G.R. No.

124617             April 28, 2000

PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C. CORTEZ, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996 of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-
08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a
company nurse of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994.
1 

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was a issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner
corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain within forty-eight (48)
hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William
Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August 1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00
entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and,
(c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the
morning of 6 September 1944 when in fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private
respondent although it was read to her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the
required explanation, so that while her case pending investigation the company placed her under preventive
suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994.

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was issued by
petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-employees with the Allied Banking
Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to receive the second memorandum although it
was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private
respondent at her last known address by registered mail.

Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00 and the
punching-in of her time card by a co-employee.

On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of her
termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of duties, serious
misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust.
2

On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and its president Francis
Chua. 3

On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and legal, at the
same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit. 4

On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The NLRC ordered petitioner
PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages computed from the time of dismissal
up to her actual reinstatement. 5

On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was denied; hence, this
6 

petition for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.

The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is entitled to damages in the
event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained.

The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of
an employee  which grounds should be strictly construed since a person's employment constitutes "property" under
7 

the context of the constitutional protection that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law" and, as such, the burden of proving that there exists a valid ground for termination of the
employment rests upon the employer. Likewise, in light of the employee's right to security of tenure, where a penalty
8 

less punitive than dismissal will suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to be
visited with a consequence so severe. 9
A perusal of the termination letter indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment for "serious
misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust." Specifically —

1. On August 2, 1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior Mr. William Chua,
the Plant Manager.

2. On August 23, 1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be sent to CLMC for
Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and was not recovered.

3. On September 6, 1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show that you were at
work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As per time card you were in at 8:02
A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.

4. On July 28, 1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an ATM card of nine
(9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees complained by the name of Tirso Aquino
about the status of his ATM Card and upon query from the bank it was found out that no application and no
deposit for said person has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not open the ATM Card and
deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It turned out that said deposit was made after a month
later. 
10

As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant Manager,
William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving special treatment from
him who would oftentimes invite her "for a date," which she would as often refuse. On many occasions, he would
make sexual advances — touching her hands, putting his arms around her shoulders, running his fingers on her
arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special treatment and sexual advances continued during her
employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude
towards her changed. He made her understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause
her termination from the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out
one day that her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal
belongings was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason,
an argument ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect.  11

Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for transmittal was not
lost; instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal as evidenced by a receipt duly
signed by the latter.  12

With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her time card
because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard Tan, and that was with the
permission of William Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing that she was anyway only
accommodating the request of a company executive and done for the benefit of the company with the acquiescence
of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was apparently tolerated as the employees were not getting any
reprimand for doing so.  13

As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees, private
respondent claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was employed as a
company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her co-employees.

The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled
that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working
for the employer.  The act of private respondent in throwing a stapler and uttering abusive language upon the
14 

person of the plant manager may be considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However,
in order to consider it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in
relation to the performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The
acts complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a nurse.
Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no other.  Also, the
15 

memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending investigation of her case was
addressed to her as a nurse.  16

As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to punch-in her
time card, although a violation of company rules, likewise does not constitute serious misconduct. Firstly, it was
done by her in good faith considering that she was asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office, which
was for the benefit of the company, with the consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit
such infraction during her five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the company did not lose anything by reason
thereof as the offense was immediately known and corrected.

On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to private
respondent dated 20 October 1994  and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994, the money entrusted to
17 
her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the employees concerned, although belatedly. We agree with
the submission of the Solicitor General that —

The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by itself, to support a
conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not show that
opening an ATM is one of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to show that
Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for petitioner's
employees. It is of common knowledge that a bank imposes upon an applicant certain requirements before
an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms, identification cards, minimum
deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay was caused by Rosalinda's neglect or
willful act (emphasis supplied). 18

Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.  The19 

negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but also habitual. Likewise, the ground
"willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" must be founded on facts established by
the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which
loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest.  All these requirements prescribed by law and
20 

jurisprudence are wanting in the case at bar.

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled to recover
such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by malice or bad faith or that it
acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her services. In disbelieving the explanation
proffered by private respondent that the transfer of her table was the response of a spurned lothario, public
respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter —

Complainant's assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager where she
threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her refusal to submit to his advances to her
which started from her early days of employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly believable. For
indeed, if there was such harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her during that period? Why
did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have taken that period for the Plant Manager to react.
This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all.  21

Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to
expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more prepared to support
her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to
his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst
because she would have been merely protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights.

We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's
sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry "foul" provided
the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is expected to
complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and
more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.

Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer's sexual
impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and
trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that
terminated the services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her
silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality
employment has become a daily "monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's
employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind,
for as long as she could outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere
occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years,
and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time. But
William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no
place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up
anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason to terminate her.

In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor.  In moral damages, it
1âwphi1

suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation by reason of the act complained of.  Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are granted in addition
22 

to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for the public good"  if the employer ''acted in a
23 

wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."  24

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager showed an
obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he would terminate her
services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced
"superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense
of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated. Thus, for
the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages,
plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service,
and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy
over their employees.

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions committed
considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or that she inflicted serious
damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently inimical to her employer's
interest.  Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was pending investigation appears to be
25 

unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the dismissal of
private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners Philippine Aeolus
Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed from the time of her
dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the strained relations between the
adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent, petitioners should pay private respondent
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service until finality of this judgment. In addition,
petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146053             April 30, 2008

DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Dioscoro F. Bacsin questions the Decision1 dated August 23, 2000
of the First Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900, which affirmed Resolution No. 98-0521
dated March 11, 1998 and Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999, both issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner from the service for Grave Misconduct.

Facts of the Case

Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan, Mambajao, Camiguin Province.
Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman

is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.

AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand.2 Once inside, she saw
him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to
come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her
breast five times, and that she felt afraid.3 A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed
the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.4

Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February 12, 1996 by Regional Director Vivencio
N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC.5

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was handing AAA a
lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his
office without any complaint.7

Resolution of the CSC

In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of
Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him from the service.8 Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have
committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28,
1999.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the recourse
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51900.

Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:

1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and the Honorable Civil Service Commission to
magnify the accidental touching incident on August 16, 1995;

2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the evidence on record; and

3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of removal.9

In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioner’s right to due process, and based
on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that right. The CA
ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with "disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct," the CSC
found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioner’s guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal from the service.

The Issues Before Us

The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present petition:

1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment, grave misconduct, which was
different from or an offense not alleged in the formal charge filed against him at the inception of the
administrative case.

2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct as charged by
complainant, whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service imposed by the Civil Service
Commission and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and applicable rulings.

3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the offense of Grave Misconduct; a
greater offense.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as "Grave Misconduct (Acts of
Sexual Harassment)," different from that specified in the formal charge which was "Misconduct." He further argues
that the offense of "Misconduct" does not include the graver offense of "Grave Misconduct."

This argument is unavailing.

As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:

The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge
against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.10

It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was his act of
improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to
designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case.

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on
the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a
sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala,11 it was held, "It is true that this provision calls for
a ‘demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.’ But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender." The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand
from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under
Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed "(w)hen the
sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice."
AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her.12 It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked
basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the
complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative
agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.

Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal charge, it must be discussed whether
or not petitioner is indeed guilty, as found by the CA and CSC, of "Grave Misconduct," as distinguished from "Simple
Misconduct." From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear that there is misconduct on the part of petitioner. The
term "misconduct" denotes intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.13

We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is
doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple
misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave
offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians
while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner
demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his office.

Petitioner’s second argument need not be discussed further, as he was rightly found guilty of grave misconduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, "Grave Misconduct" carries with it
the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the penalty imposed on petitioner is in accordance with the Rules.

Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 These elements are present in this
case, where petitioner was properly informed of the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.

A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not be allowed, under any circumstance,
to practice this noble profession. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 51900 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. CTA-01-1            April 2, 2002

ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, complainant,

vs.
HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, Presiding Judge, Court of Tax Appeals, respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The present administrative case filed with this Court originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint of Atty. Susan M.
1 

Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charging Judge Ernesto Acosta,
Presiding Judge of the same court, with sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility.

In her affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged several instances when respondent judge sexually harassed her.

On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the United States, bringing gifts for the three
judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by
shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.

On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will get
something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry
Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.
Complainant submitted the Joint Affidavit of Ma. Imelda C. Samonte and Anne Benita M. Santos, CTA Tax
2 

Specialists, to prove that respondent went to her office that day.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his
chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she
was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to enter his chambers alone.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant
and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her
shoulders and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his office. She then
asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they reached his
chambers, respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and asked her to see
him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter
agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by accident in respondent's office. Ruby then approached
the secretary's table which was separated from respondent's office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant
sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed
to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk.
Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When
he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then approached complainant
saying, "me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa." Thereupon, he tried to "grab" her. Complainant instinctively
raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She
pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face
with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that incident,
respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, "sorry, it won't happen again."
3 

In his comment, respondent judge denied complainant's allegation that he sexually harassed her six times. He
claimed that he has always treated her with respect, being the head of the CTA Legal Staff. In fact, there is no strain
in their professional relationship.

On the first incident, he explained that it was quite unlikely that complainant would ask him to go to her office on
such date in order to give him a "pasalubong."

With respect to the second incident on December 28, he claimed it could not have happened as he was then on
official leave.

Anent the third incident, respondent explained that he went to the various offices of the CTA to extend New Year's
greetings to the personnel. He also greeted complainant with a casual buss on her cheek and gave her a calendar.
In turn, she also greeted him.

As to the fourth episode, he averred that he and complainant had been attending the deliberations of the Bicameral
Conference Committee at the Senate on the bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA. Hence, when the bill was
finally approved that particular day, respondent, in jubilation and in the presence of other people, gave complainant
a spontaneous peck on her cheek. He could not recall any resentment on her part when he kissed her. She even
congratulated him in return, saying "Justice ka na Judge." Then he treated her to a lunch to celebrate the event.
Respondent recounted several times when they would return to the CTA in the evening after attending the
committee hearings in Congress to retrieve complainant's personal belongings from her office. Surely, if he had
malice in his mind, those instances would have been the perfect opportunities for him to sexually harass her.

As to the fifth incident, respondent alleged that he did not call complainant to harass her, but to discuss with her and
Elizabeth Lozano, HRMO III, and Elsie T. Forteza, Administrative Officer, the health plan for the CTA officers and
employees. The fact that such meeting took place was confirmed by a Certification issued by Lozano. 4

Regarding the sixth incident, respondent narrated his version as follows: Complainant arrived in his office past 9
a.m. that day, followed by another court employee, Ruby Lanuza. He proceeded to discuss the CTA Expansion Bill
with complainant. Then he went for a while to the rest room. When he returned, Ruby had already left but
complainant was still there. Forthwith, he remarked that he forgot to greet her on Valentine's Day, the day before.
He approached complainant to give her a casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and raised her arms to
cover her face, causing her to lose her balance. So he held her arms to prevent her from falling. Her rejection came
as a surprise to him and made him feel quite embarrassed. Shortly, complainant excused herself and left the room.
Stunned at the thought that she might misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology. Respondent
further explained that the structure of his office, being seen through a transparent glass divider, makes it impossible
for anyone to commit any improper conduct inside.

In a Resolution dated August 21, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to Justice Josefina G. Salonga of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

Justice Salonga set the hearing of the case on November 6, 2001. However, the parties, through counsel,
manifested that "they will not be adducing any further evidence." On November 7, 2001, Justice Salonga issued an
Order directing them to submit their memoranda simultaneously, after which, the case shall be considered submitted
for resolution.

On January 9, 2002, Justice Salonga forwarded to this Court her Report on Investigation and Recommendation,
thus:

"We find for the respondent.

"The complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a
kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were
motivated by malice or ill-motive. It is clear under the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were
done on festive and special occasions. In fact, complainant's testimony that she was sexually harassed on
November 21, 2000, is hardly believable. Notably, complainant declared in her affidavit-complaint that she
brought some 'pasalubongs' for the respondent judge from her trip abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not
have been 'taken aback' by the respondent's act of greeting her in a friendly manner and thanking her by
way of a kiss on the cheek. Moreover, it was established that Judge Acosta was on official leave of absence
from December 26-29, 2000. This was corroborated by Ricardo Hebia, the driver of respondent judge, in his
Panunumpa (Affidavit) dated March 26, 2001, where he stated among others, to wit:

x xx

"Corollarily, the joint affidavit of Ms. Santos and Ms. Samonte attesting to the fact that respondent dropped
by at the third floor of the CTA and greeted them Happy New Year, even if it true, can not be given any
evidentiary weight. Clearly, they did not make any categorical statement that they had witnessed or seen
Judge Acosta making sexual advances on the complainant. Nor did they even attribute any malicious acts
on respondent constituting sexual harassment.

"In addition, the respondent admitted that when he handed a calendar and greeted complainant with a buss,
complainant reciprocated by greeting him a Happy New Year. The allegation of Atty. Aquino that the
respondent merely used the calendars as 'props' to kiss her on the cheek and that she was singled out by
respondent is not supported by any convincing evidence. The affidavit of Ms. Aurora U. Aso and Renelyn L.
Larga that Ms. Carmen Acosta gave them calendars for the office of Attys. Margarette Guzman and
Felizardo O. Consing, is immaterial and irrelevant, as Judge Acosta had stated that he handed to
complainant Aquino, a 2001 calendar in the course of greeting her with a buss on the cheek. Said affidavit
could not account for the calendars distributed to the other offices in the CTA, more specifically, the Legal
and Technical Staff headed by Atty. Aquino.

"Moreover, the claim of the complainant that she was sexually harassed immediately after the final reading
of the bill anent the expansion of the CTA at the Senate, can not be accorded great evidentiary value. The
alleged kissing incident took place in the presence of other people and the same was by reason of the
exaltation or happiness of the moment, due to the approval of the subject bill. Quite interesting to note, is
that Atty. Aquino reciprocated by congratulating respondent and remarking "justice ka na judge" after the
latter had bussed her on the cheek. Complainant even failed to dispute the fact that after the kissing
incident, she joined Judge Acosta and his driver for lunch at a seafood restaurant in Luneta. There was even
a time that she allowed the respondent judge to accompany her to the office alone and at nighttime at that,
to retrieve her car keys and bag when they returned to the CTA after the hearing at the Senate on the CTA
expansion bill. These acts are not at square with the behavior of one who has been sexually harassed, for
the normal reaction of a victim of sexual harassment would be to avoid the harasser or decline his invitations
after being offended. In fact, this occasion could have provided the respondent judge with the right
opportunity to commit malicious acts or to sexually harass complainant, but then Judge Acosta never even
attempted to do so. Undoubtedly, it could be said that no strained relations existed between Atty. Aquino
and Judge Acosta at that moment.

"Neither can the alleged continuous call of Judge Acosta on complainant in the morning of February 14,
2001 to see him in his office, be considered as acts constituting sexual harassment. Atty. Aquino failed to
state categorically in her affidavit-complaint that respondent demanded sexual advances or favors from her,
or that the former had committed physical conduct of sexual nature against her. The telephone calls were
attributed malicious implications by the complainant. To all intents and purposes, the allegation was merely
a product of her imagination, hence, the same deserves no weight in law. Indeed, Atty. Aquino's own
version, indicates that she well knew that the purpose of the respondent in calling her in the morning of
February 14, 2001 was to discuss the CTA Health Plan which was disapproved by the Supreme Court and
not for the respondent to demand sexual favors from her. This was corroborated by Atty. Margarette
Guzman in her affidavit dated February 28, 2001, attached to the complainant's affidavit, where she stated:

x xx

"Finally, while Judge Acosta admitted having pecked Atty. Aquino on her cheek, which was avoided by the
latter, the same was not meant to sexually harass her. Judge Acosta's act of extending his post Valentine
greeting to complainant was done in good faith and sans any malice. This is so because immediately after
 the complainant had displayed annoyance to the kissing episode, Judge Acosta immediately extended an
apology by way of a handwritten note saying that the incident won't happen again.

"Parenthetically, the undersigned is convinced that Ms. Lanuza's affidavit that she supposedly accompanied
complainant to respondent's office as she allegedly had a previous 'bad experience' with the latter when he
was still an Associate Judge, was merely concocted to add flavor to the baseless imputations hurled against
Judge Acosta. The accusation is implausible as Ms. Lanuza did not seem to complain about the alleged bad
experience she had with Judge Acosta or relate it to anyone until ten (10) years later. It must be stressed
that Ms. Lanuza is a biased-witness who harbored ill feelings against the respondent, as she was
reprimanded by Judge Acosta for habitual absenteeism and tardiness in 1996. More importantly, Ms.
Lanuza did not even attest that she was a witness to the alleged sexual advances of Judge Acosta.

"In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be
understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of
the latter hat she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks
were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses
other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P.
Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or
kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays,
Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's
birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's department, further
attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet her with a peck on the
cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive occasions, female employees of the
CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
(Annex "8" to Comment, p. 65, Rollo)

"In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of
bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No
evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-
beso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what
happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents." 5

Justice Salonga then made the following recommendation:

"Considering the above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint for
sexual harassment and violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional
Responsibility be DISMISSED and accordingly, respondent Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta be
exonerated therefrom; that in view of these charges which might have tainted the image of the Court, though
unsubstantiated they may be, Judge Acosta is WARNED to refrain from doing similar acts, or any act for that
matter on the complainant and other female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, which in any manner
may be interpreted as lustful advances." 6

We agree with the findings of Justice Salonga.

Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care, for
proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the entire
judiciary as well.

We have reviewed carefully the records of this case and found no convincing evidence to sustain complainant's
charges. What we perceive to have been committed by respondent judge are casual gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In kissing complainant, we find no indication that respondent was
motivated by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work-
related sexual harassment under R.A. 7877.

As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice:

"A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within the purview of
sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:

'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless
of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

 1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment
or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or the refusal to grant sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in anyway would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employees;

2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws;
or

3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as follows:

1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another;

2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;

3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, or any other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.

"In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder, complainant did not even allege that Judge Acosta
demanded, requested or required her to give him a buss on the cheek which, she resented. Neither did Atty.
Aquino establish by convincing evidence that the busses on her cheek, which she considers as sexual
favors, discriminated against her continued employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment. In fact, complainant continued to perform her work in the office with the usual normalcy.
Obviously, the alleged sexual favor, if there ever was, did not interfere with her working condition (Annexes
"9" - "9-FFF"). Moreover, Atty. Aquino also continued to avail of benefits and leaves appurtenant to her office
and was able to maintain a consistent outstanding performance. On top of this, her working area which, is at
the third floor of the CTA, is far removed from the office of Judge Acosta located at the fourth floor of the
same building. Resultantly, no hostile or intimidating working environment is apparent.

"Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that Judge
Acosta committed the acts complained of; that Atty. Aquino's determination to seek justice for herself was
not substantiated by convincing evidence; that the testimony of respondent judge and his witnesses are
credible and therefore, should be given weight and probative value; that the respondent's acts undoubtedly
do not bear the marks of misconduct, impropriety or immorality, either under R.A. No. 7877 or the Canons of
Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility." 7

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded, requested or required any
sexual favor from complainant in exchange for "favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges"
specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

While we exonerate respondent from the charges herein, however, he is admonished not to commit similar acts
against complainant or other female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, otherwise, his conduct may be
construed as tainted with impropriety.

We laud complainant's effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it
was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her superior of sexual harassment.
However, her assessment of the incidents is misplaced for the reasons mentioned above.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ernesto D. Acosta is hereby EXONERATED of the charges against him.
However, he is ADVISED to be more circumspect in his deportment.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019             April 4, 2007

[Formerly A.M. No. 06-7-418-RTC]
SHARON S. ALEGRIA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, RTC, Branch 197, Las Piñas City, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

It is well to remind judges that this Court has adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards erring members of the
judiciary as part of its effort to cleanse its ranks and improve the administration of justice.1 In the implementation of
this policy, however, the Court ensures that the requirements of due process are observed, such that substantial
evidence is required to prove the charge against a judge. Side by side with the observance of due process is this
Court’s bestowal of bounden respect for the sensibilities of complainant. All these considered, the Court will not
hesitate to do its duty to discipline a judge or even dismiss him from the service when his guilt is proven by the
required quantum of evidence. Conversely, this Court is bound to absolve a judge when the charge against him is
baseless or otherwise does not meet the substantial evidence standard.

On 27 July 2005, Sharon Sanson-Alegria (complainant) then Clerk III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 197, Las
Piñas City, filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Las Piñas City, an Affidavit-Complaint2 charging Judge
Manuel N. Duque (respondent) for "commit[ting] acts insulting to and belittling [her] morals and decency." On 28
July 2005, Zandra T. Bato, Clerk of Court VI, forwarded to Joselito dj. Vibandor, Executive Judge, RTC, Las Piñas
City, said Affidavit-Complaint.3

The Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) took cognizance of the case and docketed it as Case
No. LP-05-002. Finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Committee directed respondent to file an
answer under oath.4 On 8 August 2005, respondent filed his Answer.5

A pre-hearing conference was conducted on 7 March 2006, after which the Committee issued a Pre-Hearing
Order6 containing the stipulation of facts, issue, and list of the pre-marked exhibits for the parties.

On 14 March 2006, complainant filed an Urgent Motion to order the preventive suspension of respondent and his
inhibition from the criminal cases being handled by complainant’s counsel and tried by respondent.7 On 4 April 2006,
respondent filed his comment to this motion by complainant. On the same day, the Committee issued an Order
directing the parties to submit their respective position papers with the affidavits of their witnesses.8 Before the
Committee could take any further action in the case, on 8 May 2006, it forwarded the records of the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated 7 March 2006 (A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
excluding "complaints for sexual harassment against Judges of

Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals"
from the jurisdiction of the Committee.9

In a Memorandum dated 26 June 2006, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that the complaint
against respondent judge be docketed as a regular administrative case and that the same be referred to one of the
consultants of his office for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records.10 On 6 September 2006, the Court noted the Memorandum of the Court Administrator and adopted his
recommendations.11 The complaint was re-docketed as an administrative case against respondent and the same
was referred to a consultant for investigation, report and recommendation.

Despite four (4) resettings,12 complainant and her counsel failed to appear at the 16 January 2007 scheduled
hearing. Respondent judge, on the other hand, appeared and submitted an "Opposition to Postponement and
Consider this Case Submitted for Resolution."13 Thus, Hearing Officer Designate Romulo S. Quimbo issued an
Order considering the case submitted for resolution.14

The version of complaint as found by the Hearing Officer Designate is as follows:

In her complaint[,] complainant averred that in early February 2005, she went on leave for one week. She had
notified Atty. Jeanette Tolentino, the Branch Clerk of RTC Branch 197. She had gone on leave because of a
personal problem which was affecting her work. When she returned to work, she was told that respondent Judge
wanted to talk to her. When the latter arrived, he called for her. Before she went to respondent’s office, she was
warned by her office mates to distance herself from the respondent because the latter had earlier kissed Atty. Ma.
Jeanette Baccay-Tolentino on the lips. Complainant said that she did not think the respondent Judge would do the
same to her considering that he knew her father who was a chief of police.

Upon entering the respondent’s office, complainant alleged that she sat on the chair facing him. Respondent asked
complainant to relate her problem and not to be ashamed because he treated as a daughter. She averred that she
cried and because she related her problem in a rather loud voice, the respondent Judge told her to keep her voice
low so as not to be heard outside. Respondent Judge then stood up and locked the door to his office so that no one
would disturb their conversation. Respondent Judge then sat down beside her and because she was covering her
mouth with her two hands while she was crying, respondent Judge took her hands away because according to him
he could not understand what she was saying. Immediately after he had removed her hands from covering her
mouth, he kissed her on the lips with his tongue out. This surprised her. Respondent Judge then repeated his act of
kissing her with his tongue out. That was when complainant regained her composure and she told him that his son
is outside. Before she left, the respondent Judge said "I love you" and told her not to relate what happened to
anyone. She did not mind what he said because she was then crying.

According to the complainant, she went down to the office of her "daddy" who saw her crying. He asked her why she
was crying, she told him that her husband did not come home. She did this to prevent any untoward incident and
she thought the incident with the respondent Judge would not be repeated. From her daddy’s office she returned to
the court but she was at a loss as to what she would do. During lunch at the canteen, she met their branch sheriff
who noticed that she had been crying. The latter asked her why she was weeping, she related to him what had
happened but she asked him to keep the story to himself. 1a\^/phi1.net

During the last week of February 2005, the complainant declared that she was asked by respondent Judge to bring
certain folders for his study. As she gave the folders to him, the respondent immediately embraced her. She pushed
him away and respondent took hold of his "baril." He asked her if they could go out on a date. Because of her fear,
complainant said that she agreed to the respondent’s invitation. He set it for 08 March but she demurred because it
was her birthday. Respondent suggested 10 March and complainant agreed. After that she went back to her office.

Complainant further declared that respondent Judge called her at the office to remind her of their date. They tried to
record the call by using the cell phone of her officemate but it did not work. On 09 March, the day after her birthday,
complainant did not report to her office. Ronaldo Esguerra, a nephew of the respondent Judge, sent her a text
message that the respondent was calling for her. She called the respondent who asked her why she was absent.
She replied that she had overslept. He reminded her of their date the next day. He suggested that they meet at
"Citimotors" after the raffle because he was the duty judge. She said yes and the respondent warned her that if she
will not appear, she better not return to the office ever at the same time banging the phone. For this reason
complainant stated that she did not report to the office anymore because she knew that she will be the recipient of a
series of memoranda because that is what happens when the respondent Judge does not get what he wants. This
same thing had happened to her office mates who do not want to talk for fear of losing their jobs. Because of his
several memoranda her salary and other benefits were withheld. That is the reason she could not immediately filed
her complaint. Moreover, she realized that she was the underdog because respondent Judge knew many high and
mighty people.15

In his Answer,16 respondent denies the averments in the affidavit-complaint and refuted in detail the alleged act of
sexual harassment. According to respondent, sometime in February 2005, after he learned that complainant had
reported back for work after a prolonged absence, he talked to her over the phone that he wanted to see and talk to
her about her neglected work as civil case clerk-in-charge. Complainant came to his office already trembling, crying
and appeared hysterical. The door to respondent’s chamber was only half-closed with respondent’s son standing by
the door.17

Complainant confessed that her husband, who had already become a drug addict, had another woman, no longer
reported for work, and was no longer coming home. Complainant further informed respondent that her own father
was likewise estranged from her mother and was also living with another woman. To this revelation, respondent
merely advised complainant to work punctually everyday and to take an interest in her work for her to forget her
family problems. Complainant allegedly apologized and promised not to repeat being absent.18 1ªvvphi1.nét

A few days later, on 8 March 2005, complainant called respondent asking permission for her to be absent as it was
her birthday. Respondent told her that it was her privilege but that she had to notify the Branch Clerk of Court.19

With respect to the other incident, respondent asserts that at the time complainant delivered the voluminous folders
and records of three cases, she was accompanied by Ronaldo Esguerra, the process server who carried the said
records and waited with complainant in respondent’s chambers while the latter went over the said records.
Complainant and Esguerra thereafter left together.20

In addition to his denial and refutation of the alleged acts of sexual harassment, respondent further stated other
matters with respect to complainant’s appointment, performance, and efficiency as Clerk of his court. Respondent
states that complainant was appointed to the position of Clerk in Branch 197 upon his recommendation.21 Despite
this, he criticizes her performance as docket clerk. According to respondent, several memoranda were issued by the
Branch Clerk of Court relative to complainant’s performance of her duties, to wit: (1) Memorandum22 dated 17 April
2002 directing complainant to immediately submit all pleadings, motions, memoranda, and other papers to avoid
delay and adverse consequences, (2) Memorandum23 dated 19 April 2002 directing complainant to attach the
registry receipts and return cards to the records of the case to which they pertained, (3) Memorandum24 dated 9
February 2005, requiring complainant to explain why she did not furnish the parties with copies of the decision dated
5 November 2004 in Civil Case No. 01-0148, and (4) Memorandum25 dated 2 December 2004 ordering complainant
to explain her failure to prepare the order in LRC LP-04-0097.

Complainant also frequently absented herself from September to February 2005, seriously neglecting her work to
the detriment and prejudice of the service.26 On at least three occasions too, complainant failed to follow
respondent’s instructions with respect to the release of orders or decisions in various cases assigned to him,27 as
well as to properly keep case records.28 The Branch Clerk of Court also found further irregularities in complainant’s
performance of her duties in four more cases and informed respondent about these.29 Complainant, in response to
the Memorandum dated 2 December 2004, admitted that she had a domestic problem that consumed all her time
and effort and which also wore her down due to stress.30

According to respondent, complainant was no longer reporting for work since 9 March 2005 and that they have not
received any notice or information as to the reason for her prolonged absence.31 Because of these prolonged
absences, the Branch Clerk of Court wrote the Leave Division, Office of the Court Administrator on 1 July 2005,
requesting for the immediate dropping of complainant from the roll of employees so that her position can be
declared vacant for the Court to indorse a new employee in her place.32 Another letter was addressed to the Office
of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Las Piñas City requesting said office to hold all checks payable to complainant
representing salaries, benefits and other remunerations.33

On 29 June 2005, Caridad A. Pabello, Officer-in-Charge, Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator,
wrote complainant requiring her to explain her unauthorized absences within five (5) days from receipt of the letter,
favorably endorsed by the Presiding/Executive Judge otherwise they will be constrained to recommend that
complainant be dropped from the rolls.34

Respondent surmises that it was because of this letter that complainant filed the instant administrative complaint
against him, dragging the names of the other personnel of the branch. The malicious prosecution against
respondent was also designed to cover up her misfeasance which had been discovered.35

On 22 February 2007, the Hearing Officer Designate transmitted to this Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, five (5) copies of his Report, recommending the dismissal of the case. In making his
recommendations, the Hearing Officer Designate took note of the following circumstances:36

1. Several months (from February) passed before the complainant filed this case on 27 July 2005.

2. Complainant’s father was then Chief of Police of Las Piñas and his office and respondent’s office were on
the same building. Immediately after she was assaulted, complainant left respondent’s chambers and
proceeded to her father’s. Why then did she not immediately confide in him what had happened to her[?] On
the other hand[,] she rather freely told their branch sheriff whom she met at the canteen.

3. Complainant stated that before she went in the chambers of the respondent when she was called in early
February, she was warned by her office mates not to be too close to respondent as he had earlier kissed
Atty. Tolentino. Complainant had conveniently omitted to mention who were these office mates who had
warned her.

4. The complainant had been a habitual absentee even before the alleged sexual harassment. The
respondent had sought her removal from his court. To this end, his Branch Clerk of Court had written the
Court Administrator, through the leave section, to report complainant’s delinquency and asking that her
name be dropped from the roll of employees.

5. Respondent also took steps to prevent complainant from collecting her salary for the periods she was
absent. To this end, letters were written to the Court Administrator and to the Clerk of Court for the Las
Piñas Regional Trial Court to withhold any check or other benefit that would accrue to the complainant.

6. It was not until these letters were written that the complaint for sexual harassment surfaced.

After reviewing the records of the instant administrative case, we find the above observations and conclusions of the
Hearing Officer Designate to be well-taken as they are adequately substantiated by evidence and are anchored on
applicable law and jurisprudence.

Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire –
it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact
that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances.37 Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule
on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the
Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission
is accepted by the latter. It is committed when "the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee."38

In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present, respondent being the person who
recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by
evidence other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or omissions operate to
cast doubt on her claim.

With no witnesses presented to prove or refute the allegations of the complaint, the case becomes a battle of
complainant’s word against respondent’s.

It should be remembered that the case was referred to a Hearing Officer who is not connected with the Las Piñas
court but with the Office of the Court Administrator affording a more neutral venue for both parties. However, despite
four (4) resettings39 of the hearing, complainant and her counsel failed to appear at the 16 January 2007 scheduled
hearing, thereby denying the Hearing Officer the opportunity to question her and validate her accusation against
respondent. Her dereliction enfeebles her allegations.

With respect to respondent judge, his version of the events is not totally implausible. Crucially, he does not admit to
having committed any positive act that can be construed as an untoward sexual advance. All told, there is no
inherent weakness in the version he proffers.

Most damaging to complainant’s cause is that, based on the records and contemporaneous circumstances, there
appears to be a strong motive on her part to make up charges against respondent judge. It should be remembered
that even before the alleged incident, complainant was already in hot water, being the recipient of at least four
memoranda from the Branch Clerk of Court, all of which called her to task for her poor performance as clerk in
charge of civil cases. In addition, a month before complainant filed the instant case, the Office of the Court
Administrator had directed complainant to explain her unauthorized absences and to include in said explanation a
favorable endorsement from the Presiding/Executive Judge. Complainant was further warned that upon her failure
to comply with these directives will constrain said office to recommend her dropping from the rolls.

The circumstances being as they are, it is easy to engender the belief that the filing of the administrative case
against respondent was a belated, vain, and futile attempt by complainant to cover up for her own misfeasance, i.e.,
prolonged leave of absence without official leave, among others, and a chance to get back at respondent judge for
initiating the administrative inquiry against her which resulted in the withholding of her salaries and benefits as well
as the rise of the

possibility of her being dropped from the rolls.40 Considering that complainant has failed to substantiate her
allegations, failing even to attest to her claims before the investigator appointed by this Court, elementary justice
dictates respondent’s exoneration of the charge.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative case against Judge
Manuel N. Duque, Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Piñas City for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140604            March 6, 2002

DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro
City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment, thusly:

"That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then the City
Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by express provision of
RA 7975, committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his position, did
there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q.
Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was
seeking employment in the office of the accused, namely: by demanding from Ms. Yee that she should,
expose her body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which sexual
favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms. Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the
accused, thus constituting sexual harassment."1

Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence, trial proceeded.

Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her father
accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliet’s father and
petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled up
the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able to help her.

The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and they were
informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into putting
up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine
o’clock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was
a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job.
Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already
had a boyfriend, she said "no." Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford to
be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired
whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He "hypothetically"
asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch her. Petitioner later
offered her the job where she would be the subject of a "research" program. She was requested to be back after
lunch.

Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine
guidance as she felt so "confused." When she got to the office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some
hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a
job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include
"hugging" her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling.
Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car together.
Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and
told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.

While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she
did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said "no." Petitioner told her
to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research.
Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he
reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she exclaimed "hala ka!" and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then
touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her
forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but,
eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered
her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He
begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her
to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.

Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the money he gave her but she did not
give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and instructed her to return it. In the
morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but she was not able to
see him until about one o’clock in the afternoon. She tried to give back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.

A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she attempted to slash her wrist with a
fastener right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some psychological
problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together
with her sister, came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed,
blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliet’s frustration
was due to post trauma stress.

Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28 November 1995 he had a couple of
people who went to see him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a boyhood
friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed her wish to
join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor
really had the power to appoint city personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident
happened, he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City Mayor. On 04 December
1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was
scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.
He submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for sexual harassment, as
well as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were
but forms of political harassment directed at him.

The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999, penned by Mr.
Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under
Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the

crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the
same Act, properly known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party in
 the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and to pay the cost of suit."2

In the instant recourse, it is contended that -

"I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of Republic
Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.

"II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law and presumption of
innocence on account of the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction."3

The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:

"SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

"(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

"(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee."

Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant, a newly
graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her
plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about
accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of
the story:

"x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would be a part of a
research, accused asked complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be seen.
Accused assured her that with her cooperation in the research, she would gain knowledge from it. As
complainant looked upon the accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to
undergo the physical examination. At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview and told the
complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, December 1, 1995.
Complainant returned at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, but did not proceed immediately to the office of the
accused, as she dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a loss on
how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she went back to the office of the
accused. And once inside, accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he
was told that she would only accept a registered nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the
accused when the latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call one more hospital. In her
presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for a
job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in the
Family Planning Program where there would be physical examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two
(2) secretaries to go out of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if she
would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree because the research included hugging.
He then assured her that he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been
subjected to such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to the
research, for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and would gain knowledge
from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a ‘tomboy’, she answered in the negative. He then
instructed her to go with him but he would first play bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical
examination). On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the
research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But accused instructed her to proceed to
Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for people to see them riding in a car together.
She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as instructed. And after a while, a
white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside
the car, he called her attention why she was in a pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were
seated side by side, the accused held her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he
would go home for a while to put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car and
asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house
hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has
varicose veins on her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to
raise it higher, but she protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her pants,
exposing half of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed her legs.
 He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as
instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, ‘hala ka!’ because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused
then held her abdomen, saying, ‘you are like my daughter, ‘Day’! (Visayan word of endearment),’ and let the
back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the traditional way of making the young respect their elders.
He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was
entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she
impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar while silently asking God what was happening to her and
asking the courage to resist accused’s physical advances. After a short while, she asked him if there could
be a right place for physical examination where there would be many doctors. He just exclaimed, ‘so you like
that there are many doctors!’ Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to
kiss her, she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated.
Finally, she informed him that she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that
complainant was entertaining malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would not tell
anybody about what happened. He then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the
examination. She was about to open the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time,
complainant instantly parried his hand with her bag."4

While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason,
nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office
could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an
impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue
liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro
City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary
between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health
nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.

The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner, i.e., that he was at a meeting of the
Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:

"There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence adduced by the
defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by witness
Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.

"First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna Maagad. The Notices to
hold the meeting (Exh. ‘3-A’ and ‘3-B’) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting,
Exh. ‘5’, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. ‘3-A’ and ‘3-B’
certify that the officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita Rozabal.

"Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how was she able to
personally bring the same in court when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted
during her testimony that she retired from the government service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna
Maagad could not still be the custodian of the logbook when she testified.

"And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, ‘Others Present,’ the attendance of those who attended
was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their names. But in the case of
Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and
Dr. Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to attending individuals
inside the conference room."5

Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be
respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal,6 no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now
hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its
unique position of being able to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses
at the stand, an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.7

Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the Sandiganbayan must
be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to
enable an injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the
culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice,8 and it must
always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet
should be recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found
Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress following her
unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or
as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.9

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin
y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877,
particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayan’s award of moral and exemplary damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to
indemnify the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively,
moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144 July 22, 1998

FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-BARRETO, complainants,

vs.

Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148 July 22, 1998

Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant,

vs.

Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City, was charged with "sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in a letter-complaint   dated
1

August 15, 1997, filed by Floride Dawa,   Femenina Lazaro-Barreto   and Noraliz L. Jorgensen.   In view of the
2 3 4

allegations in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 1997, placed respondent judge
under preventive suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a consultant of
the Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report and recommendation.  5

Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,   who assisted the aforementioned complainants, also filed, on
6

September 5, 1997, an affidavit-complaint   against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual harassment under
7

Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high
standard of moral[s] demanded by judicial
ethics . . . ." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998,   we resolved to consolidate her Complaint with the
8

earlier one and to refer it likewise to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation, report and
recommendation.

After conducting a thorough investigation the investigating officer submitted his Report, dated March 16,
1998, which contained the following exhaustive and detailed summary of the testimonies of the witnesses
for both the complainants and the respondent:

1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a stenographic reporter in Branch

52 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of Caloocan City. She affirmed under
oath the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record) she executed August 15,
1997. She related that on August 8, 1997, while on her way to the ladies' toilet, she had seen
respondent, Judge Armando C. De Asa, talking with a man at the backdoor of his chamber.
Out of respect for respondent, being the Acting Executive Judge of the MeTC, she had
nodded to him before entering the ladies comfort room. When she emerged from the same,
she saw that respondent was still at the backdoor of his office although this time he was
alone. Upon seeing Dawa, respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was clean. She
answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she approached him. When she neared
the respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder and led her into his chamber. Once
inside and while she was standing near the edge of respondent's office table, he placed his
arm around her shoulder and suddenly held her jaw and kissed her on the lips.

Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act of the respondent. Before she could
recover herself, respondent once again held her shoulder and chin and kissed her on the
lips. She forcibly pushed the respondent away. Respondent asked her where she lived and
with whom but she hurriedly left respondent's office.

Upon Dawa's return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria Teresa Carpio, who also works in
Branch 52, asked her what the matter was because she noticed that Dawa looked dazed
("tulala"). She first said that nothing was the matter but upon [Carpio's] insistent questioning,
she haltingly related her harrowing experience in respondent's office.

That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina Hernandez-Santiago, the presiding
judge of Branch 52 who, although [she] was then on leave, had gone to her office on the
invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of her coworkers in Branch 52, who was celebrating his
birthday. Judge Santiago, after listening to Dawa's story, advised her to go home and relate
the incident to her parents before deciding to do anything further. Dawa went home but did
not tell her parents who were sickly. Instead, she told her sister.

The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday), Dawa went to see Atty. Mona Lisa
Buencamino, the Clerk of Court, and related her story. She was told that she was not
respondent's first victim but that Noraliz Jorgensen and the Clerk of Court herself had been
objects of respondent's amorous advances.

Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that if Dawa would file a complaint, she
would follow suit.

Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the respondent. Upon the advice of Atty.
Buencamino, the two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a city councilor. The latter advised
them to go to the police and have their complaints entered in the police blotter. Calalang
brought them to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel. The latter called for
a police investigator and SPO2 Rey Domingo came and interviewed them. That same
afternoon, the two complainants went to the police station to have their complaints recorded
in the police blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp. 16-17).

Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino, Noraliz Jorgensen and Femenina
Lazaro-Barreto where they filed the letter complaint (Exhibit "X").

Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She insisted on her story although she
admitted that respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same day.

2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a policeman. She affirmed under oath
her sworn statement (Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the Record). The following is her story:

Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and
detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court, (OCC for short), MeTC, Caloocan City. Among her
duties was the preparation and follow up of the payrolls for RATA and gasoline allowances of
the Metropolitan Trial Judges. Upon the approval of said payrolls, it was her duty to receive
the cash from the cashier and deliver them to the individual judges.

Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she had gone to the
office of respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, who presides Branch 51 of the Court, for the
purpose of securing his signature on the payroll for the judges' allowances. Upon entering
the respondent's office, the latter approached her and suddenly kissed her on the cheek.
Jorgensen immediately left respondent's office after having secured his signature on the
payroll.

Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jorgensen had returned to
the respondent's office to deliver the cash representing his allowances for the months of
January, February and March. Upon entering the respondent's office, the latter immediately
stood up, held her two arms, and suddenly kissed her and licked her left ear, saying "I love
you". Jorgensen was surprised and afraid. She asked respondent, "Judge, what is this", at
the same time endeavoring to free herself from his hold but she could not because his grip
was strong. Respondent then said, "Don't make noise lest we be heard outside". At the same
time, respondent held her jaw and kissed her on the lips. He said, "Open your mouth" as her
continued to hug and kiss her while she tried to free herself. He did not heed her pleas
although she was then trembling with fear.

On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondent's office to secure his signature on the
payroll for June. Again he kissed her before he signed it. After he had signed the payroll,
respondent invited Jorgensen to eat with him at the Max Restaurant on EDSA the next
Saturday. When she asked him why he was inviting her, he answered, "You are no longer a
child, you ought to know".

Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino not to send her again to the
respondent and she told Buencamino of what had happened to her. Atty. Buencamino told
Jorgensen that if she wanted to complain, Buencamino would support her. Jorgensen was
afraid that nothing would come out of any complaint because respondent was a Judge and
powerful.

On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all judges except the respondent,
Jorgensen tried to look for someone who could deliver the money to him but she could find
no one. So she waited until she knew that someone else was inside respondent's office. At
about 3:00 o'clock, while Roderick Corral was inside respondent's office, she entered but
respondent immediately threw to Corral the paper he had brought for his signature, in effect
dismissing him. Corral immediately stepped out leaving Jorgensen alone in respondent's
chambers. When they were alone, respondent stood up and held Jorgensen's jaw kissing her
on her lips at the same time saying "Open your mouth". Jorgensen immediately left
respondent's office in tears.

On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa, a stenographer in Branch 52, was
the latest victim of the respondent. Jorgensen reported her experience to Judge Santiago,
the Executive Judge, and she informed the good judge that she was ready to file a complaint
against respondent in order to obtain justice.

Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who admitted that before August, 1997,
she had gone to respondent's office with Baby Mapue in response to his call and while there
they were shown an anonymous letter (Exhibit 2) which mentioned [the] alleged misconduct
on her part.

3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year-old married woman who is a Court Stenographer II

in Branch 53 of the Caloocan City MeTC. During her direct examination by Atty. Roberto
Abad, she identified her sworn statement (Exhibit E found on pp. 4-5 of the Record).

On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51 because Judge Romanito Amatong of
Branch 53 was on leave. While attending the session at Branch 51, respondent dictated an
"Order" in open court. Her stenographic notes are found in Exhibit "F". She transcribed these
notes (Exhibit F-1) and left them with the Branch Clerk Gina Amatong. When she returned
after lunch, Gina told her there were some corrections so she again typed and submitted
Exhibit "F-2". After typing one more draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final draft (Exhibit F-4)
to respondent's office for his signature. After respondent signed the "Order", he stood up
and while Barreto was looking at the "Order", he held her chin and kissed her. Barreto asked,
"What are you doing?" Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder saying, "Sigue
na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing her. Barreto went out of the office and wiped her lips with her
hand. Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51 saw her. She did not relate the incident to her
husband but he learned about it from the newspapers.

4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-year-old lawyer who is presently the
Clerk of Court of Caloocan City MeTC. Her first appointment was on June 18, 1987 as Branch
Clerk of Court for Branch 51, presided by Judge Filemon Mendoza, now retired. After she
became a lawyer in 1996, she was promoted to her present position as Clerk of Court.

Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants. She first came to know Jorgensen
when she assumed office as Clerk of Court because Jorgensen was detailed to her office.
She had known Barreto since 1992 or 1993 and she personally came to know Dawa when the
latter, accompanied by Jorgensen, approached her on August 12, 1997 and related her
harrowing experience in the office of respondent. Jorgensen herself related similar
experiences. Buencamino advised the two ladies that she would refer that matter to Judge
Santiago, the executive judge, who was then on leave. She reasoned that being a woman and
the executive judge, Judge Santiago would understand the complainant's situation. Dawa
and Jorgensen told Atty. Buencamino that they had already seen Judge Santiago and the
latter had advised them to consult their families before taking any step. They further told the
Clerk of Court that they had consulted their families and were decided to file an
administrative case against respondent judge. At this juncture, sheriff Noli Calalang informed
the complainants Dawa and Jorgensen that his brother, Councilor Gil Calalang, was willing to
help them.

On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, complainants Dawa and
Jorgensen were advised that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his office. Buencamino and the two
complainants proceeded to Calalang's office who, after hearing their stories, advised them to
report the matter to the police. Atty. Calalang was willing to handle their case provided
permission was obtained from Mayor Malonzo. Buencamino and the two complainants were
brought to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel, and there they were
interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked what cases could be filed against the judge
and Atty. Buencamino answered that a case for violation of the new "Anti-Sexual Harassment
Law" or for Acts of Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed against respondent.
At 5:30 o'clock that same afternoon, Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to the Caloocan Police
Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record; pp. 46-47).

On August 14, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, accompanied by her sister, saw Atty.
Buencamino and told her that she, too, was one of respondent's victims. Ms. Barreto decided
to file an administrative charge against respondent and requested David Maniquis, the
deputy clerk of court, to accompany her to the police station to have her complaint recorded.
(Exhibits 7-B and 7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).

Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the three complainants to the Office of the
Court Administrator to file the present case. Upon request of Atty. Perez of the Office of the
Court Administrator, she had administered the oaths of the three complainants and had
signed the original complaint.

5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed as Clerk III, OCC, MeTC, Caloocan
City, took the stand for the complainants to corroborate their testimonies. She declared that
—

She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the bondsmen when they were no longer
needed. In this connection, she had to prepare the vouchers and the breakdown of checks
and she had to go to the office of the respondent in order to secure his signature. In 1997,
she remembers having been requested once by Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the signature
of respondent. After respondent signed the documents she had brought to him, respondent
stood up, went around his table and abruptly kissed her. She immediately left with Emily
Rose Clemente, staff member of Branch 51 and never again went to see respondent alone.
Mapue admitted that she and Jorgensen had been called by respondent in relation to a
complaint of Judge Santiago. Asked by respondent where he had kissed her, she retorted in
the vernacular, "Sa bibig, hindi mo ba natatanda-an?" Made to explain why she had not
complained, she answered that she did not want anyone to know. As a matter of fact, her
husband did not know of the incident even as she was testifying.

6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a casual employee of the City Mayor's office
and detailed to Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following to say:

She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On August 8, 1997, she was rather in good
spirits because it was the birthday of one of their officemates and there was some sort of a
party. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning, Dawa had gone to the women's comfort room.
When Dawa returned a few minutes later, Carpio noticed that she was pale and fidgety. She
kept wringing her hands and was on the verge of tears. Carpio asked her what the matter was
but Dawa answered that nothing was the matter. After some prodding, Carpio asked Dawa to
go with her to the court room and there asked what really the matter was as she was no
longer her gay self. Dawa cried and told the story of how the respondent had twice kissed her
on the lips.

At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52, came to join the
birthday party. She was told by Esper Cabiling, another stenographer in Branch 52, that
Floride Dawa wanted to see her in private. Judge Santiago brought Dawa to her private
chambers.

On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent appeared at Branch 52 and asked if
everything was okay, at which juncture, Dawa, accompanied by Rowena Martin, went to the
courtroom.

7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City MeTC, declared that on August 14,
1997, he had been requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to accompany her to police
headquarters to lodge a complaint against the respondent. Noli Calalang, Joselito Bedana,
Noraliz Jorgensen and Floride Dawa were with them in the police station.

8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in respondent's court, was originally reluctant to

testify. She, however, appeared in the afternoon of February 18, 1998, to give testimony. She
declared that she knew the complaints and that she [was] directly under the respondent who
preside[d] Branch 51. On August 12, 1997, she learned from others that Floride Dawa was
kissed by the respondent. She also learned that Jorgensen had also been kissed by
respondent. She admitted that the respondent has the inclination for imposing fines on
employees who were late or made mistakes. She identified Exhibit "G" as an order where
[sic] requiring her to pay a fine.
 9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge of Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, was the last witness to testify for the complainants. The following is
her story:

She had been sick and had been on leave since March of last year. For this reason, the
respondent, who had been designated Vice Executive Judge, had to act in her stead.

Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-page letter (Exhibit I, I-1 to I-7;
Record, pp. 17 to 24) which she had sent to the Court Administrator. This was submitted as
her direct testimony.

In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had unburdened themselves to her not
only in her capacity as executive judge but because she was a woman. On Friday, August 8,
1997, she had gone to her office because she had been invited to lunch by birthday
celebrants, Danilo Silverio and Esperancilla Kabiling. Upon her arrival, Ms. Kabiling had
approached her and told her that Floride Dawa, one of her stenographers, urgently wanted to
tell her something in confidence. Dawa entered the judge's office "red[-]eyed, red-faced and
with a shiny nose". She kept clasping and unclasping her hands and could not stand still.
She spoke in an incoherent and shaking voice which Judge Santiago could scarcely
understand. She asked Dawa to sit down and compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to
cry, so that her story could hardly be understood. Between sobs, the judge was able to piece
out the fact that Dawa had been embraced and forcibly kissed twice on her lips by the
respondent sometime that morning.

Dawa sought Judge Santiago's help to transfer to another court and she wanted her to talk to
the respondent in order that the incident would not be repeated. Judge Santiago could not
promise Dawa but she advised her to go home as she obviously was not herself. She further
advised Dawa to think the matter over during the weekend and to talk to her parents about it.
Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the next week.

After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz Jorgensen, a casual employee
detailed to the OCC had the same experience. To verify the truth, the judge went to the Office
of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked Noraliz Jorgensen whether it was true that she had
been kissed by the respondent. Noraliz blushed and became red[-]eyed and told the judge of
the several instances that the respondent had forcibly embraced and kissed her on the lips.

Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides Branch 49. She related the
stories of Dawa and Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she knew of anyone from her
branch who may have undergone the same experience. Judge Ortiz asked Jean Marie Lazaro
and the latter told them that there was one instance when she and Zenaida Reyes, another
employee of the court, were seated on a bench near the door of their court and respondent
sat between them and placed his arms on their shoulders and kissed them both on the
cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if Dawa would complain, she too would file
a complaint. Judge Santiago advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and her husband
and to see her again the next week.

In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court stenographer in

Branch 53, accompanied by her sister, Jean Marie, came to see Judge Santiago. Femenina
confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too, had been kissed and embraced by the respondent
twice. In between sobs and with her handkerchief almost torn to shreds by her shaking
hands, she related how she had harbored her shame in silence and her guilt at not being able
to tell her husband.

That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her own story to Judge Santiago
— how she was forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by the respondent.

Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell judge Santiago about the instances that the
respondent had kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought the assistance of Judge
Santiago to transfer to another branch to escape the respondent.  9

The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondent's witnesses in this wise:

1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff in respondent's branch. He affirmed
the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-A; Record, pp. 56-57). He declared that
he had been with the MeTC, Caloocan City, since 1980. In 1995, he was detailed to Branch 51
and later became its permanent sheriff.

In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the respondent was an official who was faithful
to his job. He observed office hours religiously. He was friendly and helpful to his personnel
and was very approachable whenever they needed anything. The workers in his branch were
free to enter his office, it being always open. It [was] not soundproof such that if anything
improper happened inside, it could be heard outside.

Apostol further declared that since the respondent assumed office as judge, he had not
heard of him being guilty of any improper conduct. On the other hand, he was the object of
praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a fiscal.

Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that the respondent had been charged
administratively by Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz Jorgensen) and Flor (Floride
Dawa) because he had not seen the respondent do anything indelicate to the three women.
Whenever Nina came to Branch 51 to see the respondent, she would greet him with a "Hello
Judge, I am sexy now". On the other hand, whenever Noraliz brought in documents for
respondent's signature, she was always smiling going in and coming out of respondent's
office. Apostol declared that he had seen Floride Dawa go to respondents' office only once
and she was in company with other employees of Branch 52.

On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondent's office ha[d] a back door and the
same [was] locked with a main lock and two barrel bolts. It was his daily chore to open this
back door from the inside by unlocking the barrel bolts. After he had done this he would go
down to the street to await the arrival of the respondent.

2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondent's second witness. She is a court
stenographer in Branch 51 presided by respondent. She had been with the MeTC since
January 2, 1969. She affirmed the sworn statement consisting of two pages (Exhibits 10 and
10-A) which she had jointly executed with Lina V. Cara, a clerk in the same branch who had
been in the service for 17 years.

She said that during the almost five years that she had been under the respondent, no one
had charged him administratively. She described him as friendly and helpful to those working
under him. His office was always open to his subordinates. The same is not sound proof
such that if anything untoward happened inside or [if there was] any loud conversation [it]
would be noticed by those in the staff room.

During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge de Asa had been charged [with]
sexual harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she had not seen the respondent do
anything indecent to these three women. Everytime Nina saw the judge, she would smilingly
greet him with such remarks as "Hi, Judge" or sometimes "Hello, I'm sexy now".

She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she [went] to the Office of the Clerk
of Court to fetch Fe Apostol. She [was] told by the employees thereat about the incident. She
said that she [went] up to Branch 51 [o]n the third floor to ask her co-workers whether they
had heard the news that the respondent had kissed someone. Those who were still in replied
that they had not.

Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch 51 to have papers signed by
respondent and sometimes she came to cut the hair of certain employees, including the
respondent himself. On the other hand, she had seen Dawa only once when she came with
her co-employees at Branch 52 to have their daily time records signed.

3. Mario Muncal, respondent's third witness is 47 years old and single. He affirmed the
contents of his sworn statement (Exhibit 11; Record p. 53).

Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the respondent about a job in the
MeTC. When he entered respondent's office, Atty. Buencamino was with him. De Asa
introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling her about his application for a job in the court. Atty.
Buencamino told Muncal to wait for her at her office. When Muncal saw Buencamino, the
latter told him that he would have to undergo an observation period of one to two weeks. She
further told him that although he had been recommended by respondent, she would be his
direct superior and he was admonished not to relate anywhere else whatever he heard or saw
in her office.

Muncal was "taken aback" by this admonition knowing that respondent, as executive judge,
was her superior and was entitled to know everything that happened in the clerk of court's
office. He left after Buencamino had told him to return on August 11 to begin his observation
period. He returned to the respondent to thank him for his assistance.

Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another candidate for the vacant position so that
he had second thoughts about returning to her. However, on August 16,1997, after reading in
the papers that respondent was being charged with sexual harassment upon the instigation
of Atty. Buencamino, he decided to see respondent and relate to him what had happened on
August 11, 1997.

4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand in the afternoon of February 24,
1998. He affirmed his nine-page answer to the present charges (Exhibit "12"; Record, pp. 37-
45).

Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door to his private office, the same [was]
locked from the inside with two barrel bolts besides a main lock. Every day, he would use
this door for entering his office as well as going out of it in order to avoid "ambush talks"
with people. It was the duty of Arnel Apostol to draw the barrel bolts before respondent
arrived at his office so that when he came, he could open the main lock with his key and have
no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever Apostol was absent, it was Fernandez who
did the opening for respondent.

In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed that all these charges "were
obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated". He accused the Clerk of Court, Atty. Mona
Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this cabal" and that aside from her there were
"other people behind the conspiracy" who ha[d] yet to be uncovered.

Respondent further claimed that "the complaints were set up, hatched and designed, to
destabilize and destroy the good image of the undersigned created in the minds of party
litigants, government, local as well as private concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known to
be strict [in] fining lawyers, litigants, court personnel and even himself, for unsatisfactory
and unexpected justifications for violations of court rules and procedures, he had gained
respect and admiration for his reasonable, well[-]balance[d], compassionate and well[-]meant
application of the rule of law".

As a possible reason for the animosity of Atty. Buencamino toward him, the respondent
stated in his Answer, the following:

Accordingly, as acting executive judge, work concerns and attitudes, were

honed up if not altogether dramatically changed. Misconceptions have been
straightened up. It was emphasized that the Office of the Clerk of Court [was]
not an independent body. It must be the secretariat or unit that should serve
and cater not only to its own concern, but that of all the administrative as well
as functional requirements of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, thereat. Not
because, it is called the Office of the Clerk of Court, would mean that the clerk
of court installed, is a co-equal of the judges thereat. It was made clear that it
was for this reason why an Executive Judge/Vice Executive Judge is
designated, to fill up this impasse. Further, as clerk of court, functionally, such
a position is under the direct control and supervision of all judges thereat.
Accordingly, except those as provided for under the rules and applicable
circulars, when a clerk of court can act independently, any action, movement,
process and exercise, taken, with national, local as well as private agencies
must bear the imprimatur of the Executive Judge. This directive apparently
was not observed. Either it was misunderstood, taken lightly, seriously
resisted or even disregarded. But its non-observance cannot be excused or
countenanced.

Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court were scheduled and designed to
update and enhance their working knowledge on assigned task[s]. Important
concerns and problems of their offices [were] supposed to be taken up.

Hours of work were strictly implemented, loitering/roaming around during

office hours was prohibited, time records of the Clerk of Court, Clerks of Court
of branches including its [sic] personnel, with presiding judges on leave or
vacant, must after, its being authenticated, must [sic] be signed by the
Executive Judge.

Reports of immoral acts and loose moral values were received, specifically in
the office of the clerk of court. Ms. Buencamino was apprised and directed to
closely monitor such problem. Before the staging of this hatch-up, the
undersigned received reports of its unabated occurrences. However, either
these were treated with tolerance or viewed with blind eyes.

Most importantly, for purposes of effective control, an installation of an office

for the Executive Judge was conceived. This project was apparently disliked. It
 was about the last week of July or first week of August, 1997, that Judge
Santiago informed the undersigned, that we ha[d] to implement such a
scheme. The plan was to get the room of Atty. Buencamino, to house the
Executive Judge['s] office, as its perimeter, appeared easily organizable with
least renovation and expense, for a conference room and a library, folded into
one. Buencamino, in turn, would take the room of David Maniquis, deputy clerk
of court, who should occupy the executive table used by the former, located
outside, along with OCC personnel for proper monitoring and active control of
the affairs in the office

As related to me by Judge Santiago, she told Mona Lisa about it and

insinuated to her, to follow first before talking with me, have the room vacated,
place pertinent documents/papers, to be signed and attended to, locked [sic]
it, if the Executive Judge, [was] not around. Atty. Buencamino approached me
in disgust, proposing an alternative. She submitted a plan for renovation, as
she insisted in maintaining her present location. She suggested to move the
Executive Judge[s] office in the middle, the end part, housing the office of
Maniquis, [to] be the one to be converted as conference room and library. For
her to occupy David Maniquis['] office was "bad punsoy" (feng shui). However,
Judge Santiago's directive was firm. Mona Lisa, must have to comply first. The
matter of renovation, to be further studied. The suggested sketch plan with
scribblings from Judge Delfina Santiago dated August 6, 1997, is likewise
hereto attached as annex "7". Mrs. Buencamino vacated her office, refused
David Maniquis' room and stayed [at] her table outside with the OCC's
personnel.

Also during the occasion, as there was a vacancy for the position of a sheriff in
the said office, the undersigned recommended one Mario Muncal, Jr. y de
Castro, telling Ms. Buencamino that for the more than four (4) years that he
stayed in the office, he was not given the privilege of appointing one of his
own choice. She retorted to try Muncal as an understudy for about one (1) to
two (2) weeks. The undersigned acceded. Mr. Muncal followed Ms.
Buencamino to her office where he was interviewed, advised and instructed by
the latter. He came back before he left and informed me of the developments
but he never showed up at the designated time. He reappeared after reading
the accounts in the newspapers about the complaints lodged against me, with
revealing statements why he gave a second thought [about] returning or not.
His affidavit is attached as Annex "8" (pp. 3-5, Exhibit 12; pp. 39-41 of the
Record). (Emphasis supplied).

Considering the above, respondent believed that "Ms. Mona Lisa Buencamino, took all my
actions, with disdain, suspicion, more so, with resistance. On her face, she regretted the fact
of my designation as Acting Executive Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would
want to maintain her "madrina" and "godmother" (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.) image not only
among the employees but also among the judges as well. Thus, these pathos, comics." (p.5,
Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).

On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the story of Floride Dawa. He stated that
on August 8, 1997, he had come to work between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
Neither Apostol nor Fernandez met him. He found that his back door was still closed and
could not be opened with his key. For this reason he had to enter through his courtroom. He
said he did not see Floride Dawa near the comfort room that morning. He saw her at 11:45
when he made his rounds as executive judge.

The above testimony is also in respondent's Exhibit "12" where he stated that:

The Floride Dawa story, that she was seen by the undersigned after coming
from the public toilet located along the third floor hallway obliquely facing the
backdoor exit of the undersigned's chamber, asking her whether said comfort
room was cleaned, to which she retorted in the negative, thereafter calling her
up, placing the judge's arm around her shoulders, led her to his room and
twice kissed her, to which she reportedly resisted. Afterwards, conversing with
him, answering questions, as the latter sat comfortably at his seat, as though
nothing had transpired. This is quite indeed a long process to lend credence to
such prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the backdoor of the undersigned's
office was not shown to have been closed on the date the alleged sham had
happened, a verification of the site where the reported incident took place
would show that the backdoor of the undersigned's office leads to a wide
public hallway fronting directly the stairs servicing the second and third
floor[s] of said building, where people come and go. The circumstances of
 persons, time and place cannot fit under such a frame set. (pp. 6-7, Exhibit 12;
pp. 42-43 of the Record).

As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he expressed surprise that Buencamino

believed her story. The following is what he said:

["]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz L. Jorgensen, a casual

employee, . . . detailed at the office of the Clerk of Court, and believed her
story. Ms. Jorgensen is reportedly separated from her husband. Her credibility
throughout the court's environs appears highly questionable, especially
among her staff in the Office of the Clerk of Court. In fact, an unsigned letter
was sent not only to the undersigned but also with Judge Santiago, divulging,
her unchaste relationship with a co-employee, also assigned in the office of
the Clerk of Court. . . . Ms. Buencamino, as her immediate superior, was
advised, to closely monitor on [sic] this. Despite thereof [sic], the illicit
relationship appeared to have continued. Nonetheless, she was convinced by
Buencamino to execute and swear to a statement, which [was] maliciously and
boldly concocted. . . . . Be that as it may, the story of "victim" Noraliz borders
the realm of illusion and fiction. In no less than three (3) occasions, the dates
of which, to lend credibility, were fixed to coincide when the allowances were
allegedly released and given to the respective judges, she claimed to have
been licked at her ear, her mouth forced open, and kissed by the undersigned.
If one was indeed a victim of such sexual harassment or lascivious conduct,
why would she, after the first incident (January 31, 1997) return for the second
(May 26, 1997) and third time (August 4, 1997) and allow herself to suffer the
same fate[?] This indeed, is preposterous. It does not have the rings of truth to
it. Her lame excuse, that no one could do her assigned chore, does not have
any legal as well as factual leg to lean on. As far as the undersigned can
remember, there was Roderick Corral (Odi) who can do it. One Baby Mapue
had occasion to do the same chore. Even others in the OCC can perform such
feat. Such signing is not the exclusive affair of Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Even the
August 4, 1977 incident, would not dissuade [sic] a person in her right mind,
that she will still allow herself to be left behind by a co-employee (Roderick
Corral) whom she saw ahead of her inside the judge's office and be subjected
to the same alleged indignant act. This is plainly ABSURD." (pp. 5-6, Exhibit 12,
pp. 41-42 of the Record).

Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said the following:

["]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto account appear[s] to be a mere patch

up. Under the principle that in numbers there is strength, they blended another
scenario consistently claiming that they were kissed, their mouths forcibly
opened. In Barreto's version, she claimed that she went to the office of the
undersigned to have an order signed as their Presiding Judge was then, on
leave. Immediately thereafter, the judge stood up, approached her and kissed
her. This was allegedly repeated[,] she reportedly resisted. Then she left.

The size and arrangement of the undersigned's chamber, would rule out such
hallucination. The undersigned ha[s] developed the attitude of transparency, in
his dealings with the public and his personnel. His room [is] always open.
Everybody come[s] and go[es]. His staff can go inside, any time they wish,
without even knocking at his door, [get] cold water and even [use] his private
comfort room. How then could this be possible.

In all these instances, nothing unusual was seen or heard, much less
substantiated, except the self serving narrations of the alleged offended
parties themselves. If there was really any commotion or resistance that
occurred, the same could not escape the ears of my personnel, whose tables
are constrictedly [sic] placed and immediately outside. In fact, even the dates
alluded to, were even tailored to fit and coincide, just to give credence, to the
presence of the complainants, in the alleged places of incident.["] (p. 7, Exhibit
12; p. 43, Record).10

After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo arrived at a
conclusion, the salient portions of which are reproduced below:

1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed the acts
he is charged with. The testimonies of the three complainants were not in any manner
emasculated by the lengthy and thorough cross examination personally conducted by the
respondent. Incidentally, the undersigned had to recess the investigation several times to
 give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably broke down in tears as
they were required to relate the repeated violations of their persons and their honors by
respondent.

Complainants' declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive testimony of

Judge Santiago who had the opportunity of hearing Dawa's story soon after it had occurred
and the uninhibited retelling by the other complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord,
wrote a verified letter to the Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7; Record; pp. 17-24),
wherein she narrated all that she knew of the different incident. . . . . 11

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their stories. It
is highly improbable that the three complainants would perjure themselves only to
accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have had some real or imagined resentment
against respondent. Moreover, the reason given by respondent for the ill will that Atty.
Buencamino felt against him is too superficial to genuinely cause such malevolence,
specially because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty. Buencamino
so that her office could be used by the executive judge.  12

x x x           x x x          x x x

The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to perform their
duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition against loitering and idleness in the
premises of the court is not enough to motivate [the] three women into exposing themselves
to ridicule and chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories
that would also be derogatory to them.

Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondent's calling her attention to an
anonymous letter which mentioned her indiscretions with another employees of the OCC
who was also married. We are not convinced that this would move her into fabricating a story
as shocking as the one she related under oath. . . . .  13

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged the young Floride
Dawa to be fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa gave him, when she saw him as she
was about to enter the comfort room, was an invitation, he took advantage of the young
maiden and forced himself on her. Perhaps because Dawa was naive and innocent, she
panicked and became near hysterical prompting Carpio to question her. This broke the dam,
so to speak. When it became known that Floride Dawa was going to file a case against
respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also wanting to file charges against
respondent for his many indiscretions. How many more remain who prefer to suffer their
humiliation in silence, we can only speculate. 14

3. Respondent's denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive assertions of
complainants and their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither were the negative observations
of respondent's witnesses sufficient to belie the complainants' declarations. All his witnesses
could attest to was that they had not seen respondent do anything obscene to the
complainants nor to others. The fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof that
they did not occur specially so because they were all done in the privacy of respondent's
chambers.  15

x x x           x x x          x x x

PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs. Rivera,
Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend that respondent be
dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.  16

The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and found the findings, conclusion
and recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately substantiated by the evidence presented
by the parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, with no need to rehash the
reprehensible indiscretions of the respondent judge, we adopt the conclusion and recommendation of the
investigating justice.

The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and
the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess.   More than simply projecting an image of probity, a judge must
17

not only appear to be a "good judge"; he must also appear to be a "good person."   It is towards this
18

sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates the following:

CANON 1

A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.

RULE 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and

independence.

x x x           x x x          x x x

CANON 2

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPRORIETY IN ALL

ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting
standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his
official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore
paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be
free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.   For this reason, "[t]he Code dictates
19

that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times."   This mandate has special import for municipal and metropolitan trial court judges, like herein
20

respondent, since they are the "front-liners" of the judiciary who serve more people at the "grass-roots"
level of society. 
21

In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in subjecting herein
complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only
do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they
stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and
outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they
necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for theemployee[s]."   Let it be
22

remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere
employees of the court of which he is an officer.

In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official responsibility over the
complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court
concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct
warrants his removal from office.   In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to iterate our
23

pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:

Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a

manner unbecoming of a judge as a model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the
people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in
general.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge.
He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was
the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.  24

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-03-1697             October 1, 2003

JOCELYN S. PAISTE, complainant,
vs.
APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR., Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tayug-San Nicolas, Pangasinan,
respondent.

x---------------------------------x

A.M. No. P-03-1699             October 1, 2003

JOANNE S. GOLTIAO, complainant,
vs.
APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR., Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tayug-San Nicolas,
Pangasinan, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated administrative cases arose from two different complaints filed against respondent Aproniano V.
Mamenta, Jr., Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayug-San Nicolas, Pangasinan. In an affidavit-
complaint filed with the Office of the Chief Justice, dated August 10, 2001, complainant Joanne S. Goltiao charged
1 

him with gambling and drinking liquor during office hours, sexual harassment, arrogance and acts unbecoming of a
government official. In another affidavit-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, dated August 28,
2 

2001, the other complainant Jocelyn C. Paiste charged him with conduct unbecoming of a public officer and with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for his failure to issue official receipt.
3 

After respondent denied the accusations against him in separate letters, we resolved to refer both cases to Hon.
4  5 

Ulysses Butuyan, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan for investigation, report and
recommendation. Separate investigations of the complaints were conducted.
6 

In A.M. No. P-03-1699 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1202-P), evidence shows that complainant Goltiao is a
Stenographer I of the MCTC of Tayug-San Nicolas since 1997. She testified that on August 7, 2000, at about 3:00
7 

p.m., a representative from the Plaridel Insurance Co. came to their office seeking clearance. She immediately
prepared the necessary form and, together with the representative, went to see respondent in the courtroom to
obtain his signature. When she asked him to sign the document, respondent, who was at that time playing tong-
its (a card game) at the lawyers’ table with unnamed individuals, got angry and threw his cards. He shouted at her:
"Why did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court?" She responded that such
was not her intention and reminded him of his requirement that he must first see the applicants before he sign their
clearance. He did not sign the clearance, sent then out and shouted "Bullshit ka!" at her thrice. They all then went
out of the courtroom and proceeded back to the staff room. She went to her table and buried her face in her hands,
crying. Respondent followed her and continued uttering unsavory remarks: "Bullshit ka! Vulva of your mother! Why
did you take the client there and even raised your voice? (Bullshit ka! Okinnam nga babai! Apay ta innalam dagita
kliyente idiay sanak to rinayawan!)" She replied that her parents taught them not to answer back at older people. He
still shouted: "Vulva of your mother! I wish you will die now! Whom are you bragging of? We will try each other.
(Okinnam nga babai! Matay ka koma itattan! Apay sinno aya ti paglaslastog mo? Sige, agpipinnadas tayo.)"
Thereafter, he asked the utility aide to buy him four bottles of beer.

Goltiao declared that her working relationship with the respondent is "sometimes good and sometimes bad because
of his ill temper." He easily gets mad at her even for small, trivial mistakes. This situation started, according to her,
8 

when she told him to stop courting and sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. She related an
incident which happened early one morning when he asked her to see him inside the judge’s chamber. At that time,
the designated judge was not around. Once inside, she was told to sit in one of the chairs in front of the judge’s
table. The respondent, who was sitting at the judge’s chair, then extended his hand to her, as if he wanted to shake
her hands. She reciprocated by extending her hands and jokingly put his hands on her forehead (agmanmano). She
afterwards tried to free her hands off his but he would no let her. Instead, he told her, "Wait for a while, I would just
like to tell you something. I love you, is that okay? Tell me that you love me too. No strings attached." She retorted,
"As if you are my father." Spurned, he got mad. This kind of incident happened at least ten more times.

Furthermore, respondent sent her love notes. He wrote his love messages on pieces of paper in front of her and
handed them to her. She knew that they were intended for her as there was nobody else present when he gave the
9 

notes to her. He would also call her at her mother’s house. She did not respond affirmatively to his display of
affection as both of them are married. Finally, she explained that she filed a complaint against him only on August
10, 2001 because of the August 7, 2001 incident, when she got fed up at the way he treated her.

Marilyn de Leon, also a court stenographer of MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas, corroborated the testimony of
Goltiao. She stated that she witnessed the incident on August 7, 2001, when respondent became angry at Goltiao
10 

after the latter went to ask for his signature while he was playing tong-its. She heard respondent shout foul words at
Goltiao. She added that respondent gets mad at everyone at the office on trivial matter. She, too, received love
notes from the respondent.

Court stenographer Glenda C. Ramirez also corroborated the testimony of Goltiao. She declared that she
11 

witnessed the incident on August 7, 2001 at their office. She observed that respondent was fuming mad at Goltiao,
when the latter asked him to sign a clearance form. She heard respondent shout at Goltiao inside the courtroom and
at the staff room. Respondent got mad when Goltiao allowed the representatives of the insurance company to enter
the courtroom, where he was playing tong-its. She related that she also received love notes from him. One time,
after respondent signed her travel order she noticed the following message written on the order: "7:30 in the
evening, Jollibee." She did not go out with him. She chose him as a principal sponsor on her wedding in the hope
that he would treat her like his own child and that he would stop sending notes to her. This did not happen even as
respondent continued to easily get mad at her for simple lapses.

Renato Rombawa, a utility worker at the court, saw the incident on August 7, 2001, when respondent got mad at
Goltiao inside the courtroom. He did not know why he became furious. At the time of the incident, respondent was
12 

playing tong-its.

Estifanio Acosta, Clerk III at the MCTC, stated that he likewise saw respondent got mad when Goltiao tried to obtain
his signature for a clearance form. Respondent, he recalled, was at that time playing tong-its. He knew that
13 

respondent gives love notes to Goltiao and Glenda Ramirez, as the two revealed this secret to him.

Lastly, David Kagaoan testified that at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of August 7, 2001, somebody came to get
a clearance from the court. The clearance form was prepared by Goltiao who went to see the respondent at the
14 

courtroom. He then heard shouts of "vulva of your mother, get out of here!" from the room. He thought it came from
the respondent, who was then playing tong-its. Rombawa, the utility worker, went inside the courtroom and brought
the sobbing Goltiao out. He stated that complainant showed him some of the love notes respondent gave her. He
knows it came from respondent as he is familiar with his signature.

Respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted shouting at Goltiao because she, too, shouted at him.
15 

He declared that the complaint was intended to harass him and put him into shame and to remove him from office.
He said that Goltiao and her witnesses resent his strictness and they want to continue with their bad ways in the
office. Goltiao, Ramirez and de Leon come to office late but Goltiao’s daily time record does not reflect her
tardiness. She sells stenographic notes without remitting a single centavo to the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
Witness Rombawa does not work in the office from 2:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Witness Acosta is a
habitual absentee, reports at 10:00 o’clock and leaves after only an hour. He then returns at 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon. He is hired by one Bobby Go as a driver. Witness Kagaoan is a habitual latecomer as he attends to his
agricultural business first before going to the court. He adds that witnesses Rombawa, Acosta and Kagaoan all
play tong-its either at the session hall of the court or the first floor of the building.

On rebuttal, complainant Goltiao revealed that respondent invited her several times for a date at Jollibee, instructing
her not to tell her husband about it. Respondent countered that every time he invites her, it was with de Leon,
16 

Ramirez and other court personnel. 17

In A.M. No. P-03-1697 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1196-P), complainant Paiste is the owner of JCP72 Insurance
Agency, and as its proprietor, has transactions with the MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas. She testified that on April 3,
18 

2001 at about 2:00 p.m. she went to the court, together with a client, to post bail. When they arrived, they could not
find the respondent. An employee named Marilyn accompanied then to one of the rooms at the hall of justice where
the respondent was holding game cards and playing tong-its with some people. Marilyn called respondent’s
attention telling him that somebody wants to post bail. Respondent retorted, "You just go ahead upstairs. Why, could
you not wait?" They went ahead and respondent followed fifteen minutes after. She noticed that he was mad. They
told him they want to post bail and he asked for the records of the case. After examining the records, he slammed it
and said, "You go to Rosales! That is not our work!" He also became angry when they followed him.
On April 20, 2001, Paiste, an officemate and a client again went to the MCTC in Tayug-San Nicolas to post bail in
connection with Criminal Case No. 7461. The respondent instructed them to go to the house of Judge Pastor. They
went there as told but the judge rejected their papers. They returned the next day, a Saturday, after completing their
documents. They came from the court where they met respondent, who accompanied them to the judge’s house.
The judge approved the surety bond. Later, they handed three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) to the respondent, two
19 

thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) of which was for the JDF. They gave him the remaining six hundred
pesos (P600.00) after he asked them, "Paano naman yung sa akin?" They understood that to mean that he was
expecting some form of compensation as he accompanied them outside the office on a non-working day. They then
demanded an official receipt for the two thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) they paid him corresponding to
the amount of the JDF. He told them to go to the court and get it the following Monday. That Monday, she sent one
of her staff to get the receipt, but the latter reported to her that he did not issue one. She added that this is not the
only time that he failed to issue her a receipt. In other cases, he also neglected to do so even after she has paid the
mandatory JDF fees.

A staff member of the MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas, Estifanio Acosta, verified the records of Criminal Case No. 7461
and stated that no official receipt appears on file although the personal bail bonds issued by the JCP72 Insurance
Agency, bearing the date April 21, 2001, in favor of the several accused in the case were approved by the acting
presiding judge of the court.20

For his part, respondent merely denied the foregoing allegations in open court and waived presentation of
evidence. 21

After investigation, the investigating judge rendered a Consolidated Report and Recommendation finding
22 

respondent guilty of serious misconduct and accordingly proposed that he be sternly reprimanded and fined ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), thus:

Nonetheless, on the basis of the evidence adduced, barely refuted by the respondent, the undersigned finds him
guilty of serious misconduct in office, consisting of abundantly substantiated offenses thus:

1. Making undue advances through love notes to female subordinates;

2. Indulging in card games during office hours;

3. Using abusive language in dealing with subordinates as well as with third persons seeking his services as
clerk of court; and

4. Receiving payments for court fees without promptly issuing the corresponding receipts therefore.

WHEREFORE, all of the foregoing premises and circumstances considered, the undersigned hereby respectfully
recommends that respondent be sternly reprimanded, and fined in the amount of P10,000.00, for serious
misconduct. 23

The report was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). After evaluating the report and the records,
the OCA proposed that a stiffer penalty must be imposed on respondent. On the basis of Sections 52, 54 and 55 of
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 of the Civil Service Commission, it recommended that the two
24 

complaints be consolidated and docketed as a regular administrative case and that respondent be "SUSPENDED
for a period of one (1) year having been found Guilty of various offenses including the (sic) Grave Offenses and
disgraceful and immoral conduct." 25

A painstaking examination of the records of the cases convinces us that the respondent is guilty of the offenses
charged against him.

The evidence in A.M. No. P-03-1699 adequately establishes that he was guilty of gambling, using abusive language
and sexually harassing his female subordinates. We find credible the categorical and straightforward testimonies of
complainant Goltiao and her witnesses. Their frank and candid testimonies, unshaken by cross-examination and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their material points, deserve our full faith and belief. 26

In contrast, we are not persuaded by the denial put forward by the respondent. The purported motive he imputes
against complainant and her witnesses for filing this case is not worthy of attention. He asserts that they just want
him removed so they can continue with their "bad ways in the office." It strikes us strange that he allowed these bad
ways for a long time without taking any measures or reporting them to the OCA.

Time and again, we have emphasized that court officers, circumscribed with heavy responsibility, must be the
paragon of propriety and good behavior. This is especially true for a clerk of court like the respondent. As a ranking
27 

officer of the court, it is incumbent upon him to set an example to his co-employees as to how they should conduct
themselves in office; to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the civil service and the judiciary; and to provide then with a healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat
each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end public interest will be benefited. 28
Respondent failed to measure up to these standards. His use of offensive language towards complainant Goltiao
reflects his impoliteness and lack of decorum. He shouted profanity at her, verbally abused her and even
disrespected her mother. He did this in the presence of so many employees and clients of the court. Worse, there
was no reason for him to unleash to her a fury of this kind. She was merely asking him to sign a clearance form and
to examine the applicant pursuant to his specific instruction that he should first see the applicant for the clearance
before he sign the form. In fine, she was just doing her job. The truth is, he got mad at her out of his fear that the
client she brought along might report him to this court when they caught him in flagrante delicto gambling.

Similarly objectionable is respondent’s penchant for playing tong-its (a card game) and gambling with other
employees of the court. Gambling is illegal and is absolutely forbidden at court premises during office hours. It
29 

generates unwholesome consequences on the gambler as it diverts his attention from the more important
responsibilities of his job. Respondent himself was very much aware of this prohibition and this is exactly the
30 

reason why he castigated the complainant for approaching him while he was playing cards, thus: "Why did you bring
then with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court?" 31

Worse, respondent was playing cards and gambling during office hours at the session hall of the courtroom, which is
hardly the place for such undesirable activities. A courtroom is generally looked upon by people with high respect
and regarded as a sacred place where witnesses testify under oath, where conflicts are resolved, rights adjudicated,
and justice solemnly dispensed. Making it a game room and a casino area diminishes its sanctity and dignity.
32  33

The undue advances respondent made to complainant Goltiao betrays his twisted sense of propriety. Many times,
he declared his feelings for her and handed her love notes. He would then beseech her to say the same things to
him. He proposed to have dinner dates with her at Jollibee. There were times that he cornered her at the judge’s
chamber and unnecessarily held her hand. While professing one’s amorous intention is not something that usually
causes a hullabaloo, it becomes indecent and improper in this case considering he is complainant Goltiao’s superior
and both of them are married. His dissoluteness told itself when he went to the extent of calling her at her mother’s
house and persuading her not to tell her husband about these incidents.

It appears too that the complainant was not the exclusive object of respondent’s advances. Witnesses Marilyn de
Leon and Glenda Ramirez testified that they also received love notes and invitations for dinner from him. Like a
hunter out on the prowl, he victimized other female workers unabashedly professing his alleged feelings for them in
utter disregard of the fact that they were his subordinates, they were married and they were young enough to be his
daughters. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, he preyed on them as he took
advantage of his superior position. 34

Under the circumstances, we find respondent guilty of sexual harassment. His severely outrageous acts, which are
an affront to women, constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and
offensive working environment for his female subordinates. He abused the power and authority he exercises over
35 

them, which is the gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about
36 

a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire – it is about power being exercised by a superior
over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his
37 

amorous advances. 38

There is likewise sufficient evidence in A.M. No. P-03-1697 to hold respondent administratively liable for his failure
to issue official receipt after receiving court fees and for discourtesy. The testimony of complainant Paiste is worthy
of belief. We find her categorical and consistent declarations credible, especially when viewed in the light of the fact
that no ill-motive on her part was established. Against her positive testimony, supported by documentary evidence
39 

based on official court records, the mere uncorroborated denial of the respondent deserves scant considerations. 40

The evidence shows that on April 21, 2001, complainant Paiste gave to the respondent the amount of two thousand
four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) as bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 7461. When she asked for an
official receipt, he told her to get it the following Monday at the court. She sent an office representative that Monday
as told but respondent did not issue any receipt. Further verification from the records of Criminal Case No. 7461
reveals that no copy of the official receipt appears on file indicating that no receipt was ever issued to complainant
Paiste.

Undoubtedly, respondent should have issued an official receipt when he received the sum of money from
complainant Paiste. His failure to do so is a violation of the National Accounting and Auditing Manual which
mandates that no payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an
official receipt, in acknowledgment thereof. It bears emphasis that there is no valid reason for his non-issuance of a
41 

receipt. Even if he argues that he could not issue an official receipt to the complainant Paiste as the transaction
transpired on a Saturday and outside court premises, still, his failure to issue a receipt the following Monday is
totally unjustified.

We also find the rude and boorish manner respondent treated complainant Paiste and her client on April 3, 2001
uncalled for. His demeanor bordered on arrogance. He made them wait for fifteen minutes before he attended to
their concern as they found him playing cards and gambling. He was very irritable the whole time he was talking to
them. After he examined the record, he slammed it an told them to go to the court at Rosales. He then got annoyed
when they followed him. To be sure, this is no way to treat court users.
High strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government, especially in the judiciary, where the personnel
are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence. They are expected to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the people. Such conduct is
42  43 

exacted from them so that they will earn and keep society’s high regard for and confidence in the judicial
service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely corrodes respect for the courts. It is the imperative and
44 

sacred duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to uphold the
court’s good name and standing as true temples of justice. 45

We do not agree with both the investigating judge and the OCA when they imposed a single penalty on the
respondent for two cases. Although consolidated, the two cases are distinct and each one contains different
charges. Respondent, as a consequence, must be separately held liable and penalized for the charges in each
case.

This brings us to the individual penalties which must be imposed on the respondent for each case. In A.M. No. P-03-
1699, we hold that the gross discourtesy, gambling and sexual harassment he committed constituted serious
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service which warrant his dismissal from office. He has
been shown to lack the requisite professional and moral qualifications to continue as an employee in the judiciary. In
A.M. No. P-03-1697, his failure to issue a receipt amounted to gross neglect of duty while his grossly discourteous
behavior is conduct unbecoming of a public officer. For this reason, we impose on him a suspension of one (1)
month.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, RESPONDENT Aproniano V. Mamenta, Jr. is found Guilty of gross discourtesy, gambling,
and sexual harassment in A.M. No. P-03-1699 and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.

He is likewise found Guilty of gross discourtesy and failure to issue an official receipt in A.M. No. P-03-1697 and is
meted the penalty of suspension for a period of One (1) Month. Considering, however, that we already ordered his
dismissal in A.M. No. P-03-1699, his suspension is moot.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128777               October 7, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
ERNESTO LARIN y BONDAD, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Republic Act. No. 7610 penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses. It was enacted in consonance with the
policy of the State to "provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse." The Court thus applies this law
to the present case and grants the victim the full vindication and protection that RA 7610 accords to this helpless
sector of society.

Statement of the Case

( This portion is not available to protect the interest of the parties. )

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of moral
damages is reduced to P50,000. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.