bend every effort toward
developing replacements, even if it means wholesale shifting of personnel, from
position to position, until you have your real football players in the slots there they
can help most.

While I was inching ahead, debating the merits and disadvantages of coaching
systems with my colleagues in the Osborn Club House, Bill started using me
more and more on scouting assignments. The famous non-scouting agreement
he and T.A.D. Jones at Yale had drawn up in 1926 did not then extend to other
rivals and l found myself in a new role as a diagnostician. Princeton and Ohio
State were to meet in the Tigers' next-to-last game in 1927 and Mid-Western
football suddenly became one of my primary concerns.

These excursions into the Middle West were eye opening, inasmuch as each of
the trips on Princeton's behalf connoted a lot more than just another glimpse
of a team we were to defeat, 20-0. Ohio, under J.W.Wilce, was an interesting
team to watch; but, more important, in scouting the Buckeyes, I was brought
into contact with representatives of Bob Zuppke at Illinois, Tad Wieman at
Michigan, Doc Spears (father of Yale's 1951 captain) at Minnesota, Dick
Hanley at Northwestern and, of course, the one and only Rockne. To a certain
degree we compared notes and inevitably got around to the question of East
vs. Middle West, a question no one has yet succeeded in answering to the
satisfaction of one and all.

Although none of the men l have just mentioned had any appreciable influence
upon my interpretations of football, it was a mighty healthy development to
hash through and to think together about our widely divergent points of view.
One or two were still intrigued with Wally Steffens' spinner plays, others were
talking about varieties of backfield shifts and still others were blueprinting the
future of razzle-dazzle that was to win recognition under Andy Kerr, Francis
Schmidt, Lou Little, Ray Morrison and many others. What counted was the fact
that we were all thinking about football and turning our backs on the old idea
of bruising man-to-man combat.

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At the close of the 1927 season l again went to Bill Roper and told him I
wanted to move on, that I felt prepared to stand on my own feet, if any
institution thought it advisable to entrust its football hopes to a man aged
twenty-five. My years at Princeton, combined with four summers of camp-
work, had been a thoroughly satisfying period and more than anything else I
wanted to continue my work with boys. Football at the intercollegiate level was
my first love. Nonetheless, if circumstances had dictated otherwise, l would
have welcomed a chance to serve as a coach, or teacher-coach, in any type of
school.

Thanks to the luck of the draw, and of course to Bill Roper's help, I emerged as
the number one man in a field of thirty-five applicants for a year-round job at
Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, the college I look upon as my
second alma As I now think back to the crucial year of 1928, I am still amazed
by the almost overwhelming confidence l had in myself and in my knowledge
of coaching. At Princeton l had argued vociferously for a system, and here I
was on my own with two assistant coaches and a veteran dominated varsity
squad.

My first four years at Williams came remarkably close to spoiling me is a college

football coach. In an institution of some eight hundred undergraduates, all of
whom had met a four-year “Latin Requirement” in gaining their places in the
student body, we proceeded to roll up twenty-five victories and three ties in a
total of thirty-two games, and in the process annexed four straight “Little
Three” championships (Amherst, Wesleyan and Williams). We started out
cautiously, used both Single Wing and Double Wing and began experimenting
with men-in-motion and some of my own wrinkles.

We roared through the 1928 season, losing only to Columbia. Up to the varsity
in the fall of 1929 came the members of the Class of 1932, one of the top
athletic classes in Williams history and comparable to the equally great
Princeton Class of 1951. The squad was just as eager as the coach and we were
off to the races. Satisfied with the squad's mastery of basic football, I
broadened the base of operations and built up a repertory of plays, and
variations of plays, that would have been a credit to any one of the country's
front-rank football powers. Everything went our way through the 1931 season
and at the moment I didn't realize that nothing is more dangerous, or more
meeting, than temporary success in football.

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In those early golden years in the Berkshires I stepped far beyond the confines
of football. In 1929 l assumed direction of basketball, a sport I had played as a
Princeton underclassman and as a member of the championship Montclair A.
C. team in the winkers of 1926 and 1927. Two years later I added baseball to
my portfolio. Nothing could have pleased me more than the three-sports
status. One season flowed into the next and mine were the rewards of close
associations with boys throughout the college year. The tough part of the
arrangement was that it sliced deeply into the weeks and months I should have
been devoting to the study and analysis of football.

Captain Bill Fowle and his 1932 classmates moved on and in the fall of 1932
the opposition lowered the boom. Somehow or other we managed to squeeze
by Rochester, 6-0, but lost the other seven games, including a 31-7 setback at
Amherst's hands and a 13-6 loss to Wesleyan. This undistinguished record, my
first unsuccessful campaign as a head coach, was attributable to what I would
call coaching oversight. We were short of material; at the same time, we were
attempting the impossible by overburdening a thinly manned team with too
much football. In academic terms, we had been spoiled by a succession of
honors classes and had failed to pitch the contents of our courses to an average
group of students.

The 1932 season, my low point to date from the point of view of winning
percentages, demonstrated conclusively that in the coaching profession there
can be no substitute for paying unremitting attention to what is happening in
football, not only in your own league or section but in all parts of the nation. It
was obvious that we at Williams were in for a couple of building years and that
I couldn't afford to bypass any opportunity to swap ideas with other coaches. I
started haunting the off-season clinics in New England, the Middle West,
wherever school or college coaches might be gathering for workshop sessions.

Evolving a systems or a doctrine, of football is at best an incredibly tedious

undertaking. I have frequently been asked, “Why do you believe that?” or
“What led you to modify those principles?” or “Why is Method A more
effective than Method Z?” In giving detailed answers to such questions, I have
found that I can't say I started doing this or that at a specific time for a specific
reason. More often a departure from normal is the result of cooperative
thinking and research. For instance, the germ of an idea might originate with
me. I apply it in one way, pass along the thought at a clinic and someone else
comes up with another application. By combining the two different
interpretations of the same basic thought we contribute together to the

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storehouse of football knowledge.

As I moved from clinic to clinic, first as a student and later as an instructor, I

was frankly searching for thoughts I could integrate with my own theories of
offensive and defensive football. I listened to hundreds of speakers, sifted
through their presentations and tried to pinpoint their lines of reasoning. Gus
Dorais, one of the first of the great passers and a meticulous student of
football, gave me several new slants on the passing attack he was then using at
the University of Detroit. Noble Kizer, head coach at Purdue from 1930
though 1936, and Arthur Sampson, a staunch advocate of the Single Wing
since his coaching days at Tufts, bolstered some of my convictions about Single
Wing blocking. Fred Brice at Maine shared his original thoughts about
modifying backfield assignments in the Single Wing.

In 1933, when we were two years away from another sound Williams unit, we
participated in a “practical clinic” - possibly “laboratory period” would be a
better phrase - and engaged Fritz Crisler's championship Princeton team in
Palmer Stadium. For ten minutes our outgunned squad made a gallant stand
but then the dam broke and the Tigers' Power, in the persons of Garry LeVan,
Homer Spofford, Pepper Constable and Paul Pauk, swept through our
defenses. The game, aside from the 45-0 score, was a significant one for me, in
that it was my just experience with Crisler's highly deceptive shifting attack,
elements of which have been incorporated in the modern Single Wing.

ln the early l930's George Munger and I established our mutually beneficial
“Single Wing partnership at a distance.” We were old friends and had been
closely associated in summer-camp work. George took over the coaching reins
at Episcopal Academy, Philadelphia, and began tinkering with some of the
plans we had concocted during the summer. I would do the same thing at
Williams and then feed suggestions to George. The following summer we
would check our bearings to see just what we had succeeded in accomplishing.
When he was named head coach at the University of Pennsylvania, we
continued the practice, with George getting the worse part of the bargain
because he was solely concerned with football and I was running a three-sports
program.

Up until 1934 I considered myself very much of a traditionalist in the sense that
we were ironing out and modifying standard formations. We had our once-or-
twice-a-game passes and running plays and took the “normal gambles” in
preparing for the annual “Little Three” games or superior opponents. Probably

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because of my faith in solid football, and my distrust of gridiron gimmicks, I

have never in my “salad years” of coaching organized game strategy around the
unorthodox. Offensively we were operating from the Single Wing employing
Minnesota variations to disguise our formations. Defensively we were
investigating the possibilities of more fluid line play.

Amherst in 1934 fielded a magnificent team, a squad in which our scouts could
find few flaws. There was little hope of meeting Lloyd Jordan's team on even
terms, unless somehow or other we could throw it off balance and conceivably
score before it regained its poise. We knew that the Amherst
guards were light, so we re-rigged our attack, supplanted our regular guards
with two large tackles and concentrated on moving the ball behind four big
tackles.

We needed every football player we could muster, if we weren't going to lose

our scalps, and the guards became the key men in our defensive alignments. We
taught the linemen six different looping defenses - the first time, I believe, that
such tactics had been used on such an intensive scale.
When the Amherst linemen couldn't get to the men were supposed to take out
and their attack began to sputter, in would go the husky shock troops who led
out plunging backs to a pair of touchdowns, an eventual 14-0 victory, and my
first major upset of an opponent.

I am not turning back the clock to chortle, nor to make it look as if I were out -
masterminding the opposition - but to emphasize that nine times out of ten
widely ballyhooed upsets are not flukes. They represent carefully calculated
risks on the part of the weaker teams and they can only be brought about by
squads that have enough determination, ability and balance to follow rehearsed
scripts and to capitalize upon breaks when they occur. Conversely, before
gambling upon the unusual, you must have an imaginative, flexible system
which can absorb the new, or the unfamiliar, and make the added elements
appear to be nothing more than variations of your normal game procedures.

The 1935 season, the culmination of four rugged years of work, was one of the
most thoroughly satisfying periods of my life. We had dropped into the depths
and had fought our way back to success with the strongest combination I was
to develop in seventeen years in Williamstown. The test of all I had learned
came early in the fall and once more in Palmer stadium we squared off against
an undefeated Princeton array. Chances for a triumph over the Tigers were
remote. We were stepping out of our football class, as we did once a year

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during my tenure at Williams. Yet I was sure that we had built so solidly that
we could hold our own in any company.

Princeton's explosive backs - with LeVan and Constable in the starting

backfield-meant that our special preparations for the contest were largely
defensive. We scrambled our defenses, stressing the looping and splits we had
found so effective the preceding November against Amherst. We had brought
in the shifting huddle and beyond that had left our attack alone. It was 7-7 at
the half, with a 56-yard scoring run in the third quarter accounting for the
Tigers' 14-7 win. We played a deliberate, defensive game, punting eleven times
to Princeton's four. We “hit” on our one scoring opportunity, completed six
out of eleven passes and had a goal-ward-bound halfback, one of the three
starting backs to play the entire game, hauled down from behind on the
Princeton 20-yard line - by Bill Roper, Jr., Princeton end and son of my former
coach.

Following the eminently successful 1935 campaign - our only loss that fall was
to Princeton - we experienced the normal ups and dawns that are part of any
coach's life and produced a fair share of victories in our own circles. My
thinking underwent no radical alterations, as I sought to inject more and more
versatility in our offense, stressing the running pass, an almost unstoppable
attacking instrument when it is properly executed; testing the merits of spread
formations; and dipping back into the dim distant past to resurrect the wedge
play of turtle-neck sweater fame.

In 1937 and 1938 Dick Harlow, a brilliant teacher and strategist, whose
superbly coached clubs returned the Crimson of Harvard to the heights in the
late 1930's, opened my eyes to the potentialities of the spinning offense. I had
only dabbled with the possibilities up to that time, while Dick had so perfected
his deceptive running attack that in one game his championship 1937 team
threw exactly one pass in romping to a one-sided victory. Dick gave me all
sorts of help and advice, and in 1939, with Williams' football fortunes on the
ebb, we went all-out the spinning series of plays that were to be our “bread-
and-butter” in 1940, 1941 and 1942. It took a full year to acquire the necessary
polish and finesse, but in my last twenty-four games as head coach at Williams
the record read twenty wins, three defeats (Amherst, Army and Princeton) and
a tie.

No one in the field of education could ever forget the puzzling uncertainties of
the early years of World War II, when all of our hopes, thoughts and energies

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were subordinated to the war effort. One undergraduate put it this way: “No
one is perfectly sure he should be here studying- no one is sure how long he
will be here.” That was how my last Williams football squad (1942) felt and its
members gave every game everything they had as they prepared them selves for
the near future and the heavy responsibilities of war service. The fact that we
were playing at all was infinitely more important than the final scores. Even the
long- sought victory over Princeton, 19-7, seemed insignificant at the time and
I wouldn't have believed it, if someone had then told me that six members of
the 1942 Princeton team would be playing for me at Princeton in 1946 and 1947.

At the close of the 1942 season Williams found it advisable to suspend football
for the duration and, like everyone else, I wanted to have a share in winning the
war. I knocked on all of the right doors, talked persuasively to admirals and
corporals, but couldn't talk away defective eyesight. I remained on at Williams,
coaching informal baseball and basketball teams and working in the physical
training division of the Navy's V-5 and V-12 programs. In the fall of 1943,
another milestone in my education as a coach, I obtained a leave of absence
from Williams to serve as line coach at Yale under Howard Odell.

The three months in New Haven were extremely worthwhile. The T, the oldest
of the basic offensive formations, to which present-day coaches led by Clark
Shaughnessy had added men-in-motion and flankers, was exploding all over the
place in all of its glory. Howie was using it at Yale and so were all of the teams
Yale was playing. Delighted with the prospect of studying and dissecting a
formation I had never considered, I went to work in much the same way a
scientist would examine a specimen under a microscope. I couldn't believe that
T was sounding the death knell of the Single Wing, nor could I understand why
T was becoming such a fad.

Certainly the T is no easier to teach, although in drilling the Yale linemen I did
decide that a young squad, with limited manpower and a lack of football savvy,
can assimilate the elements of the T more easily than it can the fundamentals of
the Single Wing. It should be remembered that defense is largely a matter of
habit and that during the war years the T, with its almost infinite number of
play combinations, had upset the balance between offense and defense.
Existing defensive practices and theories tended to break down in the face of
the new threat and only gradually did players and coaches begin getting the feel
of this revamped formation.

In 1944, after any hopes of re-establishing football at Williams as part of the

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naval training program had gone glimmering, I did some scouting for Earl Blaik
and followed the Navy team the Cadets were to defeat, 23-7, in Baltimore for
Army's first win over the Midshipmen since 1938. My respect for the T in its
various forms continued to grow, but an old Single Winger dies hard. I was
struck by the feasibility of retaining the Single Wing and strengthening its
assets, much as double blocking on key plays, with T trimmings, including
flankers, men-in-motion, split ends and the other attachments customarily
associated with the T.

Late the same fall, just twenty years after I had played my last game as a
Princeton senior, I was invited to return to Princeton as head coach of football
and baseball. The appointment was effective February 1, 1945, at the
conclusion of the Williams basketball season, and I found it hard to believe that
some time in the foreseeable future - the war permitting - I would be
exchanging Little Three competition for the so-called “Big Three” round robin.
Williams and Williams athletics had been a vital part of my life for seventeen
long years; but I simply couldn't resist the challenge presented by what I looked
upon as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

In the athletic sense Princeton in 1945 was not the University I had known in
the 1920's, nor the Princeton of Crisler and Wieman in the l930's and early
1940's. The campus under the pressure of war had become a training
installation for the Armed Forces and in the space of three years some twenty
thousand men - Army, Navy and Marines - had “passed through” en route to
specialized duty in all parts of the world. Princeton had won one football game
in 1943. An informal Navy-Marine team had represented the University in
1944, defeating Muhlenberg and losing to Swarthmore and the Atlantic City
Naval Air Station. Football, as it had been played at Princeton before the war,
had disappeared from the scene.

With the University working overtime on the Princeton Program for

Servicemen and hoping to return to a normal program of athletics in the fall of
1945, time was once more of the essence. The question of organizing a staff -
the heaviest responsibility shouldered by any head coach - came first. Then, as
we were welding the staff into an operating partnership, came the short-range
problems of readying a squad for a seven-game schedule.

From the outset it was obvious that what we did for the 1945 season would
have little, if any, bearing upon our Coaching preparations for the long pull.
The Single Wing remained our stock in trade, but we were starting from scratch

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with a wonderfully spirited squad that was handicapped by an almost total lack
of football experience. Under the circumstances it was necessary to temporize,
and the stay selected to string along with the T for one season.

That scrappy 1945 team, the first and only T squad I have directed, set
Princeton squarely on the comeback trail with its 14-6 win over Cornell. The
game itself, on a boggy field at Ithaca, was a magnificent team accomplishment
which did more to rekindle “Princeton spirit” than anything I ever could have
done. The squad's buses rolled back to the campus Sunday evening to be
greeted by most of the student body. The band was crashing out Princeton
songs in the flickering light of a torchlight procession and for the first time I
could make myself believe that war was really over, that it might not take too
long to re-establish a football tradition which had been weakened by the
demands of war.

By the opening of the 1946 season most of the former Princeton football
players - men like Dick West and Frank Perantoni - were back in the University
and we lost little time in reverting to the Single Wing. In turning our backs on
what we gained with the T, we voluntarily - according to pre-cut pattern -
entered upon one, two, or possibly three years of uncertainty with the
understanding that we were laying the brickwork for the years ahead. However,
the type of personnel available in 1946 dictated an immediate departure from
the spinning series deception I had learned to count upon in my last Falls at
Williams.

Our 1946 fullbacks were big, punishing runners. They were more than
satisfactory in applying straight ahead power, but they didn't possess all of the
attributes required of a spinning fullback, one of the toughest individual jobs in
football. The spin, dependent upon polished execution and split-second timing
in lending deception to an attack, was supplanted by the buck lateral, a simpler,
equally effective form of chicanery previously exploited by Bernie Bierman at
Minnesota and modified by Crisler in his years at Princeton and Michigan.

We got off to what I thought was a flying start in the first four games in 1946,
throwing back Brown and Rutgers, losing to Harvard by the margin of a point-
after-touchdown and bowing to a superior Cornell team, 14-7. That brought an
us up to the Pennsylvania encounter on Franklin Field and I could only pray
that we could give a creditable showing against a team rated among the first
three in the land. An hour before the kickoff my fingers were still crossed, in
the hope that a lacing from Pennsylvania wouldn't sap the faith the squad was

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showing in the things we were trying to teach.

In accordance with the scouting reports, we had revised our defenses,

weakening the middle, throwing strength to the flanks to check Pennsylvania's
galloping halfbacks and shuffling our linebackers. We had intensified our
offensive drills and had carried them a step beyond what had already been
installed. What eventually took place in the presence of seventy-two thousand
persons is now history. The two teams came up to halftime all even, 14-14, and
Princeton won the game in the final minute of play on Ken Keuffel's 19-yard
field goal. Reports of the victory naturally stressed the dramatic aspects of the
upset and underplayed the developments I liked most, such as the fact that
Pennsylvania in the first twelve minutes of the second half had the ball just
four times, that we controlled the game in its closing stages by marching with
the ball.

One of my favorite newspaper clippings contains these Paragraphs which

appeared the Monday following the triumph over Pennsylvania:

“Princeton worked from the Single Wing but also with a man-in-motion, with a
flanker, with two close-up backs so near the line as to present L and Z
formations - and not only with the center spinning the ball directly to the
fullback, but sometimes handing it directly to the operator closest to him.
Seldom in the second half did Princeton call a play which did not find three
men handling the ball.

“In this way, the Tigers combined all of the deception of the T with the power
of the Single Wing, and to this they added the refinement of the mousetrap.
Outweighed by an average of 25 pounds to a man on the line, they had to do
something; so they'd voluntarily open up like the Spider inviting the Fly - and
then knock down low-charging guards and tackles from the side, with the ball
carrier sprinting through the resultant gap.”

How I wish all the above were true - then and now! The Pennsylvania game, in
which we had befuddled experienced observers as well as the opposition, was
the turning point, although it was followed by successive losses to Virginia,
Yale and Dartmouth. Princeton had demonstrated conclusively, through sheer
determination, that it was able to hold its own with the best the Ivy Group had
to over and the coaching staff in turn had proved to the players that the system
was intrinsically sound. Red Smith, of the New York Herald Tribune, expressed it
cogently the following October in writing, “They weep no more at Princeton.”

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In winning the Big Three championship in 1947, and successfully defending

that title in 1948 and 1949, we made no basic changes in the Princeton offense.
While we were marking time insofar as innovations were concerned, we were
polishing the small things, constantly accentuating the possibilities afforded by
the buck lateral and steaming out the wrinkles in such present-day musts as line
quarterbacking.

In 1948 the sideline quarterbacks refused to listen. The preceding fall our
freshman team, the Class of 1951, had romped through a championship
season, Princeton's first undefeated freshman team since 1934. Word went
around the circuit to the effect that “Princeton is loaded - watch out for those
sophomores.” Up went the ballyhoo balloon that was to be punctured by three
straight losses in the first three games in 1948. We on the scene - and I, for
one, don't agree with the blackly pessimistic school of coaches - did our best to
keep the facts in the proper perspective. We gave out the cold dope and
insisted we were in the midst of a “building year.” I remember telling Frank
Graham of the New York Journal-American, who was kind enough to recall my
remarks two years later, that “by 1950 we may have a real football team.”

I have no aspirations to be known as a prophet, but in 1948 l did have enough

faith in our way of football, and in our green sophomores, to project a
timetable coinciding with the Class of 195l's four-year cycle. None of us were
conjuring up visions of an undefeated season in 1950, for in modern football, a
sport in which anything can happen, an all-winning record calls for a
combination of ability, luck, freedom from injuries and a number of
intangibles, including perseverance and the quality of the leadership furnished
by the squad's upperclassmen.

The 1950 team, dominated by the Class of 1951 and my first undefeated squad,
was the culmination of everything I had been striving for ever since I began
making the rounds of the clinics in the 1930's. I wouldn't hesitate to call it a
“dream Single Wing team,” although oldtimers - even men who had been out
of football for as little as five or six years - wouldn't have recognized any part
of its attacking formations except the original alignment just after the team
came out of the huddle. In rolling up 349 points in nine games, seven of which
it sewed up in the first period by grabbing the ball and marching for scores, it
became the personification of the modern Single Wing.

Counting freshman year, it had taken the seniors four full beats to reach the

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heights and in that period they absorbed more football than any group of men
I have ever coached. From game to game, the 1950 season was my easiest year
of football, for the majority of the players had become accustomed to the
system in their underclass years and were ready for the advanced Single Wing
course, including the long-gainers, the “candy plays,” advocated by adherents
of the T.

Our success in 1950 dramatically illustrated how the popularity of the T has
helped the few of us who have stuck with the Single Wing. We see the T week
after week in a variety of forms, but in most cases we are the only Single Wing
club our opponents face in a nine-game season. A T team, that has been
battling T rivals for a month or so, has to give up at least several days of
practice to its preparations for a solid Single Wing, if its members, particularly
inside linemen, are not to be completely confused by the power and trap-
designs of the Single Wing.

The development of the 1950 team again drove home the point that there are
no short cuts in coaching. Ready-made football players, meaning those natural
athletes capable of standing the gaff of college football upon graduation from
secondary school, come along all too seldom. Only eight of our 1950 lettermen
were potential college regulars when they entered Princeton. Six of out 1950
stand-bys had spent one or more seasons with the junior varsity, and a regular
guard, after failing to make his freshman squad, had been a jayvee for one
season and a fourth-stringer on the varsity before he developed into an
offensive starter in September of his senior year.

Men, like that slightly built guard, who refuse to give up on themselves and
keep plugging away until they make the grade, explain why coaches go right on
coaching and why few of us look upon the number of wins and losses as the
true index of our success. Now and then you come up with a team like the
1950 Princeton team, but after the thrills of success have faded and you drop
back to normalcy, it is the men, not the scores, you remember.

In coming down through the years, tracing the step-by-step

Evolution of the “Caldwell version” of the Single Wing, I am afraid I may have
sounded egotistical. Gone are the days when the head coach constituted a one-
man staff and worried as much about the minutiae of football as he did about
the so-called “big picture.” Nothing could be farther from the impression I
would like to create, inasmuch as coaching today is a staff proposition, out and
out, and no head coach can be a bit better than his staff. In my opinion there

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isn't a man in the profession who can fulfill his coaching mission to the best of
his ability without the full-time help of other coaches, of specialists possessing
a searching knowledge of the science of football.

The rapid advance of the sport, with the still-growing emphasis upon individual
techniques and both team and individual specialization, has created a variety of
teaching problems that are directly related to the time factor. With only a
limited number of hours at your disposal, say a maximum of two hours a day at
the height of the season, you squeeze as much as you can out of every available
minute in the same way a teacher organizes a laboratory course in natural
science. Daily practice-schedules are laid out ahead of time and the basic
element in the football curriculum is the group-work conducted by the assistant
coaches.

The football staff in the l950's is reminiscent of a military general staff and a
head coach worries as much about the unity and morale of his staff as he does
about the physical and mental condition of his squad. The head coach,
following through the military analogy, is a combination of the chief of staff
and commanding general; his assistants are the staff section chiefs, who are
consulted every step of the way. Only rarely do I make command decisions
alone, because I have found that it is sounder procedure to act upon and abide
by staff decisions. When it is difficult to reconcile conflicting thoughts in open
discussion, I of course step in and we move on from there as a staff.

Our varsity staff - partnership would be an equally descriptive term - is a

smaller and perhaps more compactly organized unit than the staffs at many
major institutions. Not until 1949, with our switchover to the two-platoon
system within the limitations imposed by manpower, did we add a fifth man to
the staff. Up to that point we had retained the traditional
compartmentalization, consisting of the head, or team coach, and coaches in
charge of ends, linemen and backs. The fifth man, sometimes referred to as
assistant line coach or center coach, was essentially a defensive coach, charged
with implementing the defensive strategy conceived by the staff as a whole.

The use we make of motion pictures, teaching aids we couldn't do without,

illustrates how we operate as a staff. On the Sundays and Mondays following
games, we generally spend fifteen to twenty hours with the game films, grading
every man on every play, offensive or defensive, in which he participated. The
backfield coach charts the performances of his group, the line and defensive
coaches grade the linemen, the end coach the ends. After the marks have been

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posted and the individual breakdowns analyzed, the group coaches meet with
their squads and then sit down with each man, explaining shortcomings and
offering any criticism in private rather than in the presence of others. The
quarterbacks, both offensive and defensive, are my responsibility during the
grading-sessions.

The following week's work is planned Monday morning, on the basis of what
we have seen in the films and after the scout, normally a member of the varsity
staff, has presented the salient facts about next Saturday's opponent. Copies of
practice-schedules for recent years are close at hand and we refer to them
frequently in blocking out the work-hours ahead. Each member of the staff has
an opportunity to state just what he feels his group should concentrate upon
and is urged to make suggestions about the routine for the entire squad.

During the season, the members of the staff will devote an average of five
hours a day to staff meetings. Military staffs have their “situation rooms” and
we have our “strategy room,” which is off-limits for everyone except staff
members and the junior varsity and freshman coaches. There we assemble after
breakfast, after lunch and in the evenings. Our get-togethers may start out as
semi-formal around-the-table conferences but they soon break up into a series
of individual discussions. I set the pitch for the sessions, outlining with the aid
of films and the inevitable “chalk-talk” the general objectives and team
problems.

Once the main points have been covered, the staff turns to details. I may be at
the blackboard with the backfield coach, possibly checking spacing or trying to
devise methods of improving our timing on a particular play. The defensive
coach will be “briefing” the junior varsity coach on the type of offense he
would like to have the jayvees use the following day. The line and end coaches
will be off in one corner, running and rerunning game films in the hope that
they will be able to pinpoint why so-and-so couldn't adjust to a “new”
situation, or why a “sure-gainer” was stopped at the line of scrimmage.

While there may be nothing unique about our work-sessions, they are
mentioned at some length to show that present-day coaching is cooperation
multiplied to the nth degree, that a head coach in talking and writing technical
football is first of all the spokesman for a battery of coaches. The following
chapters on the “what” and “how” of the modern Single Wing are the result of
thousands of hours of staff-teaching and staff-coaching and are presented as
the work and cumulative experiences of the members of the staff.

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FUNDAMENTALS

In presenting the Princeton offense, we start with the fundamentals that are
taught to linemen and backs alike. Some players have an instinctive grasp of
them, others have to be carefully drilled. Actually, in teaching fundamentals,
our approach is to make blocking, in the basic sense, a reflex. It should become
an acquired habit, requiring no mental effort. Reaching this goal calls for slow,
sound building.

Princeton's offense has become noted for the decisiveness of its blocking, both
team and individual. A block cannot be thrown without first getting in position,
so lesson number ones the proper stance.

STANCE

Modern defensive shifting, forcing as it does the last-second switching of

blocking assignments, calls for a stance which allows a blocking lineman to pull
to either side or to go straight ahead. His feet should be planted straight ahead
and parallel, spaced about shoulder width, one foot three or four inches back,
according to individual preference. He should ease down from the hips, back
straight, eyes ahead, putting down the hand on the same side as the back foot.
It should be done naturally, without reaching and with a little weight on the
knuckles. From this position he can go in any direction.

In lining up, players should align their feet with the next man to avoid bows in
the line. See Diagram 1.

PREVENTING BOWED LINES

DIAGRAM 1

Backs should use the same fundamental stance except that not all of them use
the three point one. The wingback does, but he is not always squared with the
line of scrimmage. In some cases he can be cheated around, either out or in. All
other backs place their feet the same but do not put a hand down. They stand
with hands on knees, heads up and body weight evenly distributed, providing
the opportunity for movement straight ahead or laterally.

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SHOULDER USE

In our offensive charge we are not interested solely in stunning the defense
with the initial impact, and we therefore try to teach a step charge as opposed
to a lunge or uncoil. We want the blocker to step off on the charge, holding his
feet and sustaining the block above everything else. This ability to sustain a
block is all important, which is our reason for preferring the step charge.

Learning the use of the shoulder should come first in all blocking, including the
step charge method. Once this is a reflex action, the remaining blocking
techniques become routine. Since the use of the shoulder is also a fundamental
in tackling, learning how to use it serves a double purpose.

Let us consider first a shoulder block using the left shoulder against a defensive
man head-on, or on the left shoulder of the blocker. From the proper stance,
the first movement is a feint to the left with the head, while stepping into the
man with left leg and shoulder. Then, bringing the head back to the right and
dipping the shoulder to aim at a point just above the opponent's thigh, the
blocker lifts and starts to drive. A helpful gimmick for maintaining contact is to
keep trying to step on the defender's toes. The blocker's arms come up to a
thrust, forming a solid blocking wall to stop a spin out or slide, and his neck
and shoulder keep the contact while his legs move at top speed, driving up
under the body. He should try to work around, keeping his body between the
defensive man and the ball or direction of the hole.

This should all be done as a form of reflex, with the left foot and left leg under
the left shoulder at the time of contact to give added lift and drive when
needed most. Thorough drilling should make this a process that does not have
to be thought through. The blocker's head is up at all times.

The procedure is reversed for the right shoulder block, and again the important
thing is to get the right leg close under the shoulder for the start of the drive.

CROSS-BODY BLOCK

The cross-body block is essentially a natural development from the shoulder

block and should be taught as such. All blocking, actually, should be taught as
stemming from the basic principle of getting the shoulder in first, with the leg
under the shoulder.

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The need for the cross-body block comes when the defensive tactics of the
opponent cause the blocker to convert from his original shoulder block to a
side-body block. In the shoulder block, we pointed out that the blocker's body
should always be between the defender and the point of attack. The
fundamental shoulder block achieves this purpose unless the defensive player
retreats.

If the blocker has made proper contact for starting a shoulder block and the
defender starts to retreat, sliding laterally to the play, the blocker must be
prepared to switch to a cross-body block. Again we use the left shoulder as an
example. To slip into a cross-body block, he comes up fast with his legs and
extends his left arm out and beyond the opponent's left leg, trying to reach the
ground with his hand, while bringing his left leg up between the defender's legs.
This builds an effective wall across the opponent's legs with the side of the
body.

This should take the defender off his feet, and it is important to maintain the
wall by crabbing forward on all fours until this is achieved.

The same principles apply when this block is thrown on the run. The shoulder
should go in first, followed immediately by a slide on by into the cross-body.
By driving the shoulder in first, the blocker avoids that often-seen situation of a
man hitting the ground far short of his target. Proper use of the shoulder
fundamental soon develops effective cross-body blocking for both close-in
work and openfield technique.

REVERSE CROSS-BODY BLOCK

The reverse cross-body uses another of our fundamental blocking principles:

the taking advantage of a position or angle held on an opponent. The situation
calling for this block finds the blocker having lateral position on a defender
who is moving directly or obliquely toward our own goal line in pursuit of the
ball carrier. See Diagram 2 for the positions involved.

This is called a reverse cross-body because the blocker reverses his position by
throwing his head in the direction of his own goal. This is effective as it brings
the heaviest part of the body into play for striking the blow. The technique is as
follows:

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POSITIONS FOR REVERSE CROSS BODY

DIAGRAM 2

When the opponent's right side is exposed, the blocker approaches with his
own left side, getting as close in as possible before throwing the block. With his
head pointing toward his own goal, the blocker makes his final take-off from
his left foot in close, dipping his left shoulder into the opponent's mid-section.
On the next step with his right leg, the blocker throws his hips onto the
defender's exposed leg, putting his left leg in behind it and rolling his body up
and in until the opponent's exposed leg collapses under the weight of the drive.
The secret of the power in this block is in holding the rolling of the body until
close enough to reach the opponent with good drive. If the block is thrown
from too far out, the power of the drive is expended too early, allowing the
man to side-step or dodge. We will further discuss this block in later sections.

PEELBACK BLOCKING

Although this type of blocking is certainly not a novel idea, we do feel that we
are unique at Princeton in teaching it as a fundamental theory. The team as a
whole becomes "peelback" conscious, and it becomes the rule rather than the
exception to have two or more blocks by any individual on one play.

Stated simply, "to peel back" means to block behind the runner, and it has an
important purpose. The slower linemen and those with speed who are not in a
position to get ahead of the runner can contribute a block by taking men who
are chasing the ball carrier. This allows the ball carrier to make better use of
fakes and maneuvers in avoiding tacklers ahead of him, in the assurance that
pursuing tacklers will be "peeled off" his back. The time given him to make
these maneuvers, when he might otherwise be overtaken, is an important factor
in springing him loose for the whole distance. Peelback blocking can be
extemporaneous or it can be assigned, as will be shown later in play
assignments. Perhaps its best aspect is the way it makes the team look for the
impromptu block that can be the key to a touchdown after the runner seemed
cornered.
The actual technique calls for either a long body block or a shoulder block. The

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relative speeds of the blocker and tackier determine the point of inception. If
the tackier is moving faster, the blocker should hit low, aiming for a point just
above the shoe tops. Since the tackier seldom sees the blocker in this case this
is usually sufficient to cut him down. If the blocker is moving faster, he can aim
higher, usually for the top of the thighs at the opponent's point of bend. When
the defender is merely standing around, a good shoulder block to the
midsection will do the trick.

We use films of peelback blocking to point out the advantages of this

operation. They have been effective in impressing the team, so that we
sometimes have a single peelback blocker cutting off two or three tacklers. In
the films, we stress cases where the lack of peelback blocking prevented a
runner from going farther, pointing out the spots where the blocks could have
been thrown. Then we show pictures of long runs clearly made possible by
peelback blocking. The teaching points are clear and simple, and the peelback
has taken its place as a basic fundamental of a blocking offense.

PASS PROTECTION BLOCKING

Protecting the passer is the vital element in a successful passing attack. The
soundness of the protection for the passer stems from the design of the
blocking assignments for this purpose and the teaching of the technique to
carry them through. At the moment we are only concerned with the theory of
the individual's technique. Assignment patterns will come later.

We tell the individual blocker the point from which the pass will be thrown,
and we give him limiting areas from which his opponent must be kept. He
must first get between the opponent and this area. Since this usually involves
dropping back, it is imperative for all linemen to move backward on balance
and low, legs moving, while waiting to make shoulder contact. Both arms are
brought up to form a wall with the shoulders to help in preventing penetration.

Once again the position of the blocker and the speed of the opponent
determine the type of block. If the defensive player comes in slowly on a
straight line over the blocker toward the passer, the blocker should try to hold
ground and steer the man away from the limited area. If the opponent is
moving fast, a low cut-block will take advantage of his momentum. When he is
coming in fast from an outside angle, he is set up for the reverse cross-body
block previously described.

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On some pass plays the ball is thrown quickly and there is no need to protect
an area. However, the opponents must be cut down so that their hands are not
in the way of the pass. In this case, all blockers immediately throw hard, low
blocks in an attempt to clear the opponents' hands out of the path of the ball.
In general, once basic blocking fundamentals are mastered, pass protection is a
matter of selecting the best block for a situation. The important point is to get
the blocker in proper position and on balance ready to execute the proper
block.

POWER BLOCKING

Power blocking is the proper and simultaneous application of individual blocks

on one opponent by two or more men. In order to get the best results from
power blocking, we consider the following factors: the position of the
defensive men, the requirements of our plays and the type of defense
encountered. Here are the methods and procedures (see Diagram 3):

Two on One Power Block

Since all power blocks or double teams use two men on one defender, this is a
somewhat ambiguous term. It is actually the title we give to the block familiar
to most football people as the straight power block from Single Wing. It comes
when the defender is lined up in the seam between two offensive men, putting
him on the inside shoulder of each blocker, and is used on a play requiring the
defender to be moved backward and out of his original position, but not to
open a hole. Good against any method of defensive play, it is particularly
successful against a high playing type of defense.

This double team calls for simultaneous shoulder blocks by the two offensive
men. On the starting signal, both of them step in to the defender with their
inside foot, attempting to get a shoulder block, with their heads on each side of
the defender, pinning him with their shoulders. They must have their legs
under their shoulders and keep their bodies together, both in the shoulders and
trunk, so that their drive will be in a straight line, forcing the defender back. If
both men slant in from an outside position, the defender can split the seam
between them or stall them with a minimum defensive charge, taking advantage
of the weaker mechanical force applied. As already pointed out, this block
works best against a man playing high, since the blockers can get in to his mid-
section with their shoulders. It is still effective against most types of defensive
charge if the blockers concentrate on staying low and keeping their bodies

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together. As an assigned block, the two-on-one is not used much, but it

accomplishes the same result as most of the other power blocks. It is a good
block for using in practice to develop drive and power in the offensive line.

Shoot Block

This is the best double block we can get in our Single Wing formation. In it,
both blockers have blocking, or flanking, position on the defender, who is lined
up on the outside shoulder of either of the two men. Let's take here a defensive
man lined up to the left side of the offensive pair. The method of applying the
block can change to good advantage if the defender is using a known charge,
either hard or soft.

The assumed method is always that used against a hard charger. The blocker on
the left takes a lateral step of about twelve inches with his left foot, pivots to
the left and throws both hands to the ground directly along the line of
scrimmage. This is to place the heaviest part of the body, the trunk, across the
path of the opponent's charge. The blocker must keep fairly low, with his left
leg well up in support of his shoulder so that the opponent's drive does not
spin him around. His purpose is to delay the defensive man long enough for his
blocking partner to make contact and apply the power. The maneuver above is
called the post block.

The other blocker, the one who applies the power, is called the shoot blocker.
His first move is a step about half way to the defender with his right foot, then
a drive along the line of scrimmage with his next step, bringing his left foot
and left shoulder in to bear on the exposed side of the defender, in accordance
with the fundamental principle of having the leg under the shoulder. This also
prevents the defender from sliding off into the slot between the blockers. The
purpose of the shoot block is to obtain a lateral opening, and as the shoot
blocker gets contact and begins to move the defender laterally, the post blocker
comes up and joins him in a two-on-one block, driving along the line of
scrimmage.

If the opponent is a known soft charger, the post blocker's first movement is to
step right into him with the right foot and right shoulder. The shoot blocker
steps with his left foot in this case, in order to reach the sliding defensive man
more quickly. While the shoot blocker is driving to get into position to make a
lateral opening, the post tries to keep the slot between him and the shoot
blocker closed. Against this type of defense play, not as much lateral movement

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is obtained. Instead, the defender is moved back and to the side. The post
blocker must remember not to drive too hard until the shoot blocker has made
contact and applied power.

These are the two methods of double teaming a defender on the outside
shoulder of one of the blockers. The steps and blocking roles are reversed, of
course, if the defender is on the right shoulder. The positions obtained in this
type of block give the opportunity for a perfect power block, making an
excellent opening for plays developed from this phase of blocking.

Power Block

The block we specifically call a power block is the same as the shoot block,
except the defensive man is lined up head-on either one of the blockers
assigned to double team him, instead of on the outside shoulder. Here the
blocking angles obtained are not as advantageous, but the shoot blocker still
has an excellent blocking position.

Taking the case of a defender head-on the man on the left, we find that man,
the post blocker, preventing penetration. He steps in with his right foot in a
one step charge and hits and lifts with his right shoulder, the objective being to
take away the opponent's charge and straighten him up. This keeps the
opponent close to the shoot blocker, who steps in with his left foot and gets
his left shoulder and leg in at the same time. He pivots on his left foot, driving
around with his right, applying power along the line of scrimmage to move the
opponent laterally. Timing is the key to the success of this block. The shoot
blocker must come in with the full power of his leg and shoulder in a lateral
drive at the instant the post blocker has checked the defensive charge. The only
variation in technique in meeting a hard charge or a soft charge with this block
is a somewhat lower block against a hard charger.

Post and Lead Block

In this situation, the defender is in the slot or seam between the two blockers
assigned to move him laterally. We have already shown how a plain two-on-one
block can be used to move a defender in this position straight back. It is harder
to move him laterally, but it can be done if the following procedure is carried
out. The block is actually an initial impact and a brief struggle, with the two
blockers finally prevailing, and moving the defender laterally. It takes a little
time to effect a lateral opening.

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The blocker on the right is the lead blocker when the defender is to be driven
to the left. The lead man takes his first step with his left foot, moving six inches
to the right to get a better blocking position. As he does this, the post blocker
takes a step laterally and slightly back with his right foot to put himself directly
in front of the opponent's charge. The post blocker must drop very low as he
steps over, bracing himself to stop penetration. The lead blocker now pivots on
his left foot and drives hard along the line of scrimmage with his left shoulder
and left leg. The initial contact with the defender's charge is made by the post
blocker who must be low and coming up, in order to lift the defender and halt
the charge. The post fights to keep the seam closed, waiting to pick up and
drive until the lead blocker has moved the defender far enough so that the
post's drive will be a help in lateral movement. It is obvious that moving the
opponent laterally takes time. This block seems awkward at first and requires a
great deal of work, but it is the best means of achieving a lateral opening when
the defender is playing in the slot.

DIAGRAM 3

Wedge Blocking

The wedge block uses the three-on-one principle. Three offensive blockers
should be able to move one opponent either laterally or back. This block is
listed here under fundamentals, but it will be discussed in detail in the section
on the Wedge Play.

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Special Blocks

Not all double team blocks fall into the categories we have given above. For
instance, the end and wingback on the strongside of the formation work
together on the defensive tackle. The end and shortside guard of the formation
work together on the other defensive tackle. Two backs may work together on
defensive ends. Since these blocks are not fundamental in aspect and cannot be
taught as such, and since time will not allow the teaching of these blocks to all
men, their techniques will be taken up in discussing the plays in which these
blocks are used.

PULLING TECHNIQUE

"Pulling" is the term given to lateral movement by all offensive players;

linemen, centers, ends and backs. Its success in operation involves many
factors but, as in blocking, we build from a fundamental base. We mentioned
that the basic stance, which was described at the beginning of this chapter,
allowed for individual movement in any direction, and the same stance applies
here.
The individual's primary concern in pulling is with the speed and direction of
the pull, governed by the timing of the particular play being called. Speed of the
initial getaway is all important to avoid any entanglements at the start. The two
major methods of pulling are the cross-over type and the lead step type. We
prefer to use the lead step type of pulling, with particular stress on certain
important details that are often neglected.

Let's take a pull to the right. The player is in the three point stance, either hand
down, body up, eyes straight ahead. On the starting signal he steps with his
right foot to a spot six inches back and to the right of its original position,
planting his foot to point in the exact direction he wants to travel. For a run
parallel to the scrimmage line, the foot would turn ninety degrees. The angle
would be more, for a deeper pull, less for one slanting toward the line. In
taking the step, the head, shoulders and trunk swing simultaneously over the
right leg without raising the body, while the left leg pivots on the toes merely
by raising the heel. We emphasize that this step does not have to be made far
out to the right, but at least in that direction to avoid lost motion. The player is
now in a modified sprinter's start and ready to move in the direction
established by the aim of the right foot, with the left leg up on the toe and
ready to drive the body forward. Doing this all at once allows the right foot
more freedom in opening the angle, to be followed by a quick getaway.

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We stress the importance of maintaining the original crouch during the step
and pivot to avoid the waste motion of first raising and then turning. The
getaway is made at maximum speed while still low, and we like the pulling man
to run as low as possible. The body will rise automatically once the running
starts, but it is a gradual rise that does not affect the speed greatly. We work on
building up running speed in a low position, but the getaway speed and
direction, more than the running speed are the keys to successful pulling. By
becoming adept at the pivot and getaway, some linemen who lack natural speed
have been able to play regularly ahead of faster men.

Running the course comes next. Balance is very important, as the puller may be
called on to throw a block at any time or to make changes in course necessary
to carry out his assignment. Short, driving steps help maintain balance; and the
proper use of body weight to reach the objective on balance and in the shortest
possible time must be learned. Running steps should not be squared and no
square turns should be made.

We have our men think of running in a circle, which would be a circle around
to the left in pulling to the right. As the player runs this circle, he can shorten
its perimeter by leaning his weight to the inside and driving to the inside with
each step of his right foot. Leaning farther to the inside and driving harder will
reduce the perimeter accordingly. Thus, in running the course, the player must
plot a run that will get him around the turning point with maximum speed.
Most pulls through the line to linebackers, to go farther downfleld, or to get
outside position on defensive linemen, are in some form of gradual curve. This
curve varies with individuals and their body balance, but it runs fairly uniformly
throughout.

Pulling assignments fall under three general categories: Trapping Pulls; Pulls
through the Line to Block on Linebackers; and Pulls to Act as Personal
Interferer.

Trapping Pulls

A trapping pull calls for a block from the inside on a defensive lineman who
has been exposed by moving offensive men away from him. The trapping pull
is combined with a power block, based on a four man unit. See Diagram 4.

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Diagram 4

The trapper makes his initial movement as described earlier but places his right
foot short of ninety degrees. He aims it on a line through the original position
of the post blocker and runs on this line to get blocking position with his right
shoulder. He takes short steps so that he can change his direction at any time to
gain his blocking position.

The success of his assignment is governed by his position, therefore, his

original direction takes him to the worst position in which he could find the
defender, that of no penetration. When the defender has not penetrated, the
trapper uses a shoulder block. In fact, he uses the shoulder block except in
cases of deep penetration, in which case he would come back sharply on his
trapping curve and throw a reverse cross-body block. He is prepared, by using
short running steps for proper balance, to change his course, depending on the
penetration of the man to be trapped. Speed, agility and the ability to run a
course are important in performing trap blocking.

Pulls Through the Line to Block on Linebackers

This assignment is usually connected with both a trapping pull and a power
block on a given play. The puller in this case is the second man in the opening,
following the trapper, and will therefore be lined up farther removed from the
power block. He makes his initial movement with a lateral step at an angle
greater than ninety degrees and will then run a curve that takes him over the
spot where the post blocker lined up. Balance is important so that he can be
prepared to block the linebacker, using a cross-body block for the man on the
inside, a shoulder block for the man directly in the hole, or a reverse cross-body
for the man coming up on the outside. See Diagram 5.

His course is a gradual curve that allows him to clear the men on the line of

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scrimmage and get into the opening to time with the ball carrier for the most
effective blocking. The distances may vary on this type of pull, since the
trapper may be a backfield blocker not a lineman. Where the distance is short,
and curve of the pull is sharpened, this is Probably the most difficult type of
pulling to accomplish, since speed, balance and the course of pull must be
combined with good timing and good blocking ability.

PULLING FOR LINEBACKERS

DIAGRAM 5

Pulls to Act as Personal Interferer

This type of pull is governed not by distance from the opening, but by timing
with the ball carrier. In most cases, it involves outside plays where there is
some delay in getting the ball carrier and the interferer started downfield. The
pulling lineman takes his lateral step at an angle greater than ninety degrees and
runs a deeper curve behind the line of scrimmage. The direction of the pull is
determined by the position point at which he starts to lead the ball carrier.
Accordingly, his course will be deeper and his curve sharper. Speed in this pull
is necessary for getting away quickly. Success in blocking does not depend
simply on the fundamental ability to throw an openfield block, but a good deal
on the back's ability to use the interferer by setting up the block. The burden is
on the pulling lineman to get in position with enough speed to lead the ball
carrier, and the back must know how to use the blocker who is now in position
to block for him.

NUMBERING PERSONNEL

Modern football has changed our methods of referring to offensive personnel.

The old nomenclature of all positions becomes involved and inadequate under
our signal system when considering all the variables in assignments caused by
changing defenses. Our offensive players are designated by numbers 1 to 10
and X for center: #1 to #4 are backs, #5 and #6 ends, #7 and #10 guards and

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#8 and #9 tackles. These numbers assigned to ends and backs are helpful in
establishing the signal system. Diagram 6 shows how our linemen are
numbered across the formation both right and left.

In the coach's ideal dream formation, all men are of equal and outstanding
ability. Since this is in the realm of daydreams, we must take a more realistic
view. First we consider the -attack in general, then the basic fundamentals to
make it go. It is very important to fit the available material into the proper
positions, based on knowledge of the requirements of that position and the
individual's fundamental abilities. Actually this work is mainly the function of
our freshman coaching staff. The position requirements to be considered for
successful slotting of personnel by fundamental abilities are as follows:

BACKS

The backs are numbered: #1—wingback, #2—quarterback and blocking back,

#3—fullback, #4—tailback. Fitting a backfield candidate into the proper
position is sometimes the most difficult selection job of all. In varying degrees
we have to consider his speed and his ability to carry the ball, pass and block.
Perfection would have all backs proficient at all positions, but in practice,
recognizing the hairline differences for positions enables us to get a well-
balanced back-field.

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In theory, #1 should be the fastest man in the backfield, since most of his ball
carrying is done on reverses to the shortside of the formation. Along with this,
he should know how to use blockers in an openfield and to run with a personal
interferer. He is often used as a pass receiver as he is in position to get
downfield early on pass patterns. His blocking assignments, which will be
covered in the play sections, are generally summed up in a double block with
#6 end on the tackle, a reverse cross-body block on the far linebacker, and
downfield blocks, requiring him to carry a fair amount of weight. Passing ability
comes in handy on reverse passes but is not of primary importance for this
position.

#2 is the quarterback and blocking back. Blocking is his most important

function and he should have enough size to help him in it. Most of his blocks
are individual ones, with trapping the most important assignment, followed by
pass protection blocking and downfield blocking. He should be the third fastest
man among the backs as he must lead outside plays to both sides and get into
the running pass pattern. His ball carrying is similar to the fullback's. The buck
lateral sequence has opened new fields for #2 backs. If he can pass, the passing
series from the buck lateral becomes an added offensive threat similar to the
passing role of a T formation quarterback. In the buck lateral, #2 should be
adept at ball handling and faking. Finally, as a quarterback he must develop
leadership, poise and ability in calling plays and handling the team in tough
situations. Playing this position requires a great deal of football ability, but it
will be largely unrecognized in the eyes of the spectators, who watch only the
ball carrier.

#3 is the fullback. Theoretically, the slowest backfield candidate can play this
position, but his ball carrying assignment is still a valuable one, requiring
different characteristics. He should have sustained drive in lieu of breakaway
speed. Having both is desirable, but often a person with breakaway speed
cannot control it and therefore does not make a successful fullback. On most
plays in which the fullback carries, he does not start fast but should fold in on
the power blocks. At times, the opening will not appear and since most of the
interior plays are aimed at larger defenders, he should possess sustained drive
to bull his way through. His blocking assignments are those of pass protection
blocks and openfield blocks. Passing ability is desirable but not necessary. The
position of fullback in our offense can probably be learned more quickly than
the others, but to play it well and to become an outstanding member of the
offensive team requires much attention to detail of execution.

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#4 is the tailback and key ball carrier in the Single Wing formation. The triple-
threat back—run, pass, kick—is just as valuable in this position as the name
implies. In speed the #4 back is not as fast as #1 but the desirable difference is
very small. Blocking ability can be at a minimum, since an intelligent offense
does not integrate the #4 back in the blocking, but takes advantage of the
threat he offers by using him in fakes when he has no ball carrying or passing
assignment. Passing and running ability are of tremendous importance,
probably in that order. There are no primary passing requirements, since ability
to throw the quick pop pass, the standard protection pass, the jump pass and
the running pass can all be utilized. What is required is a tremendous amount
of poise and relaxation, since he has to pass under pressure, both from
inrushing opponents and when the receivers are covered by the defensive
secondary. The ability to pick out receivers and complete passes under these
conditions is a remarkable one and a key element in success as a tailback. If
tailback ball carrying is stressed, breakaway speed is desired. His plays are
designed as long gainers and should go if he uses his blockers properly. His
ability to carry out fakes when not involved in the play is also important.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that slotting backfield candidates from a
knowledge of their fundamental abilities is not so easy. The intangible qualities
that make good backs do not show up early and many of them have to be
developed. However, if a boy demonstrates at least some of the fundamentals
required for a backfield position, he has a fair chance to succeed if placed in the
best position to utilize his abilities.

ENDS

The ends of the formation are #5, or shortside end, and #6, or longside end.
In general, end candidates should conform to certain characteristics usually
identified with this position. These are more facts of physical make-up than
such intangible elements as those described for the backs.

The ends should be the fastest offensive group after the backs, since they are
ball carriers upon receiving the passes. Speed is essential if they are to outrun
the opposing backs in the secondary. In the matter of relative speed, #5 should
be faster than #6. This is based on the nature of their blocking assignments
rather than on their roles in the pass patterns of our offense.

Pass catching ability combines inherent and induced traits. Some players are
born with pass catching ability, possessing the co-ordination of hand and eye

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important for snaring the ball. Large strong hands are valuable, but not as
important as the ability to co-ordinate what the eyes see into action to be taken.
Others may have the physical make-up of a good receiver but need training in
acquiring proper coordination. Such talented boys can be taught pass receiving.

Height in an end candidate is important, but not required. Naturally, taller

players have an advantage in going up for the ball as in basketball, but lack of
height alone should not exclude a candidate from the end squad.

The ends are split into two different types of blockers. #6 should be better at
the fundamental blocks. He is required to execute individual blocks as well as
power blocks. In general, he blocks from a close position. Because we expect
#6 to be more proficient at blocking, his comparative pass catching ability can
be the lesser of the two.

#5 is the pass receiver and downfield blocker, assignments that follow

naturally, as his position allows an early start downfield away from the
concentration of strength. His openfield blocks are mostly on linebackers and
the defensive secondary, but his power blocks from the split position require a
special technique. Because we use speed and pass catching ability in this
position in preference to blocking ability, this end is an important operative in
our passing plans.

The positions are equally valuable, and the relative importance placed on the
blocking and pass catching requirements of each is close enough so that the
positions could be interchangeable. The special fundamental requirements are
indicated, however, so that end candidates can be fitted into the position
enabling them to give their best performance.

LINEMEN

Most of the fundamental material we have covered so far is the basic

groundwork for developing linemen. To find the most suitable spot for a line
candidate, we put them through all the fundamentals until the individual
characteristics and abilities become apparent. A player adept at individual
blocks is usually a good power blocker too, but a boy can be a good power
blocker without being proficient at individual blocking. Speed is considered
both in straight-away running and in quick movements for taking position and
pulling.

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#7 should be the fastest offensive lineman, and we usually select a player of the
guard type in this spot. He must lead reverses for the wingback, the fastest man
in the backfield, and be a personal interferer. In general this position calls for
individual blocking responsibility both in the open field and on the line of
scrimmage. A good individual blocker usually makes a good post blocker,
which #7 must be. On pass protection he usually draws the big defensive
tackles, so he must have sound procedure there. To sum up, speed and
individual blocking ability are the key requirements, with weight helpful but not
a necessity.

#8 can be an offensive lineman, normally a good-sized tackle, faster than #9

and ideally as fast as #7 and #10, but not as a definite requirement. This is a
key position in the offensive line, calling for intelligence and ruggedness of
character as well as blocking proficiency. He is the apex of wedge blocking and
an important shoot blocker, jobs in which weight and drive are important. He
has important cross-checking assignments and must be a good individual
blocker. He pulls as a personal interferer to block the linebacker. These
qualities of speed and agility are hard to find in big tackles, so that selecting a
boy for the #8 position should be carefully considered.

#9 is usually the spot for the big, slow tackle, but "slow" is used as a
comparative term. #9 need not be as fast as #7, #8 or #10. He is a trapper,
power blocker, apex for wedges and key pass protection blocker against the
smaller, more agile defensive guards. He should be able to get away quickly and
get in position to trap, but size is most important, as he is assigned to trap
defensive tackles on both sides. He should be big enough, with enough
sustained drive, to hit these tackles hard and stop their charge even if he is not
able to move them. Working with #8 and the center, he applies power blocks
in both directions where his weight is counted on to take effect. We can make
the wedge successful when #9 has the drive to lift opposing linemen and move
them. In individual blocking he has some cross-checking assignments, usually
removed from the play opening, but this is the least important element for
success in this position.

#10 calls for a good all-around lineman. Intelligence, speed, individual blocking
ability and all types of pull, power and pass protection blocks are required. His
assignments run the gamut of the fundamentals we have covered. The section
on plays and assignments will show this in greater detail. Of primary
importance, however, in looking for a player to fill #10 are speed and pulling
ability. He uses all types of pulls, especially trapping pulls and for blocking

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linebackers. If he can execute individual blocks while pulling he has a good

chance of succeeding as a #10 guard. Constant concentration on fundamentals
and strategy of line play are required in this position.

CENTER

In our Single Wing offense, center is a diverse job, not bound by any set of
requirements. We have had successful offensive centers of many different
physical make-ups. We have lately had a problem in finding boys for the center
position. In 1949, our four man varsity center squad consisted of four
converted fullbacks. Their only other common denominator was a desire to
succeed as a center, as their physical characteristics varied greatly.

The center must be especially well grounded in blocking fundamentals. His

blocking duties range far and wide. In some cases, he is essential to the success
of the play but for the most part he is given an average assignment. He should
be well drilled in protecting the passer, pulling and trapping, shoulder blocking
for check blocks, post blocking, power blocking and openfield blocking. Of
prime importance are his duties as a post blocker and pass protector, since
these are key assignments. His power blocking is a secondary consideration,
since we do not ask him to power-block unless he has the necessary blocking
position. Unlike some Single Wing systems, we ask our center to block
effectively even when the play is designed to the longside, as this will help in a
constant wearing down of the shortside defenders.

The crux of the problem in developing a Single Wing center lies in making him
into a good passing center without detracting from his blocking abilities. The
best ball passers are the ones who can relax and concentrate on the pass until
they have made it, and then switch immediately from the relaxed position to
their various blocking assignments.

Stance has been previously discussed for linemen and backs, but the stance of
the center is entirely different. Getting the ball ready to be passed is the first
point. For righthanders the laces should be on the lower right side one eighth
of a turn from the ground. For left-handers, this is reversed. Our stance is
designed for right formation and right-handers, since left-handers will do
equally as well using the same stance in right formation. The right leg should be
forward and the left leg back. The feet are spread wider than a normal stance,
and the knees are out over the feet so that the body rests on a horizontal plane
between the legs, allowing maximum vision and arm room. Until our centers

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become accustomed to the stance, in early season they knock their knees out
with their elbows each time to get the proper spread. About half the ball is
under the head. The center's right hand goes on the front right quarter of the
ball, fingers down, resting on the laces. The left hand is on the opposite quarter
of the ball, more toward the middle, resting lightly. The hands should be placed
on the ball without changing its position on the ground.

The mechanics of passing from center are fairly easy to learn, but "feel" and the
proper application of the mechanics are slow to develop. The right arm is the
passing arm, while the left merely guides the ball. The spiral is made by rolling
the ball off the finger tips of the right hand, while the left hand gives it
direction, right, left, up or down, by application of pressure. The impetus for
the pass comes solely from the hands so that the center can make a quick
transition from his relaxed status to blocking position. Since most of our passes
are soft spirals with a light touch, the ball is released quickly from the hands,
cutting down the time needed for switching to blocking. There is no need to
look at the pass all the way into the back's hands. The center can do little about
a fumble anyway, and he will have delayed until the defense is upon him, taking
away his effectiveness as a blocker.

The long pass for a punt must travel low and fast. Here the center adjusts to
the longer pass by using both hands, gripping the ball more firmly and
developing a wrist snap. His body must remain low to keep the pass low, since
raising the body brings up the arms and raises the point of release. We place
emphasis on pushing down the thumbs as the ball leaves the hands to keep it
low and true.

The specific assignments and teaching points for the center will be covered in
the section on plays. There is no change from the procedure of other linemen
in the center's approach to fundamental blocks. He simply must learn to
operate from his peculiar position making his pass first and his block second.
His success is measured by the extent to which he is able to combine these
functions. Much has been written on the importance of the Single Wing center,
and we can merely add that we know how valuable he can be, pointing to the
excellent records so many of them have been able to achieve.

SIGNAL SYSTEM

The signal system in any offense is the file plan for ready reference to plays. As
a file plan it must be clear, concise and comprehensive. We are familiar with the

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various methods of setting up signal systems, but none of them satisfies the
complete needs of our Single Wing. We have therefore developed the following
system, which we feel is best suited to our method of calling plays.

We have already discussed the numbering of offensive personnel to facilitate

reference to positions. The openings in the defense are given a different set of
numbers, depending on whether a six, seven or five man defensive spacing is
being used. See Diagram 7.

Numbers 2, 4, 6 and 8 are assigned for plays going to the longside of the
formation, and numbers 1, 3, 5 and 7, for plays going to the shortside of the
formation. As the diagram shows, 1 and 2 are plays outside of the ends; 3 and 4
between end and tackle; 5 and 6 between tackle and guard; and 7 and 8
between the defensive guards. For all even numbered plays, excepting end runs,
the power or double block is applied from the longside of the offensive
formation. For all odd-numbered plays, excepting end runs, the power or
double block is applied from the shortside of the formation. This explains the
obvious question on plays numbered 7 and 8 both being between the guards
against a six man line with normal spacing. On a play numbered 8, the
defensive right guard is power-blocked from right formation and on a play
numbered 7, the defensive left guard is power-blocked from right formation. A
seven man defense finds all the numbers used for openings, while a five
doubles up the off-tackle and inside-tackle openings. When the offense is run
from left formation, the defensive openings are kept in the same relation to the
formation.

In the Single Wing the only backs in position to receive a direct pass from
center are #3 and #4. Thus, our play numbering is derived from a combination
of the back receiving the ball and the opening in the defensive line; for example
Play 42 or Play 38. All plays that are direct hitters, with no delayed handling of
the ball, are numbered either m the 30's or 40's. However, if the back receiving
the ball

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DIAGRAM 7

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DIAGRAM 8

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has a different maneuver, the name for it precedes the series number to be
given; "buck" for the buck lateral maneuver, "spin" for the plays with the full
spin maneuver. The fullback half spin maneuver is more easily designated by
using the series number of 60. Diagram 8 shows a complete development of
the numbers for the plays.

This, then, is the sequence of information transmitted to the team by the

quarterback's calling of the signal for a running play. The quarterback gives the
maneuver a name, the number of the back who is to receive the ball, the play
opening and the starting signal, e.g., 42 on 2; Buck 38 on 3.

The calling of passes differs slightly. For example, we give numbers in the 70's
to a passing series. The quarterback then calls 70 pass, followed by the receiver
and pattern of the receiver. Diagram 8 also contains this information. Since
these passes are thrown by the #4 back, who originally handles the ball, the
team is aware that 70 pass starts with a direct pass from center to the #4 back.
Pass courses are designated by a word signal based on the pass areas shown in
Diagram 9A. These areas are worded in relation to the defensive backfield and
the signal of the receiver's course automatically tells the other receivers which
area they are to clear for the intended receiver. Diagram 9B, shows that cross
and drag apply to the receiver going to the opposite side from his starting
position. The elements of pass patterns will be described in the discussion of
the passing game.

Modern football requires additional information that must be imparted with a

minimum of confusion, such as the calling of flankers and men-in-motion.
When we first used these we had our quarterback refer to the personnel by
names and the flankers' positions by words. The same was true for the men-in-
motion calls. In order to standardize the calling of flankers and men-in-motion,
Diagram 10 was put into use.

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DIAGRAM 9

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Calling flankers is done by giving the number of the back to be used as a

flanker. This number can be followed by a letter or not. The letter X means
that the back is a flanker on the shortside of the formation. No letter means
that the back is a flanker on the longside of the formation. The position of the
flanker must also be called, which is done simply by saying the number (and
letter X if necessary), or by saying, "Wide." Flanker positions are defined as
first a flanking position on the defensive end, and secondly, a flanking position
wide enough so that there is no flanking threat on the end. Using this concise
form for calling flankers, one or more flankers can be called with a minimum
of confusion. Flanker positions are assumed directly from the huddle.

"Man-in-motion" is called by giving the back's number, followed by the letter

A, for motion to the longside of the formation and the letter B, for motion to
the shortside of the formation. The distance that any motion will cover from
the formation is governed by the starting signal given for the play.

Flanker and motion signals are given in that order by the quarterback,
preceding the calling of the play or pass, e.g., 3X Wide 46 on 3; 2 Wide 43 on 4;
3A 44 on 4; IB Buck 38 on 4.

Starting signals are given following the play or pass and are based on the
following cadence: SIGNALS—Ready, Hike — 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc.

The quarterback can give his starting signal on any underlined portion cadence.
It is a well-known fact that starting is important to the success of an attack.
Precise calling from this signal system helps to keep the players' minds on the
proper starting signal and in this way helps to achieve satisfactory team
maneuvers.

To sum up, the quarterback, in calling the plays from the huddle, uses the
following sequence:

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DIAGRAM 10

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For Runs For Passes

1—Flanker or Flankers 1—Flanker or Flankers
2—Man-in-Motion 2—Man-in-Motion
3—Maneuver 3—Maneuver
4—Series Play 4—Series
5—Starting Signal 5—Pass
6—Receiver and Course
7—Starting Signal

QUARTERBACKING IN THE LINE

This does not refer to a form of gridiron back-seat driving. Quarterbacking in

the line, a comparatively new method of expediting plays and assignments, has
significantly become a basic element in Princeton's Single Wing attack. Its
importance has been clearly demonstrated to us in recent seasons and we feel
that a review of the development of line quarterbacking should make a valuable
introduction to the explanation of the theories on which it is based.

The game of football has had distinct periods in which the pendulum has
swung from offense to defense and from one type of formation to another.
Prior to 1940, the swing was in favor of the defense against the Single Wing. A
natural result was the offensive swing to the T formation and its use of quick
openers, flankers and men-in-motion. The success enjoyed by the T formation
is history. Still, those of us who kept faith in the Single Wing believed that new
elements could be added to our formation to combat the defensive advantages.
From this thinking, one development was the use of flankers and men-in-
motion in the Single Wing. This was helpful in giving new problems to the
defense.

The Single Wing quarterback still had the burden of calling plays according to
the strategy of the game, with the added responsibility of checking the play if
the defense encountered was of a type that would prevent success of the
particular play called. If new ideas were to be added, some of the burden of
quarterbacking had to be shifted.

We decided to take the responsibility for checkoffs away from the quarterback,
in favor of adjusting the plays to run against the various defensive spacings
encountered. In this manner, we would at least be able to run the play with
some chance of gaining ground, rather than risking the loss of ground by

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running the play against an impossible situation, and we would save the delays
involved in checkoffs.

Borrowing a prevalent idea, we analyzed the formation to see if we could utilize

supplemental quarterbacks in the line, who could make local adjustments in
blocking. After studying various standard defenses, we selected #6, #8 and
#10 as our offensive line quarterbacks. Diagram 11 shows the breakdown of a
normal six man line defense, with the quarterbacking responsibilities for each
of our line quarterbacks and the call given for the particular spacing. #6 is
quarterback for plays in his area. He calls the blocking for #1, #7, #2 and #8.
#8 is quarterback for plays in his area, calling the blocking for #9 and #7. #10
is the quarterback for plays in his area, calling the blocking for #5, X and #9.
The apparent overlapping of calls is explained below. We feel that by the use of
quarterbacking in the line, even when we are not meeting true spacing, we
block the way the line quarterback calls the spacing, which gives us blocking
intensity at the mouth of the hole.

Diagram 11 also shows the spacing and calls for the other standard defenses
encountered. The emphasis is on calling the spacing that the line quarterback
actually sees in his area. Treating it as a local situation, we can achieve a quicker
recognition of the type of defense encountered, and the players are able to
make quick adjustments for the various assignments. Each play opening in the
defensive line is designed against all standard defenses. The assignments for

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DIAGRAM 11

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each spacing give the blockers the best possible chance to make their blocks.

The calling is done by saying the word-signal given for the various spacings. All
three line quarterbacks call on every play with equal and standard emphasis.
They are committed to calling the spacing that they see in their area. However,
in some cases the interior linemen are concerned with outer spacing and they
then listen to the outer calls. The reverse is true for outer linemen and interior
plays, explaining the overlapping responsibilities listed above. Thus, there can
be no giveaway on the ultimate direction of the play, since all three line
quarterbacks are calling, and all men seem concerned only with the problem in
their immediate vicinity. In addition, security is established since the call is
concerned with spacing only and one call will result in several different and
sometimes opposite sets of blocks against identical spacing.

Calling is accomplished in the signal cadence. As the team quarterback says,

"Signals," the line quarterbacks call the spacing in their area simultaneously, by
word signal, with no break in the general cadence.

The application of this operation to specific plays will be covered in the section
on standard plays. This development has made a significant contribution
toward lifting the burden from the team quarterback. In addition, it has
contributed to better offensive execution. It has given us intensity in blocking
on the mouth of the opening and no uncertainty as to assignments, eliminating
many costly mistakes.

CHOOSING THE CYCLE

Single Wing teams should enter the season with the straight series of plays
which start on direct passes to the tailback and fullback. All plays to the
tailback should be designed to hit every defensive hole, either on a carry by the
tailback, or on a reverse to the wingback. The straight plays carried by the
fullback should be quick hitters, aimed between the defensive guards,
particularly if the defensive guards have a tendency to line up in the seams
between blockers. Since this area is the most vulnerable to direct attack by the
fullback, plays inside the defensive tackles should be of the veer type; those
which threaten straight ahead for two steps, before slanting outside the guard's
position. The veer by the fullback will make it easier for the blockers to drive
the guard toward the center and will also prevent a defensive linebacker from
meeting the ball carrier head-on at the mouth of the hole.

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The head coach must make a decision on the use of the various delayed and
deceptive cycles which have become standard in the modern Single Wing
attack.

Most popular of the deceptive maneuvers in the backfield have been the
spinning fullback series with # 8 faking to #4 or #1, either on a full or half
spin, and, of course, the buck lateral sequence. Other spinning cycles which
have been used to advantage are: #4 spinning to #3; also #4 spinning to #3
and #1 plus the full spin of #3 to #2.

To date, no teams have combined the full or half spins with the buck lateral
maneuvers, but considerable research has evolved. The results offer distinct
possibilities for a blending of these deceptive cycles. The idea of spinning to
hide the ball from certain defensive men started in the early 1920's when many
coaches were using the Double or Triple Wing attacks. Here again the threat of
delayed inside plays prevents the use of outside strength around the ends. End
around plays, either from the spin or buck lateral series, are excellent if used to
supplement the normal plays in these cycles.

With the tailback straight series, the buck lateral and one of the spin series
incorporated in this book, some information about the choice of the latter cycle
should be helpful to the coach who has neither the material nor the time to
develop the details of both these cycles.

SPIN SERIES
Advantages
1. Blends well with the straight series. Change of pace attack, very strong
on traps on both tackle and guard positions, the latter also being
vulnerable in reverse traps.
2. Has delayed power off the tackles, being particularly strong off the
shortside tackle with the wingback carrying.
3. Presents an excellent spin passing attack with particular pressure on the
linebackers who must support the tackles.
Disadvantages
1. Requires an outstanding fullback who must have excellent balance and
ability to pick up speed after a full or half spin.
2. Weak on plays around both ends.

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BUCK LATERAL SERIES

Advantages
1. Blends perfectly with the fullback straight series.
2. Requires less all-around ability at the fullback position. The big hard
hitter is an asset here.
3. Gives an excellent outside play, which is extremely dangerous to packed
defenses.
4. Offers a great passing attack, particularly if your blocking back can be
developed into a spot passer. The threat of the wide play sets up the
wide passing attack to that side. The threat of the buck causes the
linebackers to be vulnerable for passes behind them.
Disadvantages
1. Poor faking wastes two men in the backfield.
2. Execution of plays to the shortside more difficult to teach than those to
the longside.

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The previous chapter dealt with setting up the implements of the Single Wing
attack. Now, with the fundamentals established, we can take up the planned
procedure for advancing the ball.

The first question that comes to mind in this problem is the relative importance
of running and passing. Our object is always control of the game, both
defensively and offensively. Possession of the ball is therefore of prime
importance, with the ultimate goal of scoring enough to win. We have found
that scoring is a natural consequence of control of the ball. This has been
especially evident in games in which we did not outman our opponents. How,
then, to balance running and passing in building the attack?

Based on game statistics, seasonal statistics and our record of never having
been held scoreless from 1945 through the 1950 season, our preference is to
put more stress on the running attack. We feel that passing plays are successful
only as a check on the running game. We loosen the defense with pass plays,
and we do score with them, but the importance of stressing the running game
was dramatically demonstrated to us in the final game of our undefeated 1950
season. Already in possession of our fourth consecutive Big Three
Championship, to complete the season unbeaten we found ourselves faced
with the problem of meeting Dartmouth during the famous hurricane of
November 25, 1950, under conditions that made playing almost impossible,
and passing absolutely impossible.

The Indians naturally took full advantage of the situation by using a seemingly
insurmountable eight man line with two linebackers. However, with only the
running attack to fall back on, we did control the ball, the offense did prevail,
and the team proved itself of true championship caliber. In addition to all else
accomplished by that game, it was dramatic proof to us of the theories
presented here.

In discussing the running attack in this and the following chapter, we must
remain within practical limits if the plays are to be covered in detail. We will
follow the outline from Chapter II, the section on our signal system (Diagram
8) and the section on choosing the cycle, covering the straight tailback series
for all openings, and the best two plays for the same opening from the three
other series. This will give three plays across the defense in detail, using the
plays from the buck lateral, full spin and half spin cycles that have, for the most
part, had greatest success in the particular opening. We have tried to pick plays
that can be adjusted, with a minimum of teaching, to run against any defense.

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In developing the cycle, it is important to remember that individual plays do

not stand by themselves. Even though we would not expect all the cycles to be
used, we are interested in showing the tie-in of the related blocking,
demonstrating the pliability of this offense.

Each section will start with an examination of the problems in selecting plays
to hit particular openings in the defense, followed by discussion of the
blocking, the blocking adjustments to meet changing defenses, and the ball
handling maneuvers of these plays. The discussion will cover the technique and
assignment details of each position, and we will conclude with coaching tips.
All openings will be discussed in right formation only, remembering that left
formation exactly reverses the thought and procedure. We would not think of
starting a season without left formation, and the advantages of fitting personnel
into numbered positions (Chapter II, Section: Numbering Personnel) are
apparent here. Individual assignments do not change, the only adjustment
being to reverse the technique to work in the opposite direction. Left
formation makes the defense's problems doubly difficult, and in some cases left
formation will make a play more successful than it would have been in right.
For instance, a defensive guard, playing soft, may be difficult to trap. By
reversing the formation, we can hit him with power, and a soft charge is
certainly not the defense against a power block. If there are teaching
limitations, we would recommend reducing the number of cycles to be learned,
rather than dispensing with left formation.

We believe that these running plays are good ones since each, with the
adjustments possible, becomes a sound one with a chance of success. They all
contribute to that vital factor, control of the ball—barring of course, those
elements of human mischance all coaches must suffer through, fumbles, bad
passes from center and missed signals. Perhaps the details will seem too
copious, but these details make the difference in the success of blocking, and of
handling the ball. When the player is conscious of the details of the task before
him, he is putting his intelligence to work. This appeal to and use of the
individual's intelligence in all positions is a contributing factor to the success of
modern offensive football.

Single Wing, unbalanced line, lends itself to power between the guards and off-
tackle. However, if the defense is playing in a way to prevent normal inside
plays from being successful, the obvious solution is to run the ends. Naturally,
the way the defensive ends are playing will largely determine the type of play

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used to go outside them. The direct support they are receiving from the
linebacker, halfback and, of course, by the defensive tackle beside the end, are
other important factors. The position on the field, both horizontally and
laterally and the amount of yardage to be gained in respect to the down must
be considered. The quarterbacking of outside plays must be carefully analyzed
because it involves considering a play which may gain or lose big yardage per
try.

The selection of the type of Single Wing play to use outside, has been narrowed
somewhat because of the general type of end play prevalent since the
ascendancy of the T formation.

In the early part of the 1940's, when defensive ends were responsible for a
certain amount of the territory beside the tackle next to them, end play was
more penetrating, designed to meet power. The pitchout from the T has made
ends so outside conscious that we very seldom meet the old type of crashing
end, whose duty it was to pile up the packed interference. As a result, the old
type "hook end run," wingback hooking end, has been less useful in the outside
attack. The in-and-out end run, which is designed to run either side of the
defensive end, has become more effective. In many cases, the defensive end
keys on the wingback on his side. On the hook end run, the wingback's duty is
to block the close or crashing end. When the end keys on the wingback it
causes an immediate widening of the end from his original defensive position,
thereby defeating the plan of running around him. As a result, the type of play
to use in the around end attack should be designed to succeed against a
reactionary kind of end play. By that, we mean an end who protects his outside
to the best of his ability without giving himself up on direct smashes into the
backfield. It is impossible to know ahead of time whether the ends have inside
or outside responsibilty when the quarterback selects an end run play.
Therefore, the end run, or reverse around end, must be designed to run either
side of the end. The blockers and ball carriers must practice this as a separate
unit, because blocking on such a play must become a matter of recognition,
rather than a called type of blocking. The basic principle is to contain the
defense and to prevent it from using team defense methods to come to the aid
of an overpowered end, and then to direct blocking at the end's inside or
outside support.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

Consider first the straight series end run, Play 42, against the most favorable

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defensive alignment, an undershifted six man line.

From the straight series, the problem is to get an outside position on the
defensive end since all the draw of the play and movement of the backfield is
to the outside. This is done by trying to simulate the appearance of an off-
tackle play, which play will be shown later. # 1 goes through for an outside
block on the longside linebacker, tending to the outside, in order to cut this
linebacker off from the outside. #2 and #3 run right at the end as if to take
him out, with #2 much more active in faking a block on the end. #2 slides off
to the inside without taking the end and continues laterally to knock the
halfback to the outside with a reverse body block. #3 works for outside
position on the end and runs quickly, under control, so that he can react to take
the end on out instead, if the end continues to widen. #6 hook-blocks the
tackle with a sustained shoulder to side-body block. One man who gives this
play a lot of trouble is the far linebacker coming across. #7 goes through with
depth so that he can block back on the far linebacker. #8 has a man head-on
him and blocks with a left shoulder block. Because of the control element by
#4 and #3, #9 and X (the center) must block effectively back to the shortside
to keep the defenders there from overtaking the play. #9 steps in to take the
defensive guard with a left shoulder block while X pivots and blocks back on
the shortside defensive tackle or end, whichever one is chasing the play. This is
an important detail pivot to learn and is described at length in the discussion on
techniques. #10 with no man head-on him can escape downfield easily and
travels laterally just behind the defensive linebackers to knock the safety man
across the play. #5 must escape the defensive tackle's charge and then proceed
downfield to get inside position on the far halfback.

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DIAGRAM 12

#4 starts out with controlled speed as if to run off-tackle. He fakes in at the

normal point to run off-tackle, in order to set up #3's block on the end. After
the fake he circles the end while looking for #2 to block the halfback out. He
cuts inside this block and between the block by #10 and #5 on the defensive
safety and far halfback.

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DIAGRAM 13

Running the play against a normal defense does not change the character of the
play. It has basically the same blocking assignments for the point of attack.
However, #8 must change assignments to let #7 take his guard, and #8 will go
through to block the far linebacker. This is done to insure that one man will get
through to block the linebacker. The quick draw of the play may bring the
guard over, and #7 would then be unable to get through. The remaining
assignments are the same, excepting the pivot technique of the X. The play is
equally good against a six normal if #6 can get outside blocking position on the
defensive tackle.

Obviously, when the defense is a six overshift it is a poor time to use the end
run, but it can be run with adjustments in blocking. #2 and #3 continue to
combine on the end and

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DIAGRAM 14

halfback. #2 can expect his halfback to come up more on the inside because
the end is playing wide anyhow. #1 changes assignment with #6 and gets an
outside block on the tackle. #6 goes through to get the linebacker and must be
sure to aim wide enough for outside position. #7 and #8 go the same as they
did against the six normal defense, although #7's assignment is more difficult
with the guard moved over a half unit. #9 has the same problem as #7, but no
change in assignment throughout. X blocks the shortside tackle on a specific
assignment since this tackle is the closest opponent. #5 and #10 change
assignments, since #5 can make a quicker escape. #10 folds in behind #5 and
gets position downfield on the halfback.

Running against a five requires a good understanding of the play by #1, #6,
#2, #3 and #4. They are the ones most

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DIAGRAM 15

affected by the necessary assignment changes. #6 goes through as he does

against the six overshift but blocks the middle linebacker. # 1 goes through
inside the end and linebacker to cut flat and block the halfback to the outside.
#3 continues to take the end, but #2 must be alert to take the linebacker where
he can. The assignments across the rest of the line are standard as versus the six
overshift.

Next we study the outside play which fits into the buck lateral sequence, Buck
32. This play, if properly executed, offers great possibilities for gaining ground
against a packed defense. Most outside longside plays are developed from the
play that is designed versus a six undershift defense, so let us consider that first.

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DIAGRAM 16

The assignments here are not varied much from one defense to the other,
except for changes in technique. #1 always blocks to the inside on the
linebacker, cutting his outside leg. #6 has a pulling and hooking job on the
defensive end. As has been mentioned, this will be optional, taking him to the
inside if he can, but riding the end outside in the case of an outside-conscious
end. #7 blocks the guard to protect the exchange between #3 and #2, while
#8 pulls a deep course to become a personal interferer to the halfback. #8
should get in front of #4 at the moment he receives the lateral as protection
against an end who drives directly up the field. #9 blocks first on the defensive
guard to protect the exchange and then continues downfield to get a peel-back
position. X is first concerned with getting off a good pass and then escapes
around the guard for a peel back block. #10 and #5 have the same
responsibilities as in Play 42, previously described against all defenses. #10 goes
for the safety while #5 takes the halfback. #3 uses a buck lateral maneuver and
hands the ball off to #2. #3 fakes bucking after making the exchange, and
then, if not hindered, will block back to the shortside. He should try to make
this look like a carry by himself up the middle. Then he cuts off any defensive
man who threatens as a chaser in team defense. #2 executes an eight turn (see
page 153, Diagram 56) and receives the ball from the fullback. #2 then uses a

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hop and skip to obtain balance off his right foot to toss a long, low underhand
spiral to the tailback. #4 starts quickly to gain speed and depth, before
slackening speed on his fourth step to get on balance for receiving the lateral.
He then turns the end with #8 as a personal interferer.

The defensive tackle is not blocked but is usually checked

DIAGRAM 17

by either #2 after his pitchout, or by X or #9 peeling back.

Running the play against a six normal, does not require any changes in
assignments but only local changes in technique for #7 and #9.

In running the play against the other standard defenses, we try to keep the
assignments somewhat the same. Where men are pulling as personal interferers,
such as #6 and #8, with a complex ball handling assignment, there will be
greater success if the men are used to working with each other. Let us look at
the line assignments for a six over and a five-three.

The changes are that #9 and #7 must take a regular blocking assignment to
protect the exchange and to prevent early lateral movement by the defense. #5

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and #10 effect the same switch as earlier described in their responsibility for
the defensive safety and halfback. X finds it easy to escape to peel back and
should get an excellent opportunity to block the unblocked man. Whereas
versus the six under and six normal the tackle was not blocked, here the
linebacker is not blocked. X may be able to get him if #3 makes a good threat
of a buck. # 1 must change to block the tackle versus the six overshift or go
through to block the halfback to the outside against a five.

The outside play from the spin series, Spin 32, is not as effective as either the
direct play for the tailback outside or the pitchout from the buck lateral
sequence. In the spin, #3 gives to #4, who goes outside the end, usually after
an in-and-out course that threatens the off-tackle run. #2 now hooks the end
as #4 circles the end's position. Many Single Wing teams have achieved signal
success on this type of play by pulling the three men on the longside of the
formation to lead the ball carrier on a delayed play around the end. This
maneuver is particularly effective against a defensive line which is pitching in to
stop power, or a line that has a soft charge. The three running linemen form a
wall

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DIAGRAM 18

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which screens the ball carrier, with all interferers blocking to the inside to
spring the back loose around the end.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1-42

Listens to #6's call on the spacing and adjusts his angle, depending upon the
draw of the play. For example, when the ball is shown immediately, as on an
outside play, he may expect a different defensive reaction by the linebacker
from the reaction to the delayed outside play. The draw here is wide, hence #1
must strive for the position in which the linebacker will be at the time #1
reaches the linebacker's territory. This adjustment is not quite so large when the
wing blocks the tackle on the overshift situation, because the tackle here is not
affected by the draw as much as the linebacker. Besides, the block is thrown
earlier on the tackle, as #1 usually finds him on the line of scrimmage. The call
by #6 is particularly important to #1 when the defense is a five, as he now has
an entirely different angle block on the halfback, which is again determined by
the speed of the arrival of the ball carrier outside the end.

#1 - Buck 32, Spin 32

Expects to find the man to be blocked held by the delay of the play. In all cases
uses a cut-block to prevent lateral movement.

#2-42

Runs directly at the end, anticipating a close charge on undershift spacing and a
wide charge on the overshift. In any event, he fakes his off-tackle block as close
to the end as possible, before ducking inside the end. He continues downfield
parallel to the scrimmage line, headed for the halfback, in order to pick up the
ball carrier as he circles the end. If the halfback reacts quickly to the play, #2
will find the halfback about on the line of scrimmage. A reverse body block,
head toward line of scrimmage, is the most effective block. It should be thrown
as close to the ball carrier as possible. If the defensive halfback delays in
meeting the play, #2 now assumes the role of a personal interferer as he picks
up the ball carrier. This is definitely true when #2 finds an end who defends
laterally at the inception of the play, for now #2 can be certain that the half will
reinforce the end on the inside. #2's block becomes a shoulder block, going

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into a cross-body block as #4 fakes the tackier into position.

When the defensive end crashes to the inside to close the off-tackle hole, #2
can hook him on his outside. When #2 takes #3's original assignment this way,
it causes a switch in men to be taken by #3. However, the adjustment is a
simple one, in that #3 now has plenty of time to block the halfback, since the
halfback will be delayed in reaching the line of scrimmage.

#2 - Buck 32

#2 performs an eight turn (covered later in detail on the eight trap, see page
153) holding his arms close to his body, elbows tight, forming a pocket to
receive the ball from #3, before tossing the long, underhand spiral to #4. A
cut-off block on any available victim is in order after the pitch.

#2 - Spin 32

Head-fakes the off-tackle block, before hooking the end's , outside leg.

#3-42

#3 runs directly at the end's outside, timing his arrival to coincide with #2's
inside block fake. He should throw his outside cut-block when the end is
looking at #2, if possible. The time of this block will vary because of team
defensive calls, the width of the field, or because of his individual
characteristics. #3 must now be ready to block the end out with a right
shoulder block, evolving into a cross-body block, to protect #4's inside cut. #3
must adjust to switch assignments with #2 in case the end crashes inside, so
that if #2 hooks the end, he can then be ready to take the halfback.

#3-Buck 32

Sets up four and one-half yards behind #9 to receive the ball from X. He
extends the ball with two hands, but actually gives with his right hand, parallel
to the line of scrimmage, so that after #2 receives the ball in the formed
pocket, the pitchout can be delivered quickly. #3 fakes the center drive after
giving the ball to #2, blocking behind the ball carrier if he is able to clear the
line of scrimmage.

#3 — Spin 32

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Executes an eight spin (see page 155, Diagram 57) placing the ball on #4's right
hip with his left hand as he turns. He simulates possession by covering with
both arms and fakes a carry on the eight trap.

#4-42

Sets his left foot on line with the ball at four and one-half yards. He runs a veer
inside course upon receiving the ball, cutting outside the end at the moment #3
throws the outside block, then turns upheld as soon as possible to start gaining
ground, and to take advantage of #2's outside block on the halfback. If the end
protects laterally, #4 continues right at the end until #3 makes contact. This
will protect against an end who slacks back to the inside. #4 also follows the
same technique when #3 has to meet an end who stands on the line of
scrimmage. #4 cuts only after contact by #3. After #3's block, #4 uses #2 as a
personal interferer on the halfback or he may use #3 for this purpose if the end
should crash inside so that #2 hooks him. #4's course downfield is usually
inside the block of #5 or #10 on the safety, depending on the spacing on the
shortside.

#4 - Buck 32

In all cases, #4 uses #8 as his personal interferer on the halfback. The inside,
outside blocking adjustment on the end is not so variable here because of the
draw of the play to the center. #4 runs at top speed for four steps before facing
#2 in a controlled position to receive the toss from #2. The controlled pace is
necessary because #4 can then adjust slightly to a possible inaccurate throw-out
by #2.

#4 - Spin 32

Lines up on #3, uses the same steps as when faking receipt of the ball from #3.
Forms a pocket on his outside hip for #3 to plant the ball. He must run in a
controlled course toward the off-tackle hole before cutting wide just as #2
hooks the end. A fast feed and fake into the line by #3 will help the play
considerably.

#6-42

#6's line quarterbacking is done on these outside plays for # 1 and himself. In

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general, # 1 will have better position on the linebacker, providing that the
defensive tackle is not so wide that #6 has little chance to hook him from the
inside. However, if that tackle does take the six overshift spacing, #6 will make
the "seven" call and block on the linebacker, following the same technique
described for # 1 on this play. If a five-three is encountered the call is
important and thus #6's skill in recognizing the spacing will help to adjust this
outside play. When blocking the defensive tackle against the six undershift he
starts with a sustained shoulder block evolving to side-body block when
necessary. #6 should anticipate an outside slide by the tackle and be prepared
to use his legs to get outside position. When the tackle is to his outside #6
steps first with almost a pulling step with his outside foot, to come in with his
left leg and left shoulder as he gets hooking position.

#6-Buck 32

#6's call on Buck 32 governs #l's blocking but #6 will pull on all calls to hook
the end to the inside. This is the expected design of the play and in order to get
this position he must pay attention to the details of his pull. #6 steps first with
a pulling step, at an angle of greater than ninety degrees, to run on a sharp
curve planning to meet the defensive end at a point about four yards outside of
#6's position in the lineup, and with an anticipated penetration of about one
and one-half yards. On making contact #6 uses a shoulder block to cross-body
on the run. In many cases the end will immediately react to the outside so #6
takes him out and #8 and #4 will proceed inside his block on the defensive
end.

#7-42

On this play, #7 shares responsibility with #8 on the far linebacker and listens
to his call. On a six undershift call,

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DIAGRAM 19

no one is in front of him and #7 goes through for a cut-off block on the far
linebacker. He should be careful to get his position first on this linebacker, and
then use either a shoulder, a reverse, or a cross-body block, depending on the
angle with which the linebacker approaches him. If #7 goes straight ahead
through the line, he will be assured of good position, as the far linebacker must
come quite a way, and this movement takes time.

On the six normal, six overshift and five man line calls, #7 cross-checks the
guard in his vicinity, and #8 goes through for the cut-off block on the far
linebacker. #7 must stay with this cross-check on the above calls in order to
give the tailback a good chance to fake movement into the off-tackle hole
before swinging out around the end.

#7-Buck 32

In order to protect the ball handling in the backfield, #7 checks the strongside
guard on all calls. The position of that guard will range from head-on #8 to the
slot between #7 and #6, depending on the defense used, but #7 is responsible
for him at all times.

#8-42

Shares responsibility with #7 for the far linebacker. #8 will go through for the
cut-off block on this linebacker on the six normal, six overshift, and five man
line calls. The same details apply to #8 on this cut-off block as for #7 on this
assignment. However, #8 is closer to the far linebacker and will therefore not
have as much time to get set for the block as #7 will have.

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#8 - Buck 32

#8 pulls to the strongside as a personal interferer for the ball carrier on all calls.
This pull is a deep one, in order to clear the block on the defensive end. #8
should reach a depth of five yards on this pull. Since #2 is using the eight turn
on this play, the way will be clear for #8 to aim for this depth early on his first
step. As soon as he clears the defensive end, he should turn downfield
immediately, headed for the halfback. The tendency for #8 is to keep running
wide on this play, but he should strive to turn downfield and start gaining
ground as soon as possible. If the end fades toward the sidelines and will not
let the play develop outside him, #8 must turn to the inside, and the play will
go inside the end. When this is done, as he turns, #8 should look first for a
block to his inside, rather than concentrating on the defensive half. Only if
there is no opponent threatening the play from the inside does #8 continue on
for the halfback. This turning in, and the switch to an inside blocking
responsibility for #8 takes a lot of work. Its satisfactory development will be
slow, but it is vital against today's changing defenses. #8 may suspect that he
will have to turn inside the end on a six overshift call.

#9 - 42, Buck 32

Assignments on both plays are generally the same. #9 has a check blocking
assignment on the defensive guard. This is a shoulder blocking job throughout,
but #9 can expect, because of the great draw to the outside of the plays, that he
will probably have to shift to a cross-body from the shoulder block. On the
Buck 32 play, #9 can expect to release from the shoulder block sooner, and, if
possible, to head downfield for a peelback block. This is predicated on the
threat of #3 to the inside. If #9 finds the guards straying outside, however, he
should expect to stay with his blocking assignment in any event.

Center — 42

The pass from X for 42 is a one-step lead pass to the tailback about waist high.
Should bear in mind the speed of the different tailbacks and vary this lead
according to starting ability. X must block effectively to the shortside on this
play to keep that tackle and end from chasing the play, and to keep that side
occupied. When a "five" spacing is called by the line quarterback, X steps
directly at the tackle to stop penetration. When the guard is head-on, X steps
into the guard with his right foot and pivots out to block the tackle. On a
normal spacing and with no pulling linemen on his left, X can drop his left foot

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and open pivot to pick out his block.

Center — Buck 32

This is a buck maneuver pass to the outside of the fullback, also about waist
high. X does not have a specific blocking assignment other than to peel back.
In going for position to peel back, he should not go downfield very far and
should turn to his right, enabling him to see his peelback opportunities. In
most cases he will be looking for any of the linemen who turn to go into team
defense. When there is no one on him, the X can expect to get over and get in
position to peel back on the unblocked linebacker. He should travel slightly
deeper and move laterally. This peelback blocking is effective, and, by proper
use of his position, X can do an outstanding job to aid in cutting off the team
defense maneuvers. The.X should not be anxious to get a block near the ball
carrier, but should take the first block he can in order to keep the defensive line
contained.

#10 and #5 — 42, Buck 32

The principle established on these two plays for #5 and #10 is their
responsibility for blocking the defensive safety and right halfback. In general,
the man with the best opportunity to escape downfield for a block is the one
who will take the safety. Against the six normal, six undershift and seven man
line, this will be #10's assignment (see Diagram 11 for seven man line), while
#5 will take the safety in running against the overshift or five man line. The
technique for this is to start with the inside foot and to go across very shallow.
This shallow course should be just behind the block being thrown on the
defensive linebackers, to avoid being picked off by a fellow offensive player's
block. It is expected that the safety will come up to support his halfback and,
thus, with proper timing, #5 or #10 should be able to block him across the
face of the ball carrier with a reverse cross-body block. Care should be taken
not to throw the block until the safety has committed for the ball carrier. If the
safety retreats, #5 or #10 should be prepared for a turn downfield with the ball
carrier, and then to block the safety either way.

In blocking the halfback, #5 and #10 should start laterally, with the same
principle in mind but turning sooner to get blocking position back to the
halfback. Ordinarily, the halfback will move over on an arc to replace the
safety. When the ball carrier breaks inside the block on the safety, this halfback
will then be forced to head in one of two directions.

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DIAGRAM 20

#5 or #10 should have come over enough so that he can move to block the
halfback making a direct move for the ball carrier, or to continue on downfield
and to get a long openfield block if the defensive man chooses the safe course.
#5 should work on escaping when a tackle is playing directly on him. This can
be done by driving the right or left shoulder and arm directly at the man and
raising up. This will break the tackle's hands off #5's shoulder and allow #5 to
proceed on downfield. It can also be done by stepping around to the outside
and turning back in quickly to head downfield.

#10 should remember when he is going for the halfback to let #5 have priority.
He should follow along the same course as #5 but not interfere with #5's
opportunity to get down-field for the safety.

COACHING POINTS

This play will be more effective with a fast runner at the tailback position
because the cut-blocks may not be sustained against good defensive men. #2's
block on the halfback is the block that requires the most practice. This is not
the type of play that is effective against a five man defensive line especially a
five which employs the ends to cover wide.

OFF-TACKLE PLAYS, 4 OPENINGS

The off-tackle play is to the Single Wing what the dive-tackle play is to 4:he T.
With its unbalanced line and its backs well over to the longside, Single Wing is
designed to deliver its most effective blow at the longside defensive tackle.

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Defensive strategy against Single Wing has always been conditioned by this
factor, just as T has taught defenses never to ignore the devastating quickness
with which its halfbacks can pick up straight ahead yardage on handoffs.
Because this opening is so much a fundamental part of the Single Wing attack,
it is advisable to exploit it in more than one way, even though different
assignments and adjustments may add to the teaching burden. Single Wing
operates off-tackle primarily from three series; the straight tailback series, the
spin series and the buck lateral series. Let us discuss first the tailback off-tackle
which, for years, has been the mark of the Single Wing formation. This is the
play made famous by the Pittsburgh power drives off-tackle under Jock
Sutherland in the early 1930's. Because we never know what type of defensive
alignment may face us, the play is no longer run with exactly the same
assignments of twenty years ago, but potentially we still consider it Single
Wing's most powerful play.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

Because the end and wingback are the key blockers on the mouth of the hole,
we prefer to run this play, 44, against a six undershift as that gives the wingback
the best blocking angle on the defensive tackle.

DIAGRAM 21

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On the undershift, #8 will generally knock the linebacker out, and the ball
carrier will cut inside this block to pick up #5's downfield block on the safety
man. #10 does not pull through the hole as he often used to do, but instead
executes what we call a "seal block" to cover any leakage by the guard, opposite
X through the hole left by #9, who goes through to cut off the far linebacker.
This seal block has been very successful for us, and we feel a better job has
been done in handling the linebackers when #9 goes through for the cut-off
type block. By putting only one blocker through the hole ahead of the ball
carrier, we have been able to hit the hole faster than we used to, an important
improvement when slanting and other evasive maneuvers by the defense make
it difficult for linemen to hold their blocks. #3 runs right at the end, cutting
either side of #2's block, depending on the end's reaction, and goes downfield
for the halfback. #4 takes a lead step with the right foot, one crossover step,
and cuts on his third step. He should work to time this cut as closely as
possible with #2's contact with the end. End play has changed a great deal
since the early 1940's, particularly against Single Wing, and the timing of the
ball carrier's cut on #2's block is often unnecessary. The ends have become so
outside conscious that they protect their outside almost exclusively. It is no
longer necessary to put two men on them, even when running this play on the
goal line. Movement toward the ends almost invariably widens them now, as a
result of their experience against the T, which hits outside in a hurry. That you
no longer have to double-team the defensive end to prevent his smashing the
off-tackle play is one of the big changes in thought for the modern Single
Wing. The threat of #3's hooking the end from the outside is enough to set up
#2's block. In fact, sending #3 in motion that way, or setting him out as a
flanker, will accomplish the same thing.

Against the six normal defense, the same assignments are used as against the six
undershift. #8, in pulling around the power block, now attempts to block the
linebacker in instead of knocking him out as in the six undershift. The ball
carrier breaks outside of this block and tries to pick up #3 as a blocker on the
defensive halfback.

Details on some of the above blocks change, but with the exception of #8's
job, all other assignments remain the same here as for the six undershift.

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DIAGRAM 22
We are forced to adjust this play, however, against the five man line or the six
overshift. Let's take the six overshift first. When the tackle moves out to a
position head-on #1, as he does on the six overshift, the blocking advantage
that # 1 has had disappears. # 1 no longer has a flanking position on the tackle,
and, with the tackle charging straight on him, simply cannot drive that man
inside. Moreover, anything #6 does in the way of contacting the tackle in an
effort to help out #l's block will only result in driving the tackle wider.
Therefore, we adjust the play up front as shown in Diagram 23.

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DIAGRAM 23

Having lost the double teaming advantage on the wide tackle, we adjust and
power-block the next man inside, in this case, the guard, with #6 and #7
working together on him. #2, instead of faking the end out, now traps the
tackle, who is playing head-on #1. #2's block will be made easier if #1 executes
a good driving fake at that tackle from the outside before breaking off, to
perform his adjusted assignment, in which he prevents the end from dropping
back into the play after the ball carrier is seen cutting into the hole. #3 has the
same job of running directly at the end to threaten him with the outside hook
block. In this case, #3 can continue outside the end as #4's cut is away from
the longside defensive halfback. In the middle of the line, X now goes through
for the cut-off block, while #9 and #10 check-block on the line of scrimmage.
#8 now adjusts his pull considerably and cuts close around the power block to
knock the linebacker to the outside whenever possible. #4 takes his key
from the position of the defensive guards, knowing that #6 and #7 are power-
blocking together. He therefore shortens up his lateral steps, using lots of
action, to allow him to cut short over the power block on the guard. His
downfield cut, here, is away from the halfback on the longside, and he attempts
to pick up #5's block on the safety and go for what he can get. Against the five
man line alignment we adjust again. As far as the line goes, the assignments
remain the same for the six overshift. However, #1 has an important change.

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DIAGRAM 24

#1 now goes through to cut off the middle linebacker, using a reverse cross-
body block if that man is moving into the hole, a straight shoulder block if he is
standing still, or a cross-body block if he is drifting back.

#2 takes the end man on the five man line using a right shoulder block. #8
uses the same close pull around the power block as in the six overshift call, but
he can now be sure that he will block the outside linebacker out. Again we
stress that the ball carrier should run right over the power block, because the
outside linebacker may have a deal on with his end on inside responsibility, and
our play may well turn out to be a straight trap on outside linebacker. #8's
angle as he drives in close on the power block allows him to handle even a
linebacker who is coming in to close the off-tackle hole.

These are the adjustments on our tailback off-tackle play, 44. We will cover the
details in a moment. Now take a look at Spin 34 and the buck lateral off-tackle
play, Buck 34. These two plays are alike in that they both threaten to hit into
the middle at the start of the ball handling. For this reason, these two plays are
not adjusted up front to run inside a wide, overshifted tackle, as is the case on
Play 44. Against the six overshift, both Spin 34 and Buck 34 are de-

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DIAGRAM 25

signed to run outside the tackle anyway, in spite of the fact that #1 no longer
has a flanking position on him. This has to be done because the inside tackle
hole is too close for #2 or #4 to get into it effectively from the position of
their ball handling maneuvers on the spin and buck lateral series. It is better to
run both plays against the six undershift or six normal, because, in the final
analysis, the flanking position of #1 is pretty important.

It is apparent that Spin 34, against both the six undershift and six normal has
practically the same assignments as Play 44. The only difference is that #10
now pulls all the way around the power block on the defensive tackle and leads
the ball carrier down to the defensive halfback. #10 has time for this long pull
because of the double ball handling in the backfield, and because it is important
to give the faking time to affect the defensive players. #9 no longer

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DIAGRAM 26

goes through for the shortside linebacker. He must now stay in the line and
protect the ball handling by making sure that the defensive guard does not
break through to spoil the play. The shortside linebacker is kept out of the play
by #3's fake into the line at the conclusion of his spin to #4.

On Buck 34 against the six undershift and six normal, with #2 now carrying
the ball, there is no change in assignments against these two types of six.
Because #2 is now carrying the ball it becomes necessary to put someone else
on blocking the longside defensive end. This can be done with #8, as it is not
necessary for a blocker to get to the long-side linebacker too quickly. We want
to give that linebacker a chance to react to the inside as the buck threaj by #3
takes effect. #8 pulls for the defensive end then, and #10 pulls for the longside
linebacker. The length of #10's pull gives #2 time to do his ball handling and
faking chores and still follow #10 closely through the hole. #7 and #9 must
check-block the guards in order to protect the ball exchange. X

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DIAGRAM 27

makes his regular block back against pursuit from the short-side. #2 uses the
buck lateral eight turn (see page 153) so that his turn does not carry him wide
of the hole. #10's pull is a shallow one, no deeper than a yard and a half. He
generally finds the linebacker inside, so that his block allows the ball carrier to
escape to the outside. If the defensive halfback is not held by #4's outside
faking, there is a chance for #2 to lateral the ball out to #4 as the halfback
comes in to tackle him. #1 and #6, of course, are taking their regular double
team block on the tackle.

As stated earlier, no adjustments are made against the six overshift on Buck 34
and Spin 34, as we feel the tackle will be coming in hard when the fullback
handles the ball.

You will notice that #3 is shown blocking the far linebacker on these two plays.
Of course, he will very often not get through the line to do this, but we feel
that his fake will have as much effect in holding the far linebacker out of the
play as an actual block. Sometimes a good fake by #3 on

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DIAGRAM 28

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DIAGRAM 29

Buck 34 will hold both linebackers inside to such an extent that #10 will be
able to lead #2 on downfield to the halfback, particularly after we have been

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pounding inside with guard and tackle traps off the buck series.

Against the five man line, we adjust these plays much as we do the regular off-
tackle as to the blocking on the mouth of the hole and on the linebacker.
#6 and #7 now power the tackle, and #1 goes through for the middle
linebacker, just as they do on 44, the straight tailback off-tackle play. #10 can
now anticipate a short pull. Against the five man line, #2, on Buck 34, must be
careful not to travel too far laterally, as the hole is very close. This is the most
difficult adjustment on this play against the five man line.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1 - 44, Buck 34, Spin 34

On all calls in which #1 works with #6 to double-team the defensive tackle, #1

should be sure that the foot on the side of the shoulder he blocks with is
directly under that shoulder at the moment of initial contact. On a six normal,
with the tackle in the seam between the #6 and # 1, # 1 should step first with
his inside foot, because his contact with the tackle will come on the first step.

Against a six undershift with the tackle head-on #6 and thus a bit farther away
from #1, #1 should step first with the outside foot, as he will contact the tackle
with his second step. Again, it is important to have that leg up under his
shoulder as he hits.

Against the five man line, #1 goes through for the middle line backer on all
three off-tackle ball handlings. On this assignment, #1 should use a reverse
cross-body block on his opponent most of the time, as his man will be moving
forward into the hole. He may use a shoulder or cross-body block if the
linebacker is merely standing or drifting laterally. Against the six overshift on
regular 44, #1 influences the tackle and then takes the end out. With the tackle
head-on him, #1 should take a hard first step with the inside foot, as this is the
leg # 1 would step with if he actually were going to attempt to take the tackle
in. After this one step, and a fling of the inside elbow toward the tackle, #1
pivots off that inside foot and blocks the end with a reverse cross-body or right
shoulder block.

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DIAGRAM 30

#1 does not attempt to drive the end anywhere. He merely stops the end from
dropping back into team defense. On Buck 34 and Spin 34 against the six
overshift, #1 steps first with the inside foot, as he will contact the tackle
immediately. #6 helps out there as best he can, and the inside draw of the play
is counted on to help take that wide defensive tackle to the inside. Against this
defense, #6 and #1 actually take the tackle any way he wants to go. Often the
play does run inside of their block, but remember that these plays, Buck 34 and
Spin 34, are used primarily to check a defensive tackle who is driving hard to
the inside and is hurting the traps on the guard and tackle.

#2 - 44, Spin 34

#2 always uses a shoulder block (right shoulder in right formation, vice versa
for left). #2 listens to the call of #6 to know whether to take the end out, as he
does against a six normal, six undershift and five man line, or whether to trap
the tackle, as on 44 against the six overshift. He can take a pretty good key, and
anticipate the call, by observing the position of the guard almost directly in
front of him in the vicinity of #7. However, #6's call is final and governs #2's
assignment at all times. The important detail for #2 in taking the end is that his
lead step and placement of the left foot is always a bit toward the line of
scrimmage, in order to better his blocking angle on the opponent, and to
prepare him to meet the opponent at the toughest possible angle. In this, #2 is
governed by the regular trapping details that apply to linemen.

#2 - Buck 34

The most important details of this play belong to #2. Without very hard work
on #2's steps here, he will have trouble getting into the hole at all, and will be
so far behind his interferer, #10, that he will be useless. First, #2 must take the
eight turn which is explained in the discussion of the eight hole. Then, after
accepting the ball from #3, he must be careful that in turning to run into the

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hole he does not allow himself to move in a curve and thus carry too wide.

DIAGRAM 31

The foot placement for #2 is: (a) an eight turn to accept the ball from the
fullback; (b) after accepting the ball, a lead step with the left foot at least
parallel to the line of scrimmage, and ideally even a bit toward the scrimmage
line; and (c) a long cross-over step with the right foot directly on to the tail of
#10 and on into the hole.

Originally, we tried having #2 fake a pitchout to #4 before turning into the

hole, but it became apparent that this took too much time, putting him too far
behind #10 in the hole for ideal timing. Therefore, #2 no longer fakes to #4 at
all, although #4 is still careful to fake receiving the pitchout each time with his
hands. It is felt that the timing on the play is more important than the fake to
the tailback, which delayed #2 and also tended to carry him wide of the hole.

DIAGRAM 32

#3-44

#3 takes his alignment from #4, parallel with him and one yard from him. On
the starting signal, #3 drives directly to the outside for the end. If the end
widens, #3 cuts inside of #2's block on him and continues for the halfback. If
the end does not widen, #3 goes outside him and immediately turns downfield
for the halfback. #3 will always be able to get an effective block on the

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halfback when he cuts inside the end, but seldom will his block be effective
when he has to go outside the end.

#3 - Spin 34

#3 sets the alignment, three yards deep, directly behind #9. He uses his eight
spin, and after giving the ball to #4, fakes into the eight hole between the
defensive guards. If he gets past the line of scrimmage, #3 should attempt to
cut off the shortside linebacker with a cross-body block. If his faking is good,
#3 will be tackled at the line of scrimmage by this shortside linebacker.

#3 - Buck 34

#3 sets alignment on this play for himself and #4 by lining up four and one-
half yards deep, directly behind #9. He accepts the ball from X on his right hip,
takes a lateral step with the outside foot, and drives up inside of #2, giving him
the ball with both hands. After the ball exchange, #3 must fold his arms back
quickly and continue into the line, faking possession of the ball. If he is able to
get through the line of scrimmage, #3 should attempt to cut off the shortside
linebacker with a cross-body block.

#4-44

On 44, the tailback sets the alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four and
one-half yards deep, with the left foot in line with the ball. His first step is a
short lead, or balance step, then a cross-over step and he cuts on the third step
to get up into< the hole on #8's tail. These three steps are not taken laterally. If
they were, #4 would be hopelessly behind #8 and unable to use him as a
blocker. The steps are taken almost directly at the defensive end's normal
alignment position. These are exactly the first three steps that #4 takes on Play
42, when he is running around the longside end. In this way, they contribute an
outside threat, while still permitting #4 to get into the hole in a hurry, right
behind #8's pull.

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DIAGRAM 33

#4 – Spin 34

#4 takes the regular spin series alignment with #3, toe lined with #3's instep
and four feet from him. #4 takes his regular spin series steps on the fake with
#3 (page 156, Diagram 58). He accepts the ball from #3 who should give it
across #4's body into the pocket formed by #4's right hip, right elbow and
forearm. #4 holds the ball on his right hip (in right formation) with the right
hand and forearm, covering it with the left hand. The left shoulder is dipped to
help conceal the ball held on the right hip. On the second step after the
exchange, #4 cuts into the hole close behind #10. Actually, this is not so much
a sharp cut as it is a curved course, designed to enter the hole as quickly as
possible after taking the proper time to effect a deceptive exchange with #3.

DIAGRAM 34

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#4 - Buck 34

#4 takes his alignment on #3, parallel with him and one yard from him. On the
snap of the ball, #4 starts hard with a lead step to go outside around the
longside end. On the fourth step, he fakes receiving the pitchout from #2 and
continues hard around the end, turning downfield as soon as he can. If the
halfback is not held by his fake, but commits quickly to the inside to tackle the
ball carrier, #4 should be prepared for a lateral from #2. #4 never gets a good
block on the halfback here, but he should consider his job well done if his fake
is good enough to keep that halfback out there with him until #2 has a chance
to get through the hole and under way.

#6-44

Working with #1 on the defensive tackle, #6 is expected to set the tackle up

for # 1 and to act as a post on this two-on-one block. #6 should step with his
outside foot first at all times as he hits with this outside shoulder, and it is
important that the leg be under that shoulder when he hits. #6 should hit hard,
attempting to drive his shoulder right to the mid-section of the defensive
tackle, but his follow-through should be controlled, as he does not want to
drive the tackle around #l's block. #6 should concentrate first on stopping the
man, preventing any penetration; and should then work to keep the slot
between himself and #1 from being broken open by the defender. When #6
has to adjust on 44 to become the power blocker with #7 on the guard to his
inside, he follows the details explained in our earlier section on power blocking.

#7-44

#7 cross-checks the longside guard on six normal and six undershift calls. On
the five man line and six overshift calls, he and #6 double-team the guard in his
vicinity.

#7 - Buck 34, Spin 34

#7 cross-checks the longside guard on all calls except the five man line. On this
latter call he double-teams the first man inside #6 with #6.

#8-44

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#8 is the pulling lineman on all calls and is responsible for leading the ball
carrier through the hole and blocking the longside linebacker. The length and
depth of his pull will vary depending on the defense faced. However, he can
anticipate his pull by the alignment of the guard in his area. He should know
that, with a man in the slot between himself and #7 on a six normal call, he can
expect his longest pull around the power block of #6 and #1 on the defensive
tackle. With a man head-on #7, he can expect to use a very short pull around
the power block of #6 and #7 on the calls for the six overshift or five man
line. With a man head-on himself and a six undershift call, #8 should anticipate
a somewhat shorter pull than on the six normal, and should anticipate blocking
the wide linebacker out. We do not tell #8 that he has to block the linebacker
either in or out. We ask him to run on the power block, close to, the inside
edge of the hole, and to take that linebacker whichever way is easiest for him.
In other words, he should utilize whatever blocking angle, or advantage, he
may have at the moment of contact. In general, he can expect to block the
linebacker out on a six undershift, out on a five man line, out on a six overshift,
and in on the six normal call. #8's shortest pull is on the six overshift and five
man line calls, in which he takes a very short one-step pull around the power
block of #6 and #7. At no time does #8 pull deeper than two yards from the
line of scrimmage, because it is important to get into the hole in a hurry before
looping or sliding linemen can break down the power blocks.

#8 - Spin 34

Essentially the same details apply here for #8 as on Play 44. Spin 34, however,
is not adjusted to run inside the six overshift tackle as in Play 44. Therefore,
#8's longest pull on this play will be on the six overshift call, when he goes
around the power block of #1 and #6 on the wide tackle. Except for expecting
to block the linebacker on this call, #8's details are the same as on Play 44.

#8 - Buck 34

On Buck 34, #8 takes the job of #2 in blocking the defensive end out. This
block is primarily a trapping pull and #8 should observe the details that govern
good trapping. He must start for the toughest possible spot in which he could
find that end, which would be, if the end drove hard to the inside, directly
along the line of scrimmage. #8 does not have to drive the end anywhere to
effect an opening. However, he should hold the end, stop his inside charge if
he has one, and prevent him from dropping back into the play to make a tackle
after a four or five yard gain.

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If #8 observes the rules of good trapping, he should be able to get an inside-

out blocking position on the defensive end that will prevent his falling back
into the play. This block is a shoulder block by #8 and just as he approaches
contact, a dip of the shoulders to get in under the end's hands will help. #8
takes the end with this type block on all calls on Buck 34.

#9-44

#9 goes through for a cut-off block on the far linebacker on all calls except
when there is a man head-on him; that is in the five man line call by #8. To
effect this cut-off, #9 must remember that the linebacker will be drawn
immediately to the longside of the formation by the backfield maneuvers,
which show plainly where the ball carrier is going. Therefore, #9 must not
expect that linebacker to stand still. He must run an interception course, head
for where the linebacker is going to be, not for where he is.

Against the six undershift, it is relatively easy for #9 to get through. However,
against the six normal defense, it is important that #9 protect himself against
being thrown off balance by the guard in the slot between #9 and X. This he
can do by stepping to the guard with his inside foot and throwing a hard elbow
against him before bouncing off to head for his interception point on the
linebacker.

DIAGRAM 35

If #9 does not do this he is always being thrown off stride and out of balance
by a shove from this guard. When the guard is head-on #9, #9 should cross-
check him, and X will go through for the cut-off on the linebacker, as indicated
earlier.

#9 - Buck 34, Spin 34

Because the ball handling in the backfield must be protected, #9 should cross-

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check the guard in the vicinity of X on all calls.

Center — 44

On Play 44, the pass from X is to #4, waist high with a one-step lead. In the six
undershift, X has a man head-on him, with the tackle farther to the outside. X
must hold his ground for #10 to pull around him. He therefore steps up first
with his right foot, into the man head-on him. Then he pivots on his left foot
and takes his block on the shortside tackle, using either a shoulder, reverse
cross-body, or cross-body block. Against the five man line or six overshift, he
goes through for a cut-off block on the far linebacker, with the same details
applying as described for #9.

Center — Buck 34, Spin 34

The pass for Buck 34 is a regular buck series pass to the right hip of #3, while
Spin 34 is passed to the left knee of #3. X's assignments against the six
undershift or six normal are the same for these two plays as on 44. However,
against a five or six overshift, he takes the shortside tackle alone. Since there is
no one head-on him, X steps right at the close tackle with the foot nearest him,
in order to be prepared for a crashing charge. If the tackle does not crash, X
can follow up with a reverse cross-body block. These X details essentially hold
true for all plays to the longside.

#10-44

On a six undershift or a six normal #10 is a seal blocker. He pulls hard around
X, and covers the gap left by #9, who has gone through for the linebacker. If
no one is slipping through here, #10 should be careful not to run on over into
the hole that is being developed. Instead, he should cut into the line in the area
where #8 originally took his stance.

On a five or a six overshift call, #10 check-blocks the short-side tackle, who is
on his outside shoulder.

#10-Buck 34

On all calls, #10 pulls to take the longside linebacker. His course on this play
should be a shallow one, no deeper than a yard and a half from the line of
scrimmage. He crosses in front of #3 and turns into the hole as close as

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possible to the power block. As this play is run primarily as a check on the
buck series plays in which the fullback "keeps," #10 should expect to find the
strongside linebacker inside him as he "rounds the Horn." Therefore, he should
look to his inside as he comes through the hole and block first to the inside. If
no one threatens from the inside, he continues downfield on course for the
defensive halfback. If #10 runs this shallow course, he will never have any
difficulty in blocking a linebacker who has committed to the outside. However,
it is very hard to throw a strong block back to the inside against the centrifugal
force of this shallow pull, so he must concentrate on the inside block first. If
no inside block is necessary, #10 must keep driving, and his course alone will
permit the ball carrier to use him as a blocker against a wide linebacker, a
linebacker running in, an end falling back into team defense away from #8's
block, or a halfback coming in fast to plug the hole.

DIAGRAM 36

#10 -Spin 34

#10 pulls for the longside defensive halfback on all calls on Spin 34. This pull
should be three yards deep, and again #10 should attempt to run a close course
over the power block. He should attempt to take the halfback with an
openfield block in whatever direction is easiest for him, and it is the ball
carrier's responsibility to use #10 on this block.

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#5 - 44, Spin 34

#5 is a downfield blocker on the safety man on all calls. He should go for

where the safety man is going to be when the play develops, not for where he
lines up. This will bring #5 well over toward the hole. He should attempt to get
between the safety man and the ball carrier as the latter's downfield cut should
be between the blocks on the longside halfback and safety.

#5 -Buck 34

On all calls, #5 attempts to knock the safety man across the face of the play, as
#2 tries to cut away from the longside defensive halfback on whom there is no
blocker.

COACHING POINTS

Remember that Buck 34 is not a strong play by itself. This play is used to check
Buck 38 and Buck 36, and, if thought of in those terms, will serve well.

In calling for a six overshift adjustment, #6 should be guided primarily by the

position of the guard opposite #7. Because of the draw of 44, which shows
immediately as a longside running play, #7 cannot be expected to cross-check a
man head-on him successfully, and #6 should realize this. He should call the
defense as a six overshift and double-team with #7 whenever that guard is
head-on, even though the defensive tackle is in the slot between #6 and #1 as
on a six normal.

The calls of the line quarterback always take precedence over the spacing. If #6
is continually faced with six over-shift spacing, but the wide tackle is crashing
sharply inside, #6 may use the six normal or six undershift call. When he does
so on Play 44, #1 must help him on that tackle. This is to take advantage of a
tackle who lines up in one defense, but charges to another.

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TACKLE TRAP, 6 OPENINGS

This opening should be thought of as a companion to the off-tackle play. It is

simple with today's emphasis on changing defenses for a team to take away the
effectiveness of the off-tackle play completely by playing a straight six
overshift, with the defensive tackle head-on the wingback and charging hard
into him. The tackle is a bigger man than the wing-back and it is almost
impossible for the wingback to take that tackle in, as the tackle charges on him
and reacts with him to meet the play. Anything the offensive end does in an
effort to help the wingback drive the tackle in, only helps to drive him out, and
the off-tackle play is impossible. In this situation we do, therefore, have an
opening that takes advantage of the defensive tackle's wide alignment by
running inside of him. It will help if this play looks a lot like the off-tackle play
at its inception. Moreover, this type opening will help to keep the tackle at
home, and it will relieve the pressure on the outside runs and the running pass.

The defensive tackles, against Single Wing, occupy a very strategic spot. They
are generally considered to be pretty much the kingpins of any defense, and are
chosen for size and general aggressiveness. Against Single Wing, they are not
quite as closely flanked by the offense as are the guards. Moreover, they are
farther removed from the inception point of all plays and thus have more time
to make their weight and strength tell. We feel that this opening must be
worked on, as it will help all the rest of the running and passing plays if the
defensive tackles can be slowed up a bit by the trap threat and made to realize
that their own strength and aggressiveness may sometimes rebound to hurt
them.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

We prefer, then, to run this opening with the opponents in a six overshift or, at
least, in that spacing in the immediate area o£ the hole. Also, we have found
this opening to be particularly effective when adjusted against five man line
spacing on the longside. The play may be run with a variety of ball handlings in
the backfield, which we will discuss in a

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DIAGRAM 37

moment. Consider first the actual blocking assignments and adjustments up

front:

In the above spacing, with the defensive tackle playing on #1, to stop the off-
tackle play, we have the power block set up in good position for #6 and #7.
Regardless of the ball handling maneuvers in the backfield, we want the ball
carrier to run right over the power block. #6 and #7 should move their
opponent laterally. #9 may run into a defensive tackle who has an excellent
trap reaction, but #9 should be able to stop the tackle by running a good trap
course for the toughest possible angle. We do not expect #9 to move the
tackle; we do expect him to stop the tackle. #8 has an important cross-check
here, and #10 should run a close pull right over the power block in order to get
a good inside-out blocking angle on the longside linebacker. X is responsible
for cutting off the shortside tackle in case he is keying on #10 and trying to run
behind his own line of scrimmage like this:

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DIAGRAM 38

X should step at the tackle directly with the leg closest to the tackle to be ready
to handle both cases. If the tackle comes across the line of scrimmage hard,
trying to catch the play from the rear, X merely shunts him deep enough so
that he cannot catch the ball carrier, as diagrammed.

#5 is a downfield blocker and #1 cuts off the far linebacker as indicated. In

this connection it is important to remember that the longside linebacker on a
six overshift will sometimes play behind the man to be powered, or even inside
him a bit. If this happens, # 10 will be unable to get him, as the linebacker can
step in behind #10's course and stop the play. However, we have a rule for # 1
that he blocks the first linebacker beyond the man to be powered.

DIAGRAM 39

In this case, there would be no one on the far linebacker but in all probability
he would be picked off by #l's block on the longside linebacker. If this
happened, #10 would run his regular course, taking either the defensive
halfback or the overshifted longside end, who sometimes folds back as
indicated to gum the play up.

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DIAGRAM 40

Against a five man line, it is not too different except that we now consider the
end man on the defensive line to be the tackle and trap him with #9. #1
follows his rule of taking the first linebacker playing beyond the man to be
powered, in this case, the middle linebacker in the five-three. #6 and #7 have
their power block, which is the toughest for them, but the rest of the linemen
do exactly the same assignments as if running against a six overshift.

Against a six normal, with the linemen playing in the slots, we have the ideal
shoot block angles that we want for #6 and #7. They should really move that
guard! The rest of the men have the same jobs as they do against the six
overshift or the five. #8's cross-check is somewhat more difficult, as he has
another half unit to go in order to get contact with his man. However, X's
responsibility for the shortside tackle is not quite so urgent now as the tackle is
not so near him, and we expect X to help #8 by sustaining some of the shock
of the guard's charge before sliding off to check the tackle.

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DIAGRAM 41

On the six undershift, #6 and #7 cannot double team the guard as he is too
far away for #6 to get a piece of him. Moreover, if #6 charges over toward that
guard, he will invariably pull the defensive tackle, who is playing right on him,
directly inside into #9's attempted trap. The angles are gone for our power and
trap four-man unit of #6, #7, #8 and #9. If we are determined to run the six
hole against the six undershift alignment, which is, of course, crying for the
regular off-tackle play to be run, we will adjust it this way:

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DIAGRAM 42

#6 will only hurt the play if he goes inside the tackle. Therefore, we attempt to
influence the tight tackle into moving wider and making an easier trap for #9,
by pulling #6 hard and wide to the outside as he does on some types of end
runs. We lose the double team block on the guard, and #7 must do the best he
can with a shoulder block, knowing that he is on his own and that he will get
no help from #6. #8 has a long cross-check and must have help from X. #9
has his shortest trap and must be prepared for early contact. X steps to the
guard head-on him with his right foot here and braces against his charge. He
need not worry much about the shortside tackle, who will have widened to take
care of the shortside runs and will be very late on anything to the longside. #10
also has his shortest pull on this alignment. At any rate, the above adjustments
permit us to run the play with a chance of its going, instead of having to check
it off every time we run into an unexpected six under-shift.

This opening may be run from the spin series, Spin 36. It may also be run from
the direct pass to the tailback series, 46, and from the buck lateral series, Buck
36' There are no changes as far as opening the hole goes for these three
different types of ball handling. Only #2, #3 and #4 must learn something
new. See Diagram 43.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

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#1 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46

Takes his regular alignment one yard outside and one yard back from #6. On
the five man line, the six normal and the six undershift, he has no trouble
crossing behind the defensive tackle to block the first linebacker beyond the
opponent being powered by #6 and #7. #1 tries to get to this man as quickly
as possible, for the draw of the play will pull the linebacker rapidly to the
longside of our formation. #l's block is always a reverse cross-body, in order to
get the heavy part of his body in front of a linebacker who is driving in toward
the hole to make the tackle. Sometimes, particularly against a six normal, #1
will have a problem getting by the near linebacker as he goes across for the far
one. We tell him to use his judgment on this, always keeping in mind that it is
better for the draw of the play to go behind a close linebacker to prevent
attracting his attention to the inside. Against a fairly deep linebacker on the
longside, it

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DIAGRAM 43

will be necessary for #1 to cross in front of him ninety per cent of the time in
order to get a blocking angle on the far backer-up.

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This angle of approach is important for the #l's block. He should never run a
deep, curved course or he will fail to get his man. #1 will never get his block on
the far linebacker on a course like this:

DIAGRAM 44

He should drive over the heels of the defensive tackle on a six normal:

DIAGRAM 45

On a six undershift and a five man line, his course is easier, because the tackle
is farther in and # 1 is not tempted to run a deep curved course.

On a six overshift, # 1 has the tackle head-on him and must escape this man in
order to get over to the linebacker. In our experience, if #1 just tries to run by
outside the tackle, he will be shoved hard and his own momentum will ruin his
course. We have had good success by having #1 "throw" to hands and knees
outside the tackle, going very low to escape the tackle's hands. From hands and
knees, it is easy to come back in a charging position and on a course to apply a
good block on the far linebacker. Also, the low drive at the start often makes
the tackle think he is being hooked by #1, as on a sweep, and he widens a bit,
thus helping #9's trap.

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It is on the six overshift that #1 must keep in mind his rule about taking the
first linebacker beyond the man to be power blocked. Often he will take the
longside linebacker, as that man sometimes plays inside of or behind the long-
side defensive guard on this six overshift.

#2 - Buck 36

#2 uses what we call the "six turn" in order to travel a bit wider and permit #3
to get into the hole. His first step is a six-inch drop step with his outside foot.
He then executes a one hundred and eighty degree backward pivot on this foot,
ending up with his back to the line of scrimmage. The little drop step is used to
give #9 and #10 plenty of room to get through between #2 and the line of
scrimmage.

#2 then takes the fake from #3, reaching out both hands and then pulling
them in quickly to the body. By pivoting backward on that outside foot, #2 has
placed himself in an ideal position to hide the ball exchange, or lack of it, from
the defensive tackle, the linebacker, and the halfback on the longside. These are
the men we are primarily interested in fooling. After taking the fake from #3,
#2 fakes pitching the ball out wide to #4. This is done with a lead step with the
outside foot, a skip and a full extension of both arms toward #4. He must then
follow his fake wide himself, being careful not to look back to see how the play
is faring. He should make it look exactly like the end run from this series and a
poor fake by him will mar the deception.

DIAGRAM 46

#2 - Spin 36, 46

#2's assignment on both these ball handlings is to block the longside defensive

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end to the outside. It is not necessary for him to drive the end anywhere, but it
is important for him to prevent that end from falling back into team defense.
In order to have the best blocking angle for this, #2 should run close to the
line of scrimmage and take the end with a right shoulder block (in right
formation, of course). In addition to providing a good angle on the end, #2's
course across the face of the tackle will help to draw the tackle wide and set
him up for #9's trap.

#3 -Buck 36

#3 sets the backfield alignment for himself and #4. He lines up at four and
one-half yards deep, directly behind #9. #3 starts with a lateral lead step to the
longside of the formation. There is no hurry on this as #9 and #10 must cross
in front of him. He can take plenty of time to make a good fake to #2. After
the lateral step he starts toward the scrimmage line and holds the ball out with
two hands to #2, quickly draws it back, veers a bit to the longside of the
formation, and follows #10 into the hole. His key is the position of the
defensive guards, and he must know which man is to be power blocked.
Knowing this, he can concentrate on running close to the power block rather
than on the outside edge of the hole near the trap. #3 should expect # 10 to
block the linebacker out at all times. After getting by this block, he should try
to utilize #5's block on the safety. If the defensive half on the longside is not
held by the wide fake of #2 and #4, the ball carrier should be able to take
advantage of the possibility of a lateral to #4.

#3-46

Sets his alignment on #4, parallel and one yard from him. On this play #3
should drive directly for the outside leg of the defensive end as though to hook
him on a sweep. At the last moment he passes the end up, going outside him,
and then cuts downfield for a block on the halfback. Most of the time he will
be unable to get a block on this halfback, but should be prepared for a lateral
from #4 if the halfback goes in fast to make the tackle on the mouth of the
hole.

#3 — Spin 36

The fullback again sets the alignment for himself and #4. This time it is three
yards deep directly behind #9 and down in a three point stance. It is important
that he be no deeper than three yards as this allows him to take plenty of time

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on

DIAGRAM 47

his spin fake to #4 and still get into the hole in a hurry. We have two types of
spin for #3, the six spin and the eight spin.

Talking in terms of right formation, #3's first step on the six spin is a short
balanced step with the left foot directly toward the ball. His weight should be
over this foot so that his spin can be made on it. He reaches out to accept the
ball from X and immediately pulls it in to his body with both hands. He then
holds it against his body with the right hand, elbow tight to hip, and gives his
left hand into #4's stomach. His spin is one hundred and eighty degrees on the
ball of the left foot, and he then pivots off the right foot to continue the spin
on course for his hole. His drive off the right foot governs the placement of
the third step which is the one that sets him on course for his hole. Note that
the third step on the six spin, while forward, is a lateral one toward the six hole.
#3 must get some lateral travel out of this spin in order to get into the inside
tackle hole quickly and at a good angle.

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DIAGRAM 48

Holding the ball in close to his body with his right arm, #3 allows his left to
follow through briefly with #4's course to further the impression of having
given the ball. Then #3's left arm is brought back to cover the ball as he
completes the spin and drives into the hole, still low and with the ball held
close to the body and covered with both arms.

#4 - Buck 36

Lines up parallel to #3 and one yard from him. He should run to the longside
at top speed and make a good fake at receiving the pitchout from #2. His
course should be exactly like the end run from the buck series. He should cut
down-field immediately upon getting outside the defensive end, and be
prepared for a lateral from #3 if the halfback goes in close and fast to tackle
the ball carrier.

#4-46

Sets alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four and one-half yards behind
#10. #4 lines up farther to the short-side on this play so that he may use
exactly the same steps in getting into the six hole that he does in running the
four hole. He takes a short lead step, a cross-over and a third step, and then

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cuts off this outside foot into the hole. If these steps are properly executed, he
should be right on #10's tail going through the hole. These three steps should
be taken directly toward the sideline, while moving laterally. He must run close
to the power block and should expect #10 to block the linebacker out. His
downfield course will be right to the safety man to use #5's block.

#4 - Spin 36

#4 lines up toe even with #3's instep and four feet from him in a three point
stance. His steps for the spin fake with #3 are indicated in Diagram 49.

His right forearm is held on the right hip with the elbow tight to the body. As
#3 places his left hand in #4's stomach, #4 should bring his own left arm over
the top of #3's hand and grasp his own right wrist close in against his body.
The left elbow should also be kept close to the body to help conceal
possession, or non-possession, of the ball. Reaching across the body with the
left arm causes the left shoulder to dip a bit, also aiding the deception. #4
should maintain his fake all the way outside the end. After the first four steps
he should straighten up, pump with the left arm and look down-field in an
effort to draw the defensive halfback wide.

DIAGRAM 49

#6 and #7 - Buck 36, Spin 36,46

These men double-team together on the power block as covered earlier, except

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in the case of the six undershift, when #6 influences and #7 takes the guard
alone.

#8-Buck. 36, Spin 36, 46

Always cross-checks the first man inside of the position head-on himself. In
the case of a man head-on #9, his job is relatively simple. It gets a bit harder
when a man is head-on X, or in the slot between X and #9.

In all cases, he steps first with his inside foot in order to clear the way for a
good close trapping pull by #9. Also, this step will generally place his left leg
well under his left shoulder when he hits his man.

#9 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46

Takes regular trapping pull as described earlier. He may suspect a longer pull
where there is a man head-on him, as this is generally either the five, his longest
pull, or the six overshift, his next longest. If the guard is head-on X, #9 should
suspect the six undershift and be prepared for quick contact on his pull.

Center — Buck 36, Spin 36, 46

Three different passes to make, all of them light spirals. Buck 36 is passed on a
line to #3's far knee, waist high. Spin 36 is passed to #3's near knee, riding up
into his stomach. 46 is passed to #4 waist high, with a one-step lead to the
longside. His blocks are regular cut-off blocks on the shortside tackle. On a six
normal and a six undershift, he should be prepared to help out #8's cross-
check by stepping to the guard with his right foot, preventing immediate
penetration by the guard. Otherwise this defensive guard might beat #8's cross-
check and pick off #10, the running lineman. We do considerable work on this
little detail in order to help #8's check-block against these two defenses.

#10 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46

Should be able to suspect from the spacing in his area whether his pull will be a
close or relatively long one. It is important that #10's pull be no deeper than a
yard and one-half from the scrimmage line, and he should run on the inside
edge of the hole, over the power block, in order to get the best inside-out angle
on the linebacker. Any deviation from a straight inside-out blocking course
calls for either a low cross-body or a low reverse cross-body as our #10's are

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smaller than most linebackers.

#10 should know that his shortest and closest pull is against the six undershift
or a six normal. His longest will be against a five man line. The difference will
not be great, but anticipation will help his adjustments here so that he will
always be cutting close over the power block. If #10 finds no linebacker on the
hole, he should look to his outside for an end folding back, or for the defensive
halfback. Above all, he should keep driving on this play, as the ball carrier will
be right on his tail.

#5 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46

As a downfield blocker on the safety man against all defenses, he should come
over to the opening in order to pick up the ball carrier and get position on the
safety man, who will be heading there to stop the play.

COACHING POINTS

This play is a good one when the opponents are slanting, looping or running
linebackers through the line. There is a definite blocking advantage with #6 and
#7 double-teaming the guard. They should be able to hold this man from
getting the lateral movement he needs in the looping or slanting defense. #9
should remember that his rule is to trap the first man beyond the power block,
whether tackle or linebacker. The six undershift call should not be used against
slants. Even when the defensive tackle is head-on him, #6 should always
double-team with #7. #10 may get all the way down onto the defensive
halfback on this play, as we have done-occasionally when the linebacker ran
through.

Of course, if the opponents loop to the shortside, the play is hurt. It should,
however, be repeated, as sooner or later the opponents will be caught in the
wrong slant and the play will break for a long gain.

#3 should always know which guard is to be powered, so that he can run over
the inside edge of the hole. He can see both guards plainly from his position
with hands on knees by just looking straight ahead.

In order to get #2 and #4 to put on a perfect fake on Buck 36 (and the play is
no good without a perfect fake), they should hold out a certain number of
fingers when they extend their arms in the faking maneuver. Each boy should

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DIAGRAM 50

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tell the other how many fingers were extended. This will make sure that their
eyes are looking where they should, and not back at the ball carrier. If the
defensive linebacker, halfback and end are not pulled a bit wide the fault is
generally in the poor faking of #2 and #4. This can be easily checked in the
movies.

GUARD TRAP, 8 OPENINGS

It is in the area of the defensive guard that the Single Wing applies its greatest
pressure. These guards are in an extremely vulnerable position. They are closely
flanked from both sides by men on the line of scrimmage who have both a
blocking angle and a starting advantage as they know the starting signal and can
anticipate. The blockers will get to the defensive guards quickly, from both
sides, and in overwhelming numbers. The defensive guards must hit hard to
meet this concentration of power, but they must also be prepared to meet traps
from both sides in both left and right formation. These are the first men to be
broken down in most defenses and it is their breakdown that helps to set up
many of the other plays off Single Wing.

Our longside guard trap play, the eight hole, may be run from a variety of ball
handling in the backfield such as the full spin by the fullback to the tailback, the
buck lateral maneuver, the straight tailback series, or some sort of fake pass and
run. The play is designed in every case to utilize our power blocking thought of
two men against one, in order to get a lateral opening along the defensive line;
to hold the man to be trapped with a single trapper; and to use deception or
draw to pull one linebacker at least a step or two in the wrong direction.
Without deception, without hiding the ball, this play will lose about seventy per
cent of its effectiveness, as we must split the linebackers in order to slip the ball
carrier by for an appreciable gain. This play is not a short gainer, slugged out
against tough opposition. It is designed as a long gainer utilizing deception and
finesse in addition to straight power.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

Let us look first at the hole opening against a six normal defense, with the
opponents in the slots between the offensive men:

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DIAGRAM 51

A look at this diagram will show that it is very important to hide the ball on the
fake from the longside tackle and linebacker. The tackle may not be blocked,
and the linebacker must be held for a step at least by the outside threat, in
order to give #7 time to get to him. If the longside linebacker sees the ball all
through the fake, he will move right in to make the tackle on the mouth of the
opening, and #7 will never get to him at all. If the deception, the faking
between #3 and #2, and between #2 and #4, is good, there is an excellent
chance for a long gainer. If those fakes are

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DIAGRAM 52

poor there will be a head-butting contest between #3 and the longside

linebacker, not necessarily a winning formula! The key blocks here are the

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power block and the trap on the line of scrimmage by #8, #9 and #10, and the
block on the far linebacker on #6. These should work every time, and the
power block should move that guard, as #8 and #9 have the perfect shoot-
blocking angle. #3's course must be directly over the power block, as this is
where we should expect our opening. The downfield blocking by #1 and #5
calls for a cut by the ball carrier to the shortside of the formation, away from
the halfback, to take advantage of the downfield blocking pattern.

Against the six overshift and the five man line, the blocking requires very little
adjustment. It does have different details but little major adjustment.

As you can see in Diagram 52, there are no actual changes of assignment from
those that were used against the six normal defense. The power block by #8
and #9 is effected in a slightly different way (see page 51), and #10 can suspect
from the spacing on his side that his trapping pull will be a bit longer than it
was against the six normal defense. #7 will need more help from the fakers in
the backfield in order to get position on his linebacker on the six overshift.
Against the five, however, his position is already assured for his responsibility
of cutting off the outside linebacker. #6 has an easy block on the six overshift,
as his linebacker is farther to the shortside. This linebacker is not such an
immediate threat to the hole opening as on the five man line, where #6 must
get to that middle linebacker in a hurry and drive him across the mouth of the
hole.

When run against the six undershift we are forced to adjust to a considerable
extent. In Diagram 53 we see that it has become necessary for #6 and #7 to
switch assignments. With the defensive tackle playing head-on him, #6 can no
longer get across to cut off the far linebacker. #7's course is clear, however,
and he can get there quicker than #6 anyway. #6 escapes outside the tackle,
staying very low and, aided by #l's fake on the linebacker and the rest of the
faking in the backfield, should be able to get inside position on the linebacker.
This is particularly so, because the linebacker on the six undershift has a good
bit of outside responsibility. #8 can no longer help #9 to double-team the
guard opposite X

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DIAGRAM 53

because he will close the hole. If he drives over to his inside he will pull the
guard, who is head-on him, right into #10's attempted trap. It is better if he
"pours out" of there on a deep pull, thus making the threat of the pitchout to
#4 around the end look more dangerous. This threat should hold both the
defensive tackle and the linebacker on the longside. If the tackle is not affected
by #6 going outside him, by #8 pulling across deep in front of him, and by #2
and #4 faking outside, he is then in a dangerous position for this play, and it
will be necessary for #8 to slide behind #7 to pick off that inside-conscious
tackle.

We leave this up to our #8, after explaining the problem to him and asking him
to consider himself personally responsible for keeping that tackle out of the
picture by either method. #9 knows that on this spacing he loses his double
team with #8 and must do the job himself with a driving shoulder block.

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DIAGRAM 54

However, #9 knows that X is going to step in to that guard, brace and accept
some of the responsibility for preventing immediate penetration, before X
slides off to block his shortside tackle. Often, on this six undershift, the short-
side tackle is so far away and occupied on the shortside, that X is able to devote
almost all his attention to this guard. Thus, we do not entirely lose our double
team. #10 can tell easily that this spacing will give him his toughest trapping
chore. He must get in there very close to #9's power block and dig that
longside guard out of there, particularly if the guard is unaffected by the
influence in front of him. #8 and #2 driving hard to the outside, however,
should have some effect on this longside guard. We hope to get him to take a
false step to his outside, but #10 should never count on this and should be
prepared for a tough trapping assignment.

This opening can be exploited from the buck lateral series, the spin series and
the straight tailback series.

The only men who must learn additional assignments here in order to utilize
these three different ball handlings in the

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DIAGRAM 55

backfield are #2, #3 and #4. All blocking remains the same for the linemen

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and #1. With the blocking adjustments up front for the eight opening all
learned we get these three different methods of hitting it with a minimum of
additional details, Diagram 55.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

His assignment remains the same on all: to cut off the defensive safety with an
openfield block. His timing on it can be improved, and he can help the play at
the same time, by faking an outside hook block on the man in front of him,
whether it be a tackle or linebacker. The time thus used will allow the ball
carrier to be closer to # 1 when he throws his downfield block on the safety,
and this relationship always helps the block.

#2-Buck 38

#2 uses what we call the eight turn on this play, which is designed to allow the
fullback to get into the hole as directly as possible. #2 drops his inside foot (in
right formation, the left foot), about six inches, and takes a forward half pivot
on this foot. This brings him a half unit nearer the center of the line and the
six-inch drop step allows #10 to clear him easily on his trapping pull. The eight
turn also permits #8 to take a deep pull on the six undershift alignment without
tangling with #2.

DIAGRAM 56

This is a drop step and a forward pivot on the left foot ending with both feet
parallel, back to the line of scrimmage, looking at the fullback, and prepared to
take the fake from him. #2's hands should go out to the fullback and then be
quickly withdrawn, in this case without the ball. Then #2's fake to the tailback
should be carried through with a lead step with the left foot, and a skipping
motion as the arms are fully extended toward #4 on the fake pitchout. This

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fake should be followed all the way by #2 as he runs wide to the outside faking
the pitchout sweep. #2 must follow his fake religiously, never looking back to
see how the play is going, as this will ruin the deception's effect on the
defensive halfback, linebacker, end and tackle on that side. The practice of
counting the fingers extended on the fake by #4, which we mentioned in the
discussion of the longside tackle trap opening, is no exaggeration of the
importance of maintaining this fake all the way.

#2 - Spin 38 and 48

#2's assignment is to block the longside defensive tackle out. He should move
close to the line of scrimmage to get the best angle on this tackle.

#3 - Buck 38

His key comes from the position of the guard, and he knows immediately
where the double team power block will be applied. He is thus prepared to run
over that power block. He will take a six-inch lateral lead step with his outside
foot after taking the pass from X. There is no hurry here. On all buck series
plays, #3 has plenty of time to-make a good fake. As he starts toward #2, he
should extend the bah with both hands to #2, withdraw it quickly and drive
over the power block, just off the tail of $10, who is coming over for his trap.
He enters the hole between the guards a bit straighter on this opening than
when he veers for the inside tackle hole. Indeed he may even veer a bit to the
inside, depending on the result of the double team by #8 and #9. #3's
downfield cut is to the short side of the formation to take advantage of #l's
block on the defensive safety. This cut should not be started until #3 has
gotten well by the blocks on the linebacker.

#3 - Spin 38

#3 sets the alignment for himself and #4 by lining up three yards deep directly
behind #9 and down in a three point stance. On this play #3 must use the
eight spin instead of the six spin as he now needs no lateral traveling on the
spin at all.

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DIAGRAM 57

The details on the first two steps here are the same as the six spin, Diagram 48.
#3 steps directly toward the ball, a short six-inch downstep with his left foot
(in right formation). His weight is over that foot in order to spin on it
effectively. His spin is approximately one hundred and eighty degrees and he
must stay down low. For the third step, which must put him on course for the
eight hole, his weight is transferred to the right foot and he pivots on it far
enough around to place the left foot on a straight line for the guard to be
power-blocked. The handling of the ball by #3 and the faking to #4 are the
same here as on Spin 36. After getting past the blocks on the linebackers, #3's
downfield cut is again to the shortside of the formation to utilize the downfield
blocking pattern.

#3-48

On this play, #3 lines up on #4, one yard away and parallel to him. He should
try to make this play look like the sweep by running hard to the outside, faking
a hook block on the defensive end and continuing downfield. He must run
hard as his movement and that of #2 should hold the longside linebacker long
enough for #7 to get position on him.

#4 - Buck 38

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The same details on accepting and carrying through the outside fake with #2
apply here as on the strongside tackle trap play.

#4 - Spin 38

The same details apply here on alignment and faking with #3 as on Spin 36. In
this case, however, #4

DIAGRAM 58

should drop back and fake a pass. He may fake this pass on step number one,
three or five as indicated in Diagram 58.

#4-48

#4 sets the alignment for himself and #3 at four yards deep, behind #10, in an
upright stance. He takes a hard lead step to the longside of the formation and
cuts off that foot into the hole over the power block. He should put a lot of

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"action" into this lead step and actually face the sidelines on it before cutting
into the hole. There is no lead pass by X to #4 here, as we do not want to
interfere with #4's effort to put a lot of "action" into his first step. He should
make this first step look like an off-tackle run or sweep to the longside. #4's
downfield cut is again to the shortside of the formation to utilize the downfield
blocks of #1 and #5.

#6-Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

On all defenses except the six undershift, #6 should take the shortest possible
course for the interception point on the far linebacker. He must realize that this
linebacker is not held by the fake at all and will be coming over fast and be
moving up into the hole. For this reason, #6 must go across as shallow as
possible, not in a bowed or deeply curved course. He must not deviate from a
direct line to the point where that linebacker is going to be when the play
breaks. "Don't go for where the man is, but for where he is going to be," is a
good rule for all blockers. #6's block should be a reverse cross-body to get the
heavy part of his body across the path of the linebacker's drive, which, in the
case of a good linebacker, is across the field and up into the hole. If he tries to
cross-body the linebacker, only his legs, the light part of his body, will get
across the opponent's course, and the linebacker will neither be stopped nor
cut down. Therefore, we insist on a reverse cross-body block here. #6 should
also be prepared for a longside linebacker who, on a six over-shift, has a
tendency to play inside the guard to be trapped.

DIAGRAM 59

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In this case it will be impossible for #7 to get position on such a close

linebacker, so we adjust automatically as indicated in Diagram 59. #6 takes the
linebacker across the face of the hole, #7 goes on down for the halfback and
we ignore the shortside linebacker. #6 has this rule when he goes across for the
cut-off on the far linebacker: "Block the first linebacker beyond the man to be
trapped." This is a lot like #l's rule on the six hole opening, page 131, though
here the dividing line is in the area of the man to be trapped, rather than the
man to be powered.

On the six undershift, when #6 switches assignments with #7, he must escape
the charge of the defensive tackle playing head-on him. To do this effectively,
we have found that #6 should throw himself out and on all fours, trying to get
outside of and beyond the defensive tackle. From his hands and knees he can
recover to get the block on the long-side linebacker. In this way, being low, he
escapes the tackle's hands and is not upset or thrown off balance, or course, by
contact with the defensive tackle. #1 can help to hold the linebacker so that #6
can get inside position on him by faking an outside block on that linebacker.
This is an important detail against the six undershift defense and will make #6's
block possible.

#7 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

Against the six normal and the six overshift, #7 must be sure to go straight
ahead for position on his linebacker, after allowing #6 to cut across in front of
him. #7 takes a six-inch lead step with his outside foot at an angle of forty-five
degrees back from the scrimmage line. This step just allows him to clear the tail
of #6, who is driving across sharply in front of him. His next move must be
straight ahead, to try for inside position on the linebacker. Remember that the
backer-up will be coming hard toward the play as soon as he sees the ball. #7
should remember here that same important rule: "Go for where he is going to
be, not for where he is." Against the five man line, #7 can allow himself a bit
more of a slide to the outside, as his block here is on the outside linebacker,
giving him a better angle at the start.

On the six undershift, #7 switches assignments with #6 and now goes on a flat
course right over the heels of the defensive longside guard to throw a reverse
cross-body block on the far linebacker.

#8 and #9-Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

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These two men apply the power block together on the guard in the vicinity of
the X against all defenses except the six undershift. On the six undershift, #8
influences the guard head-on him by pulling to the longside. His job is to keep
the defensive longside tackle from getting his nose into the play. If #8 cannot
accomplish this with a wide deep pull around the end, then he must simply pull
right over the tail of #7 and actually block that tackle with (in right formation)
a right shoulder block. Needless to say, it is pleasanter to fool those big tackles
than to block them, and most of the boys prefer the wide outside pull.

Center — Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

The passes to #3 for Buck 38 and Spin 38 are exactly the same as for Buck 36
and Spin 36; light spiral passes to far and near knees. The pass for 48, is a
direct, light pass to the longside waist of #4.

X then makes a regular cut-off block to the shortside as covered earlier. On the
six undershift, X should step hard to the guard head-on him with his strongside
foot and brace against this guard's charge. This is done to help #9's single
block on this guard, as #8 is pulling on the six undershift.

#10 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

This man does the trapping against all defenses. He should be able to tell from
the spacing in his area whether his trapping pull will be a long or a short one.
The five man line and six overshift are his longest pulls, and the six undershift
spacing calls for his shortest pull. #10 should think in terms of trapping the
next man beyond the power block in order to be ready for linebackers running
through. He must always observe the fundamentals of good trapping, as
explained earlier.

#5 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48

A downfield block on the near halfback on all defenses. He should run a course
for the spot where that halfback will be when the block occurs, and should
come over a bit toward the- hole, in order to pick up the ball carrier and make
his openfield block close to him.

THE WEDGE PLAY

We are one of the few Single Wing teams really stressing wedge type blocking,

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and we use it a great deal. We would use it as part of our offense, even if it, of
itself, did not work out too well, because it teaches as nothing else does, the
important elements of sustaining blocks and carrying through on an offensive
charge. It takes us four or five weeks to get a really good wedge charge
organized. In the learning process, we work on the ability to sustain, follow

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY VARSITY FOOTBALL COACHING STAFF

L. to R.: F. C. Cappon, Michigan '24; J. R. Stiegman, Williams '44; C. W. Caldwell, Jr.,
Princeton '25; R. W. Colman, Jr., Williams '37; J. A. Timm, Illinois '30.

In the following pictures the author's team is identified by the traditional Princeton uniform
of black jersey with orange-striped sleeves.

PHOTO BY ALAN W. RICHARDS

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Running the Buck Lateral Series Pitchout, in left formation. Note that the #2 back, jersey
#23, has received the exchange from the #3 back. The linemen pulling out of the line to
form the interference are #6, jersey #89, and #8 directly behind, jersey #65. The eventual
ball carrier on this play is the tailback moving into position for the pitchout on the far right
of the picture. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950.

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The Longside Off Tackle play, with a #3 back flanker and in left formation, is adjusted
against a Six Overshift defense. Note the excellent technique of #2 as he uses the shoulder
block to trap the rirfit defensive tackle jersey #72. #6 and #7, jersey #86 and #61 are also
moving the defensive guard with a fine power block. Princeton vs. Dartmouth, 1949.

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The Longside Off Tackle play, with the #3 back leading, and the blocking once again
adjusted against a Six Overshift defense, is run in right formation. Note the excellent
technique for the power block on Cornell's #77. The tailback is cutting for the opening on
his right foot in proper execution of that part of the maneuver. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950.
PHOTO BY NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

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Running the Buck Lateral Series Longside Tackle Trap, in right formation. This picture
clearly shows the team assignments in the execution of this maneuver. The ball carrier, #3
faking to #2 is about to enter the opening led by #10, jersey #66. Princeton vs.
Pennsylvania, 1948.

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BUCK 32
THE SINGLE WING
PITCHOUT

The set of the #2, #3, and #4 backs in

relation to the center is shown at the
start of the play.

As pass from center is made to #3, #2

starts his "Eight Turn" and #4 starts
wide to be in position for the pitch-out.

#3 has received the ball and starts

directly for #2.

#2 completes his turn and is ready to

receive the ball from #3 who makes a
two-handed forward handoff.

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The exchange has been completed. #1

comes into the picture as he proceeds
through the line to block on the
linebacker.

#3 fakes carrying the ball as #2 brings

his feet together to start his hop, skip
and pitchout to #4.

The start of the pitch-out to #4 is

shown as #2 prepares to make the
underhand spiral toss.

The ball spirals to #4. The tailback

will then proceed to carry around the
strongside defensive end with his
personal interferer leading him.

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BUCK 38
THE L0NGSIDE
GUARD TRAP

Backfield in position to start the play.

#2 starts his "Eight Turn."

#3 starts directly for #2.

Note how the ball is concealed from the

longside guard and linebacker.

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#3 actually extends the ball to #2 with both

hands.

#1 in this picture is taking the block of #6.

#3 keeps to drive over the power block on

the guard.

At the completion, #2 and #4 are faking

the pitchout.

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BUCK 34
THE
QUARTERBACK
KEEP PLAY

Backfield in position to start the play.

#3 receives the pass from center.

#1 is blocking on the longside defensive

tackle.

#2 completes the "Eight Turn" and

receives the ball.

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#2 pivots to carry off tackle.

Note how the correct footwork by

#2 gets him into the opening.

As #2 carries, #4 has faked the

pitchout and is in position for a
lateral.

#2 making a lateral pass to #4.

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BUCK 35
THE REVERSE TACKLE TRAP

Backfield in position to start the play.

#2 takes an "Eight Turn."

#3 hands off to #2 as #1 comes around

in position to receive the exchange.

Note how the ball is concealed from the

shortside linebacker and tackle.

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The center is holding the position of

the power block.

#1 completes the exchange to run

into the opening.

#3, #2 and #4 start on their

respective fakes.

Faking being carried out as #1 runs

the opening.

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BUCK 35
CLOSEUP VIEW
OF BALLHANDLING

#2 completes the "Eight Turn" as #3

heads directly toward him.

#3 puts the ball in the pocket formed by

#2's hands.

# 1 is proceeding toward the exchange

point.

#2 prepares to make the exchange

turning toward #1.

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#1 forms pocket with his hands to

receive the ball from #2.

#2 turns his body as the exchange is

made.

Exchange completed, # 1 ducks

inside-shoulder to hide the ball.

#1 drives for the opening as #3 and

#2 carry out faking.

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PASSING FROM THE

BUCK LATERAL
SERIES

#4 PASSING

#3 hands to #2 with the Buck threat.

#2 makes pitch back to #4.

#2 prepares to block as #4 gets ready

to pass.

Ballhandling completed, #4 ready to

make the pass.

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#2 PASSING

#3 makes handoff to #2 with the

Buck threat.

#2 fakes pitchout as he comes back

to pass.

#4 gets ready to block after faking

the pitch-out.

#2 in position to pass.

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The author's team is shown running the Wedge play, in an excellent picture. The defense is
using a 7—1 alignment. The apex of the wedge has powered the guard a full three yards as
the fullback drives up to make the gain, and the vital first down. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1948.

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The fullback drives through a large gap in the defense created by the Shortside Guard Trap
run from left formation. #3 half spins to #1 and then carries as the power block by #8 and
#9, and the trap by #2 take effect. The fake pulls the linebacker well out of position—
Cornell jersey #58—as #6 prepares to throw his block. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1948.

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Princeton uses a combination end and fullback flanker as the Single Wing Shortside Reverse
Off Tackle is run in right formation. #5 and #10 use the special high-low technique for
blocking the shortside defensive tackle. Note the effort in the check block by #9 at the far
right of the picture. Also note the fake is still being carried out by #4, jersey #42. Princeton
vs. Colgate, 1947.
PHOTO BY GERHARD F. SIMMEL

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With th« combination end and fullback flanker, Princeton runs the Single Wing Shortside
Reverse End Run in right formation. The basic elements of this maneuver are clearly shown.
#1 has just received the ball in exchange from #4 as the X, jersey #51, #2, jersey #23 and
#7, jersey #61, form the pulling interference for the play. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950.

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In another excellent photograph, the tailback, jersey #42 is shown as he cuts inside the
longside defensive on the Single Wing Straight Series Fake Reverse and Keep play. #99 and
the team carrying out the faking pull the five Cornell defenders, at the top of the picture,
completely out of position. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950.
PHOTO BY NEWARK NEWS

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A pass is thrown in left formation. #93 is the intended receiver as he goes in-motion behind
a flanking end. The team shows the proper execution of their pass protection assignments.
Princeton vs. Dartmouth, 1948.

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The Off Tackle Jump Pass to the #5 end, jersey #85, is shown about to be completed for a
twelve-yard gain. #42 has released the ball as he drives up into the line then jumps to throw.
Princeton vs. Yale, 1950.

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The #2 back, jersey #23, is well clear as he receives a scoring pass on the opponent's one-
yard line. This is the successful completion of the Straight Series Running Pass maneuver.
#42 was the passer. Princeton vs. Yale, 1950.

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Princeton scores! The tailback, jersey #42, moves into the end zone from left formation on a
Straight Series End Run. Attention must be called to the excellent block thrown on the
defensive safety by the #3 back, slightly ahead of the ball carrier. Princeton vs. Yale, 1950.

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With the fullback in motion to the shortside (3B motion) a pass is thrown to the #5 end. #5
moves into the clear to receive the pass as he gets in behind the defensive halfback, jersey
#45, who moves up to cover the man-in-motion. Princeton vs. Colgate, 1947.

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The #2 back, jersey #25, is passing from the Buck Lateral Passing Series. #2 throws out to
the tailback in position as a flanker behind a flanking end. The play is run from right
formation. Princeton vs. Pennsylvania, 1947.

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The Reverse Pass is about to be thrown. The tailback hands the ball off to #1, jersey #96,
who fakes a reverse and then pulls up short to throw. The ends' courses are described in the
Passing chapter-41 Pass Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950.

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#3 cuts between the blocks on the linebackers to break into the clear. This is the Longside
Guard Trap, run from the Buck Lateral Series in right formation. The power block, the trap
by #10, the block on the far linebacker by #6, and the block on the linebacker by #7, jersey
#67 are all excellent. Princeton vs. Pennsylvania, 1947.

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This picture shows a deep reverse with the fullback out as a flanker ready to block the
defensive right end. #42 is preparing to feed the ball to #44, the wingback, who is following
the blocking back #25, his personal interferer. Princeton vs. Rutgers, 1947.

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A happy locker-room scene, emblematic of victory—1950.

PHOTO BY ALAN W. RICHARDS

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through, and keep the legs driving, all of which are needed for effective power
blocking.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

The wedge may be likened in some respects to the snow-plow. The maximum
amount of drive must be delivered at the apex of the wedge to effect the initial
breakthrough. Every bit of power developed at the apex is used solely to drive
straight ahead. On either side of the apex, power is used in two ways; to
contribute to the straight ahead thrust of the apex and, at the same time, to
prevent infiltration from the sides. The apex of the wedge, in order to obtain
maximum power, is designed to take advantage of the opportunity to put three
offensive men against one defensive man. We try to assign three men definitely
on one, and with this ratio we should be able to get the wedge under way at this
most crucial point. The rest of the team folds in toward the apex and blocks
space rather than assigned men. This is because it is impossible to tell at the
start, exactly how the wedge will develop in terms of opening up the defense. A
gap may appear straight ahead at the apex, but more often it shows to one side
or the other. Sometimes no gap opens, and the ball carrier then dives for his
yardage. Ideally, if there were no opposition, the wedge would look something
like this at the conclusion of the folding-in process:

DIAGRAM 60

On the above diagram, #9 is the apex of the wedge. With changing defenses it
is not always the same man who forms the apex, but we have found it possible
to limit it to either #8 or #9 at the apex, depending on which has a man head-
on him.

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DIAGRAM 61

In Diagram 61, for a six undershift, #8 is the apex of the wedge and all other
men fold in on their charge toward that apex. In this case, #7, #8 and #9 are
the three men whose charge is centered on the guard opposite #8. In the same
diagram, for the six overshift, we find a guard head-on #9, so #8 and #9 and X
become the three men against one, with #9 now the apex. A glance at the five
man line shows that here again #9 is the apex, just as he is against the six
overshift. The six normal, with the defensive men in the slots, is handled a bit
differently. Here we work a straight two-on-one charge against both guards, #9
and X working together on one, and #7 and #8 the other. Our whole thought
on the wedge is so concentrated on developing straight ahead power that we do
not attempt to split the guards on this double team. We just drive them straight
back, or indeed, any way they wish to go as long as it is backward. Again, on
this maneuver, the rest of the line folds in.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

The Three Man Apex

Let us assume that #9 is the apex. He drives his head directly for the
breastbone of the man opposite him and attempts to keep going straight ahead
at all costs. If the man rolls off #9's head or shoulder, #9 does not follow or
veer from his straight ahead course. Often a rolling lineman will roll right down
the entire outer perimeter of the wedge, but #9 attempts only to continue a
straight ahead drive. If the man submarines in front of him, #9 continues right
on over him. #9 must really get off fast, as his start is crucial to the success of
the play.

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#8

#8 is assigned with #9 and X to the opponent head-on #9. He drives forward

with the foot nearest #9 at about a forty-five degree angle in, attempting to lay
his head directly behind #9's shoulder and his own shoulder in solid contact
with #9's hip. If the opponent head-on #9 pivots or slides off #9 to #8's side,
#8 will contact the opponent first with his head and secondly with his off
shoulder.

Center

Same as #8, but with the added burden of a soft pass to #3. This is a direct
pass to #3 just above the knees. Against the six normal defensive alignment, as
noted earlier, #9 and X work on the man in the slot between them, while #8
and #7 double team the opponent playing in the slot between them. Here our
two-on-one unit is trying only to drive the opponent straight back.

#6, #7, #10

These men use the same fold-in technique as #8, except that they will have to
converge farther because the men inside them are also converging. However,
being on the perimeter of the wedge, they generally meet less immediate
opposition than the men on the apex and thus will often advance farther. They
should be prepared to keep driving when they do not meet immediate
opposition, so that they may cut off linebackers who, of course, will be driving
in to stop the play.

#1 and #5

These two men have a definite responsibility, namely to cut off the defensive
tackles. In order to do this, it is often advisable for them to line up a bit tighter
against certain defenses, where the tackle may be playing tight or hard to the
inside. #1 and #5 always drive hard to their inside, prepared to cut off the
tackles at the toughest possible angle. They are responsible for preventing
anyone from breaking down the wedge on the perimeter between themselves
and the next man inside them.

#2

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This job is a vital one. Against all defenses except the six normal, #2 drives in
over the tail of #9. This is done because the area between #9 and X is a zone
of weakness. X must "pass the ball and thus is often a fraction of a second late
in his charge. Therefore, #2 acts as a sort of reinforcer here in order to pick off
any opponent who might succeed in breaking down X's charge. On the six
normal, in which the guards are playing in the seams, #2 drives straight
between them, helping either to break the hole open, or blocking a linebacker if
the defensive guards are already licked by our two-against-one setup on the
mouth of the hole.

#3

The ball carrier lines up four and one-half yards deep, directly behind #9. He
must understand the principle that establishes either #8 or #9 as the apex,
because his initial drive is directed to that spot. It is easy for #3 to take his key
from the area directly in front of #8 and #9. He knows that a man in front of
#9 makes #9 the apex regardless of all other spacing. If there is no man head-
on #9 and one head-on #8, then #8 becomes the apex. If there is no man
head-on either #8 or #9, then #3 drives for the slot between #8 and #9. It is
important that #3 should start rather slowly, instead of belting up for the apex
man at top speed. If his first two steps are taken "under control," he is able to
take advantage of any sudden gap which may open up right or left as the wedge
develops. If no hole appears, he still has enough room left from four and one-
half yards deep, to pick up speed and hit with maximum power. Moreover, the
slower start allows the apex to move the opposing line back a bit. This is
important where inches are a factor on the goal line, as the fullback should take
off and dive for his yardage over the top of the apex when no gap opens for
him.

#4

He should fake an outside run or a pass. On the goal line this fake has little if
any effect, but in midfield on an early down it does. On the goal line, #4 may
regard his assignment with real affection, as he is often the only player on the
field not engulfed in the pile of bodies, still on his feet!

COACHING POINTS

Stress that a man head-on #9 takes precedence over any other spacing. In this
case, #9 will always be the apex man, even though there might be another man

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head-on #8. If a man is in the slot between #8 and #9, then he is double-
teamed by those two men and driven straight back on a special call that we use
here.

DIAGRAM 62

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We give #3 plenty of work on diving over the top when no gap opens on the
wedge, as on the goal line. We also stress that any wedge resulting in a score is
"the line's touchdown."

DIAGRAM 63

#1 and #5 should work on cutting off the defensive tackles, as these men
sometimes can catch #3 almost from the rear, since he lines up four and one-
half yards deep and starts "under control." This is a very important detail and
should be a low, chopping block if the tackles really converge toward the ball
carrier.

Do not be discouraged if it takes a long time to get a wedge charge that is really
effective. No time spent on this is wasted, as the stress on sustaining the charge
is fundamental to any good offensive blocking.

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GUARD TRAP, 7 OPENINGS

Single Wing has often had trouble in the vicinity of the offensive center (X).
Here the T formation has an advantage, as its X is able to snap the ball with his
head up, merely handing the ball back by feel and not responsible for varied
types of passes. The Single Wing X must keep his head down until he has
actually released the ball and is thus in a poorer position to be an effective
blocker. His stance is dictated by a responsibility for putting the ball in play
accurately, rather than for effective blocking. Therefore, an aggressive, active
guard in the vicinity of X has created a problem for Single Wing, in that he can
always get the jump on X. This guard can slip past cross-checks to bother
running linemen and the backs on both longside plays and reverses on which
there is multiple handling of the ball, and consequent delay behind the line of
scrimmage. Therefore, we feel that it is essential to carry this seven hole
opening, which is designed primarily to slow down this particular defensive
guard. Our X is allowed to ask for this play at any time that the opposing guard
is giving him

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DIAGRAM 64

trouble. By means of an effective trap on this guard, we can slow him down or
be satisfied to gain ground on this guard trap play.

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BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

This play is run with the same assignments against both the six normal and six
undershift. It is probably a bit better against the six undershift, as in that
defense the guard is head-on X and charging directly on him to take advantage
of his weak offensive blocking position. The power blocking here is by #8 and
#9, and the trapping is done by #2. #10, of course, crosses in front of #6 as
they go for the two linebackers. On all ball handling maneuvers in the back-
field, the primary threat on this opening is a wide reverse to the shortside.
Therefore, #10's man is the key block as this linebacker is generally drawn
immediately to the hole and must be cut off quickly before he gets there. The
shortside linebacker is often drawn so wide by the fake of the reverse

DIAGRAM 65

that #6's block is a comparatively easy one. His course, however, is not easy,
and it takes quite a bit of practice for #6 to run in close by the power block of
#8 and #9, to get the best possible angle for his block on this linebacker.
Against the six overshift and a five man line, we need to adjust this play, as the
guard is now found head-on #9 instead of on X. Therefore, we adjust to trap a
different man (Diagram 65).

On the six overshift and the five man line, we trap the shortside tackle, who is
generally charging hard in an effort to catch the longside plays from the rear,

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and to protect himself from the block by #5 on our reverses. Notice that on
our downfield blocking we have no one on the shortside defensive halfback
and the safety, but always someone cutting off the longside defensive half. We
hope, by the threat of a wide reverse in the backfield ball handling, to draw the
safety and the shortside half up to protect the shortside flank.

DIAGRAM 66

This play is a must to fit in with the reverses, as it helps to keep that shortside
linebacker at home until he actually sees the ball.

On this seven hole opening, we feel that it is important to use #2 as the

trapper. Therefore, we do not attempt to use the buck series on the hole. We
use a one half spin by #3 to #1 which we call Play 67. We use the straight
tailback series with #4 faking to # 1 on the deep reverse, but "keeping" himself
and cutting into this opening.

We also use the spin series to hit this hole with #3 spinning to both #4 and #
1 and doing the ball carrying himself, Spin 37.

On the three diagrammed ball handlings, Diagram 67, all assignments and

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adjustments up front remain the same. Only #1, #3 and #4 have to learn any
new details, so, essentially, by learning one of the above plays we get the other
two for very little additional coaching.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1-67

We have found that this play times a bit better if we start the #1 a step early.
Thus, #3 does not have to delay his half spin to wait for # 1 to make a good
fake and is able to get into the hole very quickly. Each wingback will have to
work out for himself the timing problem involved in getting to #3 at the right
moment to insure a smooth fake. There are no two wingbacks whose speed or
sense of anticipation are exactly the same. The coach should work with each
wingback to solve this problem on an individual basis. Each wingback should
have a starting point in the signal cadence worked out for himself and should
stick to it. If the boy understands the problem and is sold on the importance of
faking and timing by the coach, he will take pride in doing a good job on this
detail. In discussing the faking by #1, we shall consider ourselves in right
formation. For left

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DIAGRAM 67

formation the details are simply the reverse. As #1 approaches #3, he should
reach out with both hands to accept the fake, with his right hand uppermost.
As he takes the fake, # 1 must pull the right arm down and across his body, at
the same time lowering the right shoulder. The left forearm should be placed
on the hip, parallel to the ground, and the right hand should grasp the left
wrist. This position should be held for four steps. Then the right hand releases
and is used to "pump," as #1 picks up speed. If #1 looks downfield at this
time, a real impression of legitimate ball carrying will be obtained. The faking
should never be considered adequate until #1 manages to get himself tackled
out on the shortside flank.

#1-47

The same faking principles for #1 apply here as in Play 67. In this play,
however, #1 does not anticipate the starting signal but takes the regular start.

#1 - Spin 37

On this play, #1 should anticipate the starting signal just a little bit, in order not
to hold up #3 too long in his spin. All other details of faking are the same as in
Play 67.

#2 - 67, 47, Spin 37

#2 is the trapper on all three types of ball handling for the seven hole. He must
observe all the details of good trapping just as any lineman would. He must
know whether #9 is the power blocker (as in a six undershift or a six normal),
or whether X is doing the power job (as in the five, or six overshift). His key
will be the position of the guard in X's vicinity. If this guard is head-on #9, #2
knows that his own trap will be on the shortside tackle, requiring a drive in
across the tail of X for the toughest possible angle on that tackle. If there is no
one head-on #9, #2 knows that his trap is on the next man to the shortside of
#9, and that #9 is the power blocker on the mouth of the hole. Of course, #2
also listens to #8's call here and blocks accordingly. Knowing his own key,
however, gives him an added second of anticipation.

#3-67

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Sets the alignment on this play for himself and #4 by taking a position four
yards deep, with his left foot in line with the ball. In right formation, #3 should
take a three- or four-inch balance step forward with his right foot. The ball is
taken from X on this right knee just as the balance step is taken. The next step
with the left foot is taken directly for the defensive guard being powered. The
body and hips are turned hard to the right.

DIAGRAM 68

In this half spin, the feet should not be pivoted off line. The hips pivot ninety
degrees, while the shoulders twist about one hundred and eighty degrees. The
knees should be well bent, so that the center of gravity is low. If the ball is held
on the right hip, it will be well concealed from the shortside tackle, guard and
linebacker, the important defenders to affect by the fake. #3 must let his head
turn with his shoulders so that he actually looks at # 1 while faking to him. At
this moment, #3 cannot see what has happened at the hole, and his footwork
alone must carry him out of his fake and start him over the power block. As #3
turns back and starts to drive into the line of scrimmage, he should draw the
ball in with his right hand close to the body and cover it with the left. #3's key
here is the position of the defensive guards. The first man to the longside of
the slot between #9 and X will be powered by two men. This is the block over
which #3 must run. #3, after getting by the linebackers, should run right to the
safety man, trying either to dodge or overpower this man.

#3-47

#3 takes his alignment on #4, parallel and one yard from him. He should run
wide to the longside on the snap of the ball and fake a hook block on the
longside end. #3 should go after the end's outside leg, hard, as this will affect
the end, the safety man, the linebacker and the halfback on that side.

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#3 - Spin 37

#3 sets the alignment for himself and #4 by lining up three yards deep behind
#9 and down in a three point stance. His key here is the same as explained in
Play 67. #3 uses the same steps in faking to #4 as on Spin 38, page 155.
However, on this play #3 must be careful not to complete his spin until #1 is
by him. Again, on this play as on Spin 38, #3 should give the left hand to #4
when faking to him. He must then switch the ball from the right arm to the left
arm, holding it in close against his body, and give the right hand to the
wingback, who is faking the reverse.

#4-67

#4 takes his alignment on #3, parallel and one yard from him. On the starting
signal, #4 drives hard for the shortside end and should actually throw a block
on the end's outside leg, in order to affect the halfback on that side.

#4-47

#4 sets alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four yards deep with the
right foot in line with the ball (in right formation). He starts with a lead step to
the right and on a course for the slot between #1 and #6. He takes a short lead
step, a cross-over, and on the third step fakes a backward two hand feed to #1,
who is crossing behind him on the regular deep reverse course.

DIAGRAM 69

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#4 should extend the ball all the way toward #1 with two hands while taking
his three steps. At the last moment, on that third step, #4 pulls the ball back
sharply into his body and cuts into the hole. There is no hurry for #4 on this
three-step course, as he wants to be on balance for a sharp cutback into the
hole. #1 runs hard, #4 moves under control. This difference in their speeds
makes it look more as though #1 were going to be the eventual ball carrier.
#4's cut after completing the fake to #1 should be right over the power block.
He runs right for the safety man after getting through the hole and cuts either
way on the safety.

#4 - Spin 37

#4 sets himself toe in line with #3's instep and four feet from him. #4 uses the
same faking details with #3 as on Spin 36.

#6 - 67, 47, Spin 37

His shortest course on the pull for the far linebacker will be on a six normal
call. His longest course will be on a six overshift or a five man line call. The
biggest fault that turns up here is that #6 often fails to run his course close
over the power block. If #6 stays close to the power block his angle for
blocking the linebacker will be perfect. He may use either a shoulder or a cross-
body block on this play. If he finds no linebacker there, #6 should continue
downfield to cut off the shortside defensive halfback.

#7 - 67, 47, Spin 37

Should always step forward first with the foot nearest to #6 to permit #6 to
pull close behind him. On a six under-shift, he may take a regular cross-check
block on the tackle head-on #6. On the six overshift, the six normal and the
five man line, he should take a balance step with the foot nearest #6, bring up
the other foot, and wait for his man to commit himself. In this way, #7 is
prepared to cut off a chasing tackle with a reverse cross-body block, a smashing
tackle with a shoulder block, or a tackle running back into team defense with a
long cross-body block. See Diagram 70.

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DIAGRAM 70

#8 - 67, 47, Spin 37

He is the post for #9 on a power block against the long-side guard on six
normal and six undershift call. On six over or five man line calls, #8 check-
blocks alone on the first man to his outside.

#9-67,47, Spin 37

On six normal and six undershift calls, #9 power-blocks to the longside with
#8 on the guard. On a five man line call, he "posts" the guard who is head-on
him for the power block by X.

Center — 67, 47, Spin 37

For Play 67, the pass is to right hip of #3. The pass for Play 47, is a one-step
lead pass, waist high, to #4. For Spin 37, the pass is to the left knee of #3.
On the six normal and six undershift call, X takes a lead step with his left foot
(in right formation) to the shortside and continues laterally for a block on the
shortside tackle. His block here is not as important as clearing the area so that
the defensive guard can penetrate to be trapped by #2. On the five man line
call, X power-blocks the guard head-on #9 with #9. In right formation he
steps half way to the guard with his left foot and brings his right foot up under
the hitting shoulder. This differs from the normal details on power blocking, as
X must compensate for his stance.

#10 - 67, 47, Spin 37

On the six normal and six undershift calls, #10 goes across for the longside

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linebacker. It is important that he go close over the heels of the guard being
trapped in order to get the best blocking angle. #10 should use a reverse cross-
body block, here. On the five man line call, he should slide outside the
defensive tackle who is to be trapped, making sure that he allows #5 to cut
across in front first. #10 then swings over to block the longside halfback. He
must be careful not to go deeper than four yards beyond the line of scrimmage,
or he will be too deep to intercept that halfback. The draw of the play pulls this
halfback over very rapidly.

#5 - 67, 47, Spin 37

On a six normal or six undershift call, #5 takes the same assignment as #10
takes on the five man line call: the cutoff on the longside halfback. He should
try to avoid crossing in front of the linebacker on his side, as this motion might
hurt the draw of the play and pull the linebacker into the middle, where we do
not want him.

On the five man line call, #5 and #10 switch assignments and #5 goes across
right over the heels of the man being trapped to block the middle linebacker.
He should also use a reverse cross-body block on this assignment.

COACHING POINTS

It is a good idea to allow the #2 backs to participate in trapping drills with the
linemen whenever possible. This means that the #2 backs will get plenty of
work on their trapping and can learn from the boys who are doing it all the
time.

For ball carriers, this diagram can be used to give them the picture of the hole
opening:

DIAGRAM 71

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The inception point of the play is the slot between #9 and X. A man playing at
that point will be trapped. If no man is at the inception point, the first man to
the right of that point will be power-blocked, and the first man to the left will
be trapped.

TACKLE TRAP, 5 OPENINGS

When Single Wing hits back to the shortside with reverses it must be
remembered that the time element is important. With the unbalanced line and
the backs well over to the longside, the ball carriers are necessarily a bit slow in
reaching the shortside openings. Therefore, it is important to utilize double
blocking here whenever possible, in order to hold and sustain the blocks for
the longer time element involved.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

In discussing methods of running the inside-tackle hole on the shortside, we

shall have to follow a slightly different procedure, as the blocking adjustments
up front for the linemen are not the same for the three different backfield
maneuvers. Identical adjustments may be used for hitting the five hole off the
reverse from #4 to #1, Play 45, and for the spin and give to #1 by #3, Spin 35.
A different set of assignments are necessary, however, in running Buck 35, the
buck lateral reverse inside the shortside tackle.

In Diagrams 72 and 73, the assignments for 45 and Spin 35 are shown against a
six normal defense. The interesting and slightly different element here is in the
power blocking on the inside edge of the hole. Because the draw of the play on
both ball handlings is to the right, the longside linebacker should not be an
immediate threat at the mouth of the hole. Therefore, it has proved possible to
have #10 check on the effectiveness of the power block by X and #9 before
sliding off for a cut-off block. If necessary, #10 actually helps. This has worked
out well when the defensive

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DIAGRAM 72

guard is slant charging to the shortside. In this case, #10 would devote his full
attention to this guard and become the power blocker with X. #9 always posts
for X's power block and is careful not to charge off against the guard. If the
guard slants to the shortside, #9 will have time to pick up #10's cut-off block
on the longside linebacker.

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DIAGRAM 74

Also, the assignment of #5 is perhaps a bit different. His job is to prevent the
shortside defensive end from dropping back into team defense to pick off the
ball carrier as the latter breaks outside of #7's block on the linebacker. There is
no hurry for #5 on this assignment so he should be able to make a good
sustained fake at blocking the tackle in, thus setting up #2's trap on him. #6
can elbow the longside tackle hard, to prevent his catching the play from the
rear, and still get across for the far halfback, as the play is a delayed one.
Against a six undershift the assignments up front are exactly the same with the
exception of the power block. Here #10 and X work together as the double
teaming unit, and #9 is assigned to the cut-off block on the longside
linebacker, Diagram 75.

#9 should protect himself from being knocked off stride by a slanting longside
guard by stepping with the right foot to this guard before sliding through for
the longside linebacker, as indicated. #7 must remember that the initial draw
on both 45 and Spin 35 is to the longside of the formation. Therefore, he
should expect that shortside linebacker to be pulled at least a step or two
toward the longside. #7 should be prepared to find his man on the inside edge
of the hole and to use a long cross-body block that will allow the ball carrier to
escape to the outside. This is the toughest spot in which to find that linebacker,
as it calls for #7 to throw a block back to the inside against the centrifugal
force of the course he is running. #6 has a tougher job disengaging himself
from the tackle head-on him, but it can be done if he steps into the tackle hard
with the right foot then immediately away with the left, into the area vacated by
#7.

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DIAGRAM 75

Against a six overshift and a five man line, adjustments are made to run outside
of the tackle instead of inside him. On both these defenses the shortside tackle
is so close to # 10 and the guard is farther over, head-on #9. This would make
it almost impossible for #1, the ball carrier, to turn into the hole sharply
enough to run over the power block. There-

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DIAGRAM 76

fore, we adjust to power block the shortside tackle with two men, and we trap
the end.

The six overshift and the five man line are treated exactly the same as far as
adjustments are concerned. On the five, the longside linebacker is ignored as he
will be late in getting to the play and is liable to be cut off by X's block on the

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middle linebacker. #5 and #10, because of the split between them, execute the
double team power block on the tackle differently from any other two linemen.
They use a "high-low" block, with #10 hitting low and #5 blocking high in an
effort to topple that tackle to the inside. Details for #10 and #5 will come a bit
later in this section.

Buck 35, as mentioned earlier, is run with a different set of assignments. On

this play, there is no adjustment to run outside the tackle against the six
overshift and five man line defenses. The shortside tackle is trapped regardless
of where he plays. There are assignment changes, but the hole itself is not
adjusted. The hole is always made inside the shortside tackle. Let us look at the
opening first against a six normal and a six undershift, as we prefer to run it
against these two defenses.

There are some assignments on this play which are a bit unusual. For instance,
X is used as the power man on the double team with #9, even when the guard
to be powered is head-on him. This assignment, of course, would be
impossible except for the great draw exerted on that guard by the ball handling
pattern in the backfield. #10 fakes a pull to the longside in order to add to the
draw in that direction. If the shortside linebacker is keying on #10, as he often
does in the six undershift, this quick fake by #10 will help to draw that
linebacker toward the longside. #10 will block this linebacker by driving him
over toward the longside. He must be careful not to step back as he starts his
fake pull, or he will interfere with a good trapping pull by #8. This is just a
pivot fake by #10; the feet are not shifted at all. #7

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DIAGRAM 77

cross-checks toward the hole, which is essentially unsound, but again the
tremendous draw of the backfield maneuvers makes it possible. The six
overshift and five man line assignments are shown in Diagram 78.

The power block by X and #9 is a bit more orthodox in appearance. #10 and
#5 switch assignments, with #10 faking a pass protection stand-up block on
the tackle in order to bring the tackle across the line of scrimmage for #8's

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trap. #5 allows the draw of the play to pull the linebacker in front of him over
towards the longside and then blocks the linebacker that way. There is plenty of
time on this, as the play is a slow hitter. The middle linebacker on the five man
line is ignored, since the draw of the play will pull him out of the picture.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1 — 45 and Spin 35

# 1 starts on the snap of the ball with a lead step and runs a slightly bowed
course, enabling him to hit the hole at about a forty-five degree angle. The bow
in his course is very slight, because #4 or #3 brings the ball up toward the line
of scrimmage and hands it forward to #1. It is important for. #1 to get into the
hole as quickly as possible, and he should be right on the tail of #7 all the way,
within arm's length of #7. The wingback takes his key from the position of the
defensive tackle on his side. If the tackle is in a six overshift or a five man line
alignment, #1 suspects that his course will be a longer one, because in these
cases the play is adjusted on the shortside to run outside the defensive tackle. If
the longside tackle is playing in a six normal or a six undershift alignment, # 1
should suspect that his course will be a shorter one, and that he must run into
the hole inside the shortside tackle. The calls by #6 will give him the spacing
on his side of the line, and, although he cannot be sure that the shortside
alignment will be consistent with that in

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DIAGRAM 78

his vicinity, he can suspect the type of course he will have to run. After getting
by #7's block on the linebacker, #1 will do well to cut back on the safety man
as there is no blocker assigned to this defender.

#7 - Buck 35

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On this play, # 1 takes a drop step with his inside foot and drops that hand to
the ground momentarily. This is done to keep him low and hide him from the
shortside defenders. At the same time, this one-step delay allows the ball to be
exchanged effectively between #3 and #2, and also, by dropping back a step, #
1 improves the angle of his approach to the hole.

#2 - 45, Spin 35

On the six normal and the six undershift calls, #2 traps the shortside tackle.
On the six overshift and the five man line calls he traps the shortside defensive
end. On all traps he observes the fundamentals of good trapping, treated
earlier. #2 may take a key by observing the position of the guard in the vicinity
of X, as it is this man's position which will govern the call by #10 in the play
area. If that defensive guard is head-on #9, then #2 can be sure that he will
trap the defensive shortside end. If the guard is in the slot between #9 and X,
or head-on X, #2 can be sure that he will trap the shortside tackle.

#2 - Buck 35

#2 executes the eight turn (page 153), and, as he hands the ball to #1 with his
right hand (in right formation), he continues the execution of his steps on Buck
34 (page 117, Diagrams 31, 32). This movement by #2 toward the long-side
off-tackle hole while handing off to #1, aids the draw of the play still further.
The continuation of motion to the longside by #2 has a decided effect on the
shortside linebacker and is therefore very important. It may be said, then, that
the details of #2's movements on this play are the same as on Buck 34, with the
added burden of handing the ball off to the #1.

#3-45

#3 sets himself on #4, parallel and one yard from him. On all calls he runs
hard to the longside of the formation, faking an outside hook block on the
longside defensive end.

#3 — Spin 35

#3 sets the alignment for himself and #4 by lining up three yards deep, directly
behind #9. He uses the steps of the six spin (page 140, Diagram 48), in order
to travel laterally to the longside of the formation. The lateral travel is necessary

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to allow a forward handoff to #1, and also, to permit #1 to get possession of

the ball in time to get a good angle into the hole.

#3 gives the left hand to #4 first, then gives the ball with his left hand to #1.
The ball should be held at all times close to the body with elbows tight to the
sides, both to hide the ball and to insure safe handling of it. After the forward
hand to the wingback, #3 picks off the chasing end or tackle. If there are no
chasers, he continues into the inside tackle hole, faking possession of the ball.

DIAGRAM 79

#3 - Buck 35

#3 sets alignment for himself and #4 by lining up at four and one-half yards
deep, directly behind #9. He then accepts pass from X on his right hip, takes a
lateral lead step with the right foot, and drives up inside of #2, handing the ball
forward to #2 with both hands. After the ball exchange, #3 pulls both hands
back quickly and continues into the line between the guards, faking possession
of the ball.

#4 -45

#4 sets the alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four and one-half yards
deep with his right foot in line with the ball. He starts to the longside of the
formation with a lead step, aiming for the slot between #1 and #6. His steps
are exactly like those he takes on Play 47, page 177, but in this case he hands
the ball forward with his left hand to #1, who is coming across to hit the five
hole. After the exchange of the ball, #4 blocks any opponent who is chasing
the play, or, if no one is chasing, he continues into the off-tackle hole, faking

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possession of the ball.

#4 - Spin 35, Buck 35

#4 fakes the end run from both these ball handlings. He should work hard at
the faking, as this is a comparatively easy assignment.

#6-45, Spin 35, Buck 35

On all three plays into the five hole, #6 is assigned to the shortside halfback.
On the six normal and six undershift calls, he must check the defensive tackle
briefly, before going across for his halfback. This is to prevent that tackle from
catching the play from the rear. On the six normal, this is easy. On the six
undershift, with the defensive tackle head-on him, the problem for #6 is to
escape the tackle's charge.

He should step hard into the tackle with his outside foot and then step over
with his inside foot into the area vacated by #7. In this way he can check the
tackle's charge and still be able to slide through for the far halfback. On a six
over-shift or five man line call, #6 can go immediately without checking
anyone. His course for the far halfback must be a flat one, never over four
yards deep.

#7 _ 45; spin 35

#7 pulls for the shortside linebacker on all calls on these two plays. He may
expect the draw of both 45 and Spin 35 to have some effect in pulling the
shortside linebacker a step or two toward the longside of the formation.
Therefore, #7 should be prepared to block to his inside as he comes through
the hole. His pull is a flat one, not over two yards deep, as it is important to get
into the hole quickly. #7 may expect his longest pull on a six overshift or a five
man line call by #6, because the hole will be adjusted on these to run outside
the shortside tackle. On the six normal and six undershift calls, #7's pull is a
short one, just about over the position of X, who is involved in the power
block on both calls. #7 must remember that, because of the flat course of # 1
on this opening, the ball carrier will be right on his tail. #7, therefore, must not
hesitate in the hole. He must run his course at top speed, and, if no linebacker
is in his immediate vicinity, he must continue right on downfield for the
halfback or safety man.

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#7 - Buck 35

#7 cross-checks the longside guard on all calls on this play. If the guard is
inside him, as on the six normal and six undershift spacings, #7 uses a reverse
cross-body block, driving his shoulders and the trunk of his body across in
front of the guard and then crabbing on all fours to get position between the
man and the hole.

#8 - 45, Spin 35

#8 cross-checks the longside guard against all defenses on these plays. It is

important that he step first with the foot nearest #7 on these cross-checks, in
order to clear the way for #7's pull.

#8 - Buck 35

On this play, #8 pulls to trap the shortside tackle on all calls. Against a six
normal and a six undershift, his pull is a normal trapping pull. On the six
overshift and the five man line calls, however, #8 must realize that the unusual
draw of the backfield maneuvers will often pull the close shortside tackle in so
much that it will be impossible to trap him. The fake of the pass protection
block by #10 will often bring the tackle across so that #8 may trap him, but
sometimes the tackle will smash along the line of scrimmage to the inside. In
this latter case, #8 must be prepared to turn into the hole and work on the
tackle, to insure his continued inside commitment. In other words, #8 prevents
the tackle's recovery as the play develops.

DIAGRAM 80

This assignment looks impossible, but it has proved itself over several seasons.
The draw of the play is, of course, the factor that makes it possible.

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#9-45, Spin 35

On the six normal, six overshift and five man line calls, #9 works with X to
double-team the guard in their vicinity. #9 acts as the post for X's power on
this block. He must be careful not to drive off too hard or he might drive the
defensive guard around X's block. Because X is a little late in charging, #9, on
the six normal call, must simply hold his position and prevent the defensive
guard from penetrating. He must not step off on the guard at all; just take a
lateral step, slightly backward, with the foot nearest X and brace himself. After
X has made contact on his charge, #9 should work to keep the slot between
himself and X closed and should only start to drive when he is sure that he will
contribute to moving that guard laterally along the line of scrimmage. In case
the defensive guard slants to the short-side, #9 must remember that #10 will
then pick up the block with X, and #9 can slide through for the far linebacker.
On the six undershift call, this is the man that #9 will get, protecting himself
first against a slant by the guard head-on #8.

#9 - Buck 35

On all calls, #9 works with X on the guard in the area between head-on X to
head-on #9 inclusive. Where #9 is post-blocking for X's power block, the same
details apply as mentioned earlier for #9 on 45 and Spin 35. However, on the
six undershift, X and #9 still take that guard, despite the fact that he is head-on
X. This block can only be successful because of the draw of the play. #9 is
careful on this call again not to step off on the guard. He must brace and allow
the draw of the play to entice the guard into directing his charge onto himself
instead of X. Then X can pick up and together with #9 move that guard
laterally. #9's main concern is to keep the slot between himself and X closed,
and to entice the defensive guard into slicing inside, toward what appears to be
the heart of the play.

Center— 45, Spin 35

The pass for 45 is made with a one-step lead to #4, while Spin 35 calls for a
pass direct to the left knee of #3.

On the six overshift, six normal and five man line calls, X double-teams with
#9 to drive the guard to the right. On the six normal call, with the guard in the
slot, X steps first with the foot nearest to that guard, because he will make

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contact on the first step. With the guard head-on #9, as on the six overshift or
five man line calls, X should step first with the foot away from the guard, since
that step will improve his blocking angle and allow the near foot to be under
the shoulder when contact is made on the second step. On the six undershift
call, when the defensive guard is head-on him, X works with #10 to double-
team the guard. In this situation he steps into the guard with the foot nearest
#10, makes contact with the shoulder nearest to #10, and attempts to keep the
seam closed while allowing # 10 to apply the drive that effects lateral opening.

Center — Buck 35

The pass to #3 is waist high and to the right. On this play, X double-teams the
guard with #9 on all calls. The same details apply for his block on the six
normal, six over-shift and five man line calls as on Play 45. On the six
undershift, however, with the defensive guard head-on him, X puts the
principles of the lead and post block to use. He steps in first with his right foot
and slides his head and shoulders to the left. As the guard makes contact with
X's right shoulder, X works around and starts to drive back to the right, letting
the guard go straight for #3 and driving him that way with #9.

#10 - 45, Spin 35

On the six undershift, #10 power-blocks the guard head-on X with X,

observing the details of good power blocking covered earlier. On the six
overshift and five man line spac-ings, he goes through for a cut-off block on
the far linebacker. His course for this block should be directly over the heels of
the guard head-on #9. A reverse cross-body block is used on the linebacker.
On the six normal call, #10 must check on the guard in the seam between X
and #9 in case that guard is slanting toward the shortside. This is done because
X is weakened in his offensive blocking by the responsibility of passing the ball.
#10 does this by stepping first with die outside foot toward that guard, and
then bringing up his inside foot, prepared to block with the inside shoulder. If
the defensive guard is not slanting toward him, #10 drives off this inside foot
to block the far linebacker. There is plenty of time for #10 to check on this
block, because the far linebacker is held for a couple of steps by the faking in
the offensive backfield. On the six overshift and the five man line calls, #10
and #5 power-block the tackle, who is lined up tight on #10's outside shoulder.
#10 steps into the tackle with his outside foot, making contact with his outside
shoulder at the belt line. #10's job is to prevent penetration by the tackle and to
straighten him up, so that large area is exposed to #5's block, and also to keep

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the slot between himself and #5 closed. #10 does not follow through on his
contact until #5's power block has actually turned the tackle to the inside. Then
#10 may pick up and contribute to moving the tackle farther to the inside.

#10 - Buck 35

On the six normal and six undershift calls, #10 fakes a pull to the longside, in
order to help the draw of the play and to allow time for that draw to pull the
shortside linebacker over toward the longside of the formation. #10 then goes
through to block the linebacker to the inside. The fake pull must be simply a
body twist rather than an actual step to the longside. If #10 actually steps back
and toward the longside he will interfere with the trapping pull of #8. On the
six overshift and five man line calls, #10 steps back, raises up, and fakes a pass
protection block on the tackle in order to bring him across. #10 then breaks
off before the tackle can tie him up and takes the shortside end with a shoulder
block or a reverse cross-body, depending on how far the end has come across
the line of scrimmage. #10's sole object on this block is to prevent the end
from dropping back into the play behind the defensive line of scrimmage.

#5 - 45, Spin 35

On the six normal and six undershift alignments, #5 influences the tackle by
stepping to him with the inside foot and threatening an outside block on him.
He then pivots on this foot and prevents the end from dropping back into the
play, using either a reverse cross-body or a shoulder block, depending on how
far the end has penetrated. On the six overshift and five man line calls, #5
power-blocks the tackle to the inside with #10. #5 steps first with the inside
foot if he is close to the tackle and can contact him on that first step.
Otherwise he steps first with the outside foot. The block is a straight shoulder
block, delivered fairly high, above the opponent's hip, to take advantage of
#10's low effort on the inside.

#5 - Buck 35

On the six normal and six undershift spacings, #5 influences the defensive
tackle and blocks the shortside end, as described for 45 and Spin 35. On the six
overshift and the five man line calls, #5 blocks the shortside linebacker. He
should delay on the line of scrimmage on the six overshift call until the draw of
the play pulls the linebacker to the longside, then block him that way with a
shoulder or reverse cross-body block. On the five man line spacing, if the

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linebacker is outside him, #5 goes right after the man with a shoulder or cross-
body block to keep him outside. If the linebacker is head-on him, or inside, #5
delays and takes him late, across the face of the play, as described for the six
over-shift.

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OFF-TACKLE REVERSES, 3 OPENINGS

We now come to the three opening. The Princeton Single Wing has a reverse
off the shortside tackle from the straight tailback series and the spin series. The
play for this hole from the buck lateral series is not quite as strong as the others
because the wingback (#1) cannot get into this hole at a good angle when the
quarterback (#2) is handing him the ball. For a third method of hitting this
hole we shall discuss the play from the fullback half spin to #1, which has
already been mentioned in discussion of the seven hole. The key factor in
running off-tackle to the shortside is the position of the shortside tackle. If he
is playing inside #5, it is practical to block him inside, because #5 holds a
blocking advantage on him. If the tackle lines up wide, so that #5 no longer has
a blocking advantage on him, the play must be adjusted to run inside tackle. As
pointed out in the previous discussion of the five hole, all reverses from Single
Wing take time to reach the point of attack. For this reason, double blocking
on the mouth of the hole is essential so that the block can be sustained for the
added time interval.

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DIAGRAM 81

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DIAGRAM 82

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

The assignments and adjustments on Play 43 and Spin 33 are the same up
front. The assignments are a bit different on the fullback half spin, Play 63. Let
us look first at 43 and Spin 33.

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DIAGRAM 83

Play 43 is a forward handoff by #4 to #1. Spin 33 is a backward handoff, this

time by #3 as he comes out of his spin fake to #4. On both these ball
handlings, the initial draw of the play is to the longside of the formation. For
this reason, #7, the pulling lineman who leads through the hole, may expect to
find the shortside linebacker on the inside edge of the hole. For this reason
also, #2 is allowed the option of going around outside the shortside end, if that
defender, influenced by the initial draw, charges hard to the inside. #2 should
always run a course, particularly for the first few steps, that will look like his
course on a play through the one hole, on which he hooks the end in. This is
done to help #9's trap, because the deeper motion by #2 should

keep the end from crashing so tightly to the inside that #9 cannot handle him.
The block on the shortside tackle by #5 and #10 is a high-low double team
effort, designed to topple the tackle to the inside. X and #8 should block the
guards as cross-checkers.

Against the six overshift and the five man line spacings the assignments are
essentially the same, except that X now does the trapping job on the shortside
end. This is shown in Diagram 82. Against the five-three defense, as shown in
Diagram 83, #2 will expect to take the outside linebacker on the shortside, and
#7 will still expect his block to develop on the inside edge of the hole. If #2

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cannot run inside the end, it is generally because the linebacker is covering
outside to allow the end to crash to the inside. In this case, #2 by continuing
outside the end, will so affect the linebacker that the latter will be unable to
recover.

Against the six undershift spacing on the shortside, it is necessary to adjust 43

and Spin 33 to run inside the tackle

DIAGRAM 84

instead of outside. When the tackle lines up head-on #5, as he does on the six
undershift, #5 no longer has a blocking advantage on him, and the double team
opportunity is lost. Any effort by #10 to help on the block will only drive the
tackle wider. Therefore, the hole is adjusted to run inside the shortside tackle.
Play 63 differs from 43 and Spin 33 in that the draw of the initial backfield
movements is toward the shortside. For this reason it is much easier to block
the shortside end out, because the threat of the deep reverse prevents his
closing hard to the inside. This always allows #2 to go inside the end against a
six normal, six overshift, or a five man line defense.

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DIAGRAM 85

#7 also leads through the hole and always blocks to the inside, since the
longside linebacker will come over very fast on the play. #2 blocks on the
outside edge of the hole as he goes through, in order to take care of the
shortside linebacker, who will be drawn wide by the movement to that side. #4
fakes an outside block on the end, as indicated, and continues for the defensive
halfback. Against a six overshift, the only change is between X and #9. This is
shown in Diagram 86.

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DIAGRAM 86

Here, the X does the blocking of the shortside end and #9 check-blocks the
guard. Against a five man line with three linebackers, the adjustments will
remain exactly the same, with #7 turning to the inside as he goes through the
hole to block the middle linebacker. #2, blocking on the outside edge of the
hole, will take care of the shortside linebacker. The outside linebacker on the
longside has no assigned blocker, because he cannot reach the hole in time to
hurt the play.
Play 63 is adjusted up front against a six undershift spacing like 43 and Spin 33.
The shortside tackle is trapped, as he is too wide to be powered in, and the
guard opposite X is

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DIAGRAM 88

double-teamed. There is a change in assignment, however, for #5. Because of

the draw of the play, #7 must continue to block to the inside against the
longside linebacker, who will be pulled to the hole immediately. Therefore, #5
must block the shortside linebacker, after faking a block on that tackle. #5 has
plenty of time on this play to allow the linebacker to commit himself. #5 may
block him either in or out, depending on the man's reaction.

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TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1-43

# 1 takes a drop step with the inside foot, and his course is parallel to the line
of scrimmage. There is no necessity for him to go back to accept the ball from
#4. The latter will bring the ball up toward the scrimmage line and will hand it
forward. #1 should be right on the tail of #7 as he enters the hole. If this
timing is not working, it is probably because #4 is not handing the ball to #1
close enough to the line of scrimmage. The position of the longside defensive
tackle is #l's key to his course. Six normal spacing by this tackle indicates #l's
longest course. Six overshift or five spacing will be his intermediate course, and
a six undershift alignment will tell #1 that his course is a close one, right over
the power block of X and #10. His downfield cut after getting by the
linebacker should be to the sidelines in order to utilize #2 as a blocker on the
halfback.

#1 - Spin 33

Same course for #1 as on 43, except that he now accepts the ball from #3 on a
backward handoff. #3 is responsible for moving well up toward the line of
scrimmage to keep the exchange from forcing #1 so deep that he is not on the
tail of #7 going through the hole. The same keys on defensive linemen as on
Play 43, will be available to #1 to anticipate the length of his course.

#1-63

On all calls on this play, #1 starts in motion on a course for the near foot of
#3. He must work out the timing for himself so that he will arrive at the
moment of the fake by #3. It is important that #3 should not have to delay his
fake to wait for #1. Each wingback must establish a starting point in the signal
cadence that will get him to #3 on time. The fake by # 1 must be carried out all
the way around the shortside end.

#2-43, Spin 33

On the six normal and six overshift calls, #2 must start his course fairly deep
toward the shortside. This is done to give the shortside end a picture somewhat
like the deep reverse to his side, and to make that man widen so that the block
on him by #9 or X is made easier. If the end widens, #2 can cut sharply inside

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him and continue downfield for the halfback. If the end is unaffected by the
initial depth of #2's course, and closes hard to the inside, #2 continues outside
the end, immediately turning downfield for the halfback. On the five man line
call, #2 will block the outside linebacker out after turning inside of X's block
on the end. On the six undershift call, #2 has a definite change of assignment.
On this call he runs a flat trapping course across the face of the tackle on the
shortside who is to be trapped, and blocks the end out. His key can be taken
from the position of the defensive guard in the vicinity of #8.

#2-63

On all calls, #2 turns into the hole and blocks the shortside linebacker out.
Because the draw of this play is to the short-side, #2 does not experience any
trouble in getting into the hole and will usually find the linebacker on that side
committed to the outside. Again, #2 can take an early key from the guard in the
vicinity of #8. If this defender is lined up head-on #8, #2 suspects his course
will be a close one inside #9's trap on the shortside tackle. #2 should start a
fairly deep course each time so that he and #7 enter the hole almost shoulder
to shoulder at all times.

#3-43

#3 starts wide to the longside on all calls. He throws an outside hook block on
the defensive end, in order to hold the longside linebacker and halfback on that
side.

#3 - Spin 33

Sets alignment for himself and #4 at three yards deep directly behind #9 and
down in a three point stance. He executes the six spin on this play, making sure
to travel well up toward the line of scrimmage. At the same time, the six spin
insures that he will also travel laterally toward #1. He hands the ball back to #1
on his third step with the right hand (in right formation, which we are always
talking here), and then picks off the longside tackle, who may be chasing the
play. This technique differs only in the backward hand-off from that shown in
Diagram 79.

#3-63

#3 sets alignment for himself and #4 at three and one-half yards, with his left

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foot in line with the ball. The technique of his half spin to #1 is the same as on
Play 67, page 175, Diagram 68. However, after coming out of the half spin, he
must pick up #7 and slide laterally toward the hole. This hole will vary,
depending on the defense faced. #3 may take a key from the position of the
defensive guard in the vicinity of X. If the guard is in the slot between the X
and #9, #3 can expect a six normal call, which gives his longest course to the
shortside. If the defensive guard is head-on X, #3 should anticipate a six
undershift call, with his hole opening up almost straight ahead, since this guard
will be power-blocked by #10 and X.

#4-43

Sets alignment for himself and #3 at four yards deep directly behind #10.
Starts laterally, and up toward the line of scrimmage, with a short lead step. He
will hand the ball forward with the inside hand on his third step and then break
wide around #3's block on the end, faking possession of the ball.

#4 — Spin 33

#4 fakes receiving the ball from #3 on the spin and then carries out the fake
around the longside defensive end.

#4-63

#4 runs right at the shortside defensive end and fakes an outside hook block
on him. As soon as he clears the end #4 turns downfield for the defensive
halfback. He uses an open-field block on this man, taking him in or out,
depending on the man's position at the moment of contact. The fake block on
the end is a duck of the head and shoulders just at the approach. The effect of
the fake can be improved if #4 will throw both arms forward toward the end's
outside leg on the duck of his head and shoulders.

#6-43, Spin 33

On a six normal or six undershift call, #6 must check the tackle briefly before
going downfield for his block on the safety. This can be done by stepping hard
into the tackle with the foot nearest him and jarring him off balance with the
shoulder and elbow closest to him. #6 has only to slow the tackle down one
step to have done a good job. He then cuts sharply across the field for the
point where the safety man will be as the play develops. On a six overshift or a

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five man line call, #6 may go immediately for his downfield block, since the
tackle is too wide to hurt this play, particularly with the initial draw being to the
longside of the formation.

#6-63

Because the draw on this play is to the shortside, #6 must check the tackle as
described above on all calls except the five man line. With # 1 leaving early, the
tackle might well catch #3 from the rear unless #6 checks him solidly before
going downfield for the safety man,

#7 - 43, Spin 33

On all calls #7 pulls around the power block on the short-side and blocks the
shortside linebacker. Because of the draw of the play, he may expect to block
that linebacker to the inside almost all the time. His pull will vary in depth
depending on the call. His deepest pull, about two yards, will be on the six
normal call, and he must be prepared to turn into the adjusted hole very
quickly. On all these pulls he may take the linebacker the easiest way. It is up to
the ball carrier to use #7 properly as a blocker, but #7 should understand that
the draw of the play will almost always pull the shortside linebacker to the
inside edge of the hole. His block should be a cross-body block at all times,
unless the linebacker is right in the middle of the hole. In this case, #7 uses a
straight shoulder block.

#7-63

On this play, #7 always blocks on the inside edge of the hole, taking the
longside linebacker, who is pulled immediately to the hole by the draw of the
play. His pulls are the same as to depth and length on this play as on 43 and
Spin 33. The only difference is that #7 always blocks to the inside as he comes
through the hole.

#8 - 43, Spin 33, 63

On all calls on the three hole plays, #8 check-blocks in the line on the first man
in the area from head-on himself to the longside.

#9 - 43, Spin 33, 63

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On all three hole plays, #9 check-blocks the guard head-on him on the six
overshift and five man line calls. On the six normal he pulls to trap the
shortside end, and on the six undershift he pulls to trap the shortside tackle. #9
must be ready for a short trapping pull and early contact with his man on the
six undershift call. The six normal call tells him that his trapping pull will be
longer, since he blocks the end on this defense. At all times, #9 is guided by the
details that apply to good trapping, as described earlier.

Center — 43, Spin 33, 63

The passes to #4 and #3 for 43, Spin 33 and 63, follow the same pattern
previously described for these series. Actually giving #4 a one step lead on 43
makes this pass go directly back from center. The assignments of X for all three
plays are standardized from play to play. However, each defensive charge
causes an adjustment in blocking for X. The off-tackle reverse is designed
against the six normal defense. This is probably the most difficult assignment
given to X. He cross-checks on the guard on his right shoulder. His main
problem is to prevent penetration by that guard, so the technique is to throw
his body across the opening, using a reverse cross-body block. This is similar to
the technique of the post for a shoot block. If the defensive guard is not a hard
charger, then X steps in with his right shoulder to take the man with a shoulder
cross-check. If the guard moves to an overshift and "five" is the call, X pulls to
trap the end. This pull conforms to the basic technique of a trapping pull. His
assignment, when "under" is called and the guard is over him, is to post the
guard for #10's power block. X should work hard to prevent initial penetration
by the guard, as the act of passing the ball will prevent X from doing his job
quickly.

#10 -43, Spin 33, 63

On all three hole plays, #10 double-teams the shortside tackle with #5 on the
six normal, six overshift and the five man line calls. On the six normal
alignment the block by #10 and #5 is a high-low effort, designed to topple the
defensive tackle to the inside. #10 shoots out low and goes to all fours,
attempting to contact the tackle with the hip nearest to him. #10's hip, thigh
and leg should be in a position to prevent penetration to the inside by the
tackle, and his hands should go to the ground inside and behind the tackle. The
intent is to trap the tackle's inside leg. As soon as contact has been established,
#10 should work on all fours to get the trunk of his body across the tackle to
the inside so that #5's drive will topple the tackle over him.

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On the six overshift and the five man line, #10 and #5 work together on the
tackle, but here the technique is a bit different. Because the tackle is now close
to him, #10 steps immediately into the tackle with the foot nearest him and
drives the shoulder into the pit of the stomach. He stops the tackle's
penetration first and then works to keep the slot between #5 and himself
closed. He does not follow through on his initial contact, but merely tries to set
up the tackle for #5's power block. #10 should not pick up and drive until the
force of #5's block has moved the tackle. Then #10's drive will contribute to
moving the man laterally along the line of scrimmage rather than straight back.
On the six undershift call the hole is adjusted to run inside the shortside
defensive tackle who is too wide to allow #10 and #5 to block him in.
Therefore, #10 power blocks with X on the guard.

#5 - 43, Spin 33, 63

#5 has the same assignments. On the six normal, six overshift and the five man
line, he power-blocks the defensive tackle with the help of #10. This is a
straight shoulder block for #5, who applies the power on this double team. His
first step must be taken with the thought of having the foot under the blocking
shoulder at the moment of contact. Thus, if the tackle is close to him, as on a
six normal, #5 would step with the foot nearest him, because contact will be
made on the first step. If the tackle is farther away to the inside, as on a six
overshift, #5 should step with his outside foot first, as contact will be made on
the second step. On the six undershift call, #5 should fake an outside block on
the tackle to influence him into a wide charge. #5 must actually contact the
tackle on this fake, since he has plenty of time before breaking off to go
downfield for the halfback. The reverse play is a late hitter, and #5 should
work on the time element involved to keep him from going downfield too
soon. His block on the halfback should occur close to the ball carrier to be
effective. He may block the halfback in or out, whichever is easier at the time.
It is up to the ball carrier to use this block effectively.

END RUN REVERSES, 1 OPENINGS

The general principles for running the attack outside of the ends remain the
same. In essence, we attempt to cut off the main body of the defense, isolating
the problem in the outer defense. However, the play changes to a certain extent
in attempting to run around the end defending the shortside of the formation.
Plays directed at this end usually are delayed, arriving at the line of scrimmage

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later. This is due to the longer distance required for the pulling linemen to form
interference in front of the ball carrier, compared with running to the
overbalanced side. Successful plays that hit late must, in addition, block the
defensive line at a later position, because linemen who are blocked early on
delayed plays may recover in time to make the tackle.

In applying this principle for the inside reverses, because of the delay, we have
attempted to standardize the assignments for all maneuvers. An attempt at
standardization has also been made in the adjustments for the varying defenses.
In this manner, the linemen will be better prepared to contribute to the sealing-
off effect on the main body of the defense.

Wide reverse plays naturally get best results when run against the overshifted
six man line. Let us therefore take the blocking against this type of spacing for
all the reverses as focal point of the discussion.

BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS

#5 takes the linebacker in, using a body block to cut the outside leg of the
linebacker. #10 must stand the tackle up and then work to contain the tackle
from the outside, making him escape, if at all, to the inside. X pulls, as in the
off-tackle opening, to threaten the end from the inside. Having done this, he
takes a position as the first important member of the cut-off wall, ready to
second-block the first defensive man to arrive in his area. #9 and #8 have
shoulder blocking assignments to check the guard, before they release to join X
in the cut-off wall. #6 is assigned to the safety as a downfield blocker. Having
isolated the defensive team from the defensive end and right defensive
halfback, we now find that key blocks on the end and halfback are the
individual problems of #2 and #7. #2 approaches the end at an angle to take
the end in. If X's threat has been well made, #2 should be able to take that end
in. #7 pulls seven yards deep on a course to go around #2's block. When he
clears the end he can anticipate outside support for the blocked end by the
halfback, which means that #7 should be prepared to block the halfback out.

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DIAGRAM 89

The changes for running this play against a five-three defense are nominal.
However, the changes are not called changes but rather recognition problems.
#5, who was assigned to take the linebacker in, finds he will not be able to do
so because of the outside position of this linebacker. Seeing this, #5 will
disregard the linebacker and proceed laterally to block the defensive halfback
out. #7 is assigned to the halfback, but, since he is a personal interferer, he is
prepared to take the first block needed for success of the play. The far
linebacker will be up quickly on the outside so we expect #7 to block him out.
When teams consistently play a five, #7 will be able to anticipate blocking
earlier on the play.

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DIAGRAM 90

We must adjust the blocking a good deal to run against the six undershift and
six normal. #5 takes over the position block in the cut-off wall, taking an inside
course in the six undershift to draw the tackle in. #10 takes the block on the
linebacker with the same technique used by #5 against the six overshift. X
becomes a check blocker, using a shoulder block and then he becomes a
secondary cut-off blocker. #9 pulls, just as he does for a shortside off-tackle
opening, but hooks the outside leg of the tackle in the same way that #2 blocks
the end. #6 elbows the tackle before going downfield as before. The play is
adjusted in this manner to continue to give the appearance and threat of an off-
tackle play, before breaking wide.

#2 and #7, however, can expect a different reaction by the

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DIAGRAM 91

end and halfback. Should the defensive end react wide, #2 will block him out.
#7's course is deep enough so that he can see the end reacting and being taken
wide. #7 will change his course to run inside the end and also will anticipate
inside support of the end by the halfback. He can expect then to take the
halfback in. This type of reaction and change of blocking is interchangeable at
all times, no matter what the defense. With the type of end play encountered
today, this may be true when the end is playing in an overshifted spacing.

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Conversely, with the changing defenses, the end may be reacting inside even
with this spacing, and the play will run outside. In other words, there is not
much that is static in plays designed to go around the ends, except for the
containing of the main body of the defense.

The choice of cycle for running the play does not bring any requirements for
changing the blocking. Running the play from a specific series contributes to
standardizing the reactions of the defense and thus necessitates local changes in
technique. Each series has a different draw, and different men are being fooled
by the fakes. An understanding of these elements helps the man on offense to
anticipate defensive reactions and to be prepared to accomplish the local
change in technique required for his position. This play around the end can be
run from three different maneuvers, all of them allowing the wingback to carry
the ball around the shortside end. See Diagram 92.

From the straight series we use Play 41. #4 receives the direct pass and uses a
forward handoff to exchange the ball with #1. #3 in this case, starts to the
right and goes directly at the end. By throwing an outside block on the end, he
helps to hold the linebacker and tackle on that side. #4 completes the fake by
putting his left hand on his right hip as he circles the end behind #3's block. #1
takes a deep course to use #7 as his personal interferer. The draw of this

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DIAGRAM 92

play is all to the longside, so all blockers can expect inside reactions from the
defense.

Running from the half spin, by the fullback, the play is 61. #4 is added to the

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cut-off wall in an attempt to draw the linebacker and tackle in. #3 hands off to
#1, who leaves his lining-up position on an early count, and then blocks the
longside tackle to complete his fake. The expectancy on this maneuver is that
the end will widen and the play will run inside, with the halfback being drawn
up on the inside. Early draw on this play is all to the shortside, and all blocks
should be so compensated, but this is offset by the gain in speed of attack
before reaching the hole.

Using the full spin cycle, or Spin 31, #3 fakes to #4 and gives to #1. #3 fakes
the left hand to #4 and travels laterally toward #1. As he turns, he gives the
ball to #1, who must time his course properly to get behind #3's spinning
position. This spin will hold the linebackers and force the end to react deep.
The advantage gained is that the linebacker and halfback will be held
momentarily and thus delay their arrival at the play.

TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS

#1-41

Lines up in his usual position one yard deep, one yard away from his end,
facing in at a forty-five degree angle. His course on the starting signal is directly
at the right shoulder of the #3 back, to receive an outside feed from the #4.
The step is a lead and cross-over, keeping low and receiving the ball on his
outside hip in a pocket formed there by placing his arms on this side as he
prepares to get the ball from #4.

As # 1 takes his offensive stance, he soon learns that a tackle playing directly in
front of him in an overshifted position, combined with a play number which
starts with the draw toward this tackle should in all probability result in a
successful outside-in block on the other end by #2. #1 has this in mind as he
receives the ball from #4, but he watches the decision of #7, his personal
interferer, as to his course either side of the end. #1 knows that an outside
course around the end should bring the defensive halfback up on the blocked
end's outside. He should be ready to set up #7's block by faking a farther
outside course by use of eyes, hips and body sway. #1 should not take the
inside cut until #7 has made contact on his block.

#1 - Spin 31

The details of course and techniques correspond to a large degree to those in

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the 41 play. The difference being in obtaining the ball from #3. #1 goes behind
the feeder to receive the ball from #3 as #3 turns to start his off-tackle course.

#1-61

Takes the ball from #3 as he goes behind him. The draw of the play here, at
times, will change #l's course to an inside cut even on an overshifted defense.
In this case, #1 should allow #7, his personal interferer to make the decision.
If the end is blocked out, # 1 should anticipate an out-side-in block on the
halfback, reversing the setup technique used when #7 is blocking the halfback
out. #1 can slant a fraction of a second earlier on this play if he finds the
defensive end always wide. This would result in a definite cut inside the end.
The ball carrier continues on his deep course but can still time his cut on #7,
despite now being a step farther away from his personal interferer.

#2-41

#2's responsibility is to block the end either in or out on all one hole plays. He
takes a straight course to a position outside the course of a normal defensive
end, whom he should meet on his sixth step. #2 can tell on his fourth step if he
must change his block to take the end out rather than in. #2 also knows, from
the draw or backfield maneuver, that his highest percentage of successful
blocks to flank the end would occur on this play.

#2 - Spin 31

The draw is somewhat the same, therefore #2 should expect to block the end
in, except on the undershifted defenses.

#2-61

This play starts toward the shortside of the formation. In many cases, the
blocking back can anticipate a wide end, especially against the undershifted six,
or the five end with outside responsibility.

It must be remembered that other factors such as position on the field, call of
the play in the down sequence, and the individual play of the defensive end, all
have a bearing on #2's anticipation of which way he can take the end.

#3-41

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Runs laterally toward the longside end to screen the exchange of the ball
between #4 and #1. #3 should just miss #1 and continue his course to throw
an outside block on the end.

#3 - Spin 31

Position three yards behind #9. Receives the ball passed to his left knee,
executes a six spin, faking to #4 with his left hand, and turns as if he were
carrying off the six trap. He then feeds the ball to #1 with his right hand,
allowing the hand to follow #Ts course as he hides the hand behind his back.

#3-61

Position, four and one-half yards behind #9. He receives the ball from X,
executes a half spin toward #1, by stepping forward with his right foot, turning
body so that #1 can take the ball from him. He then fakes into line to screen
off the chasing tackle. If the #3 back prefers the drop step with his right foot
for the half spin, he must line up so that #1 is not forced too deep into the
backfield.

#4-41

Takes a position four and one-half yards behind #10. Accepts the ball from X
on his second step as he runs exactly parallel to the line of scrimmage. Feeds
the ball to # 1 with his left hand, allowing hand to follow course of #1. We
prefer to fake a keep on his feed by having #4 grasp his right hand on his right
hip after giving the ball to #1. Some coaches prefer to have #4 hide the left
hand behind the back as he continues to fake the keep.

#4 - Spin 31

Steps forward as he pivots, to fake receiving the ball from #3. Ducks his left
shoulder, grasping his right hand on his right hip as he continues fake beyond
the end.

#4-61

Against six overshifted and six normal defenses #4 takes a course directly at
the end to be blocked, veering to the inside to become a part of the cut-off

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wall. On undershifted six, #4 blocks the defensive right tackle's outside leg to
prevent lateral movement in support of the end.

#7-41

On this play, #7 pulls on all calls and is the personal inter-ferer for the ball
carrier all the way to the shortside defensive halfback. Because the draw of the
initial ball handling is toward the longside of the formation, #7 should expect
to go outside the defensive end on every defense except the six undershift. The
depth of his pull should be six yards from the line of scrimmage when he
rounds the defensive end. The initial steps of his pull are directed for a point
six yards behind the line of scrimmage and opposite the position of the
shortside defensive end. As soon as #7 gets outside the end he must turn
downfield for his block on the halfback. He should block this halfback either in
or out, whichever is easiest for him at the moment of impact. It is up to the ball
carrier to use #7's block on the half. In fact #1 should set the block up for #7
and then cut on that block.

Against a five man line, #7 should be prepared for an early block while he
rounds the end or the linebacker who has come up fast on the outside. This
shortside linebacker sometimes lines up outside his end on a five-three defense
so that #5 is unable to get to him. In this case, #5 will continue for the
defensive halfback and leave the linebacker for #7.

On the six undershift, the defensive end will sometimes play so wide on the
shortside that #2 will have to block him out, and #7 will have to turn inside
this block in order to get his halfback. When this happens, the ball carrier will
follow #7 inside the end and again #7 blocks the halfback the easiest way, with
an openfield block.

#7 - Spin 31

Here again the initial maneuvers in the backfield create a draw to the longside
of the formation. #7's pulls on all calls

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DIAGRAM 93

are the same as for Play 41, except that at the start he will have to travel a bit
laterally to avoid hitting the spinning fullback. This is accomplished by moving
laterally instead of back on the first two steps of #7's pull. He then swings back
off his right foot for his depth.

#7-61

On this play the initial draw is to the shortside. Therefore, #7 should expect to
have to cut inside the shortside defensive end more often than he will be able
to get outside him. For this reason, he does not have to pull as deep as on 41
and Spin 31. Otherwise the details are the same on this play as on 41. Against a
very wide linebacker on five-three defense, however, because of the play's
draw, #7 can expect to block the man out, rather than in as on 41 and Spin 31.

#5 - 41, Spin 31, 61

On this outside play #5 has three basic changes in assignments: taking the
linebacker in, taking the halfback out, and blocking in the cut-off. As described,
his assignments and techniques for these blocks will vary with the maneuvers
used. When blocking the linebacker in, #5 should be able to anticipate
movement of the linebacker. On the 40 series, this linebacker should take a
step or two with the draw, so #5 goes straight through and takes a position
facing laterally toward that linebacker. When the opponent reacts back with the
play, #5 can then take him with a reverse cross-body if there is penetration
toward the ball carrier, or take him with a shoulder block if he comes straight
across. Lastly, #5 can go for a side body if the linebacker moves laterally,
retreating from his original position. Taking the linebacker on the 61 and Spin

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31, #5 must go right at him, cutting his outside leg while anticipating lateral
outside movement by that linebacker.

The six overshift and the five can be alike, in that the linebacker will be too
wide for #5 to take him. Then #5 goes through and turns laterally just behind
this linebacker to knock the halfback to the outside with a downfield block.
When blocking in the cut-off, #5 should get no deeper than five yards from the
line of scrimmage and no farther out than three yards for his position. Against
the six undershift, he should make an effort to go inside, to draw the defensive
tackle in with him. On Spin 31, versus the six undershift and six normal, #5
can fake a quick pass before proceeding to the position as per his assignment.

#10 - 41, Spin 31, 61

The most difficult job for #10 is to hook the tackle on his five call. #10 should
step first with his left foot just as if pulling and then bring his right leg and
shoulder in on the outside of the tackle. #10 must remember to work hard and
keep driving for the outside position before attempting to get the cross-body
on the tackle's outside leg. In blocking the linebacker against the six normal and
six undershift #10 should follow much the same detail as #5 does in his block
on the linebacker. If #10 finds the linebacker is too wide here for him to get,
he can make the five call and send the end on the linebacker.

Center — 41, Spin 31, 61

The passes from X for this play are somewhat less varied than most plays. X's
pass for 41 is a one-step lead, and because of the #4's position, this pass is
directly straight back. 61 is a direct pass to the right hip of a stationary #3, and
the spin to #3's left knee. X's assignment to block in the seal-off wall is not too
difficult. However, it does require that he make a fake at the end from the
inside and then block back to the inside. When encountering a five-three
consistently, X should be alert for the middle linebacker. In all cases, however,
he should be more interested in blocking back to the runner than in trying to
proceed farther down-field.

Against the six undershift and six normal, X must check the guard who is head-
on him or on his shoulder. This requires a quick transition from passing the
ball to blocking and an effort to keep the legs moving to maintain contact on
this block, always working around to the short side of that guard.

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#9-41, Spin 31, 61

This tackle has done considerable check blocking, and blocking for the one
hole on a six overshift or five is nothing but a shoulder check block. However,
if #9 can make this guard release and go around his longside, then #9 can go
downfield to add to the containing wall. This release is governed by the type of
defensive guard encountered also. If the guard consistently submarines, #9
would only worry about stopping his penetration and can release quickly.
However, against a fast, sliding guard, #9 must make every effort to stay with
him. In pulling to block the tackle in, #9 has essentially the same problem as
#10 did. #9 should be in no hurry to leave his feet until he is satisfied that he
has adequate outside position to get good contact. #9 should remember to get
in close with the right shoulder and leg before throwing for a cross-body on the
outside leg.

#8 - 41, Spin 31, 61

In all defenses, #8 check-blocks the defensive guard. In this check blocking he

is governed by the same elements just given for #9. #8 should remember
always to step into the guard on a six normal and a six overshift with the foot
nearest #7. This will clear #7's first pulling step and also get #8 in position to
stop penetration by the guard, who might stop the play before it really got
started with a good, fast charge.

#6 - 41, Spin 31, 61

The assignment for #6 is always to take the safety man. #6, however, has a
secondary responsibility on the six normal and six undershift calls. He should
belt the tackle effectively to keep him from starting right off with the play.
Against a normal six, #6 steps right at the tackle with the right leg and right
shoulder before proceeding downfield raising up as he hits in order to knock
the tackle off balance. Versus a six undershift, #6 should step at the inside foot
of this tackle with the same leg and shoulder, repeating the process. In going
for the man downfield, #6 must remember to move laterally just behind the
defensive linebacker in order to meet the safety where he will be. If the safety
reacts quickly and to the outside, #6 can expect to block him out. When the
safety delays getting over, #6 should get down-field blocking position on him
from the inside in the same manner as #5 and #10 on the two hole plays.

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COACHING POINTS

The time spent on the shortside outside play from Single Wing is probably
more important than any other single play. Considerable practice must be
utilized to:
1. Aid the blocking back to recognize his problem of taking the end either
way.
2. Help #7 learn by practice the course and block he executes as he cuts
either side of the end.

Fortunately, this can be learned in a drill which employs only the men involved
in blocking the end and defensive halfback. Continued practice will perfect
these blocks, as well as the course of the ball carrier in recognizing his cuts
both at the line of scrimmage and downfield.

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GENERAL TECHNIQUES

The use of the passing attack in Single Wing varies somewhat in theory from
the popular conception of this weapon as employed in other formations.
Granted that the pass is a dangerous offensive threat, given much leeway for
potential success under the present rules, we must remember that we are
seeking balance in the overall attack, with the pass as an integral part, rather
than the major weapon. The decision on how much the pass should be
emphasized depends upon the ability and experience of the personnel involved.
These variables differ from year to year. Generally speaking, it is our thought
that a well-executed passing attack against a balanced defense should net
approximately one half the yardage gained by the running attack.

In supplementing the running attack in the above manner, the patterns used
must, of necessity, look like the basic running plays. The number of such pass
plays would vary with the number of cycles chosen in the formation. In
addition, the passing attack should carry one pass which will take advantage of
each defender who might be out of position. For deep halfbacks, quick passes
in front of these positions should be used. For a close safety, a pass behind
him. For close linebackers in abnormal spacing, quick touch football passes
into the exposed areas.

In designing a passing attack which does not use the threat of a running play to
open up the areas, the principle of employing certain patterns that have proven
successful against specific defensive alignments must be stressed. The same
thought holds true against teams which have a typed plan for defending against
passes. For example, cross passes which require switching are best against man-
for-man defenses. Hook passes are most successful against straight zones. The
hook pass is probably the surest and easiest way to advance the ball against all
types of pass defenses, especially where the defenders retreat too deeply in
order to prevent the receivers from running behind them.

PASSING TECHNIQUES

The art of throwing a football correctly has been developed to a high degree,
particularly since the pass has assumed a more important position in the general
offensive scheme. No longer does a passer palm the ball or deliver it with the
decided side-arm twist used in the early days. The proper method employed by
a number of great passers is as follows:

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Holding the Ball

Grasp the ball with the tips of the fingers, allowing for a space between the
palm and ball. The touch of the delivery comes from the tips of the fingers. In
teaching this to youngsters, have them pick up a ball from the ground with just
the finger tips, with the back of the hand above the ball. With the hand in this
position, allow the ball to drop an inch or two but retrieve it at once before it
hits the ground by re-grasping the ball with the tips of the fingers. This drill will
not only strengthen the fingers but will impart a certain touch which is highly
important.

Size of hand helps in holding the ball but it is not absolutely necessary to have a
large hand to be able to deliver the ball properly. In placing the hand on top of
the ball, slide the fingers toward the end of it until the hand can grasp the ball
comfortably. The smaller the hand, the nearer the ball will be held toward its
narrow end.

The position of the fingers should not be across the long axis but as nearly
parallel as possible. The proper grip will find the index finger parallel to the
stitching, almost at the very end of the ball. The index finger is slightly spread
from the rest of the hand, as the passer approximates the position of the split
index and middle finger grip used to throw a baseball overhand. As a further
check, the ball should point back toward the elbow of the hand that is on top
of the ball.

PASSING POSITION

Raise the arm directly upward, ball just above the ear with the elbow close to
the body. This is the proper place from which the ball should be delivered on
all passes thrown when the passer is upright in his cup protection. The left
hand is placed on the side of the ball to help the passer balance the ball in this
position. The left hand can now be used to check the ball if the passer uses a
fake pass to decoy defenders, opening other receivers.

The feet should be placed so that a balanced step off the back foot will allow
the body to follow through with the forward step. The step is part of the throw
but is not absolutely necessary on short passes, as use of the arm as described
above can deliver the ball without the step.

RELEASING THE BALL

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With the ball in correct position for delivery we are now concerned with the
actual throw. The previously detailed method of grasping the ball helps
eliminate the side twist, fatal for the passer who wants the ball to travel a true
course. The two fingers behind the ball should direct a force through the ball in
a straight line, the arm following the line of flight. Actually, as the hand turns
normally the fingers should point toward the target after releasing the ball. Care
must be taken to have the front part of the ball high at the time of release. A
slight downward pull upon delivery will insure a soft pass, causing the forward
point of the ball to stay high during flight. Improper delivery can be spotted by
the finish of the throw. It is important to stress continually that the force
applied should always be in back of the ball, never across the long axis. The
speed of the pass is determined by wrist snap. In applying the snap, the passer
must make a mental note to keep the proper pressure on the finger tips. Failure
to remember this point will cause loss of control of the ball.

Passes thrown into the center area of the defensive back-field should be
thrown fairly hard about number high. This is true on hook passes and other
types where the receiver can turn his body to face the passer. All other passes
should be delivered according to the length and direction of that particular
pass. The deep, or behind the defender, pass should be thrown well ahead of
the receiver, allowing a run-under catch. In all cases, the passer should
remember to overthrow rather than underthrow. In all passing, the passer must
know what effect the prevailing wind conditions will have on his passing game.
This factor changes from Saturday to Saturday and may change during the
course of the game.

WHEN TO THROW

The mistake most common to all inexperienced passers, is to throw too late.
The timing must be such that the ball and receiver arrive at the open spot
simultaneously. A free receiver will draw the attention of the defenders so that
he will be immediately covered. A late throw will end in a failure, or even an
interception. If passes allowing a choice are used in the attack, the passer
should know the order of choice; primary receiver, secondary receivers, etc. All
passes should have an outlet receiver, usually a blocker, to prevent large
yardage losses in instances when the defense covers the regular pattern.

The passer must know the protection cup for each pass. He should decoy the
rushers to the outside of the protective cup, the advance inside his blockers as

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he throws. He should be ready at all times to run with the ball if the defense
drops linemen into the secondary, or if the linemen, in rushing the pass,
overrush or allow gaps between them.

The passer must remember that the ball belongs equally to the receiver and
defender once it has left his possession. He must do everything in his power to
prevent an interception.

RECEIVER TECHNIQUE

The debate as to whether the receiver makes the passer, or vice versa, had
never ended.

Superior receivers can disrupt most defenses, particularly if they have speed,
height and natural catching ability. The potential downfield receiver must
disguise his intention when ready to go out for the pass. He must be prepared
for a defensive holdup, a "chug" by the linebacker as he takes off on his course,
particularly if the pass is called on a so-called "passing" down.

Speed, change of pace, feints, fakes and running on balance are prerequisites
for a talented receiver. On long passes, which must be thrown well ahead of the
receiver, the receiver must be able to judge the ball in flight and extend his
arms at the proper time but still have relaxed hands. If the pass is underthrown,
he must come back toward the ball, with his body between the throw and the
defender, to prevent interception. He must now catch the ball as far as possible
with his hands toward the flight of the ball, rather than allow it to settle, as he
does on the passes which are caught away from the defenders.

On hook reception, the receiver must catch the ball with his body between the
ball and defender. As he catches the ball, he must be ready to protect the ball
and himself from the shock of a head-on tackle. In all cases, the pass catcher
should remember to catch the ball before he runs with it; Hundreds of passes,
every year, are dropped because of the eagerness of the receiver to make the
long run.

THE RUNNING PASS, 42 PASS

This pass is one of the most effective used by the Single Wing attack. Its
effectiveness varies with the potency of the outside attack to the longside of the
formation. The

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DIAGRAM 94

pressure of the end run threat overextends the defense, making the running
pass a lethal weapon.

Diagram 94 shows the protection of the running pass against all defenses
except a seven man line, in which case we have X block the man in his area.
Since the passing cup is well overbalanced to the longside of the formation, all
protectors must endeavor to get in front of the passer, between the passer and
rusher. The men who block immediately on the scrimmage line should cut-
block early. The others should block late, or act as auxiliaries if their normally
assigned men do not rush.

PROTECTION

#3

Uses the same block on the end as he does on the outside running play, a low
outside cut-block trying to give the passer more freedom for choice of receiver,
or the option of running if the receivers are covered.

#7

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Uses block suited to the individual in that territory. A straight shoulder block
easing into a cross-body block should be effective.

#8

Pulls on a deep course so that he can get outside position on the tackle, no
matter what defensive spacing has been taken by the tackle. #8 can suspect
depth of pull by the spacing in front of him. He cuts the tackle down from an
outside position.

#9

Same block as #7, but on the guard head-on him or over X.

Center

Steps back with his left pivot to cut off the shortside tackle, or any rusher who
lines up in or shoots the gap to his left and in the area of #10.

#10

Takes his deep pull to arrive at the outer edge of the passing cup, where he cuts
off the end if that man chases, or may act as an additional protector.

If a seven man line is encountered, or if a rusher lines up in the area between X

and #10, the #10 will call seven spacing, which will quarterback the blocking
for X to take the man on his left shoulder and next man to #10's left. The
shortside defensive end will be ignored.

Five Man Line Protection

#7

His man is on his outside shoulder, so he takes him, working to get outside
position.

#8

Will pull for his end as normally assigned but will find himself as" an auxiliary
blocker. He should get in position in front of the passer to lend strength to the

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protection or to lead the play downfield should the passer elect to run with the
ball.

PATTERNS

#1

Is the primary receiver against the undershifted line, #1 runs at a forty-five

degree angle, full speed and looks over his right shoulder just as soon as he is
free. The quick draw of the play causes the defensive halfback to start to
protect the flank. As the safety has difficulty in reaching the

DIAGRAM 95

territory through which #1 angles, this deep defender has an almost impossible
assignment to cover #1.

#6

If the halfback drops to cover #1, #6, the secondary receiver, who takes a
course inside the undershifted tackle to keep from taking him laterally, now
runs a course so that he can escape the defensive linebacker. He normally
arrives about eight yards deep in the flat area.

#2

If the linebacker should drop to cover #6, #2, who fakes the end, takes a flat

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course no deeper than one yard beyond the line of scrimmage. He should now
be open for the outlet pass. Some teams cover #2 with the end on that side. If
this occurs, we instruct the #4 to run with the ball, either to gain ground, or to
stretch the defensive zones so that eventually a receiver will be free.

#5

Angles at the safety away from the defending half on his side if the safety tries
to cover #1. The side draw of the play isolates the defensive right half making
him a personal defender for the #5 end. This affords #5 an excellent
opportunity to use personal fakes and feints against the right halfback on
personal passes.

#4

Starts at full speed toward the flank faking the outside run, and fixes the ball as
he watches the progress of the deep man. His throw is made on the run. The
ball is aimed almost directly at the receiver. A normal lead will cause a continual
overthrow of the receiver. If the deep man is covered, #4 looks for the
intermediate receiver at the eight yard depth. If this man is covered the #2
should be open for the outlet pass.

In Diagram 96, #6 and #1 must change courses, because

DIAGRAM 96

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part of the success of the play comes from the speed at which the deep receiver
reaches his pass receiving area.

DIAGRAM 97

Diagram 97, shows additional patterns off the tailback wide pass that have
proven successful, mostly thrown to the short end as a personal receiver.
When a personal pass for the #5 end is called from the second pattern, the
protectors will know that the pass is to be thrown much sooner than when
stressing the outside pattern, hence the passer will pull up to throw,
necessitating a protection cup closer to #4's original starting position.

THE REVERSE PASS, 41 PASS

PROTECTION

#2

Runs the normal course used on the deep reverse. His block is the low cut-
block for the purpose of knocking the end off his feet or making him stumble.

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DIAGRAM 98

#7

Acts again as personal interferer for the passer. #7 now becomes an auxiliary
blocker who, as an added protector, can block the end or tackle who escapes
from #2 and #10 respectively, or the linebacker who crosses the line of
scrimmage. #7 must be prepared to lead the passer downfield if #2 knocks the
end down, and when the defense fades to cover the potential receivers.

#8

Uses shoulder block, which after contact, can slip into a cross-body, on the
man to his right in the area in front of #7.

#9

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Executes a shoulder pass protection block on the man in front of him, then
cuts low, trying to topple this guard sliding to the play.

#10

Must first work to get outside position for his pass protection blocking. From
that position he endeavors to stay in front of the tackle for his block.

Center

Delays pull until #7 and #2 have chance to clear. Drops straight back to cut-
off chasing linemen from the longside. Usually protects against the tackle away
from the play.

Versus the six undershift, #9 and X switch assignments so that X takes the
guard and #9 takes the drop-pull to block back on the long side.

PATTERNS

#5

Fakes the running play course, allowing the defensive right half to commit
against the run. On the forward movement of this defensive man, #5 cuts
behind and away from the safety man. If the half should fade with #5, the
latter continues on his deep course, veering to the outside, endeavoring to turn
the defensive halfback around, preventing his lending support if the pass is
thrown to #6.

#6

Eludes a possible holdup by an undershifted tackle and runs a preliminary

course which corresponds to that on the running play, i.e., toward the safety for
five yards before he parallels the line of scrimmage. The preliminary course will
allow the end to get behind the linebacker, provided the play looks like the run.
#6 continues on this parallel course as an outlet receiver in case #5 is not clear.

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DIAGRAM 99

#4

Uses the same method of delivering the ball to # 1 as used on the. running
play, with a forward handoff. #4 fakes a keep, then continues on a "blooper"
course around end into defensive left half territory.

#3

Blocks end. After the block, he remains in that area as an outlet receiver if the
defensive linemen and linebacker chase the passer.

#1

Fakes run until point P before he shows pass. He looks for the deep pass first.
If #5 is uncovered he throws to the outside to prevent the safety from making
a last minute save.

If the halfback retreats to cover the end, #6 should be free. If the linebacker
fades into the area traversed by #6, then #1 should adjust to a run, led by #7.

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Receivers #4 and #3 are used on call, when from the past experience, the
defense fails to cover them or their area.

BUCK LATERAL SERIES RUNNING PASS, BUCK 32 PASS

PROTECTION

The technique, assignments and adjustment of protection on this pass are

similar to those used in the running pass for #7, #8, #9, X and #10. However,
the draw of the play and the area from which the pass is thrown create a
different problem for #1, #2 and #8.

DIAGRAM 100

#1

He now uses an on-balance screen block to protect the passer from the end on
this side. #1 throws his body low only after the end has definitely chosen to
rush. The block may become a reverse cross-body if the end recognizes the
play as a pass.

#2

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After #2 pitches the ball back to #4 he becomes an added blocker, protecting

the area in front of #4, checking on all preliminary blocks by the linemen and
#1.

#5

Has a slight change in technique from that of the running pass. Since the passer
is deeper, #8 can start off with his original pull, as in Buck 32 run. When he
reaches the deepest part of this pull, he comes up on balance to protect the
passer. He should block the tackle, since that man is unblocked, but his
position will allow him to take the first man to threaten the passer.

PATTERNS

#6

Straight down the field through the safety's position be-

DIAGRAM 101

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fore turning to look over right shoulder. If the pass is thrown to #6, he would
receive the ball twenty to twenty-five yards downfield.

#5

Same course as used for his downfield block on the safety. This pattern allows
#5 to become almost a personal pass receiver, in that he should look for the
pass any time between the R's as marked on his course in Diagram 101.

#3

Drives into line, if possible he takes a sharp right or left veer parallel to line of
scrimmage, depending upon the reaction of the defenses to the threat of the
run. #3 can be an outlet receiver if he veers right, a nuisance receiver if he
veers left against defense caught covering wide against the run.

#4

Checks first to see if #6 is free deep. If #6 is covered, then #4 looks for #5

crossing over. He throws to #5 at any time the latter is free.

SPIN PASSES

The area behind the linebackers is most vulnerable to the spin passing attack.
This is true because of the tremendous pressure exerted on these defensive
men by:
a. Hiding the ball during the exchange, or fake exchange;
b. The threat of cross blocking on these men during the preliminary ball
handling.

As a result of factor (a) the linebackers have a tendency to be held in position

momentarily. Factor (b) makes them play closer to the line of scrimmage. The
three potential receivers, the ends and #1, arrive in the areas of the three deep
defensive men before the linebackers can recognize the pass. This gives a
chance to use a personal passing attack, with all the known fakes and feints
used by receivers to escape a man-to-man pass defender. Elimination of
linebackers from the pass defense, whether the defense as a team maneuver is
using a zone, man-to-man or combination, forces the three deep men into
man-to-man coverage.

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PROTECTION

We have shown that all plays are adjusted to be run against any defense. We
can also adjust all our pass protection blocking for any defense encountered.
When a number of passing patterns are thrown from one maneuver we can
standardize the assignments for that passing cycle. Diagram 102, shows the
pass protection against the standard defenses and the passing triangle area from
which the defense should be kept. Protection can be used for the spin passes
against all defenses.

#2

Is not used in the pass pattern and so is assigned to the end in all defenses. He
sets himself on the outside of either #7 or #8'-s block on the tackle, to obtain
an inside position on the end. He must insure that the end will have to go
outside or straight over his position. If the end elects to drive straight ahead,
#2 will keep on balance in front of the end until he can steer him wide of the
passer's position. If the end goes to the outside #2 can cut him down with a
reverse cross-body. #2 should remember to let the end commit first and not go
out after him.

#7

Will take the guard head-on himself against the six over-shift or the seven, and
the tackle on his outside against a five man defense. He gets his assignment by
listening to

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DIAGRAM 102

#8's call. Versus the six undershirt and the six normal, #7 should protect on a
line between the tackle and the passer, to steer that tackle away from the
passing triangle.

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#8

Is calling the blocking for #7 and himself. On all calls except the six normal
and six undershift #8 will pull to take the tackle. In doing so, he should pull
quickly to get outside #7 and inside #2, so that there is no breakdown in the
protection. #8 also trys to get an inside-out position by staying close to #7's
outside leg. Versus a five-three, #8 can suspect he will become the auxiliary,
because, with a man on #9, the next man over should be head-on #7 in a six
overshift. When this man is on #7's outside shoulder, #8 can suspect a five. As
an auxiliary, #8 can help whichever of #7 or #2 is having more trouble, or
definitely look for the end, when #2 is used as an outlet receiver.

#9

Since #9 makes his adjustments and switches with X, #10 will quarterback for
all three on passes. #9 takes the guard in his vicinity on all calls. He must first
drop back between the guard and the passer. Then he can steer that guard to
either side, away from the passing triangle. #9 has a special recognition
assignment on a seven call when there is no man in his vicinity.

DIAGRAM 103

#9 will drop back first to protect his area. If no one comes in over his area, he
then slides out to take the end, using the same technique as X uses on the end.

Center

Drops out on all calls for the end. In doing this, he must work like #2 and #8.
X should first hustle to get outside of #10 and assume his position. After
reaching this position he should be ready for three types of end play. If the end
charges over him and hard, X uses a reverse cross-body to cut him down. If the
end charges over him and slides in deep, X steers him outside with a shoulder

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block. If the end charges over him and slides inside, X endeavors to stay in
front of him along the line of scrimmage until the end starts further
penetration. In most cases, the end will be stumbled by the block of #10 and
#9, and X can drop back to give auxiliary help to the protection. Diagram 104
shows this.

Versus the seven call, X blocks with the general pass protection technique for
all linemen.

DIAGRAM 104

#10

Is always assigned to the tackle. #10 always takes a position on a line between
the tackle and the passer. He will try to steer the tackle outside when he can.
However, if the tackle goes to the inside, #10 should try to cut him down with
a cross-body. Since the tackle will usually be larger than a #10, this cut-block
will serve to get the tackle's hands down to enable the passer to throw.

PATTERNS

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DIAGRAM 105

#1 and #5

Are decoys to take the defensive halfbacks wide.

#3

Feeds to #4, on the eight spin maneuver, faking directly toward the defensive
X position as if he retained the ball.

#6

Delays a half count, runs seven yards half way between the safety and X, and
just inside the X position. If the safety closes fast to cover or if X retreats, #6
cuts away from his course to be in a position to receive the ball over his right
shoulder. The personal pass feints or double feints are adaptable here against
a safety man who rushes hard to defend against a receiver in the original area.

#4

Receives ball from #3 on his third step. He should be ready to deliver ball on a
spot pass to spot designated A. If receiver is covered #4 fakes pass and drops
two steps, to throw to #6 at spot B. After #5's change of course, #4 decides if
and when #5 should receive the pass. #4 always can run with the ball if the
linebacker drops to cover #5, provided the defensive end tries to penetrate to
the inside when #1 employs his screen block. Here again, #4 must make the

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play resemble the running play if the defense is to be drawn into a position
hampering the normal coverage against passes. #4 is coached to run his regular
running course even to the point of approaching the line of scrimmage before
delivering the ball.

Another design can be thrown to #1 slightly deeper but with #3 faking at the
defensive linebacker to hold him, so

DIAGRAM 106

that #1 can cut behind his defensive position. This pattern, with decoys #5 and
#6 widening the two deep men has proven effective as a scoring pass against
the 6-3-2 defense. Diagram 106.

The 5 cross pattern as shown in Diagram 107.

#6 and #2

Decoy safety and half to widen area for #5 to cross-over behind fullback.

#3

Uses six spin faking at the defensive fullback after delivering ball, to keep the
fullback from retreating to the area behind him.

#4

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Delivers ball ahead of #5. Throws off his right foot on what should be his fifth
step.

DIAGRAM 107

The same backfield ball handling can be used on another effective pass pattern
outlined above, wherein #1 drives deep through the half's position. #6 delays
and fakes a short course straight ahead before he cuts on his second step into
the area vacated by the halfback.

POSITION PASSES

Position passes are the simplest to recognize and the easiest to teach, because
of the obvious fact that a receiver has an exposed area which is vulnerable to
his direct course. Generally, the areas directly behind the scrimmage line, which
are the responsibility of the linebackers, are the hardest to cover, because the
receiver is able to step across the line to be open for a quick pass. If the areas
are covered by the maximum number of linebackers (three or four), a fake run
or plunge toward the line will expose certain spots that open up when the
linebackers move to defend against the run. The new development of the fake
run-and-jump pass near the scrimmage line has placed a terrific burden on the
secondary defenders. Such a pass must be used sparingly and in the proper
situation, due to the possible loss of ball by interception. The gain from such a
pass is small. Several completions would be necessary to offset an interception.

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Let us examine the areas which are normally open when the defense is using
the standard defenses against the unbalanced Single Wing formation. As stated,
these openings occur from either the actual section on the field or the number
and position of the linebackers used in a specific defense.

Against the overshifted seven man line, our #5 now will be open for a pass
from #4 either in the flat area when the defensive halfback is deep, or straight
ahead for a catch of the ball on the inside. The single linebacker cannot cover
the exposed area if the pass is thrown quickly.

#1 would likewise be open on a jump pass from #3 provided the threat of the
buck held the linebacker until # 1 could evade the defensive tackle and enter
the exposed area straight ahead of him. Offensive linemen must use the regular
power charge against the man in front of them to prevent the defense from
raising their hands.

DIAGRAM 108

The use of many combinations of straight ahead quick passes that can be used
to advantage to keep the spacing of the linebackers near normal. For example,
the #6 would be wide open when the defenses in an overshifted six with a
linebacker also overshifted from his normal inside position. Single Wing
passing attacks should always carry such passes as emergency measures, against

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seven, eight and even nine man defensive lines when they are used, either as
regular defenses or as surprises.

PASSING DRILLS

We use two drills which we feel are important for the development of the
passer. One is a squad drill which has been of twofold benefit. The passer has a
chance to throw many passes. The squad likes the pre-game drill as a warm-up.

DIAGRAM 109

A dozen footballs for the present-day large squads is sufficient. The centers
hand the ball to the passer, who throws to receivers cutting across his position.
The receivers cut just as soon as the passer has the ball. The passer must throw
as quickly as possible. This develops speed in throwing the ball.

After a thorough warm-up of the arm the passer now has the option of faking
the throw against his hand. This fake changes the course of the receiver, and
also allows the passer to change his balance step as he prepares to throw the
longer pass. Various spacing of the receivers and their different courses can be
utilized for the above drill to correspond with the maneuvers employed in the

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regular pass patterns. This drill develops passing technique, while giving
adequate opportunity for coaching on the proper delivery.

Another drill, valuable for choice passes, can be set up with two receivers
centering in an area covered by one defender. The defender should vary his
coverage by definitely following one receiver or the other, then use a straight
defense, playing the ball. Increasing the number of receivers and defenders will
teach the passer to throw to the open man.

Eventually, the passer will be ready for a drill which we have found valuable.
Line up two teams without the guards and tackles, in other words, seven men
on each side. Throw the regular pass patterns against the defensive team,
employing their ends as rushers. Occasionally use a running play, particularly
the outside plays, to keep the defense honest. The drill teaches catching the ball
under pressure, as well as delivering the ball at the proper time. The rushing
defensive ends help to teach the passer the position of his protecting cup and
the normal amount of time allotted for throwing.

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Before discussing the technicalities of a modern quarterback's duties, may I

extend to him my greatest salute of respect. His problems and responsibilities
are more important than those of any man in any other position. The
quarterback has always been the coach on the field since the day he was given
this authority. He controls the movements of ten other men, directing their
offensive destinies for the entire time his team has the ball, and in addition
must be proficient in all his own personal assignments.

The current stress on defense, which presents a changing problem from one
series of downs to the next, or even within one series, would drive an individual
without the determination a quarterback must have to frustrated and haphazard
decisions. There was a day when a quarterback could presume a somewhat
standard defensive alignment and spacing, depending upon the formation from
which he normally started his offense. All that peace of mind is a thing of the
past. No longer can he anticipate the usual defenses. He must be mentally
prepared to expect the abnormal and be ready to take advantage of
opportunities presented by the new theory of team defensive stratagems.

What explanation can be offered for this new evolution in defense? Could the
fact that there is probably more competition for top positions in football
coaching than any other comparable profession have a bearing on this new
approach toward defense? Could the study of slow-motion films by eager
progressive coaches for practically twelve months of the year be a contributing
factor? Isn't it safe to assume that defensively minded coaches are going to use
the new medium of television as an additional scouting help to further the
development of the defense?

Past history of defensive football has proven that the defense, generally favored
by the rules, usually has the last say. The offensive team must have at least
seven men on the scrimmage line. The defense is allowed much greater
freedom in the absence of restrictions as to the numerical alignment or position
of the men who have the duty to stop the legally restricted offense. The
defense has full use of the arms and hands to ward off potential blockers. Add
to the above the recognized fact that defense is easier to teach and that most
linemen have an innate desire to play defense and our offensive quarterback's
problems are plainly evident.

Fortunately for football in particular and the spectator in general, football was
rescued from being overbalanced in favor of the defense by the legalizing and
subsequent development of the forward pass. The two forces were about equal

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until a further ruling allowed the ball to be handed forward behind the line of
scrimmage to a teammate or to be thrown forward to a teammate at any
distance behind the line of scrimmage. These two rules have swung the balance
of power to the offense. The emphasis on defensive play has not lessened,
however, and new methods of teaching defense by platoon instruction presents
a genuine challenge to the offense, directed by our hero, the quarterback.

What characteristics should the coach seek in selecting his field general? Since
the team must have complete confidence in the decisions of the signal caller,
we suggest that the one outstanding characteristic should be his command of
the squad's all-around respect for his judgment on and off the field, for his
knowledge of the game, and for the manner in which he meets perplexing
problems.

We like to have our quarterback in the backfield if possible, but playing a

certain position on the team is not essential for being picked as the field
general. Generally, the backfield man has a clearer conception of the overall
picture in football but many teams have been quarterbacked to success by
linemen. It is possible to improve and mold an individual who has the innate
intelligence and desire to call signals.

It must be remembered that it is the coach's duty to sell the quarterback to the
squad for the quarterback must in turn sell the coach's ideas to them. The
quarterback must know more theoretical football than any other teammate. He
must obtain this information from the head coach, who cannot teach the entire
squad the many variables from which the quarterback must map his campaign.
More teams have been ruined by more than one quarterback than for any other
reason—the old story of too many cooks and the broth.

The team play caller should have complete authority and be backed to the limit.
Many coaches, to their sorrow, have tried to run the attack from the bench by
various means. The recent free-substitution rule gave the coach complete
control over selection of each play if he wanted it. Frankly, I feel that coaches
on the bench and spotters in the press box are able to advise, but in the final
analysis only the quarterback can make the correct decision at the crucial
moment. Failure here must be blamed on the coach who has not trained his
representative to meet the emergency.

One of the most important requirements of any quarterback is the ability to

command, once he has been given that authority. Personal bearing as he gives

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plays and his enunciation of signals in the huddle and during the starting
cadence are essential to the preliminary success of any play. Simplicity of play
numbers or descriptive words are helpful aids.

THE STARTING SIGNAL

Since voice and cadence are of primary importance in team starting, voice
control can be improved by continual practice and stress of the details
involved. The starting signal must resemble a bark. The sound should come
from deep within the throat rather than from the nasal passages. Sharp staccato
bursts, evenly spaced, impart confidence, as well as superior team movement
on the starting signal. A metronome is helpful in teaching the original cadence.
Once the cadence has been established, all quarterbacks who call the starting
signal must have similar beats. In early season practice, having all men count
together is helpful. A regular track-starter's gun, blank shells of course, can be
used to advantage to impress on the team, listening for the starting signal, the
exact moment they should move as the ball is passed.

We do not concur with the thought that passing the ball a fraction of a second
before the starting signal is of advantage. The defensive lines move after the
offense moves, not on the snap of the ball. Therefore the secret of good team
starting comes from all men moving at once. The advantage given by knowing
the starting signal can be utilized by using more than one starting signal,
provided a team can perfect more than one.

GAME STRATEGY

The quarterback must have a general knowledge of the theory behind offensive
play. Coaches differ radically in their approach to this difficult subject, mainly
because of the varied opinions as to how to use the three offensive phases of
football: the kicking, running and passing games.

Teams have won championships by stressing one of the above three, but very
few have won without a plan for the correlation of their use.

Strong defensive teams with a great kicking game have literally kicked the
opponents across their own goal line. Such an endowed team needs only a
limited running and passing attack to win.

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Great teams, stressing the running attack, have won championships by kicking
and passing to complement the runs. Their offensive plan is to control the ball
by making first downs. The possession of the ball for long periods prevents the
opposition from presenting its full attack, because it is forced to try for quick
scores.

Teams emphasizing the forward pass as the major weapon stress passing
anywhere and under all conditions. Their running attack is used mainly to keep
the defense off balance so they can pass.

The conclusion is that football games can be won by all three methods. The
coach, therefore, must decide how he wants his team to use the components of
the offense, and he must school his quarterback to his way of thinking.

Once the offensive plan for a particular team has been established, the
education of the field general can be initiated. The type of formation used can
lend emphasis to a certain phase of the offense but, generally speaking, plays
within the formation are the important factor.

We have already established our offensive theory as that of a team that prefers
to run rather than pass against a balanced defense. When speaking of balanced
defense, we mean one which is deployed to defend equally against all phases of
the offense. We must be prepared to take advantage of a defense that is
overbalanced to stop one phase, by immediately shifting to another phase of
the attack.

Our Single Wing quarterback must know the strength and weakness of his
formation. He must know the reasoning behind the design and use of each play
and the amount by which personnel influence the success of certain plays
through their special abilities or shortcomings. In learning about his own
personnel he must have a thorough knowledge of their various abilities and
when these can be exploited, both for linemen and backs.

The quarterback should know which of his plays are best against the standard
defenses usually used against his formation. He should know the exact play to
call to take advantage of any variation which might occur in these standard
alignments. As shown in the chapter on plays, each play needs a certain
defensive situation to bring its greatest success. If our quarterback can
anticipate certain defenses on certain situations, running, passing or kicking, the
correct choice of play becomes academic.

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Before the start of the game our quarterback must know just how the weather
(wind, rain and sun) affects his choice of plays in all three phases as the game
progresses. Time and score are additional factors which enter into the picture.
The quarterback must know when to gamble and when to be conservative. He
must be governed by the following axiom: "Score the safest way while retaining
possession of the ball, but you must score to win." The size of the score should
never enter into his overall strategy, one point victories are just as important as
the larger scores. The quarterback will learn that an offensive play for the
whole game, properly adhered to, will be more successful provided events
during the game do not change the estimated situation radically. However, he
must be prepared to shift his strategy in the event that first or second quarter
scores by the opponents leave him at a disadvantage.

PRE-GAME PREPARATION

Modern scouting methods have been instrumental in eliminating what was

once the surprise element of abnormal defenses. In their defensive planning,
most teams reflect the general scheme of the opponent's coaching staff. The
defensive strategy employed from year to year will vary only according to the
opponent's changes of personnel and to the pre-game guesswork as to the
relative strength of the two teams.

The offensive quarterback can be sure of this general information about his
own team: he will know that by one method or another the opposing defensive
quarterback will endeavor to stop his most successful plays to date, even to
overbalancing the defense to accomplish the job. The offensive quarterback
must be alerted to abnormal or unusual defenses which are used to upset his
team at the start of the game or the second half. He must be fully cognizant of
these problems, with such a thorough knowledge of his attacking weapons that
he can immediately take advantage of the surprise element. These defenses
occur most frequently when the opponents feel they need to gamble, rather
than remain orthodox in their alignment and spacing. A strong running team
should expect its previously most successful running plays to be stopped, but,
because of this, should have new avenues for advancing the ball, either by other
running plays or by exploiting exposed passing areas.

Many coaches use horizontal or vertical offensive zones for the entire field as a
guide for green quarterbacks. These are helpful, but a strict adherence to them
will find the designated plays always running against the defense which is the

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most difficult to solve. Also the old rulcj of passing, running and kicking on
certain downs in certain parts of the field have become outmoded by the
advantage given the defense. However, flagrant disregard of some of the more
basic principles has lost more games than it has won.

The offensive quarterback must know the expected gain of each play in the
circumstance under which it is called. This knowledge, gained from the history
the play has established over a certain period, is invaluable for selecting plays
for what we call "crucial downs." Crucial downs are those which demand a kick
on the following down because of failure to make the first down in two or
three tries. The plays called must vary, because the defense will be overbalanced
to stop the crucial down play if the same one has been repeated often in the
identical situation.

The offensive quarterback must anticipate the thinking of the defensive

quarterback who is deploying his echelons to stop the offense. Our field
general must select just enough cross-up plays to keep the defensive
quarterback off balance in calling his defenses. The signal caller should never
allow his selection of plays to be typed.

When the quarterback obtains the ball for the first series of downs and the
defense is somewhat near normal in five, six or seven spacing, he should select
one of his basic plays from the cycle which he has chosen to establish. The
play's proven history should be such that, at the conclusion of the play, the
situation, as to down and yardage remaining can be met by the selection of
another safe yardage play. Our Single Wing generates power over the tackles
and guards. A selection of plays over this area, while not designed to break
away for long runs, should produce (against equal opposition) enough yardage
so that the quarterback can plan his selections for the entire march.
He should use basic plays, testing the defense here and there, as a boxer would
start a contest. The plans should call for feinting at certain sectors to establish
an opening for the big play.

A long march of successive first downs usually ends in failure when a

quarterback tries to take his team seventy or eighty yards against equal
opposition. The field general must plan for the big gainer, either a run or a
pass, somewhere on the march, in order to have his team take him through the
zone of most intense resistance, the last ten yards from the goal.

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Use of a cycle of plays from a certain formation is essential. As explained, a

cycle should contain as many plays as possible, to test, find out and then take
advantage of the weaknesses of the defense. Generally a quarterback should
stay with one cycle while he establishes the various plays in it. To start with, he
can experiment with the cycles for a while, because they are designed to lend
variety to the attack through the draw of the various plays within a cycle and by
doing so will create a change of pace for his attack. He should use this
experimentation to establish the cycle he feels will be most successful. Once
the cycle is chosen, we feel that a stress on plays in that cycle will bring a larger
measure of success than a hit-or-miss selection from the three or four cycles
each team might carry.

USE OF MEN-IN-MOTION

Use of backfield men-in-motion before the play starts was used in earlier
decades, went out of favor for a time and has recently been redeveloped in all
formations. The theory of changing the strength of the formation by having the
backs run to either side of it puts an additional burden on the defensive team to
adjust to meet the changed alignments. It is a well-known fact that, by the time
the ball is passed with the man-in-motion having reached varying distances
from the original starting point, the defense has had to make some sort of
adjustment. The need for coverage of the man-in-motion by different defensive
men at different times, whether by an end, linebacker or halfback, gives
numerous opportunities to the offense for decoying the defenders into a more
desirable position for blocking on running plays. The use of men-in-motion to
stretch the defensive base aids in increasing the efficiency of both the running
and passing attack, particularly when the passes are defended by men using a
basic zone. The zone becomes so spread out that a zone team can be forced
into man-for-man coverage. The opportunity presented here of using your best
pass receiver against the poorest pass defender is one which should not be
ignored. An effective passing attack, one-man-against-one, is now presented
with the odds favoring the offense.

USE OF FLANKERS

The placing of men in flanking position on tackles, ends or in wide positions

has been used for years to harry certain defensive men, either on the line of
scrimmage or in the defensive backfield. The opportunities for using flankers
are numerous in the Single Wing attack. Flankers are more reliable than men-
in-motion, because of the tendency of the defense to cover flankers by the

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same adjustment each time. If the quarterback will delay the starting signal to
allow the defensive adjustment, the spread of the defense becomes clear to all,
allowing complete exploitation of the new defensive alignment. The adjustment
becomes apparent at the start of the play, because the flanker takes his position
directly from the huddle. The Single Wing with the wingback up in normal
position, already presents a flanking problem to the defensive tackle. Additional
flankers can be used on either tackle or either end. This widens the defensive
line and it also gives the identical advantage enjoyed by teams which attack
from split lines.

The combination of the use of flankers and men-in-motion presents an

intriguing opportunity to disrupt the team defensive pattern and is limited only
by the experience of the attacking unit. The problems of the defense increase
when such men are deployed both to the long and short sides of the
unbalanced formation, together with running the formation from both the right
and left alignments. The option of running plays toward the flanker, then away
from the flanker, eventually creates a defensive mistake in meeting strength.
This eventuality favors a team that can handle the change in blocking
assignments.

A simple example of how the quarterback can use the flanker attack to help a
basic play can be illustrated by referring to Diagram 21. Here we have the off-
tackle play as designed against the undershifted defensive tackle opposite the
longside of the formation. The tackle is vulnerable to the power block of #1
and #6. This defense, being undershifted, usually compensates for this
alignment by placing the linebacker outside the tackle, with outside defensive
responsibility. The linebacker may even cover outside his own end if the team
defensive scheme is to have the defensive end cover the off-tackle hole.

The offensive fullback, #3, stationed behind the center of the line does not
have a position from which he can threaten the end from the outside at the
start of the play. He must run a course to threaten the end from the outside,
setting up #2's single block. Improper timing in the execution of this maneuver
will present a difficult job for our #2 back if the defensive end ignores the
threat of this outside block. It can be seen that #3's additional assignment after
faking the end is to take the defensive right halfback.

Now note the improvement of the formation for this play if #3 takes his
normal flanking position, two yards outside the normal defensive position of
the end and one yard off the line of scrimmage (to preserve the pass eligibility

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of his own end). Now the defensive end has a far greater problem than that
presented by having #3 line up in his normal position. A further variation can
be obtained by cross-flanking the shortside end. This would widen the
defensive half on that side and at the same time give the flanker a better
blocking angle on his regular assignment: the safety man.

It must be remembered that the men who are used as flankers and in motion
must be a real threat before the defensive team will adjust to meet the changed
formation. This means that passes must be used for these men to get across the
fact that they are more than a decoy.

Every play has one or more men who can be utilized to change the solid
alignment of the formation. If all were used for each play the quarterback
would have so many details to remember that he would find himself lost when
trying to disrupt the defense. However, it now becomes evident that the more
variations a quarterback can use, the less, both in variation and number, he will
be bothered by myriad defenses. And, of course, as we pointed out in Chapter
II, one of the burdens of the quarterback, checking a play that seems doomed
to failure by the defensive alignment, has been removed by the system of line
quarterbacking described. True, this has added to the details he must learn
personally, since he is affected by the signals given in the line, but we feel that
removing this formerly great cause of confusion and frustration has helped
keep his head clear and his command of the situation firm.

And as we mentioned at the start of this discussion, he needs all the help he
can get in this most demanding, vital and, withal, rewarding job on a Single
Wing team. More power to him.

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Conclusion

And there we have the basic plays of the Princeton Single Wing offense.
To sum it up, here are the major points, remembering, of course, the wealth of
detail we have outlined:

Emphasis and re-emphasis on fundamentals. Without sound, solid blocking, this

offense is shackled. Copious attention must be given to the details of every
motion of every player in acquiring these fundamentals.

Line quarterbacking. The addition of this factor makes a world of difference in

the success of our attack. It ends the situation which found certain plays in a
game absolutely wasted because they had to be run off with no chance of
success. A great burden has also been removed from the play-calling
quarterback.

Control of the ball. We certainly intend to score, but we plan to do it by control of

the ball over long periods of time. For this reason, we favor the running game,
with the passing attack an important adjunct to keep the defense loose and
honest. Control of the ball prevents the opponents from making full use of
their planned offense.

Adaptability. The basic Single Wing is an old system, but it does not have to be
old-fashioned. Combined with the opportunities it gives for raw power, by the
use of flankers, men-in-motion and the various cycles of plays possible, it
becomes a varied, fluid attack, able to keep up with the most advanced thinking
in modern football.

To some, the abundance of detail, the hard work required, may make it seem
like too complicated a system, and, of course, as every coach knows, material
has to be there to make the system work. I have found great satisfaction in
working with material of all kinds with this system, however. Material, after all,
is a word standing for boys and young men. When players #2, #9, etc., in the
paperwork planning come alive before you on the field as flesh and blood
youngsters, with all of the factors of their individual personality, their
intelligence and their spirit entering the picture, coaching becomes a doubly
fascinating challenge.

This Single Wing offense of ours gives great satisfaction to a coach, and, I
believe, to the players because of the sense of participation it gives all of them.

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Conclusion

Every man in the offensive pattern must put his intelligence to work on every
play. The day of that cartoonist's delight, the "big, dumb lineman," has certainly
ended as far as we are concerned. Line quarterbacking, both in the calling and
in the carrying out of assignment, is a lightning-like exercise in human chess.
Some of the most profound football thinkers it has been my privilege to coach
have been guards—not the great hulking type the public often associates with
this position, but wiry, rugged little 175-pounders, honor men in English,
history or philosophy. They became great students of the game by analyzing all
the possibilities in their offensive assignments.

Modern football, with its emphasis on specialists, has aided boys like this who
would have been too small to earn a full-time berth in the old days. There is
now a chance for perfection in each position that has developed the game into
a stimulating challenge for this type of boy as well as for the "natural" football
player of size and ability, and for the coaches who work with them. With our
present-day schedules of all major games, each one prepared for and planned
out like a battle campaign, there is plenty of room for this specialized
perfection.

To a coach, looking back over the years to high school football just after World
War I, to the inspirational qualities of the game under Bill Roper and the eye-
opening experience of playing Knute Rockne's great team, it has been a long
road. I have been asked, "Is it worth it?"

I can only say that it certainly has been. The hard work, the disappointments,
the inevitable criticism are all balanced out by the memories of constant
association with American kids in the years of their awakening manhood, of the
exchange of thoughts, ideas and knowledge (and victories and defeats!) with the
many fine men who have made coaching their lifework, of such unforgettable
thrills as the first Little Three Championship at Williams, the Princeton-
Williams game of 1942, the upset of Penn in 1946, the first Big Three title in
1947, the Cornell game of 1950 and the winding up of that season undefeated
under the dramatic circumstances of the Dartmouth "hurricane" game. Even
with all this, if I didn't feel that football had an important role to play in
American education, it would not have been worth it, but I am firmly
convinced that the game is an important adjunct to education.

There are some who ask, "How can a football player keep up with his studies?
Doesn't playing football keep a boy from gaining the education he supposedly
went to college to get?"

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Conclusion

In answer to this, I would like to quote a few facts. Many of our players gain
honors in their studies, and post-World War II teams at Princeton have
consistently averaged as high as or higher than the whole student body in
marks. On the 1949 team, nine out of the ten graduating lettermen went on to
graduate studies in law, medicine, engineering and business administration. It
seems to have been the rule rather than the exception for the captain to be an
honor student,, and we have had men on the team standing as high as the first
five out of their class. It is not unusual, for example, to find the whole right
side of the line made up of honor students.

This does not mean that you have to be an honor man to play modern football.
Many average students, and poor ones too, play the game, but I have found
that football, if anything, tends to help their studies. The players realize that
they have to keep up their marks to remain eligible, so they plan their study
program to fit in with athletics. Often, this teaches them how to get the full
value out of an hour of study better than unrestricted leisure time would. The
mental exercise, the physical release and the emotional satisfaction they obtain
from being part of the intense group effort that is a football squad give them a
perspective that helps in planning their other activities well. It is an interesting
fact that as many as two-thirds of the squad in some years, and a general
average of about half the squad, actually improves its academic standing during
the football season.

Obviously, education comes first, as these facts should show, but without
football something vital would be missing from the educational scene. The
classroom is concerned with the intellectual side of life, but the football field,
where the intellect, too, is more and more coming into play, teaches other
important lessons in mental, physical and emotional well-being.

The blend of physical contact, strategy, psychology, will-to-win and self-

discipline is a combination that appeals to something basic in our American
way of life. If it were not there, football would not have risen from its modest
beginnings in that Rutgers-Princeton game of 1869 to its present position of
great appeal for thousands of coaches and players and the millions of
spectators who share its stimulation from the sidelines.

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 GLOSSARY

OFFENSIVE REFERENCES

Right Formation—an unbalanced Single Wing lineup with the offensive

line and backfield overbalanced to their right.
Left Formation—an unbalanced Single Wing lineup with the offensive
line and backfield overbalanced to their left.
Longside—refers to the overbalanced side of the formation.
Shortside—refers to the opposite and thus underbalanced side of the
formation.
Straight Series—a backfield maneuver which moves the ball carrier
directly toward a longside opening or involves a reverse in moving
toward a shortside opening.
Buck Lateral—a backfield maneuver which establishes the threat of a
buck into the line at the same time as the threat of an exchange
and resulting pitchout or pass is established by the quarterback.
Full Spin—a backfield maneuver which attempts to hide the ball by
spinning two backfield men toward each" other.
Eight Turn—the quarterback's pivot in the buck lateral for an eight
opening. Described in Chapter IV.
Eight Spin—the full spin maneuver used in the spin series by the
fullback for an eight opening. Described in Chapter IV.
Six Turn—the quarterback's pivot in the buck lateral for a six opening.
Described in Chapter IV.
Six Spin—the full spin maneuver used in the spin series by the fullback
for a six opening. Described in Chapter IV.

ACTION—this is considered apart from the act of moving. It involves the

faking of strenuous movement designed to make the defense think the ultimate
destination is outside.

ADJUSTMENTS AND ADJUST—the automatic changing of blocking

assignments necessitated by changing defenses and expedited by the calls of the
line quarterbacks.

APEX OF WEDGE—the man to whom all wedge blocking converges.

BALANCE STEP—a step taken in place to improve the original stance for the
act of spinning or delaying.

BLOCKING ANGLE—the advantage enjoyed by the offensive player who

has lateral position on the defender.

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 GLOSSARY

BLOOPER COURSE—refers to a pass course in which a receiver runs

laterally behind the line of scrimmage and turns downfield on a curve just
outside the defensive end. The ball is received as the turn is completed and the
receiver heads down-field.

CALLS—the word signal given by the line quarterbacks that establish spacing
and assign blocking.

CHECK—to stop the movement of a defensive player momentarily.

CHECK OFF—action taken by the offensive quarterback to change plays at

the line of scrimmage from those called in the huddle.

CHECKOFFS—any such plays called by the quarterback.

CLOSE-IN—refers to blocking men in the immediate vicinity of the offensive

and defensive lines.

CONTROL ELEMENT—the sense imparted with certain play maneuvers.

CONTROL OF THE GAME—generalship that gives the offense the

advantage by retaining possession of the ball.

CRABBING FORWARD ON ALL FOURS—an offensive player's movement

in a position with both hands and both feet on the ground.

CROSS-CHECKING—single blocking on defensive linemen removed from

the play opening.

CROSS PASSES—pass patterns in which receivers cross over from their

original position.

CROSS-UP PLAYS—standard plays called in unexpected situations.

CUT-BLOCKS—blocks designed to take a defender from his feet.

CUT-DOWN—to take a defender off his feet.

CUT-OFF BLOCK—a block on a defender in the secondary somewhat

removed from the play opening.

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 GLOSSARY

CYCLES—a number of plays run from one series. Such plays complement
each other and place a balanced burden on the defense.

DEPTH—distances behind the offensive line.

DOWNFIELD—the offensive team is considered to be running downhill.

DOWNFIELD BLOCKING—blocking done in the area of the defensive

secondary.

DOWNFIELD CUT—a planned change of direction by the ball carrier after

gaining sufficient ground to reach the blocks thrown downfield.

DRAW OF THE PLAY—the natural pull of the defense resulting from the
offensive maneuver.

FAKES—offensive techniques and maneuvers, team and individual, which

draw the defense into a desired position.

FEEL—the ability or sense that makes it possible for the center to make
accurate and easy-to-handle passes.

FLANKERS—backfield men lined up in positions outside the defensive ends.

FLANKING POSITION—this is defined for a back in Chapter II. It also

refers to the outside blocking angle enjoyed by #1 and #5 on the defensive
tackles.

FOLD IN—the ball carrier aims his course directly over the power block.

FOLDING IN PROCESS—refers to wedge blocking in which all men drive

inward and forward to the apex of the wedge.

FORWARD HANDOFF—refers to a ball exchanged between backs wherein

the back who gives the ball is further removed in depth from the line of
scrimmage than the back who receives the ball.

HANDOFF—the exchange of the ball on a play where the man hitting straight
ahead takes the ball from the quarterback for a quick opening play.

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 GLOSSARY

HEAD BUTTING—results from improper execution of the play or technique.

The ball carrier meets up with a defender who has a straight and unhindered
path toward him.

HIGH-LOW BLOCK—a special technique of blocking on the defensive

shortside tackle used by #5 and #10. Described in Chapter VI.

HOLE—the designed opening created in the defensive line. Refers specifically

to the gap created in and on the line of scrimmage.

HOOK BLOCK—a block designed to tie up the defender's outside leg

preventing movement to the outside.

HOOK END RUN—an end run from the straight series predicated on the
ability of the wingback to hook-block the defensive longside end.

HOOK PASSES—passes thrown to receivers who proceed downfield a short

distance and then turn to face the passer to receive the ball.

INFLUENCE—relates to the movement of the offensive power blocker in

pulling to the outside when the man to be trapped lines up directly over his
position. Also refers to the effect this has on the defender lined up in this
position.

INITIAL DRAW—the first reaction of the defense toward plays that start in
one direction and finish going in another.

INSIDE DRAW—the natural draw of plays that create a strong impression of

running over the center area of the defensive line.

JUMP PASS—a pass thrown by the back who starts toward the line of
scrimmage as on a running play but who then leaps into the air to throw the
pass before reaching the line of scrimmage.

KEEP—the ball carrier retains possession of the ball to run the opening after
faking an exchange.

KEY ON—offensive backfield men observe the positions of the defensive

guards for the ultimate opening for the play.

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 GLOSSARY

LATERAL—a pass thrown across the field either underhand or overhand

which travels laterally or toward the offensive team's goal line.

LEAD—refers to the distance the center must pass the ball ahead of the ball
carrier to compensate for his running start.

LEAD THE BALL CARRIER—a blocker leads when he is running ahead of a

ball carrier and in position to block for him.

LINE OF SCRIMMAGE—the area around a line drawn through the ball and
parallel to the goal lines in which the offensive and defensive lines take their
positions.

MANEUVER—the action of the backfield taken to advance the ball through

the opening in the defensive line.

MEN-IN-MOTION—backfield men running laterally or somewhat toward

their own goal line at the time the ball is put in play.

MOUTH OF THE HOLE—the immediate area of the power block or key

block on which the play is based.

MOUTH OF THE OPENING—the immediate area of the power block or

key block on which the play is based.

OPENING—the blocking assignments in total for one play.

OPENFIELD—considered to be the area outside of and downfield from the

defensive line.

PASSING CUP—the protective wall formed by the blockers in the pass

protection assignment.

PASSING DOWN—a down on which the offense can be expected to use a

pass.

PASS PATTERN—the planned courses of receivers for any pass.

PASSING TRIANGLE AREA—synonymous with the passing cup and is the

area that the pass protectors endeavor to clear for the passer.

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 GLOSSARY

PEELBACK—stated simply, to block behind the runner.

PEELED OFF—a prospective tackier is blocked by a peelback block.

PERSONAL PASS—a pass thrown to a receiver who designates his personal

fakes and ultimate destination.

PITCHOUT—the lateral pass made from an interior position to a back

attempting to run an outside play.

PIVOT—the actual technique of offensive players in turning or spinning on

the ball of one foot.

POURS OUT—this is the figurative description of "influence."

POWER BLOCKING—the proper and simultaneous application of individual

blocks on one opponent by two or more men.

PULLING—the term given to lateral movement by all offensive players.

PUMP—the action taken by the arms in faking possession of the . ball.

QUICK POP PASS—a pass thrown to a receiver as he steps into an exposed

area behind the defensive line.

REVERSE—a play starting in one direction and ending up going

in the opposite direction.

ROUNDS THE HORN—a pulling lineman who expects to block back to the
inside after running around the power block is said to be "rounding the Horn."

SCREEN THE EXCHANGE—the action of running between the defender

and the offensive exchange of the ball.

SEAL BLOCK—the blocker here is not assigned specific blocking

responsibility other than to cover behind the offensive line and to take the
necessary block.

SEAL-OFF WALL—the figurative wall formed by players given seal blocking

assignments on outside plays.

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 GLOSSARY

SEAM—the area between two offensive players lined in the original formation.

SERIES—the name given to the combination of offensive maneuver and

blocking for advancing the ball.

SLOT—synonymous with "seam."

SLOTTING OF PERSONNEL—the placing of players in the offensive

positions.

SPOT PASS—a pass thrown to a predetermined position by a passer who is

not always in view of his receiver. In such cases he is involved in spins or fakes
in the backfield maneuver for that pass.

TAIL OF—a ball carrier running one yard to the rear of a personal interferer.

UNDER CONTROL—ball carriers and blockers proceed at a speed wherein

they can make expected adjustments in course.

VEER—the ball carrier's action in sliding laterally behind the line of

scrimmage, after first driving forward.

DEFENSIVE REFERENCES

Defensive Alignments are given in the following descriptive order:

1. Number of men on line of scrimmage
2. Spacing of men on line of scrimmage; if not given, this is a
standard spacing
3. Number of linebackers; if not given, this is understood to be two
linebackers
4. Deep secondary; if not given, this is understood to be a two-one
setup
6-3-2 Defense—a defensive alignment with six men on the line of
scrimmage, three linebackers and two men in the deep defensive
secondary.

ABNORMAL SPACING—any deviation from the normal defensive spacings

as described in Chapter II.

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 GLOSSARY

BACKER-UP—a defender in the close secondary lined up just behind the

defensive linemen. This is a synonym for "linebacker."

CHASER—defensive lineman who runs behind the line of scrimmage in

pursuit of plays directed away from his territory.

CHUG BY LINEBACKER—defensive block on a receiver proceeding

downfield in the pass pattern.

CLOSE LINEBACKERS—linebackers playing closer to the line of scrimmage

than is considered to be normal for their position.

CLOSE SAFETY—defensive safety man who plays closer to the line of

scrimmage than is considered to be normal for his position.

CRASHING CHARGE—defensive movement across the line of scrimmage

aimed sharply and forcefully to the inside.

DEEP HALFBACKS—defensive halfbacks lined up farther removed from the

line of scrimmage than is considered to be normal for their position.

DEFENSIVE SECONDARY—defensive players not stationed on the line of

scrimmage. This refers to the linebackers, halfbacks and the safety man.

FAR LINEBACKER—the linebacker farthest removed from the offensive

point of reference. The offensive point of reference may be either an offensive
player or an offensive opening.

HALF UNIT—each offensive player is considered to occupy one unit of

position. A half unit would be half of this distance.

HARD CHARGER—defensive lineman who moves toward the offensive line

with a forceful charge.

HEAD-ON—a defensive position taken directly in front of an offensive

player.

HOLDUP—defensive technique designed to prevent offensive receivers from

proceeding downfield in the pass patterns.

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 GLOSSARY

INSIDE-CONSCIOUS—usually refers to defensive ends and tackles who

have a tendency to play to the inside of the formation from their original
position.

KEY ON—the defensive man watches the play of a certain offensive man or
men and bases his reaction on the movement of the offensive player or players.

KINGPINS OF ANY DEFENSE—the defensive tackles.

LINEBACKER—synonym for "backer-up."

LONGSIDE END—defensive player lined up at the end position opposite the

longside of the formation.

LONGSIDE GUARD—defensive player lined up at the guard position

opposite the longside of the formation.

LONGSIDE HALFBACK—defensive player lined up in the halfback position

opposite the longside of the formation.

LONGSIDE LINEBACKER—defensive player lined up in the linebacker

position opposite the longside of the formation.

LOOPING—defensive lineman moves laterally before proceeding across the

line of scrimmage.

MAN-TO-MAN—refers to a type of pass defense in which the defensive

secondary are assigned to cover specific offensive men in the pass patterns.

MIDDLE LINEBACKER—refers to a five-three or six-three defense. The

middle linebacker is in the center of the three.

NEAR HALFBACK—defensive halfback closest to the offensive point of

reference. The offensive point of reference may be either an offensive player or
an offensive opening.

NEAR LINEBACKER—defensive linebacker closest to the offensive point of

reference.

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 GLOSSARY

OUTSIDE-CONSCIOUS—usually refers to defensive ends and tackles who

have a tendency to play to the outside of the formation and their original
position.

OUTSIDE-LINEBACKER—refers to a five-three or six-three defense. A

linebacker on the outside of the three and closest to the offensive point of
reference.

PENETRATION—distance that defensive linemen proceed across the line of

scrimmage into the offensive backfield area.

PITCHING IN—refers to defensive linemen who are submarining or

otherwise charging in low and hard, sacrificing their lateral strength.

RUNNING LINEBACKERS THROUGH—defensive maneuvers which

involve charging a linebacker through the line of scrimmage so that this act
changes the structure of the defense.

SEAM—where defenders line up in a position between offensive players, the

area between offensive players is called a seam.

SHORTSIDE LINEBACKER—defensive player lined up in the linebacker

position opposite the shortside of the formation.

SHORTSIDE END—defensive player lined up in the end position opposite

the shortside of the formation.

SHORTSIDE HALFBACK—defensive player lined up in the halfback

position opposite the shortside of the formation.

SHORTSIDE TACKLE—defensive player lined up in the tackle position

opposite the shortside of the formation.

SLANTING—defensive linemen charging at a forty-five degree angle to either

side and moving toward the offensive line.

SLIDE—the technique of defensive linemen who do not charge across the line
of scrimmage but move laterally to the play.

SOFT CHARGER—defensive lineman who does not move across the line of
scrimmage with force, difficult to trap.

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 GLOSSARY

SPACING—refers to the alignment taken by defensive players along the line

of scrimmage.

SPIN OUT—defensive lineman's technique in reacting to blocks. Spins toward

the block and around the head and shoulder of the blocker.

SUBMARINE—defensive player going under the offensive players and coming

up in position to tackle.

TEAM DEFENSE—a plan for stopping the offense, wherein defensive

players proceed on planned courses to other areas to help on plays not directed
in their area.

ZONE—refers to pass defense in which the def ,nsive secondary are

responsible only for assigned areas.

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