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ETHICS
Author(s): Paul Blackledge
Source: History of Political Thought , Winter 2005, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp.
696-720
Published by: Imprint Academic Ltd.
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Thought
Paul Blackledge2
Introduction
1 Thanks go to Neil Davidson and Kristyn Gorton for their comments on a draft of this
essay.
2 School of Social Sciences, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds, LS13HE. Email:
p.blackledge@leedsmet.ac.uk
3 A. Maclntyre 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good', in The Maclntyre
Reader, ed. K. Knight (Cambridge, 1998), p. 235.
4 Indeed, the two collections on his ideas that have been published do not address his
early Marxism except tangentially {After Maclntyre, ed. J. Horton and S. Mendus (Cam
bridge, 1994); Alasdair Maclntyre, ed. M. Murphy (Cambridge, 2003)). This failing is
magnified in Knight's selection of Maclntyre's work: The Maclntyre Reader. For, while
Knight is to be congratulated for his inclusion in this selection of Maclntyre's 1958-9
essay 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness', he misrepresents the power of that essay
through his decision to locate it simply as a misguided precursor to his later arguments
rather than as a key constituent of a very different project. In contrast to the bulk of Mac
illuminate the process through which his thought began to evolve tow
more recent conclusions.
Maclntyre famously concluded After Virtue with the suggestion that 'we
are waiting not for Godot, but for another — doubtless very different — St.
Benedict', and premised this suggestion on a prior dismissal of the adequacy
to the modern world of Marxist politics. He suggested that, first, Trotsky's
late political optimism was based upon subsequently falsified predictions for
the future of the Soviet Union; while, second, Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism
'entailed that the Soviet Union was not socialist and that the theory which was
to have illuminated the path to human liberation had in fact led to darkness'.
Consequently, Maclntyre argued, 'a Marxist who took Trotsky's last writings
with great seriousness would be forced into a pessimism quite alien to the
Marxist tradition, and in becoming a pessimist he would in an important way
have ceased to be a Marxist'.5 A decade later, Maclntyre outlined what was if
anything an even more devastating critique of Marxism. Marx failed to recog
nize, he argued, 'that while proletarianisation makes it necessary for workers
to resist, it also tends to deprive workers of those forms of practice through
which they can discover conceptions of a good and of virtues adequate to the
moral needs of resistance'.6
As we shall see, Maclntyre first elaborated versions of these arguments in
the 1960s when he was still a member of the revolutionary left. What set Mac
lntyre aside from his comrades in this period was not his criticism of Trotsky
or his analysis of the fragmentation of working-class struggles. Rather, Mac
lntyre differentiated himself from more orthodox members of the far-left
through his disputation of Marx's theory of economic crisis and his rejection
of any theory of human nature. Interestingly, while these underlying argu
ments informed the growing political pessimism that was to become most
apparent in After Virtue, in his more recent work Maclntyre has gone some
way to reversing these arguments; suggesting that the gap between his con
temporary thought and his earlier Marxism is not as wide as it once was.
24 Ibid., p. 124.
25 H. Hanson, 'An Open Letter to Edw
(Autumn 1957), p. 88.
26 Ibid., p. 79.
32 Ibid., p. 39.
33 Ibid., p. 40.
34 Ibid., p. 41.
35 Ibid., pp. 43, 41.
36 A. Maclntyre, The Unconscious (London, 2nd edn., 2004), p. 62. The first edition
of this book was published in 1958 — the new edition contains a substantial new preface.
without losing sight of its biological basis: 'it is only with Hegel tha
begins to possess and with Marx that Man achieves a real history', for
history 'becomes one with the history of men'.37 It is in thus historici
that Marx's greatness lies, for he refuses to follow either Hobbes into
cholic model of human needs and desires, or Diderot into a
counterposition of the state of nature against contemporary social st
Instead, Marx comprehends the limited historical truth of Hobbes's
but counterposes to it, not a Utopia, but the real movement of workers i
gle through which they realize that solidarity is a fundamental human
Maclntyre sought to ground this suggestion of Marx's through a p
rewriting of the history of ethics. He argued that such a history coul
ten as a synthesis of three strands: first, a 'history of moral codes'; s
history of human attitudes to desire'; and third, a history of 'human
While moral codes initially related to human desires, with the Pr
reformation the connection between desire and morality is broken. In
the Protestants, as humanity is by nature corrupt, then human desir
act as the basis for moral codes. Moreover, as men are finite beings, th
cannot hope to understand the mind of God, and thus cannot hope to
His moral code. Consequently, 'the moral law becomes a connection o
fiats', which are 'so far as we are concerned totally arbitrary'.38 In
world, 'desire becomes something anarchic and amoral', and, inde
moral codes lose their religious colouration and take on a secular for
are seen to act, for instance in Hobbes, as 'at best an uneasy truce o
between warring desires'.39 To counterpose desires in their natural
these moral codes, as did Diderot, was an inadequate response to
reformation view because this strategy failed to acknowledge that 'i
society desire itself is remoulded, not simply repressed' .40 Two quest
essarily arose from this claim: could this remoulding be absolute, an
process of remoulding was not absolute, was it possible that it might
scended? To understand these issues historically we must ask if a fo
human nature could emerge such that the needs and desires of individ
not felt to be in simple atomized opposition one to the other? Marx, a
to Maclntyre, comprehended both the deep historical and sociological
to this question when he suggested that 'the emergence of human n
something to be comprehended only in terms of the history of class-s
Each age reveals a development of human potentiality which is specific
form of social life and which is specifically limited by the class-struc
that society.' In particular, under advanced capitalism, according to M
Maclntyre, 'the growth of production makes it possible [for m
41 Ibid., p. 46.
42 Ibid., p. 45.
43 Ibid., p. 48.
44 Ibid., pp. 42,49.
45 Ibid., p. 47.
view that apathy had grown because 'prosperity leaves no room for disc
tent' ; while, second, he accepted the partial truth of the view that apathy
'an expression of the impotence of the individual in the face of contempo
institutions', but noted that this was a universal truth, whereas apathy was
In place of these models, Thompson believed that the key cause of the c
temporary malaise was that people 'do not believe that there is any worka
alternative, or they very much dislike any alternative (such as Commun
which is proposed' ,46 He thus argued that the New Left should aim to de
strate the practicality of a preferable political system. Indeed, he insisted
so over-ripe was Britain for socialism that 'any vigorous initiative w
probes beyond the conventional limits of party controversy calls into ques
the continuance of the capitalist system'.47 The rest of the book was th
designed to explore this possibility. Moreover, while the New Left did n
hold to a 'party line', most of the contributors to the volume worked with
broadly shared framework, whereas, as Thompson wrote, Maclntyre
Trotskyite differs in some ways from all other contributions'.48
Whatever his disagreements with his New Left comrades, Maclnty
agreed with them that apathy was a pressing political concern wh
demanded serious consideration; and so, in his essay 'Breaking the Chain
Reason', he set himself the task of uncovering the intellectual culture t
reinforced political apathy by denigrating the very concept of commitme
Pointing out that at the cusp of the modern era intellectuals were wont to
tify themselves as radicals, Maclntyre noted that the dominant reason g
by contemporary intellectuals to excuse their own lack of political comm
ment was to note the apathy of the workers. Yet, as he argued,
So what had happened to the radical intelligentsia to cause the growth in its
apathy over the last two centuries?
In answer to this question, Maclntyre sought to trace the intelligentsia's tra
jectory from the Enlightenment to the modern age. 'The inheritors of the
Enlightenment are in their different ways Hegel and Marx'; and these two
used a bevy of concepts that are still of the utmost value to contemporary
46 E.P. Thompson, 'At the Point of Decay', in Out of Apathy, ed. E.P. Thompson
(London, 1960), pp. 5-8.
47 Ibid., p. 10.
48 Ibid., p. 14.
49 A. Maclntyre, 'Breaking the Chains of Reason', in Out of Apathy, ed. Thompson,
pp. 195-240, p. 198.
50 Ibid., p. 199.
51 Ibid., p. 200.
52 Ibid., p. 201.
53 Ibid., p. 208.
54 Ibid., p. 210.
55 Ibid., p. 217.
56 Ibid., p. 220.
Either men can discern the laws which govern social development or t
cannot. If they can, then they must avow that their own behaviour is sub
to these laws and consequently they must admit that they have discover
themselves to be not agents, but victims, part of a social process wh
occurs independently of human mind, feeling and will. If they cannot
cern such laws, then they are necessarily helpless, for they have no inst
ments of change at their hands. So in any case human agency is bound t
ineffective. Of course, so far as small-scale changes are concerned, it m
be otherwise. All sociologists leave room for reformist manoeuvre.57
This ideology, Maclntyre reminded us, did not exist in some pure st
divorced from the world of work and routine, but rather grew out o
world: 'our social life and our intellectual visions reinforce each other.
social life is one in which human activity is rendered uncreative and
We live in a society of . . . predetermined lives'.58 Indeed, so sterile i
social life that even when intellectuals reach beyond it their work is n
through the most conformist interpretation: thus the radical implicati
both Wittengenstein and Freud were, or so Maclntyre argued, castrat
interpretation. How then to break from these predetermined pathwa
opposition to crude vanguardism, Maclntyre insisted that freedom ca
won by telling the masses to do what the elite desires it do, but only by h
'them move where they desire. The goal is not happiness, or satisfactio
freedom. And freedom has to be both means and ends. The mechanica
ration of means and ends is suitable enough for human manipulation,
human liberation.'59 For Maclntyre, emancipatory politics emerge spo
ously through the struggles of the working class against capitalism.60
insight allowed him to move from a standard Marxist critique of Kanti
to a powerful break with the vestigial influence of consequentialism th
been felt as a burden on Marxist approaches to ethics in the century
Maclntyre made his contribution. Thus, because freedom was both the
and the end of socialist activity, such activity, contra the Kantians, req
strong anchorage in contemporary history, while, contra the con
tialists, it was not a reified end that could be inaugurated by a variet
means. Therefore, Maclntyre concluded, 'the philosophers have contin
57 Ibid., p. 225.
58 Ibid., p. 230.
59 Ibid., p. 235.
60 Ibid., pp. 230, 238.
61 Ibid., p. 240.
62 A. Maclntyre, 'Freedom and Revolution', Labour Review (February/March 1960),
pp. 19-24, p. 20.
63 Ibid., p. 22.
64 Ibid., p. 23.
65 Ibid., p. 24.
66 L. Goldmann, The Hidden God (London, 1964), p. 301.
67 A. Maclntyre, 'Pascal and Marx: On Lucien Goldmann's Hidden God.', in A.
Intyre, Against the Self-images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (Lon
1971), pp. 76-87, p. 84.
struggles of the working class, or at least part of it, had been 'instit
ised'.71
While Maclntyre therefore seems to have responded pessimistically to the
decline of CND, in the short term he continued to defend revolutionary poli
tics. Thus, in 'Rejoinder to Left Reformism', he took issue with Henry Col
lins' defence of a left reformist strategy for Labour. Like Bernstein and the
revisionists of the 1890s, Collins, according to Maclntyre, accepted a
mechanical separation of the economic structure of the world, from ideas
about it. Consequently, Collins failed to see that reformism was less a coher
ent response to the problems that beset the working class, than it was a reflec
tion of a particular moment in the history of capitalism, which arose 'within a
capitalism which has learnt some degree of rationalisation and control'.72
However, while the ideology of revisionism reflected a specific moment in
the evolution of capitalism, it was less apparent that revolutionary politics
would replace it as the hegemonic ideology within the working class. Accord
ingly, Maclntyre suggested in his essay 'Prediction and Polities', published in
International Socialism in 1963, that contemporary economic trends had cre
ated barriers to the diffusion of socialist class consciousness across the work
ing class. He opened this essay with a critique of the use by socialists of the
word inevitable: indeed, he insisted that as socialism was premised on the
rejection of the inevitability of the continuation of capitalism, it was some
what ironic that many socialists merely inverted the dominant ideology refer
ring to the inevitability of the victory of socialism, rather than the inevitable
continuation of capitalism. Moreover, while he noted that a minority of Marx
ists had rejected the argument that socialism was inevitable, most notably
Lenin and Trotsky, none of these had produced a 'coherent substitute' to the
mechanically deterministic interpretation of historical materialism; rather
they had merely rejected a form of 'automism' for 'substitutionism'.73 Macln
tyre opened his attempt to move beyond these two inadequate interpretations
of Marxism with the suggestion that post-war capitalism had been trans
formed by the 'conscious, intelligent innovation' of the bourgeoisie and its
representatives:
If capitalists had behaved in the forties and fifties as they did in the twenties
the apparently mechanical laws of the economy would have issued in
slump. But there are no longer slumps for the same reason that the pig-cycle
is no longer with us: the changed self-consciousness of the participants.74
However, if this argument implied that economic crises on the scale of the
1930s could be managed out of existence, then, while Maclntyre's break with
this essay was to bolster Maclntyre's critique of Collins noted above. Thanks to
Harman for this reference.
However, something of his mind-set can be gleaned from his book Marcu
published in 1970. In this essay, Maclntyre emphasized his own continuin
allegiance to the concepts of human liberation and freedom. However, he a
held to something of a performative contraction in so far as he simultaneo
rejected the argument that an ideal pure Marxism could be deployed as an
alternative to the reality of Marxism's history, while accepting an implicit
idealized vision of the struggle for liberation. Thus, he denounced the co
temporary student struggles as 'the first parent-financed revolts' that w
'more like a new version of the children's crusade than a revolutionary mo
ment'.92 This elitist critique of the movement of 1968 allowed Maclntyre
maintain a formal allegiance to the emancipatory politics of the left, wh
dismissing real struggles as they happened around him: so, against the disr
tive influence of 'Marcuse's students', Maclntyre extolled, in 1970, the vi
tues and 'authority' of the university as a seat of learning.93
Conclusion
The power of Maclntyre's Marxism in the period of the first New Left was
rooted in his argument that any moral claim, if it was to be universalized in the
modern world, must be rooted both in a historically conceived theory of
human nature, as actualized within the real historical struggles for freedom of
the oppressed. To this end, he played a key role in retrieving the revolutionary
kernel of Marx's theory of history from the deadening grip of Stalinism, and
thus in releasing historical materialism from the cage of Stalinist determin
ism. However, despite this contribution to Marxist theory, Maclntyre pro
gressively distanced himself from the Marxist left through the 1960s. While
this tendency was brought to a head in 1968, when he played a minor role as
'policeman' to the students of Essex, it had much deeper roots than this. On
the one hand, the context was unpropitious for the left, and Maclntyre's tra
jectory can be read as a response to the decline of the New Left and CND.
However, this context demanded interpretation, and Maclntyre's pessimistic
reading of it was informed by, first, his rejection of the idea of an essential
human nature, and second, by his dismissal of Marx's theory of economic cri
sis. Together, these two revisions of Marxism meant that he read the contem
porary fragmentation of the class struggle as a much more profound barrier to
the struggle for socialism than was implied by the 'cause for concern' noted
by other members of International Socialism. Indeed, as the 1960s wore on,
the tension between the optimism of Maclntyre's will and the pessimism of
his intellect became so great that something eventually had to give. Since
then, while Maclntyre has remained a firm critic of international capitalism, a
deep sense of pessimism has coloured his moral theory.