T DECLASSIFIED : Eres, Draft: February 24, 1970 : ws " NssI CURRENT ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY PRECIS AND STUDY 4DECTAS: King E0958 | By RA Date (2-7-9 REE NSSM-83° CURRENT ISSUES OF BUROPEAN SECURITY Introduction As the 1970's begin and memories of the invasion of Czecho~ slovakia recede, both halves of divided Europe increasingly are inclined to pursue a-more active dialogue that could lead to re~ duced tensions. But there are as yet few hard indications the Soviets would agree to proposals acceptably settling the central issues of European security. They still seek to consolidate. and obtain recognition of their substantial political and security gains from World War II. We and our Allies do not want to ratify the present bisection of the continent or permanent Soviet hege- mony in Eastern Europe. Relations today, then, are at an uncertain half-way point in which neither side probably feels as threatened by the other as in the past, but in which there is no clear path for the future. Thus, negotiations for the near future, as for the past, are likely to center on discret®;—and well-defined subjects essentially peripherial to the basic political and security problems of Europe. The ensuing paper focuses principally on available options on major current issues related to East-West discussions on European security and cooperation, It also sketches relevant past East-West efforts to negotiate; Eastern and Western approaches to European security; and the German and Berlin issues. I. The Setting A. Antecedents to Today's Negotiating Situation Current cautious probes and limited agendas on European se~ curity problems are pale shadows of proposals in the 1950's for sweeping "plans", Four-Power summit meetings and ministerial conferences -- frequently played out in a context of crisis. Many of these proposals were either unrealistic in ignoring the questions of Germany and Berlin, or else included propositions unacceptably undercutting opposing positions on the future of Germany. Although they led to little substantive agreement, they probably contributed to the transition toward recent less abrasive exchanges, and also generated among the Allies an attitude of SECRET£0.2958 i. —- ae = sAIRA Date /2-7-9 | ~2- hi reserve to proposals for high-level East-West conferences that f stimulated public expectations but led to little or no agreement. | | i B. Current Soviet/Eastern European Approaches to European I: Security | 1. Soviet, e ‘ I The major thrust of Moscow's current European policy is not | only.to stabilize the present territorial and political arrangements in Europe by persuading the West Europeans, and hopefully the US,, ; | to endorse them, but also.to promote in Western Europe a feeling : | of diminished threat and consequent relaxation of defense efforts, | including diminished solidarity of action between Western Europe and |_| the US. The principal recent vehicle for this is the Warsaw Pact (¢ ce proposal for‘a European Security Conference (ESC) ,suggestdd earlier | by the Soviets in 1954, and reiterated in 1966 and 1967. In con- | trast to earlier appeals, however, the Warsaw Pact countries have vigorously pursued ESC in the Budapest Declaration of 1969 and sub- sequent statements, which have been largely non-polemical and de- void of specific unacceptable preconditions. In October 1963, the “| Warsaw Pact for the first time proposed a formal ESC agenda: mutual renunciation of force and increased economic and technological contacts. The Soviets also have made clear that an ESC should not deal with such difficult problems as Germany and Berlin and disarm ment, Moreover, they have indicated that they would have no ob- jection to our. attending, while East German participation would be expected. Soviet objectives in pursuing the conference idea are not difficult to discern: They seek to -- foster a letting down of the guard and divergencies between + the US and its Allies; t w+ stabilize relations with the West, so as to have a freer hand in dealing with Sino-Soviet problems; -- achieve greater access to Western technology; and ~- in the process of all this to acquire Western acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Soviet preserve in Eastern Europe. Fed by a resurgent nationalism, the East Europeans look upon the conference idea as a way to promote their own individual national interests, including a freer hand in internal and ex- + East European | ternal affairs. | SECRET. |©. E0958 é irra, SECRET a3 C. Current Western Approaches to European Securit) i i i 1. US Goals Us security is bound to that of Europe. With 300 million people, a gross national ‘product in excess of $600 billion, and industrial output constituting about one-fourth of the world's total, Western Europe is an area of vital interest to the US, reinforced by myriad other bonds. Our long-range security goals remain: -- A stable and peaceful situation effectively guaran- teeing the independence and sovereignty of all European states, based upon a military equilibrium sufficient to ensure that this settlement is on terms satisfactory to the US and its Allies. -- A strengthened, prosperous and cohesive Western Europe able to bear its full responsibilities for the preservation of peace and stability. ‘The resolution of the German question. Peaceful and constructive US relations with the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Dimunition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the gradual liberalization of Communist regimes. 2, Tripartite and FRG Approaches to the Problems of Germany and Berlin The German question and the status of Berlin lie at the heart of European security. Movement to resolve these questions on terms acceptable to the West has depended largely upon the willingness of the Soviet Union, East Germany and, to a lesser extent, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, there are few signs the Eastern countries are willing to make serious adjustments. The recent Tripartite Allied (Us, UK, France) proposal to the Soviet Union for talks on the Berlin situation assumes that the Soviets might agree to modest improvements in the restoration of communications within Berlin and movement of persons and goods. The FRG is also engaged in complex and inter-related bilateral negotiations with Eastern states: USSR (non-use of force); East Germany (transport and postal matters); Poland (involving possible West German recognition in some form of the Oder-Neisse line). SECRETThis German polic y contains few ri gchievenen cy. risks for the W Beye cee 2a ee icc seee vould be a LCLLULmr Gp ot aoa e anise) oealaasny, cfr ries cies alts the west “ae geeks to improve, its relations vith the Bast seens + ects ae se derthe dmtie reweeat name tapers, foie. and ovr ilies will folloy closoly the new FRC policy tovards the 3. Qther Western and Neutral Initiatives As the : ana *othe ost, active advocate since 1966 of "detente —rr”~—”.—.C—.CizsONSCSN eoohasie ona Perce eoei cs and on bilat ; ; go E oe eee S. While East- i ana Mile, EastcMest bilateral aiemasions.on economic, technical and cal tur inue on a broad scal r y and France, the other European Allies eg eerrars eared n ntere into negotiation with into negotiation with the USSR or other East European states on po- qe Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium have, howeltr, sought to reduce tensions by participating in the Sroup of Ten. (which to reduccrises Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, hasty oa, a1eeen and Yugoslavia). The Soviets Go not favor activity by this Group. he European Neutrals, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, have ail welconed the BSC’ proposal. The Finns; for example, have ~ pevered Helsinki as the site for an ESC. 4, NATO Initiatives Since 1967, NATO has become increasingly engaged in consvl- tatiien Selating to European security. | In Tespovss to the Warsaw tations 5¢9 call for an ESC, the NATO Ministers called for a list br specific subjects for possible negotiations with the Soviet nick and other countries of Eastern Europe, qhe culmination of the ensuing study of Sseuce was the affir- mation in December 1969 of the Allies’ interest i = mutual and balanced force reductions, and further study of other arms control measures: == Responses from the East to FRG pilateral and tri- Response cforts on Germany and Berlin; and and cultural exchanges, and Economic, technological mental and oceanographic fn cooperation in enviro! activities. CRET (g e