GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON

DEROGANT

PSDA
of
Interpretation of Statutes

Submitted to: Dr. Ravinder Kumar

Submitted by: Priyank Rao(02316503516)
BBA-LLB

GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT

The principle

“where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application
without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to
hold that earlier and spectral legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely
by force of such general words Without any indication of a particular intention to do so.1”

Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant is a legal maxim, used in India, with the following
meaning: Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words “where there are general
words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending to
subjects specially dealt with by the earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier or
special legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such
general words, without any indication of particular intention to do so” Maharaja Pratap Singh
Bahadur v. Man Mohan Dev2. The literal meaning of this expression is that general words or
things do not derogate from special. This expression was explained to mean that when there
is conflict between a general and special provision, the latter shall prevail CIT v. Shahzada
Nand & Sons[1966] 60 ITR 392 (SCand Union of India v. India Fisheries (P.) Ltd. AIR 1966
SC 35.), or the general provisions must yield to the special provisions. (State of Gujarat v.
Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.) The maxim is regarded as a ‘cardinal principle of
interpretation’ (State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.), and is characterised
as a well recognised principle. 

Rather, in such a case, the earlier special statute continues to have exclusive application to its
own subject matter, and the later general act, although in terms wide enough to extend to the
subject matter of the earlier act, is held not to have any application to it. In fact, the effect of
the earlier special act may be looked upon as engrafting an exception on to the general words
of the later.3

An example is the case of Blackpool Corporation v. Starr Estate Co. Ltd. 4 By the Blackpool
Improvement Act 1917 a certain company was to sell land to the corporation, the price to

1
Seward v. Vera Cruz (Owners) (1884) 10 App Cas 59, 68 per Lord Selborne
2
AIR 1966 SC 1931
3
Goodwin v Phillips (1908)
4
Miller v. Minister of Mines [1961] NZLR 820
be determined, in default of agreement, by arbitration as provided in the Act itself. A later
Act, the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919, provided that where
by any statute land was authorized to be acquired compulsorily by any local authority, any
question of disputed compensation was to be determined in the manner therein set out. It was
held by the House of Lords that the former Act, dealing in a specific way with a specific
situation, applied exclusively to the Starr company-Blackpool transaction, and that the later
general statute had no application to it.

It is common to regard Generalia specialibus non derogant as a rule of construction

enabling the specific and general provisions to be reconciled. It is, however, a rather more
violent mode of reconciliation than in I. above, for it virtually involves the engrafting of an
exception on to general words which, in their natural signification, readily extend to the
situation in hand. Indeed, the maxim has its classic application only where the natural
meaning of the general provision conflicts with that of the specific one.

The maxim can have considerable force, and at times can even take on the appearance of an
arbitrary rule to be applied regardless of the legislature's intention. In the Starr case, for
instance, it was applied despite a provision in the 1919 statute that "the provisions of the
Act by which the land is authorised to be acquired . . . shall . . . have effect subject to this
Act, and so far as inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall
not have effect". In other cases, it has been applied despite the fact that the court suspected
that desirable social policy might be being partially frustrated by the decision. However,
these cases mark the high-water mark. In the last analysis the court's task is to give effect to
what it finds to be the legislature's intention, and if that intention is clearly that the later
general act is to be all embracing, that act will be held to prevail and the inconsistent special
act will accordingly be held to have been impliedly repealed.

2. What is a special statute?

The principle has somewhat hazy boundaries. It only applies where there is a "special"
statute and a "general" one. These are expressions of degree. In many of the older cases
on the subject the matter was clear enough; the "special" act was usually either a local act
dealing with a limited area such as a parish or borough, or the empowering act of a particular
enterprise such as a railway company. The upholding of these truly "special" statutes at the
expense of later public general statutes is reminiscent of the common law's willingness to
countenance local custom. It could be, and was, justified on at least three grounds. First, it
would be unfair to attribute to Parliament in the general act an intention to repeal the special
one, for that would deprive the inhabitants of the locality affected of the chance they would
otherwise have to make representations to the House." Second, there is in any event a
presumption that an act does not intend to deprive persons of their vested rights, particularly
rights in reliance on which they may have expended money. Third, Parliament having already
given its attention to a special set of facts and provided care-fully for them, is unlikely to
want to alter that provision by a general enactment in the course of who’s passing the
special set of facts has not been discussed.

Yet the maxim can clearly have application beyond the very narrow area of local and
specific empowering acts. At attempt was once made to confine its scope by defining a
special act as one which protects a class of persons or the property of such class. Yet the
notion of "class" is vague; a similar guideline has produced nothing but uncertainty in other
areas, for example the tort of breach of statutory duty. In fact the maxim generalia specialibus
has been applied when it was difficult to discern anything that could be called a protected
"class" of persons. In Cox v. Hakes, for instance, it was held that the Judicature Acts,
providing for a right of appeal from a High Court decision, did not affect ancient
statutes providing that no appeal would lie from a discharge in proceedings for habeas
corpus. It is artificial to say that these ancient statutes protected a "class of persons" more
than do any other statutes dealing with rights of the citizen. At best these statutes were more
restricted in scope and dealt with a narrower range of subject matter than the Judicature
Acts. In such a situation the first two grounds given above for justifying the maxim
generalia specialibus have no obvious relevance; decisions like Cox v. Hakes must thus be
justified solely on the third of the above grounds.

Yet one wonders where the cut-off point comes. In some cases where generalia specialibus is
pleaded, it is in fact very difficult to say that the earlier act is really any more "special" than
the later; there are, as Kato J. has put it, cases were "each enactment may be called general or
special according to the point of view from which it is regarded". Strangely enough, one case
where that was arguably so was a case which is usually cited as one of the small handful of
leading authorities on the application of the maxim. It is Seward v. Vera Cruz (Owner)5 . It
was a case where death had resulted from a collision at sea, and the question involved the
relationship between the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 and the Admiralty Court Act 1861
allowing an action in rem in proceedings for "damage done by a ship". It was held that, since
a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act was a purely personal claim, the latter provision had
no application.Two members of the House of Lords (composed in that instance of only
three members) ostensibly based their decision on generalia specialibus, although it is not
apparent that either statute was more "special", or more "general", than the other. The
doctrine may therefore be of some flexibility; it may enable a court in at least some cases to
refuse to apply the later of two inconsistent provisions where the common sense of the case
makes the other result preferable. In both Cox v. Hakes and the Vera Cruz case, members of
the respective courts, in addition to citing the maxim, supported their decision by reliance on
considerations of policy, in particular the absurdity and inconvenience which could result
from any other solution. In other words, the maxim may well just have been the legal
expression of a result arrived at for other reasons.

3. The order of the provisions

The great majority of the cases where the maxim has been applied have been cases where the
specific provision has preceded the general one. But it is also occasionally applied as a
means of "reconciling" otherwise inconsistent provisions in the same statute, or in two
different statutes passed at the same time. If, however, the specific provision is later in
time than the general, the maxim is seemingly never applied. In such a case the specific
provision again prevails, and again has the effect of engrafting a proviso on to the earlier
general one, but this result is normally justified not on the basis of the maxim, but by saying
that the later provision impliedly repeals the earlier pro tanto. There is no pretence here that
the matter is merely one of construction. However the practical effect is usually the
same whether the special provision is later or earlier: it creates an exception to the general
one, and even if the order of the two provisions is later reversed by one of them being
consolidated it will normally make no difference.38 However it should be pointed out at
this stage that while a later specific provision will always prevail over an earlier general one,
the converse is not universally true; in some (exceptional) cases a later general statute will

5
(1884) 10 App. Gas
be held to override an earlier special one. To that extent, the order of passing can make a
difference."

In Doré v Verdun, Justice Gonthier of Canada's Supreme Court used these words:

the rule of interpretation that subsequent general legislation is deemed not to derogate from a
prior special Act (generalia specialibus non derogant).

In a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision, Lalonde v Sun Life, Justice Gonthier had
used these words in his opinion:

"This is an appropriate case in which to apply the maxim generalia specialibus non

derogant and give precedence to the special Act.... The principle is, therefore, that where
there are provisions in a special Act and in a general Act on the same subject which are
inconsistent, if the special Act gives a complete rule on the subject, the expression of the rule
acts as an exception to the subject-matter of the rule from the general Act."

Justice Locke wrote, in Greenshields v. The Queen:

"In the case of conflict between an earlier and a later statute, a repeal by implication is never
to be favoured and is only effected where the provisions of the later enactment are so
inconsistent with, or repugnant to, those of the earlier that the two cannot stand together…
Speciat Acts are not repealed by general Acts unless there be some express reference to the
previous legislation or a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together which
prevents the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant being applied."

In Sullivan and Driedger:

"Implied exception (generalia specialibus non derogant). When two provisions are in conflict
and one of them deals specifically with the matter in question while the other is of more
general application, the conflict may be avoided by applying the specific provision to the
exclusion of the more general one. The specific prevails over the general; it does not matter
which was enacted first. This strategy for the resolution of conflict is usually referred to by
the Latin name generalia specialibus non derogant. The English term “implied exception” is
adopted ... for, in effect, the specific provision implicitly carves out an exception to the
general one...."
In R v Greenwood, Justice Griffiths of the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote

"The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant means that, for the purposes of interpretation
of two statutes in apparent conflict, the provisions of a general statute must yield to those of a
special one."