De Castro - Crim - 2008 - 2015

Justice
Teresita Leonardo-‐De Castro Cases (2008-‐2015) Criminal Law

BOOK 1 (Articles 1-‐99, RPC)

FELONIES
(Stages of execution)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO DOMINGUEZ, JR., alias SANDY
G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro
We cannot simply assume that there was attempted rape simply because accused undressed
himself and the offended party, plus the fact that accused did rape the latter on three other occasions.
Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.

Facts:
Domingo Dominguez, Jr. (Domingo) was indicted for four counts of rape and one count of
attempted rape, all qualified by his relationship with and the minority of the private offended
party.
Based on the combined testimonies of the witnesses and documentary evidence for the
prosecution, the RTC accounted the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:

The evidence for the prosecution shows and as narrated in open court by the victim
herself [AAA]; that the first incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-‐548) happened
before the fiesta of Magallanes which was in the month of July 2001. Her small
siblings were already asleep and she was about to go to sleep also, when she noticed
her father (the accused) already beside her. Her father (accused) undressed her
while he also undressed himself, and as he was about to mount her for the purpose
of raping her, her mother arrived and inquired why she was naked. Because of fear
of bodily harm brought about by the threat coming from the accused who was then
holding a bolo, the victim did not say anything. She positively identified her father
(the accused) inside the courtroom when asked to do so by the public
prosecutor. The accused failed to consummate the rape during the first incident.

The second rape (Criminal Case No. 02-‐549) happened after a week from the first
attempt, which could be between the fourth week of July or first week of August
2001 because the victim stated that it was no longer in the month of July 2001. It
happened in a coconut farm in Anibong, Magallanes, Sorsogon. The victim was asked
by her father to accompany him in getting coconut leaves because they are going to
weave it in their house. When the two (2) of them reached the place, her father
(accused) undressed her and thereafter undressed himself also and made her lie
down then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt weak and pain all over her
body including her vagina which she felt to be swollen at that time. She tried to
struggle but she was helpless, particularly so, that the accused was also armed with
a bolo at that time. After the bestial act was consummated they proceeded home
bringing with them the coconut leaves that they gathered. She did not tell anyone
about the incident because of fear of the accused and the thought that they might
not believe her.
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Justice Teresita Leonardo-‐De Castro Cases (2008-‐2015) Criminal Law

The third incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-‐550) happened two (2) weeks after
the second incident, which was sometime in the month of August 2001. While the
fourth incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-‐551) happened three (3) weeks after
the third incident which was sometime in the month of September 2001. The fifth
and last incident of rape happened according to the victim sometime in the 20th of
November 2001. All the 3rd, 4th and 5th incidents of rape happened in the same
coconut farm although in the different places of the farm. The same pattern of
execution was adopted by the accused. He would ask the victim to go with him to
the coconut farm to gather coconut leaves, and once they reached the place the
accused would undress the victim then undress himself also and have sexual
intercourse with her against her will. The victim could not refuse or disobey the
command of the accused (her father) because he will scold and threaten her with
punishment if she would not go with him. She could not also tell her mother about it
because of fear. At the time of the first and second rapes the victim was only 12
years old. She was already 13 years old when the third, fourth, and fifth incidents of
rape happened. Her date of birth was January 3, 1989.

During the fifth incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-‐552) on November
20, 2001 the accused and the victim [were] again in the same coconut farm in order
to get coconut leaves. Both of them were already naked and the accused was about
to mount the victim when they were seen by prosecution eyewitness [CCC] who
shouted at them, thats why the accused fled leaving the victim behind. Because of
what happened the victim was able to gain enough courage to tell her mother and to
report the incident to the barangay captain of their place, thus leading to the
apprehension of the accused.

In its Decision, the RTC found Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐549, 02-‐550 and 02-‐551, and two counts of attempted rape
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552.

Domingo interposed his appeal from the judgment of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. He
asserted his innocence and asked for his acquittal from all the charges.

On the two counts of attempted rape, Domingo claimed that the prosecution failed to show
any overt act which would prove his intent to rape AAA. AAAs claims during her testimony that he
was about to rape her or about to go on top of her were it not for the timely arrival of her mother,
BBB, in Criminal Case No. 02-‐548, or were it not for the fortunate appearance of a relative, CCC, in
Criminal Case No. 02-‐552, were allegedly so vague that one cannot make a clear conclusion whether
the he really intended to rape AAA.

Domingo also noted that should his conviction for the crime of attempted rape be sustained,
the trial court committed an error in the imposition of the proper penalty. With the abrogation of
the death penalty, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape committed in the attempted stage,
which must be two degrees lower than that of the penalty imposed for the crime intended to be
committed, should be prision mayor.

Anent the three counts of qualified rape, Domingo denied the accusations and questioned
the motive of AAA in charging him with said crime. He pointed out that it was implausible that AAA
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would not tell her mother and siblings about the alleged rapes. It was also incredible that AAA
would still accompany him repeatedly to the coconut farm despite her having been previously
sexually assaulted by him, with AAA knowing that their seclusion was another opportunity for him
to sexually assault her again. He averred that AAAs unexplained silence and continuous
acquiescence to the sexual abuses supposedly committed against her made her accusations
dubious.

After its review of the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed Domingo’s conviction in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐549, 02-‐550, and 02-‐551 for three counts of qualified rape; while it modified
the RTC judgment in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552 and convicted Domingo for two counts
of acts of lasciviousness. Thereafter, Domingo appealed his convictions before us.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting Domingo of the crime of
rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐549, 02-‐550 and 02-‐551.

2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting Domingo of the crime of
attempted rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552.

3. Granting arguendo that Domingo is guilty of attempted rape in Criminal Case Nos.
02-‐548 and 02-‐552, is the penalty imposed proper?

Ruling:

On the first issue, We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and affirm Domingo’s
conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐549, 02-‐550, and 02-‐551 for three counts of qualified rape.

Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a
man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through
force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Orillosa, we held that in incestuous rape of
a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral
influence of the father would suffice.

In this case, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-‐
appellant, through force, threat or intimidation, had carnal knowledge of his daughter, AAA, who
was then only 12 to 13 years old.

On the second issue, We also affirm the convictions of accused-‐appellant in Criminal Case
Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness and not for attempted rape.

Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce
the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
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penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. (Perez v. Court
of Appeals)

We also reiterated in Perez our pronouncements in People v. Caingat, that the offenders acts
of lying on top of the victim, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand
inside her panty, and touching her sexual organ, which were interrupted were it not for the timely
arrival of the victims mother, do not constitute the crime of attempted rape, absent any showing
that the offender actually commenced to force his penis into the victims sexual organ, and that said
acts rather constitute the crime of acts of lasciviousness punishable under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552, there is a similar dearth of evidence that accused-‐
appellant was able to commence penetration of his penis into AAAs vagina. What the evidence on
record established was that during these two occasions, accused-‐appellant was only able to undress
himself and his daughter before the arrival of BBB and CCC.

We cannot simply assume in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552 that accused-‐appellant
was intending to rape AAA simply because accused-‐appellant undressed himself and AAA during
these two instances, plus the fact that accused-‐appellant did rape AAA on three other
occasions. Such a presumption hardly constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape. The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been
committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into
the vagina, before the interruption.

As the Court of Appeals found, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552 that accused-‐appellant committed the crime of acts of lasciviousness.

The elements of acts of lasciviousness, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, are:

1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2) it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

All elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐548 and 02-‐552.

Lewdness is defined as an obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous act which signifies that
form of immorality carried on a wanton manner. It is morally inappropriate, indecent, and lustful
for accused-‐appellant to undress himself and his own daughter (who was completely capable of
dressing or undressing herself), while his wife was away and his other children were asleep; or
doing the same acts in an isolated coconut farm where only the two of them were present.

Finally, we adopt the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-‐appellant,
but modify the damages awarded in AAAs favor.

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Given the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, the Court of Appeals properly reduced the
penalty of death and, instead, imposed upon accused-‐appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of his three convictions for qualified rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-‐549, 02-‐550, and 02-‐551.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH BARRA
G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

The crime of robbery remained unconsummated because Elmer Lagdaan refused to give his
money to Joseph Barra and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason
that Elmer Lagdaan was shot. Joseph Barra can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide.

Facts:

Ricardo de la Peña (De la Peña) testified that he knew Barra for a long time. He stated that
he was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9,
2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw Joseph Barra (Barra) enter the house of Elmer Lagdaan
(Lagdaan), which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to Lagdaan’s right forehead and demanded
money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away. When Lagdaan stated that the money was
not in his possession, Barra shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following
morning.

Ely Asor (Asor) testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the
Lagdaan’s house to collect his daily wage when he saw Barra in the yard of Lagdaan’s house. He
inquired from Barra if Lagdaan was around. Barra responded that Lagdaan was not around. Asor
went home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following
morning that he learned that Lagdaan died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.

In his defense, Barra denied the charges against him. Barra claimed that he was in Batangas
City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines
Sur and charged with the crime of “robbery with murder.” Barra’s brother, Benjamin, tried to
corroborate his testimony.

The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found Barra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative
testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses deserved more weight than Barra’s defense of denial and
alibi. Thus, finding the prosecution’s witnesses to be credible and that the killing of Lagdaan to be
by reason of the robbery.

However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found Barra guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Barra should be held liable for the crime of robbery with homicide or
attempted robbery with homicide only.

Ruling:
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He is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only.

In the case before us, Barra’s intention was to extort money from the Lagdaan. By reason of
the Lagdaan’s refusal to give up his personal property — his money — to Barra, the Lagdaan was
shot in the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element
of taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed
to the crime Barra was convicted in the RTC. Barra is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC.

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the Lagdaan
refused to give his money to Barra and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was
for this reason that Lagdaan was shot. Barra can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court
of Appeals found Barra’s crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CONSPIRACY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY
PAMPLONA A.K.A. NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINO
G. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

Acts of conspiracy of each accused need not be directly proved as it can be inferred from the
acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. What is material is that the actions
of the accused pertain to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest in conspiracy an
act one is the act of all.

Facts:

Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia were charged of the crime of murder
for the killing of Mauro Biay. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dulce Borero, the sister of
the accused, the forensic expert who conducted the autopsy over the victim and the victim’s widow,
Amelia Biay.

According to her, Dulce Borero was selling balut with her brother Mauro Biay. She was
about 7 arms length from her brother when he was called by Jessie Garcia. When Biay approached
Garcia, the latter twisted the former’s hand behind his back and Garcia’s companions, Joey
Pamplona and Arnold Garchitorena, repeatedly stabbed Biay. Biay tried to free himself from the
three but failed to do so. Borero went home to call her elder brother Teodoro, but when they
returned to the scene, the Biay was no longer there as he had already been brought to the hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

According to the autopsy report, Biay’s death was caused by multiple stab wounds. Dr.
Poblete, who conducted the autopsy, specified the victim suffered eight (8) stab wounds and the
nature of stab wounds indicated that it may have been caused by more than one bladed instrument.

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Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses amounting to P16,700.00 due to the
death of her husband and alleged that her husband earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a balut
vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-‐time carpenter.

Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay while Garcia interposed
the defense of alibi, and Garchitorena raised the defense of insanity. The respective defenses of the
accused were:

Pamplona claimed that he was seated on a bench when co-‐accused Arnold came along. Then
the balut vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up, pull something from the right side of his
pocket and stab the balut vendor and that due to fear that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran
away from the scene. A certain Danilo Garados testified that Garcia was not there and Pamplona
allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed Mauro. Garcia also took the stand and claimed that he was
still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt when the incident happened. With respect to
Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and resident physician of the National Center for
Mental Health, testified that she examined the accused Arnold and based on the history of the
patient, it was found that he had been using prohibited drugs two (2) years prior to the stabbing
incident and that he was allegedly suffering from schizophrenia. However, Dr. Belen also testified
that the accused Garchitorena had remissions and understands what he was doing and was aware
of his murder case in court.

The trial court found that Garchitorena, Pamplona and Garcia were in conspiracy and used
superior strength in killing Mauro Biay and therefore, guilty of the crime of murder and were
sentenced to death. Further, they were ordered to pay jointly and severally Amelia Biay, widow of
the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums: a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity, b) 50,000.00 as
and for moral damages, c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages, d) 16,700.00 as and for actual
damages, e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and, f) To pay the
costs of suit.

The accused appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto. Hence, the automatic review. Pamplona and Garcia contended that the trial court
erred in giving credence to the testimony of Dulce Borero and failed to appreciate the evidence in
favor of them. Further, the judge who decided the case was not the same judge who heard the
testimonies during the trial. Garcia also claimed that there was no proof presented to prove that
they conspired nor used superior strength to kill Mauro. As to Garchitorena, he claimed that the
trial court erred in not considering the testimony of his expert witness as to his mental state. Lastly,
they are questioning the propriety of awarding of moral and exemplary damages absent any proof
from the prosecution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there was conspiracy
2. Whether or not the accused used superior strength

Ruling:

1. Accused-‐appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as there was no
evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-‐appellants or that he participated in their
criminal designs. We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo, we stated:
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Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for
conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent
to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or
community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the
conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all. (citations omitted,
emphasis ours)

In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-‐appellants were together in performing
the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and
twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him
on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were
too strong. All means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to
the ground and expired. The three accused-‐appellants prior act of waiting for the victim outside
affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the
fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-‐principals regardless of the intent and
the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.

2. The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated against the
accused-‐appellants. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength is
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. This circumstance was alleged in the Information and was proved during
the trial. In the case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend himself in any way. The accused-‐
appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively
using the same deadly weapon.

All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-‐appellants of murder, considering
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, each of the accused-‐appellants
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. Murder, under Article 248of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Following Article 63 of the same code, the higher penalty of death shall be
applied.

In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as the Anti-‐Death
Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. Accordingly, accused-‐appellants shall be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of death.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SERRANO and ANTHONY SERRANO
G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a
meeting of minds and intent. It is present when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the
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attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. Clearly, it is attendant in circumstances when there was concerted action between the
accused-‐appellants before, during and after the offense which ably demonstrated their unity of design
and objective in successfully committing the crime.

Facts:

In the afternoon of January 18, 2003, Major Jerry Galvan received a telephone call from a
concerned citizen about an illegal drug trade being conducted by a certain alias "Tune" in Barangay
Bambang, Pasig City. Thereafter, Major Galvan coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the conduct of a buy-‐bust operation. Thus, a team led by SPO3 Leneal Matias,
PO3 Carlo Luna and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 FAMILARA) was formed to buy "shabu" from
"Tune" with the aid of a confidential informant. Preparations were then made, and two (2) One
Hundred Peso bills were marked "MRF" and delivered to the assigned poseur-‐buyer, PO1
FAMILARA. The composite team thereafter proceeded to the aforementioned location, the
confidential informant pointed to a house where accused-‐appellant Joseph Serrano (JOSEPH) was
found standing. SPO3 Leneal Matias and PO3 Carlo Luna positioned themselves at a distance where
they can see PO1 FAMILARA, who approached JOSEPH together with the confidential informant.
The latter greeted JOSEPH and informed him that his companion, PO1 FAMILARA, would buy Php
200.00 worth of shabu. JOSEPH thereafter knocked at the door of "Tune", who turned out to be
accused-‐appellant Anthony Serrano (ANTHONY). ANTHONY partially opened the door and
conferred with JOSEPH. PO1 FAMILARA thereafter handed the marked money to JOSEPH, who in
turn handed the same to ANTHONY. Upon receiving the money, the latter then took out a plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the same to the
JOSEPH, who, in turn, handed the plastic sachets to PO1 FAMILARA. As such, FAMILARA
immediately grabbed JOSEPH's hand while the rest of the team rushed to the scene to arrest the
accused-‐appellants. ANTHONY even attempted to escape to his house but was subsequently
likewise apprehended.

Both accused-‐appellants were bodily frisked after their apprehension. Recovered from
ANTHONY were four heat-‐sealed plastic sachets with white crystalline substances, two (2) marked
one hundred peso bills, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter and one plastic bag containing several
pieces of empty plastic sachets. However, nothing aside from the heat-‐sealed plastic sachet he
previously handed to PO1 FAMILARA was recovered from accused-‐appellant JOSEPH.

Upon examination by P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural, the five heat-‐sealed plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances were found positive [for] Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or commonly known as "shabu."

In their defense, both ANTHONY and JOSEPH denied the charges against them. The latter
averred that the plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance were shown to him only
at the police station. For his part, ANTHONY argued that they only came to know the reason for
their arrest and detention when they were already in court.

The RTC rendered judgment convicting the brothers for illegal sale of shabu in Criminal
Case No. 12007-‐D and Anthony Serrano for illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 12008-‐
D. In view of the imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment on the accused-‐appellants, the case
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was elevated to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. The appellate court affirmed the said
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not conspiracy is present in the case at bar,

Ruling:

Conspiracy, as settled in our jurisprudence, is always predominantly mental in composition
because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. By its nature, conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy. Hence, for collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that
conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime as only rarely
would such agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are
rarely documented by agreements in writing. However, the courts are not without resort in the
determination of its presence as it may be inferred and proved through the acts of the accused,
whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime point to a common purpose,
concert of action, and community of interest. In short, conduct may establish conspiracy. An
accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.

As testified to by the police officers involved in the buy-‐bust operation, it was accused-‐
appellant JOSEPH who negotiated with the poseur-‐buyer, PO1 FAMILARA, received the buy-‐bust
money, and handed the same to ANTHONY. The latter, after receiving the money from JOSEPH,
handed to JOSEPH the sachet of shabu to be given to PO1 FAMILARA. It was JOSEPH who delivered
the illegal drug to PO1 FAMILARA. When ANTHONY was frisked during the arrest, the police
officers retrieved the marked money that JOSEPH gave him, together with other sachets of shabu
and paraphernalia used in packing the illegal drug, such as several empty plastic bags, a disposable
lighter and a pair of scissors. Clearly, there was concerted action between the brothers JOSEPH and
ANTHONY before, during and after the offense which ably demonstrated their unity of design and
objective to sell the dangerous drug.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN
CHUA

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike
evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period
of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on
the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.

Facts:

The drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance
from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house.
After they talked to Milan’s sister, the police formed a team.
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When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., they alighted from their vehicles and
surrounded Milan’s house. Henry Milan, Restituto Carandang and Jackman Chua were all inside the
room of Milan when the team of Policemen arrived. The door of the room was open but was
suddenly closed by Milan when they were alerted of the presence of the police officers. When the
police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with bullets.
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded.
Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered
Milan to attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the
latter, however, was able to shoot him.

The Trial court found Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of two counts of murder for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo
and one count of frustrated murder qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC‘s ruling that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was
Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three
accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained that
Carandang, Milan and Chua‘s actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police
officers. Milan and Chua argued that there‘s no direct evidence showing that they conspired with
Carandang during the latter‘s act of shooting the three victims.

Issue:

Can conspiracy exist even if there is no full opportunity for meditation and reflection at the
time the crime was committed.

Ruling:

Yes, there can be conspiracy even if at the time the crime was committed, there is no full
opportunity for meditation and reflection.

In People v. Sumalpong, the Court held that conspiracy may also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the
conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and
objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of
the degree of participation of each.

The conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts
(1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan‘s closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua‘s directive to
Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan‘s following such instruction). Contrary to the
suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement or that Milan‘s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by
direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of
Page 11 of 299


purpose in the minds of the three. As co-‐conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct
participation.

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike
evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient
period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy
arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan‘s act of closing the door facilitated
the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when
the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to
prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the
case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN NIEGAS y FALLORE

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While it is mandatory to prove it by competent
evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced from the mode, method,
and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. The
mere circumstance that accused did not personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the
crime is irrelevant when conspiracy is proven, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Facts:

Mila Rose Fernandez (Fernandez) worked for Augusto Manikis, Jr. (Augusto) as the nanny of
his son, James Augusto Manikis (James). She testified that on December 9, 2002, at around 7:30 in
the morning, she took James, who was then crying, outside the house. She saw Augusto’s driver,
accused-‐appellant Niegas, who offered to take them to Jollibee at the Maysilo Circle to pacify the
child. They used Augusto’s car, a brown Toyota Revo.

From Jollibee, Fernandez thought that accused-‐appellant Niegas was driving them home.
However, accused-‐appellant Niegas kept on driving and only stopped to allow an unknown man to
board the vehicle. She told accused-‐appellant Niegas to take them home, warning him that the
child’s grandmother might get angry. The unknown man, however, insisted that accused-‐appellant
Niegas take them to Barangka where he would alight, and accused-‐appellant Niegas complied.

Two other unknown men boarded the vehicle and sat to the left and right of Fernandez. At
Boni Avenue, she was forced to wear covered shades so she could not see anything. They drove for
around four hours, and apparently got lost somewhere in Calamba, Laguna. She heard the unknown
men asking for directions to go to a place called Larang. They detained Fernandez and James, a
minor, for eleven days, for the purpose of extorting ransom. Fernandez and James were only
released after Augusto gave them the ransom money.

Page 12 of 299


Augusto never saw accused-‐appellant Niegas since the kidnapping incident. Fernandez told
Augusto that accused-‐appellant Niegas was one of the kidnappers who took them somewhere in
Laguna, and that when she asked accused-‐appellant Niegas to help them escape, he punched her
stomach. Augusto filed a criminal complaint against accused-‐appellant Niegas in Mandaluyong City.
He thereafter learned that accused-‐appellant Niegas was arrested one year later and was told that
the person who organized the crime was the father of accused-‐appellant Niegas’s girlfriend.
The RTC of Mandaluyong City rendered its Decision finding accused-‐appellant Niegas guilty
of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-‐appellant of kidnapping
despite the absence of direct evidence to establish his criminal culpability?

Ruling:

The testimonies of Fernandez and Augusto, which were believed by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, clearly attribute all the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention to
accused-‐appellant Niegas and his companions, collectively. Specifically, Fernandez’s and Augusto’s
testimonies proved that the offenders detained Fernandez, a female, and James, a minor, for more
than three days, for the purpose of extorting ransom. The mere circumstance that accused-‐
appellant Niegas did not personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the crime is
irrelevant when conspiracy is proven, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While it is mandatory to prove it by competent
evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced from the mode,
method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. On this point, accused-‐appellant Niegas argues that mere driving and allowing other men
to board their vehicle are not sufficient to establish conspiracy. The records, however, reveal
otherwise. Accused-‐appellant Niegas’ acts unequivocally show that he was complicit in the joint
purpose and design of the kidnapping of Fernandez and James:
1. Instead of driving Fernandez and James home, accused-‐appellant Niegas kept on driving
and only stopped to allow an unknown man to board the vehicle. He later let several other men to
board;
2. When they reached their destination, it was accused-‐appellant Niegas himself who took
Fernandez and James into the concrete house. Accused-‐appellant Niegas told them that she should
follow their instructions if she wants to go home alive;
3. When Fernandez attempted to escape, it was accused-‐appellant Niegas who caught her
and pushed her towards the room;
4. When Fernandez tried to shout upon seeing an old person, accused-‐appellant Niegas
told her he will kill her if she does that.

Moreover, after the incident, accused-‐appellant Niegas did not report what happened to the
authorities or even try to contact Augusto to explain his alleged non-‐participation in the incident.
Instead, he went home to his province and it took the authorities one year to apprehend him.
Accused-‐appellant Niegas’ excuse that he lost his wallet and therefore cannot contact Augusto is
absurd, as it is inconceivable for someone’s personal driver for at least half a year to simply forget
Page 13 of 299


the address of his employer or to fail to communicate with the latter in some way and seek
permission to return to the province if he is indeed innocent. We have held on several occasions
that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when
unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked
flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.

In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to reverse the Decisions of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals finding accused-‐appellant Niegas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The trial court likewise correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is death, Republic Act No. 9346 has proscribed the imposition
of death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua.

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

SEVERINO DAVID, JR. Y ECHANE and TIMOTEO GIANAN vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 136037, August 13, 2008, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

It is well settled that unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger—not merely threatening and intimidating action. Thus, unless the victim has committed
unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no selfdefense on the part of the latter.

Facts:

Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on 01 March 1992 while Datalio was walking alone in an
alley in Valenzuela, he met David and Gianan both of whom were not his acquaintances. David
stabbed him while Gianan tried to hit him with an adobe stone, but Datalio kicked him. Wounded,
Datalio ran out of the alley and called for his sister to bring him to the hospital. At the house where
suspect Severino was, the policemen were allowed to enter by the owner. Then, Severino came out
and surrendered a fan knife.

In an Information dated March 2, 1992, Severino David, Jr. and Timoteo Gianan were
accused of frustrated homicide. The RTC found petitioner David and Gianan guilty of the crime
charged. David and Gianan appealed their conviction to the CA which affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.

In pleading selfdefense, David asserted that it was the victim Datalio who knocked on the
door of his house and challenged him to a fight. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend
himself when Datalio attempted to stab him with a bladed weapon. Gianan did not join David in the
present petition.

Issue:

Can David be acquitted because of selfdefense?

Ruling:

No.

Page 14 of 299


The accused who maintains that the killing arose from an impulse of self defense has the
onus probandi of proving the elements thereof. The essential requisites being: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
selfdefense. To invoke self defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked
attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict the injury or wound
upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

First, as narrated by petitioner David, the victim was drunk and walking in a zigzag manner
before reaching the door of his house. Clearly, if this was true, Datalio would not have been
physically strong enough to pose a danger to petitioner David who was then sober and already
sleeping inside his house. Second, after allegedly being challenged to a fight by a drunk outside his
house, we find it unbelievable that petitioner David would come out and confront this intoxicated
person if this person was in a position to harm him. It certainly goes against human nature to go
out, court danger and meet headon the alleged unlawful aggression when one is already in the
safety and confines of his own house. Third, both testimonies of petitioner David and defense
witness Ecalnir that it was the victim Datalio who was holding the fan knife when he fell down after
the scuffle are contrary to the testimony of SPO3 Montallana, that after being accosted in his sister’s
house, petitioner David came out and surren dered the fan knife allegedly used in the stabbing
incident. Fourth, petitioner David himself testified that the victim Datalio had no motive nor reason
to challenge him to a fight as they did not have any misunderstanding or disagreement. These
circumstances undeniably negate the existence of the unlawful aggression.

Verily, his act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the
police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence. Selfdefense is not credible in the face of
petitioner David’s flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities about the
incident.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO,
SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and NOEL REGALARIO
G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

When self-‐defense is invoked by an accused, the three (3) elements of self-‐defense, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

In conspiracy, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of
all, and each incurs the same criminal liability.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay
and related to one another by consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay
kagawad and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangay
tanod, is their cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the
barangay pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were enjoying the
Page 15 of 299


festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them. To avoid trouble, the two distanced
themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido
Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with their respective nightsticks, locally
known as bahi. The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he
was able to get up. He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the
barangay captain. Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was already near
Marciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano
Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-‐inch knife.
Armed with their nightsticks, appellants took turns in hitting the victim until he slumped to the
ground face down. In that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when
Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up.
Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope
used by farmers for tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.

In the early morning, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, tried to report the incident at the
police station but her statements were not entered in the police blotter because appellant Marciano
Regalario had earlier reported to them a different version of the incident. Marciano alleged that it
was the victim Sevilla who shot his brother Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed
under the custody of the barangay tanods. The policemen proceeded to the crime scene and took
the victim’s cadaver to the police station where pictures were taken showing the victim’s hands and
legs tied behind him. The cause of death was sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and
multiple lacerated wound, probably secondary to intracranial hemorrhage.

The trial court ruled out accused-‐appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, and
held that there was conspiracy among the accused-‐appellants in the commission of the crime.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the victim was killed in self-‐defense;
2. Whether or not there was conspiracy among the accused-‐appellants in the commission of the
crime;

Ruling:

1. No. When self-‐defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily
owns up to the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and that he
incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-‐defense, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, without unlawful
aggression, there can be no self-‐defense, either complete or incomplete.

Accused-‐appellant Ramon contends that the victim Rolando Sevilla committed an act of
unlawful aggression with no provocation on his Ramon’s part. Ramon testified that he was trying to
investigate a commotion when, without warning, Rolando emerged from the group, thrust and fired
his gun at him, hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon
struck the victim’s head at the back with his nightstick, causing the victim to reel backward and lean
on the bamboo fence. He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the latter from regaining his balance
and, as he pressed on farther, the victim retreated backward.
Page 16 of 299


By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head
and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive
stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but
still Ramon went beyond the call of self-‐preservation. In People v. Cajurao, we held:

The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the cessation of the
unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the
person invoking self-‐defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in
attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-‐
defense. Self-‐defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor
who is retreating from the fray.

Ramons claim of self-‐defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on
the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on
different parts of the victims body, as shown in the Medico-‐Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who
conducted the post-‐mortem examination on the victim revealed that the victim’s lacerated wounds
could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; his stab
wounds by a sharp-‐edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or
through contact with a blunt instrument. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at
Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the
force used against him by Ramon and his co-‐accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent
him from doing harm to others.

2. Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for
criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime,
however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred
from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It
does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs
the same criminal liability.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN LAURIO Y ROSALES
G.R No. 182523, September 13, 2012, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

A person who invokes self-‐defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of
self-‐defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.
Moreover, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses’
credibility are entitled to great weight and respect particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the
said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial judge
who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore is in a better position to
determine the veracity of the witnesses’ testimony.

Page 17 of 299


Facts:

A kabataang barangay kagawad and daughter of the owner of the vulcanizing shop where
Efren Laurio (Laurio) worked narrated that at around 9:30 p.m. she went to the sari-‐sari store to
buy cigarettes for her father. Upon her arrival at the store, she saw the victim, a balut vendor,
drinking a bottle of Red Horse and inquiring from the saleslady about the price of the deposit for
the bottle. As she was about to leave, the victim threw a bottle in the direction where Laurio and his
co-‐accused Gullab were engaged in a drinking spree. Gullab confronted the victim. Gullad punched
the victim, causing him to fall to the ground. It was while the victim was down that appellant
stabbed him on the chest several times. Pangan related that she saw appellant wrapping a knife
with a white hand towel bearing the inscription “Good Morning.” She then told her father about the
incident and called the police. The bloodstained towel was recovered by the second floor occupants
of the vulcanizing shop from the rest room at the first floor and was later surrendered to the police
officers. The testimony of the witness was affirmed by Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, medico-‐legal officer of
the Western Police District who was also presented as a witness by the prosecution.

After weighing the evidence presented by both parties, the RTC rendered decision finding
appellant guilty of the crime of murder which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but modified
the award of damages. Appellant filed his notice of appeal and averred that the court failed to note
his plea of self-‐defense as the victim was the one who drew a weapon first. Even assuming that self-‐
defense was not availing, appellant claims that he could only be liable for the crime of homicide
since the attack was sudden, thus negating the presence of treachery.

Issue:

Whether or not Laurio shall be held guilty of the crime charged despite his claim of self-‐
defense.

Ruling:

Yes, Laurio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

The Court has often stated that factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of
the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great weight and respect particularly when the Court of
Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the
case.It is the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge
therefore is in a better position to determine the veracity of the witnesses’ testimony.

In the present case, appellant has failed to produce any scintilla of evidence to warrant a
reexamination of the facts and circumstances as found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. In any event, well-‐settled is the rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible
and positive, is sufficient to support a conviction, even in a charge of murder.

Anent his claim of self-‐defense, appellant had to prove the following essential elements: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-‐defense. A person who invokes self-‐defense has the burden of proof. He must prove
Page 18 of 299


all the elements of self-‐defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-‐
defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression is an
actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of
threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It
“presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -‐ not merely threatening and
intimidating action.” It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to
one's life.”

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. Mere allegation by
appellant that the victim pulled out a knife is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression and warrant
the justification of the victim’s killing. In fact, the testimony of eyewitness Pangan shows that the
victim, who had fallen on the ground when he was repeatedly stabbed by appellant, was not
capable of unlawful aggression.

Contrary to his claim of self-‐defense, appellant’s act of stabbing the victim while he was
down demonstrates treachery. We previously ruled that treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. M. MALICDEM

Self-‐defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and
appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-‐defense or by accident without
fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative
defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.
Facts:
At around 9:00 p.m., while the witnesses and victims were seated on the septic tank,
Malicdem Marcial Malicdem (Malicdem) arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his godson,
Rogelio Molina (Rogelio). They answered in the negative. They noticed that Malicdem was reeking
of alcohol and was drunk. Malicdem asked again for the whereabouts of Rogelio. As they stood to
leave, Malicdem suddenly embraced Wilson and lunged a six-‐inch knife to the left part of his chest.
When he moved to strike again, Wilson was able to deflect this blow which resulted to a cut on his
right arm. Intending to help his friend, Bernardo was hit by the knife in his stomach. In the course of
aiding Wilson, Joel boxed the appellant. During the brawl, Francisco Molina, Rogelio’s father,
arrived at the scene, but was stabbed in the stomach by appellant. Appellant then ran away.
Afterwards, Joel brought Wilson aboard a police patrol car to the Region I Medical Center in
Dagupan City where Wilson was declared dead on arrival.
The RTC, after observing inconsistencies in the testimonies of the appellant and his wife,
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC as to damages.
Page 19 of 299


Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Malicdem shall be held guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
Yes, Malicdem is guilty.
Time and again, this Court has stated that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction, it
generally defers to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses especially if such
findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This must be so since the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.
Given the factual circumstances of the present case, we see no need to depart from the
foregoing rules. Appellant failed to present proof of any showing that the trial court overlooked,
misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case. Prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant to have stabbed
the victim.
We agree that the death of Wilson at the hands of appellant was not occasioned by self-‐
defense. For this Court to consider self-‐defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has to prove
the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to selfdefense. The Court has repeatedly stated that
a person who invokes selfdefense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also
considers unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as the most important of these elements.
Thus, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-‐defense to be successfully pleaded,
whether complete or incomplete.
Based on the summary of facts by the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defense
failed to discharge its burden to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Wilson by sufficient and
satisfactory proof. The records were bereft of any indication that the attack by Wilson was not a
mere threat or just imaginary. Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were just in the act of leaving when
appellant suddenly plunged a knife to Wilson’s chest.
Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant’s act of suddenly
stabbing Wilson as he was about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As
we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Here, appellant caught Wilson by surprise when he suddenly embraced him and
proceeded immediately to plunge a knife to his chest. The swift turn of events did not allow Wilson
to defend himself, in effect, assuring appellant that he complete the crime without risk to his own
person.
Self-‐defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear
Page 20 of 299


and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial
and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-‐defense or by accident
without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such
affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be
acquitted.
Hence, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR
G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of
greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the evil
sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and (3)
there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Moreover, Punzalan failed to
satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so
that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort
and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without
causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may
be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be taken.

Facts:
In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio
Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members
of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and
Training Command (NETC) in , San Antonio, Zambales.

On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the “AllinOne”
Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby
videoke bar, “Aquarius,” where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heated
argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr (Punzalan) regarding a flickering
light bulb inside “Aquarius.” When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off (“Patayin ang
ilaw”), Punzalan who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement
belligerently reacted asking, “Sinong papatayin?,” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was
directed at him.

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to the
NETC camp. They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first group,
followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last
group, with each group at one arm’s length distance from the other. Along the way, they passed by
the NETC sentry gate. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some
barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions.

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala
flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The
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sentries approached the van and recognized Punzalan, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver.
Punzalan angrily uttered, “kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!,” while pointing toward the direction of the
navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, Punzalan shifted gears
and sped away while uttering, “papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!” While F1EN Dimaala was writing the
van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly heard a loud thud.

Punzalan, who was driving his van from behind, suddenly bumped and ran over the victims.
The victims were thrown away, resulting in the instantaneous death of SN1 Duclayna and SN1
Andal and causing injuries to the other victims.

Punzalan was later charged for double murder and multiple attempted murder. RTC
convicted Punzalan as indicted. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.

Punzalan claimed that the trial court erred in not finding that he may not be held criminally
liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance under
paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. His act of increasing his vehicle’s speed was
reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men whose four companions were also
approaching. He asserted that the attack against him by the two navy personnel constituted actual
and imminent danger to his life and limb. The sight of the four approaching companions of his
attackers created in his mind a fear of greater evil, prompting him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a
greater evil or injury to himself. According to Punzalan, if he accidentally hit the approaching navy
men in the process, he could not be held criminally liable therefor. The instinct of self-‐preservation
would make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying
circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code

Ruling:

No. Punzalan did not act in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance
under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
After a thorough review of the records of this case and the arguments of the parties, this
Court affirms appellant’s conviction.

Punzalan’s version of the crime, upon which the justifying circumstance of avoidance of
greater evil or injury is invoked, is baseless. This is because his assertions anent the existence of the
evil which he sought to be avoided did not actually exist as they neither conformed to the evidence
at hand nor were they consistent with the testimony of his own witness, Alicia Eusantos.

Punzalan’s own witness, Alicia Eusantos, not only failed to corroborate his claim but also
belied his claim that he was attacked by the Philippine Navy personnel. Alicia Eusantos
categorically stated that she did not witness any unusual incident in the evening of August 10, 2002
while on board the Nissan Urvan Van driven by Punzalan while they were cruising the access road
going to the NETC compound. Punzalan claim, therefore, is more imaginary than real. The justifying
circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury cannot be invoked by the Punzalan as the alleged
evil sought to be avoided does not actually exist
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Moreover, whether or not Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question
of fact. It is an issue which concerns doubt or difference arising as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts. This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts. There is nothing that would indicate that
the RTC and the Court of Appeals “ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.”

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of
greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the
evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
and (3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected Punzalan’s s self-‐serving and uncorroborated
claim of avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even Punzalan’s own
witness who was in the van with appellant at the time of the incident contradicted appellant’s claim.
Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the evil Punzalan claimed to avoid did not
actually exist. This Court agrees.

Moreover, Punzalan failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and
less harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may
be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there
is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no
such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to
one’s self, then such course should be taken.

In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width,
and the place was well-‐lighted. Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or
structures. Punzalan was a driver by occupation. However, Punzalan himself testified that when he
shifted to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy
personnel approaching from in front of him, he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might run
them over. He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available
means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO y PAULINO

A person who invokes self-‐defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of
self-‐defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-‐defense to be successfully pleaded,

Facts:

At around midnight of February 10, 2001, Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio
(Inocencio) were causing a ruckus on Libertad Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water
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bottles at passersby. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante (Alfante), who was
seemingly drunk, walked down the street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: “Pare,
mukhang high na high ka.”Alfante retorted: “Anong pakialam mo?” At this juncture, Vergara threw
his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante.
Vergara then said “Taga rito ako.”

Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several
witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.

In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February
10, 2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for
“baon” the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go
to the 711 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and
proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of
the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his
side for the duration of the incident. Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police
station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his
right palm sustained during the tussle.

After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001,
the RTC found Vergara and Inocencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as principal and accomplice, respectively.

On March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of
damages the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Vergara and Inocencio are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-‐
defense under Article 11, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:

No. They are not entitled.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury. It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger —
not merely threatening and intimidating action.” It is present “only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to one’s life.”

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all
the witnesses, the victim’s actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of
force employed by Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home albeit drunk
when he passed by Vergara. However, there is no indication of any untoward action from him to
warrant the treatment that he had by Vergara’s hands.

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The victim was just walking, he [was] neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the
Vergara and Inocencio into a fight. Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put
the life of the victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim.

It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of
Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-‐defense.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO,
SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and NOEL REGALARIO
G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009, J. De Castro

To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available
to the person attacked to defend himself.

Tying the victim hog-‐style after rendering him immobilized constituted outraging or scoffing
at the corpse of the victim.

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in such a manner that it
shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of finding and
capturing him.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay
and related to one another by consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay
kagawad and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangay
tanod, is their cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the
barangay pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were enjoying the
festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them. To avoid trouble, the two distanced
themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido
Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with their respective nightsticks, locally
known as bahi. The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he
was able to get up. He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the
barangay captain. Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was already near
Marciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano
Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-‐inch knife.
Armed with their nightsticks, appellants took turns in hitting the victim until he slumped to the
ground face down. In that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when
Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up.
Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope
used by farmers for tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.

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In the early morning, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, tried to report the incident at the
police station but her statements were not entered in the police blotter because appellant Marciano
Regalario had earlier reported to them a different version of the incident. Marciano alleged that it
was the victim Sevilla who shot his brother Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed
under the custody of the barangay tanods. The policemen proceeded to the crime scene and took
the victim’s cadaver to the police station where pictures were taken showing the victim’s hands and
legs tied behind him. The cause of death was sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and
multiple lacerated wound, probably secondary to intracranial hemorrhage.

The trial court ruled out accused-‐appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, and
held that there was conspiracy among the accused-‐appellants in the commission of the crime. It
further ruled that the killing was qualified to murder by abuse of superior strength and by their
scoffing at the body of the victim. It also appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. On appeal, the CA did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of the accused-‐appellants.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime was committed with a qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength;
2. Whether or not the crime was committed with a generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at
the body of the victim;
3. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated

Ruling:
1. Yes. To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means
available to the person attacked to defend himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly
shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage thereof. In
this case, as testified to by the prosecution eyewitnesses, accused-‐appellants Ramon, Sotero and
Bienvenido, with the exception of Marciano, were armed with nightsticks (bahi) while Noel was
holding a knife. Clearly they took advantage of their superiority in number and arms in killing the
victim, as shown by numerous wounds the latter suffered in different parts of his body.

2. Yes. Accused-‐appellants did not just kill the victim. They tied him hog-‐style after rendering him
immobilized. This action constituted outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. In this
connection, we agree with the trial courts observation:

Not satisfied with delivering mortal blows even when their hapless victim was
already immobile, Bienvenido and Sotero, upon order of their co-‐accused Marciano,
tied their victim hog style. The manner by which Rolando was tied as vividly
captured in the picture clearly speaks for itself that it was nothing but to scoff at
their victim.

3. No. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in such a manner that it
shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of finding and
capturing him. In the case at bar, accused-‐appellants remained at large even after Judge Jose S.
Saez issued the warrant for their arrest on February 6, 1998. Accused-‐appellants surrendered
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only on September 9, 1998 after several alias warrants of arrest were issued against them. Hence,
voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in their favor as mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ASILAN Y TABORNAL
G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

It is basic in our penal law that treachery is present when the offender employs means,
methods or forms which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

Joseph Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.

The prosecution, based on the testimony of Joselito Binosa, narrated that in one evening,
Binosa while chatting with his friends heard a gunshot nearby. He then went to the place where the
sound came and from where he was standing, he saw a uniformed policeman, who was arresting
someone and order the latter to lay on the ground.

The police officer pushed the man to the wall and was about to handcuff the latter when
another man, Asilan, arrived, drew something from his back and stabbed the police officer on his
back several times until the latter fell to the ground. The man who was being arrested then took the
officer’s gun and shot the latter with it.

Binosa then threw stones at the malefactors who subsequently left the place. Then, Binosa
followed Asilan and his companion. Thereafter Asilan returned to the place of the incident. At that
moment, a policeman passed by and Binosa pointed Asilan to him. Asilan then was arrested and the
knife which was used in the stabbing was confiscated by the policeman.

In his defense, Asilan stated that while he was waiting for a jeepneet, 3 motorcycles stopped
in front of him, the passengers of which approached and frisked him. He was thereafter brought to
the police station and he was forced to admit the stabbing of a police officer.

The RTC acquitted Asilan for the crime of direct assault for the reason that the prosecution
failed to establish that the police officer was in the performance of his duty. On the other, the RTC
convicted him for the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming in toto
the RTC’s ruling. Hence this appeal.

One of the arguments of Asilan was that treachery cannot be appreciated in the presennt
case as the prosecution failed to establish that he had consciously or deliberately adopted the mode
of attack employed upon the police officer. He further argues that the mere suddenness of the
attack is not enough to constitute treachery.

Issue:

Whether the RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in killing
the police officer

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Ruling:

Yes.

It is basic in our penal law that treachery is present when the offender employs means,
methods or forms which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.

The eyewitness testified on how Asilan attacked the police officer from behind. The police
officer could not have defended himself because Asilan stabbed him at his back repeatedly sans
provocation or warning. The deciding factor is that Asilan’s execution of his attack made it
impossible for the police officer to defend himself or retaliate.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA
G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

When the victim was stabbed by accused, the latter inside the trial, judicial notice can be taken
that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of
the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car.
Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both
from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, treachery is present. There is
treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately
and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an
appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself.

Furthermore, in a case of special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design
of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.

Facts:

On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita (Lita),
accompanied by his ten-‐year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the former’s black Kawasaki
tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino (Aquino)
together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter Doe boarded the
tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by Aquino.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, Aquino and his companions had a shabu session while
Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money. Bing suggested to her
companions that they leave the nipa hut, thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started the
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engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while Aquino and
Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson sitting at the toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle,
Aquino pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the Lita’s side. After the Lita
was stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while Aquino drove the tricycle to his friend’s
house where they again stabbed Lita using the latter’s own knife. Then they loaded the victim to the
tricycle and drove to a grassy area where Aquino and his companions dumped the body of Lita.
Thereafter, they returned to Aquino’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of Aquino about the death
of his father but the sister only told him to sleep.

The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get
home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-‐Lita, about the death of his father. Ma.
Theresa Calitisan-‐Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met a police
outside their residence. The police informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found in
Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told the police that he was with his father at the time of his death
and he brought the police officers to the place where his father was stabbed and to the hut owned
by Aquino. Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of
Lita. Aquino was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does
not know anything about the incident. The police officers were able to obtain a picture of Aquino
which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as "Akong" one of those who
stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was shown to
Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also
stabbed his father. Aquino denied the accusations against him.

RTC found Aquino guilty for murder and carnapping; the CA affirmed the decision with
modifications on penalties.

Issues:

1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the killing.
2) Whether the CA committed an error on the imposition of penalty.

Ruling:

1) Treachery is present in the case at bar.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. The Court has
consistently held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. On this point, we quote with approval the Court of Appeals’ discussion of this aspect of
the case, to wit:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since
what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the
lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the
place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle
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driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the
side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car.
Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his
body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the
trial court’s finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means,
methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an
appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself.

2) No, the CA did not commit any error in the imposition of penalty.

Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide,
there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the
original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The appellate court correctly observed
that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because the
carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim’s death was already fait accompli. Thus,
appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO,
EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI

The accused, charged for the felony of murder, questions the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of strength when the same was not in the Information. The Court ruled that
even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify
or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

Facts:

Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi was
charged for the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code when the accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with intent to kill, by means of
treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack,
assault and shot Pionio Yacapin, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that caused his death
thereafter. Prosecution presented as witness Ronie Dacion, a 14-‐year old stepson of the Yacapin,
testified that on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao,
Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of
firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot,
Talakag, Bukidnon. The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12-‐
year old stepson of the victim, corroborates the testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion. The
RTC ruled that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt; CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
thus, the instant petition.
Issue:
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Whether the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength when the same was not alleged in the information.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
Contrary to appellants’ claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior

strength was used by the trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by appellants to murder
despite it not having been alleged in the criminal information filed against them, the text of the
assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of the trial court clearly shows that, even though abuse of
superior strength was discussed as present in the commission of the crime, it was not appreciated
as either a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which
was alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to
murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and
proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is
jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
Time and again, SC has declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. Furthermore, SC has also held that the essence of treachery
is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In the case at
bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of
treachery. We quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter,
to wit:
Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution. The
Court notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was
making a fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the
bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) personnel, shows the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by
the victim. The chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
TREACHERY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE JADAP

The essence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery is the suddenness, surprise and the
lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity
for self-‐defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.

Facts:
Page 31 of 299


In the evening of February 20, 2001, Robert Alisbo (Alisbo), the victim, together with his
friends were in a drinking spree at Raagas Beach Resort. The group were in a spot lighted by a
fluorescent light approximately 2.5 meters away from them. Around 9:30 p.m., Dante Jadap (Jadap)
suddenly appeared from nowhere behind Robert Alisbo and Rollie Arciso. Without provocation
from the latter’s group, Jadap took out a .38 caliber revolver and shot Alisbo, hitting him on the
right side of his body which caused his death. Then, he pointed the gun at the friends of Alisbo and
fired it twice, causing them to immediately scamper away. However, Rollie Arciso, Lenderico
Sabanal, and Ferlin Alberca stayed, taking cover under the cottage’s table. He hit Ferlin Alberca and
Lenderico Sabanal who was injured on his left leg. Thereafter, accused-‐appellant casually walked
away towards Bayabas, a nearby barangay. On July 3, 2001, an Information was filed against Jadap
charging him with the crime of murder. Eventually, the trial court rendered a decision finding him
guilty of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed
firearm. The appellate court affirmed the said decision with modification only as to the penalty
imposed. As he was ordered to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection, the entire
record of the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: 1) Alisbo's friends who were
eyewitnesses to the said crime; and 2) Dr. Ryan R. Mortiz who operated on the victim. The latter
testified that the wound was considered fatal because the bullet entered the chest area through the
right side of the body, about 6" below the nipple with no exit wound, the slug was found on and
damaged the spinal cord, including the right lung and chest cavity. They also presented proof that
Jadap was not a licensed firearm holder.

Accused Jadap, a former police officer who was discharged from the service due to absence
without leave, contended that he stayed at Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro which is about a kilometer
away from Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro, with his children as he was separated de facto from his wife.
He only goes to the latter place whenever his wife calls him to fetch their children. On the night
when the crime was committed, he argued that he was at home attending to his two children and
that he never knew that he was charged of murder until the time his wife turned him over to the
police due to a misunderstanding.

Issue:

Whether or not Jadap was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified
by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm.

Ruling:

The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Jadap was established by the following:
1) It has been settled that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal considering that the trial court was in a better
position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial. Its findings on the credibility of witnesses and the facts
must be given great weight on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Here, there is no reason to deviate from the
trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Page 32 of 299


2) The defense of Jadap of denial and alibi cannot stand taller than the positive identification of the
eyewitnesses presented. Their testimonies were straightforward, clear and consistent and they
could not be mistaken in pinpointing Jadap as the person who gunned down Alisbo, because the
place where the incident happened was illuminated by a fluorescent light. Also, Jadap did not even
rebut their testimonies that they knew him. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the
accused was somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of the access between the two places. In the case at bar, Jadap failed to prove the element of
physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it took place. He himself
admitted that it would only take him about ten minutes to walk from his house in Bayabas to his
wife’s house at Raagas Beach, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, where the crime was committed.

3) The truthfulness of the testimonies of the witnesses presented was also bolstered by the physical
evidence supported by the testimony of the doctor who operated on the victim.

4) Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that
treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the
offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what
must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such
means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-‐defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that
the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-‐defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.

In the case at bar, evidently, the attack was unexpected and swift. The victim and his friends
were drinking on the beach when Jadap suddenly appeared from behind, walked towards their
right side, and without any warning pulled out a gun and fired at the victim. This shot was followed
by more shots directed at the victim’s friends. The victim had no opportunity to defend himself and
Jadap was not exposed to any danger in view of the unexpected attack. Also, he deliberately and
consciously adopted his mode of attack by using a .38 caliber revolver and made sure that the
victim, who was unarmed, would have no chance to defend himself.

5) Records also show that Jadap was not a licensed firearm holder. Pursuant to Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 8294, when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of the crime, it should
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Hence, taking into account all the foregoing considerations, the penalty imposed should be
the maximum penalty, which is death. However, in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," on June 24, 2006, the
penalty imposed must be reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMSON ESCLETO

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
Page 33 of 299


means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

Samson Escleto was charged with the crime of murder of Alfredo Marchan.

During the trial, the prosecution presented Benjamin Austria, who was personally present
during the stabbing. According to the prosecution, Alfredo and Merly Marchan was on their way
home from a birthday party when they passed by Benjamin’s house. Benjamin and Samson were
drinking wine at the balcony of the said house. Samson called Alfredo. Subsequently, Samson went
down from the balcony as Alfredo dismounted from the caraboa and approached Samson. However,
once Samson and Alfredo were facing another, Samson suddenly stabbed Alfredo in the chest,
causing Alfredo’s death. Samson fled right after the stabbing.

The defense presented a totally different version. Samson testified that while Samson and
Alfredo grappled with each other, Benjamin approached them. Benjamin tried to stab Samson but
accidentally hit Alfredo in the chest instead. Hence, Samson ran away.

The RTC promulgated a decision finding Samson Escleto to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The RTC further found that Samson employed treachery in killing Alfredo, therefore
qualifying the crime committed to murder.

Issue:

Whether treachery attended Samson’s stabbing to death of Alfredo, hence qualifying the
crime of murder

Ruling:

Yes.

The stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

We have also held that: in order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements
must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.

While it is true that in this case the attack on Alfredo was frontal, the same was so sudden
and unexpected. Alfredo was completely unaware of the imminent peril to his life. Alfredo was
walking to meet Samson, expecting that they would only talk. Alfredo was unarmed while Samson
had a knife. Alfredo was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself and repel Samsons attack.

Page 34 of 299


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA,"

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

While victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Novaliches, Quezon City,
appellant, Ramil Rarugal, with the use of a long double-‐bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus,
forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, Ramil hurriedly fled the scene. This
incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-‐Jar, who positively identified appellant in court. Florendo
arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato.
When Renato recounted the events of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and
his other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to
Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital, due to the
unavailability of blood. It was there that Florendo.

In his defense, Ramil Rarugal denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at that time
working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan. He said he was living with his
cousin in Pangasinan, where he had been staying since 1997. He stated that during the period 1997
to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any point.

RTC found Rarugal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime?

Ruling:

Yes. Qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.

Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that Rarugal’s act of suddenly stabbing
Florendo while he was innocently cycling along Novaliches, Quezon City constituted the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Here, Rarugal surprised Florendo when he suddenly
and swiftly attacked and stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless
to protect himself, allowing Rarugal to commit the crime without risk to his own person.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL MORES
G.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro
The manner by which appellant deliberately rolled the grenade on the ground towards the
dance floor packed with the unsuspecting revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the
Page 35 of 299


aftermath of the sudden blast was accompanied with treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
Facts:
The accused appellant was charged with the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder. He pleaded not guilty to the charged. Upon trial, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were summarized in this manner: In the evening of January 24, 1994, while
of the Roxas Gymnasium, and while a dance was being held, the accused-‐appellant was seen to
pulled out a round object from his left pocket, transferred it to his right hand and then threw it on
the dance floor full of revelers as if rolling a ball. Thereafter an explosion occurred causing the
death of Ramie Balasa and multiple injuries to other victims. When apprehended, the accused
interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that in the evening of January 24, 1994 he
slept early at his house with his wife and their two-‐year old child.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, hence
the automatic review.
Issue:
1. Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in
the commission of the crime charged
2. Whether the accused appellant is guilty of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder
Ruling:
1. No. Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code states that “there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, , employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” It is long settled in
jurisprudence that two elements must concur in order to establish treachery: (a) that at the time of
the attack. The victim was not in a position to defend himself; (that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means of attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the helpless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape.
The manner by which appellant deliberately rolled the grenade on the ground towards the
dance floor packed with the unsuspecting revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the
aftermath of the sudden blast was accompanied with treachery. Mores’ unexpected action which
was immediately followed by the grenade’s lethal explosion left the victims with utterly no chance
to escape that blast area nor to find protective cover. Though Mores stood a short distance away. He
knowingly positioned himself safely from the reach of the grenade’s destructive force. The
foregoing can confidently conclude the presence of treachery.
2. Yes. The single act of pitching or rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium
which resulted in the death of Ramie Balasa and injuries to other victims constituted a complex
crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which states that when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
Page 36 of 299


the same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for the most serious crime of Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpertua to death. Thus, applying Article
48, the death penalty should be imposed. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the proper
sentence therefore is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LITO HATSERO

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape.

Facts:

Thirty-‐eight year old truck driver Alex Barroa (Barroa) testified that the victim, Mamerto
Gravo (Gravo), was the first cousin of his wife. He knew Lito Hatsero (Hatsero) as a hauler or
“pakyador” of sugarcane in their place.

On August 27, 2000, at 12:30 a.m., Barroa was with Gravo, celebrating the barangay fiesta at
the dance hall of Sitio Tunga, Barangay Dulangan, Pilar, Capiz. Barroa and Gravo were about to go
home when they passed by a group drinking behind the dance hall, in front of the store of a certain
Yulo. He recognized Hatsero as one of the drinkers, but failed to recognize his companion who was
seated in a dark place. Hatsero invited Gravo to have a drink. While Gravo was holding the glass,
Hatsero stabbed him, and ran towards the store. Gravo was not armed when this happened.
Barroa saw everything since he was only about 58 inches away from them. Barroa was stunned
with what he saw, but he managed to run towards the door of the gate of the dance hall, where he
got people to help him bring Gravo via a tricycle to the Bailan District Hospital. Barroa then had the
incident recorded with the Barangay Captain.

Lito Hatsero was 33 years old at the time of his testimony. He was a lumberjack chainsaw
operator. He testified that he was sleeping in his house at around 12:30 a.m., on August 27, 2000.
Earlier in the evening, however, he went with his children to the dance hall. He asserted that he left
the dance hall at around 10:00 p.m., denied having killed Mamerto Gravo, and believed that he was
implicated because he refused Mamerto Gravo’s wife’s request to be a witness when she asked him
to pinpoint the real killer. He denied knowing Alex Barroa, and claimed that the latter’s testimony is
incredible as he was wrong as regards the number of wounds inflicted.

On August 22, 2006, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting Hatsero of the crime of
murder. The trial court held that Hatsero was positively identified as the assailant, that the
eyewitness account was categorical and consistent, and that there was no showing of ill motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, failed to conclusively
establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate
time of its commission.

Page 37 of 299


Hatsero elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which rendered its Decision affirming the
conviction. The Court of Appeals agreed with the assessment of the trial court that Alex Barroa
described the stabbing incident in a clear and convincing manner.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the defense of alibi by Hatsero is sufficient to rebut the positive
identification of Barroa that the former killed Gravo.
2. Whether or not there exist a qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Ruling:

1. No. It is not sufficient.

In the face of this positive identification, Hatsero puts up the defense of alibi, claiming that
he was sleeping in his house at the time of the incident. It has been consistently held by this Court
that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. In the case of Hatsero, however, it was
established in his very own direct testimony that his house is within the immediate vicinity of the
scene of the crime.

Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. In
the case at bar, it is even weaker because of the failure of Hatsero to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti at the time of the crime, and in the face of the positive
identification made by Barroa.

2. Yes. Treachery exists.

“The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape.” The manner Mamerto Gravo was stabbed by Hatsero has treachery written all
over it. The Supreme Court cannot think of any other reason Hatsero would make the friendly
gesture of offering a drink to a person he intended to kill, other than to intentionally lure the latter
into a false sense of security.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRY SABANGAN and NOLI BORNASAL

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.

Facts:
Page 38 of 299


Accused-‐appellant Gerry Sabangan was charged with murder for the death of Barangay
Captain Abe Felonia together with his co-‐accused, Noli Bornasal. Both accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged against them.

Prosecution presented the testimonies of 2 witnesses who saw Sabangan shoot the victim to
death; another witness who saw both accused running away from the vicinity immediately after the
shooting incident; the Chief of Police of Kidapawan City who investigated the shooting incident; and
the daughter of the victim who testified on the damages suffered by Felonia’s heirs.

According to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, on December 27, 1999, the
victim (Abe Felonia) who was the barangay captain of Duroloman, Arakan, Cotabato, was gunned
down at Mega Market in Kidapawan City. Eden Allado and Flora Navales testified that they were
inside a store at Mega Market with the victim when the accused went inside the store and shot the
victim three times at the back of the head of Felonia.

Roberto Badian, the Chief of Polcie of Kidapawan said he conducted an investigation right
after the shooting incident and came up with the information from bystanders and witnesses that
Gerry Sabangan who had a pending robbery case in Kidapawan but out on bail, was one of the
suspects. Thereafter, when Gerry Sabangan was spotted in Antipaz, he was invited to the police
safehouse where the 3 witnesses positively identified and pointed the accused as the man who shot
the victim. Sabangan was arrested and locked up in jail and a case for murder against him was
initiated by the police. Accused Noli Bornasal was subsequently apprehended based on the account
of one witness who testified that he saw him running away from the vicinity with Sabangan
immediately after the shooting incident.

Sabangan denied the accusations against him and put up the defense that he was at
Barangay Luhong, Antipas, Cotabato at the time of the incident, helping in the preparation of a
wedding ceremony of a relative. He argued that it was physically impossible for him, on the date of
the shooting incident, to be in Kidapawan City when Felonia was killed considering that Kidapawan
City was approximately 40 kilometers away from Antipaz, Cotabato. Sabangan also complained of
the irregularity in the conduct of the investigating police officers during the out-‐of-‐court
identification of Sabangan by the witnesses.

Bornasal argued, on the other hand that no other circumstantial evidence was presented by
the prosecution to establish the alleged conspiracy between him and Sabangan to kill Felonia.

The RTC found both Sabangan and Bornasal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder
of Felonia. On appeal, both accused asserted that the award of actual damages in the total sum of
P234,080.00 was excessive, contrary to what was sufficiently proven during trial.

The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of Sabangan but acquitted Bornasal on the
ground of reasonable doubt, and modified the award of damages. Hence the instant petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not accused Sabangan is guilty for the crime of murder?
2. Was there convincing proof of evident premeditation in the case at bar?

Page 39 of 299


Ruling:

1. Yes, the totality of evidence for the prosecution against Sabangan established with moral
certainty all the essential elements of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victims.

In this case, Felonia was at a store, chatting with Allado. He was unarmed with his guard
down. Sabangan went in and out of the store, around three times, apparently waiting for the perfect
opportunity to commit the crime. When he saw his chance, Sabangan positioned himself behind the
unsuspecting Felonia, suddenly brought out his gun, and without the slightest provocation on
Felonia’s part, shot the latter once in the head and twice in the back. Sabangan clearly employed
treachery in killing Felonia. Sabangan’s attack on Felonia was sudden and unexpected, the manner
of which was deliberately adopted to give Felonia little or no chance at all to defend himself or
retaliate.

2. No, the Court found no convincing proof of evident premeditation in the case at bar.

In order to be appreciated, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be
“evident premeditation.” To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must
establish the confluence of the following requisites:

(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and
(c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder,
must be established by clear and positive evidence showing the planning and the preparation
stages prior to the killing. Without such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter
how logical and probable, will not suffice.

In this case, the prosecution’s evidence pertained merely to the actual commission by
Sabangan of the crime. It did not submit any proof that Sabangan, at some prior time, determined to
kill Felonia; that Sabangan performed an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination to kill Felonia; and that there was sufficient interval of time between his
determination and execution which allowed Sabangan to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

In order to give credence to the defense of alibi, it must not only appear that the accused
interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Page 40 of 299


In the case at bench, it was established that the travel time from Luhong to Kidapawan City
is only about an hour. As such, it was not physically impossible for accused Gerry Sabangan to travel
from Luhong to Kidapawan City, the place where the crime was committed, simply because you can
reach Kidapawan for only an hour by riding on a Jeepney from Luhong.

There is no cogent reason for the Court to overturn the credence and evidentiary value
accorded by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the positive identification of Sabangan as
Felonia’s assailant by the disinterested witnesses of the prosecution, rather than Sabangan’s alibi,
corroborated by his relatives, that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y
JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y CRUZ

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because
he does not act with freedom. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated
must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. A threat of future injury is not enough.

Facts:

On September 27, 1999, while Jundoc and Jingabo were tending to their fish stall in Iloilo
Public Market, Dequina, their friend, came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed
reason, at the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the morning of the following day, September
28, 1999. As agreed upon, they met at the designated place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally
joined them.They knew Sally to be Dequina’s supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while,
Dequina and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of the mall where they talked
privately. Soon after Sally left, Jingabo and Jundoc asked Dequina what they talked about. Instead of
answering, Dequina asked if they are willing to go with her to Manila in order to get
something. While a little bit surprised, Jingabo and Jundoc readily agreed as they had never been in
the city before. Dequina handed to them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were
given by Sally. However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names but in the
names of other persons. When they called the attention of Dequina about it, the latter simply
replied “Anyway that is free”. Jingabo noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at that
time. Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila at around 7:45 a.m. of September 28,
1999.

From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the house of Dequina’s aunt in
Guadalupe, Makati City. In the afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar
vehicles. Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the house. Unmindful about it,
they left Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to a Philippine Rabbit Bus
Terminal. Thereat, two male persons approached Dequina and handed to her bus tickets. They were
pointed to the particular vehicle where they were to board.

Page 41 of 299


They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. of September 29,
1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple approached Dequina and they had a
talk. Thereafter, the couple motioned them to three male persons, each carrying a bag, at the
opposite side of the road. Upon Dequina’s instruction, they took the bags from the three men. Then,
they waited for their ride back to Manila.

As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside the compartment. They
alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting
tricycle. When they reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton boxes where they loaded
two of the three bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed Dequina to a waiting taxi where they
boarded along with their baggages.

As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a mobile patrol car ordered
them to stop. They were ordered to alight and the police officers ordered the driver to open the
taxi’s compartment. One of the police officers took a knife from his pocket and slashed one of the
bags. Then, the policemen told them that what they had in their bags were marijuana. The police
officers ordered them to board the mobile car while the bags were loaded inside the compartment
of the same car.

They were brought to a sari-‐sari store where a certain Chief Sapitula, whom they later knew
to be the police officers superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated Dequina and at one point, he
slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people who took their photographs. Thereafter, they were
brought to the Hospital ng Bayan and finally, to the police precinct were they were charged
accordingly.

In its Decision dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed accused-‐appellants
conviction. Hence, accused-‐appellants appealed to this Court.

In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she transported
the marijuana under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand,
claim that they went along to accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.

Issue:

Whether or not Dequina’s contention that she acted under compulsion and Jundoc and
Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in Dequina are meritorious.

Ruling:

We are unconvinced with Dequina’s contention that she acted under compulsion and
Jundoc and Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in Dequina.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me
against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor
to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-‐
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury
Page 42 of 299


is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the
accused for escape or self-‐defense in equal combat. Here, Dequinas version of events that
culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabos arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally
far-‐fetched is Jundoc and Jingabos assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the
transportation of marijuana.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although the
same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the
presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANICETO BULAGAO
G.R. No. 184757, October 5, 2011, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

For the defense of Bulagao that he was suffering from mental retardation be given credit,
There must be a showing from the findings of the psychologist that Bulagao had the same mental or
psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. The RTC noted that the psychological
examination of Bulagao was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the complained
of incidents. Even assuming that accused-‐appellant was of such mental state at the time of the
incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-‐appellant had the capacity to discern right from
wrong.

Facts:

Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate Informations both dated
December 21, 2000. On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room
which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody enter the room. She
recognized Bulagao as the intruder, and saw that he was holding a knife. Bulagao poked the knife at
AAAs neck, causing her to freeze in fear. Bulagao removed AAAs clothes, and then his own. Both
AAA and Bulagao were wearing t-‐shirt and shorts before the undressing. Bulagao kissed her neck
and inserted his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but Bulagao did not stop and
continued raping AAA for one hour.

On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in Lolomboy,
Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in the second floor of the
house, where there are no rooms. AAA was roused from her sleep when Bulagao was already
undressing her. Bulagao removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to
resist, but Bulagao held her hands. Bulagao then touched her breasts and kissed her. And he
remained on top of her for half an hour. AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the
rape incidents. Upon learning of the same, BBB, the mother did not believe AAA and whipped her.

Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, Bulagao pleaded not guilty on both
counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand
for the prosecution. AAA was born on April 13, 1986 (14 years old). In April 2000, AAA arrived
from the province and settled in the house of her brother DDD and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and Aniceto Bulagao, and her
Page 43 of 299


younger sister, then six-‐year-‐old FFF who were also the children of BBB, the mother and CCC, the
father (deceased) AAA being an adopted child.

When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year later, it also
presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the prosecution. This time, she
testified that the sexual encounters between her and the Bulagao appellant were consensual. She
fabricated the charge of rape against the Bulagao because she was supposedly angry with him. She
also claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who investigated the incident to say that
the accused-‐appellant used a knife. She also testified that she was raped by her father CCC when she
was seven years old. She was recanting her previous testimony because she purportedly was no
longer angry with Bulagao.

On redirect examination, AAA testified that Bulagao did not force himself upon her. She
affirmed that he had a little defect in his mind. Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma,
a clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on Aniceto Bulagao, and found that
Bulagao was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. Aniceto Bulagao, who
was 40 years old claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He denied pointing a knife
at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was asking for P300 from him after they kissed. He
also testified that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA (ampun-‐ampunan lang). On
January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Hence, accused-‐appellant interposed the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Aniceto Bulagao was suffering from mental retardation that would entitle
him of an exempting circumstance.

Ruling:

No, Bulagao is not entitled to an exempting circumstance.

As regards the defense of Bulagao that he was suffering from mental retardation, the RTC
noted that the psychological examination of Bulagao was conducted more than a couple of years
after the dates of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the
psychologist that accused-‐appellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of
the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-‐appellant was of such mental state at the time of the
incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-‐appellant had the capacity to discern right from
wrong.

Accused-‐appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he
was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court
that there was no proof that the mental condition accused-‐appellant allegedly exhibited when he
was examined by Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-‐appellant
proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of
intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason
Page 44 of 299


or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD O. SARCIA
G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

When the prosecution fails to prove the exact date of the commission of the offense and there is
a question whether the accused reached the age of majority at the time of the commission, such
question shall be resolved in favor of the accused and therefore shall benefit from the mitigating
circumstance of minority.

Facts:

In 1996, AAA, a 5-‐year old girl, played with her cousin (7 years old) and other children
when Richard Sarcia invited her to go to the backyard of a certain Saling Crisologo. Unknown to the
accused, AAA’s cousin followed them. There, Sarcia pulled down the shorts and panties of AAA and
succeeded to have carnal knowledge with her. AAA’s cousin saw the said act and proceeded to tell
AAA’s mother what happened but the latter disregarded the story of AAA’s cousin stating that they
were too young to understand those matters. AAA’s father was, at the time, working in Manila.

Almost after four years, Sarcia was charged by AAA’s father with rape. Sarcia denied the
allegations and contended that the rape case was only instituted to bolster the arguments in
another case where he was charged of murder of a certain Christine Camu. In the said murder case,
Sarcia was accused of Christine’s grandmother of the said and even helped AAA’s family to pursue
the rape case against him.

During the trial, the testimonies of AAA, AAA’s cousin and AAA’s father were presented, as
well as the medical examination report which contained that AAA had no scars nor healed wounds
inside but the hymen showed signs of trauma caused by a blunt object which could be a medical
instrument or a penis. Also, the prosecution was only able to establish that the crime was
committed in 1996 but no specific date was proven and Sarcia was about to turn 18 years old at the
time. Sarcia asseverated that the absence of scars and healed wounds negated the allegations of
rape against him and that the testimonies of the AAA and AAA’s cousin were inconsistent as to the
time and place of commission of the offense and failed to establish his guilt. Sarcia also noted that
the rape charge was only instituted almost four years from the alleged time of commission and that
the delay of filing affected the credibility of the witnesses.

The RTC found Sarcia guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision but modified the penalty to death. Hence, the
present petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the penalty should be reduced on the ground of minority

Ruling:
Page 45 of 299


Yes. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-‐appellant cannot be deemed
a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused
appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in
1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place in
any month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date
and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or
after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance
of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone
declaration of the accused regarding his age.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-‐appellant is reclusion perpetua.

PAROLE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE CANDELLADA

No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended

Facts:

[AAA] was the second of three daughters of Candellada and his deceased first wife. [AAA]
lived with Candellada and the latter’s second wife, while [AAA]’s two sisters lived with Candellada’s
mother. While they were still living in Davao, Candellada impregnated [AAA]. When [AAA] was
already five months pregnant, Candellada brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Candellada and
[AAA] arrived in Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.

While they were staying at Gemina’s (the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where
Candellada and [AAA] lived) old house, Candellada had intercourse with [AAA] many times, but
[AAA] could only remember eight specific dates.

On December 28, 2004, Candellada again made amorous advances on [AAA]. [AAA] refused
so Candellada became violently angry. He mauled [AAA] and hit her head with a piece of wood,
which rendered her unconscious. Gemina, who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay
Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested Candellada.

Page 46 of 299


Vicente Candellada (Candellada), father of [AAA], was charged with attempted rape and 8
counts of rape before the RTC, Branch 7, of Tubod, Lanao del Norte for attempting to rape and
raping [AAA], who is a minor at the time of the commission of the said crimes contrary to and in
violation of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-‐Rape Law in relation to R.A. 7610 otherwise
known as the Anti-‐Child Abuse Law.

Candellada was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him. During pretrial, the defense admitted that Candellada is the father
of private complainant [AAA] and that [AAA] was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crimes charged and/or filing of the cases. Thereafter, the nine criminal cases were tried jointly.

Candellada outright called [AAA] a liar. He denied raping [AAA] eight times between May
30, 2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an attempt to rape
AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time. Candellada claimed that he was
already arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday, after he struck [AAA].

The RTC rendered its Consolidated Decision on December 23, 2005. The RTC found that
there was not enough evidence to prove Candellada’s culpability for the charge of attempted rape
on December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, 35 the RTC pointed out that the
overt acts committed by Candellada resulted only in AAA’s physical injuries that took five to seven
days to heal and slight physical injuries were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted
rape. As for the charge of eight counts of consummated rape, the RTC pronounced that “[AAA’s]
down-‐to-‐earth testimony was convincing and straightforward that she was abused [by] her father
in x x x Lanao del Norte” and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of Death in each of the 8 counts
thereof.

In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction against Candellada but modified the sentence from death penalty to reclusion perpetua
and award of damages.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the defense of alibi by Candellada is sufficient to rebut the testimony of
[AAA] that she was raped by the former.

2. Whether or not Candellada is entitled for parole under the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Ruling:

1. No. It is not sufficient.

Candellada’s denial and alibi deserve scant consideration. No jurisprudence in criminal law
is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. It has been consistently held that denial and
alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not prevail over complainant’s
direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which
has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.
Page 47 of 299


2. No. He is not entitled for parole.

With the guilt of Candellada for the eight rapes already established beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, when
the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9346 further provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

BOOK II (Articles 114-‐365, RPC) and related Special Laws

FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR NOTARY OR ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTER

ROMEO D. LONZANIDA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 160243-‐52, July 20, 2009, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person;
the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed.

Facts:

Petitioner Romeo D. Lonzanida, then Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, was among
those criminally charged with Falsification of Public Document as defined and penalized under
Paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

on separate complaints filed on various dates by Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios, Daniel Alegado and
Rene Abad. The complaints alleged that Lonzanida, as Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales,

notarized thirteen Affidavits of Ownership of parcels of 117-‐hectare public land. The Affidavits of
Ownership appeared to have been executed by certain persons who in turn either denied executing
the same or had no capacity to do so. The complaints also alleged that Lonzanida notarized thirteen

identically worded Joint Affidavits of two disinterested persons purportedly executed and signed by
Rufino Aniceto who is an illiterate and Roberto Querubin who was already deceased at the time of
their execution. Upon arraignment, Lonzanida, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of “not guilty” to
all the charges. On October 20, 2000, the Sandiganbayan through its Fourth Division rendered a

decision convicting petitioner of ten counts of Falsification. After three motions for
reconsideration, Sandiganbayan gave in to Lonzanida’s plea for a new trial and allowed him a last
chance to present evidence in his behalf. On July 25, 2003, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Decision convicting Lonzanida of the crimes charged. In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan belittled the
recantation of the three prosecution witnesses. Lonzanida filed a motion for reconsideration and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration but both motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan
hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Page 48 of 299


Whether petitioner Lonzanida is guilty of falsification defined and penalized under Art. 171
of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Yes, he is.

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for falsification of a public document to be
established, the following elements must concur: 1. That the offender is a public officer, employee,
or notary public; 2. That he takes advantage of his official position; 3. That he falsifies a document
by committing any of the following acts: a) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature
or rubric; b) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate; c) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; d) Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; e) Altering true dates; f) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning; g) Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to
be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; h) Intercalating any
instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

Undeniably, the foregoing elements of the crime were proven in the present case. Lonzanida
is a public officer who has taken advantage of his position to commit the felonious acts charged
against him. In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by
private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed. In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by
private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person. This notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that Lonzanida consummated his act in falsifying
the documents, and which documents he used in successfully obtaining the tax declaration in the
names of the alleged applicants causing prejudice to the real occupant, Efren Tayag.

COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SERRANO and ANTHONY SERRANO

When all the elements of the crimes charged were present thereby establishing the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the accused, no error has been committed in the court’s decision of
conviction. In fact, settled is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature
are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; and speculative,
arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Facts:

In the afternoon of January 18, 2003, Major Jerry Galvan received a telephone call from a
concerned citizen about an illegal drug trade being conducted by a certain alias "Tune" in Barangay
Bambang, Pasig City. Thereafter, Major Galvan coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Page 49 of 299


Agency (PDEA) for the conduct of a buy-‐bust operation. Thus, a team led by SPO3 Leneal Matias,
PO3 Carlo Luna and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 FAMILARA) was formed to buy "shabu" from
"Tune" with the aid of a confidential informant. Preparations were then made, and two (2) One
Hundred Peso bills were marked "MRF" and delivered to the assigned poseur-‐buyer, PO1
FAMILARA. The composite team thereafter proceeded to the aforementioned location, the
confidential informant pointed to a house where accused-‐appellant Joseph Serrano (JOSEPH) was
found standing. SPO3 Leneal Matias and PO3 Carlo Luna positioned themselves at a distance where
they can see PO1 FAMILARA, who approached JOSEPH together with the confidential informant.
The latter greeted JOSEPH and informed him that his companion, PO1 FAMILARA, would buy Php
200.00 worth of shabu. JOSEPH thereafter knocked at the door of "Tune", who turned out to be
accused-‐appellant Anthony Serrano (ANTHONY). ANTHONY partially opened the door and
conferred with JOSEPH. PO1 FAMILARA thereafter handed the marked money to JOSEPH, who in
turn handed the same to ANTHONY. Upon receiving the money, the latter then took out a plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the same to the
JOSEPH, who, in turn, handed the plastic sachets to PO1 FAMILARA. As such, FAMILARA
immediately grabbed JOSEPH's hand while the rest of the team rushed to the scene to arrest the
accused-‐appellants. ANTHONY even attempted to escape to his house but was subsequently
likewise apprehended.

Both accused-‐appellants were bodily frisked after their apprehension. Recovered from
ANTHONY were four heat-‐sealed plastic sachets with white crystalline substances, two (2) marked
one hundred peso bills, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter and one plastic bag containing several
pieces of empty plastic sachets. However, nothing aside from the heat-‐sealed plastic sachet he
previously handed to PO1 FAMILARA was recovered from accused-‐appellant JOSEPH.

Upon examination by P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural, the five heat-‐sealed plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances were found positive [for] Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or commonly known as "shabu."

In their defense, both ANTHONY and JOSEPH denied the charges against them. The latter
averred that the plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance were shown to him only
at the police station. For his part, ANTHONY argued that they only came to know the reason for
their arrest and detention when they were already in court.

The RTC rendered judgment convicting the brothers for illegal sale of shabu in Criminal
Case No. 12007-‐D and Anthony Serrano for illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 12008-‐
D. In view of the penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon them, the case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals for automatic review. The appellate court affirmed the said decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused-‐appellants for the crimes
charged was successfully established by the prosecution.

Ruling:

We find that the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in this instance.
Hence, there is no reason to deviate from both the lower courts' findings and conclusions that
accused-‐appellants committed the offenses charged.
Page 50 of 299


Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings
are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.

Here, the records bear out that all the elements of the offense have been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court finds the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible,
straightforward and corroborative of each other. Their testimonies sufficiently proved that a
legitimate buy-‐bust operation took place wherein the accused-‐appellants were apprehended.
Moreover, the shabu subject of the sale was brought to, and properly identified in, court. Accused-‐
appellants were likewise positively identified as the persons who sold the sachet containing the
crystalline substance which was later confirmed to be shabu according to the Chemistry Report of
the forensic chemist.

With respect to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 against ANTHONY, we also find that the elements of the offense have
been established by the evidence of the prosecution. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most notably that of the arresting officer, PO3
Luna, showed that four sachets containing white crystalline substance were recovered from
ANTHONY when the latter was told to empty his pockets upon his apprehension. As a result of a
chemical analysis thereof, the substance in the plastic sachets was confirmed to be shabu.

In view of the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the denials
of the accused-‐appellants must, perforce, fail. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of a witness; it is self-‐serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As
between the categorical testimony that rings of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other,
the former is generally held to prevail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,
G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

Tuan was charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs and contended that he should
not be convicted to such crime due to discrepancies and testimony of the witnesses. The court ruled
Page 51 of 299


that Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies
of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence

Facts:

Two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-‐ing (Lad-‐ing) arrived
at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS
Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay
Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Afterwards they conducted surveillance operations which resulted
positive that indeed Tuan was selling marijuana. SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for
Search Warrant for accused-‐appellants house.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-‐ing, filed the Application for a Search
Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-‐Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one oclock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two
hours later, at around three oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong,
and Lad-‐ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable
cause.

Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and PO2 Chavez
implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-‐appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez
invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one
was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-‐appellants neighbor, to come
along. The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-‐appellants house. Even though accused-‐
appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda
(Magno), accused-‐appellants ather, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2
Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the
house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside. SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began
searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their
search on the second floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-‐appellants room, below which
they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that evening, accused-‐appellant
arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-‐appellant to open a built-‐in cabinet, in
which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana. PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items
confiscated from accused-‐appellant and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and
recovered from the house and in accused-‐appellants presence. The nine bricks of marijuana were
brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused Tuan is guilty of Illegal possession of prohibited drugs

Ruling:

Yes, he is guilty of the offense charged.

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Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following
elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
consciously possesses the said drug. All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in
Criminal Case No. 17619-‐R. The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-‐
appellants house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-‐
appellants possession thereof could not have been authorized by law in any way. Accused-‐appellant
evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even offering the same for sale. The
bricks of marijuana were found in accused-‐appellants residence over which she had complete
control. In fact, some of the marijuana were found in accused-‐appellants own room. Accused-‐
appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her guilty of
illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test
buy and the manner by which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened. These alleged
inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do
not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal
possession of marijuana by accused-‐appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not
in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies
of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence

Although Criminal Case No. 17619-‐R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following
pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar, relating to the illegal sale of the same drug, still
rings true: Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's
failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an
informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-‐presentation of the marked money used in
buying the contraband, the non-‐presentation of the informer on the witness stand would not
necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHITO GRATIL y GUELAS

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of
illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established.

Facts:

A confidential informant arrived at the PNP Central Narcotics Office at EDSA, Quezon City
and talked to P/Insp. Nolasco Cortez in the presence of several other police officers regarding the
alleged illegal drug activity of one Chito Gratil.

Immediately, P/Insp. Cortez formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy bust
operation. SPO2 Manglo was designated as poseur buyer and was given a P500 bill the serial
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number of which he took and which he also marked with his initial on the side of the face of the
person on the bill and also a dot on the nose. The genuine P500 bill was put on top of boodle money.

At 11:40 o’clock of that same morning, SPO2 Manglo and the confidential informant
proceeded to the house of accused Chito Gratil. They proceeded to McDonald’s at Harrison Plaza
where they would meet with accused Gratil for the final arrangement. At around noontime, accused
Gratil arrived and talked to the confidential informant. Accused Gratil instructed the confidential
informant to go to Gratil’s house at 4:00pm so that the transaction on the shabu could be
completed. After the meeting, SPO2 Manglo and the informant returned to the Central Narcotics
Office and reported to P/Insp. Cortez.

That afternoon, the team composed of P/Insp. Cortez, PO1 Molina, SPO2 Antonio, and SPO2
Manglo together with the confidential informant proceeded to the house of accused Gratil on board
a vehicle. Upon learning that SPO2 Manglo was the buyer of the 400 grams of shabu which the
confidential informant earlier confirmed that morning to be available, accused Gratil begged leave
to get the stuff outside: "Saglit lang at kukunin ko". Ten minutes after, more or less, accused
returned and handed over a white plastic bag with the Mercury Drug label to SPO2 Manglo which
the latter verified if it contained shabu. SPO2 Manglo opened the black clutch bag wherein the
boodle money was put in and then handed it to the accused. After accused Gratil received the bag
and before he could start counting the money, SPO2 Manglo introduced himself as a NARCOM
policeman and then he pulled out his Icom radio which was tucked behind his back and called for
back up.

Accused Gratil was arrested for selling shabu to a poseur buyer by the team of policemen
and in the process SPO2 Antonio recovered from the accused the marked money. From there, they
brought the accused together with the shabu and the marked money back to the Central Narcotics
Command where the apprehending policemen executed their affidavit of arrest and other related
documents. P/Insp. Mary Leocy Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame testified that the specimen reacted with a positive result for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

On the other hand, accused Gratil and Imelda Redolvina testified for the defense. Accused
Gratil was on his way to his cousin’s house.. As he walked, he saw people running at an alley
(eskinita) going towards him. Suddenly someone grabbed him by the collar and told accused Gratil:
"Putangina mo sama ka." Accused Gratil asked: "Bakit po?" And the man holding him said: "Doon ka
sa presinto magpaliwanag."

Imelda Revoldina testified that on August 24, 1997 between the hours of 4:00 and 5:00 in
the afternoon she and others were undergoing training for soap making business in front of the
Alay Kapwa center. There were people shouting and running towards them. After the first group of
people passed by her, she saw Chito Gratil collared and held by the police.

A criminal information was filed against Chito Gratil. The RTC found Gratil guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Gratil alleged that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the drug which constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.
Moreover, he alleged that proper procedure for taking custody of the seized prohibited drugs was
not faithfully followed.

Page 54 of 299


Issues:

1. Whether or not the prosecution was able to satisfy its burden
2. Whether or not the failure to observe the proper procedure for taking custody of seized
prohibited drugs is fatal to the prosecution of the case

Ruling:

1. Prosecution was able to satisfy its burden. Gratil is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In prosecutions involving the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or
regulated drug as evidence. For conviction of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited or regulated
drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.

A perusal of the records would reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in the case at
bar. The proof of the shabu transaction was established by prosecution witness Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 2 William Manglo, the poseur-‐buyer, who made a positive identification of the
appellant as the one who gave him the "Mercury Drug" bag and to whom he gave the marked
money during the buy-‐bust operation.

2. The alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by appellant does not prove fatal to the
prosecution’s case.

Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which was cited by appellant as the rule of procedure which the
arresting police officers did not strictly observe, provides that all prohibited and regulated drugs
shall be physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

However, the failure to conduct an inventory and to photograph the confiscated items in the
manner prescribed under the said provision of law applicable at the time of appellant’s arrest and
which is now incorporated as Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) that repealed Republic Act No. 6425 cannot be used as a ground for
appellant’s exoneration from the charge against him.

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series
of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is
totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the
crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established.

First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-‐
bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section
21(a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the
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presence of such regulation and its non-‐compliance by the buy-‐bust team, the Court still applied
such presumption. x x x.

Notwithstanding the minor lapse in procedure committed by the police officers in the handling of
the illegal drugs taken from appellant, the identity and integrity of the evidence was never put into
serious doubt in the course of the proceedings of this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN ULAT y AGUINALDO @ PUDONG

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove the
following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The conspicuous variance in the testimonies for
the prosecution casts serious doubt on the arresting teams due care in the custody of the confiscated
illegal drug. We declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to
establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which
characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with
every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.
Facts:

In an Information filed against the Edwin Ulat charged with violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165,that the above-‐named accused, without the necessary license or
prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and distribute Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug,
weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, in consideration of P100.00. Edwin Ulat pleaded not
guilty to the charge, thereafter, trial commenced.

The prosecutions version of the events leading to Edwin Ulat’s arrest is as follows: On
February 10, 2003, a confidential informant relayed information regarding the illegal drug pushing
activities of one alias Pudong along Seabird Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City to Barangay
Chairman Dreu, head of the Makati Anti-‐Drug Abuse Council. The MADAC in coordination with the
Makati Police Drug Enforcement Unit met and decided to go to the place of alias Pudong to verify if
alias Pudong is indeed selling illegal drugs and to conduct an entrapment operation. During the
briefing, it was agreed that one of the MADAC volunteers, Armando Pol-‐ot, together with the
confidential informant, would act as poseur buyer and buy illegal drugs from alias Pudong that very
same day. The buy-‐bust money was then marked and was handed to the poseur-‐buyer. Pol-‐ot, who
was then accompanied by the confidential informant, approached alias Pudong and was introduced
by the informant as a buyer in need of shabu. Alias Pudong asked how much and Pol-‐ot replied Piso
lang naman, meaning One Hundred Pesos only. Thereafter, alias Pudong took the marked money
and left. Upon his return, he handed Pol-‐ot a small plastic sachet containing suspected substance.
Pol-‐ot then gave the pre-‐arranged signal and lighted a cigarette, signifying that the transaction was
consummated. Upon seeing the pre-‐arranged signal, PO1 Santos and Rogelio Patacsil approached
alias Pudong and apprehended him. Alias Pudong was then ordered to empty the contents of his
pockets and the marked money was recovered. The confiscated substance contained in the plastic
sachet which Pol-‐ot bought from alias Pudong was then marked EUA. Pudong was brought to the
Makati DEU office for proper investigation. The duty investigator prepared a request for laboratory
examination of the specimen marked EUA and a drug test for the accused. The following day PO1
Santos and MADAC volunteers Pol-‐ot and Patacsil executed a sworn statement entitled Pinagsanib
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na Salaysay ng Pag-‐aresto in connection to the buy-‐bust operation which led to the arrest of
appellant Edwin Ulat y Aguinaldo alias Pudong.

On the other hand, the defense narrated the following: In the evening of 10 February 2003,
at about 7:30 oclock p.m., the accused, EDWIN ULAT, was at home watching television when he saw
five (5) to seven (7) men in front of their door whom he thought were looking for someone. He
approached them and asked who they were looking for. Suddenly, a gun was poked at him and he
was told to go with them to the barangay hall. Ulat then asked who they were but he was told not to
ask question or else he might get hurt. Two (2) of the men forced him out of the house. He resisted
but he was punched in the stomach and was dragged towards a blue Revo. The accused was
likewise asked if he knew a certain Sandy. He denied knowing the said person. He was brought to
the barangay hall and then to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

After due proceedings, the trial court convicted Edwin Ulat of violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165. On review, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Thus, interposed the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-‐appellant guilty with
violation of section 5, article ii of R.A. 9165 despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes, the trial court gravely erred.

The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is
proved. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to
determine. Owing to the built-‐in dangers of abuse that a buy-‐bust operation entails, the law
prescribes specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, independently of the general
procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation and of the
accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded.

In this regard, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 states: The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove
the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Similarly, it is essential that the
transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. A meticulous review of the records of this case has led us to the conclusion that the
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prosecution failed to demonstrate with moral certainty that the identity and integrity of the
prohibited drug, which constitutes the corpus delicti, had been duly preserved.

First, the records reveal that the prosecution did not establish the exact location where the
confiscated illegal drug was marked and the identity of the person who marked it because of
contradicting testimonies from the prosecutions witnesses. This conspicuous variance in the
testimonies for the prosecution casts serious doubt on the arresting teams due care in the custody
of the confiscated illegal drug. Worse, the foregoing is not the only instance of conflict between the
narrations of Pol-‐ot and PO1 Santos with regard to the handling of the confiscated sachet of shabu.
In other words, the prosecution could not present an unbroken chain of custody for the seized
illegal drug.

In a string of cases, we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of
key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the
irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in
court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused. We are not
unaware of existing jurisprudence holding that non-‐compliance by the apprehending/buy-‐bust
team with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. It is this assurance of evidentiary integrity
that is lacking in the case at bar. Thus, as a consequence thereof, appellants acquittal from the
criminal charge against him would be in order. However, in the present case, there were not merely
trifling lapses in the handling of the evidence taken from the accused but the prosecution could not
even establish what procedure was followed by the arresting team to ensure a proper chain of
custody for the confiscated prohibited drug.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGG C. BUENAVENTURA

In a buy-‐bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-‐bound, to apprehend the violator and to
search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

Facts:

An entrapment operation was planned in response to a tip given by a confidential informant
of rampant selling of illegal drugs by one, Gregg C. Buenaventura, at Teachers Village, Barangay San
Miguel, Pasig City. P01 Espares was designated as the poseur-‐buyer and two P100 bills were
marked with his initials ME. P03 Sanchez and the other members of the entrapment team
positioned themselves nearby to observe the transaction between PO1 Espares and accused
Buenaventura.

PO1 Espares then executed the pre-‐arranged signal to let the other police officers know that
the buy-‐bust transaction had been consummated. Buenaventura, already sensing that something
was wrong, attempted to escape by locking himself up in his house and jumping off the roof to an
adjoining vacant lot. The police officers pursued and eventually arrested Buenaventura, and seized
from him the marked bills in his possession. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance, obtained by PO1 Espares from Buenaventura, was duly marked at the place where
Buenaventura was apprehended. Thereafter, the contents of the plastic sachet were subjected to
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forensic examination which yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu.

Buenaventura’s defense consisted only of denial and claim of frame-‐up. He also asserts the
violation of his constitutional right as the police officers did not have a warrant to search his person
and to seize the marked money in his possession.

Both the RTC and CA found Buenaventura guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling
dangerous drugs without lawful authority, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165

Issue:

Can the police officers conducting a buy-‐bust operation search accused’s person and seize
the marked money in his possession without a warrant?

Ruling:

Yes, they can.

A buy-‐bust operation is far variant from an ordinary arrest; it is a form of entrapment which
has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Law. In a buy-‐bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-‐bound, to apprehend the violator and to
search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.
The SC sustained the judgment of conviction against Buenaventura, for the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that he was selling dangerous drugs without lawful authority, in
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

For the successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti. The presence of all of these elements in the instant case has been duly established.

As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-‐up, like alibi, has
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NENITA LEGASPI y LUCAS
Legaspi claims that she was instigated into committing the crime as charged, as she was the
one approached by San Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu cannot stand. To use instigation as
a defense, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit
the offense. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug. Unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-‐bust operation team were inspired by
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improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full
faith and credit.
Facts:
On April 23, 2003 Nenita Legaspi y Lucas, also known as Nita, was charged before the RTC
for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. On or about April 22, 2003, the accused,
not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to Police Officer Arturo San
Andres, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-‐sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance weighing sixteen (16) decigrams (0.16 grams), which was found positive to
the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.
Upon arraignment Legaspi pleaded not guilty to the charge against her. The prosecution evidence,
upon which the RTC anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of the testimonies of two of the
operatives involved in the buy-‐bust operation, Police Officer (PO) 2 Arturo San Andres and PO1
Janet A. Sabo.
On April 22, 2003, at around 4:00 p.m., a certain informant, approached San Andres to
report about the rampant incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City
and about the drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. San Andres immediately informed his
superior, Police Inspector Villaruel, who instructed him, Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and PO1 Roland
Panis to conduct a buy-‐bust operation. Villaruel designated San Andres to act as the poseur-‐buyer
and gave him two pieces of one hundred-‐peso (₱100.00) bills to be used as buy-‐bust money.
At around 5:15 p.m., the team proceeded to Legaspis house, while the others strategically
placed themselves in the entrapment area, keeping San Andres within their view. After San Andres
gave Legaspi the buy-‐bust money, which he had previously marked with his initials ABS, Legaspi
reached into her pocket and gave him one heat-‐sealed plastic sachet containing the
suspected shabu. The team then brought Legaspi to Rizal Medical Center for a check-‐up, and then to
the police station wherein they filed the appropriate charges against her. Meanwhile, San Andres
sent the sachet to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and requested for an
examination to determine the nature of its contents.
After the prosecution had rested its case, Legaspi was called to the witness stand to relay her
version of the events. Legaspi primarily denied the charges against her. She testified that, while she
was inside her house taking care of her grandson, San Andres and Mariano peeked through her
window and asked her if she was Nita. Legaspi alleged that after she answered in the affirmative,
the two police officers pushed the door open and told her to go with them. She claimed that because
of the shock the events had caused her, she was not able to ask the police officers why they were
taking her with them. In convicting Legaspi, the RTC stated that it was more convinced with the
version of the prosecution. The RTC held that the positive testimonies of the two police officers
were stronger than Legaspis negative testimony. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision,
affirming the RTCs judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Legaspi of the crime charged
despite the fact that the police instigated the alleged buy-‐bust transaction.
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Ruling:
No, the trial court did not err in convicting Legaspi.
Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its
purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on
the other hand, involves the inducement of the would-‐be accused into the commission of the
offense. In such a case, the instigators become co-‐principals themselves. Instigation is recognized as
a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this as a defense, however, the accused
must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the
offense. Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing the crime as charged, as she was the
one approached by San Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu.
We find, however, that Legaspi’s defense of instigation must fail. It is an established rule
that when an accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses cannot be set
up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or
(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-‐buyer seeking to
expose his criminal act; or (3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present
and apparently assisted in its commission.
The prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell ₱200.00 worth
of shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or
induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres did not even have to ask
her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a scorer; and as soon
as she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately asked him how much he needed. Under
the circumstances, the police officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to
arrest Legaspi even without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence. The
RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in applying the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police officers, especially since Legaspi
failed to impute on them any motive to falsely testify against her. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-‐bust operation team were inspired by improper
motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith
and credit. Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not
instigation. While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and
avoidance.
Legaspi also argues that the veracity of the buy-‐bust operation is suspect as it was conducted
without prior surveillance. This Court has many times discussed the dispensability of prior
surveillance in buy-‐bust operations, as it is not a pre-‐requisite for the validity of an entrapment or
such buy-‐bust operation. Legaspi further contends that the failure to present the informant as a
witness in court is very material and relevant in the case at bar, inasmuch as she had denied having
sold shabu to anyone. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the successful
prosecution of drug cases. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the
need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.

People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Amansec y Dona

Page 61 of 299


Prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-‐bust operation, especially if the buy-‐bust team
is accompanied to the target area by their informant. Furthermore, the failure of the police officers to
use ultraviolet powder on the buy-‐bust money is not an indication that the buy-‐bust operation was a
sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in a buy-‐bust operation has been accepted by the SC.

Facts:

Amansec was charged and convicted for selling methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,

Amansec argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as they failed to pass the test in determining the value of a witnesss
testimony that such must be in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of
mankind.

Amasec claims that the charges against him were merely planted and enumerates the
following as evidence, which supposedly creates reasonable doubt as to the allegation of the
prosecution that a buy-‐bust operation was conducted:

1. Only Amansec was charged with violating Republic Act No. 9165, and not Pintis, whom the
police officers alleged to have bought shabu from him, while the buy-‐bust operation was being
conducted.
2. The prosecution failed to produce and present in court the ₱100.00 bill Pintis allegedly used to
buy shabu from Amansec.
3. The informant was not presented in court, and no explanation was given by the prosecution for
their failure to do so.
4. There was no surveillance prior to the buy-‐bust operation conducted by the police officers.
5. The buy-‐bust money used by Mabutol was not dusted with ultraviolet powder.
Amansecs arguments are untenable. As we have held before, [i]t is for the party to plan its own
strategy and to choose which witnesses to call and what evidence to submit to support its own
cause.

Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence against him was
obtained in violation of the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that Section 21
of the aforesaid act was violated when the police officers who arrested him did not take his picture
with the shabu they confiscated from him, and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu
in his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of justice, or any
elected public official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence prevails over the
presumption that the police officers performed their duty in a regular manner.

He also avers that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence
obtained from him as the station investigator, to whom the specimens were turned over, was not
presented in court. Moreover, Amansec claims, there was no evidence to show that the forensic
chemist examined the same articles allegedly confiscated from him. Amansec says that the
stipulations made as regards the testimony of the forensic chemist mentioned nothing about the
chemists actual receipt of the specimens from the Investigator or from any other person. Amansec
argues that the prosecutions failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal and leads to
the unavoidable suspicion on its integrity.
Page 62 of 299


Issue:

Whether or not both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting Amansec for
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165

Ruling:

No, there was no error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in convicting
Amansec for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-‐
bust operation, especially if the buy-‐bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.

In People v. Eugenio,we held:

There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-‐bust
operation can be undertaken especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to the
scene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or a buy-‐bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one. We
have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-‐bust money is not an
indication that the buy-‐bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in a
buy-‐bust operation has been accepted by this Court.

In People v. Rivera, we declared:

It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to
be used in the buy-‐bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did not
render the exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-‐bust
operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases

Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. However a
testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain.

Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not
render Amansecs arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence.

This Court has consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized had been preserved. Both the prosecution witnesses were categorical and
consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis. These
were later recovered from Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself. As soon as the police officers,
Page 63 of 299


together with Amansec and Pintis, reached the La Loma Police Station, the seized sachets were
marked with the initials of the police officers, with each officer marking the sachet he personally
retrieved from the suspects. This was done before the specimens were turned over to the station
investigator for the preparation of the request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, the
specimens were forwarded to the crime lab by the police officers themselves. The Chemistry Report
prepared by the forensic chemist listed the same specimens, which bore the initials of the police
officers, and which were later identified by Mabutol and Pascua in open court as the plastic sachets
they marked with their initials.

Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain
unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence. Amansec
bears the burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers
handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties. This,
Amansec failed to do.

Furthermore, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which
requires each and everyone who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. As long
as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and
every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand

The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on the satisfaction
of the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that [i]n prosecutions for illegal
sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.
Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the person who sold to the
poseur-‐buyer a heat-‐sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He had been
caught red-‐handed in the entrapment operation conducted by the SDEU of the La Loma Police. Such
positive identification must prevail over Amansecs uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and
unsubstantiated defense of frame-‐up.

The corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness.
Amansec gave one of the two remaining plastic sachets to Mabutol after receiving the ₱100.00 buy-‐
bust money.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCOS SABADLAB y NARCISO @ "Bong Pango

Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-‐bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the
buy-‐bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of
Page 64 of 299


the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular
performance of their duties

Facts:

The respondent, Marcos Sabadlab, was charged with illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The prosecution presented PO3 Lowaton as witness where he testified that they received an
information that a certain “Bong Pango” was selling shabu around the streets of Makati. Acting on
this information, the PO3 Lowaton planned an entrapment or a buy-‐bust operation. They then
arrested Sabadlab. The Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Lowaton and
convicted Sabadlab for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.

It is the contention of Sabadlab that the lower courts erred in giving credence to the
testimony of PO3 Lowaton and the fact that there was no close coordination with PDEA and no
prior surveillance made his arrest and conviction doubtful. In addition, he contends that it is
contrary to human nature for him to bring his son during a drug sale transaction.

Issue:

Whether or not, considering the contention of Sabadlab, he should be convicted of illegal
sale and possession of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that
Sabadlab must be convicted for violation of the provisions of the Dangerous Drug Act.

It is a well-‐settled rule that the courts gives ample value to the testimony of police officers in
the absence of any evidence that the testimony made by the said police officer arises out of an ill
and improper motive. This is premised upon the principle of regularity of performance of the duties
of the law enforcement agencies. In the case at bar, Sabadlad failed to present any evidence that the
testimony made by PO3 Sabadlad is derived from an ill and improper motive. Moreover, the
contention of Sabadlad that there must be a prior surveillance in order for the buy-‐bust operation
to be valid is untenable. Prior surveillance is not a necessity or a condition precedent to a valid buy-‐
bust operation. The police officers are given the discretion whether or not to conduct surveillance,
they may decide to dispense with surveillance when time is of the essence in order to arrest the
offender. In addition, the implementing rules and the Dangerous Drug Act itself is silent as to the
effect when the police fails to closely coordinate with PDEA. This silence, the Supreme Court held,
cannot be construed to make the arrest or the evidence confiscated through a buy-‐bust operation
inadmissible as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL CLARITE y SALAZAR
G.R. No. 187157, February 15, 2012, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

Page 65 of 299


In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers on the ground that they are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner. The exception is when there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on
the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. In the case at
bar, accused-‐appellant’s only evidence of ill motive on the part of the NBI operatives is his own
testimony of frame-‐up and extortion, a very common defense in dangerous drugs cases. We have held
that such defense is viewed with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To substantiate such a defense,
therefore, the evidence must be clear and convincing.

Facts:

Police officer Romano received an information from their asset Cedeno that a certain
“Arnel” who is a supplier of illegal drugs is looking for a buyer. Upon this information, the police
officers planned an entrapment operation. Arnel was then arrested as he was caught inflagrante
delicto selling drugs. The Regional Trial Court convicted the Arnel of violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

Accused-‐appellant’s main contention is that he was arrested while he was riding a tricycle
and not while he was supposedly selling shabu. Thus, since he was not caught in flagrante delicto,
he can only be arrested with a warrant. Consequently, according to accused-‐appellant, the search
conducted upon him cannot be deemed to have been incidental to a lawful arrest, thus, making the
evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible. In making such argument, accused-‐appellant challenges
the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals which both accepted the version of the
prosecution.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Arnel should be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the
accused must be convicted of the crime charged.

Unfortunately for accused-‐appellant, findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court, save only for certain compelling
reasons. We perused the records of the case at bar and found no reason to disturb the findings of
the courts a quo.

In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers on the ground that they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner. The exception is when there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill
motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.
In the case at bar, accused-‐appellant’s only evidence of ill motive on the part of the NBI operatives
is his own testimony of frame-‐up and extortion, a very common defense in dangerous drugs cases.
We have held that such defense is viewed with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To
substantiate such a defense, therefore, the evidence must be clear and convincing.

Page 66 of 299


Jurisprudence holds that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs are the following:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and payment therefor.

The testimonies of Romano, corroborated by his fellow NBI investigators Jimenez and Dizon
and informant Cedeño established the sale and delivery by accused-‐appellant Clarite to Romano of
what was initially believed to be 50 grams of shabu in four plastic sachets, in exchange for what
Clarite thought was P50,000.00. Romano positively identified accused-‐appellant Clarite as the
person who sold the plastic sachets of shabu to him.

As for accused-‐appellant’s argument that he would not have sold shabu in a crowded place,
we find the same unconvincing. We have already held in Ching v. People that:

This Court observed in many cases that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any
prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the
daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly
defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of
agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs.

Accused-‐appellant also claims that the alleged buy-‐bust operation was conducted without
the authorization of or coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), in
violation of Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165. This Court has already held that the silence of the
foregoing provision as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the
prior authority of the PDEA cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without
such PDEA participation illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSEMARIE MAGUNDAYAO y ALEJANDRO alias "ROSE,"
G.R. No. 188132, February 29, 2012, J. Leonardo–De Castro

We therefore stress that the ‘objective’ test in buy-‐bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-‐buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.
The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy-‐bust’ money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether
to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure
that law-‐abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.

Facts:

Two criminal complaints were filed against respondent Rosemarie Alejandro for illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of the provisions of RA 9165. The Regional
Trial Court convicted the accused of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.

The accused-‐appellant claims that there exist in the records of the case certain facts and
circumstances that makes doubtful the prosecution’s version of events. She pointed to the allegedly
contradictory statements in the testimonies of PO3 Arago and PO2 Memoracion as to how their
team leader, P/Chief Insp. Paat, received the information disclosed by the informant. Specifically,
Page 67 of 299


PO2 Memoracion testified that the informant himself talked to P/Chief Insp. Paat. PO3 Arago,
however, stated in his testimony that the information was first given to the other members of their
team and the same was thereafter relayed to P/Chief Insp. Paat.

The accused-‐appellant also argues that the inventory of the items seized from the accused-‐
appellant lacked the requisite signatures of a representative of the media, the Department of Justice
or any elected public official. This procedural lapse was allegedly not explained adequately by the
witnesses of the prosecution. In like manner, the police did not photograph the confiscated items in
the presence of the above-‐enumerated individuals. These procedural lapses, the accused-‐appellant
posits, violated the provisions of Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, thus proving that the
police failed to perform their duty properly. Accordingly, in praying for her acquittal, the accused-‐
appellant submits that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
be invoked as a basis for her conviction given the presence of facts and circumstances tending to
negate said presumption. She concludes that "the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt."

Issue:

Whether or not Alejandro must be convicted of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs.

Ruling:

accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Appellant rightly argues that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence. In
fact it is on this premise that we have laid down the ‘objective’ test in scrutinizing buy-‐bust
operations. In People v. Doria, we said:

We therefore stress that the ‘objective’ test in buy-‐bust operations demands that the details
of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-‐buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant,
the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy-‐bust’ money, and the delivery of the illegal
drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-‐abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.

In consonance with the above-‐stated "objective test," the testimony of PO2 Memoracion
duly established that the members of the SAID-‐SOTF of the Taguig City Police Station properly
performed their duties in the conduct of the buy-‐bust operation on April 14, 2005. The testimony of
PO2 Memoracion, which was corroborated by the testimony of PO3 Arago. Consequently, the
accused-‐appellant’s claim of frame-‐up cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony and the
positive identification made by the witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers in this case stands.

Page 68 of 299


As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2 Memoracion and PO3
Arago, the Court finds the same unpersuasive. People v. Lazaro states that "[f]or a discrepancy or
inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to the
significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An
inconsistency which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the
acquittal of the accused."

In People v. Padua, the Court stated that "[c]learly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in
the implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items." Furthermore, we reiterated in People v. Naquita that "[n]either would non-‐
compliance with Section 21 render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUSA FIGUEROA Y CORONADO

It is settled that Sec. 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the
law enforcers’ failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA.

Facts:

Jesusa Figueroa was charged for a violation of Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 9165.

For the version of the prosecution, it testified that an informant came to the office of Supt.
Yabut, Chief of the Special Operation of PNP Anti-‐Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force and
informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain “Baby” later identified as Figueroa. Supt.
Yabut instructed his task force to conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information.

PO3 Callora, together with the informant, met with Figueroa at the parking area of SM
Bicutan in Taguig, Manila. The informant introduced PO3 Callora to Figueroa as the one who was
willing to regularly buy shabu from her should the sample be of good quality. Figueroa however
told them that she had no stock of shabu at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 Callora
through the informant once she already has supply of good quality shabu.

Figueroa informed PO3 Callora that she had a stock of shabu and she agreed to deliver the
shabu in front of 7-‐eleven Convenience Store at the corner of San Joaquin, Pasig City. The task force
proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3 Callora and the informant waited Figueroa, who after a
few minutes, arrived driving a car. Stopping near them, Figueroa rolled down the window of her car
and asked where the money was. At that juncture, Figueroa opened a Chowking plastic bag and
showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3 Callora was about to
hand over the buy-‐bust money, Figueroa, sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she
sped away. Figueroa’s vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue. At the time, a police office
saw a boy alighted from the backdoor of the car and threw the Chowking plactic bag to the
pavement. The police officer picked it up and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance inside. Subsequently, Figueroa was arrested.

On her defense, Figueroa denied that she met and transacted with PO3 Callora. She likewise
Page 69 of 299


denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that were recovered. Furthermore she alleged that
the buy-‐bust operation conducted by the police officers was irregular because of lack of prior
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

The RTC rendered a decision finding Figueroa guilty of the offense of violation of Sec. 26 of
RA 9165 which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the buy-‐bust operation was irregular because there was lack of prior coordination
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

Ruling:

No.

It is settled that Sec. 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of
the law enforcers’ failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. The Court noted that
Section 86, as well as the Internal Rule and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the
consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek authority of the PDEA prior to
conducting a buy-‐bust operation. Hence this silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to
make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an
arrest inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY BIYALA VELASQUEZ

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements
concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.

Facts:

Jimmy Biyala Velazquez was charged with violation of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.

The testimonies of the prosecution stated that a certain Manuel De Vera reported to the office
of the Regional Criminal Investigation and Detectiin Group that Velazquez is engaged in selling
shabu and marijuana leaves in his residence at Baguio City.

Hence, a team of police officers was formed to implement a search warrant. They sought the
assistance of Barangay Kagawad Udani and Somera to witness the search. The police officers
together with Udani and Somera proceeded to the residence of Velazquez, introduced themselves
and presented the search warrant.

In the course of the search, the police officers found in the bedroom of Velazquez a plastic bag
containing a brick of dried leaves suspected to be marijuana. After informing Velazquez that they
found illegal drugs inside his bedroom, the police officer arrested him. When Velazquez was frisked,
Page 70 of 299


one transparent heat-‐sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu was found in his pocket.

In his defense, Velazquez stated that he was frame-‐up and that when he was bodily searched,
they found nothing on him. Furthermore, Velazquez claimed that when the conduct of the search
started, the barangay officials Udani and Somera were not present.

The RTC rendered a decision finding Velazquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged against him.

Issue:

Whether Velazquez is guilty of the crime charged

Ruling:

Yes.

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements
concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.

All these elements were established beyond reasonable doubt in the cases against
Velazquez. The prosecution witnesses consistently and categorically testified that pursuant to a
search warrant duly issued by a judge, they found and seized from accused-‐appellants house and
actual possession a brick of marijuana leaves and heat-‐sealed sachets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

In contrast, Velazquez only proffered the defenses of denial and frame-‐up, that the dangerous
drugs and paraphernalia were planted by the police officers. However, other than his bare
allegations, there is no other evidence on record to corroborate his version of the events that
transpired at his house. Denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-‐up, like alibi, has
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARICAR BRAINER y MANGULABNAN

This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the arresting officer to comply
strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of the accused
illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost important is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Also, in every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug,
i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court is material. In fact, the existence of the dangerous drug is
crucial to a judgment of conviction. It is, therefore, indispensable that the identity of the prohibited
Page 71 of 299


drug be established beyond doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact that
the substance bought during the buy-‐bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Finally, the Court acknowledged that a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The Court stresses that what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.

Facts:

At around 6:00 p.m. on June 22, 2004, a confidential informant apprised a certain PO2 of
Sampaloc Police Station 4 (PS4) that a certain Cacay was looking for a shabu buyer. Such
information was relayed to the Chief of the Station Anti-‐Illegal Drug-‐Special Operation Task Unit
(SAID-‐SOTU), who immediately organized a buy-‐bust team composed of himself, PO3 Renaldo
Robles (Robles), PO3 Ronaldo Intia (Intia), PO3 Jonathan Dy, PO1 Arnel Pornillosa (Pornillosa), and
PO2 Gatdula as the poseur-‐buyer. A coordination report was faxed to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency stating that the entrapment would be conducted on June 22-‐23, 2004. Police
Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Reyes conducted the physical examination of the specimen
and stated in her Chemistry Report No. D-‐1158-‐0410 that the said specimen positively tested for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Thus, respondent Brainer was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. Respondent testified in her own defense. According to him, the buy-‐bust operation did
not take place and the shabu allegedly confiscated during the said operation was not hers. The
defense also called on several other people to testify for the defense. One of them corroborated
respondent’s testimony regarding the arresting police officers’ demand for P 300,000.00 in
exchange for respondent’s freedom. Another declared that he knew Brainer since childhood as they
were neighbors; and there had never been a report in the barangay that respondent used or pushed
illegal drugs. The other claimed that she was the one who introduced Brainer to PO2 Gatdula when
respondent’s friend was in trouble.

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the police officer’s straight, clear, and convincing
testimony, and found that an entrapment actually took place. This was affirmed by the appellate
court.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the failure of the arresting officer to comply strictly with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is fatal and would be a ground for the acquittal of the accused.

2) Whether or not the case should be dismissed based on chain of custody.

Ruling:

1. No, it’s not fatal.

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court is material. In fact, the existence of the dangerous drug is
crucial to a judgment of conviction. It is, therefore, indispensable that the identity of the prohibited
Page 72 of 299


drug be established beyond doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact
that the substance bought during the buy-‐bust operation is the same substance offered in court as
exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Furthermore, the fact that the item allegedly seized and confiscated from her was not
immediately marked after her arrest and that there was no physical inventory and photograph of
the item supposedly seized and confiscated from her is not enough to warrant dismissal of the case.

This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the arresting officer to
comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of
the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
important is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations which expounds on how Section
21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is to be applied and, notably, also provides for a saving
mechanism in case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly complied with, to wit:
(a) x x x Provided, further, that non-‐compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours.)

For the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-‐buyer and the receipt of the marked money
consummate the buy-‐bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. In other
words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires
the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the exchange of money
and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.

A review of the records of this case reveals that the prosecution was able to prove all the
essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. PO2 Gatdula, the poseur-‐buyer, was able to positively
identify Brainer as the person who sold to him the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance, later determined to be shabu, for the sum of P 1,000.00, during a legitimate buy-‐bust
operation. As the RTC expressly observed, Gatdula’s narration of the circumstances leading to the
consummation of the sale of illegal drugs and the arrest of Brainer was given in a clear, positive,
and straightforward manner.

The defense utterly failed to prove any ill motive on PO2 Gatdula’s part which would have
spurred the police officer to falsely impute a serious crime against Brainer. Where there is nothing
to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that they were not so moved, and that their testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit. Neither was respondent able to present clear and convincing evidence of frame-‐up and
extortion to overturn the presumption that PO2 Gatdula regularly performed his duty.

Page 73 of 299


Charges of extortion and frame-‐up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus,
cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate such
defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show
that the members of the buy-‐bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith
and credit.

2. No, the case should not be dismissed.

Respondent tries to raise doubts on the chain of custody of the item seized and confiscated
from her. Brainer argues that since no one testified as to how the alleged seized and confiscated
transparent plastic sachet, containing shabu, reached the PNP Crime Laboratory, then there is
reasonable suspicion whether the item physically examined by the Forensic Chemical Officer was
the very same one seized and confiscated by the buy-‐bust team from her.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, which implements
Republic Act No. 9165, defines "chain of custody" as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.

The Court acknowledged that a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The Court stresses that what is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
There is nothing herein that would have convinced the Court that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items could have been jeopardized.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERIAM GURU y KAZAN
The elements that should be proven in both the sale and possession of dangerous drugs
intrinsically include the identification of what was seized by police officers to be the same item
examined and presented in court. This identification must be established with moral certainty and is a
function of the rule on the chain of custody.
FACTS:
Respondent Meriam Guru y Kazan was charged in two separate Informations, charging her
with violation of Sections 5 and 11(3), respectively, of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. A confidential informant went to the Moriones Police
Station 2, Station Anti-‐Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Unit (SAIDSOTU) and informed that
respondent was conducting illegal shabu activities along Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. They
verified the information and carried out a buy-‐bust operation.
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The buy-‐bust team and the confidential informant arrived at Isla Puting Bato at around 4:00
p.m. They found accused-‐appellant seated in an alley in front of her house. They approached
respondent, who recognized the confidential informant, and asked, “Kukuha ka ba? Magkano?” The
informant replied, “Siya daw kukuha,” pointing to PO1 Juaño. PO1 Juaño confirmed, “Piso lang” (P
100.00), and showed respondent the money. Respondent took a small plastic sachet from her pants’
back pocket and handed it to PO1 Juaño. PO1 Juaño introduced himself as a police officer.
Respondent was surprised. PO1 Juaño arrested respondent, while SPO3 Del Rosario and PO1
Bajarias rushed to the scene for assistance. The marked P 100-‐bill was recovered from respondent.
respondent was asked to empty her pocket. Another small transparent plastic sachet was recovered
from him.
The defense presented the testimony of respondent herself. She testified that she was at
home on the day the buy-‐bust operation took place. It was also alleged that the police officers failed
to indicate the name of the respondent in the pre-‐operation report and to conduct an examination
of marked money for fingerprints. The respondent also alleged that the prosecution failed to
comply with the procedure for the proper custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs. The
RTC rendered a decision finding the respondent guilty of the crimes charged. This was later on
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent shall be held guilty of the crimes charged despite non-‐
compliance by the police officers with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous
drugs.
RULING:
No, respondent cannot be held guilty of the crimes charged.
In the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, the elements that should be proven are the following: (1)
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. The prosecution must (1) prove that the transaction or sale
actually took place, and (2) present in court evidence of the corpus delicti. As regards the
prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements to be proven are the following:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
However, in order for the prosecution to successfully overturn the constitutionally

mandated presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, it should, in drug-‐related cases, prove
not only the acquisition of the subject specimens through a legitimate buy-‐bust operation, but
likewise the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti by a substantially unbroken chain in the
custody of said specimens from their acquisition to the necessary laboratory examination.
The above elements that should be proven in both the sale and possession of dangerous
drugs intrinsically include the identification of what was seized by police officers to be the same
item examined and presented in court. This identification must be established with moral certainty
and is a function of the rule on the chain of custody.
In the case at bar, according to PO1 Juaño, the buy-‐bust team brought respondent to the
station, where the items recovered were marked by “the investigator” in his presence. He, however,
Page 75 of 299


failed to mention the name of this investigator. The sachet sold to PO1 Juaño was marked “MG,”
while the sachet recovered from accused-‐appellant was marked “MGK.”35 PO1 Juaño further
testified that PO1 Bajarias prepared a request for the examination of the specimens. Curiously
though, the specimens were not discussed in the testimony of PO1 Bajarias, except for his account
of accused-‐appellant handing a transparent plastic sachet to PO1 Juaño in exchange for the buy-‐
bust money.
It is noteworthy that there was no further testimony regarding the subject specimens. As
Forensic chemist P/Insp. Mariano was not presented as a witness due to the stipulation by the
defense as to her qualification, as well as the “genuineness and due execution of the documents she
executed together with the specimen.” However, the prosecution likewise admitted that P/Insp.
Mariano “does not have personal knowledge as to the ultimate source of the subject specimen,”
leaving it to the other witnesses to establish that the specimen examined by P/Insp. Mariano were
the same ones recovered in the buy-‐bust operation.
Pertinently, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides as follows:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation , physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
While this Court has disregarded the strict compliance of the requisites under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, can be
applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved.
In the case at bar, the physical inventory of the subject specimens was made only at the
police station and by an unnamed investigator. This, in itself, evokes to a reasonable mind several
questions on the safekeeping of the specimens from the time accused-‐appellant was arrested, up to
the time she and the buy-‐bust team arrived at the police station. The identity of the person who
marked the specimens and his or her competence to distinguish between the item sold by accused-‐
appellant and the item recovered from her are likewise relevant points of inquiry. Finally, the
conflicting evidence as regards the persons who had custody of the specimens after the marking
casts serious doubts as to whether the identity and integrity of said items had truly been preserved.
We find that these are all substantial gaps in the chain of custody which inevitably creates a
rational uncertainty in the appreciation of the existence of the corpus delicti.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALD DEL ROSARIO

This Court has reviewed and scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and found glaring inconsistencies that relate to the identity of the prohibited drug allegedly
confiscated from Del Rosario. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of PO2 Mendoza and
PO3 Besmonte necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the
same one allegedly seized from Del Rosario. In light of the foregoing, we find merit in Del Rosario’s
claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
Page 76 of 299


must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal
drug’s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-‐appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fail.

Facts:
Accused-‐ appellant Ronald M. del Rosario (Del Rosario) was apprehended in a buy-‐bust
operation pursuant to an information from a confidential informant.

Upon apprehension, it appears that the apprehending officer PO3 Besmonte, marked the
plastic sachet with “RMR-‐April 26, ‘03” before turning it over to PO2 Dalagdagan, the investigator
on duty that night. Del Rosario later was brought to the Office of the Drug Enforcement Unit [DEU]
of Las Piñas City and the confiscated items, including the sachet containing white crystalline
substance, and the P100 marked money were turned-‐ over to the duty investigator, PO3 Rufino
Dalagdagan. According to PO2 Mendoza, PO3 Dalagdagan placed Del Rosario’s initials “RMR” and
the date “April 27, 03” on the confiscated sachet and prepared a request for its laboratory
examination. When subjected to qualitative examination at the Southern Police District Crime
Laboratory Office, the content of the plastic sachet was found to weigh 0.03 gram and tested
positive for shabu, a dangerous drug.

RTC later convicted Del Rosario. CA affirmed, hence, this appeal.

Del Rosario posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as he was
convicted because of the weakness of his defense, rather than the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence. He highlighted the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, which are
material to the establishment of the identity of the dangerous drug allegedly confiscated from him.
Del Rosario also points out the noncompliance by the police officers with the guidelines in the chain
of custody of seized drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not Del Rosario’s guilt for the illegal sale of shabu, a dangerous drug, was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

After a thorough deliberation, this Court resolves to acquit Del Rosario for the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds that the prosecution failed to
satisfactorily establish that the plastic sachet of shabu presented in court was the same one
confiscated from Del Rosario.

In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what
is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
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While it is true that in many cases this Court has overlooked the non-‐compliance with the
requirements under the foregoing provisions, it did so only when the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items had been preserved. While it is admitted that the police officers failed to
conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized shabu in Del Rosario’s presence immediately
after he was apprehended, as required under the above provisions, what creates a cloud on the
admissibility of the evidence seized, the plastic sachet of shabu in particular, is the failure of the
prosecution to prove that the sachet of shabu they presented in court was the very same one they
confiscated from Del Rosario.

It must be remembered that to successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, it is not enough that the buyer, seller, and consideration for the transaction are identified. It
is equally important that the object of the case is identified with certainty. The prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the shabu, from the moment it was seized
from Del Rosario, up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti, “i.e., the
body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown
by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.”

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the
corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily
arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered
from the accused-‐appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165
fail.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.

This Court has reviewed and scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and found glaring inconsistencies that relate to the identity of the prohibited drug
allegedly confiscated from Del Rosario. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of PO2
Mendoza and PO3 Besmonte necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified
in court is the same one allegedly seized from Del Rosario. In light of the foregoing, we find merit in
Del Rosario’s claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution was not able to salvage the above inconsistencies with a logical and rational
explanation. Moreover, it offered no explanation as to how PO3 Besmonte was able to identify
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the plastic sachet presented in court as the one he seized from Del Rosario, considering that it
contained a marking different from the one he just said he made. PO3 Besmonte’s testimony on the
matter ended with the statement that the Investigator would be the best person to explain the
different marking on the plastic sachet; however, it must be remembered that the Investigator’s
testimony was already dispensed with early in the trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO LAPASARAN

It may be gleaned that to establish the chain of custody in a buy-‐bust operation is as follows:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals. A
perusal of the records of the case revealed that after the dangerous drugs were seized from Lapasaran,
the same were marked “RML” and “RML1” by the buy-‐bust team. PO1 Saez and PO2 Maglana then
turned over “RML” and “RML1” to investigating officer P/SInsp. Obong, who in turn, delivered the
same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Based on the Physical Science Report timed, dated
and signed by Forensic Chemist Bonifacio, “RML” and RML1” tested positive for the presence of shabu.
Lastly, both sachets were then presented and turned over by P/SInsp. Bonifacio to the court. The
Certificate of Inventory, request for laboratory examination and the consequent testimonies in Court
leaves no doubt in the Court’s mind that the chain of custody rule was duly followed.

Facts:
Appellant Renato Lapasaran (Lapasaran) was arrested after a buy-‐ bust operation was
conducted against him at around 5:30 in the afternoon of September 2006 in front of his residence
at after receiving reports from an informant on his supposed illegal drug activities. During the said
operation, PO1 Saez acted as the poseur buyer who pretended to be a drug user wherein he used 2
marked P100.00 bills, or the total sum of P200.00. After being introduced by their informant to
their “target person” PO1 Saez handed the said bills to the Lapasaran and the latter, in turn,
purportedly gave a plastic sachet containing suspected shabu which he chose out of the 2 sachets
supposedly shown to him. When PO1 Saez gave the prearranged signal PO2 Maglana then rushed to
the scene to assist him. Lapasaran was then arrested by PO2 Maglana and recovered by PO1 Saez
from him were the marked bills as well as another plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. As
such] Lapasaran was then brought to the police headquarters for investigation wherein the
arresting officers executed a joint affidavit regarding the incident.

Lapasaran was later charged for illegal possession and sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, in violation of Section 11(3) and Section 5(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

RTC later convicted him of the crimes as charged which was later affirmed by the CA.

Lapasaran asserts that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his
commission of the crimes charged. He argues that no testimony was presented by the prosecution
to attest to the police officer’s compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and to
establish that the chain of custody rule had been complied with.
Page 79 of 299


Issue:

2. Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming his conviction.

Ruling:

No. The appellate court did not err in affirming Lapasaran’s conviction.
The appeal must be dismissed for lack of merit.
For prosecution for both illegal sale and illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the corpus
delicti of the offenses is the dangerous drug itself, in this case shabu. In People v. Alcuizar, 647 SCRA
431 (2011), this Court stated that: The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This
requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the accusedappellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.

It may be gleaned that to establish the chain of custody in a buy-‐bust operation is as follows:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals. A perusal of the records of the case
revealed that after the dangerous drugs were seized from Lapasaran, the same were marked “RML”
and “RML1” by the buy-‐bust team. PO1 Saez and PO2 Maglana then turned over “RML” and “RML1”
to investigating officer P/SInsp. Obong, who in turn, delivered the same to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Based on the Physical Science Report timed, dated and signed by
Forensic Chemist
Bonifacio, “RML” and RML1” tested positive for the presence of shabu. Lastly, both sachets were
then presented and turned over by P/SInsp. Bonifacio to the court. The Certificate of Inventory,
request for laboratory examination and the consequent testimonies in Court leaves no doubt in the
Court’s mind that the chain of custody rule was duly followed.

Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs
depends largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-‐bust operation. It is
fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of witnesses
are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a
better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed
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their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYA

When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements must
be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
consciously possessed the drug; With regards to Chain of Custody, unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered or meddled with, the presumptions that the
integrity of such evidence had been preserved and that the police officers who handled the seized
drugs had discharged their duties properly and with regularity remain.

Facts:

PO1 Solarta said that their office had received reports of Manalao’s drug pushing and using
activities in the area of Lanao del Norte. Thus, upon instructions of their Officer-‐in-‐Charge, Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Renato Salazar, they prepared to conduct an entrapment or buy-‐bust operation
against Manalao. PO1 Solarta narrated that, the buy-‐bust operation team composed of P/Insp.
Salazar, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Expedito Daulong, and himself, prepared two P100.00 bills
as drug money by having them signed by P/Insp. Salazar and then photocopying them.

At around seven in the evening, the team, together with a civilian agent who was to act as
the poseur-‐buyer, proceeded to the carenderia of Josephine Tamarong. At the carenderia, the team
pretended to be customers and had some coffee while waiting for Manalao. PO1 Solarta, who
claimed to have been only around three to four meters away from the scene, testified that when
Manalao arrived, the civilian agent immediately established contact with him. Following a brief
conversation, the civilian agent handed Manalao the buy-‐bust money and in turn, Manalao "got
something from his pocket, opened it, and gave something" to the civilian agent. After the "give and
take" transaction, the civilian agent approached the buy-‐bust team, who without delay arrested
Manalao.

During the arrest, the buy-‐bust team introduced themselves to Manalao and bodily searched
him, from which three decks of shabu and money, including the buy-‐bust money of two pieces
ofP100.00 bills, were recovered. Manalao, together with the items seized from him, were brought to
the police station. Thereafter, P/Insp. Salazar marked the seized items in front of the other
apprehending officers and Manalao. PO1 Solarta, aside from narrating his account of the
entrapment operation, also identified the certificate of inventory of the items seized from Manalao,
which he enumerated to be one deck of shabu, three decks ofshabu, two P100.00 bills, and one
small, black and white, lady’s purse. He likewise identified the shabu presented in court to be the
same one recovered from Manalao and examined by Forensic Chemist Mag-‐abo.

RTC convicted Manalao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime in violation of Section
5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Manalao is now before this Court
posits that the sale of the drugs was not established; and that the chain of custody of evidence of the
drugs was not established

Page 81 of 299


Issue:

Whether or not Manalo is guilty of the crime in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic
Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

Yes. Manalo is guilty of the crime in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No.
9165.

The elements necessary to successfully prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are:
(1) [T]he identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) [T]he delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Simply put, the prosecution must establish that the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs actually took
place together with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in
evidence.

It is clear from the records that the prosecution was able to establish the above elements.
Manalao was positively identified by PO1 Solarta, who knew him even before the operation, as the
one who sold the seized shabu subject of this case to the poseur-‐buyer. Manalao was caught in
flagrante delicto in the entrapment operation conducted by the PNP of Tubod, Lanao del Norte.
Moreover, the corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness.
Manalao handed to the poseur-‐buyer one deck of shabuupon his receipt of the P200.00 buy-‐bust
money. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-‐buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummated the buy-‐bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and Legaspi.

Manalao’s insistence that the non-‐presentation of the civilian agent, who posed as the
buyer, weakens the prosecution’s case is without merit. In People v. Berdadero, this Court,
presented with the exact query, held: The non-‐presentation of the poseur-‐buyer is fatal only if there
is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction

This Court would also like to emphasize the fact that Manalao himself testified that when
the police officers recovered some money from him, P/Insp. Salazar, immediately, without leaving
his sight, took out the photocopy of the buy-‐bust money and told him to compare it to the
two P100.00 bills found on him. Manalao admitted, both in his direct and cross-‐examination, that
the serial numbers of the bills obtained from him matched the serial numbers of the bills in the
photocopy. Moreover, while he claimed that he only had P500.00 with him, with P400.00 meant for
his nephew and P100.00 meant for him, he contradicted himself by saying that the police officers
recovered more than P600.00 of his money on his person.

With regards to chain of custody, a perusal of the law reveals that failure to strictly comply
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not render an arrest illegal or the items seized from
the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.

In People v. Llanita and Buar, this Court elucidated on the concept of "chain of custody" and,
quoting People v. Kamad, enumerated the different links that must be proven to establish it: "Chain
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of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in

In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court had the opportunity to enumerate the different
links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-‐bust
operation, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court.

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs had been maintained. P/Insp.
Salazar, who was one of the apprehending officers, marked the seized items in front of Manalao and
the other apprehending officers. P/Insp. Salazar, who was also the investigating officer, thereafter
signed a request for the laboratory examination of the seized drugs, which was received by Forensic
Chemist Mag-‐abo, together with the items enumerated therein. She then testified in open court on
how her examination confirmed that the seized items, which she submitted in court, tested positive
forshabu.

Besides, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered or meddled with, the presumptions that the integrity of such evidence had been
preserved and that the police officers who handled the seized drugs had discharged their duties
properly and with regularity remain. The burden to overcome such presumptions lies on Manalao,
and this Court finds that he failed to do so.

When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
consciously possessed the drug.

The prosecution was able to satisfy all the foregoing elements during the joint trial of the
cases. The three decks ofshabu subject of the case for illegal possession of drugs were validly
obtained upon searching Manalao after he was arrested in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO and ELIZABETH DE LA VEGA y
BAUTISTA

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The elements that must be established for the successful prosecution of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the same. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The
delivery of the contraband to the poseur-‐buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the
buy-‐bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. The chain of custody of the
seized drugs in a buy-‐bust operation had been sufficiently established when there was proof of the
following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Facts:

The Officer-‐in-‐Charge formed a team to conduct surveillance and buy-‐bust operations at
Quezon City. PO2 Edsel Ibasco was designated as the poseur-‐buyer with SPO4 Edgardo Rebu Riano
and other policemen as back-‐up. Upon arrival at the place, PO2 Ibasco and the confidential
informant approached Linda Alviz outside her house. The confidential informant told Linda that
PO2 Ibasco was deeply in need of shabu. Linda asked for the money and PO2 Ibasco gave a P100.00
bill on which he earlier placed his initials "EI." Linda called for Elizabeth dela Vega, who was inside
the house, and the two talked. Elizabeth then went inside the house.

After a while, Elizabeth came out and handed a plastic sachet to Linda. Linda gave
the P100.00 bill to Elizabeth and the plastic sachet to PO2 Ibasco. PO2 Ibasco then gave the pre-‐
arranged signal by scratching his head. SPO4 Rebu[r]iano, who was only two (2) meters away,
rushed to the group, arrested Elizabeth and recovered from the latter the buy-‐bust money, while
PO2 Ibasco arrested Linda. The police officers brought Linda and Elizabeth to the police station.

PO2 [Ibasco] placed the letters "EV-‐LA" on the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. A request for laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance was made by the
La Loma Police Station 1 to the PNP Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office
(CPDCLO). Forensic Analyst submitted a Report stating that the qualitative examination conducted
on the specimen gave positive result to methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

RTC convicted them for violating RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 which was affirmed by CA. Now, only Elizabeth appealed to the Court wherein she insists that
there was no buy-‐bust operation and what actually took place was an unlawful warrantless arrest;
that they are not liable for violation of RA 9165 since they were just framed-‐up and that police
officers blatantly ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No.
9165, particularly, the requirements on making an inventory report and taking photographs of the
seized drugs in the presence of the accused or the latter’s representative or counsel.

Issue:

Whether or not Elizabeth and Linda are liable for violation of RA 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Ruling:
Page 84 of 299


Yes, they are liable for violation of RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

Jurisprudence has identified the elements that must be established for the successful
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the same. What
is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-‐buyer and
the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-‐bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused. In other words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the
moment the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.

The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals eventually affirmed, that all these elements have
been amply proven by the prosecution. The prosecution, through the detailed testimonies of PO2
Ibasco and SPO4 Reburiano, established that there was a consummated sale of shabu by Linda and
Elizabeth to PO2 Ibasco during the buy-‐bust operation.

Charges of extortion and frame-‐up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus,
cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate such
defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show
that the members of the buy-‐bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith
and credit.

In this case, there is absolute lack of evidence that the members of the buy-‐bust team were
stirred by illicit motive or had improperly performed their duties in arresting Linda and Elizabeth.
Both Linda and Elizabeth admitted that they did not know the police officers prior to their arrest.
Hence, there could not have been any bad blood between them and said police officers.

As a result of the finding that a buy-‐bust operation actually took place and that Linda and
Elizabeth were apprehended in flagrante delicto, the evidence gathered and presented by the
prosecution on the occasion of their lawful arrest without warrant cannot be deemed as the "fruits
of a poisonous tree," but are admissible and competent proof of their guilt. Indeed, in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the proof that the accused peddled illicit
drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, both of which were satisfactorily
complied with by the prosecution in this case.

Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Sec. 21. Custody and
Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. -‐ The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
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accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof

The above rule is implemented by Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
which expounds on how it is to be applied, and notably, also provides for a saving mechanism in
case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly complied with:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-‐compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said item

The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the
chain of custody of the same are duly established. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing Republic Act No. 9165, defines chain of custody as
follows: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in

In several cases, the Court found that the chain of custody of the seized drugs in a buy-‐bust
operation had been sufficiently established when there was proof of the following: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Given the law, rules, and jurisprudence, the failure of the police officers to make an
inventory report and to photograph the drugs seized from Linda and Elizabeth, as required by
Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not automatically fatal to the
prosecution's case, as it was able to trace and prove the chain of custody of the same: after arresting
Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-‐bust operation, the police officers brought the two women to
the police station; at the police station, P02 lbasco, who acted as the poseur-‐buyer, marked the
sachet of suspected shabu he received from Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-‐bust with his
initials "EV -‐LA" and turned over the same to P/Insp. Villanueva; P/Insp. Villanueva prepared the
Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the sachet; P02 Ibasco delivered the Request
Page 86 of 299


for Laboratory Examination and the sachet of suspected shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
CPDCLO, Quezon City, where the Request and specimen were received by P02 Piau; the contents of
the sachet were examined by Forensic Analyst Jabonillo, who prepared Chemistry Report No. D-‐
198-‐2003, confirming that the specimen tested positive for shabu and lastly, during the trial, the
marked sachet of shabu, as well as the marked money used in purchasing the same, were presented
as evidence and identified by P02 Ibasco and SP04 Reburiano.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR DE JESUS y GARCIA

A testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible
to obtain an unbroken chain." The arresting officers’ failure to conduct a physical inventory and to
photograph the items seized from De Jesus will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated
from him inadmissible in evidence as they were able to nonetheless preserve the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the said items. This is what is of utmost importance as the seized items are what
would be used in the determination of De Jesus’ guilt or innocence.
What is significant is that the links in the chain of custody were all accounted for by the
prosecution, from the time the items were confiscated from De Jesus, up to the time they were
presented in court during trial as proof of the corpus delicti. In any case, unless De Jesus can show that
there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering with the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the
evidence has been preserved, and that the police officers discharged their duties properly and with
regularity, will remain

Facts:

A report reached the office of the Bulacan PDEG about the alleged drug selling activities of
one alias Vic, herein appellant Victor De Jesus y Garcia, along Baliuag, Bulacan. Upon instructions of
the chief of the PDEG, a surveillance was conducted in the area by SPO2 Violago, as the team leader,
together with PO1 Quizon, PO1 Dimla, and PO2 Carlito Bernardo, as members. A buy bust operation
was instructed by the PDEG chief with the assistance of a confidential agent, known as alias "Erap".
PO2 Carlito Bernardo was designated as the poseur buyer with SPO2 Violago, PO1 Jacinto, and PO1
Quizon as back up. The former was given two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills of which
he placed his initials CB on the center of the seal of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas of each bill.

The buy-‐bust team proceeded to the house of their confidential agent at Barangay
Poblacion. PO2 Carlito Bernardo and the confidential agent proceeded to the house of [De Jesus] in
the guise of buying sachets of shabu. Upon arrival thereat, the confidential agent introduced PO2
Carlito Bernardo to De Jesus. He then asked about the money. PO2 Carlito Bernardo handed the
money to him consisting of two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills. He ,in turn, received
the money and took out a white colored cylindrical plastic film case. From the film case, he took out
a medium sized transparent plastic sachet and gave it to PO2 Carlito Bernardo. After receiving the
sachet, the latter held De Jesus and introduced himself as a police officer. PO2 Carlito Bernardo
recovered the film case from the right hand of De Jesus. The film case contained two (2) medium
sized and six (6) small sized transparent plastic sachets. The marked money was recovered from
the pocket of De Jesus. After asking De Jesus to bring out the contents of his pocket, a sachet of
marijuana was likewise recovered. De Jesus was then informed of his constitutional rights.

While still at the scene of the incident, PO2 Carlito Bernardo marked the medium sized
transparent plastic sachet handed by De Jesus to him as A-‐BB and CB and other sachet found. De
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Jesus was immediately taken to the police station for proper investigation. The incident was logged
and the evidence were turned over to the station’s investigator, PO2 Tomas Nachor. PO2 Tomas
Nachor, in turn prepared the request for the laboratory examination of the recovered specimen and
personally submitted the same to the crime laboratory office, which were later found positive for
shabu and marijuana.

On the other hand, De Jesus, in his brief, denied the charges and claimed that he was framed
by the confidential agent for personal reasons. RTC convicted De Jesus for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which was affirmed by RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not De Jesus is liable for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

Yes, De Jesus is liable for violation of Republic Act No. 9165?

the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu,
what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence."

To reiterate, the prosecution must establish the actual occurrence of the transaction
between the buyer and seller of the dangerous drug, simultaneous with the presentation of the very
same dangerous drug in court as evidence. This burden, the prosecution was able to successfully
discharge. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of
confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs:
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, provide as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-‐four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-‐four (24) hours
after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous
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drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals
does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous
drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-‐four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-‐two (72) hours,
conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the
PDEA shall within twenty-‐four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or
burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall
draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s
which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as
determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate
purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is
retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning
of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the
PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the
representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally
observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission
of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after
due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-‐two (72) hours
before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice
shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;
(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative
sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of
the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over
the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within
twenty-‐four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and
(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-‐four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act,
dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement
agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of
representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or
his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and
burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section
shall be implemented by the DOH.

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
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(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-‐compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items;
(b) Within twenty-‐four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(c) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-‐four (24) hours
after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, that when the volume of the dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals
does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous
drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, that a final
certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-‐four (24) hours;
(d) After the filing of the criminal case, the court shall, within seventy-‐two (72) hours,
conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the
PDEA shall, within twenty-‐four (24) hours thereafter, proceed with the destruction or
burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall
draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s
which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, that those item/s of lawful commerce, as
determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes;
Provided, further, that a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(e) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning
of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the
PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In cases of seizures
where no person is apprehended and no criminal case is filed, the PDEA may order the
immediate destruction or burning of seized dangerous drugs and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals under guidelines set by the Board. In all instances, the representative
sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(f) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally
observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission
of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after
due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-‐two (72) hours
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before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice
shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;
(g) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative
sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of
the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over
the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within
twenty-‐four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and
(h) Transitory Provision:
h.1) Within twenty-‐four (24) hours from the effectivity of the Act, dangerous drugs
defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall,
with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the
court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel;
and
h.2) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or
destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section
shall be implemented by the DOH.

In the meantime that the PDEA has no forensic laboratories and/or evidence rooms, as well
as the necessary personnel of its own in any area of its jurisdiction, the existing National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forensic laboratories shall continue to
examine or conduct screening and confirmatory tests on the seized/surrendered evidence whether
these be dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment; and the NBI and the PNP shall
continue to have custody of such evidence for use in court and until disposed of, burned or
destroyed in accordance with the foregoing rules: Provided, that pending appointment/designation
of the full complement of the representatives from the media, DOJ, or elected public official, the
inventory of the said evidence shall continue to be conducted by the arresting NBI and PNP
operatives under their existing procedures unless otherwise directed in writing by the DOH or
PDEA, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied.)

It was held, however, that "a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it
is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The arresting officers’ failure to conduct
a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized from De Jesus will not render his arrest
illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as they were able to nonetheless
preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the said items. This is what is of utmost
importance as the seized items are what would be used in the determination of De Jesus’ guilt or
innocence.

Verily, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the evidence had been preserved. PO2 Bernardo’s testimony as to how they learned of De Jesus’
drug dealing activities up to the time they arrested him and confiscated the items subject of this
case was clear and positive. He was also categorical in his statements on how he marked the seized
items and to whom he turned them over. His mistake as to the exact date of the buy-‐bust operation
will not render his testimony incredible. It must be remembered that aside from the fact that these
police officers handle numerous cases everyday, the first hearing held for this case was years after
the date of De Jesus’ arrest. Besides, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of the crime
need not be proved unless it is an essential element of the crime. What is significant is that the links
in the chain of custody were all accounted for by the prosecution, from the time the items were
Page 91 of 299


confiscated from De Jesus, up to the time they were presented in court during trial as proof of
the corpus delicti.

In any case, unless De Jesus can show that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering with the
evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved, and that the police
officers discharged their duties properly and with regularity, will remain. It is worthy to note that
the ill motive De Jesus speaks of is imputed against the informant and not the police officers. This
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals when it said that it is highly incredible that the arresting
officers would waste their time and effort, and even run the risk of losing their jobs and tainting
their reputations just so they could accommodate an informant with a grudge against De Jesus.

In prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

The above elements were all duly established by the prosecution. After De Jesus was validly
arrested for the illegal sale of drugs, he was searched and frisked, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANG

Noncompliance with Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 regarding chain of
custody, does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is
essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be

Facts:
On November 28, 2006, a buy bust operation was conducted wherein the accused appellant
Lolita Quesido y Badarang was apprehended. Appellant was thereafter formally prosecuted for
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 as indicated in the Information dated
December 4, 2006. Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the aforementioned charge upon her
arraignment on January 16, 2007. Thereafter, trial ensued.
In her defense, appellant narrated a different version of the story which basically states that
at around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 2006, she was at home when two persons entered
the same and then invited her to go with them to the police station. Thereafter, she complied
because she was already handcuffed by them. In its Decision dated May 7, 2008, the trial court
found appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant
challenged her conviction with the Court of Appeals but her appeal was turned down by the
appellate court in its Decision dated July 27, 2009, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. In the instant petition, appellant argues that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply
with the procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 9165 and she insists that the chain of custody
for the supposed seized drug was not properly established.

Issue:

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Whether the failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 9165
will render the acquittal of the accused

Ruling:

No. The relevant procedural rule referred to by appellant is Section 21(1), Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, which provides the procedure for the handling of seized or confiscated
illegal drugs. Section 21. Custody and Noncompliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the
arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.—Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

Nonetheless, despite the apparent mandatory language that is expressed in the foregoing
rule, the court have always reiterated in jurisprudence that noncompliance with Section 21 does
not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLO

Denial or frame-‐up is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted.
When the accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses cannot be set
up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that
the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-‐buyer seeking to expose his
criminal act; or (3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisted in its commission.

Facts:

Following a buy-‐bust operation, on December 1, 2004, two separate Informations were filed
against Aguilar in the Pasay City RTC, Branch 116 charging her with violation of Sections 5 and 11,
respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Aguilar pleaded not guilty to both charges when
arraigned on January 10, 2005. Thereafter, trial ensued. Upon trial, Aguilar contradicted the
prosecution and denied the charges against her. She claimed that on November 30, 2004, at around
10:00 a.m., while she and her niece, Lazaro, were waiting for a jeepney to Baclaran along NAIA
Page 93 of 299


Road, PO2 Medrano and PO2 Mendoza accosted and handcuffed her without any explanation.
Aguilar argued that there could have been no buy-‐bust operation as she was already in detention at
the station at the time such operation was supposedly conducted. She averred that while she was
once a resident of Pasay City, she no longer lived there and that she would only go there to visit her
mother. On August 19, 2005, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s version and found Aguilar
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases. Aguilar’s denial and theory of frame-‐up, the RTC held,
cannot be accepted over the prosecution’s case, which was not only clear and convincing, but also
amply supported by the evidence. Finding that the prosecution has proven Aguilar’s guilt of the two
crimes beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision on November
26, 2009.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to accused-‐appellant’s
defense of denial and frame-‐up
2. Whether the buy-‐bust operation was valid.

Ruling:

1. No. Time and again, the Court has looked at the defenses of denial and frame-‐up with
disfavor. The explanation of the court in People v. Cruz, 652 SCRA 286 (2011), with regard to the
defenses of denial and frame-‐up finds applicability in this case, given that Aguilar also accused the
police officers of extorting money from her, to wit: Denial or frame-‐up is a standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the
court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted. It should not accord a redoubtable
sanctuary to a person accused of drug dealing unless the evidence of such frame up is clear and
convincing. Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute appellant
in the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-‐serving claims of appellant that he had
been framed up. Neither can appellant’s claim of alleged extortion by the police operatives be
entertained. Absent any proof, appellant’s assertion of extortion.

2. Yes. In resolving issues involving the validity of a buy-‐bust operation, specifically the
question of whether the government had induced the accused to commit the offense as charged, the
Court usually finds it instructive to first distinguish between entrapment and instigation. The
court’s distinction in the recent case of People v. Legaspi, 661 SCRA 171 (2011), is elucidative, to
wit: Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its
purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on
the other hand, involves the inducement of the would-‐be accused into the commission of the
offense. In such a case, the instigators become co-‐principals themselves. Where the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no conviction may be had.
Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense
is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the
accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.
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The court recognizes instigation as a valid defense that can be raised by the accused.
However, for this defense to prosper, the accused must prove, with sufficient evidence, that the
government induced him or her to commit the offense.36 Aguilar claims that she was instigated by
the informant to sell shabu to PO2 Medrano. Her only evidence to support this claim was her
interpretation of PO2 Medrano’s testimony. The Court finds Aguilar’s defense of instigation
unworthy of belief. It has been established that when the accused is charged with the sale of illicit
drugs, the following defenses cannot be set up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime
were intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the
decoy or poseur-‐buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or (3) that police authorities feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission. The Court agreed with
the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that “[t]here was no showing that the informant employed
any act of inducement such as repeated requests for the sale of prohibited drugs or offers of
exorbitant prices.” Aguilar was never forced or coerced to sell the prohibited drug to PO2 Medrano.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE L. DUMALAG
G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐ De Castro

“Marking” of the seized items “immediately after seizure and confiscation” may be undertaken
at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an
accused in illegal drugs cases.

Facts:

After a buy bust operation, two separate informations were filed charging accused-‐
appellant Dante Dumalang of violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accused-‐appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges when he was arraigned on June 14, 2005. Thereafter, trial ensued. Upon trial, the defense
averred that the police officers framed accused-‐appellant after failing to extort money from him. On
November 16, 2005, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-‐appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felonies charged.

On appeal, accused-‐appellant argued that the police officers who arrested him and purportedly
confiscated the sachets of shabu from his possession failed to strictly comply with the mandated
procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said provision of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter require that the marking of the drugs be done immediately after they
are seized from the accused; otherwise, reasonable doubt arises as to the authenticity of the seized
drugs. Accused-‐appellant claimed that the sachets of shabu supposedly seized from his possession
were marked when he was already at the police station and not at the place of his arrest. In its
Decision dated July 3, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC judgment of conviction.
Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether the prosecution failed to comply with the procedures in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs as embodied in Section 21 of Republic Act 9165 by the
failure of the police to mark the seized items immediately upon their confiscation
2. Whether the accused-‐appellant is guilty of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous
drugs
Page 95 of 299


Ruling:

1. No. Accused-‐appellant’s insistence that the police officers broke the chain of custody rule when
they failed to mark the seized items immediately upon their confiscation at the place where he was
apprehended lacks legal basis. It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark
the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the
place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that
“marking” of the seized items “immediately after seizure and confiscation” may be undertaken at
the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an
accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court elaborated in this
wise:
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with
Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal or the
items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the

2. For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it must be shown that (a)
the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug. In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.
In this case, prosecution witnesses, PO3 Albano and PO2 Valdez, categorically stated under oath
that as members of the buy-‐bust team, they caught accused-‐ appellant in flagrante delicto selling
and possessing shabu. The prosecution was able to establish that (a) accused-‐appellant had no
authority to sell or to possess any dangerous drugs; (b) during the buy-‐bust operation conducted by
the police on January 5, 2005 at the Sexy Beach Resort in Barangay Estancia, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte,
accused-‐appellant sold and delivered to PO3 Albano, acting as a poseur-‐buyer, for the price of Two
Hundred Pesos (P200.00), one heat-‐sealed plastic sachet containing 0.023 grams of white
crystalline substance, chemically confirmed to be shabu; and (c) as a result of a search incidental to
the valid warrantless arrest of accused-‐appellant, he was caught in possession of three more
heat-‐sealed plastic sachets containing 0.01, 0.015, and 0.04 grams of white crystalline substance, all
chemically confirmed also to be shabu.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

When, of all the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of
the shabu allegedly seized from the accused, only the arresting officer testified for the specific purpose
of identifying the evidence, and his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it
ended with his identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed, then
Page 96 of 299


the requirement of chain of custody is broken. In effect, the custodial link ended with the arresting
officer when he testified that he brought the seized items, together with the accused, to the police
station. Such a break in the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case, and the accused must be
acquitted.

Facts:

Two separate informations were filed with the RTC, charging accused-‐appellant Arturo
Enriquez with violation of R.A. No. 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. The
prosecution alleged that police officers SPO2 David, SPO2 Divina and SPO1 Garung caught Enriquez
selling shabu in a buy-‐bust operation. During the buy-‐bust, Enriquez handed SPO2 David a sachet of
shabu. The search on the body of Enriquez yielded several plastic sachets of a white crystalline
substance.

Enriquez avers that he was eating alone in an eatery when he was approached by three men
in civilian clothes. One of them, SPO2 David, poked a gun at him and asked if he knew of a certain
truck driver who was suspected of selling shabu. When he denied knowledge thereof, he was
immediately handcuffed and was brought to the police station for further investigation. He was
detained and was told that he is being suspected of selling shabu.

The RTC convicted Enriquez, and the CA affirmed the conviction. Hence the appeal.
Enriquez claims, among others, that the prosecution was not able to prove with moral certainty the
identity of the corpus delicti for failure of the police officers to comply with Section 21(a) of
Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and disposition of confiscated or seized dangerous drugs. He
avers that there was neither physical inventory nor a photograph of the seized items. Moreover,
Enriquez says, the markings on the confiscated items were not immediately made upon its seizure,
at the place of the incident, nor were there any indication in the records that it was made in his
presence. Enriquez points out that while “non-‐compliance x x x with Section 21 is not fatal, as police
lapses, may at times occur, these errors, however, must be supported with justifiable grounds and
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved.

Issue:

Did the prosecution fail to establish the chain of custody of the confiscated shabu?

Ruling:

The appeal is granted. Enriquez is acquitted.

[T]he prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in
court as proof of the corpus delicti. The chain of custody requirement “ensures that unnecessary
doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.”

[T]he following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-‐bust
situation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;
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Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.

While non-‐compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when
i. “there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and
ii. the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.”
Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the
non-‐compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the
corpus delicti.

In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable ground offered for the non-‐compliance
with the chain of custody requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from
the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. In other words, the prosecution’s evidence
failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the sachets of shabu presented in court
were the very same items seized from Enriquez.

The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure from Enriquez of the
dangerous drugs and its subsequent marking. Under the law, such marking should have been done
immediately after confiscation and in the presence of the accused or his representative. While it is
true that the items presented in court bore the initials of SPO2 David, who was also the poseur-‐
buyer and primary apprehending officer, nowhere in the documentary and testimonial evidence of
the prosecution can it be found when these items were actually marked and if they were marked in
the presence of Enriquez or at least his representative. Emphasizing the importance of this first
link, this Court in People v. Zakaria, pronounced that marking upon seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover,
the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence. A failure to
mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the
law requires.

The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the illegal drug by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Both SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina testified that
after the buy-‐bust operation, they brought Enriquez and the seized items to the police station.
However, they both failed to identify the person to whom they turned over the seized items.
Records show that the request for laboratory examination was prepared by Chief of Police Erese,
and yet there is no evidence to show that he was the person who received the seized items from the
apprehending officers. There is therefore a crucial missing link, i.e., what happened to the seized
items after they left the hands of SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina and before they came to the hands of
Chief of Police Erese.

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As for the third and the last links, although records show that Chief of Police Erese signed
the request for laboratory examination, he was not presented in court to testify as such. The
testimony of Chief of Police Erese is indispensable because he could have provided the critical link
between the testimony of SPO2 David, and the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp. Dizon, which the
parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for whereabouts of the seized items from the time they
were brought to the police station to the time they were submitted to P/Insp. Dizon for examination
constitutes a clear break in the chain of custody. Moreover, no one testified as to how the
confiscated items were handled and cared for after the laboratory examination.

Overall, the prosecution failed to observe the requirement that the testimonies of all
persons who handled the specimen are important to establish the chain of custody. Of all the
individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of the shabu allegedly
seized from Enriquez, only SPO2 David testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence.
However, his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it ended with his
identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed. In effect, the
custodial link ended with SPO2 David when he testified that he brought the seized items, together
with Enriquez, to the police station.

Under the above premises, it is clear that there was a break in the chain of custody of the
seized substances. The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of custody is fatal
to its case as we can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA y CHAVEZ

The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Consistency with
the “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure that
they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence –
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. Thus, even if the police officers failed to immediately make an inventory and marking of
the seized sachet of shabu at the place where the accused was apprehended does not destroy the
integrity and evidentiary value of said sachet of shabu, if the chain of custody could be continuously
traced from its receipt by the arresting officer, the transfer to the police laboratory for examination, it
being kept in police custody awaiting trial, and its presentation as evidence before the RTC.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellant Giovanni Ocfemia was charged before the RTC with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, penalized under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The prosecution averred that a team of PDEA and PNP agents and officers conducted a buy-‐bust
operation against Ocfemia. PO2 Aldea was assigned to act as the poseur-‐buyer, and after Ocfemia
handed to him a sachet of shabu, PO2 Aldea gave the signal to the team to arrest Ocfemia. The latter
was brought to the police station, where PO2 Aldea marked the sachet of shabu sold to him by
Ocfemia. PO2 Aldea then submitted the same to their crime laboratory. P/SUPT Arroyo conducted
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the chemical examination of the substance which tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Ocfemia denied the charge and asserted that he was framed-‐up by the police. As a police
asset, he joined some of the members of the PDEA/PNP team in a buy-‐bust operation, where
Ocfemia would be the poseur-‐buyer. After the supposed suspect was arrested, PO2 Aldea disclosed
that Ocfemia would be charged with illegal sale of shabu.

The RTC convicted Ocfemia, and the CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

Did the prosecution fail to prove with moral certainty that the sachet of shabu presented in
court is the same one Ocfemia allegedly sold during the buy-‐bust operations?

Ruling:

The appeal is denied.

Ocfemia protests that the prosecution failed to prove with moral certainty that the sachet of
shabu presented before the RTC was the same one he allegedly sold during the buy-‐bust operations
since the police officers who had initial custody and control thereof neither showed an inventory
nor a photograph taken of the same; and that assuming it was marked, the marking was not
immediately done after its seizure and confiscation at the place where he was apprehended.
Ocfemia contends that the police officers disregarded Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 which
requires that the drugs seized must be physically inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure and confiscation in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. On
that premise, Ocfemia additionally argues that the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties by the police officers.

Ocfemia’s assertions are bereft of merit.

Jurisprudence has already decreed that the failure of the police officers to make a physical
inventory, to photograph, and to mark the shabu at the place of arrest do not automatically render it
inadmissible in evidence or impair the integrity of the chain of its custody. The failure to strictly
comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the

Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. 9165 provides, in part: the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-‐compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

Page 100 of 299


What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is
the matter of “marking” of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the
evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of
the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

In this case, the chain of custody of the sachet of shabu sold by Ocfemia could be
continuously traced from its receipt by PO2 Aldea, the poseur-‐buyer, during the buy-‐bust
operation; its transfer to the police laboratory for examination; it being kept in police custody while
awaiting trial; and its presentation as evidence before the RTC. PO2 Aldea himself marked the said
sachet of shabu with his initials upon arriving at the police station with the arrested Ocfemia. He
also personally submitted the same sachet of shabu to the PNP crime laboratory for forensic
examination. When he testified before the RTC, PO2 Aldea identified the sachet of shabu and
confirmed his initials thereon. P/SUPT Arroyo was the forensic officer who conducted the chemical
examination of the contents of the sachet bearing PO2 Aldea’s initials and she confirmed on the
witness stand that the said contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet of shabu presented in evidence against Ocfemia was
properly preserved in substantial compliance with Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA and PHANS BANDALI y
SIMPAL

While the accused may not be convicted of illegal sale of shabu due to the absence of all the
elements of the crime, they may still be convicted for illegal delivery of shabu if all its elements are
present and proven by the prosecution. The accused may also be convicted for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs as the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.

Facts:

Two separate informations were filed with the RTC, against Michael Maongco and Phans
Bandali, charging them for illegally dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing, or acting as
brokers of dangerous drugs. The prosecution alleged that the police arrested Alvin Carpio for illegal
possession of shabu, which, according to him, came from Maongco. An entrapment operation was
later planned. PO2 Arugay approached Maongco and introduced himself to Maongco as Carpio’s
cousin, and claimed that Carpio was sick and could not be there personally. PO2 Arugay then asked
from accused-‐appellant Maongco for Carpio’s order of “dalawang bulto.” Accused-‐appellant
Maongco drew out from his pocket a sachet of shabu and showed it to PO2 Arugay. When PO2
Arugay got hold of the sachet of shabu, he immediately revealed that he was a police officer,
arrested accused-‐appellant Maongco, and apprised the latter of his constitutional rights.

When the police team questioned accused-‐appellant Maongco as to the other “bulto” of
shabu Carpio had ordered, Maongco disclosed that the same was in the possession of accused-‐
appellant Bandali, who was then at Jollibee Pantranco branch along Quezon Avenue. The police
team, with Carpio and accused-‐appellant Maongco, went to the said restaurant where accused-‐
Page 101 of 299


appellant Maongco identified Bandali to the police team as the one wearing a blue shirt. PO2 Ong
approached accused-‐appellant Bandali and demanded from the latter the other half of the drugs
ordered. Accused-‐appellant Bandali voluntarily handed over a sachet of shabu to PO2 Ong.
Thereafter, PO2 Ong apprised Bandali of his constitutional rights and arrested him.

The RTC convicted Maongco and Bandali for illegally selling shabu. The CA affirmed the
RTc.

Issues:

1. Did the RTC and CA erroneously convicted Maongco for illegal sale of shabu?
2. Did the RTC and CA likewise erroneously convicted Bandali for illegal sale of shabu?

Ruling:

The appeal is partly meritorious.

1. Yes, but Maongco is guilty of illegal delivery of shabu.

In the case of accused-‐appellant Maongco, the Court finds that the RTC and the Court of
Appeals both erred in convicting him in Criminal Case No. Q-‐04-‐127731 for the illegal sale of
shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The evidence on record does not support
accused-‐appellant Maongco’s conviction for said crime, especially considering the following
answers of prosecution witness PO1 Arugay during the latter’s cross-‐examination, practically
admitting the lack of consideration/payment for the sachet of shabu. Inarguably,
consideration/payment is one of the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, without
which, accused-‐appellant Maongco’s conviction for said crime cannot stand. Nonetheless, accused-‐
appellant Maongco is still not absolved of criminal liability.

A review of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-‐04-‐127731 readily reveals that accused-‐
appellant Maongco was not actually charged with illegal sale of shabu. Said Information specifically
alleged that accused-‐appellant Maongco “willfully and unlawfully dispense[d], deliver[ed],
transport[ed], distribute[d] or act[ed] as broker” in the transaction involving 4.50 grams of shabu.
These acts are likewise punishable under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that (1) the accused passed
on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such
delivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note
is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.

It is not disputed that accused-‐appellant Maongco, who was working as a taxi driver at the
time of his arrest, had no authority under the law to deliver any dangerous drug. The existence of
the two other elements was established by PO1 Arugay’s testimony.

There was a prior arrangement between Carpio and Maongco. When PO1 Arugay appeared
for his purportedly indisposed cousin, Carpio, and asked for his order of shabu, Maongco
immediately understood what PO1 Arugay meant. Maongco took out a sachet of shabu from his
pocket and handed over possession of said sachet to PO1 Arugay.

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Based on the charges against accused-‐appellant Maongco and the evidence presented by the
prosecution, accused-‐appellant Maongco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of
shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

2. Yes, Bandali was also erroneously convicted for illegal sale of shabu, but must be
convicted for illegal possession of shabu.

For the same reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
also erred in convicting accused-‐appellant Bandali for the crime of illegal sale of shabu in
Criminal Case No. Q-‐04-‐127732.

The Information against accused-‐appellant Bandali, same as that against accused-‐appellant
Maongco, charged him with “willfully and unlawfully dispens[ing], deliver[ing], transport[ing],
distribut[ing] or act[ing] as broker” in the transaction involving 4.45 grams of shabu. However,
unlike accused-‐appellant Maongco, accused-‐appellant Bandali cannot be convicted for illegal
delivery of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, given that the circumstances
surrounding the arrest of the latter were radically different from those of the former.

In Bandali’s case, it cannot be said that he knowingly passed on the sachet of shabu in his
possession to PO2 Ong. PO2 Ong approached accused-‐appellant Bandali as a police officer, absent
any pretense, and demanded that the latter bring out the other sachet of shabu. Bandali’s voluntary
production of the sachet of shabu in his possession was in subservience to PO2 Ong’s authority. PO2
Ong then acquired the sachet of shabu from Bandali by seizure, not by delivery. Even if there may be
doubt as to whether or not Bandali was actually aware at that moment that PO2 Ong was a police
officer, the ambiguity would still be resolved in Bandali’s favor.

This does not mean though that accused-‐appellant Bandali goes scot free. The evidence for
the prosecution did establish that Bandali committed illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.

For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following
essential elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possess the said drug.30 Accused-‐appellant Maongco informed the
police officers that the other sachet of shabu was in the possession of accused-‐appellant Bandali.
Accused-‐appellant Bandali herein was in possession of the sachet of shabu as he was sitting at
Jollibee Pantranco branch and was approached by PO2 Ong. Hence, Bandali was able to
immediately produce and surrender the said sachet upon demand by PO2 Ong. Bandali, admittedly
jobless at the time of his arrest, did not have any authority to possess shabu. And as to the last
element, the rule is settled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession.

But can Bandali be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article II,
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 when he was charged with illegal dispensation, delivery,
transportation, distribution or acting as broker of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 5 of the
same statute? The Court answers in the affirmative.

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Well-‐settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily
includes the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The same ruling may also be applied to
the other acts penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 because for the accused
to be able to trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit, or transport any dangerous drug, he must necessarily be in possession of said drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA

The testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-‐bust operations are credible
when they are consistent in establishing the elements of illegal sale of shabu, despite their
consistencies on peripheral matters. In addition, objections to the alleged violation to the chain of
custody rule must be made during trial and not first time on appeal, otherwise the objection must be
denied.

Facts:

Santos and Valera were charged with illegal sale of shabu, in violation of R.A. No. 9165.
According to the prosecution, an informant notified the police that a certain Marilyn and Arlene will
sell her shabu. A buy-‐bust operation was then conducted, with SP02 Aninas as the poseur buyer.
The appellants Santos and Valera entered inside the vehicle occupied by the informant, P02 Aninas
and SP02 Male. After the sale was completed, Santos and Valera were arrested. The six pieces of
plastic sachets containing shabu which were taken from the appellants were marked by PO2
Aninas. And were inventoried in Camp Vicente Lim.

The RTC convicted the appellants, and the CA affirmed the decision.

Issues:
1. Were the testimonies of the police officers inconsistent to such extent as to warrant
acquittal for Santos and Valrea?
2. Did the police officers violate the chain of custody rule?

Ruling:

1. No. The testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male, stating that the same corroborated
each other on material points and established beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was indeed consummated.

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.” People v. Nicolas adds that “[w]hat
is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.”

In handing down its judgment of conviction against appellants, the RTC gave more credence
to the testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male that appellants were caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs in a buy-‐bust operation. The RTC ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by
appellants did not destroy the credibility of the police officers’ testimonies. The inconsistencies
merely involved peripheral matters that did not totally cause damage to the declarations of the
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police officers, which the RTC found to be credible and consistent on material points. The RTC
found that appellants acted in conspiracy with each other in the selling of shabu to PO2 Aninias as
both appellants were present and actively participated in the sale. As regards the testimonies of the
defense witnesses, the trial court deemed the same insufficient to refute the affirmative allegations
of the police officers and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
functions.

The Court of Appeals also found credible the testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male,
stating that the same corroborated each other on material points and established beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was indeed consummated. The
appellate court added that, based on the conduct of appellants during the buy-‐bust operation, their
actions collectively could not be interpreted to mean anything other than their eagerness to sell
illegal drugs to the poseur-‐buyer.

To our mind, the above seemingly incompatible statements of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male
did not destroy their credibility. Nor are these statements utterly irreconcilable as appellants would
like this Court to believe. As to the sale transaction itself, the testimony of PO2 Aninias is of greater
relevance considering that he was the poseur-‐buyer who dealt directly, i.e., face to face, with
appellants. PO2 Aninias stated in his cross examination that he was seated at the passenger seat of
their vehicle and his head was turned towards appellants while he was talking to them. On the
other hand, SPO2 Male, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, merely listened to the conversation
between PO2 Aninias and the appellants. SPO2 Male had no actual participation in the exchange of
illegal drugs and boodle money. His recollection of events might not be as precise as that of PO2
Aninias. Thus, PO2 Aninias was in a better position to testify on who handed to him the box
containing the shabu and to whom he gave the boodle money. The variance in the statements of
SPO2 Male as to the role(s) played by appellants does not detract from the fact that both accused
were involved in the transaction with the poseur-‐buyer. Neither did the same mean that the police
officers in this case were guilty of prevarication or otherwise in bad faith in their testimonies.

Brushing aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
the Court finds that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution duly established the fact that
appellants sold to PO2 Aninias, the poseur-‐buyer, six heat-‐sealed transparent plastic sachets that
contained white crystalline substance that later tested positive for shabu. Thus, the elements of the
crime charged had been sufficiently established.

2. No. The failure of the appellants to object on the alleged lapse of the police officers
regarding the chain of custody of the drugs during trial is fatal to their claim.

The Court notes, however, that appellants raised the issue of the police officers' non-‐
compliance with the above provisions only in their appeal. The memorandum42 of the appellants
before the RTC and the transcript of stenographic notes of this case did not contain any objections
regarding the safekeeping and the integrity of the shabu seized from appellants on account of the
failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of said drugs. This lapse is
fatal to appellants' case.

The law excuses non-‐compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-‐bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant[s] did not question during trial
the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of
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Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead
raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did [the] appellant[s] least intimate at the trial
court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARISSA CASTILLO
G.R. No. 190180, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐de Castro

Non-‐compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items
seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack
of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official in the operation will not render the evidence seized as inadmissible.

Facts:

While on duty at the drug enforcement unit of the Eastern Police District, a confidential
informant (CI) came and informed PO2 Santos and his colleagues at the said office about the illegal
activity of the accused Marissa Castillo and one alias "Ompong" who were reported to be selling
shabu along J.B. Miguel St., Brgy. Bambang, Pasig City. Acting on such tip, a buy-‐bust information
was conducted.

On the same day, the CI introduced PO2 Santos and PO1 Grace Chavez to Marissa as
potential buyers. During the transaction, Marissa brought out three (3) plastic sachets and then
gave one of the plastic sachets to PO2 Santos. PO2 Santos examined the plastic sachet given to him
after which he scratched his head with his right hand which was the pre-‐arranged signal to signify
that the sale had been consummated. PO2 Santos and his companions then introduced themselves
as police officers after which PO2 Santos grabbed the left hand of Marissa Castillo. PO2 Santos was
able to recover the Php200.00 buy bust money from the left hand of Marissa and the two other
plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Marissa’s companion, however, was able to run away.

After PO2 Santos had arrested accused Castillo, he informed her of her rights and then put
markings on the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused. Thereafter, the accused was brought
to the office of the SDEU while the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused were brought to
crime laboratory for examination. The examination shows that the contents of the plastic sachets
tested positive for shabu. PO2 Santos identified the accused Marissa Castillo in open court.

The RTC found the accused guilty of violation of Section 5 and Section 11 (sale and
possession of illegal drugs, respectively), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

In the instant appeal, appellant avers that the police officers who apprehended her failed to
strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence,
and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official in the operation.
Page 106 of 299


Issues:

Whether or not the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized
evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation will render the evidence seized as
inadmissible.

Ruling:

No, the evidence will not be rendered inadmissible because of such failure.

Non-‐compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items
seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.

Moreover, despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a
perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-‐compliance with said procedural rule non-‐
prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses: “…that non-‐compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.”

Essentially, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures that the chain of custody of the
seized drugs to be used in evidence must be complete and unbroken. We have defined "chain of
custody" as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substation and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering – without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule.
In the case at bar, we concur with appellant’s assertion that the arresting officers involved
were not able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1), Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with appellant’s argument does not sway us towards
granting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody
of said evidence was shown to be unbroken.

At the outset, it should be noted that appellant did not raise the issue of the alleged non-‐
compliance with the aforementioned procedural rule when the case was still being heard in the trial
Page 107 of 299


court. In People v. Robelo, we ruled that this assertion must be argued before the trial court and not
on appeal for the first time.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASIR GANI and NORMINA GANI
G.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐de Castro

In dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and to
photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render
the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody
of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.

Facts:

On May 5, 2004, Special Investigator Elson Saul (SI Saul) received information from a
confidential informant that accused-‐appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking
for a buyer of shabu. SI Saul arranged for a meeting with Normina, and the two eventually agreed
on the sale of 100 grams of shabu for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) to be
consummated in the afternoon of the following day, May 6, 2004, at FTI Complex corner Vishay
Street, Taguig City. After reporting the negotiation to his NBI superior, SI Saul, in coordination with
PDEA, formed a buy-‐bust team.

On May 6, 2004, Normina arrived in the agreed place together with Asir Gani. SI Saul
showed the accused the marked money and the accused, in turn, showed two plastic packs
containing a white crystalline substance. The exchange took place, then SI Saul lighted a cigarette to
signal the other members of the buy-‐bust team. The accused were arrested and duly advised of
their constitutional rights.

During the search incidental to the arrest, the buy-‐bust team seized from accused-‐
appellants’ possession, two other sachets of shabu, the marked money, accused-‐appellant Asir’s .45
caliber pistol, and the motorcycle. The team and the accused then proceeded to the FTI Barangay
Hall.

At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered from
accused-‐appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul
marked "ES-‐1 05-‐06-‐04" and "ES-‐2 05-‐06-‐04," representing SI Saul’s initials and the date of the
buy-‐bust. All these were done in the presence of accused-‐appellants and two barangay officials. SI
Saul’s inventory report, however, did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from
accused-‐appellants’ possession. Thereafter, the buy-‐bust team brought accused-‐appellants to the
NBI Headquarters in Manila.

An Information for violation of Section 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165 in relation to Art. 62, Par. 2, of the
Revised Penal Code was then filed in court. During the pre-‐trial phase, one of the stipulated facts
include the existence of the four (4) plastic sachets, but not their source or origin. RTC Pasig City
found the accused guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

The appeal in the CA and the instant appeal are grounded on the alleged violation of the
chain of custody rule under RA 9165. The accused claim that there is no showing that the inventory
Page 108 of 299


and picture-‐taking of the shabu were conducted in their presence, as well as in the presence of a
representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official,
immediately after arrest. It is likewise not clearly established where and when the markings on the
plastic sachets of shabu were made. They also claim that suspicions could have been avoided had
the prosecution presented the testimonies of the barangay officials who signed the inventory
report. They further pointed out that the prosecution’s evidence conflicted as to the number of
sachets of shabu seized from them.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the the rules on the custody of seized drugs provided under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 were complied with in the case.
2. Whether or not the inventory of the drugs should be conducted in the presence of all persons
enumerated in Sec.21 of RA 9165.
3. Whether or not the testimonies of the Brgy. Officials who signed the inventory should be
presented in trial

Ruling:

1. Yes, they have complied.
The Court finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a
physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the
place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the
integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved that
immediately after accused-‐appellants’ arrest, they were brought to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was
there, in the presence of two barangay officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two
plastic sachets of shabu plus the other items seized. It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul
marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him with his initials and the date.. Thereafter, the
buy-‐bust team, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul made a
request for examination of the two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-‐1 05-‐06-‐04" and "ES-‐2 05-‐
06-‐04," and personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI Forensic Chemist II
Patingo, conducted the laboratory examination of the contents of the two sachets marked "ES-‐1 05-‐
06-‐04" and "ES-‐2 05-‐06-‐04" and kept said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to
the RTC as evidence during trial.
Contrary to accused-‐appellants’ averment, prosecution witness, SI Saul, was able to explain
why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial, when SI Saul only bought
two sachets during the buy-‐ bust operation. SI Saul testified that in addition to the two plastic
sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-‐appellants, there were two more sachets of shabu
recovered from accused-‐appellants’ possession by the buy-‐bust team during the body search
conducted incidental to accused-‐appellants’ lawful arrest.
2. No, it is not necessary.
Page 109 of 299


The failure of the buy-‐bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon
seizure and at the site of accused-‐appellants’ apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of
the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not
fatal and did not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was
able to trace and establish each and every link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and,
hence, the identity and integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved.
3. No, it is not necessary.
For the same reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to present as witnesses
before the RTC the two barangay officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the
testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and would have no
significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELITO TACULOD y ELLE

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-‐bust operation is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established.

Facts:

On September 24, 2003, a confidential informant called the Caloocan City Police Station,
telling the police officers about the drug-‐peddling activities of the appellant.

On September 25, 2003, in a buy-‐bust operation, accused-‐appellant was arrested while in
possession of three heat-‐sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu weighing 0.02 gram
each. He also sold and delivered shabu weighing 0.02 gram to a police officer, who posed as buyer.
On September 30, 2003, accused was charged for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

During the trial, the defense painted a different picture of the events that transpired on the
day the appellant was arrested. The appellant was arrested while watching a basketball game on
September 24, 2003 at about 6:00 or 7:00 o’clock in the evening at Sabalo St., Dagat-‐Dagatan,
Caloocan City. While simply observing his neighbors play basketball, the appellant was suddenly
approached by several unidentified individuals who inquired if his name is "Lito." After replying in
the affirmative, they suddenly grabbed and handcuffed him for no apparent reason. He tried to
resist but to no avail, the policemen succeeded in seizing him and thereafter, brought him to the
police station. Thereat, he was told that the reason why he was arrested was because he had
quarrelled with their assets on April 22, 2003.

The appellant denied the charges filed against him and that he only came to know about
such charges at the police station. Nevertheless, the trial court found the appellant guilty of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellant, thus, filed the instant
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Page 110 of 299


Issues:

1. Whether or not there was indeed a buy-‐bust operation.
2. May the accused interpose the defense of denial and frame-‐up in the case at bar?

Rulings:

1. Yes.

The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-‐bust operation primarily boils down to
one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a
contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial
court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-‐bust operation is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution satisfactorily proved
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti.

On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or
regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.

With respect to the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the police officer positively
identified the appellant as the person who sold to him one plastic sachet of shabu worth P100.00 in
a buy-‐bust operation. The police officer also identified in court the plastic sachet of shabu he bought
from the appellant. The testimony of the police officer was in turn corroborated by the testimony of
a member of the buy-‐bust team who also categorically pointed to the appellant as the person whom
he saw the police officer who bought illegal drugs from. To further prove that a buy-‐bust operation
was actually conducted, the prosecution also presented the testimony of a forensic chemist
assigned to the case.

On the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the police officer testified that when
he bought shabu from the appellant, the latter took out from his pocket four plastic sachets. The
appellant gave one sachet to the police officer and put the rest back in his left pocket. After the
arrest of the appellant, the police officer relayed this information to another police officer and the
latter ordered the appellant to empty the contents of his pocket. The appellant then brought out the
three remaining plastic sachets of shabu, which the police officer marked accordingly.

3. No.

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The appellant could only muster a defense of outright denial, with nary any evidence to
adequately support his version of the events that led to his arrest. Sadly for the appellant, this
omission does nothing to help his cause. The defense of denial and frame-‐up has been invariably
viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defense of denial and frame-‐up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN
G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-‐de Castro

When the prosecution was able to establish the elements for conviction for the crime of illegal
sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, illegal possession of regulated and prohibited drugs and the guilt
of the accused, the Court must affirm the decision of trial court and the CA.

As to imposition of penalties in illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, illegal possession
of regulated and prohibited drugs, as provided by law, it shall depend on the amount sold and
possessed by the accused.

Facts:

Donald Vasquez (Don), claiming that he was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), was arrested, together with Reynar Siscar, through a buy-‐bust operation of the
Philippine National Police. The police found six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-‐bust
operation contained in a self-‐sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the
brown envelope was confiscated from Don, the police put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it.
The police also noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-‐93-‐1303 re
Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but the police did not bother to check out what they were for or who made
them. When they interrogated Don about the brown envelope, they found out that the same was
submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. The police also testified that after the appellant
was arrested, they conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more
plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant which vary in sizes and were contained in a white
envelope and marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers
then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio.

Don denied all the allegations of the prosecution stating that the drug specimen was
obtained from him through force when the police entered his house and searched his room, picking
up what they could get. One of the police opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s]
possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide; from two (2) cases and marked as DD-‐93-‐
1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-‐96-‐5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug
specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-‐93-‐1303 was intended for presentation on 3
April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and
his wallet containing P2,530.00.

Issues:

1. Whether the accused is guilty of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs and illegal
possession of regulated and prohibited drugs.

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2. Whether the CA proper imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as to the crime of illegal
sale of of regulated or prohibited drugs and applying ISLAW as to the crime of illegal
possession of regulated and prohibited drugs.

Ruling:

1. The accused is guilty of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs and illegal possession of
regulated and prohibited drugs.

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On
the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In the case at bar, the testimonies of the police officers established that a buy-‐bust
operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. The
police/poseur-‐buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags
of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise
identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the
same were seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white
crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. The Court finds that the
police’s testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-‐bust operation was
detailed and straightforward. It was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the
face of the opposing counsel’s cross-‐examination.

The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to
criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling
and possessing illegal drugs. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily
sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his
predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents
that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the
original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court
did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the
appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers
that the appellant was caught red-‐handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of
prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-‐bust operation. Thus, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.

2. The CA properly imposed the penalties.

Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:

SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. -‐ The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Page 113 of 299


Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed.

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -‐ The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Crime. -‐ The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-‐A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after
public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

In the criminal case involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the appellant was
found to have sold to the poseur-‐buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount
is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition of either reclusion
perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death penalty.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, in this case,
considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the appellant’s violation of
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed
the trial court’s imposition of reclusion perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on
the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs, the Court of Appeals properly
invoked our ruling in People v. Tira in determining the proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in
Tira that:

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of
the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
Page 114 of 299


QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant
amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the
imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable
penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-‐164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death.

Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a
regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into
consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which
arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, was
not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower
courts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE
G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014, J. Leonardo–De Castro

For there to be illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be present: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery to
the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the payment therefor. Thus, upon delivery of the
illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the seller, illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
committed.

Facts:

On April 2006, the Philippine National Police in Tabaco City received a confidential
information that “Palito” of Cormidal, Tabaco City is engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana. Upon
investigation, it was later on confirmed that “Palito”, the accused–appellant Joselito Morate
(Morate), is indeed involved in the sale of illegal drugs. The police officers then planned for the buy-‐
bust operation with PO1 Manamtam designated as poseur-‐buyer.

Morate was then arrested through the buy-‐bust operation and was brought to the police
station. Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buy–bust were counted,
marked and inventoried. The marking and inventory of the seized items were witnessed by
Barangay Kagawad Julio Marbella of Cormidal, Tabaco City and Emmanuel Cea III, a local newsman,
Page 115 of 299


both of whom signed the Certification of Inventory. The seized items were all transferred to PO3
Eva as the evidence custodian.

PO3 Eva thereafter prepared a Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property before handing the
seized items to PO1 Reynaldo Borromeo who signed the receipt upon taking hold of the items. PO1
Borromeo proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City bringing with him the seized
items and a Request for Laboratory Examination. The seized items were received by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Legazpi City where PSInsp. Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, examined
them. PSInsp. Clemen subsequently presented the seized drugs to the trial court as the
prosecution’s evidence in the course of her testimony.

The lower court finds the accused, Joselito Morate, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5 of Art. II of R.A. 9165 and Section 11, Art. II of the same law. Morate appealed
his case to the Court of Appeals questioning the non–compliance with the rule on chain of custody
of seized illegal drugs. CA rejected the contentions of Morate and denied his appeal. Hence, the
petition of Morate.

Issue:

Whether Morate is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

This Court denies Morate’s appeal.

A successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires that the following
elements be established:

1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and
2) the delivery to the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the payment
therefor.

On the other hand, there can be conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs only if
the following elements are present:

1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug;
2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed when the sale transaction is consummated, that
is, upon delivery of the illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the seller. In this
case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals both found beyond reasonable doubt that the accused–
appellant, as seller, sold 1.0291 grams of marijuana to the poseur–buyer, PO1 Manamtam, for
P100.00. Morate handed PO1 Manamtam three sachets of marijuana after the latter paid the
P100.00 consideration for the sale. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, such illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, regardless of quantity, is punishable with the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00). In light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act
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Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death has been proscribed. Consequently, the penalty applicable to the accused–
appellant shall only be life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, and fine. Thus, the accused–
appellant was correctly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). Under Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal possession of
less than 300 grams of marijuana is punishable with the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). Thus, in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused–appellant was correctly meted the penalty of
imprisonment for a minimum term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to a maximum term of
twenty (20) years, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT"

In cases of illegal sale of regulated and prohibited drugs, it is necessary that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have been preserved from the time they were
confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court. The following links must be
established in the chain of custody in a buy-‐bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
When the seizing officer (the poseur-‐buyer) failed to mark the seized illegal drugs and it was only
when the drugs were turned over to the investigating officer that they were marked, there is already
failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody and the Court can no
longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
dangerous drug were properly preserved.

Facts:

On January 20, 2005, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the
Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a
certain “Jojit” (Hermanos Constantino, Jr., hereinafter referred as Constatino) was selling illegal
drugs in the said city. P/Supt. Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-‐bust group composed of Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur
Blaquera (Blaquera), Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando
Domingo (Domingo). PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur-‐buyer. The buy-‐bust money,
consisting of one P500.00 bill and five P100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder and their
respective serial numbers were recorded in the police blotter.

On the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, the
place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a
street light while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting for about 45
minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized Constantino as the Jojit
described by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit. When
Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked, "Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you
have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he wanted to buy. PO3
Domingo said he wanted to buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-‐
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bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon,
PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-‐arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon
seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-‐bust team approached the scene at once and
arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the buy-‐bust money.

Constantino was then brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and money
were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The recovered drugs were then marked with
the initials "A-‐1" and "A-‐2." The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the
recovered drugs and money. Later that evening, the two plastic sachet with white crystalline
substance marked as "A-‐1" and "A-‐2" was submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, for laboratory examination to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs; as well as both hands of Constantino, one
piece P500.00 bill, and five pieces P100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet
powder. It was, later on, found out through the chemistry report the contents of the two plastic
sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other specimens tested
positive for the presence of bright-‐yellow ultraviolet fluorescent powder.

Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-‐up.
He was, thereafter, charged of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly
known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. RTC, after hearing, ruled that Constantino is guilty as
charged. On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC against Constantino.
The appellate court held that Constantino’s defense of frame-‐up was not worthy of credence as his

Issue:

Whether Constantino is guilty of illegal sale of regulated and prohibited drugs beyond
reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The appeal is impressed with merit.

the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, “[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu,
what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.” And in the prosecution of these offenses, the
primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other
related articles have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until
their presentation as evidence in court.

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, defines "chain of
custody" as follows: “Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
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the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.”

The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-‐bust situation: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the
marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds
glaring inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from
Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan
as to who, when, and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to
question whether the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones
confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the
seized shabu at a very early stage.

The first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the illegal drug. In this
case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-‐buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in
exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic
sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-‐bust team with Constantino at the police station,
PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who
was also a member of the buy-‐bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put
the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-‐bust
team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-‐bust team, as the one who
put the marking "NBT" on the plastic sachets upon the team’s return to the police station.

The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria the importance of marking the seized
item right after seizure:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking
upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the
evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time
of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law
requires.

Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-‐buyer,
despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino,
failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another
police officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of
the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-‐bust and the ones presented before the
trial court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly
received and marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as
witness either SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in court, but
unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This
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omission diminished the importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent
handling of the evidence. As a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the
shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.

The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case
as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved. In light of the foregoing, Constantino is
acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court accords credence to his defense of frame-‐up,
but because the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

MURDER

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DARWIN BERNABE GARCIA

The Court held that while there were indeed discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution
witnessed, they are not sufficient to negate the guilt of accused. As long as the testimony jibes on
material points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute the credibility nor the veracity of their
testimony.

Facts:

Darwin Bernabe y Garcia a.k.a. Bong was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder.

Accused Darwin invited Jomar, Alvin, and three girls to his house for a drinking spree. He
allowed his guests to stay on and sleep in his bedroom. At about 2:00 a.m., Jomar was awakened by
the voice of Darwin telling Alvin to join him in buying some cigarettes. Outside the house, they met
the victim Jann Michael Olivo. While the three were walking along Chico Street, the Jann told
Darwin that he knew the latter. Darwin poked a gun at the victim and ordered the latter to go with
them to the house where he started questioning the victim why he was roaming around the
house. Jomar, who was in the bedroom, heard Darwin strongly utter the words, Sino ang nagbayad
sa iyo na subaybayan ako, to which the victim answered Walang nagutos sa akin na subaybayan
ka. Then, Jomar heard some punching sounds and then he heard a person plead, Kuya Bong parang
awa niyo na ho kahit dito na lang ako tumira sa inyo, huwag mo lang akong patayin. Accused-‐
appellant replied, Hindi naman kita papatayin, aminin mo lang sa akin kung sinong nagbayad sa iyo
para subaybayan ako. Sabihin mo lang sa akin at dodoblehin ko ang bayad.

Jomar saw Darwin holding a piece of wood while the victim was sitting near the front door
of the house. He also saw Alvin, who was seemingly frightened, seated near another room. Jomar
stayed inside the bedroom from where he saw Darwin hit the victim thrice with the piece of wood
until it broke. Darwin then instructed the weakened victim to undress while he went to the kitchen
to get a toothbrush and some lotion. He commanded the victim to bend over and the former then
put lotion on the victims butt. The victim shouted in pain as accused-‐appellant inserted the
toothbrush into the victims anus.

Accused Darwin continued to interrogate the victim and hit the latter two times with a
metal pipe. He then ordered the victim to lie down and tied his hands with a plastic straw. Accused
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got GI wire or alambre, placed a gray shirt over the victims head, and then strangled the latter with
the wire. While doing this, he called out to Jomar and Alvin and ordered the two to hold the
struggling victims feet. When the victim stopped breathing, Darwin got hold of two sacks from
hisbodega or stockroom, put the lifeless body inside the sacks, placed it at a corner of the house,
and covered it with yero or GI sheets. In the afternoon, Darwin and Alvin borrowed the sidecar of
Prudencio Aristan.

At dawn, Alvin and Jomar were commanded to load the body on the sidecar and dispose of
the same. The two dumped the corpse in a water lily-‐filled vacant lot. Thereafter, Alvin and Jomar
were threatened that Darwin will kill them if they report the incident to the police. Jomar and Alvin
then went their separate ways and into hiding.

After the victim’s body was found, the relatives of Jomar and Alvin arranged the surrender
of the two minors to the authorities. Upon inquiry, they divulged what they witnessed and how they
allegedly accidentally participated in the commission of the crime. They voluntarily offered
themselves to help in the immediate arrest of Darwin.

Darwin was arrested on follow-‐up operation at his hideout. The testimony of Dr. Ruperto J.
Sambilon, Jr. was dispensed with in view of the stipulation of facts that he was an expert witness
and that he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Jann Michael Olivo. Based on his
findings, the cause of death of the victim was asphyxia by strangulation.

The defense had another version of the facts. Allegedly, it was Jomar and Alvin who asked
Darwin if they could stay in his house. He allowed them to go to his house and stayed behind in the
drinking session he was having with Noel Wagas, his caretaker. Arriving at 2 a.m. at his house, he
found Alvin and Jomar having an argument with the victim, who was allegedly unknown to him at
the time. He told them to fix the problem and make the victim leave the house. He then entered his
bedroom where he saw three girls sleeping. He slept in another room and when he woke up, the
victim was already gone, while the three girls were still sleeping. He found Jomar and Alvin fixing
things on the table.

He allegedly thereafter went to the manukan to check on his roosters and rested there and
then instructed Alvin to borrow a sidecar in the nearby junkshop and to dispose of the garbage. He
then proceeded to his brother-‐in-‐law’s house in Manuyo II, Las Pinas City but immediately went
home since his brother-‐in-‐law was not there.

Darwin denied the charges hurled against him. He claimed that he had no capacity to
strangle the victim because he could not use his left hand effectively after undergoing an operation
on his two fingers. Amy Bandala was the Medical Records Supervisor of Las Pias Doctors
Hospital and she caused the production of the original copy of the Record of Operation of Darwin
which showed that Dr. Francisco Raura operated on the neglected fracture on the 4th and
5th fingers.

Issue:

Whether or not Darwin’s guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:
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Yes, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused pointed out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alvin and
Jomar in their direct examination and cross examination regarding their locations in the house and
where they met the victim.

The Court held that while there were indeed discrepancies in the testimony, they are not
sufficient to negate the guilt of accused. The evident attempt of Alvin and Jomar to downplay their
participation in the commission of the crime did not completely render weightless the evidentiary
value of their testimonies. Alvin and Jomar were consistent in pointing to accused-‐appellant as the
one who hit the victim with a metal pipe in the head causing the latter to lose consciousness, and
who strangled the victim to death using a G.I. wire (alambre).

In People v. Togahan, the Court likewise held: “While witnesses may differ in their
recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them
should be disbelieved as liars and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless. As long as
the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute the
witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimony, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but
natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest
and unrehearsed.”

The trial court accorded greater weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
dismissed defenses of denial and alibi, holding the same as self-‐serving evidence that cannot be
given evidentiary weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
The Supreme Court approved these findings of the trial court: “The primordial concern is the fact
that it was the accused himself who killed the victim through strangulation and as testified by the
two witnesses who saw the said dastardly act. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and
cruelty indeed attended the killing of Jann Michael Olivo. Assuming ex gratia arguendo that the
statement of Jomar Butalid would be believed, i.e., that he and Alvin helped the accused in holding
the legs of the victim, they would still be exempted from criminal liability as they did the said act
because of fear. Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability if he
acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, because such persons did not act with freedom.’

As to the argument that Alvin and Jomar were the ones who went into hiding and not
Darwin himself, the Court held that different people react differently to a given situation, and there
is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or
frightful experience. The fact that Alvin and Jomar were still minors at the time they witnessed the
crime was also considered. Moreover, they were threatened to be killed by the accused Darwin.

As to defenses of alibi and denial, accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. In this case, requirement of physical
impossibility was not met as he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.

As to the allegation of the injury of the accused, evidence revealed that the disability did not
render him incapable of perpetrating the crime. Testimony of Dr. Raura, who did the operation,
showed that there was no total loss of the function of Darwin’s left hand.
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The two courts below correctly appreciated treachery, which qualified the killing of Jann
Michael Olivo to Murder. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim. Also, cruelty as an aggravating circumstance was also
considered when the accused inhumanly augmented the suffering of the victim through the
insertion of the toothbrush to the victim’s anus.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-‐defense,

Facts:

Late at night, Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy, where the former
used to reside as the live-‐in partner of Mary Jane Acibar, Ernesto’s stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto
had a confrontation during which the latter was stabbed nine times, causing his death.

Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the crime of Murder on March 3, 2000. On
March 27, warrants for their arrest were issued. On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay
Tanod Edilberto Alarma. During that time, Alberto remained at large. A pre-‐trial conference was
held wherein Gary admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-‐defense. A
reverse trial ensued.

Gary testified that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane
were living together. However, Gary left the house because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto
when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant
at that time.

At the night in question, Gary was allegedly in his house at around 11:40 p.m. Overcome
with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernesto’s house, but was not
able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from the
outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane
up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When Gary
was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto
was aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left index
finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt
that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto’s back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the
bladed weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.

According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, “saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako”
three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, Alberto, coming. Alberto asked Gary,
“anak, ano ang nangyari?” To which Gary responded “nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning,” referring to
Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, allegedly out of fear.

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Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he and
Ernesto who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.

In August 2001, Alberto was apprehended and his defense was denial. He stated that did not
consider surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his name, nobody would work to
support his family.

Emerito Acibar, the brother of Mary Jane, as the eyewitness, testified that he was inside
their house in with his brother and his stepfather, Ernesto, at around 11 p.m. on the night of the
incident. He heard somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then heard a kalabog, followed
by Ernesto’s plea for help. Emerito was already at the door of their house when he saw Ernesto
being held by a certain Toning Kulit and another person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing
Ernesto with fan knives. Emerito lost count of the number of stabs, but each inflicted more than
one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. Emerito shouted for help. The four assailants left when
somebody arrived, allowing Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan Provincial
Hospital.

SPO2 Ronnie Morales testified that he was on duty at the police station on that night.
Emerito reported at the police station that Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito
proceeded to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating
room, very weak due to multiple injuries. While in the presence of two doctors on duty, SPO2
Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and
son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero.

As they went to the hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2 Morales that he witnessed the
incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did not tell him who the suspects were
when Emerito reported the incident, because they immediately proceeded to the hospital,
considering that Ernesto, was still alive.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-‐defense of Gary should be considered

(2) Whether or not Gary is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

(3) Whether or not Alberto is guilty as a principal in the crime

Ruling:

(1) No, Gary’s self-‐defense cannot be considered.

The requisites for self-‐defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to
prevent and repel aggression.

There was allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto when the latter delivered
the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the defense, the means Gary used to defend himself
was reasonable, and the shouted professions of his feelings for Mary Jane could not be considered
provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make the unlawful aggression.
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The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the
alleged unlawful aggression was Gary’s own testimony. Citing Casitas vs. People, the Court of
Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to kill, and not
merely intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the means used
by Gary to defend himself was reasonable.

The Court agreed. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-‐defense.
Gary’s own testimony is insufficient and self-‐serving. By invoking self-‐defense, Gary, in effect,
admitted killing Ernesto, and thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the elements
of the said justifying circumstance. A plea of self-‐defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it
is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in
itself.

The defense further argued he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-‐defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court disagreed. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there
can be no self-‐defense, whether complete or incomplete. There is incomplete self-‐defense when the
element of unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the other two essential
requisites for self-‐defense. Having failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression,
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance, even assuming the presence of the other two
elements of self-‐defense.

(2) No, Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the
accused, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be
voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit
oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them
the trouble and expenses in capturing him.

The surrender was made almost one year and six months from the incident, and almost one
year and one month from the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. The Court ruled that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Gary. A surrender to be
voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save
them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender
presupposes repentance.

(3) Yes, Alberto is guilty as principal in the crime of murder

Conspiracy need not even be proven by the prosecution in this case, since Alberto was
categorically pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the assailants who actively and directly
participated in the killing of Ernesto.

Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2
Morales, that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero who stabbed him. As an
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exception to the hearsay rule, the Court held that it must be shown that a dying declaration was
made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence—not so much
the rapid eventuation of death—is at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the deceased
himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents wounds, or other relevant
circumstances.

The Court considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no
person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation.

The Court declared there was treachery as amply demonstrated by the restraint upon
Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less
evade, the assault. Thus, the crime committed is murder.

PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO ASIS AND JULIUS PEARANDA
G.R. No. 177573 July 7, 2010, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

Donald Pais was killed by the accused appellants however, the latter denied such allegations.
The court ruled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity

Facts:

Ma. Theresa Ramos was inside her store when she saw Donald Pais (the deceased-‐ victim),
standing from a distance of five meters. She also saw Alex Costuna, accused-‐appellant Julius
Pearanda and another person in front of her store. Suddenly, a commotion broke out and stones
were being thrown by different persons. Accused-‐appellant Julius Pearanda placed his arms around
Donalds shoulders, after which, Alex Costuna punched Donald who initially fought back but was
eventually outnumbered. Donald was hit in the head. He ran away limping because he was stoned in
the legs. However, Alex Costuna, accused-‐appellant Roberto Asis and several other persons caught
up with Donald and ganged up on him. Thereupon, Alex Costuna took out a knife and repeatedly
stabbed Donald. Accused-‐appellant Roberto Asis also did the same thing. The victim sat on the
ground with hands crossed, covering his head to ward off his attackers. According to witness
Theresa Ramos, she saw around nine to ten persons ganging up on the victim, but she could not tell
who among them initiated the attack. However, she saw that aside from accused-‐appellant Roberto
Asis and Alex Costuna, other men also hit and boxed Donald Pais. She shouted for help but nobody
came. The victim was bloodied and holding his stomach. After accused-‐appellants group left,
Theresa and her husband boarded the victim on a tricycle and took him to Fairview General
Hospital in Quezon City where he died shortly after. Dr. Anthony Joselito Llamas, a medico-‐legal
officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory autopsied the victims body, and his findings are reduced in a
medico-‐legal report which concluded the cause of death was multiple stab wounds of the trunk.
Accused-‐appellant Julius Pearanda denied before the court his alleged participation in the killing of
Donald Pais. According to him at the time of the incident, he was in their house sleeping because he
was a little drunk so he slept early. He attended the birthday celebration of his brother-‐in-‐law
Roberto Asis. They had a drinking spree at the back of their house together with Alex Costuna and a
certain Bong. Julius insisted that he only learned about the death of Donald Pais from his mother
the following day. He asked who killed Donald but [his] mother did not know. RTC ruled that the
accused appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for treachery was
present and correctly appreciated in the killing of Donald Pais. The victim was caught defenseless
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when accused-‐appellant Pearanda suddenly put his arms on the shoulder of the victim and
thereafter, accused-‐appellant Asis and his group punched and stabbed him several times. The
attack was so swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
opportunity to resist or defend himself.which was thereafter affirmed in toto by the CA and added
that it is well settled is the rule that inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered as grounds for acquittal. Indeed, the
accused-‐appellants alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the crime. Again, for alibi to qualify as a valid defense,
it must first be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been present in the
crime scene at the supposed time of its commission. In this case, the place where the murder was
committed was also within the same vicinity as the accused-‐appellants houses where the two allege
to have been in deep slumber while the killing was being committed. The accused-‐appellants,
therefore, were not so geographically removed from the locus criminis as to conclusively rule out
the possibility that they were responsible for the felony.

Accused-‐appellants insist that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. They assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Ma. Theresa Ramos and Clifford
Magsanoc, whose testimonies, accused-‐appellants contend, are conflicting and inconsistent. They
particularly point out that while Ma. Theresa testified that the victim was sitting on the ground
while he was being attacked, Clifford testified that the victim was lying prostrate on his
back. Likewise, Ma. Theresa testified that the other assailants punched the victim while Clifford
declared that he saw the other assailants stab the victim. Accused-‐appellants also argue that the
testimonies of these witnesses did not jibe with the medico-‐legal findings which cast doubt as to the
veracity of the said testimonies and their culpability for the crime charged.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt due
to the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses

Ruling:

No. The court did not erred in proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not
sufficient to adversely affect their credibility. They merely pertain to the position of the victim at
the time he was attacked and the participation of the unknown assailants. The materiality of the
victims exact position when he was attacked as well as the participation of the unknown assailants
are minor details and of little significance. The more important consideration is that both Ma.
Theresa and Clifford categorically and positively identified accused-‐appellants as the persons who
assaulted the victim. As the Court declared in People v. Lacbayan It is perfectly natural for different
witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some
details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,
jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it
could mean that their testimonies were pre-‐fabricated and rehearsed.

The testimonies of these two witnesses on material details are coherent, categorical and
consistent with each other. Ma. Theresa saw accused-‐appellant Pearanda put his arms around the
victim, after which, a certain Alex Costuna punched the victim who initially retaliated but eventually
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ran away because he was outnumbered. However, accused-‐appellants and their group caught up
with the victim, ganged up on him and thereafter stabbed him. Both witnesses personally saw
accused-‐appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Contrary to accused-‐
appellants assertions, the declarations of these two witnesses established beyond reasonable doubt
their identity as the perpetrators of the crime. It must be emphasized that the RTC gave full faith
and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The time-‐tested doctrine is that a
trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding on this Court. The reason is obvious. The trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe at firsthand the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and
attitude in the course of the trial.

Accused-‐appellants also claim that the testimonies of Ma. Theresa and Clifford did not
coincide with the findings of the medico-‐legal officer. Ma. Theresa testified that the victim was
stabbed thrice, while Clifford declared that the victim was stabbed twice by Costuna and once each
by Asis, Pearanda, and a certain Romy Manzanilla. In addition, accused-‐appellants unknown
companions, numbering around five to six persons, also stabbed the victim. On the other hand, the
medico-‐legal report indicated that the victim sustained just six stab wounds. Again, this seeming
inconsistency does not detract from the certitude of Ma. Theresas and Cliffords testimonies that
they saw accused-‐appellants stab the victim. True, they may have been mistaken with respect to the
exact number of wounds inflicted on the victim by the accused-‐appellants and their group, but their
account of the events remains credible. The essential thing is that the medico-‐legal findings which
concluded that the victims cause of death was multiple stab wounds confirmed the interlocking
testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the victim was stabbed by several men including
accused-‐appellants. Indeed, this Court declared in People v. Bihison that: Eyewitnesses to a
horrifying event cannot be expected, nor be faulted if they are unable, to be completely accurate in
picturing to the court all that has transpired and every detail of what they have seen or
heard. Various reasons, mostly explainable, can account for this realty; the Court has long
acknowledged the verity that different human minds react distinctly and diversely when
confronted with a sudden and shocking event, and that a witness may sometimes ignore certain
details which at the time might have appeared to him to be insignificant but which to another
person under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy. Moreover, accused-‐appellants have
not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of Ma. Theresa and Clifford that would have
impelled them to falsely testify against them. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations
on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence

Accused-‐appellants defense of denial was properly rejected by both the Court of Appeals
and the RTC. We quote with approval the trial courts ratiocination, The Court is not convinced of
the defense of the accused that they did not participate in the commission of the crime and were
neither at the place of the incident because they were positively identified by prosecution
witnesses. Defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and have always been viewed with
disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. (People vs. Danao, 253
SCRA 146). The alibi of the accused deserves scant consideration in the absence of evidence that it
was physically impossible for the two accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. In fact, evidence shows that both accused never left the area at all before, during or
after the incident and their sole defense was that they were sleeping at their respective houses at
the time the crime was committed. There is therefore no physical impossibility for them to be at the
scene of the crime taking into account the distance between the place of the incident and the place
where they were allegedly situated. As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established
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doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. From the aforequoted findings of the
trial court, accused-‐appellants failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible
for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The crime of murder
happened in San Juan Evangelista St., Payatas, Quezon City or exactly the same area where accused-‐
appellants houses were located and claimed to be sleeping when the crime occurred. Weak as it is,
alibi becomes weaker in the face of the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses as
in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN
G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, J. Leonardo–De Castro

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution
must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the
prosecution’s own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.

Facts:

On November 6, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Leyte, Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin
with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound Felipe
Lagera Y Obero, 65 years old and Ranil Tagpis Y Lagera, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo
(sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose.

The prosecution presented several witnesses: Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health
Officer of Carigara, Leyte; Carmela Tagpis, the 5-‐year-‐old granddaughter of the victim Felipe Lagera
and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.

Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-‐mortem examination on the body of the
victim Felipe Lagera. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds and the said wound
was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp instrument such as a bolo. She also conducted a
post-‐mortem examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. The results revealed that Ranil sustained
a hacking wound. The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-‐edged like a bolo.

Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness. She pointed to Rosendo as the "Bata Endong"
(Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the
forehead, while Felipe was hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder. Carmela said
that she saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that Felipe also
owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he was attacked. She was then inside the
house with Felipe and her two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about
four meters away when the hacking incident occurred indoors.

The defense presented the following witnesses, Raymond Rance, the stepson of the accused-‐
appellant; Renerio Arminal, the barangay chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; and
accused-‐appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.

Raymond Rance testified that his mother’s name is Marites Rance. Rosendo is not his
biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated that on the
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night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their house and placed himself on top of
Raymond’s mother, who was lying down. In different date, Raymond recounted that he saw Felipe’s
son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy kept trying to place himself on top of
Raymond’s mother. Rosendo was working in Manila when the incidents happened. Raymond said
that his mother left for Manila. When Rosendo arrived in Leyte, he told him about the incidents
involving Felipe and Timboy.

Renerio Arminal testified that Rosendo surrendered to him. Arnulfo Alberca was called
upon to the witness stand to prove that the voluntary surrender was entered into the records of the
police blotter.

Rosendo testified on November 6, 2002, he went to the house of barangay chairperson
Arminal to place a call to his wife who was in Manila. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that
she was sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. He went home, it rained heavily so he first sought
shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. He
remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera. When he reached
the house of Felipe, the latter was feeding chickens. He confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual
abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that Rosendo had a bad purpose for being there and that
the latter wanted to start a fight. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at
him, but he was able to parry it with his hand. Rosendo then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe,
as the latter was about to run to the house. He also went inside the house since Felipe might get
hold of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a second hacking blow,
Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered
suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. He
then left and surrendered to the barangay chairperson.

The RTC rendered a decision, convicting Rosendo of the crime of double murder and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. The manner by which the accused adopted in
killing the victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was a premeditated decision and executed
with treachery.

The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review but the Court ordered
the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.

The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the RTC. The appellate court adopted the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts resulted in two separate
crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex
crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing
of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. With respect to the mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited the
circumstance of voluntary surrender, but rejected intoxication, immediate vindication of a grave
offense and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that the
same was attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.

Issue:

Can the Court a quo gravely erred when it ruled that Rosendo is guilty for the crime of
murder and not homicide?
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Ruling:

No, the court a quo did not commit an error when it ruled that Rosendo is guilty for the
crime of murder and not homicide.

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution
must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the
prosecution’s own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.

In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of
Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.

According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill
another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of
treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article
246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is
decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate.

In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in
establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-‐appellant carried out
the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil.

Carmela categorically pointed to Rosendo as the person who entered the house of Felipe.
She clearly stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight between the accused-‐appellant and
Felipe. Without any provocation, Rosendo suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The
abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any
opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child
unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial
court likewise correctly appreciated the existence of treachery.

The said circumstance may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the
two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it. The
killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the
weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.

On the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of Felipe and Ranil to
murder.

The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ appreciation
of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate a
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crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and
execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is not enough that evident
premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious
outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be
"evident premeditation."

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that tended to establish the
exact moment when the accused-‐appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his
determination to carry out the plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his
plan.

Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. While dwelling, minority and
intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the instant case considering
that the same were not alleged in the information that was filed.

With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the CA vis-‐à-‐vis the nature of crimes
committed, we agree with the appellate court that the accused-‐appellant should be held liable for
two (2) separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is
known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls under
any of the two classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly establish
the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow. It was neither proven that
the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary means for committing and/or facilitating the
murder of Ranil and vice versa. Rosendo should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of
murder.

In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on Rosendo, we uphold the trial court’s
ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. For
voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority
or to the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be
spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the
trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.

Rosendo has duly established that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered
unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before he
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was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this circumstance of voluntary surrender
during trial.

We reject, however, Rosendo's contention that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate
the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave offense.

The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the intoxication of
the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has
committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

The Court finds that Rosendo is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication
since his own testimony failed to substantiate his claim of drunkenness during the incident in
question. During his cross-‐examination, he positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not
drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. He cannot, be allowed to make a contrary
assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the crimes he committed on the basis thereof.

As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the
same cannot be appreciated. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the act
be "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony
(delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees." The established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his
equanimity.

In the case at bar, Rosendo points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the
virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that
he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on
November 6, 2002, he carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind,
a period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which he could have regained his
composure and self-‐control.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of any other aggravating circumstance in
both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the presence of the lone mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly established in both instances, Article 63,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The accused-‐appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for
the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLEOFE BAROQUILLO y VILLANUEVA and LEONARDO
MAHILUM y CAÑETE
Page 133 of 299


We agree with Cleofe and Leonardo that alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly
exculpate a person accused of a crime. However, this is true only if the accused’s alibi strictly meets the
following requisites: 1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and 2.
The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

Facts:

Accused Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo (Lorenza) and victim Nelson Madeloso (Nelson) are
spouses with five children. In 1994, accused Lorenza met accused Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva
(Cleofe) and nurtured a special friendship that culminated to an amorous relationship.

Accused Lorenza disclosed to her kumare Ellen Dajao (Ellen), her intimacy with accused
Cleofe. Accused Lorenza told Ellen that she wanted her husband killed because he no longer gives
her money.

Accused Lorenza went to her father-‐in-‐law Gregorio Madeloso (Gregorio), in Cotabato City
to get the P23,000.00 which the latter promised as financial assistance for her intended trip abroad.
On the same day, accused Lorenza went back to Iligan City with the money.

On 10 January 2001, at around twelve o’clock noon, accused Lorenza met and had lunch with
accused Cleofe and accused Leonardo Mahilum (Leonardo) at Dado’s Lechon House.

At around 8:15 p.m., Lorenza, with one of her children, arrived home. Nelson flagged down
Meneleo, their neighbor driving his motorcycle. When the latter asked where he was headed,
Nelson responded, "Mamang(Lorenza) called for me."

At around nine o’clock in the evening, in Bagong Silang, Nelson was shot dead by accused
Leonardo. The prosecution witness, Ricky Ramos (Ricky), saw the incident while walking on his
way home. He recounted that he saw Nelson sitting by the gutter of the road when two (2) men,
identified later on as accused Cleofe and Leonardo, crossed the street and approached Nelson.
Accused Cleofe pulled Nelson up towards him and held him, while Leonardo pulled out a gun from
his side and shot Nelson in the head several times.

Neighbors, then accompanied accused Lorenza to Bagong Silang. When accused Lorenza saw her
husband’s lifeless body, she embraced him and cried but her cry allegedly x x x appeared feigned
and insincere.

When the police received the information of accused Lorenza and accused Cleofe’s extra-‐marital
affair, Lorenza was invited to the police station for questioning where she confessed her illicit
relation with accused Cleofe.

While at the police station, Lorenza received a phone call from Leonardo. Leonardo
instructed her to meet him at Dado’s Lechon House to which she agreed with the approval of the
police. Accused Lorenza, together with the police, arrived at Dado’s Lechon House. After thirty
minutes, accused Leonardo arrived and sat at the table occupied by accused Lorenza. The police
approached the two accused persons and invited accused Leonardo to the police station for
questioning.
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Cleofe and Leonardo, along with Lorenza, were charged with Murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code before the RTC. Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.

RTC convicted all three accused of Murder.
The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC in so far as it found accused Cleofe
Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete GUILTY of murder. While, accused Lorenza
Madeloso y Demecillo is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The Court of Appeals agreed that Cleofe and Leonardo were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the murder of Nelson, it found the evidence against Lorenza insufficient to convict her as a
principal by inducement.

The prosecution presented none of the percepto (command) or pacto (consideration)
required to establish the liability of accused Lorenza. It bears stressing that it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove that accused Lorenza had an influence over accused Cleofe and Leonardo
so great that such inducement would be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by
the material executor. We can only surmise, at the very least, the motive of the other accused, Cleofe
and Leonardo, in killing Nelson. But, our surmises and conjectures, no matter how strong, are no
substitute to proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Can the Court reverse the decision of the RTC and CA convicting accused Cleofe and
Leonardo of the crime of murder?

Ruling:

No, the Court cannot deviate from the decisions of the lower court.

Cleofe and Leonardo were charged and convicted of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code:

Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin;

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4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.

This Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and finds no reason to overturn the
conviction of Cleofe and Leonardo.

The two accused-‐appellants contend that "contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a
good defense," and that "it cannot be concluded that the accused-‐appellants conspired with each
other to kill Nelson x x x, when such conclusion was only brought about by the statements of the
prosecution witnesses that the three (3) accused-‐appellants were seen eating lunch together on the
day of the commission of the crime charged."

We agree with Cleofe and Leonardo that alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly
exculpate a person accused of a crime. However, this is true only if the accused’s alibi strictly meets
the following requisites:

1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and

2. The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

However, neither Cleofe nor Leonardo was able to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that not only was he somewhere else when Nelson was killed, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. "By physical impossibility, we
refer to the distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the place where he
says he was when the crime was committed."

Noting the distances between Bagong Silang, where Nelson was killed, and the respective
locations of Leonardo and Cleofe at the time the crime was committed, the trial court correctly
concluded that given the relative proximity of the places, the availability of transportation, and the
physical fitness of both accused to travel, it was not impossible for them to have traversed to and
from the scene of the crime and their alleged locations that fateful evening of January 10, 2001.

The testimonies of Cleofe’s and Leonardo’s witnesses who corroborated their alibis, did
little to help their case as they were either relatives or close family friends of the accused. Not a
single disinterested witness was presented by Cleofe or Leonardo to support their alibis. In People
v. Abatayo, this Court held that "alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated
only by a relative or a close friend of the accused."

Furthermore, contrary to Cleofe’s and Leonardo’s arguments, their conviction was not
based on circumstantial evidence but on the positive identification of an unbiased witness. It is
well-‐settled that since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and
is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused
perpetrated the crime.

Page 136 of 299


The issue therefore boils down to the credibility of the prosecution’s lone eyewitness, Ricky
Ramos. This Court sees no reason to disturb the trial court’s evaluation and assessment of the
credibility of Ricky Ramos, which the Court of Appeals also sustained.

The RTC adequately addressed and rebuked each doubt the defense tried to cast on Ricky
Ramos’s testimony. Moreover, it sufficiently explained why Ricky Ramos’s testimony was enough to
convict the accused-‐appellants, to wit:

The credibility of evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of the testimony. (People v. pascual, Jr. 127 SCRA 179). A perusal of the records will not
yield any trace of bias in the testimony of Ricky Ramos. In fact, when asked if he was sure of his
identification of the two accused, considering the gravity of the crime charged against them, he
categorically replied that "he can stand on his words." It is contrary to human nature for a witness
to finger innocent persons as the perpetrators of a very serious crime. Thus, absent any showing
that there was any ill motive on the part of Ricky Ramos, his categorical, consistent, and positive
identification deserves full weight and credit.

This Court also agrees with the lower courts’ appreciation of the attendance of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the conspiracy between Cleofe and Leonardo to kill
Nelson.

Article 14, No. 16, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

It was established in this case that Nelson was attacked with treachery because aside from
having had no idea of what was to befall him when he stood up as Cleofe and Leonardo approached
him, Nelson was also defenseless against the sudden gunshots Leonardo delivered to him. The fact
that the attack on Nelson was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery in this case as the
same made the attack no less unexpected and sudden.

Conspiracy was also duly established as Ricky Ramos testified that while Cleofe pulled
Nelson, Leonardo fired shots at Nelson. Conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements
of the two accused, their common purpose, being, to kill Nelson. In People v. Quinao, we expounded
on the concept of conspiracy as follows:

It is well-‐settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest
on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be
carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each
of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. In such a case, the act of one
becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime
committed.

Page 137 of 299


WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it found the
accused-‐appellants Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE VILBAR

In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera, we ruled that treachery cannot be
appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected. We can not presume that
treachery was present merely from the fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack,
does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. . . . While it
appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the surrounding circumstances attending the
stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the victim’s families and the attending
eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accused-‐appellant wanted to make certain that no risk
would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim.

Facts:

The respondent Vicente Vilbar was charged and convicted for the crime of murder. The
conviction by the RTC was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals lowering the crime
from murder to homicide ruling that the prosecution failed to prove that there was treachery on the
part of the accused. Hence, the current petition.

Vicente Vilbar contends that the lower courts erred in convicting the accused by giving
credence to the testimony of the witnesses. He argues that there are inconsistencies and
discrepancies in their testimonies. Moreover, he contends that the witnesses presented by the
prosecution are not credible.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused for the crime of
homicide.

Ruling:

Case laws mandate that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally binding upon this Court." There is no compelling reason for us to depart from the
general rule in this case.
Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She recognizes the accused, she was just behind him when he
stabbed her husband who was facing the accused. There was proper illumination of the place x x x
and her testimony was not destroyed in the cross-‐examination. Her testimony is positive and
spontaneous. The Court notes nothing in her demeanor and flow of testimony that would indicate
some contradiction or incredibility.
Page 138 of 299


The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony of Maria Liza Patricio.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro, these being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither
pertaining to the act constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant. Also,
these minor contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they differ in their impressions of
the incident and vantage point in relation to the victim and the accused-‐appellant.

In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent and he talked unintelligibly. His
testimony is not credible and perceived to be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was with him
at the time of the incident and he was not involved in the stabbing, why did he have to leave the
place and his wife and go to the house of his parents-‐in-‐law rather than their house? The accused
should have presented his wife to corroborate his testimony in that regard, and also his parents-‐in-‐
law so the latter can testify regarding the alleged visitors, the alleged parents of one Dodong
Danieles who came to their place when the accused was also there days after the incident, telling
him not to help the family of the victim.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-‐appellant is guilty only of homicide in the
absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In a number of cases, surveyed in People v.
Rivera,we ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected:

[W]e agree with accused-‐appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
established. Surveying the leading decisions on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we
recently stated:

In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. . . .

. . . where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been
aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack, . . .; and the means,
method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the
attack was impulsively done.

Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. . . .

Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution has not proven
that the killing was committed with treachery. Although accused-‐appellant shot the victim from
behind, the fact was that this was done during a heated argument. Accused-‐appellant, filled with
anger and rage, apparently had no time to reflect on his actions. It was not shown that he
Page 139 of 299


consciously adopted the mode of attacking the victim from behind to facilitate the killing without
risk to himself. Accordingly, we hold that accused-‐appellant is guilty of homicide only.

Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the instant case merely
showed that accused-‐appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove
that accused-‐appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the
killing without risk to himself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIOSDADO CAMAT and MAMERTO DULAY
There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make. The testimonial evidence gathered in this case clearly indicates that the victims who were
simply engaged in conversation in a private residence were caught entirely by surprise with the
assailants’ swift, deliberate and unexpected attack using multiple firearms thereby negating the
possibility for the victims to escape or defend themselves.
Facts:
Between 3:00 o’clock and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1999, Aurelio,
together with Anastacio, Juanito, Ricardo, Pedro, Marcelina, Abelardo, Elmer, all surnamed Hidalgo,
Lydia Flores, some young ladies, their children, and his nephews and nieces were in front of the
yard of his brother Anastacio Hidalgo (Anastacio).
While engaged in conversation, Aurelio noticed a motorcycle pass by two times. At the first
pass, he noticed that only Oning Campos was on board. The second time, both Oning Campos and
Pilo Cabangas were on board the motorcycle. After a few minutes, gunfire coming from the back of
and directed at Aurelio’s group suddenly erupted. The gunfire came from the other side of the road
in front of a three feet high concrete fence fronting the house of Anastacio. Aurelio saw both
accused-‐appellants Diosdado Camat and Mamerto Dulay armed with long firearms shoot at his
group. Although there were six other persons armed with short firearms (Henry Caoile, Junior
Lopez, John Laurean, Ibot Campos, Rogelio Campos, and Serafin Dulay), standing at the back of
accused-‐appellants, Aurelio, however, only saw accused-‐appellants firing their guns at his group
because he saw them place their long firearms on top of the concrete fence. The gunmen were
approximately six meters away from Aurelio’s group.
Aurelio said that during the shooting, his aunt Marcelina Hidalgo, and his nephew were hit
and Elmer Hidalgo fell down. They died on the spot. Juanito Hidalgo was hit on his right leg. Ricardo
Hidalgo was hit on the buttocks. The bullet exited near his anus. Pedro Hidalgo was injured on the
buttocks and left arm. Aurelio was himself hit on both legs.
Consequently, six separate criminal informations were charged against the appellant Camat
alias "Boyet" and his other co-‐accused, the accused Dulay (referred to in the title of this case), John
Laurean alias "Masong," Rogelio Campos, Ibot Campos, Henry Caoile, Serafin Dulay, and Junior
Lopez with the crimes of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder.
Page 140 of 299


As a defense, the Accused-‐Appellant Camat firmly claimed that on the day of the crime, he
was in Baguio to do some carpentries.
Issue:

Whether or not Camat’s conviction of murder is warranted upon due consideration of the
evidence on record.

Ruling:

Yes.
As encapsulated in jurisprudence, to be liable for Murder, the prosecution must prove that:
(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide.
All the elements of the crime of murder concur in this instance. With regard to the first
element, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of death of Marcelina and Elmer Hidalgo as
shown by their death certificates as well as the autopsy reports. The fourth element is present as
well since both the victims are adults and not related by consanguinity or affinity to appellant
Camat which forecloses any possibility of classifying their fatal shooting as either parricide or
infanticide. As for the second element, there can be no doubt that the prosecution also proved the
participation of appellant Camat in the crimes subject of this case. During the hearing, the
prosecution witnesses correctly pointed and identified Camat as the murderer who was then
present in the court room.
Moreover, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was adequately shown to exist in this
case, thus, satisfying the third element of Murder.
There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make. For alevosia to qualify the crime to Murder, it must be shown that: (1)
the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety
from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method and manner of
execution were deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.
The testimonial evidence gathered in this case clearly indicates that the victims who were
simply engaged in conversation in a private residence were caught entirely by surprise with the
assailants’ swift, deliberate and unexpected attack using multiple firearms thereby negating the
possibility for the victims to escape or defend themselves.
Finally, since the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible, this Court cannot
accept appellant Camat’s defenses of alibi and denial in light of the positive identification of him as
one of the gunmen involved in that dreadful massacre. It bears repeating that this Court has
consistently held that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive
identification by truthful witnesses. Moreover, positive identification of the accused, when
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categorical and consistent, and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on
the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK JOSEPH ZAPUIZ Y RAMOS "JAYMART"

To hold the accused liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide.

Facts:

Victim Emmanuel Ramirez y Arellano (Emmanuel) was at his house, sitting before a table,
writing something. Emmanuel’s house was well lighted since Avon products were being sold there.
Edwin was just standing around on the street, about five steps away from Emmanuel, when Edwin
noticed a man, later identified as Jaymart, walk past him. Jaymart positioned himself behind
Emmanuel, and poked and fired a gun at the back of Emmanuel’s head. Emmanuel fell from where
he was sitting. Jaymart walked away still holding the gun. Although frightened, Edwin managed to
bring Emmanuel to the Gat Bonifacio Hospital where Emmanuel was pronounced dead on arrival.

Thereafter, Edwin informed Emmanuel’s mother, Olivia A. Ramirez (Olivia), about the
shooting. The very next day, Edwin executed a Sworn Statement before Senior Police Officer in
which he averred that the man who shot Emmanuel is called Jaymart and that he would be able to
recognize Jaymart if he sees him again. Days later, a confidential agent informed the police that
Jaymart was confined at the Ospital ng Maynila for a gunshot wound. A police team, which included
SPO3 Labarda, fetched and brought Edwin to the Ospital ng Maynila, wherein Edwin positively
identified Jaymart as the person who shot Emmanuel. The police team arrested Jaymart after
informing him of his constitutional rights.

The RTC promulgated its decision, given the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, it convicted Jaymart of murder which was affirmed by CA. However, Jaymart asserts
that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that Edwin’s testimony is
inconsistent with the physical evidence, particularly, the location of Emmanuel’s wounds. Edwin
testified that Jaymart shot Emmanuel at the back of the head while Emmanuel was sitting down,
writing something; yet Dr. Salen reported that the trajectory of the bullet was upward so that the
gunman, when he fired the fatal shot, must have been in a position lower than Emmanuel.

Issue:

Whether or not Jaymart is guilty for crime of murder?

Ruling:

Yes, Jaymart is guilty for crime of murder.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides: Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who,
not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following circumstances:
Page 142 of 299


1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

To hold the accused liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither
parricide nor infanticide. All elements were established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution in the present case.

First, it is undisputed that Emmanuel died from a gunshot wound sustained. Second, Jaymart
was positively identified by eyewitness Edwin as the one who shot and killed Emmanuel As the RTC
and the Court of Appeals observed, Edwin was positive and steadfast in his identification of Jaymart
as the man who shot and killed Emmanuel. Edwin clearly saw Jaymart shoot Emmanuel at the back
of the head because the locus criminis was well lighted and Edwin was just a few steps away from
both Jaymart and Emmanuel at the time of the shooting. Edwin also had an opportunity to take a
good look at Jaymart when Jaymart passed by him before the shooting.

In the case at bar, it must be noted that the victim was sitting while he was writing
something on the table. What accused-‐appellant failed to consider was that when a person writes
while seated, his head is naturally bowing down. Consequently, the path of the bullet, that is –
entering from the back portion of the head and exiting on top of the right eye, will take an upward
trajectory. Thus, contrary to the argument advanced by Jaymart, that the assailant must have
positioned himself lower than his victim, the posture of the victim’s head caused the upward
trajectory of the bullet.

Indeed, alibi is an inherently weak defense, and it becomes weaker in the face of the positive
identification made by the prosecution witness.18 It is likewise well-‐settled that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

In addition, for his alibi to prosper, Jaymart must prove that not only was he somewhere
else when Emmanuel was killed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime. "Physical impossibility" refers to the distance between the place where the
appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.

Third, the killing of Emmanuel was attended by treachery. The law provides that an
offender acts with treachery when he "commits any of the crimes against a person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."
Thus, there is treachery when the attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden that he had clearly
no inkling of what the assailant was about to do. In this case, Emmanuel was sitting down before a
table, busily writing, when Jaymart came up behind him and, without warning, shot him at the back
of the head. Evidently, Emmanuel, who was unarmed and unaware, had no opportunity at all to
defend himself.

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And finally, the killing of Emmanuel constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide. All told,
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Jaymart was responsible for the murder of
Emmanuel

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY ALINAO

Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive upon the
Supreme Court when supported by evidence on record. Thus, when the trial court gave credence to the
testimony of the witnesses who saw that the accused and his son set fire on the victim’s house and later
shoot the victim and the CA affirmed the trial court’s findings, the SC will affirm the conviction of the
accused for murder.

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When the time it took the accused and his son to
device their plan, plot where the gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms,
as well as the time it took to go to Antonio Ardet’s house, and even the time when they waited for
Antonio Ardet to come out of the house, all afforded the accused sufficient opportunity to reflect upon
the consequences of his act to kill his brother-‐in-‐law and his determination to commit the cold-‐blooded
deed from the time of its conception until it was carried out, it clearly shows that the accused and his
son had a previously and carefully crafted plan to kill the victim.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellant Gary Alinao, together with his son Jocel Alinao, was charged with
murder with the use of illegally possessed firearm. The prosecution witnesses testified that they
saw Gary and Jocel poured gasoline and set on fire the house of Gary’s brother-‐in-‐law, Antonio
Ardet. Nestor Ardet, brother of the victim, was peeping through a window when he saw Antonio try
to escape, but Gary shot him with a shotgun. This made Antonio fall back inside the burning house.

Gary denied the accusation and presented witnesses who testified that Gary was attending a
wake at the time of the incident, and arrived at the scene of the crime only when the body of
Antonio was already placed meters away from his burning house. It was also impossible for Nestor
to see him and his son because of the narrow gap in the window through which he allegedly saw
Gary and his son, and that there are obstructions to that view. Nestor and some witnesses also
failed to immediately execute an affidavit to implicate Gary.

With Jocel still at large, the RTC found Gary guilty of murder with evident premeditation as
the qualifying circumstance. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issues:

1. Did the prosecution fail to prove that Gary killed Antonio Ardet?
2. Should evident premeditation not be considered?

Ruling:

1. Gary’s guilt was sufficiently proven.
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After a thorough review of the testimonies of all the witnesses and other evidence
presented, we find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. As we have held time
and again, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
generally conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.

This Court observes that in the case at bar, counsels for both sides went the extra mile in
questioning the witnesses through in-‐depth cross-‐examinations, re-‐direct and re-‐cross
examinations, and even bringing them back as rebuttal and sur-‐rebuttal witnesses. The trial court,
for its part, was also very active in trying to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court
thus had every opportunity to take advantage of observing the witnesses’ demeanor, conduct, and
attitude, as well as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of their voices, as potent aids in
ascertaining which of them were telling the truth. As we find nothing material in the records which
the trial court seems to have ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued that could warrant the
reversal of its factual findings, said findings should be affirmed.

Gary hinges his defense mainly on discrediting Nestor Ardet, Antonio Ardet’s brother. The
testimony of Nestor Ardet, however, was clear and straightforward. The defense’s contentions
against his ability to have seen the incident are likewise merely excessive nitpicking. Based on
experience, a three-‐inch opening of either a door or a window is certainly wide enough to give the
observer a full view of the outside if he “peeps” (peering with the eyes very close to the crevice)
through it, as Nestor said he did. The defense likewise failed to show how the barbed-‐wire fence,
the roof of the porch, and the elevation of Antonio’s house could have completely blocked Nestor’s
view of the house.

We are also more inclined to believe the testimony of Nestor Ardet over that of his sister,
Linda Alinao. While both are siblings of the deceased, Antonio Ardet, Linda Alinao is the wife of
Gary himself, and is naturally expected to be protective of him. Linda Alinao’s testimony is likewise
hearsay as she was not present when Nestor Ardet was allegedly maltreated and forced to testify
against her husband. Furthermore, we cannot emphasize enough that Nestor Ardet and Linda
Alinao were recalled on the same trial date to refute each other’s testimonies. The trial court was
thus afforded an even better opportunity to observe their demeanor, conduct, attitude, gesture, and
inflection of their voices, and ultimately believed Nestor over Linda.

2. Evident premeditation must be considered.

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be proved:
a. the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
b. an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and,
c. sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during
a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

In the case at bar, Gary, in razing Antonio Ardet’s house in order to drive him out and
shooting him the moment he appears at his front door, clearly had a previously and carefully crafted
plan to kill his victim. We are convinced that the time it took Gary and his son to device their plan,
plot where the gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms, as well as the
Page 145 of 299


time it took to go to Antonio Ardet’s house, and even the time when they waited for Antonio Ardet
to come out of the house, all afforded Gary sufficient opportunity to reflect upon the consequences
of his act to kill his brother-‐in-‐law and his determination to commit the cold-‐ blooded deed from
the time of its conception until it was carried out.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLANDO LAS PIÑAS, JIMMY DELIZO AND MERWIN LAS
PIÑAS
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated,
two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified to
by Roger above-‐quoted.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It does not need to be proven by direct evidence
and may be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and after the commission of the crime –
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves
the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when
the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.
Facts:
Roger and his brothers, Edgardo and Benjamin, and their cousin, Carlito Lasala, were at
Edgardo’s fishpen. The fishpen was supported by four wooden posts arranged in a square. On top of
the posts was a 9 to 10-‐meter bamboo platform about four to five meters above the sea. While on
the platform, they lighted three pressure lamps in the middle of the fishpen to attract the fish. After
checking the fishnet and eating supper, they took turns in resting and watching.
While Roger was on guard duty and the rest were sleeping, the Rolando Las Pinas et al.
arrived on board a "sibid-‐sibid," a long wooden boat mobilized by paddles. The accused then
climbed up the platform and opened fire at the Aringo brothers and Carlito.
Specifically, Roger narrated that he saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot Edgardo and
Benjamin, while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot Carlito. He likewise witnessed
Armando slash the throat of Edgardo after the latter was incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo)
body into the sea. As for himself, Roger testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador
and Gilberto; and tha the sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest, and left buttock.
The carnage finally ended when the accused thought that the three Aringo brothers and Carlito
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were all dead; and then they boarded their boat and left. Roger recognized all the accused because
they used to be neighbors at Sorsogon.
Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually rescued by a passing
fisherman. He was brought to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for treatment. Initially, only the
bodies of Benjamin and Carlito were recovered from the platform. But four days later, Edgardo’s
body was found floating in the water. 3 informations were filed against Rolando Las Pinas et al with
the crime of Murder which circumstance was attended by treachery. On the other hand, Rolando
Las Pinas et al. denied such allegation by using the defense of alibi.
RTC convicted Rolando Las Pinas et al. of the crime of Murder which was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Rolando Las Pinas et al. can be held liable for the crime of murder.
2) Whether or not there was Conspiracy.
3) Whether or not defense of denial and alibi can be admitted.
Ruling:
1) Yes, they can be held liable for the crime of murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means toweaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo, Benjamin and
Carlitowere shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three of the eight perpetrators who
killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito’s killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of
Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito were neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
Page 147 of 299


position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this
case and as testified to by Roger above-‐quoted.
To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were caught off guard
when the accused, including the accused-‐appellants, in the dead of night, arrived at the fishpen and
climbed the same, and without warning, opened fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them.
Upon disabling the victims, the accused and the accused-‐appellants continued shooting at the
victims – accused Armando and accused-‐appellant Rolando shot Edgardo and Carlito; accused-‐
appellants Jimmy and Merwin and accused Freddie shot Benjamin; and accused Renato, Salvador
and Gilberto shot Roger. Accused Armando even slashed Edgardo’s throat after shooting him and
threw his body out to the sea – the stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack
was carried out gave the four victims no chance at all to evade the bullets and defend themselves
from the unexpected onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that the collective acts of the accused and
the accused-‐appellants reek of treachery.
2) Yes, there was Conspiracy.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." It does not
need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and
after the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence
of sentiments as in conspiracy. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-‐appellants is a matter not in
issue. Both trial courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the conspiracy among the
accused/accused-‐appellants from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. This
Court is satisfied that their deduction was warranted. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the
crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct –
before, during, and after the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy. In this case, all the accused/accused-‐
appellants were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of
assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only
from their going together to the fishpen located offshore on board the same boat, but also from
their joint attack commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the four victims and
immediately followed by clambering up the platform and resuming their shooting of Roger,
Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. It was also significant that they fled together on board the boat that
they arrived in as soon as they had achieved their common purpose. Their conduct – before, during,
and after the commission of the crime – indicated a joint purpose, concerted action, and
concurrence of sentiments. Hence, conspiracy attended the commission of the crimes.
3) No, twin defenses of denial and alibi must fail in light of the positive identification made
by one of their victims, Roger.
Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It
is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. The accused-‐appellants’
alibis that they were at different places at the time of the shooting, and that family members and or
their friends vouched for their whereabouts are negative and self-‐serving assertions and cannot not
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be given more evidentiary value vis-‐àvis the affirmative testimony of a credible witness. The
accused-‐appellants and Roger, at one point, resided in the same barangay and, are, therefore,
familiar with one another. Therefore, Roger could not have been mistaken on the accused-‐
appellants’ identity, including the five other accused who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the
following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and
(ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.
Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he
was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed. Here, the accused-‐appellants utterly failed to satisfy the
above-‐quoted requirements. As held by the Court of Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the fact
that Barangay Bitan-‐o in Sorsogon City where the accused claimed they were at the time of the
shooting and the area of the sea adjacent to the municipality of Castilla where the incident took
place are neighboring sites that can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or less."
Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-‐appellants at the
fishpen, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.
Finally, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution’s witnesses
to discredit their testimonies. Absent any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure
himself, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and his testimony is, thus, worthy of full
faith and credit.
HOMICIDE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODEL LANUZA y BAGAOISAN

It is axiomatic that a person who invokes accident must prove that he acted with due care.
This was belied by the conduct of the Lanuza when he allegedly received the shotgun from the private
complainant. As he himself admitted, he received the shotgun by placing his pointer finger, also known
as the trigger finger because it is used to squeeze the trigger, inside the trigger guard and over the
trigger itself. Worse, he did so while the barrel of the gun was pointed at the private complainant.

Facts:

In view of Lanuza's assertion of an exempting circumstance in his favor, the RTC, in its Pre-‐
Trial Order ordered a reverse trial of the case. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC summarized the
evidence presented by the parties as follows:

From the defense evidence, the incident took place at the basement of the BIR office in
Laoag City while the private complainant as outgoing security guard was handing his shotgun to
Lanuza, the incoming security guard. Allegedly, the private complainant held it with both hands,
with the muzzle pointed at him and the butt towards the accused. At that moment, the accused
gripped the firearm with one hand, with his pointer finger inside the trigger guard and on top of the
trigger itself. The private complainant was hit on the left side of his waist. With the private
complainant bleeding the accused went to the telephone upstairs to call for an ambulance.
However, Lanuza heard the sound of a motorcycle leaving the BIR premises. He went down and
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discovered that the private complainant was no longer at the place where he had left him. Lanuza,
proceeded to the Laoag City police station and surrendered.

The prosecution presented a different scenario. According to the private complainant, he
did not actually hand the shotgun to the accused. Instead, he merely placed it on top of the security
guard’s table. While the private complainant who was about to go home was asking why the
accused did not report on his scheduled shift, the latter got the shotgun and shot him. Lanuza ran
upstairs, and the private complainant crawled to his motorcycle and drove it himself to the
provincial hospital.

At the end of the trial, the RTC promulgated its Judgment finding Lanuza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code and, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, dismissing Lanuza's appeal and affirming his
conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide.

Issue:

Can the court a quo correctly ruled that Lanuza is guilty of frustrated homicide as opposed
to Lanuza's contention that the shooting is completely accidental?

Ruling:

Yes, the Court sustains the verdict of guilt against Lanuza.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, of the means used by the
malefactors; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; the circumstances
under which the crime was committed; and the motive of the accused. These elements are extant in
the case at bar.

The prosecution has satisfactorily proven that Lanuza intended to kill private complainant
based on the method of attack, the weapon used, and the location of the gunshot wound. He shot
private complainant with a shotgun at close range hitting the latter’s abdomen. Private complainant
sustained a wound that could have caused his death if not for the timely medical attention given to
him.

The RTC did not give probative weight to Lanuza's testimony that his shooting of private
complainant was completely accidental, for the following reasons:

It is axiomatic that a person who invokes accident must prove that he acted with due care.
This was belied by the conduct of the Lanuza when he allegedly received the shotgun from the
private complainant. As he himself admitted, he received the shotgun by placing his pointer finger,
also known as the trigger finger because it is used to squeeze the trigger, inside the trigger guard
Page 150 of 299


and over the trigger itself. Worse, he did so while the barrel of the gun was pointed at the private
complainant. Worst, he had been a security guard for three years prior to the incident and had
undergone lessons on gun safety. According to him, he knew that it was not proper for a person to
receive a firearm from another by immediately inserting a finger inside the trigger guard. Likewise,
he knew that the hand-‐over of a firearm with its barrel pointed towards the giver or any other
person was not proper. That he did these improper acts despite his training and experience as a
security guard undermines any notion that he had acted with due care during the subject incident.

According to him, after the private complainant was shot and rendered unconscious, he did
not go near him. He made no attempt to check if he was still alive or if he could help him in any way.
That he offered no help to the wounded private complainant undermines his claim of accident. As
observed in People v. Reyes, "had [the shooting] really been accidental, then the natural tendency of
the accused would have been to immediately give help to his unfortunate victim and even to plead
and express his regret to the mother of the deceased."

Finally, the Court likewise sustains the penalty and damages imposed against accused-‐
appellant.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than
that prescribed by law for the crime of homicide. Under the indeterminate sentence law, the
maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending
circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal, the penalty for the crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the
indeterminate sentence law, there being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no
aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of prision
mayor in its minimum term which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years,
and that, on the other hand, the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the imposition of
imprisonment from four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, is in order.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Lanuza is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLITO VILLACORTA

Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. He is guilty of slight physical injuries under
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the
charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical
injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the
essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the
offense of murder.

Page 151 of 299


Facts:

On June 21, 2002, an Information was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of
murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, Villacorta, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one
DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his
immediate death.

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr.
Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

Mendeja narrated that she was tending her sari-‐sari store and both Cruz and Villacorta
were regular customers. At around 2a.m, while Cruz was ordering bread, Villacorta suddenly
appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using a
sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the
stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja
returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s
body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz
sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he
was treated as an out-‐patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14,
2002, where he died the following day. Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical
chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

The defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted
that he was on his way home from work. Villacorta went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.
When he was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted
Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got
hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of
conviction against Villacorta.

Issue:

Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that Villacorta is guilty of murder without taking
into considerations that given circumstances?

Ruling:

Yes, the court a quo erred when it ruled that Villacorta is guilty of murder without taking
into account the surrounding events that transpired.

Page 152 of 299


In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja.

Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s testimony is incredible because
she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court
because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.

"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.

His other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible the
identification of the assailant cannot prosper in view of his admission that he was in the store of
witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning and that he assaulted the
victim by boxing him.

Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and
regular customers. There was light in front of the store. The victim was in front of the store buying
bread when attacked. After the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her
additional opportunity to identify the malefactor.

Villacorta was unable to present any reason for Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely
accuse him of stabbing Cruz. We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness
was familiar with both the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good
visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the
accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight.

Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it
also constitutes self-‐serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is
found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the
stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January
23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-‐patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus
infection, where he died the following day. The prosecution did not present evidence of the
emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz
Page 153 of 299


to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-‐up medical treatment of his stab wound,
or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court was confronted with a case of very
similar factual background as the one at bar. We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the
Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus. Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside
a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking
incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court
that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano
that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction
of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing
and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would
have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus
infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with
two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can
only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with
tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of
his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form
part of those constituting the offense of murder.

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s intent to kill.

Page 154 of 299


The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as
to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-‐
appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such
intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries
only.

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical
treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz
was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-‐patient. There was no other evidence to
establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than
nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in
the Information and proved during trial.

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out
what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of
such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-‐defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that
the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-‐defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Likewise, even when the victim
was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate.

Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was
two o’clock in the morning, and Cruz, who was out buying bread, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard
down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from
nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the
left side of his body, then swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no
opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor.

RAPE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO CASTRO
G.R. No. 172874, December 17, 2008, J. Leonardo-‐ De Castro

Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault,
especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and
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put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to
condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and punished.

It is enough that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex
organ. The mere touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private part
is sufficient to consummate rape. It was therefore consummated rape which accused-‐appellant
committed.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellant Mario Castro was charged with the crime of rape. It was alleged that
on November 11, 1999 at about 11:00 in the evening, accused-‐appellant fetched AAA, a minor
fourteen (14) years of age, his sister-‐in-‐law, from her Aunt’s house at PNR Compound, Taguig,
Metro, Manila. Appellant brought her to TEMIC Factory and told her to undress. When she refused,
appellant undressed her, after which, he undressed himself. Appellant kissed her on the different
parts of her body and, in an instant, forced his penis into her vagina until he satisfied his lust.
Appellant eventually told AAA to dress up. When AAA reached her residence she told her aunt and
her grandmother that she was raped. After her relatives learned of the incident, they brought her to
the Barangay Tanod and, later to Camp Crame for medical examination. When arraigned, accused-‐
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The defense relied on the testimony of Margarita Salangsang, a lessee of accused-‐appellants
mother at Signal Village in Taguig. She testified that at around 9:30 in the evening on November 11,
1999, accused-‐appellant was in her house for her birthday celebration. Accused-‐appellant did not
leave the house at any time from the moment he arrived at 9:30 in the evening until he finally left
around midnight. She knew that accused-‐appellant went home straight after the party because she
even saw him at his house when she returned the pans she borrowed from accused-‐appellants
mother. Margarita declared that her house was located just at the back of accused-‐appellants house.

The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-‐appellant of the crime of rape. On
appeal, the CA upheld the conviction of accused-‐appellant and affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-‐appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He contends that complainant did not particularly describe the details of the
alleged rape as to whether she was forced to lie down or whether they were standing when he
inserted a part of his organ into her vagina. Accused-‐appellant also asserts that complainant failed
to categorically state that accused-‐appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina, thus
undermining her allegation of consummated rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-‐appellant is guilty of rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

There is no question that accused-‐appellant in this case committed rape by means of threat
and intimidation. Being 30 years old and the brother-‐in-‐law of complainant, accused-‐appellant
exercised not only physical superiority, but also moral ascendancy over his 14-‐year old victim such
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that his threat to inflict physical harm on her effectively cowed her into submitting to his lustful
designs.

Accused-‐appellant argues that he cannot be held liable for consummated rape following the
ruling in People v. Campuhan. It was held that the crime was merely attempted rape because all that
the victim said in that case was that accused's penis touched her organ but did not penetrate it. The
argument is misplaced. In the case at bar, testimony of the complainant herself established the
consummation of the crime of rape.

He cites the testimony of complainant that not all of accused-‐appellant's organ was inserted
into her vagina. Clearly, complainant's statement that not all of accused-‐appellant's organ was
inserted simply means that there was no full penetration. There can be no doubt, however, that
there was at least a partial entry, so as to make the crime consummated rape. As we have said in
unnumbered cases, full or deep penetration is not necessary to consummate sexual intercourse; it is
enough that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ. The mere
touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the womans private part is sufficient to
consummate rape. It was therefore consummated rape which accused-‐appellant committed.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO A. LOPIT

In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying
circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there
can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of
rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused-‐appellant must be
both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellant was charged in thee (3) separate informations, Criminal Case Nos. 85-‐
2003, 86-‐2003 and 87-‐2003, with three (3) counts of rape committed against his own 14-‐year old
daughter AAA on September 5, 7, and 9, 2003. Accused-‐appellant entered a plea of not guilty in all
of the Information. During the pre-‐trial accused-‐appellant manifested his desire to plea-‐bargain. In
open court, he expressed willingness to plead guilty in Criminal Case No. 85-‐2003, on the condition
that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 86-‐2003 and 87-‐2003 be withdrawn. Victim AAA,
assisted by her mother BBB and the provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto. Thus,
accused-‐appellant entered a new plea of guilty to the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 85-‐
2003. This was done with the assistance of counsel de oficio and after the trial court conducted
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused-‐appellants plea. The trial court commenced with the reception of evidence to prove
accused-‐appellants guilt and degree of culpability. The prosecution presented the victim AAA and
her mother BBB as witnesses, while accused-‐appellant testified on his own defense.

The trial court rendered a decision imposing upon the accused-‐appellant the supreme
penalty of death. The records of these cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in
view of the death penalty imposed. Accused-‐appellants appeal by way of automatic review was
transferred to the CA. The CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming in most part
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the decision of the trial court with modification only in the amount of the award of moral and
exemplary damages. Hence, this review. In his Brief, accused-‐appellant alleged that the trial court
gravely erred in imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the death penalty imposed is proper.

Ruling:

No.

In his Brief, accused-‐appellant does not question his conviction for raping his own
daughter. He only assails the imposition of the death penalty by the CA. Accused-‐appellant contends
that while the Information alleged the qualifying circumstances of both his relationship to the
victim and the latter’s minority, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt these
qualifying circumstances.

Here, the Information alleged the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship
to accused-‐appellant. However, except for the bare testimony of the victim and her mother as to the
formers age as well as their filiation to the accused-‐appellant, no birth certificate or baptismal
certificate or school record and marriage contract exist on record to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the victims age or her minority at the time of the commission of the offense. There is no
showing that the victim’s birth certificate and accused-‐appellants marriage contract were lost or
destroyed or were unavailable without the prosecutions fault. Therefore, the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged special qualifying circumstance of minority
attended the commission of the crime of rape. Hence, accused-‐appellant should be convicted only of
simple rape. Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CADAG JIMENEZ

The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or
intimidation against her will or without her consent; the exact time of its commission is not an
essential element to the crime.

Facts:

On or about the 8th day of August 1996 and sometime during the last week of October of the
same year, accused Jaime Jimenez by means of force, coercion, intimidation and with lewd design or
intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire or abuse, humiliate, degrade complainant, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA, a 12-‐year
old girl against her will and consent. He was charged and convicted by the RTC of two counts of the
crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the CA
rejected Jaime’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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Thereafter, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court with the accused-‐appellant Jaime Jimenez
alleging that the prosecution failed to establish the exact dates of the commission of the crimes
charged and that such failure of AAA to recall these dates with certainty likewise clouds the veracity
of her testimony.

Issue:
Whether failure of the prosecution to prove the exact dates of the commission of the crime
of rape will have to merit acquittal of the accused.

Ruling:

No, it will not.

The failure of the prosecution to prove the exact dates of the commission of the crimes
charged is immaterial and would not warrant the reversal of accused-‐appellant’s conviction. The
exact time of the commission of the crime of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime and
it is sufficient if the acts complained of are alleged to have taken place as near to the actual date at

which the offenses are committed as the information or complaint will permit. The gravamen of the
crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation against her will

or without her consent. As the exact date of the commission of the rape is not the essence of the
crime and it is sufficient to allege in the information a date as near to the actual date of the offense
as the circumstances allow, the dates of the rapes committed by the accused-‐appellant need not be
proven exactly as alleged in the criminal information.

The failure of AAA to recall minor details and the exact dates of the incidents of rape and
sexual assault likewise does not affect the veracity of her testimony. These lapses are
understandable taking into account the nature of these crimes she suffered at her young age. The
Court cannot impose the burden of exactness, detailedness, and flawlessness on the victim’s
recollection of her harrowing experiences.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE MARIANO
G.R. No. 168693, July 19, 2009, J. Leonardo-‐ De Castro

The mere touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private
part is sufficient to consummate rape.

Facts:

In three separate Informations, accused-‐appellant Jessie Mariano was charged with three
counts of rape allegedly committed against the ten-‐year old daughter of his common-‐law wife. On
his arraignment, Mariano pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During trial on the merits, the
prosecution presented the oral testimonies of victim AAA, her mother BBB and Dr. Ronald
Bandonil, medico-‐legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Baguio City. On July 2, 2001,

the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-‐appellant of three counts of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each crime charged. On appeal to the SC,
Accused-‐appellant Mariano insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of rape. He assails the credibility of AAA, branding her testimony as
inconsistent and contradictory with that of Dr. Bandonil, the medico-‐legal expert.

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Issue:

Whether Dr. Bandonil’s testimony was incompatible with the claims of the victim.

Ruling:

No, it was not.
During trial, he categorically declared that the possible cause for the swelling of the victim’s
hymen could be the male organ which would connote that accused-‐appellant’s penis indeed
touched the labia of AAA’s organ. The mere touching by the male organ of the labia of the
pudendum of the woman’s private part is sufficient to consummate rape. The fact that there was no
deep penetration of the victim’s vagina and that her hymen was intact does not negate rape, since
this crime is committed even with the slightest penetration of a woman’s sex organ. Significantly, in
a number of cases, the Court has held that where penetration was not fully established, the Court
had anchored its conclusion that the rape was nevertheless committed on the victim’s testimony
that she felt pain.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO BUBAN

In cases of rape, the force and intimidation is viewed from the perspective of the victim. There
need not be physical force provided that the victim succumbed to the act out of fear. Furthermore, the
sweetheart theory as a defense does not carry any weight when it is not accompanied by independent
proof.

Facts:

AAA, then 17 years old, was already an orphan and has two other siblings named BBB (15
years old) and CCC (the youngest). Since she was a small child she had been living with her
aunt. Her aunt has nine children the eldest of whom named GGG is the one married to Alberto
Buban. She claimed that Buban succeeded to have carnal knowledge with her through force,
threats, intimidation and without her consent four times and that all incidents happened inside the
house of her aunt because the accused and his wife GGG used to live with them.

She was only able to file the cases for rape at the time when her aunt noticed that her
stomach was getting bigger. When her aunt learned that she was raped by Buban, her aunt
accompanied her to file a complaint. The declaration was corroborated by the testimony and the
findings of the medico-‐legal officer who examined the offended party. It was found out in the
examination that AAA was six months pregnant. She subsequently surrendered her child to a social
worker contending that she had no love for the child as it served as a remembrance of what Buban
did to her.

The defense upon the other hand, admitted Buban had carnal knowledge of the victim for
several times, but argued that the sexual intercourse had been consensual as Buban and AAA were
sweethearts. The accused further claimed that the instances of carnal knowledge happened so
frequently that he could no longer count them. Buban also mentioned that he initiated to break up
with the AAA but never expounded on the reason why.

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The RTC found Buban guilty of rape which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, the
present review. Buban puts at issue the credibility of AAA that it is contrary to human nature and
experience that after having been previously raped twice, AAA would still feel comfortable, in the
presence of appellant, and that there were inconsistencies between AAA’s testimony as to the dates
of the commission of the four (4) rape incidents. Lastly, Buban asserts that there could be no rape
where the sexual act was consensual.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in convicting Buban of rape

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err in convicting Buban.

The Court ruled in People v. Nazareno as follows:

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following jurisprudential
guidelines: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to
the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Tersely put, the credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the
guilt of a person accused of rape. By the very nature of this crime, it is usually only
the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. Thus, in rape cases, the accused may
be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Else wise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if
credible, suffices to warrant a conviction for rape.

Guided by these judicial doctrines, the Court scrutinized all the pieces of evidence on record,
especially the testimony of AAA and we find no reason to overturn the trial courts assessment of
her credibility, which had the opportunity of observing AAAs manner and demeanor on the witness
stand. AAAs testimony was indeed candid, spontaneous and consistent. As the trial court observed
and we quote:

xxx. Even on re-‐cross examination the victim remained consistent and
unwavering in her claim that she was sexually abused by the accused. Despite her
young age and lack of experience in court proceedings she remained steadfast
unfazed by the lengthy cross-‐examinations conducted by the defense, thus, attesting
favorably to her credibility.

Well-‐established is the rule that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the
force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary
that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it
was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it
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brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are
beside the point.

Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear -‐
-‐ fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her
at that moment or even thereafter.

In the present case, there can be no doubt that accused-‐appellant employed that amount of
force sufficient to consummate rape. At the time rape incidents took place, the victim was only
seventeen (17) years old, while accused-‐appellant was more or less twenty-‐seven years old and in
his prime. The obvious disparity between their physical strengths manifests the futility of any
resistance exerted by AAA as clearly established in the latter’s testimony.

Accused-‐appellant failed to show any ill motive, on the part of the victim to fabricate such a
story. Since there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the complainant to
testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical
conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO GRANDE
G.R. No. 170476, December 23 2009, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

The sweetheart defense, being an affirmative defense, must be established with convincing
evidence—by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures
and the like. In this case, there was no evidence offered to prove that what transpired between accused
and victim was consensual.

Facts:

Fifteen-‐year-‐old student AAA was renting a room in a boarding house at Purok 1-‐A,
Barangay San Roque, Mercedes, Camarines Norte. One night, she was roused from her sleep by
accused Ricardo Grande who was on top of her and in the act of removing her shirt. Ricardo,
already naked from the waist down, pressed on her keeping her hands crossed on her chest and
lowered her shorts and panty down to her knees. He then inserted his penis inside her private part
and made pumping motions causing unbearable pain. AAA pushed her attacker away but her efforts
proved futile for Ricardo was quite heavy. The push and pull motion lasted for about five minutes.
After satisfying his lust and before leaving, Ricardo threatened AAA not to report what happened or
he would kill her and her parents.

AAA retreated to one side of her room crying. That night she couldn’t bring herself to sleep.
She stayed in her room the next morning until her mother arrived. She wasted no time and
reported the incident to her mother. Accompanied by their neighbor Tiang Azon, AAA went to
Bombo Radio the next day to request for assistance. Then AAA and her mother went to the police.
Assisted by her mother, AAA executed a sworn statement narrating the incident. The following day,
they went to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital for medical examination. The Medico-‐Legal
Officer, Dr. Marcelito Abas, conducted the medical examination and found healed hymenal
laceration and that vagina admits one finger easily.

Page 162 of 299


For his defense, 25-‐year old Ricardo claimed that he and AAA were lovers. According to him,
she was introduced to him by her cousin. Thereafter, Ricardo courted her for two days before
winning her heart. Then, he left for Sariaya, Quezon for a year. When he returned to Camarines
Norte, he courted AAA again. Again, she answered him. Ricardo then would visit her boarding house
every afternoon. Sometimes, he would go there at night. According to him, they had gone out on
dates and he had sexual intercourse with AAA before the complained incident. On that night when
said incident happened, Ricardo admitted that he was at the boarding house of AAA with her two
classmates. Shortly after those classmates left, he claimed that they subsequently had sex.

Both trial court and appellate courts did not give credence to the sweetheart theory.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape

Ruling:

Yes, the Court found Ricardo guilty.

For conviction in the crime of rape as alleged in this case, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
that said act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation.

Accused Ricardo does not deny the sexual intercourse between him and AAA that took place
on August 21, 1997, the precise date mentioned in the Information. However, as to the second
element of the crime, he asserts an exculpatory claim that it was consensual sex because he and
AAA were sweethearts.

The Court ruled that the invocation of the sweetheart theory fails for lack of convincing
proof. In People v. San Antonio, Jr., it was held that the sweetheart defense, being an affirmative
defense, must be established with convincing evidence—by some documentary and/or other
evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Likewise, the sweetheart theory
appellant the proffers is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and
consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial
evidence. To be worthy of judicial acceptance, such a defense should be supported by documentary,
testimonial or other evidence.

Other than his self-‐serving assertions, no other evidence was proffered by Ricardo to
establish the existence of a romantic relationship between him and AAA. The Court cited the trial
court’s decision, noting that AAA was a girl of fifteen and barrio lass, while Ricardo was in his
twenties at the time of the incident. Other than his self-‐serving testimony, no other evidence, like
love letters, mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged relationship with AAA.
Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this alleged voluntary intercourse.

In any event, it has been held often enough that love is not a license for rape because a man
does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires. People v. Napudo
ruled that the sweetheart defense is considered an uncommonly weak defense because its presence
does not automatically negate the commission of rape. The gravamen of the crime is sexual
Page 163 of 299


congress of a man with a woman without her consent. Hence, notwithstanding the existence of a
romantic relationship, a woman cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her will.

AAA clearly and positively identified the accused-‐appellant as her attacker and, in a
straightforward manner, consistently described how the latter succeeded by the use of force and
intimidation in having sexual intercourse with her against her will.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMINIGILDO SALLE SOBUSA

It has consistently been held that no family member would expose a fellow family member to
the ignominy of a rape trial or to the shame and scandal of having to undergo such an ordeal merely
to satisfy their alleged motive if the charge is not true.

Facts:

Accused Sobusa was a widower with children and working as a security guard of the
Philippine National Bank. After the marriage of AAA’s mother and Sobusa, she lived with her
grandmother. When her grandmother died, she lived with her mother and stepfather. However,
when her mother BBB left for Taiwan, she was left by her mother under the custody of her aunt
DDD, the elder sister of her mother. She stayed with DDD for only one month and a half because her
stepfather wrote her mother a letter that she was always sick, thus, to the house of Sobusa. She
lived there until April, 2000 only, because before the Holy Week of the year 2000 (April 17 to 21,
2000), according to her, she was raped, by Sobusa.

AAA narrated that at about a quarter of nine in the evening while she was sleeping, she was
awakened when she felt that somebody was mashing her whole body. When she woke up, she saw
her stepfather whom she called as her papa, as the one mashing her whole body. Accused Sobusa
then immediately covered her mouth by using his palm. She did not also shout because she was
afraid. Thereafter, accused undressed himself and pulled down her shorts with her panty to her
knees and inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. While doing
these acts, accused was lying on the AAA’s back while the latter was lying face down. Accused also
let her lie on her back, mashed her whole body and kissed her.

According to AAA, there was only a slight penetration because she did not feel the pain but
she was very sure that what was inserted into her vagina was the penis of the accused and not his
finger because his fingernails were sharp and pointed and besides the penis of the accused is bigger
in size than the finger of the accused. She did not feel the pain although she has not yet experienced
having sexual intercourse with a man.

After the said sexual act, AAA pulled her pillow and placed it between her thighs and the
following morning, she discovered that the pillow was wet with bloodstains. She then told Sobusa
about the bloodstains but he told her just to keep quiet because he will just wash the pillow and the
panty. Her Tita Bebing, the half-‐sister of Sobusa, overheard the same. Upon inquiry by her Tita
Bebing, she told her about the incident but her Tita told her just to keep quiet. In May 2000,
however, she also told her two friends about the incident that happened to her and her friends
advised her to tell everything to her aunt DDD which AAA did. Thereafter, they reported the
incident to the barangay captain and the latter also reported the same to the Municipal Hall and a
warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
Page 164 of 299


The Medico Legal Certificate indicated a presence of hymenal laceration. The old healed
hymenal laceration could have been inflicted on the victim a month or more prior to the date of the
examination, depending however on the healing process of the patient.

Sobusa testified that he only came to know about the filing of this case against him in May,
2000 and upon knowing this, he voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Juanito Molinas, Jr. of San Miguel
PNP and he was placed in the lock up cell.

He denied having raped AAA because being employed as Security Guard of the PNB, Iloilo
Branch, his duty was always during night time, from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. or from 11 p.m. until 7 a.m. In
the months of March and April 2000, according to him, he was on night shift duty every day, and he
also had Daily Time Records showing the schedule of his duties as security guard.
He further stated that this case was only instigated by DDD, sister of his wife, their aunts and
cousins because according to them, he is a gambler, a drunkard and he had another family and they
wanted to separate them.

The testimony of the accused was corroborated by his aunt Margarita Sobusa. She testified
that the family of BBB was not in good terms with the family of Sobusa and she knew this fact
because Sobusa also shared his problem with her. According to her, the family of BBB does not
favor her marriage to the Sobusa because the latter had another family, and the money sent by BBB
to him was spent by the accused in his gambling activity.

The fact of Sobusa’s surrender to the police authorities was testified to by SPO1 Juanito
Molinos, a PNP member assigned at the San Miguel Police Station.

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence to refute Sobusa’s claim that he was on
duty every night on the month of April of 2000 and to show that AAA was raped sometime on April
11 to 15, 2000.

The prosecution presented Severino Pago, Chief Security assigned at the PNB main branch.
Sobusa was under him since May, 1994, until this case was filed against him in the year 2000.
According to him accused Sobusa reported for day duty on April 10-‐16, 2000 and on April 15 he
was not on duty.

AAA testified that she was not very sure of the exact date when she was raped but as far as
she can remember, it was only a few days before the Holy Week. AAA stated that she was sure that
she was raped between the dates April 11 to 15, 2000.

Both trial court and appellate court found him guilty of qualified rape.

Issue:

Whether or not Sobusa is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

Yes, the Court sustained his conviction of rape, qualified by AAA’s minority and relationship
with him.
Page 165 of 299


There are three settled principles in reviewing evidence on rape cases: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Accused was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape on the basis
of the following: (1) AAA’s credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) AAA’s positive
identification of accused-‐appellant as the one who raped her; (3) physical evidence consistent with
AAA’s assertion that she was raped; and (4) the absence of ill motive on AAA’s part in filing the
charge.

Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-‐
child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

AAA’s testimony that she was raped is highly trustworthy not only because of the fact that
she was merely a young lass below twelve years of age at the time she testified before the trial court
who would not concoct a sordid tale against his stepfather whom she endearingly calls papa but
more so because of her candid, positive, direct, and consistent narration of how her stepfather
sexually abused her.

Jurisprudence is likewise settled that when the rape victim’s testimony is corroborated by
the physician’s finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the
essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration.

The prosecution successfully established the qualifying circumstance of relationship of AAA
with Sobusa as well as her minority. AAA is the stepdaughter of the accused-‐appellant in view of the
marriage of AAAs mother with accused-‐appellant. The birth certificate of AAA, on the other hand,
proves that she was only 10 years old on the month of April of the year 2000 or at the time the rape
was committed.

Ill motive on the part of AAA’s family in the filing of this case is bereft of convincing
evidence. The Court has consistently held that no family member would expose a fellow family
member to the ignominy of a rape trial or to the shame and scandal of having to undergo such a
debasing ordeal merely to satisfy their alleged motive if the charge is not true. The Court did not
believe that the relatives of AAA would subject the latter to the humiliating and agonizing
experience of a public trial just to falsely accuse a person of the commission of the crime of rape.

Aside from the fact that AAA positively testified that the accused-‐appellant was her
assailant and that she was raped a few days before the start of the Holy Week of the year 2000 or
sometime on April 11 to 15, 2000, the daily time records of the accused-‐appellant easily belie his
claim that he worked on the night shifts from April 10 to 16, 2000.

Jurisprudence requires that a surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must
clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. The
Page 166 of 299


following requisites should likewise be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; (3) the surrender
was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. In this case,
Sobusa surrendered only after having been informed of the charge of rape against him or about two
months from the commission of the alleged crime. The alleged surrender, therefore, does not
qualify as a mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON BARSAGA ABELLA

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Facts:

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of trial court convicting Marlon Barsaga Abella of the
crime of rape further ordering him to acknowledge and support his offspring with the victim AAA.
The trial court found the 38-‐year-‐old AAA as a credible witness and her testimony candid and
truthful despite her moderate mental retardation.

Dr. Emelito Alegre testified that he had conducted an ultrasound examination on AAA,
confirming her pregnancy. At the time of the examination, AAA was already 30.7 weeks pregnant.

Dr. Imelda Escuadra of the Women and Children Protection Unit of Bicol Medical Center,
Naga City, and a specialist in the field of psychiatry testified that AAA was referred to her clinic for
examination and evaluation by the Department of Social Work and Development. During the first
examination, she noticed that AAA was pregnant, was coughing, but responsive, coherent and
relevant with no auditory or visual hallucinations or delusions shown. AAA, as she had observed,
was not psychotic at the time of the examination.

Dr. Escuadra added that AAA had recurrent thoughts of the rape incident and the threats to
kill her if she would divulge the matter. It was also observed that AAA was not oriented as regards
to persons and dates and that she showed poor grasp of general information. She further testified
that AAA’s mental ability particularly on the arithmetic aspect was poor, as she could not even
count from 1-‐100. She concluded that although AAA’s chronological age was 38 years old, she
manifested a mental age of between 7-‐8 years old. AAA’s intelligence quotient was only 51, which is
classified as moderate mental retardation. Aside from her mental disadvantage, AAA also suffers
from dwarfism being only three feet and eight inches tall.

AAA testified that she knew Abella personally since he was a child because they lived in the
same neighborhood. Sometime at around 1 p.m., while she was alone at home, Abella entered their
house and started molesting her. He pulled down her shorts with his left hand while covering her
mouth with his right hand. He then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. At that time, AAA did not shout as he was holding a knife. She recalled that when he inserted
his penis into her vagina, she had felt pain. Afraid for her life, she did not tell her parents about the
rape incident.

Several months after the incident, her stomach became big. Thinking that she was just ill,
she drank some bitter solution upon her mother’s instruction. As her stomach continued to grow,
Page 167 of 299


AAA was forced to tell her mother about the rape incident. Thereafter, AAA consulted a doctor who
confirmed that she was pregnant. Consequently she gave birth to a baby girl.

BBB, AAA’s mother, testified that Abella is the cousin of her husband. She claimed that she
noticed her daughter becoming pale and thinner. She also noticed that AAA’s stomach was getting
bigger and thus decided to bring her to a doctor. BBB then asked her daughter who was responsible
for her pregnancy, and AAA replied that it was Abella. BBB immediately reported the matter to the
Municipal Hall of Pamplona. Thereafter, the appellant was arrested.

BBB also testified that Abella’s parents had tried to settle the case by offering P20,000.00.
They however declined said offer, as it was not even commensurate to the expenses they have
already spent for their daughter and her child. Abella and his family had never given them any
financial support.

Both testimonies of Abella and his father were principally anchored on denial, and
attributed that the filing of this case against the accused was ill motivated and was due to the bad
blood and personal animosities between their family and that of AAA.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of Rape

Ruling:

Yes, Abella is guilty. The Court affirmed the conviction.

Accused asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime charged because AAA allegedly
testified unsurely as to the identity of her assailant and that she testified incoherently as to the
details surrounding the rape incident. Accused pointed out that AAA mentioned that she was raped
by a certain Mang Ben.

The Court ruled that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused
had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was
psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-‐year old child and that
she gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual relationship.
These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse.

The Court found no real conflict in the testimony of AAA as to the identity of her assailant. A
close scrutiny of the testimony of AAA that a certain Mang Ben raped her shows her evident
confusion to the suggestive questions and insinuations of the defense counsel and to the
hypothetical questions of the trial court. AAA’s puzzling answers are understandable considering
her undisputed low mental ability to comprehend the true import of the questions. Nonetheless, on
further clarificatory questions of the trial court, AAA rectified her answers and testified consistently
that she was raped by the accused-‐appellant, and not by a certain Mang Ben.

The Court cited the trial court’s finding on this matter. It noted that even if the victim had a
mental age of a 7 to 8 year-‐old child, yet, she was candid, sincere, straightforward and simple in her
testimony in court despite the grueling cross-‐examination conducted by Atty. Manlangit. The
aforesaid demeanor of AAA only showed that she was telling the truth. She never wavered in her
Page 168 of 299


testimony, that it was Marlon who raped her, the circumstances or details under which she was
raped; and in positively identifying Marlon Abella in court. The court likewise noted the limited
mental ability and poor aptitude of the complainant when she was extensively grilled and cross-‐
examined, and even upon clarificatory questions from the court, thus giving the impression to the
court that she was just being obedient and was coached by her parents in filing this instant case
against Marlon Abella. She likewise admitted that a certain Mang Ben also raped her, but, later
corrected herself. Such was understandable. Even Atty. Manlangit noted that the victim was already
tired and exhausted while testifying in court. Besides, there was no testimony from AAA that she
was merely instructed by her parents to file the rape case against Marlon Abella even if the same
were not true. The court considered the inconsistencies in her testimony as minor inconsistencies
which even strengthen her testimony.

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This
is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the victim through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.

The criminal information failed to allege the qualifying circumstance that the accused knew
of the mental disability of AAA, thus, his conviction of statutory or simple rape committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, instead of qualified rape, is in order.

The Court also affirmed the ruling of the lower courts, that the accused was the biological
father of the two-‐year-‐old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of their
striking facial similarities and features. The order to acknowledge and support the offspring is in
accordance with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL BAGOS

No parent would expose his or her own daughter to the shame and scandal of having
undergone such debasing defilement of her chastity if the charges were not true.

Facts:

Sometime in May 1998, AAA, her older brother CCC, younger sister DDD and friend Michael
went to Baling-‐Caguing River, sitio Camanggaan, barangay Caranglaan, Mabini, Pangasinan from
their house to take a bath. CCC and Michael then decided to fish at a different location in the river
about 50 meters from where the sisters were bathing. Thereafter, DDD left AAA to join them.

Later, AAA prepared to leave and follow her companions. However, accused Manuel Bagos
who was bathing nearby suddenly pulled her left leg causing her to slip towards him. He then
lowered the panty of AAA up to the level of her knees and, thereafter, removed his pants.

Bagos sat down and seated AAA on his lap while they were in the water which was neck-‐
deep in that position. AAA boxed the thighs of the appellant saying, “No uncle.” Despite her
protestations, accused placed his left hand over her stomach and used his right hand to insert his
penis inside her vagina which caused her pain. After satisfying his lust, appellant threatened to
shoot AAA if she reported the incident to anybody. She was frightened because she had seen his gun
when they played in his house one time prior to the incident.
Page 169 of 299


AAA’s mother, testified that AAA was ten years old when the incident happened since she
was born on July 18, 1987 as shown by her birth certificate. She was then troubled by the unusual
questions of her daughter such as: ‘Mama, is my stomach getting bigger?’ and ‘Mama, is my neck
beating faster?’ She then confronted AAA and asked her if somebody molested her. AAA confessed.

AAA underwent physical examination which was conducted by Dr. Maribel Lazo. Dr. Lazo
explained that the findings meant that the hymen had been ruptured and that the laceration took
place longer than two weeks before the day of the physical examination or that AAA was no longer
a virgin at that time.

Bagos denied swimming or bathing in the river near his house at that time, and claimed that
he only went near the river to gather coconuts. He has known AAA’s parents for approximately ten
years because they were neighbors. AAA’s grandmother and his father are also first cousins. He
insisted that he stayed at the river bank while gathering coconuts, but never went near AAA. He
denied that he raped AAA, much less squatted on the river while raping AAA since he has a physical
defect that renders him incapable of squatting down.

He recounted that when he went to their barangay hall, the barangay captain asked him if
he could afford to settle the case. He answered that he would not settle because he was innocent of
the crime charged against him. He speculated that AAA’s family accused him of raping her due to a
family misunderstanding and boundary dispute.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape

Ruling:

Yes, the Court found Bagos guilty.

Accused’s contentions essentially assail the credibility of AAA’s testimony. The Court held
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
finding of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.

The victim in the present case was only ten years old when the rape happened. Despite her
very young age, her narration of her ordeal on the witness stand was straightforward, spontaneous
and candid. Under rigid cross-‐examination, she was steadfast in the telling of the incident.

The prosecution has adequately established that the complainant was only 10 years old at
the time of the rape incident, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth. Undeniably, the instant
case is one of statutory rape, the gravamen of which is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12
years old. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years is always rape. Thus, force, intimidation or
physical evidence of injury is immaterial.

Page 170 of 299


AAA’s testimony is further corroborated by the medical findings. Where a rape victim's
testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for
concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.

The theory of accused-‐appellant that that it was not possible for him to rape the
complainant in a sitting position because of his physical defect was properly rejected by the RTC
when he was required to sit by placing his buttocks on the floor. With more reason then, that he can
sit under water which is easier to perform.

The Court was unconvinced of accused’s attempt to impute ill-‐motives on the part of AAA’s
family. As held in People v. Monteron, Not a few accused in rape cases have attributed the charges
brought against them to family feud, resentment, or revenge. But such alleged motives have never
swayed this Court from lending full credence to the testimony of the complainant where she
remains steadfast in her direct and cross examination. No parent would expose his or her own
daughter to the shame and scandal of having undergone such debasing defilement of her chastity if
the charges were not true. It is unnatural for a parent to use his own offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO REPUBLO,
G.R. No. 172962 July 8, 2010, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

AAA was raped by Romeo but the latter denied such accusation. The court ruled that In order
that the defense of alibi may prosper, the appellant must prove both the presence of the appellant in
another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical impossibility of him being
at the scene of the crime

Facts:

AAA victim, her mother BBB. In 1997, BBB went to New Guinea Republic, West Africa, to
work, leaving her daughter, AAA, with the family of her older sister, RRR, in a house they were
renting in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. Romeo Republo the accused-‐appellant is RRRs husband. All
three incidents happened sometime in September 1997, on three different dates.

The first incident occurred at around 9:00 a.m. on a Saturday, when then 11-‐year old AAA
was awakened from her sleep by Romeo Republo accused-‐appellant. Only AAA and Romeo Republo
accused-‐appellant were in the house at that time. Romeo Republo Accused-‐appellant, who was
wearing only his shorts, pulled her blanket, forced her to lie down and undressed her. Upon
removing her shorts, Romeo Republo accused-‐appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina. He
then left. The second incident happened at around 3:00 p.m., two days later. While AAA was doing
her schoolwork inside her room, Romeo Republo accused-‐appellant entered the room and
immediately went on top of her. However, as the daughter of Romeo Republo accused-‐appellant
was inside the house, AAA was able to run outside. AAA went to her aunt LLLs house. Aunt LLL is
the wife of BBBs brother. The latter was not in his and LLLs house at the time AAA went there.
Third incident was when AAA was preparing to sleep with accused-‐appellants children at around
10:00 p.m. AAA laid down beside the three children. When the Romeo Republo accused-‐appellants
three children were already sleeping, Romeo Republo accused-‐appellant laid down beside AAA, and
threatened her not to tell anybody about what was happening, or else he would kill her family. AAA
was afraid and believed that Romeo Republo accused-‐appellant would execute his threat as she
Page 171 of 299


knows that he is a bad man. Romeo Republo Accused-‐appellant then removed her shorts and
inserted his private part into hers.

The defense presented accused-‐appellant Republo as its lone witness. Republo denied
having raped AAA. Instead, he believed that the rape charges were filed against him in order to
teach him a lesson, as there were several incidents that allegedly infuriated BBB due to some
punishments he inflicted upon AAA because she had a boyfriend at her very young age.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in proving the guilt of Romeo Republo
accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

No. the Court of Appeals did not erred in proving the guilt of Romeo Republo
accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt

Accused-‐appellants argument is apparently meant to support his alibi, that he and AAA
supposedly lived in the same house only in November 1997 upon the request of AAAs parents after
AAAs grandfather died. Citing the following portion of BBBs cross-‐examination, accused-‐appellant
contends that it is highly inconceivable for AAAs grandmother, who was entrusted with the custody
of AAA, to let the children of BBB stay in accused-‐appellants house considering that BBB specially
provided an apartment for her children. Accused-‐appellant concludes that it was physically
impossible for him to have raped AAA in September 1997 considering that he and AAA lived in the
same house only in November 1997.

In order that the defense of alibi may prosper, the appellant must prove both the presence
of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical
impossibility of him being at the scene of the crime In Marco v. Court of Appeals, the Court did not
find the distance of twelve (12) kilometers far enough as to make it physically impossible for the
appellant therein to be at the scene of the crime. In People v. Bation, we ruled that there was no
physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime, citing that the appellant
claims to be merely twenty-‐six (26) kilometers away from said scene. In People v. Ignas, the
distance was even much farther:

Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the
appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. In these cases, the defense admitted that the distance
between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which can be negotiated
in 4 or 5 hours. Clearly, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail. SC therefore, find it difficult to uphold
accused-‐appellants defense of alibi in the case at bar, when he is merely claiming to be living in the
adjacent house to that of AAA.

SC furthermore agree with the finding of the trial court that it is unbelievable that AAA
would file complaints for two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape just to exact revenge
Page 172 of 299


for the time accused-‐appellant allegedly kicked her. scare convinced even less that BBB would
persuade her daughter to lie about such rape incidents because of her quarrel with accused-‐
appellant. Thus, have repeatedly held that: Not a few accused in rape cases have attributed the
charges brought against them to family feuds, resentment, or revenge. But such alleged motives
have never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who
remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-‐examinations, especially a minor as in this
case. Further, we simply cannot believe that a lass of tender age would concoct a tale of defloration,
allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma, of a public trial, unless she was in fact raped. No young and decent Filipina
would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such was true, for it
would be instinctive for her to protect her honor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELSON BALUNSAT y BALUNSAT

AAA a ten year old girl was raped by Nelson Balunsat who is her first cousin. Nelson denied
allegation. It is settled that when the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.

Facts:

Private complainant, [AAA], was ten (10) years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. At about 9:00 oclock in the morning of April 24, 1999 she was alone in their house at x x x
as her parents were in the cornfields working. When she was in the process of cooking lunch, the
accused Nelson Balunsat, who is the first cousin of the private complainant, their mothers being
sisters, arrived. He took off the shorts and underwear of the private complainant and, thereafter,
took off his short pants and underwear. He forced [AAA] to lie down on the floor and, opening wide
her legs, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Then he said If you report this I will kill
you. Then he left the private complainant who could not do anything but cry. Her private parts bled
and she felt extreme pain. She did not tell her parents about the incident because of the threats
made by the accused. On April 26, 1999 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, private complainant
[AAA] was sleeping in a room of the house of her grandmother CCC in the same barangay x x x,
Tuao, Cagayan. With her was her cousin [BBB]. The accused arrived and removed his shorts and
underwear and lay down beside [BBB]. The accused tried to insert his fully erect penis into [BBB]s
private parts. However, BBB resisted and the accused could not make any penetration of his penis
on the former. Failing to satisfy his lust on [BBB], the accused told her to move over and then lay
himself down beside private complainant [AAA]. He removed the shorts and panties of [AAA] and
had sexual intercourse with her. Then he left both girls. On April 28, 1999, [AAA] told her Aunt
[DDD] who then brought [AAA] first to the barangay authorities and later to the Tuao Police Station
to report the twin rapes. She was then brought to the Tuao District Hospital where she was medico-‐
legally examined by Dr. Roselyn B. Cardenas. The latter issued a medico-‐legal certificate (Exhibit C)
where her findings showed the following: hymen with recent laceration at 1 oclock. The defense, on
the other hand, relied on denial and alibi, testified to by Nelson himself.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
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Ruling:

No. The trial court did not erred in proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

Nelson is charged in Criminal Case No. 763-‐T with statutory rape considering that AAA
was then below 12 years old. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in
Article 266-‐A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. Sexual congress then with a girl under 12 years of age is always
rape. Thus, force, intimidation or physical evidence of injury are immaterial. To convict an accused
of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second,
the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused
and the complainant As shown by AAAs Certificate of Live Birth, she was born on February 3,
1989. Hence, on April 24, 1999, when the rape charge in Criminal Case No. 763-‐T supposedly took
place, she was only 10 years and 2 months old. Inside the court room, AAA identified her first
cousin Nelson as her rapist. The remaining element of statutory rape which needed to be
established herein is carnal knowledge between Nelson and AAA.

The Court stresses that in the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the
complainants private part is not at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen
essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at least the introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora
of the victims genitalia, even without the full penetration of the complainants vagina, consummates
the crime. Hence, the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum of the victims genitalia consummates rape.

The Court has carefully gone over the records of this case, particularly, the transcript of
stenographic notes to ferret out the truth and we find AAAs testimony on the incident that took
place on April 24, 1999 to be candid, straightforward, truthful, and convincing, consistent with the
finding of the RTC, which had the opportunity to closely observe AAA as she was giving her
testimony. AAA was able to describe with the simplicity of a child the ordeal that she suffered, even
vividly recounting the pain caused by Nelsons penetration of her female organ, AAA broke down
and cried while narrating on the witness stand how she was sexually abused by Nelson. Such
spontaneous emotional outburst strengthens her credibility. The crying of a victim during her
testimony bolstered her credibility with the verity borne out of human nature and experience. As
previously held, when a young girl like private complainant cries rape, she is saying in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. It is settled that when the victims
testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to
conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or
fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.

Nelsons defense consisted mainly of denial and alibi. Mere denial without any strong
evidence to support it cannot prevail over AAAs categorical and positive identification of
Nelson. His alibi is likewise unavailing. We give scant consideration to Nelsons claim that he went to
Barangay Lallalayug, Tuao, Cagayan, with five companions from Barangay x x x to play basketball in
the morning of April 24, 1999, after which, they stayed at the house of a certain Fred Ocab until
4:00 oclock in the afternoon. Nelson did not present as corroborating witness any one of his
supposed five companions to Barangay Lallalayug in the morning of April 24, 1999 or Fred Ocab in
Page 174 of 299


whose house he allegedly stayed at in the afternoon of the same date. For alibi to be considered, it
must be supported by credible corroboration, preferably from disinterested witnesses who will
swear that they saw or were with the accused somewhere else when the crime was being
committed. In the absolute absence of corroborating evidence, Nelsons alibi is implausible.

Concerning Criminal Case No. 781-‐T, the Court of Appeals modified the guilty verdict of
the RTC against Nelson from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness. We can no longer review the
downgrading of the crime by the appellate court without violating the right against double
jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of increasing
the penalty imposed upon the accused. In effect, the Court of Appeals already acquitted Nelson of
the charge of attempted rape, convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less
severe penalty. Hence, we limit ourselves to determining whether there is enough evidence to
support Nelsons conviction for acts of lasciviousness.

The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation, or (b) when
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party
is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. All these
elements are present in Criminal Case No. 781-‐T.

First, there were acts of lasciviousness or lewdness, i.e., Nelson lying naked on top of his
cousin BBB while the latter was sleeping at their grandmothers house; and Nelson attempting to
insert his penis into BBB even when the latter was fully-‐clothed. Second, the lascivious or lewd acts
were committed on BBB who was only 11 years old at the time of the incident. And third, the
offended party BBB is another person of the opposite sex. BBB positively identified Nelson as the
offender. We stress that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave great weight to BBBs testimony
and were convinced that Nelson committed a crime against BBB on April 26, 1999 at around 1:00
p.m., even though said courts may have varying views as to the precise designation of the crime. In
contrast, Nelson merely denied the accusation against him, proffering the alibi that he was at a
neighbors house the whole day of April 26, 1999, going home to his grandmothers place only to eat
lunch at around 11:00 a.m.

Denial could not prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As
between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare
denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Also, for Nelsons alibi to be credible and
given due weight, he must show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. His defense of alibi is not only self-‐serving
and easily fabricated, but is also the weakest defense he could interpose. We have uniformly held
that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-‐
culpability to merit credibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEDDY MAGAYON
G .R . N o . 1 7 5 5 9 5 July 28, 2010, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

AAA was raped by Magayon but the latter denied such allegation. The court ruled that a rape
victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
consistent, is a credible witness. Moreover, when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as
in this case, where the victim was only nine years old at the time the rape was committed, courts are
inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, not only because of their relative
Page 175 of 299


vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by
court trial, if the matter about which they testified were not true.
Facts:

At the onset, she BBB(grandmother) testified that her daughters inaction against Magayon
pushed her to file the complaint on behalf of her granddaughter, since Magayons uncle was the
second husband of AAAs mother. She narrated that sometime in August, 1996, having heard of the
rumor about AAAs rape being spread around by Francisco Asi, she confronted the latter and
inquired on the veracity of the gossip. Francisco Asi confirmed to her that indeed Magayon sexually
abused AAA. After obtaining this information, BBB approached and sought the advice of the
Barangay Captain of XXX, Oriental Mindoro, who told her that, as AAAs grandmother, she had the
right to vindicate AAAs honor and suggested to her to have AAA undergo a medical
examination. BBB then brought AAA to Dr. Soller, who, after having examined AAA, instructed BBB
to lodge a complaint with the Police Station of Bansud. There, BBB executed an affidavit in
connection with her complaint.

Dr. Preciosa Soller, second witness for the prosecution, testified that she was the one who
conducted the physical examination on AAA on September 4, 1996 and found out that AAA has lost
its virginity. She further testified that the lacerated hymen could have been caused by an insertion
of a hard object into the vagina such as a hardened penis.

AAA testified that at around 9:00 oclock in the morning on August 9, 1996, she and her 11-‐
year old brother were in her grandmothers house with Magayon. Magayon took her out of the
house and brought her somewhere and raped her for about two minutes. As Magayon was doing it,
she felt pain in her vagina. After the episode, the two of them went back to the house. On the
witness stand, she identified the affidavit she made when she went to the police station. The final
witness presented by the prosecution was Violeta Nazareno, social worker of the DSWD, whose
duty was to assist victims of rape. Violeta came to know of AAA because the latter was referred to
her for assistance. She said she knew that AAA was born on September 18, 1986 because she came
into possession of the victims birth certificate. Magayon denied such allegations. RTC ruled
convicting Magayon with Rape

Issue:

Whether or Not RTC erred in convicting the accused appellant Magayon with Rape

Ruling:

No. It did not erred in convicting the accused appellant with Rape

Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences, both for the accused-‐appellant
and the complainant; hence, a painstaking assessment of a judgment of conviction for rape must be
done. In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility, and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime,
only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized
with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Accused-‐
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appellant is charged in the information under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code of raping a
nine-‐year old girl. Noticeably, the applicable provision is paragraph 3 thereof which classified the
offense as statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 335, paragraph
3 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following:

(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and

(2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age.

In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, such as in the case of AAA, proof
of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force is not an element of statutory
rape, but because the absence of free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided
sexual intercourse is proven.

The prosecution adequately proved that AAA was nine years old on August 9, 1996 at the
time accused-‐appellant allegedly had carnal knowledge of her. This was evidenced by AAAs birth
certificate, which showed that she was born on September 18, 1986. Since she was merely 9 years
old at that time, no proof of involuntariness on her part is necessary. AAA, being a minor at the time
the act was committed against her, is considered by law to be incapable of consenting to the sexual
act. To convict accused-‐appellant of rape, the only circumstance that needs to be proven is the fact
of sexual intercourse. Here, in giving greater weight to the version of the defense, the trial court
observed that the victim was direct, unequivocal, convincing and consistent in answering the
questions propounded to her. The records disclose that AAA was categorical and straightforward
in narrating the distasteful details of her horrid experience as accused-‐appellant ravished her even
at such tender age. It must be stressed that AAA did not only identify Magayon as her rapist, she
also gave the specifics of how the sexual intercourse happened.

A rape victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. Moreover, when the offended parties are
young and immature girls, as in this case, where the victim was only nine years old at the time the
rape was committed, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, not
only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment to
which they would be exposed by court trial, if the matter about which they testified were not true.

Magayon denies raping the victim. His denial in this case, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative, self-‐serving evidence, which cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters. His
denial cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of AAA, a minor less than 12 years old, who
narrated the sexual episode.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EDGARDO OGARTE

A certification from the Local Civil Registrar as to the date of birth of a victim of rape is
sufficient evidence to prove minority of a victim.

Facts:

Page 177 of 299


On May 2, 1997, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Ogarte with
two separate counts of Rape. He was alleged to have had sexual intercourse with his 16 year old
daughter AAA. During arraignment, Ogarte pleaded not guilty on both counts of rape.

AAA detailed her ordeal as follows. The first instance of rape happened at around ten
o’clock in the evening of November 1, 1996, in their home in xxx. AAA claimed that while she was
sleeping beside her four younger sisters, Ogarte woke her up, held her hands, grabbed her head,
and brought her to the kitchen wherein she was forced to lie down on the floor. AAA said that after
Ogarte ejaculated. He threatened to kill her if she told her mother, who was at that time in
Guinabucan, Zamboanga del Sur.

The second instance of rape was when, upon her mother’s order, she reluctantly obeyed to
help Ogarte gather some firewood in the wooded area near their house. Ogarte carrying the bolo he
used to cut the wood, pulled her shoulders and told her not to make any noise. AAA recounted how
Ogarte then went on to remove her undergarments, and ignoring her cries, once again placed
himself on top of her and with a "push and pull motion," consummated his sexual desires.

Several attempts were made by Ogarte to again rape AAA. AAA was able to foil such
attempts by avoiding Ogarte and by pinching her siblings to waken them whenever Ogarte was
approaching AAA. AAA, mustered the courage to reveal to her mother the events that transpired on
November 1 and 3, 1996. Upon learning about this, Ogarte, in his anger, pulled AAA and was about
to stab her when he was stopped by AAA’s mother who arrived just in time. Thereafter, AAA’s
mother told her to keep quiet about what her father did to her.

AAA told her grandmother BBB her ordeal in the hands of her own father. On April 2, 1997,
AAA and BBB went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Dipolog City where they
executed the sworn affidavits that were used as bases for the charges against Ogarte.

On the other hand, Ogarte, vehemently denied that he had raped his own daughter on the
night of November 1, 1996. He said that although it was true that he was at their residence that
evening, his wife, AAA’s mother, was also there that night, contrary to AAA’s allegations. Ogarte
alleged that it would have been impossible to pull her and bring her to the kitchen without stepping
on or awakening his other children who were sleeping right beside AAA.

Ogarte likewise claimed innocence on the second charge of rape and averred that he was not in the
wooded area with AAA on November 3, 1996 as he was plowing his farm that day. Ogarte
contended that AAA filed these charges against him as an act of revenge because he and his wife
slapped her sometime in February 1997 when she adamantly denied having sexual intercourse
with three men at her school, as reported by Ogarte’s cousin who worked as a teacher in AAA’s
school.

The RTC found Ogarte guilty as charged in both criminal cases and imposed on him the
supreme penalty of death for each count of rape.

On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Ogarte alleged that AAA’s testimony was replete with
inconsistencies, her minority was never duly established, and his credible alibi should have been
believed in view of the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. However, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. The CA imposed reclusion perpetua as penalty for each count of rape.

Page 178 of 299


Issue:

Whether or not the allegation of minority was sufficiently established

Ruling:

Yes. The minority of the victim was sufficiently established.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three settled principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult
for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the
crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.

While we are aware of the divergent rulings on the proof required to establish the age of the
victim in rape cases, this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Pruna, wherein we
established certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance. We have reiterated these guidelines in the more recent case of People v.
Flores, as follows:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
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The qualifying circumstances of age and relationship were not only properly alleged in the
information but were also duly established by the prosecution during the trial of the cases against
Ogarte. Records show that AAA submitted a certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte that her birth records appear in its Register of Births and that her
date of birth is listed as "June 24, 1980." Under the above guidelines in establishing the victim’s age,
this certification qualifies as an authentic document.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO MIRANDA y MICHAEL

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under the instances provided for
in the law. With the intrinsic nature of the said crime, only two parties, namely the victim and the
accused, are usually involved. As such, accused’s defense of denial will not stand as against the victim’s
positive identification and credible testimony. This is especially so when it is qualified by minority and
relationship and the victim has no improper motive in purporting the accused as the perpetrator.
Moreover, in rape committed by a father or a person recognized by the victim as her father, the
prosecution need not prove the elements of force and intimidation as the same was substituted by the
former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter.

Facts:

About noontime of June 23, 2000, AAA, a seventeen year-‐old young lady, while fetching
water in a "poso" near their house, came to learn that the live-‐in partner of her father died, hence,
she went to her father’s house to condole. Her father then told her to look after her half-‐brother,
CCC, and half-‐sister, BBB. She stayed at his house, cooked food and washed the dishes. She slept that
night with her half-‐sister in the sala. On the following day, June 24, 2000, her father left in the
morning but returned at lunch time and stayed in the house for the rest of the day. She was,
however, not feeling well because of a high fever and headache accompanied by vomiting spills
which started at noontime of the same day. After having dinner and while she was washing the
dishes, her father came to know of her condition and he told his daughter, BBB to finish the dish
washing. She then went to the room and after wearing a pajama over her shorts and panty, she put
on the mosquito net. She then laid down and while preparing herself to rest and go to sleep, she
watched TV from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. with a "Good Morning" towel stuck on her mouth to
prevent her from vomiting. When her father turned off the TV, she asked for the "Vicks Vaporub"
placed at the side of the TV set. Accused then entered the mosquito net and volunteered to massage
her head. While he was massaging her head, she felt that both his elbows were touching her breasts.
She tried to evade his elbows saying she would be the one to do the massaging but he refused. In an
attempt to forestall her father’s acts, she told him that she will tell her mother about it which made
him stop and instead, he massaged her hands. He then kissed her on her neck while slowly lifting
her T-‐shirt who thereafter sucked her breasts causing her to push him hard telling him not to do it
to her. Only his two children were inside the house but both were already asleep at that time. After
sucking her breasts, he used his left hand in slowly pulling down her pajama and thereafter her
short and panty. He then held both her arms and with his head going down, he licked her vagina.
She resisted and tried to kick the wall to create some noise to awaken her half-‐siblings but he did
not stop. Out of fear of being hurt by her father, whom as testified by AAA, she saw with red eyes for
the first time, she did not shout for help. Thereafter, he removed his shorts with a garter and his
brief and she turned her back to him but he embraced her to make her face him. Then and there, he
laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt an entry into her vagina which she
Page 180 of 299


described to be painful. When her father removed his sex organ from hers, she felt something hot
flowed from her vagina. After the foregoing incident, he got dressed and wiped her vagina with the
"good morning" towel. She then waited for him to sleep and seeing him asleep, she fixed herself and
climbed the fence to get out from the house. She went to their house and after seeing that her
mother was still sleeping, she proceeded to the Barangay Hall where she saw her uncle who
accompanied her to Police Station where she executed a sworn statement. She was also brought to
Camp Crame for a physical and genital check-‐up.

Thereafter, an Information for the crime of rape qualified by minority and relationship was
filed against Romeo Miranda y Michael (Miranda).

For his defense, Miranda denied having committed the crime. While he did not deny that
before they went to sleep, he massaged AAA’s aching forehead with efficascent from 9:00 to 9:30
p.m. as she was also feeling dizzy. He, however, vehemently denied having raped her asserting that
after massaging her head AAA transferred to another room while he, together with his two (2)
children, remained in the room where they eventually slept. He also described that the materials
separating his room from the room where AAA slept were made of carton and wood of good lumber
and one can hear and see if someone is talking or doing anything in the other room as it has no
door.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape and was meted out the capital punishment of death. On automatic review to the
Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the death penalty
imposed was reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty. Hence, the
records of the case were forwarded to this Court for automatic review.

Issue:

Whether or not Miranda is guilty of the crime of rape qualified with minority and
relationship.

Ruling:

As the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically
pleaded in the Information and proven during the trial, Miranda is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of QUALIFIED RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, in lieu of death, without
the possibility of parole.

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
instances: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Miranda committed rape under the first circumstance, i.e., by having
sexual intercourse with his 17-‐year old daughter with the use of force and intimidation.

As to Miranda’s challenge against AAA’s credibility, this Court held that:
1) In review of rape cases, the credibility of the private complainant is the single most
important factor for consideration. The case of the prosecution stands or falls on the credibility of
the victim. This is in accord with the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two parties,
namely the victim and the accused, are usually involved. In this regard, the appellate court will
Page 181 of 299


generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on matters of credibility owing to its unique
opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of witnesses firsthand during the
trial unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. In the instant case, there is no basis for this Court to overturn the finding of
the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the testimony of the victim, AAA, is credible. As
the RTC observed, the testimony of AAA, in which she positively identified her father as the one
who ravaged her, is straightforward, categorical, and spontaneous.

2) As to Miranda’s defense of denial, this Court has already settled that a mere denial, like
alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-‐serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As against the positive identification and credible testimony by the private
complainant, mere denials of the accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the trial court.

3) This Court takes judicial notice that ordinarily and customarily, Filipino children revere
and respect their elders. It is thus unthinkable, if not completely preposterous, that a daughter
would audaciously concoct a story of rape against her father in wanton disregard of the
unspeakable trauma and social stigma it may generate on her and the entire family. A teenage
unmarried lass does not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father,
if it is not true. Even Miranda admitted that that he has no misunderstanding with AAA, thus, no
improper motive could be attributed to AAA for charging her father with the commission of such an
atrocious crime. Therefore, AAA’s testimony is worthy of full faith and credence because her only
apparent motive is to bring her father to justice for raping her.

4) Moreover, we have held that where a rape victim did not lose time in reporting her
father’s dastardly act and in seeking help as soon as she was able to escape, such spontaneous
conduct was an eloquent attestation of her abhorrence and repugnance to her father’s perversity.
That AAA immediately told her uncle and police officials about her hellish ordeal and that she
willingly submitted herself to physical and genital examination evince the truthfulness of her
charge of rape against Miranda.

5) AAA’s account of the rape is reinforced by physical evidence. The Medico-‐Legal Report
and testimony of P/Sr. Insp. Ruby Grace Sabino, who physically examined her on June 25, 2000, a
day after the rape, established that AAA’s hymen had a deep fresh laceration at 6 o’clock position,
evidencing penetration of the genitalia; and that seminal fluid was present in AAA’s vagina.

As to the argument that the prosecution failed to prove that Miranda used force and
intimidation against AAA, this court held that:
1) Contrary to Miranda’s averment that AAA failed to fight back or to cause any noise while
supposedly being sexually abused is contrary to human experience, AAA’s testimony actually
revealed her several attempts to fight back at him. AAA threatened that she would tell her mother
about what Miranda was doing to her, but it only deterred Miranda for awhile. AAA pushed Miranda
away, but he continued to kiss her breasts and undress her. AAA kicked the wall to create noise but,
unfortunately, it wasn’t loud enough to disturb her half-‐siblings’ sleep. AAA turned her body away
but Miranda grabbed and hugged her. AAA repeatedly begged Miranda to stop but her pleas fell on
deaf ears. Miranda overpowered all of AAA’s resistance. Without doubt, Miranda gained carnal
knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation.

Page 182 of 299


Notably, the prosecution need not even prove the elements of force and intimidation in this
case. Settled is the rule that in rape committed by a father or a person recognized by the victim as
her father, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitute for violence and
intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN PADILLA y UNTALAN

The spontaneity with which the victim has detailed the incidents of rape, the tears she has shed
at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency almost throughout her account
dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the
medical findings attesting to her non-‐virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her
charges

Facts:

Benjamin Padilla y Untalan of three (3) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA
which occurred in November 1999, on January 13, 2001 and on January 14, 2001.

AAA testified that the date of her birth was February 28, 1989. In September of the year
1999, her mother, BBB, went to work abroad. Since then, AAA had been living in their house in with
the accused-‐appellant, Benjamin Padilla; CCC, her older brother; DDD, her younger brother; and
EEE, her younger sister.

In November 1999, AAA recounted that at around seven o’clock in the morning, she was at
their house changing her clothes as she was about to go to school.. While AAA was changing clothes,
accused-‐appellant held her arm with his left hand and his right hand held a bolo. He pushed AAA
and the latter fell down on the floor in a lying position. He told her not to shout or he would kill her.
He proceeded to remove AAA’s short pants and panty. He was able to spread apart the legs of AAA
despite her efforts to prevent him. He then went on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her
vagina. He then did the push and pull movement. Afterwards, he removed his penis, put on his brief
and shorts and went to the market.

On January 13, 2001, AAA related that the same likewise occurred at the upper floor of their
house in the evening of the said date. The facts for this second count of rape are relatively similar
with the first count.

On January 14, 2001, at dawn as AAA slept at the ground floor of their house. CCC was
already in the market, while DDD and EEE were sleeping at a distance of around two meters from
AAA. The accused-‐appellant woke up AAA and whispered to her not to shout or he would kill her.
He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He went on top of her, inserted his
penis in her vagina and did the push and pull movement.

AAA said that at noontime on January 14, 2001, she and her younger siblings went to the
house of her aunt, FFF. There, she reported the incidents of rape to FFF. They then waited for AAA’s
grandmother, GGG, and the latter accompanied AAA to the police station.

Page 183 of 299


CCC testified for the defense in order to prove that he had no knowledge of the allegations of
rape of his younger sister, AAA. He stated that, in 2001, the accused-‐appellant worked as a kargador
(porter) in the market. This fact was corroborated by accused-‐appellant’s testimony.

The RTC found accused-‐appellant, Benjamin Padilla guilty of the 3 counts of rape. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. However, the CA modified the penalty imposed.

Issue:

Whether or not Benjamin Padilla, based on the evidence provided by the prosecution, is
guilty of 3 counts of statutory rape

Ruling:

Yes, accussed-‐appellant, Benjamin Padilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for 3 counts of
rape.

In the prosecution of statutory rape cases, force, intimidation and physical evidence of
injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a
will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.33

In the instant case, the element of carnal knowledge was primarily established by the
testimony of AAA, which the Court of Appeals and the RTC found to be unequivocal and deserving
credence.

The testimony of AAA that the accused-‐appellant had sexual intercourse with her was also
corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Taganas that AAA was no longer physically a virgin. In
People v. Oden, we held that "[t]he spontaneity with which the victim has detailed the incidents of
rape, the tears she has shed at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency
almost throughout her account dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The eloquent
testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-‐virgin state, should
be enough to confirm the truth of her charges.

Thus, the Court rules that the element of carnal knowledge of AAA by the accused-‐appellant
was sufficiently proven in each of the three (3) counts of rape in this case.

In the instant case, the accused-‐appellant merely denied that he raped AAA in November
1999. The testimony of CCC did not particularly provide any specific corroboration on this point, as
CCC merely testified that the accused-‐appellant usually goes to work at the Asingan market at 5:00
a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Furthermore, the accused-‐appellant failed to demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to be at their house at the time of the commission of the third incident of rape.
Thus, it would have been relatively easy for the accused-‐appellant to go back from the Asingan
market to their house to carry out the sexual abuse against AAA and then go to the market again.
Consequently, the accused-‐appellant’s defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive declaration of
AAA.

Page 184 of 299


As to the second element of statutory rape, the fact that AAA was under 12 years of age
when the incidents of rape occurred had likewise been clearly established in the instant case. Thus,
AAA was only 10 years old and 11 years old, respectively, when the incidents of rape charged
against the accused-‐appellant took place in November 1999 and January 2001. Moreover, the
parties previously stipulated during the pre-‐trial conference and, thereafter, the accused-‐appellant
admitted during trial that he is the biological father of AAA. The said fact is also evident in the
Certificate of Live Birth of AAA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL DION

We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of
the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when
time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is
important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and
that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on
her or deprived her of reason.
Facts:

Noel Dion was accused of two counts of rape against AAA, a 10 year old minor.

The first count of rape occurred at around three o’clock in the afternoon, after she had
finished throwing garbage at the "bakir" or garbage pit located some 300 meters from the back of
their house, Dion came out from behind some trees, beckoning her to approach him. Instead of
going to Dion, AAA started to run to their house, but she tripped and fell to the ground. This allowed
Dion to catch up to her. After threatening AAA that he will cut her tongue and neck if she shouted,
Dion forced her on her back and removed her undergarments. Dion then removed his own short
pants and briefs then climbed on top of her. AAA described how Dion made the "push and pull
movement" after he inserted his penis into her vagina.

The second count of rape occurred, AAA averred that at around ten o’clock in the evening of
June 16, 2001, while she was getting water from their kitchen, she heard knocking at the door. She
testified that all of a sudden, Dion was already inside their house. Once again, Dion gave the same
threats to AAA before raping her as he did previously, in April 2001. Dion had just finished his deed
and was about to go home when AAA’s uncle, CCC, arrived. Following the sound he had heard, CCC
found Dion hiding in a corner in the kitchen. CCC immediately collared Dion and woke up BBB,
AAA’s grandmother. BBB thereafter called Dion’s father and their Barangay Chairman.

After undergoing a physical examination, noticeable in the Medico-‐Legal Certificate were
the findings that the hymenal lacerations on AAA were not only healed but also only superficial.
Moreover, the cervicovaginal smear done on AAA to test for presence of spermatozoa yielded a
negative result.

Negating AAA’s accusations, Dion denied that he had raped AAA, whom he claimed he had
never talked to. He alleged that he could not have raped AAA in April 2001 because he was in
Barangay Dusoc, Bayambang, Pangasinan the entire month, working as a "bata-‐bataan"20 (boy) in
the carnival which was situated there at that time. Allan Ramirez, also a resident of Rosales,
Pangasinan, was presented to corroborate Dion’s alibi that he was at the carnival in another
Page 185 of 299


barangay in April of 2001. Ramirez disclosed that he had come to know Dion in the carnival where
they both worked. He claimed that in April 2001, both he and Dion were working in the carnival,
which at that time was located in Barangay Dusoc, Bayambang.

The RTC found Dion guilty of the 2 counts of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Dion is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of rape
2. Whether or not the inconsistencies in the medico-‐legal report has any bearing

Ruling:

Yes, Dion is guilty of 2 counts of rape.

Dion disputes the validity of the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 4355-‐R for allegedly having
grossly violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state the exact, or at least the
approximate, date the purported rape was committed, he was not able to intelligently prepare for
his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him.

It is clear from the foregoing that the requirement of indicating in the complaint or
information the date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a material
ingredient of the offense.

We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element
of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element.
What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of
age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or
intimidation on her or deprived her of reason.

It is clear that the prosecution’s evidence consisting of AAA’s credible and straightforward
testimony, and the certification from the Municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan Office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar as to AAA’s date of birth, are sufficient to sustain Dion’s conviction. The defense
raised by Dion, which consisted of an alibi with respect to the April 2001 incident and denial as
regards the June 16, 2001 allegation, were not strong enough to create a doubt on AAA’s credibility.

Dion has failed to show us that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime in April 2001. In fact, his alibi was discredited by the testimonies of his own witnesses. The
RTC cannot be faulted for not giving probative weight to Dion’s alibi. Besides being inherently weak
for not being airtight, Dion’s alibi cannot prevail against the positive identification and credible
testimony made by AAA. The documentary evidence submitted by Dion was a mere certification
that the carnival owned by Mr. Jose Miguel was in Bayambang for the entire month of April 2001.
The RTC was correct in not giving it due consideration as it was never authenticated by the one who
issued it. Moreover, it merely certified the whereabouts of the carnival, not Dion’s. The inconsistent
testimonies of Dion’s witnesses destroyed his defense from its very foundation.

Page 186 of 299


2. Inconsistencies in the medico-‐legal report is immaterial in the prosecution of the case

We accordingly reject accused-‐appellant’s arguments which hinge on alleged
inconsistencies between the statements made by the private complainant vis-‐a-‐vis the medical
examination and report. The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly
held that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and
no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical
examination of the victim or the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the
commission of rape as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the
accused of the crime. The medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is
merely corroborative in character.

Dion had failed to impeach the credible and straightforward testimony of AAA. Well-‐settled
is the doctrine that testimonies of child-‐victims are given full weight and credit. When a woman or a
girl-‐child says that she had been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape
was really committed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL MANJARES

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

Facts:

On September 23, 1998, private complainant AAA filed with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a sworn complaint accusing her father, Arnel Manjares, of having raped her on
164 occasions, from the period of April 1992 until September 1995, while she was then still a
minor.
The RTC convicted Manjares for the crime of twenty-‐seven (27) counts of rape.

On the other hand, Arnel Manjares argues that not only was the testimony of the alleged
victim inconsistent and uncorroborated but that it was also incredible since she claimed to have
been raped by him for several years without even telling her mother and grandmother.

Furthermore, Manjares claims that it is inexplicable that the victim did not shout while
being raped so that her siblings could have helped her, as she testified that most of the rapes were
committed inside their house while her other siblings were sleeping just beside her. In addition,
Manjeras argues that the elements of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
were not present in the facts of the instant case.

The CA upheld the conviction of Arnel Manjares for all twenty-‐seven (27) counts of rape.
Issue:

Are all the essential elements of rape present in the case at bar?

Ruling:

Page 187 of 299


Yes, all the essential elements of rape are present.

The incidents of rape occurred prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-‐Rape
Law of 1997), hence, the applicable law is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. The evidence on
record, particularly the victims detailed and damning testimony, clearly proves that Manjeras had
carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter on multiple occasions.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in this case. Furthermore, the SC has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount
of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to
jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent
testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.

The delay in reporting a rape could be attributed to the victims tender age and Manjares's
threats. A rape victims actions are oftentimes influenced by fear, rather than reason. In incestuous
rape, this fear is magnified because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the perpetrator
or is at any rate subject to his dominance because of their blood relationship.

It is settled jurisprudence that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
Manjares own categorical admission that he regularly went to the alleged boarding house of the
victim and his two other children to give them their provisions for food and other expenses cast
major doubt on his defense of alibi because, even if it were true, this only demonstrates that it was
not physically impossible for Manjares to be at the locus delicti when the victim was repeatedly
raped.
The proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA

The date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.

Facts:

On December 29, 1999, Henry Arpon y Juntilla was charged with eight (8) counts of rape in
separate informations. The accused-‐appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give
weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the
exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-‐
appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the other incidents of rape charged,
all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of
Page 188 of 299


Appeals, the accused-‐appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted
as insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority and her
relationship to the accused-‐appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-‐
appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals found Juntilla guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and
seven (7) counts of qualified rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the date of the commission of the rape is an essential element of the crime
of rape

Ruling:

No, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.

In particular, Article 266-‐A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the
elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a
woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. The provision came into existence by
virtue of Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-‐Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22,
1997.

Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of statutory rape in Article 266-‐A and Art. 335 are essentially the same.

Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before
the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-‐
Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the
age of AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.

Contrary to the posturing of the Juntilla, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime are not grounds for acquittal.

As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs
testimony. In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found
no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that Juntilla indeed committed the first incident
of rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-‐appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly
crimes. With tears in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape.

The testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-‐Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol
and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA.
When the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis
to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.

Page 189 of 299


Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court
disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The
testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:

It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law
requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting
test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's
presumption of innocence. Thus, including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only
able to establish three instances when Juntilla had carnal knowledge of her.

The allegation of Juntilla that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a
uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs narration of the sexual abuses
committed by Juntilla contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime
of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her private part. Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine
that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate
account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience a verity borne out of human nature and
experience.

We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-‐appellants defense of alibi deserves scant
consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he
was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Since
alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face
of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.

In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:

The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger
bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at
any time of the day after working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day
off every Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.

The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually molested her
beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August
1999. She can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation
happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her
mother.

As to Juntilla’s objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial
courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of
rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987, the voluntary
stipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during
pre-‐trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of the age of the victim, his own niece, all
militate against accused-‐appellants theory.

In People v. Pruna, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:

Page 190 of 299



2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand
(when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.

That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation
need no longer be belabored upon. In rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-‐
father, uncle, or the common-‐law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL ORTEGA
G.R. No. 186235 January 25, 2012, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro
It has long been established that the testimony of a rape victim, especially a child of tender
years, is given full weight and credit. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. Furthermore, this Court
has repeatedly ruled that matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment
on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate courts which usually rely only on the
cold pages of the mute records of the case. In incestuous rape of a minor, it is not necessary that actual
force and intimidation be employed. The moral ascendancy of appellant over the victim, his daughter,
renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation.
Page 191 of 299


Facts:

Respondent Daniel Ortega has been charged and convicted of two counts of rape of his 16
year old daughter. This decision of the RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
current petition.

Daniel Ortega contends that the lower courts erred in convicting the defendant because of
lack of sufficiency of evidence and failure on the part of the prosecution to prove his guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Furthermore he contends that there were discrepancies in the testimony of the
complainant raising doubt as to her credibility and he, in addition, alleges that his daughter merely
accused him of raping her because she was jealous of the attention he gives to her step-‐brothers
and sisters. Moreover, he also asserts that the lower courts erred in giving credence to the sole
testimony of the complainant despite the fact that the testimony is tainted by discrepancies.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused Daniel Ortega should be convicted of the crime of rape as
punished by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code on the sole basis of the testimony of the
complainant and despite the fact that such testimony is tainted with discrepancies.

Ruling:

lower courts correctly convicted the accused of the crime charged. The Court held that an accused
may be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant upon a finding that
such testimony is neither rehearsed and in the absence of any ill-‐motive on the part of the
complainant.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court had always been guided by three well-‐entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Yet, we have also held that an accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s
testimony, provided that such testimony is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing.

It has long been established that the testimony of a rape victim, especially a child of tender
years, is given full weight and credit. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. Furthermore, this
Court has repeatedly ruled that matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness'
deportment on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate courts which usually
rely only on the cold pages of the mute records of the case.

Ortega’s insistence on the lack of evidence proving that he used force and intimidation
during both incidents of rape does little to change our mind. In incestuous rape of a minor, it is not
necessary that actual force and intimidation be employed. The moral ascendancy of appellant over
the victim, his daughter, renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation.
Page 192 of 299


The purported inconsistencies or contradictions in AAA's testimony vis-‐a-‐vis her sworn
statement do not adversely affect her credibility. AAA was a minor at the time she was first raped
by her father, Ortega. Her painful experience, followed by the police investigation, medical
examination, and court trial in full view of the public, surely placed her under a lot of pressure and
caused her confusion, given her tender age. We have repeatedly held that "the precise time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape and it has no bearing on its
commission.” Despite her failure to give the exact time and date of the two rape incidents, AAA was
able to recall in detail how the sexual assault was committed against her by Ortega.

[I]t [is] most unnatural for a fourteen (14) year old to concoct a tale of defloration against
her very own father just to get back at him for having physically manhandled her. Certainly, an
unmarried teenage lass would not ordinarily file a complaint for rape against anyone, much less,
her own father, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, submit herself to public trial
and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek
justice for the wrong committed against her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PATERNO SARMIENTO SAMANDRE

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-‐serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible
witness. Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant],
the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.

Facts:

The respondent Samandre was charged with four counts of rape for committing rape
against his daughter. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime charged. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the current petition.

In his lone assignment of error, accused-‐appellant professes his innocence of the crimes
charged. Accused-‐appellant highlights the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, particularly, on
whether or not she has a suitor/boyfriend. Accused-‐appellant asserts that AAA’s initial concealment
of the fact that she already has a boyfriend supports accused-‐appellant’s contention that AAA
accused him of rape so he could go to jail and no longer prevent AAA from marrying her boyfriend.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of committing four counts of rape against his daughter.

Ruling:

accused is guilty of the crime charged against him.

Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a
man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through
force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
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unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Orillosa, the Court held that "in incestuous
rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering
moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant’s father, would suffice."

The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-‐appellant, taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy as a father, had carnal knowledge of his 16-‐year-‐old daughter,
AAA. The Court cannot give much weight to accused-‐appellant’s defenses, constituting of denial,
alibi, and the imputation of ill motive on AAA’s part in the filing of the instant rape charges.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-‐serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible
witness. Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the
[appellant], the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary
weight.

The inconsistencies in AAA’s statements do not destroy her credibility. Whether or not AAA
has a boyfriend does not have any relevance to any of the essential elements of the crime of rape.
The Court adopts the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this matter:

As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in the appellee’s brief, the initial
denial by AAA that she has a boyfriend is immaterial as it has no bearing whatsoever on the
essential elements of rape or the identity of the perpetrator.1âwphi1 Settled is the rule that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor or insignificant details do not
destroy the witnesses’ credibility. Moreover, no evidence was presented by accused-‐appellant to
support his claim that AAA wanted to marry her boyfriend, Freddie Fragata, and that the latter is
married.

"What does it take for a young daughter to wish her father to stay in jail possibly for the rest
of his life or even executed to death? Certainly not for the reason that her father refused to let her
marry someone. According to the accused in this case his daughter charged him of raping her
because he scolded her and prohibited her to marry her boyfriend who is a married man. This is
absurd especially as he did not try to show that his daughter has evil ways.

It bears stressing once again that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth,
been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is settled
jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. A woman would think twice before she
concocts a story of rape, especially against her own father, unless she is motivated by a patent
desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.

The issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial
court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts" and "[a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial
court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been
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overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case."
The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that when
the findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court. The Court finds no compelling reason herein to deviate
from said findings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELECIO DE LOS SANTOS, JR.

Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.

Facts:

Melecio De Los Santos, Jr. was charged with statutory rape against AAA.

Based on the testimony of AAA, who was then eleven years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, stated that Melecio De Los Santos was the younger brother of her mother.
She narrated that De Los Santos arrived from Negros to stay in their house. On February 14, 1995,
AAA and her younger sister BBB, were sitting on the stairs of their house while De Los Santos was
at the window. Their mother soon arrived and called BBB for help. Thereafter, she went to their
room to lie down. Then De Los Santos closed the windows and the door. He git a knife from the
kitchen and pointed the same to her, He told her to undress. He went on top of her and he was
naked. She said that his penis penetrated her organ. He told her if she will reveal the incident to her
family to anyone, he will kill her family.

On the other hand, De Los Santos in his defense, testified that on that certain afternoon he
claimed that he was at their house in Negros attending to his sick adoptive father. He presented a
death certificate to prove that his father died on February 20, 1995.

The RTC rendered judgment pronouncing the guilt of De Los Santos.

Issue:

Whether De Los Santos is guilty for the crime of statutory rape

Ruling:

Yes.

The death certificate of Melecio de los Santos, Sr. which was offered in evidence to support
the accused-‐appellants claims, were not squarely in point. The said certificates evidenced only the
fact of death of Melecio de los Santos, Sr. and in no way proved with certainty the whereabouts of
the accused-‐appellant on the date the incident of rape was committed.

In People v. Nieto, we stressed that it is an established jurisprudential rule that a
mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to
him.The accused-‐appellant likewise failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the prosecution
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witnesses that would have impelled them to prevaricate and charge him falsely.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER TEJERO
G.R. No. 187744, June 20, 2012, J. De Castro
Although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-‐law spouse of the victim's
mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on the offender because his relationship
was not what was alleged in the Informations. Thus, the offender is guilty only of three counts of
simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua for each count.

Facts:

Private complainant herself, [AAA] was only fourteen years old when the accused raped her
on three different occasions in the year 2004. She directly identified accused Roger Tejero as the
man who raped her repeatedly. She regarded him as her stepfather since he has been cohabiting
with her mother in their home when the criminal acts were committed by him. She claimed that she
was first raped by the accused on a Sunday February 1, 2004 at their living room. She stated that
this happened at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon when her mother was out selling vegetables and
while her two siblings went to the family house of their maternal grandparents. She narrated that
she was suddenly pulled by her stepfather, removed her clothes and then raped her. He then
warned her not to tell anybody or else he would kill all of them. On February 8, 2004, the next
Sunday, the accused again raped her at their living room in the same house. At that time, her
mother was selling vegetables again in another barangay while the accused fended off her sisters to
the family house of their maternal grandparents again. For the third time, the accused again raped
her on April 4, 2004 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon now inside a room at their house while
her mother was out selling vegetables again. In her sworn statement, she also revealed that she did
not report all the incidents to anyone because of her fear of her stepfathers repeated threats that he
would kill all of them if she did. Her mother [BBB] only came to know that she has been repeatedly
ravaged by him when she was hospitalized for three weeks due to her appendicitis. During her
check-‐up, her attending doctor discovered that she was already about five months pregnant. She
said that her pregnancy was a result of the rape. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy.

Issue:

Whether or not Tejero is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape.

Ruling:
Yes.

When AAA was raped, Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-‐Rape Law of 1997 (which repealed
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and classified rape as a crime against persons) was already
effective. The new provisions on rape, particularly, Articles 266-‐A and 266-‐B of the Revised Penal
Code, read:

Art. 266-‐A. Rape; When and how committed. -‐ Rape is committed

1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
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Art. 266-‐B. Penalties.-‐ Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-‐parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

Under the above provision, one way to commit rape is having carnal knowledge of a woman
using force or intimidation. Tejero herein was able to have carnal knowledge of AAA thrice by
threatening to kill AAA and her family. Furthermore, Tejero also exercised moral ascendancy over
AAA since Tejero was then cohabiting with BBB, AAAs mother, and AAA considered Tejero as her
stepfather. Such moral ascendancy sufficiently qualifies as intimidation.

Although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-‐law spouse of the
victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on Tejero because his
relationship was not what was alleged in the Informations. Thus, Tejero is guilty only of three
counts of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua for each count.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINA

Even if the alleged romantic relationship were true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape
for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on
the pretext of love because love is not a license for lust.

Facts:

Marcial Bayrante was charged for the crime of rape. The victim, AAA, is the niece of Marcial
and she is a 20 year old mental retardate whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age .

AAA testified that Marcial brought her to Poblacion, Pili, Caramines Sur, particulary to a
house, which she described to have many rooms. Thereat, Marcial undress her and himself, laid on
top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her organ. After an
hour or so, Marcial again raped her.

In his defense, Marcial narrated that he stayed with the family of AAA because he and the
AAA’s father were first cousins. AAA confessed that she had feelings for him. He dissuaded her at
first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they do not become sweethearts. Further, he and AAA
left the house and went to Manapao. While in Manapao, AAA suggested that they go to the office of
the Barangay Captain to execute an affidavit to the effect that AAA’s act of going with him was
voluntary. Subsequently, they checked in at a hotel in Pili, Caramines Sur, where they spent the
night. The next morning, they went to the house of his cousin to pick up their personal belongings,
AAA’s parents were there.

The RTC rendered a decision convicting Marcial for the crime of rape which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

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In his appeal, Marcial maintains that AAA was his lover and she voluntarily eloped with him
as evidenced by the affidavit she signed before the barangay captain. Furthermore, he argues that
the prosecution failed to establish the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he
raped a woman who is of legal age but otherwise deprived of reason.

Issue:

Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting Marcial Bayrante for the crime of rape

Ruling:

No.

It is settled in jurisprudence that carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is
considered rape because such a person is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. In a recent
case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a victim suffering from mental retardation,
proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.

In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a Medical
Specialist II and officer-‐in-‐charge of the Women and Children Protection Unit at
theBicol Medical Center who personally conducted the psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established
that the victim is afflicted with mild mental retardation. She further testified that AAA was also
suffering from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA possesses an IQ of 55 with a
mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-‐year-‐old person.

Furthermore, AAA testified that she initially resisted Marcial carnal desire but was
eventually overcome by the latter because he used a knife to threaten her. At one point in her
testimony, AAA could not continue with her narration of the events that transpired during the
alleged rape incidents as she was overwhelmed by emotion, even weeping on the witness stand.
Consequently, it was necessary for the trial court to call a recess in order to give AAA the chance to
collect herself.

In addition, for the sweetheart theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship
must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his
claim to be self-‐serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be
a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a
relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.

Significantly, this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic relationship were true,
this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a
fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license for
lust.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO OSMA, JR. y AGATON

We held that actual force or intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor
because the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to
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his beastly desires. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome of the
case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter takes
the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused who did
not have blood relationship with the victim.

Facts:
Two separate informations were filed charging accused-‐appellant Agaton of two counts of
rape namely Criminal Case No. 4467 and No. 4468.
One night in the month of December 2000, while AAA was in the residence of her parents,
she slept in the sala with her father, her six-‐year-‐old brother, and younger sisters. Her mother slept
in an adjoining room. When AAA was awakened, her shorts were already pulled down. She saw
Agaton’s face as he was already on top of her. Agaton, his father, inserted his penis into her vagina,
causing pain. When Agaton was through, he placed her shorts back on and they went to sleep.
On March 14, 2002, AAA was in the residence of her parents. While she was gathering
pilinuts with her uncle, the latter asked her to get the scythe. She went into the house to get it.
Agaton, who was waiting for her, pulled her into a corner. He removed her shorts and inserted his
penis into her vagina. During this time, Agaton and AAA were the only people in the house as her
mother, BBB, was washing clothes and her siblings were with her mother. Accused-‐appellant
thereafter placed back her shorts. AAA proceeded to get the scythe. AAA testified that she did not
immediately tell her mother, BBB, about the incidents because she was afraid of her father, who she
claimed was very cruel and was fond of beating them.
Issue:

Whether or not Agaton is liable for rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

Criminal Case No. 4467

Agaton assails the Decisions of the courts a quo primarily on the basis of the alleged lack of
credibility on the part of the private complainant, AAA. Accused-‐appellant cites an instance in AAA’s
testimony when she was smiling. According to accused-‐appellant, it is surprising that a daughter
who was sexually abused by his father would take such matter lightly, considering the gravity of the
accusation. Agaton further argues that AAA’s testimony that she was raped sometime in December
2000 is incredible, considering the size of the sleeping area where the act supposedly occurred. The
defense points out AAA’s statement that a mere stretching of an arm during the time the supposed
rape happened would disturb the person sleeping beside her.

This Court is unswayed by the foregoing arguments. In the determination of credibility of
witnesses, this Court, as a general rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless it
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the outcome
of the case. This is mainly due to the fact that it was the trial court that heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. In the case at bar specifically,
Page 199 of 299


the trial court was in the best position to determine whether AAA’s facial expressions and
demeanor manifested a blithe unconcern about the alleged injustice done to her, or merely an effort
to appear courteous to the judge and lawyers. AAA’s smiling can hardly be considered a fact of
substance and value that should affect the outcome of the case, especially since she is a very young
witness with little or no experience in court proceedings.

Since AAA was born on March 9, 1990, as evidenced by the Certification from the Civil
Registrar’s Office, she was 10 years and 9 months old when the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
4467 was committed. As such, the crime charged and proven is one of statutory rape. The two
elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
the woman is below 12 years of age. Proof of force and consent is immaterial if the woman is under
12 years of age, not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but also because the
absence of free consent is presumed. Conviction will lie provided sexual intercourse is proven.

Criminal Case No. 4468

Accused-‐appellant argued that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA when the
latter’s uncle, mother and siblings were within 50 meters from them. We disagree. We have held
time and again that: Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along
the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in
the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or
incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened
while a sexual assault is being committed. Lust is no respecter of time and place; neither is it
deterred by age nor relationship.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, however, the trial court erred in convicting accused-‐
appellant in Criminal Case No. 4468 for statutory rape. As clearly stated in the Certification by the
Civil Registrar’s Office of the Municipality where AAA was born, AAA was born on March 9, 1990.
AAA was thus 12 years and five days old when the second incident of rape occurred. Consequently,
accused-‐appellant cannot be convicted in Criminal Case No. 4468 for statutory rape, which requires
that the victim be below 12 years of age.

However, even though accused-‐appellant cannot be convicted of statutory rape in Criminal
Case No. 4468, and despite the absence of evidence of resistance on the part of AAA on said count,
his criminal liability for rape nevertheless remains. In People v. Fragante, we held:

It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need not be
employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is
sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father commits the
odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter
substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not
affect the outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the
father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases
committed by an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO VIOJELA y ASARTIN

Page 200 of 299


Following a long line of jurisprudence, full penetration of the female genital organ is not
indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however
slight, is sufficient. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape.

Furthermore, in establishing the age of the victim, bare testimony of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family would suffice only if the victim is alleged to be below seven years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old.

Finally, the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to
the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime
was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the
two places.

Facts:

Private complainant VEA was only 10 years old when the incident complained of took place,
she having been born on September 13, 1986. Respondent Alejandro Violeja y Asarin is the
common-‐law husband of VEL, VEA’s mother, with whom respondent has three children. VEA
started living with them when she was four years old, after her mother VEL took her from Cagayan
Valley to live with her. VEA is VEL’s daughter from her deceased husband.

Sometime in June 1997, when VEL was not at home and VEA was left alone with
respondent. The latter instructed her not to make any noise, and then forced his penis into her
vagina. According to VEA, respondent was not able to insert his organ into her genitalia, but
respondent’s act of forcing his penis into her vagina was painful. VEA recounted another incident
prior to the one described above when they were still residing in a room situated inside a bakery
where respondent worked. It is during this time when respondent finally admitted that he did
something to VEA. He told VEL that he molested VEA.

After VEL and VEA lodged a complaint with the barangay and police authorities, VEA was
brought to the Silang Municipal Health Center in Silang, Cavite, where she was examined. Based on
the medical certificate issued, the victim’s vagina does not admit her smallest finger. The
examination, however, revealed the presence of fresh lacerations at the 3:00 and 9:00 o’clock
positions at the labia minora of the victim’s vagina. Dr. further testified that the lacerations could
have been caused by any forcible entry upon the victim’s vagina, and could have been inflicted
within more or less a week from the time of the victim’s medical examination.

Accused-‐appellant invoked alibi in his defense. In his appeal, appellant maintains that his
alibi should be given more weight and credence over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
which he claims to contain certain irreconcilable inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities.
Furthermore, appellant argues that the testimony of the prosecution’s own witness, Dr. Luz
Jaurigue-‐Pang (Dr. Pang), belies the charge of rape because said witness testified that, during her
medical examination of VEA,10 VEA’s vagina could not accommodate entry of even her smallest
finger. On the basis of this fact, appellant asserts that no consummated rape could have occurred
because if VEA’s vagina could not admit Dr. Pang’s smallest finger then it would be improbable for
Page 201 of 299


said sexual organ to have had admitted the appellant’s penis or be lacerated by it. Moreover,
appellant insists that the lacerations on VEA’s vagina could have been caused by an object other
than appellant’s penis.

After a full-‐blown trial, the trial court did not give credit to appellant’s professed innocence
and convicted him. However, he was not convicted of the crime that he was originally charged in
the Information, which was rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, but with the offense of
statutory rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications as to the award of actual damages
the decision of the RTC.

Issues:

1) Whether or not responded should be acquitted of the crime charged due to failure of the
prosecution to prove that his penis penetrated the vagina of the victim.

2) Whether or not respondent should be convicted of statutory rape as ruled by the lower
court.

3) Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in disregarding respondent’s defenses of denial
and alibi.

Ruling:

1. No, respondent should not be acquitted.

It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.

We affirm the lower courts in ruling that all the elements of rape are present in the case at
bar. The victim’s clear and credible testimony coupled with the corroboration made by the medical
findings of Dr. Pang points positively to the conclusion that appellant indeed committed the crime
of rape attributed to him. In her testimony, VEA was clear and straightforward, not to mention
consistent, in her recollection of the details of her sexual abuse in the hands of respondent.
Contrary to respondent’s assertions, Dr. Pang’s medical findings support, rather than negate, VEA’s
accusation of rape.

Appellant is grossly mistaken in his contention that no rape occurred because the
prosecution did not prove that his penis penetrated the vagina of the victim. Such an argument is of
little consequence in light of jurisprudence declaring that penetration of the penis, however slight,
of the labia minora constitutes consummated rape.

Following a long line of jurisprudence, full penetration of the female genital organ is not
indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however
slight, is sufficient. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape.

2. No, respondent is guilty of simple rape, not statutory rape.
Page 202 of 299


Although the Court is convinced that indeed rape had been committed by appellant, we find
that the prosecution failed to present VEA’s birth certificate or to otherwise unequivocally prove
that VEA was indeed below 12 years of age at the time of the incident in question. In view of this
paucity in the prosecution’s evidence on the matter of the victim’s age, jurisprudence compels us to
reclassify appellant’s offense as simple rape.

In appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, the following
guidelines were formulated in response to the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the
sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases:

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Measured against the jurisprudential guidelines that this Court has set forth, VEA and her
mother’s testimonies cannot be given sufficient weight to establish her age with moral certainty, for
in the absence of relevant documentary evidence or an express admission from the accused, the
bare testimony of the victim’s mother or a member of the family would suffice only if the victim is
alleged to be below seven years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old. In the present case, VEA was supposedly 10 years of age on the material date stated in the
Information.

Nevertheless, simple rape was proven to have been committed by appellant since he is the
common-‐law spouse of VEA’s mother and, thus, exercises moral ascendancy over VEA. In a recent
case, we reiterated that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary
to show physical force and intimidation. Indeed, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the
victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-‐law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
or intimidation.

Page 203 of 299


It is apropos to mention here that appellant’s offense could not be deemed qualified rape,
despite the proviso in Article 335 (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), imposing the death
penalty on rape committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-‐law spouse of the parent of the victim. This is due to the fact that the "live-‐
in" or common-‐law relationship between appellant and VEA’s mother was not alleged in the
Information despite being proven in the trial court. What was alleged in the Information is that VEA
was the stepdaughter of the appellant but we have held that a stepfather-‐stepdaughter relationship
as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victim’s mother and the accused contracted
marriage. However, it was shown during trial that no marriage was ever contracted between
appellant and the victim’s mother.

3. No, respondent’s defenses of denial and alibi cannot be sustained.

We have consistently regarded the defenses of denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses
and must be rejected when the identity of the accused is satisfactorily and categorically established
by the eyewitnesses to the offense, especially when such eyewitnesses have no ill motive to testify
falsely. In the instant case, appellant failed to show that VEA, the victim and sole eyewitness to the
crime of rape, was motivated by ill will in accusing him of such a grave offense.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the assailed November 29, 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals, appellant’s alibi cannot be counted in his favor. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the
place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime
transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.

In the present case, appellant failed to establish the distance between the corn plantation
where he claimed to have been working and the house where the rape occurred. Failing in this
regard, doubt is cast on appellant’s defense of alibi because this leads to the conclusion that it was
not physically impossible for appellant to be at the place of the crime at the time when the victim
was raped.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDGAR PADIGOS

After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is indeed
guilty of qualified rape. In People v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (2002), we formulated a set of guidelines
that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding
the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows: 1. The
best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Page 204 of 299


Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a.
If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age,
the complainant’s testimony suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5.
It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial
court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim

Facts:
AAA who was then only six years old was sleeping inside their house on August 26, 2002
when her father, herein accused-‐ appellant Edgar Padigos raped her. He undressed her and
removed her panty. He also took off his pants. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made push
and pull movements. She felt pain in her private organ. Her mother was not around as it was only
her and her father who were home.

The next day or on August 27, 2002, Padigos made her hold his penis. He, on the other hand,
touched her genitals and inserted his fingers into her vagina causing her to feel pain.

She related the incidents to her mother who simply gave her father a fierce piercing stare
but did nothing. She also confided to her aunt, sister of her mother, who brought her to a doctor for
medical examination and to the police station to report the matter.

Subsequently, two criminal informations were filed against Padigos. The first information
charged appellant with the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, while the other
information charged him with the crime of acts of lasciviousness also in relation to Republic Act No.
7610.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. RTC convicted of the
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness both in relation to Republic Act No. 7160 and considering
the aggravating qualifying circumstance of relationship to and minority of the victim, imposes upon
him the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection. The Court of Appeals denied Padigos’ appeal
and affirmed with modification the trial court judgment and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua
for the first crime and to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (2[0]) days as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum of
reclusion temporal.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was correctly charged and convicted.

Ruling:

Yes. After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is
indeed guilty of qualified rape.

Page 205 of 299


As cemented in jurisprudence, the elements of rape under the said provision of law are: (1)
the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and, (2) such act was accomplished through force
or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim is under 12 years of age. Thus, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old, which is the
subject of this case, is considered as statutory rape in this jurisdiction. According to the sixth
paragraph of Article 266B, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

It would appear from the death penalty imposed by the trial court that it found appellant
guilty of qualified rape. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, albeit reduced to reclusion
perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346.

In People v. Pruna, we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential
benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in
order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of
the victim’s age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party;

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age;

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.

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6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim

In the case at bar, the prosecution may have been unable to present AAA’s birth certificate
or other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial, however, that failure to
present relevant evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed
committed by appellant because he himself admitted, in his counter-‐affidavit which formed part of
the evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open
court, that AAA was below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In the Court’s view, this
admission from appellant, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently proved the victim’s
minority.

Utilizing the foregoing definition as a guide, it is beyond cavil that appellant’s act of making
AAA hold his penis and, subsequently, of touching her vagina with his fingers can be both
characterized as constituting acts of lasciviousness. As previously discussed, the moral influence or
ascendancy exercised by appellant over AAA takes the place of the element of force and
intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA

To raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape, the twin circumstances of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. When a father commits the odious crime of
rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for
violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome
of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter
takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused who
did not have blood relationship with the victim.

Facts:

AAA was the second of five children of Amistoso and BBB. On July 10, 2000, AAA was
exactly 12 years, one month, and eight days old. Prior to that date, Amistoso had often scolded AAA,
maliciously pinched AAA’s thighs, and even whipped AAA. On the night of July 10, 2000, AAA had
fallen asleep while Amistoso was eating. AAA was awakened, when Amistoso, already naked,
mounted her. Amistoso reached under AAA’s skirt and removed her panties. After he had
ejaculated, Amistoso stood up. AAA noticed white substance and blood coming from her vagina.
Amistoso told AAA not to tell anyone what happened between them, otherwise, he would kill her.

AAA told BBB what Amistoso did to her. BBB brought AAA to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), which in turn, brought AAA to Doctor for physical examination.
Thereafter, BBB and AAA went to the police and filed a Complaint against Amistoso. McTC issued an
Order of Arrest against Amistoso.

Amistoso recounted that on July 10, 2000, he was working, unloading diesel and kerosene,
at his employer’s warehouse. After finishing his work, he had dinner at his employer’s place before
going home. When Amistoso arrived home, he found the door and the windows to the house tied
shut. Amistoso’s children were inside the house with BBB and an unknown man whereby he
suspected that they were having sexual intercourse because they did not open the door when
Amistoso called out. Amistoso was told to wait so he did wait outside the house for 15 minutes.
Page 207 of 299


Meanwhile, BBB and the man made a hole in the floor of the house from where they slipped out,
crawled under the house, and fled. Amistoso said the children had been sleeping inside the house,
but BBB woke the children up. When BBB and her lover fled, the children were left together.
Amistoso believed that BBB, afraid she got caught with another man, manipulated AAA to falsely
charge Amistoso with rape.

RTC rendered its Decision finding Amistoso guilty of qualified rape. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed Amistoso’s conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed.

Amistoso argues that the defense of denial and alibi should not be viewed with outright
disfavor. The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of Amistoso’s defense; it must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and establish Amistoso’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Amistoso
asserts that the prosecution failed even in this regard. Further, Amistoso was charged in the
Information with statutory rape and not qualified rape. He also asserts that AAA had ulterior
motive to falsely accuse him of rape due to his maltreating against her and that she had already
developed hatred or ill feeling against Amistoso. Such admission casts doubts on the veracity and
credibility of AAA’s rape charge and raises the question of whether the act complained of actually
occurred. Lastly, he claims lack of showing that AAA was below 12 years old or demented when she
was supposedly raped on July 10, 2000.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Amistoso is guilty of qualified rape?
2. Whether or not Amistoso’s defense of denial should be favored?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Amistoso is guilty of qualified rape.

As provided in the Revised Penal Code, as amended: ART. 266-‐A. Rape; when and how
committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-‐
A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12
years old on July 10, 2000, thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it
does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other
circumstances described by Article 266-‐A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as
long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. What
is controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large,
Page 208 of 299


mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.

In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged.

In this case, a perusal of the Information against Amistoso reveals that the allegations
therein actually constitute a criminal charge for qualified rape under Article 266-‐A, paragraph
(1)(a), in relation to Section 266-‐B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The elements of rape under Article 266-‐A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. But when the offender is the victim’s father,
there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation, as the Court expounded in People v.
Fragante: It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force
and without consent.

In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need not be employed in
incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to
cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father commits the odious crime of
rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for
violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the
outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over
his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by
an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.

Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-‐B, paragraph (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must concur. The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article
266-‐A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-‐B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are sufficiently alleged in the Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years
old on the day of the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAA’s father.

AAA’s aforequoted testimony already established the elements of rape under Article 266-‐A,
paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AAA had positively and categorically
testified that Amistoso’s penis had entered her vagina, so Amistoso succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA. The Court reiterates that in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or
intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would
suffice. Even the twin circumstances for qualified rape, namely, minority and relationship, were
satisfactorily proved by the prosecution. That AAA was 12 years old on July 10, 2000 and that she is
Amistoso’s daughter were established by AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth and Amistoso’s
admission before the RTC.

2. No, Amistoso’s defense of denial and alibi must not be favored.

Page 209 of 299


Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant. Alibi is an
inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be fabricated. Denial
is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-‐ culpability
to merit credibility. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically
impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission. By his own testimony, appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime when the rapes were alleged to
have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of his home and in fact
alleged that he was supposedly even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third
incidents.

Except for his own testimony, Amistoso presented no other evidence to corroborate his alibi
that he was working at his employer’s warehouse when AAA was raped. Amistoso even admitted
that his employer’s warehouse was only a kilometer or a 10-‐minute hike away from the house
where AAA was raped, so it was not physically impossible for Amistoso to be present at the scene of
the crime at the time it occurred. Amistoso’s version of events is also implausible and irrational.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO BASALLO y ASPREC

Gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent. We also previously declared that when a victim is threatened with bodily injury
as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such constitutes
intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist. Thus,
appellant’s succeeding in having non-‐consensual sexual intercourse with ABC through intimidation
using a knife plainly constitutes the crime of rape. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an
indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the
complainant Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone.

Facts:

The victim ABC testified that she is a helper of the accused Antonio Basallo. Accused took
her as his helper for the past three (3) years. They are neighbors and she calls the accused "uncle."
While the children were sleeping at the first floor of the house, Basallo told her to take his shirt at
the second floor of the house. She went inside the first room and took the shirt at the back of the
door panel. After she entered the room, Basallo also followed her. He inserted his penis to her
vagina for thirty minutes while he was holding a knife, which prevented ABC to shout for help. She
was told by accused not to report the incident to her mother because the former would kill her.
After the incident, accused left and told her to take care of the children. She stayed at the house of
the accused for one more week. Thereafter, she told her mother that she was sexually abused by
Basallo, when her mother discovered her pregnancy.

Subsequently, her mother brought her to the hospital where she was told that she was four
(4) months pregnant. She was issued a medical certificate when she consulted a doctor. Then they
filed a case against the Basallo. She did not talk to accused or the latter’s wife after she stopped
working at their residence. Basallo went into hiding. The child is now six (6) years old.

Page 210 of 299


After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape which was
affirmed by CA. However, Basallo contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He hinges this assertion on the belief that carnal knowledge and force or
intimidation, which are the two indispensable elements of the crime of rape under Article 335(1) of
the Revised Penal Code that the prosecution alleges to be present in this case, were not established
with moral certainty.

Issue:

Whether or not Basallo is liable for the crime of rape.

Ruling:

Yes. Basallo is liable for the crime of rape.

Since the incident of rape at issue happened prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
8353, the applicable law is the previous definition of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

According to the foregoing provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when
the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of
age.

In the case at bar, the prosecution insists that the elements of carnal knowledge and force
or intimidation are present. Time and again, the Court has held that, in rape cases, the accused may
be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

On the basis of the foregoing consistent narratives from the victim, it is evident that carnal
knowledge and force or intimidation as elements of the crime of rape were unmistakably present in
this instance. This Court has held that the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with
a woman against her will or without her consent. We also previously declared that when a victim is
threatened with bodily injury as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or
bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires
of the rapist. Thus, Basallo’s succeeding in having non-‐consensual sexual intercourse with ABC
through intimidation using a knife plainly constitutes the crime of rape.

Basallo points out that, if the incident at issue did occur as alleged by ABC, the said sexual
encounter should be characterized as consensual because, as evidenced by her own testimony, she
did not perform any overt and determined resistance to her rapist nor did she take advantage of
purported opportunities to escape.

Page 211 of 299


This Court cannot subscribe to such theory. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure of
the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and even the victim’s lack of resistance especially
when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent.
Furthermore, we have emphatically ruled that the failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or
escape from the scoundrel is not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no
obligation to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle.

Further, Jurisprudence tell us that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication
of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. We
also stated in another case that delay and vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not
necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In the instant
case, appellant instilled the fear of bodily harm in ABC’s mind during the rape incident at issue and
this fear continued to firmly grip ABC even after the incident especially since ABC believed, rightly
or wrongly, that appellant held a reputation in their community as a "killer." This fear, coupled in all
likelihood with shame, reasonably explained ABC’s silence regarding her sordid ordeal at the hands
of appellant until she had no more choice but to admit the truth to her mother when ABC’s
pregnancy due to the rape could no longer be concealed. On this note we reiterate what we
declared in a previous ruling which states that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when
facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. Not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONATHAN "UTO" VELOSO y RAMA

In dealing with cases for rape, this Court has often acknowledged that there is often a want of
witnesses. Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than
not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility
becomes the primordial consideration. . Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her
credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape. The testimonies of child-‐victims of rape are to be given full weight and
credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and
sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true.

Facts:

At around 12:00 noon, Rama went looking for BBB’s brother. He went to BBB’s house asking
her to accompany him to her brother’s house. Since BBB was indisposed, she declined. Rama then
insisted that AAA, BBB’s daughter, accompany him instead. BBB consented. Thus, AAA with CCC,
BBB’s nephew, left the house with Rama. Instead of taking a padyak or tricycle, Rama opted to take
a boat. It was while they were in the middle of the river that Rama threatened to hit CCC with a
paddle if he would not jump off the boat. Immediately after CCC jumped off the boat, appellant
steered the boat towards the riverbank and pulled AAA out of the boat.

Thereafter, Rama made AAA lie in the water lily-‐ and grass-‐covered banks and proceeded
to violate her, all the while threatening to drown her. AAA tried to fight Rama but was unsuccessful.
After satisfying his lust twice, appellant boxed AAA on her face, lips, stomach and thighs. Appellant
kicked AAA on the stomach, slapped and smashed her face to the ground, and choked her until she
became unconscious.

Page 212 of 299


Boral found a conscious but dazed, naked, and bloodied AAA along the grassy portion of the
riverbank. He shouted and called for BBB. Upon BBB’s arrival, she saw her daughter’s state. She
asked AAA what happened. AAA, however, could only say "Uto." BBB then covered AAA’s body with
a shirt and brought her to a nearby hospital.

RTC rendered a decision finding Rama guilty of the crime of rape which was affirmed by CA.
However, Appellant argues that AAA’s testimony that she was made to lie down on a water lily and
thereafter raped her was improbable since it was impossible for the water lily to have supported
their combined weights. Moreover, appellant questions AAA’s non-‐resistance to the rape except by
kicking. Lastly, appellant claims that the time of the physical examination preceded that of the rape
incident. Thus, appellant claims that due to the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimonies, his guilt for the
crimes charged was not proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

Issue:

Whether or not Rama is guilty for crime of rape.

Ruling:

Yes. Rama is guilty for crime of rape.

The applicable law in this case is Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code, which states that:
Art. 266-‐A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

In dealing with cases for rape, this Court has often acknowledged that there is often a want
of witnesses. In People v. Dion, this Court said that: Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a
crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in
the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is
settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it
passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of
rape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even
conclusive and binding.

In the present case, defendant argues that AAA’s testimony is improbable, especially her
testimony under cross-‐examination where she stated that appellant placed her on top of a water lily
floating on the water. Contrary to appellant’s submission, however, a careful scrutiny of the records
would show that the water lilies on which AAA was made to lie down were on the riverbank and
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not on the river. AAA’s testimony during the trial was straightforward, candid, clear and consistent.
She was not moved nor cowed by the peroration of the cross-‐examiner. Her answers were direct
and concise. She was unmoved by the slings and arrows of her misfortune. She was bold,
determined and credible. The defense never broke her, in fact her answers enhanced her will to
correct a wrong, her quest for the protective mantle of the law and her passion to punish the
appellant.

In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-‐victims of rape are to
be given full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who
barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if
what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of
credibility, especially if no ill will -‐-‐ as in this case -‐ -‐ motivates her to testify falsely against the
accused. It is well-‐settled that when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be
convicted solely on her testimony -‐-‐ provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.

In any event, we have held that "the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to
prove resistance. What has to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the
accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUNDO VITERO

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-‐law-‐spouse of the parent of the victim. The elements of the crime charged against accused-‐
appellant are: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-‐law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation.

Facts:

Edmundo Vitero, accused, and BBB were married on April 5, 1984. Out of the marriage, they
begot six (6) children, four (4) girls (AAA, the eldest, CCC, DDD and EEE) and two (2) boys (FFF and
GGG). In September 1996, accused and BBB separated. She left the conjugal home bringing with her
CCC, EEE, and GGG and established her own residence at Barangay.

AAA, DDD and FFF were left to the custody of the Edmundo Vitero. They transferred to the
house of the parents of the accused at Barangay XXX, Ligao City, Albay. AAA, then already thirteen
(13) years old, having been born on April 30, 1985, her sister DDD, and her brother FFF. AAA slept
in the extreme right portion of the room, immediately beside the wall separating their room from
that of her grandparents. To her left was the Edmundo Vitero followed by DDD and FFF.

AAA was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody on top of her. When she opened
her eyes, she saw her own father mounting her. AAA felt searing pain and her vagina bled. She
started to cry, but he was unmoved and warned her not to make any noise. She tried to resist his
lewd desires, but her efforts were in vain. She did not shout for help because she feared accused
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who had a 20-‐inch knife beside him might kill her. After ravishing AAA, accused dressed himself
and went back to sleep. Because of the harrowing experience she suffered from the hands of her
own father, AAA was not able to sleep anymore. AAA did not report her ordeal to her grandparents
for fear they would only scold her.

Sometime, Edmundo Vitero brought AAA to the house of his sister Salvacion at Batangas.
Meantime, HHH, AAA’s maternal grandfather, visited his daughter BBB, and showed to her an
anonymous letter stating that AAA had been raped by [her] father. Thereafter, BBB went to see
Salvacion, her sister-‐in-‐law in her house at Lian, Batangas to look for AAA, but she did not find her

She finally found AAA in the house of her employer in Lian, Batangas. BBB asked AAA if she
was indeed raped by her father. AAA disclosed that accused ravished her six (6) times while they
were still living in her grandparents’ house. He usually raped AAA at night when she and her
siblings were already sleeping in their room. Upon learning they reported the incident to the Ligao
Police Station and with the help of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),

However, accused Edmundo vigorously denied the allegations against him. He testified that
he was employed as a construction worker in Manila. However, upon his return to Albay, he learned
that he was criminally charged with raping his own daughter AAA.

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC. However, the penalty was
modified because of Republic Act No. 9346. Accused-‐appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death finding appellant Edmundo Vitero guilty of the crime of
qualified rape and was affirmed in toto by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Edmundo Vitero should be held guilty for crime of qualified rape.

Ruling:

Yes, Edmundo Vitero should be held guilty for crime of qualified rape

Accused-‐appellant was charged with qualified rape, defined and punishable under the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353: Article 266-‐
A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
x x x x
Article 266-‐B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-‐
law-‐spouse of the parent of the victim.
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The elements of the crime charged against accused-‐appellant are: (a) the victim is a female
over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-‐law
spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either
through force, threat, or intimidation.

There is no dispute that the first two elements exist in this case. Documentary and
testimonial evidence, including accused-‐appellant’s own admission, establish that AAA is the
daughter of accused-‐appellant and BBB and she was born on April 30, 1985. This means that AAA
was almost or already 13 years old when she was raped in April 1998.

As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that it was
duly proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAA’s testimony. AAA was able to describe in
detail how accused-‐appellant mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against
her will, one night in April 1998.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT
In rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-‐law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.
The sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape.

Facts:
Accused-‐appellant was charged with qualified rape in an Information dated December 16,
2002. On September 9, 2003, accused-‐appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented complainant AAA and Medico-‐Legal Officer Dr.
Edgar S. Savella. AAA was already seventeen (17) years old at the time of her testimony before the
court a quo. She was barely thirteen (13) years old when appellant allegedly raped her. Appellant is
AAA’s granduncle, being the brother of her paternal grandfather. Appellant had eight (8) children
from his estranged wife who lived in another barangay. AAA fondly calls appellant “Papa.” In the
early part of 2000, appellant resided with AAA’s family for about four (4) months. After building his
own house, appellant moved in to his new house. AAA also transferred to appellant’s new house.
AAA’s parents were promised by appellant that he would send AAA to school. AAA recalled that she
lived with appellant for about three (3) years and during those years, AAA claimed to have been
raped by appellant many times. Dr. Edgar S. Savella, medico-‐legal officer of NBI Caraga Regional
Office testified that when he examined AAA, the latter was already pregnant. He found no laceration
in AAA’s hymen.
For the defense, appellant testified that AAA’s father is his nephew, being the son of his
brother. Appellant disclosed AAA became his lover. Appellant further testified that when he moved
in to his new house, AAA moved in with him as well. Appellant claimed that from that time on, he
and AAA were already living together as husband and wife. The alleged amorous relationship
between him and AAA was known to the public, particularly their neighbors.
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On September 20, 2006, the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused. On
August 29, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the findings of the Trial Court.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-‐appellant anchors his prayer for acquittal on the following points,
which, according to him, are undisputed: (1) accused-‐appellant was unarmed; (2) there was no
proof of great disparity in terms of physical strength or capacity between accused-‐appellant and
AAA; and (3) AAA never put the slightest resistance against accused-‐appellant.

Issue:
Whether the fact that the accused was not armed during the commission of the offense is
material in the crime of rape

Ruling:
Accused-‐appellant’s being unarmed is inconsequential considering the circumstances of the
instant case. The Court have previously held that “in rape committed by close kin, such as the
victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-‐law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation.” Accused-‐appellant, AAA’s granduncle, is certainly a person having moral
influence and ascendancy over AAA. AAA would surely observe the deference accorded by her own
parents to accused-‐appellant, her father’s uncle. Indeed, AAA herself fondly called
accused-‐appellant as “Papa,” showing that she more or less treated him like her own father.
Neither is it required that specific evidence be presented to prove the disparity in physical
strength between AAA and accused-‐appellant. As argued by the prosecution, accused-‐appellant is a
grown man who is used to hard work and manual labor as a farmer and a chainsaw operator, while
AAA is a very young girl when she was allegedly raped and when she testified. It was the trial court
which had the opportunity to observe the physical disproportion between them and considered the
same in finding accused-‐ appellant guilty.
The Court has likewise repeatedly held that the sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily
admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. In People v. Mirandilla, Jr., 654 SCRA 761
(2011), it was held that “[t]his admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for
it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has
successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who
has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual.” In the case at bar, accused-‐appellant
miserably failed to discharge this burden.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO BUSTAMANTE y ALIGANGA
Romeo Bustamante was accused of raping his minor daughter. There were no other witnesses
and the prosecution was not able to establish the element of force and intimidation. In convicting the
accused, the Supreme Court held that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on
the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature
and the normal course of things. The Court also ruled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over
the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by
a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-‐law spouse of her mother,
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.
Facts:
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Accused-‐appellant Romeo Bustamante was charged of raping AAA, his eleven year old
daughter. Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. During trial, AAA testified that on or
about February 17, 1997, her father, while they were alone in their home, laid her down on the
floor and proceeded to rape her. After the act, he told her not to report what had happened and that
she was not able to resist because she was still young during that time. She reported the incident to
her mother and the police. There were no other evidence which would indicate that the accused
used force and intimidation upon the victim. Also, there were no other eyewitnesses of the crime.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted appellant of the crime of rape. Appellant
elevated his case to the Court of Appeals in the hope of having a reversal of judgment however, his
appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the accused can be convicted in the absence of evident force and intimidation
2. Whether the accused can be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim

Ruling:
1. Yes. Despite the absence of any evident force and intimidation, the same is still appreciated
in this case because it is doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over
the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape
committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-‐law
spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.
2. Yes. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Jurisprudence is likewise
instructive that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape
victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. In the
case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA to be a credible witness
and her testimony worthy of full faith and credit. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells us that it
is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as
well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death
or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOISES CAOILE

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person
regardless of the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the perpetrator’s
knowledge of the victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime and
makes it punishable by death under Article 266B, paragraph 10.

Facts:
Accused appellant Moises Caoile, in two separate Amended Informations filed before the
RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person
under Article 266A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Caoile pleaded not guilty to both
charges upon his arraignment for both cases on March 1, 2006. The antecedents of this case, as
narrated by the prosecution, are as follows: [AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her
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grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La Union when her mother left to work abroad when
she was still young. One of their neighbors was the accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the
playmate of [AAA]. One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place.
Upon reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the
instruction of the accused whom she called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused proceeded to have
carnal knowledge with the victim. [AAA] felt pain but she did not complain nor say anything about
it. The sexual abuse was repeated until the grandmother of the victim learned of the assaults. Claire
Baliaga, a psychologist, testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] on August
10, 2007; that [AAA] obtained an overall score performance of 55, which is classified within the
mental retardation range; and that [AAA] has the mental age of a sevenyear, ninemonth old child
who is inadequate of sustaining mental processes. Such findings was affirmed by the findings of Dr.
Roderico V. Ramos, a psychiatrist of the ITRMC.

In his defense, the accused appellant claims AAA was his sweetheart and they had several
intimate relationship. He further contends that he did not know that [AAA] was a demented person
since she acted like a normal individual.

On May 6, 2009, after weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the RTC rendered its
Joint Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. In its Decision
dated March 21, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:
Can the lack of knowledge of the accused that the victim suffers from mental retardation
sufficient to absolve him of the crime of rape?

Ruling:
No. Article 266A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two
circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered
rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and 2. Paragraph 1(d):
when the offended party is x x x demented. Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with
rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term demented refers to a person who has
dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the
individual’s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the
other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include
those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is “deprived of
reason,” and not one who is “demented.”

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person
is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be
proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the victim’s
mental retardation. Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental
retardate. Anent the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecution’s
own testimonial and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with
AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being
sweethearts.

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Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a
female, even when done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without
her consent. To expound on such concept, this Court, in People v. Butiong, 659 SCRA 557 (2011),
said: In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the
necessity of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act
was committed against her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or
unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such
lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also
when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not
necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse.
Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes
rape. Where the offended woman was feebleminded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse
with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent. The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental
abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape.
Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape.

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person
regardless of the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the
perpetrator’s knowledge of the victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape,
qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under Article 266B, paragraph 10, to wit: The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: x x x x 10) When the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of
the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PAMINTUAN y SAHAGUN
G.R. No. 192239, June 5, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐ De Castro
Article 266-‐A(1)(d) provides the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of
which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented. As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the
concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the
hymen necessary, to conclude that carnal knowledge took place; the mere touching of the external
genitalia by a penis that is capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.
A mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.
Facts:
On September 6, 2004, accused-‐appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila with the crime of rape under Article 266-‐A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accused-‐appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. During
the trial of the case, the prosecution put forward AAA, the victim, as a witness. AAA testified that
accused-‐appellant was her uncle since the latter was the cousin of her father, BBB. He was also the
common-‐law husband of her mother, CCC, as her parents had already separated. AAA related that in
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September 2003, accused-‐appellant started to sexually abuse her inside their house. He pulled her
to her mother’s room when nobody else was around. He touched her breasts and her vagina.
Afterwards, accused-‐appellant was able to insert his penis into her organ. He was only able to insert
his penis halfway but the same hurt AAA. She cried and fought back by boxing him but he continued
to assault her. He also kissed her lips and licked her vagina. She said that she did not bleed after she
was raped. Accused-‐appellant succeeded in abusing her seven times. AAA presented in court her
birth certificate, which showed that she was born on November 6, 1992. Medical findings shows
that there is no evident injury at the time of examination but medical evaluation cannot exclude
sexual abuse.
For his defense, accused-‐appellant testified that AAA was his niece as he was the cousin of
AAA’s father. He was also the common-‐law husband of AAA’s mother, CCC. Accused-‐appellant
denied AAA’s accusation of rape against him. He stated that CCC’s children had a grudge against
him, as they did not want him to live with their mother.
On June 17, 2008, the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, adjudged accused-‐appellant guilty of
statutory rape. On November 24, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Hence
this appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether the medical findings of lack of injuries or trauma to the vagina of the victim
belied AAA’s claim that she was raped seven times
2. Whether the accused-‐appellant is guilty of statutory rape

Ruling:
1. No. The Court has often held that “full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential
ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary, to conclude that carnal knowledge took
place; the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis that is capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.” It was also said in People v. Opong, 554
SCRA 706 (2008), that: In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, the court likewise
affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim’s
hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim’s hymen to remain intact
despite repeated sexual intercourse. The strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one
woman to another, such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse;
on the other hand, it may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse
can ensue. x x x x It also bears stressing that a medico-‐legal report is not indispensable to the
prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature. The credible disclosure of AAA
that appellant raped her is the most important proof of the commission of the
crime.……………………………………………………..

2. Yes. Article 266-‐A(1)(d) provides the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements
of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented. The element of carnal knowledge was established by the
testimony of AAA. Her identification of accused-‐appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual attack
was positive, consistent and steadfast; her narration of the incident, detailed and straightforward.
When she was recounting her ordeal before the trial court, she was overcome with emotion and
shed tears on more than one occasion. She did not waver in her stance even as she underwent
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cross-‐examination by the counsel for the defense. These factors impress upon us that AAA’s claim
against accused-‐appellant was not at all fabricated. The age of AAA was duly alleged and proven in
this case. However, AAA’s relationship with accused-‐appellant, i.e., that accused-‐appellant was the
common-‐ law spouse of her mother, was not specifically alleged in the information. Although this
circumstance was proven during trial, the same cannot qualify the crime committed. We held in
People v. Ramos, 394 SCRA 452 (2002), that “[a]s a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of
rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused must be both
alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the accused-‐appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged is insufficient to
exculpate him. It is the rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of
appellant in the crimes attributed to him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANG
The only subject of inquiry on statutory rape is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place.
Facts:
On January 8. 1999, upon the sworn complaint of AAA’s mother, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City filed with the RTC an Information charging the accused-‐appellant Ricardo Pionsang of
the crime of rape. He pleaded not guilty of the charge.
During trial, AAA, the child victim, testified that the accused-‐appellant lured her to go to his
house to play computer games. While they were on their way to his home, the accused-‐appellant
pushed her inside the detached toilet of his house and proceeded to rape her. Her testimony was
supported by the testimony of CCC, an eleven-‐year-‐old eye witness of the crime. In his defense, the
accused avers that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the time of AAA’s rape. The
RTC rendered its Decision on November 26, 2009 finding accused-‐appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping AAA. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of statutory rape
Ruling:
ART. 266-‐A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is committed— 1) By a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: x x x x d)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present .
Rape under paragraph 3 of the above-‐mentioned article is termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a
will of her own on account of her tender years.
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The commission of rape was sufficiently established by the testimony of the child witness.
Testimonies of child-‐victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. Furthermore, AAA was born on July 21, 1994 as
evidenced by the Certification from the Civil Registrar’s Office so she was almost four years of age
when the crime was committed. Resultantly, accused-‐appellant was charged and proven guilty of
statutory rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABEL DIAZ
Accused-‐appellant Abel Diaz was convicted of the crime of rape. His appeal boils down to a
question of credibility of the prosecution’s primary witness, the private complainant Mara. He argues
that the failure of Mara to make an outcry during the two hours he allegedly stayed in her room makes
her testimony not credible. In rejecting his contention the Supreme Court ruled that the precise
duration of the rape is not material to and does not negate the commission of the felony. When one is
being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be reasonably expected to
keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last minute.
Facts:
Accused-‐appellant Abel Diaz was charged with the crime of rape. During the trial, The
prosecution established that the offended party, 17-‐ year old Mara, and the accused-‐appellant were
neighbors as they both resided at X Compound, Y Subdivision, Barangay Z, Tarlac City. At early
dawn of March 30, 2003, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody on top of her.
While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming from outside illuminated her room and
allowed her to recognize the then shirtless accused-‐ appellant as the intruder. Startled, she pushed
the accused-‐ appellant away and shouted for him to go away but she was not able to free herself as
he held her hands and he was straddling her. The accused boxed her and was able to penetrate her
despite of her shouts and resistance. The dastardly deed done, the accused-‐ appellant stood up,
wore his pants and left. Mara also testified that the accused stayed at her room at approximately
two hours.
Abel Diaz used the defense of denial and alibi. He claims that he was attending a party of
another neighbor at the time the crime was allegedly committed. He further contends that the
victim’s failure to make an outcry for the two hours that he was allegedly in her room is not
credible.
After weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court found Mara’s testimony
categorical, spontaneous and consistent. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Is the precise duration of rape material to the commission of the felony ?

Rulings:
No. Mara’s testimony that the accused-‐appellant stayed for two hours in her room did not
make her credibility doubtful. It was a mere estimate and could not be expected to be accurate with
rigorous exactitude. When one is being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock,
she cannot be reasonably expected to keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last
Page 223 of 299


minute. Indeed, for a woman undergoing the ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the
accused-‐appellant, every moment is like an eternity of hell and the transit of time is a painfully slow
crawl that she would rather forget. Besides, the precise duration or the exact time or date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the felony. Rape has no regard for time and
place. It has been committed in all manner of situations and in circumstances thought to be
inconceivable.
As regards his other defenses, the accused-‐appellant’s denial and alibi crumble in the face of
his positive identification by Mara. In particular, his alibi is worthless as his presence at a mere 30
meters away from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission definitely does not constitute
a physical impossibility for him to be at Mara’s room at the time of the rape. On the contrary, it is in
fact an implied admission that there is facility of access for the accused-‐appellant to be at the place
where the crime happened when it happened.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCIDITA T. RESURRECCION
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as
evidence. With respect to illegal possession of dangerous drugs, possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in
the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
Facts:
Two separate Informations for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were
filed against the accused-‐appellant Mercidita Resurection. When arraigned, accused-‐appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges. In its Decision promulgated on August 28, 2006, the RTC found
accused-‐appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The trial court gave full
weight and credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution and disregarded
accused-‐appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-‐up. Accused-‐appellant appealed her conviction
before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated January 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the RTC judgment. Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-‐appellant of the crimes
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
The conviction of the accused-‐appellant was sustained by the Court.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements
must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the
presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.
With respect to illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its elements are the following: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
Page 224 of 299


possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the foregoing elements of the crimes charged against
accused-‐appellant.
In this case, the vivid and detailed testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO2 Lique and
MADAC operative Abellana were not only credible by themselves, but were corroborated by
numerous documentary and object evidence. The sum of the evidence for the prosecution shows
that following the conduct of a surveillance, the Makati City SAID-‐SOTF planned and executed a
buy-‐bust operation against accused-‐appellant on May 16, 2006. During the operation,
accused-‐appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling 0.02 grams of shabu for Three Hundred
Pesos (P300.00) and possessing a total of 0.24 grams of shabu, without any legal authority to do so.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN ZAFRA Y SERRANO

Inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.

It is not uncommon for a rape victim to initially conceal the assault against her person for
several reasons, including that of fear of threats posed by her assailant. A rape charge only becomes
doubtful when the victim’s inaction or delay in reporting the crime is unreasonable or unexplained.

Facts:

On December 19, 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging Zafra with the
crime of qualified rape of his minor daughter. Zafra pleaded not guilty to the charge upon his
arraignment on February 4, 2002. Thereafter, the parties held their pre-‐trial conference, wherein
they stipulated on the facts that AAA was the daughter of Zafra, and that she was only 17 years old
on December 14, 2001. Upon trial, AAA testified that her father, Zafra, started molesting her when
she was around 13 or 14 years old. He used to insert his finger in her vagina and mash her breasts,
which progressed into actual sexual intercourse when she was about 15. AAA claimed that her
mother knew what her father was doing to her but did nothing to stop it. Aside from her best friend
in school, AAA told no one about her ordeal for fear of her father, that her mother would not side
with her, and that rumors about her would spread. Sometime in November 2001 however, she
moved to her aunt’s house, after she was again raped by Zafra. On December 14, 2001, her brother
went to her aunt’s house to tell AAA that Zafra had some chores for her. AAA followed her brother
to their house, where she found Zafra, who asked her to fix the beddings and wash the dishes. When
her brother left the house, Zafra instructed AAA to get his dirty clothes in his room. AAA did as she
was told, but Zafra went inside the room and locked the door and proceeded to rape her. While she
was dressing up, Zafra warned her against telling anybody of what happened. AAA immediately
picked up the dirty clothes on the floor and went out the room. After having lunch with her mother,
who arrived while she was doing the laundry, she returned to her aunt’s house. At her aunt’s house,
her mother asked her “inulit na naman ng tatay mo, ano?” to which, she replied yes. Her mother told
her that they would file a complaint, then went back to their house, got the linen in her father’s
room, then soaked it in water. Just as AAA was about to leave her aunt’s house, her mother arrived
and asked her where she was headed. AAA said she was going to file a complaint against her father.
AAA’s mother accompanied her but was prodding her not to file any complaint. AAA however
proceeded to file the complaint, and was subjected to a medical examination on the same day.
Page 225 of 299


Zafra denied the charge against him and claimed that it was filed as an act of retaliation by
his wife. On January 20, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, giving credence to the prosecution’s
version, found Zafra guilty of qualified rape of his minor daughter, and sentenced him to death. On
June 29, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Zafra attacks the credibility of AAA
for being inconsistent. He claims that during AAA’s testimony, she was so confused that she
contradicted her own statements. Zafra also emphasizes the fact that prior to December 14, 2001,
AAA acted as if nothing had happened at all. Zafra claims that the fact that she did not stay away
from him despite the alleged incidents of rape belie her claim of sexual
abuse.…………………………………

Issues:
1. Whether AAA’s inconsistent and contradictory testimony is an indication that she merely
concocted her story of rape
2. Whether AAA’s actions, of not immediately reporting that she was raped and returning to their
house, belie her claim of sexual abuse.
Ruling:
1. No. The court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness. The inconsistencies Zafra are referring to are frivolous matters, which merely confused
AAA when she was being questioned. Those matters are inconsequential and do not even pertain to
AAA’s ordeal. Thus, such trivial and insignificant discrepancies, which in this case were immediately
clarified upon further questioning, will warrant neither the rejection of her testimony nor the
reversal of the judgment.
2. No. It is not uncommon for a rape victim to initially conceal the assault against her person for
several reasons, including that of fear of threats posed by her assailant. A rape charge only becomes
doubtful when the victim’s inaction or delay in reporting the crime is unreasonable or unexplained.
In this case, AAA testified that she did not immediately report the crime because she was afraid of
her father, that her mother would not side with her even though she was aware of what Zafra was
doing to her, and the rumors that might spread once word of what her father had been doing to her
comes out. It must be noted that AAA was only a young girl when Zafra started molesting her. It is
but natural that she factor in her decisions how her father and mother would react. Furthermore, it
is settled jurisprudence that delay in filing a complaint for rape is not an indication of falsehood,
viz.:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons
close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the
conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are
all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the
rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the
world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citations
omitted.)
Anent AAA’s behavior after the rapes, suffice it to say that there is no one standard reaction
that can be expected from a victim of a crime such as rape. Elucidating on this point, the Court, in
People v. Saludo, held:
Page 226 of 299


Not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with
the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while
others may be shocked into insensibility. And although the conduct of the victim
immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance as it tends to
establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape, it is not accurate to say that there is a
typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims, as not every victim can be
expected to act conformably with the usual expectation of mankind and there is no standard
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience, each
situation being different and dependent on the various circumstances prevailing in each
case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JADE CUAYCONG y REMONQUILLO

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim, who was a minor, does not warrant a
finding of exculpating reasonable doubt when it fails to establish beyond doubt the innocence of the
appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone
impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.

Facts:

Two informations were filed with the RTC, charging accused-‐appellant Jade Cuaycong with
the felony of statutory rape. The victim, AAA, was the daughter of Cuaycong’s live in partner, BBB.
One evening, when BBB was at work, Cuaycong lay beside AAA, removed her shorts and laid on top
of AAA. Cuaycong then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, and afterwards threatened to kill AAA’s
mother if AAA will not keep quiet. When CCC, BBB’s mother learned of the incident, CCC brought
AAA to the medical center, and the doctor who examined AAA reported to the police.

AAA also recalled that the same thing happened to her about a year ago at the store which
they also utilized as their residence. At that time, AAA was tending their store while Cuaycong was
then sleeping beside her brother. When Cuaycong woke up, he approached her and removed her
shorts and standing from behind, he inserted his penis to her anus. She felt pain and cried, so that
Cuaycong was forced to stop. She also disclosed the incident to CCC.

Cuaycong denied the charges, stating that they were filed so that BBB could get rid of him as
he was jobless and that BBB wanted to live in with her new lover.

The RTC convicted Cuyacong on two counts of statutory rape. The CA affirmed the first
count, but reversed the conviction on the second count because, while the Information alleged rape
by carnal knowledge, the prosecution was able to prove rape by sexual assault since the rape
incident at issue involved penile penetration of the victim’s anus. The CA modified the conviction to
acts of lasciviousness.

Issues:

1. Is AAA’s credibility is very much suspect and thus does not warrant the judgment of
conviction?
2. Does a shallow hymenal laceration negate the occurrence of rape?
Page 227 of 299


3. Was the CA correct in changing the conviction of the second charge from rape to acts of
lasciviousness?

Ruling:

1. No. Cuaycong’s contention that the inconsistencies found in the victim’s testimony warrant
a finding of exculpating reasonable doubt deserves scant consideration. Jurisprudence tells us that
for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it
must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged since the
credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her
testimony. We have also declared that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies, moreover, they do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the assailants. In the case at bar, the alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s
testimony do not deviate from the fact that AAA categorically identified Cuaycong as the one who
raped her on July 4, 2002 and earlier sexually assaulted her sometime in June of the year 2001. The
inconsistent statements pointed out by appellant merely affect minor and tangential aspects of
AAA’s testimony which do not significantly alter the integrity of her narrative concerning the
incidents of rape and sexual assault which are the subject matter of this case.

With regard to the credibility of AAA’s declarations against appellant as well as that of other
prosecution witnesses, we see no cogent reason to veer away from the jurisprudential principle of
affording great respect and even finality to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses.

2. No. With regard to Cuaycong’s assertion that Dr. Carpio’s testimony indicated that the
shallow hymenal laceration present in AAA’s vagina rules out the probability of any penetration by
a male sexual organ and could only have been caused by the insertion of a finger, we rule that the
said testimony does not negate the occurrence of rape. A perusal of the transcript would reveal that
the same medico-‐legal officer did not totally discount the possibility of rape and, in fact, he admitted
that he was not competent to conclude what really caused the shallow hymenal laceration. During
cross-‐examination by defense counsel, Dr. Carpio even gave the inference that partial penetration of
the penis could have caused the shallow hymenal laceration found inside AAA’s vagina.

Jurisprudence states that carnal knowledge as an element of rape does not require full
penetration since all that is necessary for rape to be consummated is for the penis of the accused to
come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. Moreover, it is equally settled that
hymenal rupture, vaginal laceration or genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not
an element of the crime of rape.

3. Yes. As for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 02-‐0576
should be downgraded to an act of lasciviousness, we find no justification to disturb the same. As
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, it was settled in People v. Abulon that in view of the material
differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second,
and vice versa. Thus, since the charge in the information for the [second charge of] rape through
carnal knowledge, Cuaycong cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was
proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation
Page 228 of 299


to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Cuaycong can be found guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO ESPENILLA

If the testimony of the rape victim is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime
beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony. Thus, an
affidavit of retraction of the father of the victim unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence
cannot prevail over the positive declaration made by the victim herself.

Facts:

While AAA, a Grade 2 pupil was left in their house with her two younger siblings (as her
father BBB and stepmother were in the farm), accused-‐appellant Carlito Espenilla, who is the
brother of her stepmother, arrived and asked her for a tobacco leaf and a newspaper. When AAA
went inside the room to get what was asked of her, accused-‐appellant followed and closed the door
behind him. While inside the room, Espenilla who was then with a bolo, immediately undressed her
by taking off her shorts and panty and at the same time warning her not to tell anyone about what
is happening, otherwise, she will be killed. After she was undressed, Espenilla unzipped his pants,
put out his private organ, held her, and ordered her to lie down on the floor. With the unsheathed
bolo beside them, Espenilla inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA cried because of the pain but
did not offer any resistance because Espenilla was very strong and had a bolo that was placed
beside her. Neither did she shout because there was no other person in the house (except her
younger siblings). And besides, she knows that nobody would come to her rescue.

Later that day, while AAA’s parents were still not around, Espenilla came back and raped
her again for the second time. She was threatened not to tell anyone said incident. AAA later ran
away from home to the nearest barangay and revealed the incident.

A complaint was filed with the trial court against Espenilla, charging him with rape. For his
defense, Espenilla presented the Affidavit of Recantation executed by BBB, the latter initially
claiming that he realized that he was made to falsely believe by AAA that Espenilla raped her. BBB
later changed his answer and stated that he merely forced AAA to say that she was raped by her
grandfather and Espenilla. The RTC found Espenilla guilty of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision.

Issue:

Did BBB’s recantation of the charges against Espenilla absolve the latter from criminal
liability?

Ruling:

The appeal is without merit.
Page 229 of 299


Based on the foregoing provision, the elements of rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.

The records of this case reveal that the prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that there
is ample evidence to prove that Espenilla had carnal knowledge of the then minor victim through
the use of force and intimidation. The testimony of AAA pertaining to the rape incident at issue
articulates in blunt detail her horrific experience at the hands of Espenilla.

It is a settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may
be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. It is likewise elementary that the
issue of credibility of witnesses is resolved primarily by the trial court since it is in a better position
to decide the same after having heard the witnesses and observed their conduct, deportment and
manner of testifying; accordingly, the findings of the trial court are entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would
otherwise affect the result of the case. In other words, as we have repeatedly declared in the past,
the trial judge’s evaluation, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, binds the Court, leaving to the
accused the burden to bring to the Court’s attention facts or circumstances of weight that were
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted by the lower courts but would materially affect the
disposition of the case differently if duly considered. Unfortunately, Epenilla failed to discharge this
burden.

We find that the testimony of AAA was indeed delivered in a clear and straightforward
manner; thus, the same is worthy of the belief that was bestowed upon it by the trial court and later
by the Court of Appeals.

Lastly, we declare that the Affidavit of Recantation executed by BBB, AAA’s father, fails to
convince considering that the said document, which seeks to exculpate appellant from the charge of
rape, was unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

Courts have long been skeptical of recantations of testimonies for they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration.

In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused often depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is
generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim’s
testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent
and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
Page 230 of 299


notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate her original testimony.

A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly
unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It
can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any
other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and,
especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.

Thus, with more reason, we cannot ascribe any weight to the recantation of the charges by
the victim’s father when the victim’s own categorical testimony remains on record. Alternatively
put, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, BBB’s recantation cannot prevail over the
positive declaration of rape made by AAA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL ESPERA y CUYACOT

When the rape victim’s testimony which identified the accused as the rapist is clear,
categorical, consistent and credible, the defense of alibi will crumble and the accused shall be held
liable. Thus, if the victim was able to identify the accused in the police station as the rapist and during
trial, he will be convicted for rape even if the rapist covered his face with his clothes and despite the
incident taking place in the dark of night.

Facts:

Two informations charging accused-‐appellant with rape were filed with the RTC. The
prosecution alleged that one evening, co-‐workers Ana and Susie decided to share a tricycle ride
home. As was her wont, Susie beamed a flashlight on the front part of the tricycle. Susie recognized
the driver, Espera in this case, as one of her husband’s friends. Ana recognized the driver by face,
although she did not know his name. She noticed that he was wearing a red polo shirt and maong
pants.

After Susie disembarked, the tricycle moved down the road past Ana’s house, with Espera
claiming that the brakes were not working. The tricycle stopped at the quarry site, as Espera
claimed that the tricycle ran out of gas. Ana was walking home under a bright moonlight when she
realized that she was being followed. It was Espera, with his red polo shirt covering his face and a
gun in his hand. Ana tried to run but was caught by Espera, who threatened that he will kill her if
she shouted. Espera dragged Ana to a more secluded place, pushed her to the ground and forcefully
undressed her. He was able to force his manhood into Ana’s mouth. He then inserted his fingers into
her vagina, and while pointing the gun at her head, forcefully penetrated Ana.

Later, Ana and her parents reported the matter to the police. When she saw Espera at the
police station, she recognized him although he cut his hair and shaved his beard. And when she
heard his voice, she became more certain that he was her assailant and, with that realization, she
could only cry and was unable to say anything.

Page 231 of 299


Espera maintained that at the time the crime was committed, he was asleep in his house,
and saw Ana the first time at the police station, where he was considered as among the suspects for
the rape.

The RTC found Espera guilty of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual
intercourse. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Did Ana fail to properly identify Espina as the perpetrator of the rape?

Ruling:


Ana and Susie positively identified Espera as the driver of the tricycle in red polo shirt,
which ferried them to Barangay Ekis on that fateful night. Instead of bringing Ana home, Espera
brought her to the quarry in the pretext that the tricycle’s brakes malfunctioned and the vehicle
subsequently ran out of gas. Consequently, Ana was placed in a vulnerable situation that enabled
Espera to commit the crime charged. As Ana started to walk home from the quarry, Espera took off
his red shirt and covered his face with it and then followed her with a gun in his hand. She ran when
she noticed him and he ran after her until he caught her. He poked his gun at her, repeatedly
threatened her, mercilessly hit her and raped her twice, first by sexual assault and then by sexual
intercourse. His lust satiated, he went back to his tricycle and drove away. She recognized him as
the one who raped her when he was presented to her at the police station two days after the
incident, although he already cut his hair and shaved his beard. And she positively identified him in
open court when she gave her testimony.

While Espera attempts to hide his identity in the blackness of the night, his identity has
been revealed and the darkness that is his cover has been dispelled by the categorical testimonies
of Susie and Ana that, while it was late into the night when they boarded Espera’s tricycle at the
junction, they saw his face because the place was illuminated by light from lamp posts and the
nearby chapel as well as from the houses in the vicinity. Moreover, Susie beamed her flashlight at
the tricycle, giving Ana an opportunity to recognize Espera as the driver and to notice that he was
wearing denim pants and a red polo shirt, which was the same red polo shirt he used to cover his
face. In other words, the tricycle driver in the red polo shirt was the same man whose face was
covered with a red polo shirt -‐-‐Ana’s rapist -‐-‐ Espera.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Ana identified Espera not only by his appearance
but also by the sound of his voice. She remembered his voice when he was negotiating with her and
Susie for a ride to Barangay Ekis, when Susie disembarked from the tricycle and when he told her
that the tricycle’s brakes malfunctioned and, later on, that the tricycle’s fuel had gone empty. It was
the same voice that repeatedly threatened to kill her, ordered her to take him in her mouth, asked
her whether she recognized him and his tricycle, and directed her not to leave the scene of the
crime until after he was gone for some time. And when she met him at the police station, despite his
attempt to prevent her from recognizing him by cutting his hair and shaving his beard, it was the
same voice that made her recognize him and made her cry out of fear.

Page 232 of 299


Ana’s testimony is clear, categorical, consistent and credible. Under its evidentiary weight, Espera’s
denial and alibi collapse and crumble. Thus, beyond reasonable doubt, the crimes of rape by sexual
assault and rape by sexual intercourse committed against Ana have been established. Beyond
reasonable doubt, too, it is Espera who committed the said crimes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO M. VIDAÑA

It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is likewise settled that the factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and
respect, if not conclusiveness, since the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the
facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their
respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the
offense charged. Thus, the testimony of a rape victim who is 15-‐year old girl which recounted the
ordeal she experienced at the hands of her own father, if delivered in a straightforward and convincing
manner, is sufficient to convict the accused.

Facts:

An information was filed with the RTC, charging Ricardo M. Vidaña of rape in relation to R.A.
No. 7610. The prosecution alleged that one evening, Vidaña pulled AAA, his 15-‐year old daughter,
from her bed and into the sala. Vidaña covered her mouth and told her not to make noise, and
forcibly removed her clothes afterwards. As she lay naked, Vidaña inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina. During the consummation of Vidaña’s lust upon his daughter, he warned her not to tell
anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings. The next day, AAA went to the house of Vidaña’s
friend, who was able to learn about the incident. They accompanied AAA to the police to report the
incident. Vidaña, on the other hand, claimed that he was at the fields harvesting with AAA’s
stepmother. The RTC convicted Vidaña.

Issues:

1. Is AAA’s testimony not credible and thus does not warrant a judgment of conviction?
2. Did the RTC mistakenly characterize the offense as sexual abuse under R.A. no. 7610?

Ruling:


1. No, as the victim’s testimony may be the sole basis for conviction in rape cases.

It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is likewise settled that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great
weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, since the trial court was in the best position as the
original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses
Page 233 of 299


rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the
ingredients of the offense charged.

A careful review of the evidence and testimony brought to light in this case does not lead to
a conclusion that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were mistaken in their assessment of the
credibility of AAA’s testimony. Absent any demonstration by appellant that both tribunals
overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome of the case or misunderstood
a circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, we are thus
inclined to affirm the facts as established by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

We are of the opinion that the testimony of AAA regarding her ordeal was delivered in a
straightforward and convincing manner that is worthy of belief. When AAA testified and, thus, was
constrained to recount the torment she suffered at the hands of her own father, she broke down in
tears in more than one instance. This can only serve to strengthen her testimony as we have
indicated in past jurisprudence that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the
truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that the victim feels
when asked to recount her traumatic experience. It is also worth noting that appellant’s counsel did
not even bother to cross-‐examine AAA after her direct examination by the prosecutor.

We have previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story
that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge
could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her father. That legal dictum finds application in
the case at bar since appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper motive on the part
of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge of raping his own flesh and blood. His
allegation that AAA’s admission in open court, that she is not close to him and that they do not
agree on many things, cannot suffice as a compelling enough reason for her to fabricate such a
sordid and scandalous tale of incest.

With regard to appellant’s contention that AAA’s lack of resistance to the rape committed
against her, as borne out by her own testimony, negates any truth to her accusation, we rule that
such an argument deserves scant consideration. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure to
shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal
acts of the accused since rape is subjective and not everyone responds in the same way to an attack
by a sexual fiend.

Furthermore, we have reiterated that, in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the
moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby forcing
her to do whatever he wants. In other words, in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or
intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would
suffice.

2. Yes, the RTC erred in impliedly characterizing the offense charged as sexual abuse
under Sections 5 and 31 of R.A. No. 7610.

Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that “[t]he complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.” The information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime punishable
Page 234 of 299


under Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the
information with feloniously having carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter against her will
by using his influence as a father.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL ALCOBER

When a rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently.
Her failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape does not automatically vitiate the credibility
of her account. Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature
individuals would when placed in such a situation. The fact that AAA was not able to escape when she
had the opportunity to do so, her continued visit to their home after the incident, and her delay in
filing the complaint does not at all contradict her credibility.

Facts:

AAA testified that she was around 10 years old and was in Grade 5 when accused-‐appellant
and her mother started living together as husband and wife. She considered accused-‐appellant to be
her father and calls him "Tatay." Her mother is the one earning for the family, by selling bananas in
Carigara, Leyte.

On July 20, 1999, at around 2:00 a.m., AAA was in their house in Tunga, Leyte. Her mother
was away, selling bananas in Carigara, while her younger siblings were upstairs, sleeping. At that
time, AAA was in second year high school and was thirteen years old. After working on her school
assignment, AAA cooked rice downstairs in the kitchen. While she was busy cooking rice, she did
not notice the arrival of accused-‐appellant, who suddenly embraced her from her back. She
identified accused-‐appellant as the person who embraced her since she immediately turned around
and the place was illuminated by a kerosene lamp. AAA resisted and was able to release herself
from accused-‐appellant’s hold. Accused-‐appellant unsheathed the long bolo, locally called a
sundang, from the scabbard on his waist and ordered her to go upstairs. Poking the sundang at
AAA’s stomach, he then ordered AAA to take off her shorts, and told her he will kill her, her siblings
and her mother if she does not do as she was told.

AAA complied with accused-‐appellant’s orders. When she was lying on the floor, already
undressed, accused-‐appellant placed the sundang beside her on her left side. He took off his shirt
and shorts and went on top of her. AAA did not shout since accused-‐appellant threatened to kill
them all if she did. He held her hair with his right hand and touched her private parts with his left
hand. He then "poked" his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. AAA felt pain.
Accused-‐appellant kissed her and said "Ah, you’re still a virgin." When accused-‐appellant was done,
he stood and said "If you will tell this to anybody, I will kill you."

AAA did not tell her mother about the incident as she was afraid accused-‐appellant will
execute his threat to kill them all. The sexual advances were thereafter repeated every time AAA’s
mother sold bananas on Wednesdays and Sundays.

On January 8, 2001, accused-‐appellant ordered AAA to pack and go with him to Tabontabon,
Leyte, threatening once more to kill her siblings if she does not comply. In Tabontabon, accused-‐
appellant once again forced AAA to have sex with him. The following day, AAA’s mother,
accompanied by police officers of Tunga, Leyte, arrived, searching for AAA and the accused-‐
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appellant. AAA was finally able to talk to her mother, which led to AAA’s filing a complaint for rape
against accused-‐appellant.

The RTC of Carigara, Leyte rendered a Decision finding accused-‐appellant guilty of the crime
of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding accused-‐appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape?

Ruling: No

Accused-‐appellant asserts that AAA’s testimony that the sexual intercourse between them
was not consensual is "patently incredible." According to accused-‐appellant, AAA could have
escaped after she was raped for the first time on July 20, 1999. Since AAA was already residing in
her aunt’s house, she should never have returned to BBB and accused-‐appellant’s house in order to
prevent the repeated sexual intercourse after July 20, 1999 and the before the incident in
Tabontabon. Accused-‐appellant furthermore claim that the delay in revealing her alleged sexual
ordeals from July 20, 1999 up to January 10, 2001 creates serious doubts as to her contention that
she was raped.

We must emphasize that when the accused in a rape case claims, as in the case at bar, that
the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, the burden of evidence
shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship.
Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence, such as by some
documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.

Other than his self-‐serving testimony, however, accused-‐appellant failed to adduce evidence
of his supposed relationship with AAA. The testimony of Davocol as regards seeing AAA and
accused-‐appellant on July 20, 1999 boarding a jeep bound for Tacloban does not in any way suggest
a romantic or sexual relationship between them. On the other hand, we are convinced that the
sordid version of facts presented by accused-‐appellant is nothing but a depraved concoction by a
very twisted and obnoxious imagination. Accused-‐appellant’s tale of being seduced by his 13-‐year
old stepdaughter who calls him "Tatay" or "Papa," and having sexual intercourse with her while her
mother was watching and crying is not only nauseatingly repulsive but is likewise utterly
incredible. It is unthinkable for BBB, who helped AAA file the complaint and testified against
accused-‐appellant, to just passively endure such an outrage happening before her very eyes. The
trial court, which observed the demeanor of AAA, BBB and the accused-‐appellant on the witness
stand, did not find accused-‐appellant’s account plausible, and instead gave full faith and credence to
the testimonies of AAA and BBB. The trial court, in fact, described accused-‐appellant’s demeanor as
boastful and his narration as a make-‐believe story.

While at the witness stand, the accused boastfully testified and took out from the back
pocket of his pants a panty of a woman which according to him was given to him by AAA after their
sexual intercourse to which he exchanged it with his own brief as a proof that AAA enjoyed having
sexual intercourse with him.

Page 236 of 299


Contrary to the assertions of accused-‐appellant, the fact that AAA was not able to escape
when she had the opportunity to do so, her continued visit to their home after the incident, and her
delay in filing the complaint does not at all contradict her credibility. As discussed by the Court of
Appeals, when a rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act
coherently. Her failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape does not automatically vitiate
the credibility of her account. Similarly, in People v. Lazaro, we propounded on the impropriety of
judging the actions of child rape victims by the norms of behavior that can be expected from adults
under similar circumstances:

It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time the assault on her virtue. Her
initial hesitation may be due to her youth and the molester’s threat against her. Besides, rape
victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would
when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar
circumstances. x x x. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from them. Certainly, the
Court has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has
been violated. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending
on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. Indeed,
different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard
form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful
experience. x x x.

In all, we do not find sufficient ground to overturn the guilty verdict rendered by the lower
courts. However, the proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence, we modify the amount of exemplary damages for qualified rape by increasing the
same from Twenty-‐Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
following established jurisprudence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WELMO. LINSIE y BINEVIDEZ

In rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things. Rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the
incident, so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory, thus,
a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended
party.

Facts:

At around 11 o’clock in the morning of December 14, 2005, accused-‐appellant, armed with a
knife allegedly committed rape against complainant at Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque City. After
raping her, appellant threatened to kill her and told her not to tell her common law husband about
what happened. Because she could no longer hide from her husband what happened, she told him
about it the following day. They both went to the barangay and had the incident blottered. She was
able to have a medical checkup on December 17, 2005.

Page 237 of 299


On December 19, 2014, appellant was charged of rape. During the trial, complainant
testified that she has known appellant for a very long time because he is a "kababayan" from Bicol.
On the other hand, appellant testified that he does not know of any reason the complainant is
accusing him of rape. He denied that on December 14, 2005 at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning,
armed with a knife, he raped her. He left his house at around 6 o’clock in the morning to work as a
construction worker in the house of Aling Gigi and went home around 5 o’clock in the afternoon on
the same day.

Nevertheless, the trial court convicted accused-‐appellant of one count of the felony of
simple rape as defined and penalized in Article 266-‐A, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-‐B,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.

Appellant appealed his conviction. On review, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
affirming the trial court ruling. Undaunted, appellant filed the instant appeal before the Supreme
Court.

Issues:

1. Does the credibility of the rape victim’s testimony is a recurring crucial factor in the resolution of
a case of rape?
2. Is the failure of the rape victim to shout, fight back, or escape from the scoundrel is tantamount to
consent or approval?
3. Are a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of
rape, indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape?

Rulings:

1. Yes

It is settled in jurisprudence that in reviewing rape convictions, the court is guided by three
principles, namely:

a. That an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to
prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;
b. That in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving two persons, the
rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and
c. That the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

In rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things. With regard to appellant’s assertion that complainant’s testimony was
plagued with inconsistencies and variations that would merit appellant’s acquittal, it is concluded
that these discrepancies in complainant’s testimony involve minor matters that do not constitute
material facts or circumstances of consequence. The suppositions that appellant could not have
raped the complainant as his legs at one point were supposedly sandwiching complainant’s legs or
that he could not have been able to undress while pointing a knife at the victim do not necessarily
render complainant’s testimony incredible. In the present case, the complainant categorically stated
Page 238 of 299


under oath that despite her attempts to resist, appellant succeeded in removing her panty and
inserting his penis inside her sexual organ, thereby consummating the crime of rape.

Furthermore, rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the
incident, so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory,
thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the
offended party.

2. No.

Appellant’s allegation that the complainant did not tenaciously resist his sexual advances is
rejected. The victim’s testimony will bear out that she did exert efforts to refuse appellant’s carnal
desires by slapping the accused, kicking him and trying to create noise but she was physically
overpowered and intimidated by the threat of mortal harm posed by appellant’s knife as well as
debilitated by illness. Failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or escape from the scoundrel is
not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no obligation to exhibit defiance or
present proof of struggle.

3. No.

Appellant’s attempt to discredit the medico-‐legal report cannot exculpate him from liability
for rape because the said document and the medico-‐legal’s subsequent testimony are not essential
for the prosecution and conviction of a person accused of rape. A medical examination and a
medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a
successful prosecution for rape.

Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive
and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as
between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi
on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he
was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Appellant’s alibi did not sufficiently
establish that he was working at a construction site when the complainant was raped and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Likewise,
the corroborating testimony of defense witness Talinghale does not discount the possibility that
appellant may have left the construction site to commit the dastardly act he was charged with and
came back afterwards
.
Appellant failed to show any motive why the complainant would testify falsely against him.
This fact further bolsters the veracity of the complainant’s accusation since no woman would
concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her
family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape,
unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her. Therefore,
the conviction of appellant for the felony of simple rape is affirmed.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in favor of
appellant; however, considering that the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua is single and
indivisible, the same may not serve to lower the penalty.
Page 239 of 299


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DALTON LAURIAN, JR. y PUGSOT

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things. The very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that, usually, only the participants can
directly testify as to its occurrence.
Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim
and the latter submits out of fear — the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make
voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.
A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his
beloved to his carnal desires against her will.

Facts:

At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of September 28, 2001, at Poblacion, Baguias, Benguet,
the accused allegedly committed rape against a 16-‐year-‐old girl when he suddenly pulled the
complainant by the hand and led her towards a classroom at Baguias Central School while on her
way home after attending a fellowship at the Assembly of God Church. Out of fear, the complainant
never told anyone of the incident. It was only when her landlady wrote her mother, informing her
of her disappearance on that fateful night that she eventually told her mother what happened.

After learning of the incident, the complainant was immediately referred to a psychologist
and to a medico-‐legal officer for medical check-‐up. The examination conducted revealed shallow
healed lacerations at 3 and 7 o’clock positions and deep healed lacerations at 9 o’clock positions of
the hymen. On the other hand, the psychologist found her to be suffering intense anxiety, inferred
to be due to her traumatic experience of sexual abuse.

Thereafter, the complainant filed a criminal complaint against appellant. Upon learning of
the case, appellant went to the house of the complainant’s grandfather five times to offer marriage
to the victim as a form of settlement.

On the other hand, the defense offered an alternate narrative that the accused and
complainant were sweethearts and having amorous relationship.

The trial court convicted the accused for the felony of rape under Article 266-‐A, paragraph
1(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals but the
appellate court merely upheld the lower court’s judgment. Thus, the appellant, filed the instant
appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. In a prosecution for rape, may the accused be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim?
2. Is there a need to establish physical resistance on the part of the rape victim?
3. May the accused interpose the defense of Sweetheart Theory in the case at bar?

Page 240 of 299


Ruling:

1. Yes.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that, usually, only the participants
can directly testify as to its occurrence.

Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code defines when and how the felony of rape is
committed, to wit: Rape is committed –
A. Bye a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(2) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
(3) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
(4) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
B. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

2. No.

Contrary to appellant’s insistence that the essential element of the use of force or
intimidation was not present in this case because the complainant never exhibited an adequate
amount of resistance despite the fact that appellant was drunk and unarmed, it is evident from the
transcript that appellant used his physical superiority to intimidate and force the complainant into
coming with him inside a dark classroom and later to knock her unconscious which facilitated the
consummation of rape. It matters not whether the complainant strongly resisted appellant’s
unwanted purpose for it is jurisprudentially settled that physical resistance need not be established
when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits out of fear –the failure to
shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal
acts of the accused.

Furthermore, force or violence required in rape cases is relative –it does not need to be
overpowering or irresistible and it is present when it allows the offender to consummate his
purpose. In other words, the degree of force or violence required to be proven in a rape charge
varies because it is dependent upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to
each other.

Records show that the complainant was only 16 years old and 5 feet 3 inches in height when
she was raped; while appellant was 21 years old and 5 feet and 7 inches in height. Understandably,
a girl of such young age could only cower in fear and yield into submission to such an adult. Rape,
after all, is nothing more than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps a woman
in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible for a victim of rape not to make an
outcry against an unarmed assailant.

Page 241 of 299


A rape charge becomes doubtful only when the delay or inaction in revealing its
commission is unreasonable and unexplained. With respect to the complainant’s actions
immediately following the rape incident at issue as well as her delay in reporting the crime which
appellant both characterized as indicative of the falsity of her accusation, there has never been any
uniformity or consistency of behavior to be expected from those who had the misfortune of being
sexually molested. Some of them have found the courage early on to publicly denounce the abuses
they experienced, but that there were others who have opted to initially keep their harrowing
ordeals to themselves and to just move on with their lives as if nothing had happened, until the
limits of their tolerance were reached. The complainant belonged to the latter group of victims, as
her honest declarations to the trial court revealed. Also, it cannot be expected from the immature
and inexperienced complainant to measure up to the same standard of conduct and reaction that
we would expect from adults whose maturity in age and experience could have brought them to
stand up more quickly to their interest. Lastly, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape
to the proper authorities have not always been considered as an indication of a false accusation.

When the complainant relived her ordeal at the witness stand, she broke down in tears
more than once. This only serves to bolster her credibility considering that the crying of a victim
during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion
indicates the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience.

The defense of denial was ineffectively supported by corroboration from witnesses who are
composed of appellant’s friends and acquaintances. It is well-‐settled in jurisprudence that denial,
just like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an
accused by the complainant and that mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of
appellant in the crime attributed to him.

3. No.

Granting without conceding that the accused and the complainant knew each other prior to
the rape incident at issue and that he had been courting the complainant, implying they were
sweethearts holds true, the damning declaration made by the complainant that she was raped by
appellant stands undiminished. The use of force or intimidation in sexual intercourse is not
necessarily ruled out by the mere claim of an amorous relationship. Love affair does not justify rape
for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against
her will.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINO PALDO

It is a well-‐established rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given
full weight and credit. When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in
effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be
willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her
own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and
punished.

Page 242 of 299


Facts:

Accused-‐appellant Lino Paldo was charged with qualified rape under Article 266-‐A(1) in
relation to Article 266-‐B(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353. An Information was
filed against him at the RTC in Banaue, Ifugao accusing him of having carnal knowledge with his
daughter, who was eight (8) years old at the time when the crime was committed.

Upon arraignment, accused Paldo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

According to the prosecution’s version of events, in the evening of March 10, 2001, the
accused and her daughter (AAA) were sleeping at their residence when suddenly AAA was
awakened by her father who removed her pants and thereafter raped her. Although there were no
lights on, the victim knew it was the accused who sexually assaulted her, being very familiar with
her own father. The accused threatened her not to tell the victim’s mother who was not around
when the incident happened. However, the victim narrated to her mother who arrived home on
March 12, 2001 about the incident thereby causing the filing of the present complaint against the
accused.

Accused, on his part, denied the accusations against him. He averred that from February to
March 2001, he was working for Maria Pin-‐ag in Kinakin, Chapeh, Banaue, Ifugao which was a two-‐
hour hike from their residence. He also averred that he did not go home to their residence on the
night of the alleged rape, rather he stayed in Chapeh with his two friends. He also asserted that he
could not have raped his daughter on March 10, 2001 since the victim was not staying in their
residence, but was living with her grandfather at the place where she was studying.

Much of the accused’s arguments focused on the purported inconsistencies of the victim’s
testimony which cast doubt on credibility: (1) that there was no electric light inside their house
when the alleged rape took place so the victim could have seen the face of the rapist; (2) that the
school records reveal that the victim was not staying at their residence where the alleged rape took
place; and (3) that the rape case was filed against the accused at the instigation of his wife.

RTC found the accused-‐appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for raping his daughter
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The Appellate Court affirmed his conviction hence this
petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the testimony of minor victims of rape can be given full weight and credit.
2. Whether or not the accused’s denial and alibi will prosper.
3. Whether or not the presentation of the birth certificate is an all-‐exclusive requisite in proving the
age of the victim.

Ruling:

1. Yes, it is a well-‐established rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are
given full weight and credit.

The Court has ruled that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped,
she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts usually give
Page 243 of 299


greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor,
particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public
trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it
not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished.

In this case, the victim (AAA) was barely eight (8) years old when she was raped by the
accused-‐appellant.

Moreover, the fact that the room was dark because there was no electricity in the house is
insignificant and cannot be considered as a hindrance for the victim’s identification of the accused
as her rapist, especially considering that the accused is her father, with whom she is very familiar,
even when it is dark. During rape incidents, the offender and the victim are as close to each other as
is physically possible.

The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost
importance in establishing the truth and falsity of the charge of rape. When AAA immediately
narrated to her mother about the incident and thereafter, straightaway reported the matter to the
authorities, strengthened the belief that AAA had been raped by the accused-‐appellant.

2. No, the accused’s denial and alibi will not prosper.

The accused cannot totally deny that he was at their house when the rape happened in
order to counter and categorical declarations of AAA that her father raped her.

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when
the crime was committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.

In this case, the accused acknowledged that the travel time of 1-‐2 hours from Chapeh to
their residence did not pose an insurmountable barrier for the accused to actually take a trip from
Chapeh to their residence and back after committing the crime. Hence, it was not physically
impossible for the accused-‐appellant to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.

3. No, the presentation of the birth certificate is not an all-‐exclusive requisite in proving the age of
the victim.

The following are the guidelines established by the Court in appreciating age as either an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

a) The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified
true copy thereof;

b) In the absence of the abovementioned documents, similar authentic documents may be
presented such as baptismal certificates and school records;

c) If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible
testimonies of the victim’s mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under
certain circumstances; and
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d) In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and testimonies
of the victim’s mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim
may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.

It is prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. The
trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In this case, the victim’s mother testified that her daughter (AAA) was born on February 9,
2001 and was eight years old at the time of the rape. The victim herself categorically stated in her
Sworn Statement and Supplemental Sworn Statement that she was eight years old. Even accused-‐
appellant, in his testimony before the trial court, confirmed that the victim was 8 years old in March
2011.

Therefore, since the rape of victim was qualified by AAA’s minority and the accused’s
paternity, the Court of Appeals was correct in determining the proper penalty that can be imposed
upon the accused which is reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI

It is jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the
exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the fate of the
accused in a rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the victim’s testimony. In
this regard, the Court defers to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of victim’s testimony, most
especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10)
months after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations.

Facts:

AAA is sixteen years old and a resident of x x x, Leyte. She testified that she knows accused
Mervin Gahi (Mervin), the latter being the husband of her aunt DDD. Mervin was charged of two
instances of rape against AAA.

On the first instance of rape, AAA recounted that on March 11, 2002 at about 11:30 in the
morning, she was in her grandmother’s house, who was then out of the house to collect money from
debtors. While she was in the living room mopping the floor, Mervin arrived in the house. AAA
recounted that Mervin came near her and instructed her to "Lie down, lie down". Fearful upon
hearing Mervin’s orders, AAA stopped mopping the floor. Mervin, with his right hand, then held
AAA’s right arm. He pushed AAA, causing her to lose her balance and fall on the floor. Mervin raised
AAA’s skirt and proceeded to take off her underwear. Mervin was holding a knife poking it at AAA’s
right breast. Fearful for her life, AAA did not resist Mervin’s initial advances. After taking off AAA’s
underwear, Mervin went on top of her and while in that position, he took off his shorts, inserted his
penis inside her vagina and ejaculated. AAA’s efforts to free herself from Mervin’s hold were
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unsuccessful. As a result of her struggle, she felt tired and weak. After satisfying his lust, Mervin
warned AAA to keep secret what transpired or else he would kill her. Afraid that he would make
good his threat, AAA did not mention to anybody what happened, even to her aunt DDD, the wife of
the accused.

On the second instance of rape, AAA recalled that the second rape occurred on March 12,
2002 at about three o’clock in the afternoon. On her way to the field and with a carabao in tow, she
was met by Mervin along the foot trail. While on the foot trail, Mervin went near AAA, prompting
her to hurriedly scamper to BBB’s house. Mervin followed her. Once in the living room of BBB’s
house, Mervin approached AAA, poked a knife at the right side of her body, pushed her and made
her lie down. Out of fear, she didn’t resist Mervin’s advances. He threatened and ordered her to
"keep quiet, don’t talk". Then he raised her skirt and took off her underwear, after which, he took
off his short pants and his brief, laid himself on top of her, and made pumping motions until he
ejaculated. Blood came out of AAA’s vagina. After the rape, AAA cried while the accused left the
house. Just like before, she did not mention the incident to anybody, not even to her grandmother
and to her aunt DDD, for fear that Mervin might kill them.

AAA narrated that the first person she told about her ordeal was Lynlyn, her employer in
Ormoc, where AAA spent three months working, when the former was able to detect her pregnancy.
It was also Lynlyn who accompanied her to the Capoocan Police Station to report and file the case.
After reporting the matter to the police, AAA did not go back to Ormoc anymore and later gave
birth. Instead, she and her baby stayed with the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).

The defense presented several witnesses to belie the claim. After hearing, RTC found Mervin
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Rape plus damages. On appeal, CA affirmed the
decision with modification as to the damages. On this petition, Mervin maintains that AAA’s
incredible and inconsistent testimony does not form sufficient basis for him to be convicted of two
counts of rape. He argues that his testimony along with that of other defense witnesses should have
been accorded greater weight and credibility. He faults the trial court for ignoring the extended
time period between the alleged rapes and the birth of AAA’s baby; and for disbelieving Jackie
Gucela’s testimony which stated that the latter was AAA’s lover and the father of AAA’s child,
contrary to AAA’s claim that the baby was the fruit of appellant’s unlawful carnal congress with her.
He also insists that his alibi should have convinced the trial court that he is innocent because he was
at another place at the time the rapes were allegedly committed by him. On the strength of these
assertions, appellant believes that he is deserving of an acquittal that is long overdue because the
prosecution failed miserably to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

1. Whether Mervin is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
2. Whether sweetheart theory is a valid defense for Mervin.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty against Gahi.

Ruling:

1. Gahi is guilty of simple rape.

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Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code defines when and how the felony of rape is
committed, to wit:

Rape is committed –
circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

It is jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it
satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the fate of the accused in a rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the
victim’s testimony. In this regard, the Court defers to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of AAA’s testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the Court express their agreement with the statement made by the Court of
Appeals that it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10) months
after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations. In any event, we dismiss
appellant’s contention as immaterial to the case at bar because jurisprudence tells us that
impregnation is not an element of rape. This rule was eloquently explained in People v. Bejic:

It is well-‐entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant
childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was
fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the
latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner.

2. Sweetheart theory is not applicable in this case.

The Court assigns no significance to the testimony of defense witness Jackie Gucela. Firstly,
AAA categorically denied that Jackie Gucela was her boyfriend or that she had sexual relations with
him or any other person other than appellant near the time of the rape incidents at issue. For the
sweetheart theory to be believed when invoked by the accused, convincing evidence to prove the
existence of the supposed relationship must be presented by the proponent of the theory. The Court
elucidated on this principle in People v. Bayrante, to wit:

For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship
must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence
renders his claim to be self-‐serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the
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Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation
by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.

In the present case, although it is a person other than the accused who is claiming to be the
victim’s sweetheart and the father of her child, such an assertion must nonetheless be believably
demonstrated by the evidence. The defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that AAA and
Jackie Gucela had any kind of romantic or sexual relationship which resulted in AAA’s pregnancy.
We quote with approval the discussion made by the Court of Appeals on this matter:

In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic
attachment with a person other than the accused at the time of the rape incidents or
thereafter, this circumstance would not necessarily negate the truth of AAA’s statement that
the appellant, her aunt’s husband, twice had carnal knowledge of her through force and
intimidation and without her consent.

3. The CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua against Mervin.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the penalty imposed on appellant from death (as decreed
by the trial court) to reclusion perpetua. It has been established that appellant committed the
aforementioned felonies with the use of a deadly weapon which according to Article 266-‐B,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating circumstance present in this case, the proper penalty of imprisonment should be
reclusion perpetua for each instance of rape.

It is worth noting that appellant is an uncle by affinity of AAA.

Following the 5th paragraph (1) of Article 266-‐B of the Revised Penal Code, a relationship
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity taken with the minority of AAA would have
merited the imposition of the death penalty. However, no such close relationship was shown in this
case as accused appears to be the husband of AAA’s father’s cousin. In any case, the death penalty
has been abolished by the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which also mandated that the
outlawed penalty be replaced with reclusion perpetua. A qualifying or aggravating circumstance, if
properly alleged and proven, might not have the effect of changing the term of imprisonment but it
would, nevertheless, be material in determining the amount of pecuniary damages to be imposed.

Thus, in view of the foregoing, we affirm the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals which
was reclusion perpetua for each conviction of simple rape. The award of moral damages in the
amount P50,000.00 is likewise upheld. However, the award of civil indemnity should be reduced
from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with jurisprudence. For the same reason, the award of
exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 toP30,000.00.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ

When through evidence, the accused is guilty of ‘rape through sexual assault’ but the
information charged against him is ‘rape through carnal knowledge’, the accused cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material
differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice-‐versa. Consequently, to convict the accused of rape by
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sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, the accused, on the said information, may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness.

Facts:

AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse
took place on three (3) different dates, particularly in December 2003, February 2004, and March
27, 2004. AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with Bernabe
Pareja (Pareja) who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their
children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in Pasay City.

The first incident took place in December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s
mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the
situation, Pareja, while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was
already naked, begun to undress AAA. Pareja then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied,
Pareja likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt,
AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house. AAA never told anyone about the
December 2003 incident for fear that Pareja might kill her. Pareja threatened to kill AAA in the
event that she would expose the incident to anyone.

In February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by Pareja.
Under the same circumstances as the December 2003 incident, with her mother not around while
she and her half-‐siblings were asleep, Pareja again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts.
But this time, Pareja caressed her and held her vagina and inserted his finger in it. With regard to
the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw
Pareja in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s
mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then
narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by Pareja many times.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. After the results of the medico-‐
legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then filed a complaint for rape
before the Pasay City Police Station.

Pareja, on the other hand, offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his
defense. He denied raping AAA but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-‐in
partner and that they all stay in the same house. Pareja further averred that it would have been
impossible that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of
their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10)
meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the
vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side.
Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings. All taken into account, [Pareja]
asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about with his plan without
AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.

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Pareja was charged of two counts of rape and attempted rape. The RTC acquitted Pareja
from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. On appeal, CA
affirmed RTC’s ruling in toto.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of rape

Ruling:

The accused in not guilty of rape but may be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-‐Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the
concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-‐related" orifices other than a
woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender-‐free
rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons
and the introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through
carnal knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’" Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article
335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-‐A.

Under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-‐A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as
"organ rape" or "penile rape." The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is
carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Article 266-‐A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or
object rape," or "gender-‐free rape." It must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

In a previous case, the Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be
a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the
offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.

Under Article 266-‐A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual
assault is "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."

AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis
into her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident,
she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the
occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the
Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable. However, since the charge in the Information
for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of
rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences
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and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily
included in the second, and vice-‐versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault
when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. The
following elements must be proven:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

Clearly, the above-‐mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and
were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was
for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.

The February 2004 Incident

It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution
against Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on the
rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had
to modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond
reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a
second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-‐1556-‐CFM, or the February 2004
incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she was actually penetrated by
Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.

This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, stated that aside
from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to
give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being
repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to
testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she
added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the
material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004
incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall
under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in the
crime of rape. Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked
both her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a
quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AURELIO JASTIVA

When the accused asserts that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the "kamalig"
where the crime took place, utterly diminished victim’s ability to identify him or anyone for that
matter, is downright erroneous. The victim never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the
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"kamalig." What was testified was the fact that the victim saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past
her by the open door of the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. The Court
have held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground
unmeritorious. Furthermore, in other cases the Court ruled, “If identification of persons is possible even
by the light of stars, with more reason that one could identify persons by moonlight.”

Facts:

On August 3, 2004, then 67-‐year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn in a farmland
located at Sitio XXX, Zamboanga del Norte, when her husband, BBB, left her alone. BBB spent that
night in their permanent residence at Sitio WWW because their daughter has no companion.

At about 11:00 in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later identified
as accused-‐appellant Aurelio Jastiva (Jastiva) covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and
told her not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA grabbed accused-‐
appellant’s hand and felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, accused-‐appellant removed
AAA’s underwear. However, he cannot proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet
erected (sic), accused-‐appellant therefore toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. Accused-‐
appellant then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue. The latter evaded her assaulter’s
sexual advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the same through her teeth.
Once done, accused-‐appellant held his penis and inserted it to AAA’s vagina. After fulfilling his
sexual desire and before AAA could stand up, accused-‐appellant tapped AAA’s shoulder and said
"Salamat" (Thank you).

AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-‐appellant out. When the latter passed
through (sic) AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the
moon, that it was their (sic) neighbor accused-‐appellant who abused her. Engulfed with fear, AAA
immediately closed the door because she thought that accused-‐appellant might go (sic) back and
kill her. AAA later learned that accused-‐appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen to
enter the small barn. AAA was no longer able to sleep after the incident.

In the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her neighbor Corazon Mokot and
her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her that they will bring the matter to the attention of
the authorities. AAA and BBB went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident. The officer-‐on-‐duty
wrote a barangay blotter about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically examined which
revealed that AAA’s labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of irritation and are
reddish in color, in addition to a partial separation of tissues noted between the labium. AAA’s
vaginal opening also showed signs of irritation and are (sic) reddish in color. The same also stated
that AAA sustained multiple scratches at both her upper and lower lips.

AAA filed a Complaint for Rape against Jastiva. On the other hand, the defense offered
testimonies of several witnesses to counter the evidence. According to the defense, appellant
Jastiva, 49 years old at the time of the incident, could not have committed the crime because on the
date and time thereof, he was at home sleeping. After trial and upon evaluation of the evidence on
record, the RTC found appellant Jastiva guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the
decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
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Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable
doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence
presented.

Ruling:

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Article 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:
ART. 266-‐A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation.

From the above-‐quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1,
subparagraph a) are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or
intimidation.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had carnal
knowledge of AAA against the latter’s will through force and intimidation. Despite his vigorous
protestations, this Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by appellant Jastiva
against AAA was proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAA’s credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances
surrounding her rape;
b) AAA’s positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;
c) The physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped; and
d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against
appellant Jastiva.

Firstly, the appeal of appellant Jastiva centers on the credibility of AAA, the main
prosecution witness. But credibility of a witness is the sole province of the RTC being the trial court
in this case. Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on matters of credibility of
witnesses are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Such conclusiveness
derives from the trial court’s having the first-‐hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and
manner of the victim when he/she testified at the trial.42 Undeniably, the calibration of the
testimony of a witness, and the assessment of the probative weight thereof, are virtually left, almost
entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness at the
stand. Unless there are substantial matters that might have been overlooked or discarded,
generally, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on
appeal.

It is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation of
rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in
mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits; and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was
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committed. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is
accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s testimony.
This is because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the
risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.

The testimony of AAA was shown to be credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature; and the fact that AAA is already of advanced age lends more credence to her
protestations of rape and inspires the thought that this case was filed for the genuine reason of
seeking justice.

Secondly, the circumstances after the commission of the rape testified to by AAA sufficed to
establish the ability of the latter to identify appellant Jastiva as the perpetrator of the crime.
Appellant Jastiva’s assertions that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the "kamalig"
where the crime took place, utterly diminished AAA’s ability to identify him or anyone for that
matter, is downright specious. AAA never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the "kamalig."
What AAA testified to was the fact that she saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the
open door of the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. The Court have
held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be sufficient
illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.
The ruling in People v. Pueblas, citing the earlier ruling in People v. Vacal, is even more to the point,
“If identification of persons is possible even by the light of stars, with more reason that one could
identify persons by moonlight.”

Jastiva further tries to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that AAA’s claim that he
indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary
to the normal conduct of a rapist, i.e., that "normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be
caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what
actually happened in this case." He reasons that he could not have engaged in sexual foreplay
because he could not have known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse on the night in
question.

Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and
audacious circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the
crampness of the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has
been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.

All told, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jastiva committed
the crime of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA using force and intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCO BILLA

Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child, among
other acts. In this case, AAA positively identified the accused-‐appellant as the person who kicked her in
the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on. Because of the said
brutal and inhumane acts of the accused-‐appellant, AAA suffered bruises and contusions in different
parts of her body. Furthermore, the Court finds no cogent reason to disbelieve AAA’s testimony, which
Page 254 of 299


was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano that the victim’s hymen
had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 o’clock positions." Jurisprudence provides that the
eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-‐virgin state,
should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges of rape.
Facts:
Escobilla was separately charged with child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified rape in separate informations before the RTC. Said crimes were
alleged to have been committed against AAA as follows:
AAA was born on March 29, 1992 to Escobilla and BBB. AAA’s parents separated as the
Escobilla was beating BBB. AAA then lived with her aunt until the Escobilla took her in. In the year
2000, AAA lived in the Escobilla’s house. One day, she was awakened from her sleep when the
Escobilla removed her shorts and panty. Escobilla then removed his shorts and went on top of AAA.
He inserted his penis into her organ and told her not to create any noise because their neighbors
might hear them. He also warned AAA that he would kill her if she would report the incident. AAA
could not do anything but cry. Subsequently, at around 6:00 a.m. on January 17, 2005, AAA woke up
with her legs spread apart and tied to wooden panels on the wall. She was only wearing her upper
clothing and was not wearing her shorts and panty anymore. Escobilla removed his shorts and only
wore briefs. Escobilla then lay on top of her and began to insert his penis into her organ, which
caused her pain. While Escobilla was doing said act, he told AAA not to report the incident;
otherwise, he threatened to cut her tongue and kill her. Thereafter, the Escobilla untied her.
On January 23, 2005, Escobilla asked AAA to look for a lighter. When AAA failed to find one,
Escobilla told her to go inside a room in their house. There, he kicked AAA in the buttocks, hit her
head with a hammer and smashed her head on the wooden wall. She suffered injuries on her
forehead and the back of her head. Afterwards, she told the Escobilla that she was going to use the
toilet so she was able to go out of their house. She ran to the street and went to the house of a
neighbor, Ate Annie. Escobilla looked for her there so she hid under the bed. After Escobilla left,
AAA was brought to the house of Nanay Loleng, a neighbor of Ate Annie. They treated AAA’s
wounds and put her to sleep. When she woke up, the barangay tanods were already at the place.
They first talked to AAA then they called the police so that the Escobilla could be apprehended.
When Escobilla was arrested, AAA was brought to the police station where she gave her statement.
AAA was then taken to the hospital where she was treated and examined by doctors.
Issue:

Whether or not Escobilla is guilty of child abuse and qualified rape.

Ruling:

Yes.
In Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-‐appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing child abuse by infliction of physical injury against
AAA. Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child,
among other acts.
Page 255 of 299


In this case, AAA positively identified the accused-‐appellant as the person who kicked her in
the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on January 23, 2005.
Because of the said brutal and inhumane acts of the accused-‐appellant, AAA suffered bruises and
contusions in different parts of her body. The Medico-‐Legal Certification of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr.
Arellano clearly reflected the fact that AAA indeed sustained contusions, coupled with a finding that
she suffered multiple physical injuries secondary to mauling.
In the case of qualified rape, pursuant to Art. 266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code, a charge of
rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was
under twelve years of age or was demented.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused-‐appellant had
carnal knowledge of AAA on January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in a straightforward manner the
harrowing details of how the Escobilla had sexual intercourse with her. Again, the RTC found
credible and convincing AAA’s testimony on this matter. Likewise, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disbelieve AAA’s testimony, which was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte
and Dr. Arellano that the victim’s hymen had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 o’clock
positions." We held in People v. Oden that the "eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the
medical findings attesting to her non-‐virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her
charges." As to the manner by which the rape was committed, the accused-‐appellant’s moral
ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is required in rape cases.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL ABAT y COMETA

Impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape.

Facts:

On November 15, 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging Abat with the
crime of Rape allegedly committed against AAA, his niece, and a 15 year old minor. Abat pleaded
not guilty to the charge upon his arraignment on January 30, 2002. The pretrial conference was
held, after which, trial on the merits ensued. According to the prosecution, the facts of the case are
as follows: On September 22, 2001, around eight o’clock in the evening, AAA was home with her
parents and siblings. Abat, (an uncle of AAA, being the half-‐brother of AAA’s father), with the
permission of AAA’s parents, brought AAA with him to the poblacion to buy medicine. The two
proceeded to the poblacion on board a tricycle driven by Abat. Then, he drove the tricycle to
Barangay Malabo. Upon reaching Barangay Malabo, Abat brought AAA to her grandfather’s nipa hut.
Abat undressed himself then laid AAA down on a bamboo bed. Abat then succeeded to obtain carnal
knowledge of the victim. AAA struggled and tried to push Abat away but he threatened to kill her
and her family if she would tell anybody about the “act.” AAA, fearing that Abat will make good of
his threat, didn’t tell her parents of the assault.

On November 12, 2001, Abat tried to force AAA to go to his house. Thus, in the evening, AAA
informed her parents about the rape incident and they went to Victoria Police Station to lodge a
complaint against Abat. Because of rape, AAA, on April 24, 2002, gave birth to a baby girl. For his
defense, Abat claims that he and AAA considered themselves as lovers. She frequently visited him
Page 256 of 299


during Saturdays and Sundays. AAA’s parents filed a case against him when they discovered she
was pregnant.

Abat was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals found no error committed by the RTC, and affirmed Abat’s conviction.
Abat is now alleging that he and AAA had a romantic relationship, which eventually turned sour
when AAA started asking for money from him all the time. In support of this claim, he cites the birth
date of the baby, who was supposedly the product of his crime. Abat says that if the baby was born
in April 2002, then his version of the story, that they had consensual sex in July 2001, is more
credible than her story of rape in September 2001; otherwise, the baby would have been
premature.

Issues:

1. Is the determination of the exact date of fertilization material to the crime of rape?
2. Is denial and ill-‐motive a defense in the crime of rape?

Ruling:

1. No. The Court, in People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 (1998), said: “[A]uthorities in forensic
medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The exact
date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of
pregnancy.” Citing a Filipino authority, the Court further elucidated: “The average duration of
pregnancy is 270 to 280 days from the onset of the last menstruation. There is, however, no means
of determining it with certainty. Evidence derived from pregnancy following a single coitus is
trustworthy, but inasmuch as some authorities consider more than two weeks as the life span of the
spermatozoa in the vaginal canal, it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization. There is no
synchrony between coitus and fertilization.

In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape. Proof that the child
was fathered by another man does not show that accusedappellant is not guilty, considering the
positive testimony of Amalia that accused appellant had abused her. As held in People v. Alib:
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation;(2)When the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)When the woman is under twelve
years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present. It is therefore quite clear that the pregnancy of the victim is not
required. For the conviction of an accused, it is sufficient that the prosecution establish beyond
reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of the offended party and that he had committed
such act under any of the circumstances enumerated above. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act
of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.

2. Abat’s attempt to escape liability by denying the charge against him and coupling it with
the imputation of ill motive against AAA’s parents must be ignored. “Motives such as resentment,
hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor rape victim.” More so in this case, where the attribution of the improper motive is against
AAA’s parents and not her personally.

Page 257 of 299


Furthermore, the Court has never favorably looked upon the defense of denial, which
constitutes selfserving negative evidence that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the positive declaration of a credible witness. To elucidate on the point, this Court, in People v.
Espinosa, held that: It is wellsettled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is a selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Denial cannot prevail over the positive,
candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the
complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO DELA CRUZ

Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in
this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique opportunity
to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether they were telling
the truth.
Facts:
In two separate Informations, the prosecution charged the accused-‐appellant with two (2)
counts of rape that were allegedly committed against AAA in the following manner:
[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3253-‐M-‐2004]
That on or about the 9th day of September 2003, in [XXX], and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-‐named accused, father of the offended party, [AAA], did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], then fifteen (15) years old, against her will and
without her consent.
[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3254-‐M-‐2004]
That sometime in the month of October 1999, in [XXX], and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-‐named accused, father of the offended party, [AAA], did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], then eleven (11) years old, against her will and
without her consent.
[AAA] is the third of four (4) girls in the family of [CCC] and respondent Renato. The family
is living in a one-‐storey house with one bedroom in [XXX]. [CCC] the mother works as a "labandera"
and "plantsadora" while the father is a "mananari" or the person installing the bladed instrument
during cockfights. The mother usually leaves the house early in the morning to sell at the Bocaue
market.
The RTC in its decision held that respondent is indeed guilty of qualified rape for the
incident that occurred on September 9, 2003. However, respondent was only convicted for the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness for the incident that transpired on October 1999. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Page 258 of 299


Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove that respondent is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove that respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must be able to prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished the act through force, threat
or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was
under 12 years of age or was demented.
On the other hand, the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as punished under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x
The elements of this crime are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation,
or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex.
The lower courts gave credence to the testimony of AAA, who narrated the harrowing
details of the sexual abuses she experienced at the hands of the accused-‐appellant. AAA positively
identified the accused-‐appellant as the person who sexually abused her. AAA’s testimony
established the fact that sometime in October 1999, she was awakened from her sleep when the
accused-‐appellant kissed her and touched her body. Thereafter, AAA testified that on September 9,
2003, the accused-‐appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her when he was able to
partly insert his penis into her vagina before BBB caught them and the accused-‐appellant abruptly
got up to plead with BBB to not reveal what she saw. The lower courts also found the testimony of
AAA to be fully supported by the testimony of BBB, the sister of AAA, as well as the medico-‐legal
report, which concluded that AAA was in a "non-‐virgin state physically." After a thorough review of
the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of fact of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals. As held in Dizon v. People:
Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration,
as in this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether
they were telling the truth. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, as in the present case, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. (Citation
omitted.)
Contrastingly, the accused-‐appellant’s bare defense of denial deserves scant consideration.
The same cannot overcome the positive identification and affirmative testimonies of AAA and BBB.
Anent the accused-‐appellant’s argument that the alleged ill motives of AAA and BBB destroyed their
credibility, the same is utterly unconvincing. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that ill
motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape
victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused. In this case, AAA never wavered in her
identification of the accused-‐appellant as her abuser. We had occasion to rule in People v.
Balunsat that it is unlikely for a young girl and her family to impute the crime of rape to their own
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blood relative and face social humiliation if not to vindicate the victim’s honor. Indeed, no member
of a rape victim’s family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor tainting
the family unless the crime was in fact committed, more so in this case where the offender and the
victim are father and daughter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS


Pregnancy is not an essential element of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore
was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and
decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her
consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Thus, when the victim, a 17-‐
year old girl who was the house helper of the sister of the accused, categorically and consistently
testified that the accused had carnal knowledge of her while pointing a gun in her mouth, the courts
will give credence to her testimony and convict the accused regardless of the pregnancy of the victim.

Facts:

Democrito Paras was charged with rape before the RTC. It was alleged that sometime in
March 1996, AAA, a 17-‐year old house-‐helper of the Spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, the latter being
accused-‐appellant Democrito Paras’s sister. AAA was weeding the grass of her employer’s yard
when she was approached by a gun-‐wielding Paras. Paras pointed the gun at AAA’s mouth and
gained carnal knowledge of the latter. Subsequently, AAA got pregnant due to the incident, and gave
birth to a child.

Paras denied having raped AAA, and testified that he was in the market the whole day at the
time the alleged rape occurred. Paras also asserted that AAA accused her of rape due to a
misunderstanding between him and Sergio regarding the mango trees owned by Paras’s mother.

The RTC convicted Paras as charged, and the CA upheld the RTC. Hence the appeal.

Paras argues that since AAA was already 3 months pregnant when she was examined on
October 1996, AAA could have had sexual intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in
March 1996 when the alleged rape was supposed to have been committed.

Issue:

Did the pregnancy of AAA prove that Paras did not rape her?

Ruling:


In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-‐appellant guilty of
rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The
courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the Paras as the
perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds
that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that Paras was the one who
Page 260 of 299


pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to
disturb the lower courts’ appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony.

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape
victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's
will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS
G.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014 , J. Leonardo-‐De Castro
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime
are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not
affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-‐telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-‐free
testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even
suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization
is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual
normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the
child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim
against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner.
Facts:
While the victim [AAA], a house-‐helper of spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding
grass using a bolo at her employer’s farm in [XXX], appellant Democrito Paras approached her from
behind. He pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her
mouth. While pointing the gun at [AAA], Democrito Paras pulled down her long pants and panties.
He also pulled down his pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted
her. Since [AAA] was afraid of him and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not strike
appellant with the bolo she was holding. Democrito Paras told [AAA] not to shout. While struggling,
[AAA] even threw stones at him. After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and
fled, while [AAA] went back to the house of her employers Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to
the incident. She gave birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA] testified.
The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and alibi. Accused-‐
appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because she was the helper at the house
of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA.
RTC convicted the accused-‐appellant of the crime charged which was upheld by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.
Page 261 of 299


Ruling:
Yes, Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. -‐ Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-‐appellant guilty of
rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The
courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-‐appellant
as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the
Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-‐
appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her.
Inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-‐appellant in the testimony of AAA, namely, her
inability to remember the birth date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy her
credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to do with the essential elements of rape, that is,
carnal knowledge of a person through force or intimidation.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the
same do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-‐telling witnesses are not always expected to
give error-‐free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory.
Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of
fertilization is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining
the actual normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.
Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified
to by the victim in a truthful manner.
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many opportunities to do
so, we are not persuaded. People react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard
form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the assailant is
physically near. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. In a given situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen
Page 262 of 299


into silence. Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first
opportunity cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO BESMONTE

To convict an accused for statutory rape, two elements must be proven: 1.) the victim is a
female under 12 years of age or is demented; and the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
Thus, where the prosecution was able to present a 7-‐year old girl’s credible, positive and categorical
testimony relative to the circumstances surrounding her rape; and the physical evidence consistent
with AAA’s assertion that she was raped, the accused must be held guilty of statutory rape.

Facts:

Accused-‐appellant Renato Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The
prosecution alleged that the victim AAA was merely seven years old when the first rape incident
was committed. Besmonte was in AAA’s house, and after her younger brothers left the house upon
Besmonte’s instructions, the latter ordered AAA to lie down on a mat and remove her clothes.
Afterwards he undressed and tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was unable to penetrate
since AAA was crying because of pain. This prompted Besmonte to leave.

The second rape incident occurred when AAA was accompanying Besmonte in the upland to
get some root crops. AAA was made to sit down on a banana leaf Besmonte placed on the ground.
He tried to look for lice on her hair, and AAA was surprised when he poked a fan knife at her chest
and ordered her to lie down and remove her clothes. Thenceforth, he undressed himself, laid on top
of her, and succeeded in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The latter felt pain and observed that
her vagina was torn. Besmonte denied raping AAA, her niece, on both occasions.

The RTC found Besmonte guilty of the two counts of rape, and imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:
Were the accusations of rape insufficiently proven?

Ruling:


Basic in the prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following
elements:
1. the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and
2. the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove
that the age of the woman is under 12 years and carnal knowledge took place.

In this case, Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals were one in finding that he twice had carnal knowledge of AAA, a child of tender
years at the time of the commission of the two counts of rape. Despite his vigorous protestations,
Page 263 of 299


the Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by Besmonte against AAA was
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAA’s credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances
surrounding her rape; and
b) The physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped.

Besmonte would have the Court reverse his conviction for the first count of statutory rape
on the ground that AAA admitted in open court that the rape committed in March 2000 did not
happen.

His attempt is futile. A review of the transcript of the testimony of AAA clarified such
misleading assertion – her testimony that nothing happened simply meant that he tried to insert his
penis into her vagina but was unsuccessful because it did not fit. In fact, AAA cried out with pain at
his attempts to put it in; and her cry of pain was what prompted accused-‐appellant to leave
abruptly. That she suffered severe pain inside her genitalia while his penis was penetrating her,
could only be understood in light of the foregoing explanation made herein about his penis
attaining some degree of penetration beneath the surface of her genitalia.

Carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not
require full penile penetration of the female. In People v. Campuhan, the Court made clear that the
mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of
rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact
with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the
penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum.
And People v. Bali-‐Balita instructed that the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere
epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the
labias or sliding into the female genitalia. xxx is required, however, that this manner of touching of
the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established. For the Court, the proof of the touching
of the penis of accused-‐appellant and the labias of AAA had been convincingly established – from
AAA’s categorical testimony that his penis had gone beyond her mons pubis and had reached her
labias majora and minora.

With respect to the rape committed on May 4, 2001 the Court concurs with the RTC and the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that AAA’s testimonial account thereon and the physical injury that
she sustained as a result thereof sufficiently and convincingly established the commission of the
second count of statutory rape. Besmonte tried to interject reasonable doubt thereto by claiming
that AAA’s account of the second incident was highly incredible considering that she did not even
bother to escape from him; or why she even went with Besmonte in the first place in view of the
supposed earlier incident of rape.

But the Court, in People v. Jastiva taught that it does not follow that because the victim failed
to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she could not have been raped. The
force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and
strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. And physical resistance need
not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety, or
the exercise of the moral ascendancy of the rapist over the victim.
Page 264 of 299


Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation
involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable, and people react differently -‐ some may shout, others may faint, and still others
may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the
intrusion. More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO
We differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term
demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional
apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.
Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a
person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
Facts:
BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused-‐appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in
their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six
houses away from BBB’s house. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a
problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused appellant were already at
the outpost. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-‐rape po ako." BBB asked her who
raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-‐appellant.
During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by
accused appellant, which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When Cataytay
answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA
went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita
Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report
stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-‐year-‐old child. BBB also identified AAA’s birth
certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident.
On cross-‐examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999
against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape
committed by the accused appellant. Cataytay countered such allegation by defense of denial and
alibi.
RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Cataytay liable for crime of rape which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Page 265 of 299


Whether or not Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes, Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.
Article 266-‐A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reasonor is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
We differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term
demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be
properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental
capacity of a seven-‐year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the
conclusion of the psychologist that the "mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the
time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old
child." Accused-‐appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article
266-‐A of the Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-‐B, which
relevantly provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances xxx When the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Since the accused-‐appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation was alleged in the
Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance
is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall instead be imposed.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006
Page 266 of 299


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILAN ROXAS Y AGUILUZ

In determining the age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. 9344,
Section 6 thereof clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not
the mental age of the accused. Thus, a person who is eighteen years old at the time of the commission
of the crime of rape is not exempt from criminal liability despite having a mental age of nine years old.

Facts:

Accused-‐Appellant Milan Roxas was charged with five counts of rape with force and
intimidation. AAA testified that from 1997 to 1998, Roxas had carnal knowledge of his minor niece,
AAA, while pointing a sharp instrument at the latter. In his defense, Roxas presented the testimony
of Dr. Aglipay, the Regional Psychiatrist of the BJMP, who said that Roxas was suffering from a mild
mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old.

The RTC held that accused-‐appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the
ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay
merely testified that he was an eighteen-‐year old with a mental development comparable to that of
children between nine to ten years old. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.

Issues:

1. May Roxas, who was eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime, be
exempt from criminal liability under R.A. 9344 due to having a mental age of a nine year
old?
2. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship between Roxas and AAA sufficiently proven?

Ruling:

1. No, the determining age is anniversary of one’s birth date, not the mental age.

In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 934418 is
explicit in providing that “A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the
fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.”

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to
the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by
accused-‐appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning
may the court interpret or construe its true intent.

2. No, mere allegation in the complaint that the victim is the niece of the accused is
insufficient.

While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335 (old rape provision) and
Article 266-‐B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between AAA and accused-‐
appellant Roxas is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence.
Page 267 of 299


In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-‐appellant Roxas’s “niece” in each
Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon,
for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating
circumstance alleged in the Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower
courts’ appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

KIDNAPPING

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AIDA MARQUEZ
While one of the essential elements of this crime (Art 270 -‐ Kidnapping and failure to return a
minor) is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his
parents or guardians.
Facts:
On December 28, 1998, Respondent Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18, before the RTC. Respondent
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the
beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician. On September 6, 1998, Marquez allegedly
borrowed Merano’s then three-‐month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy
her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to
bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine
in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask them for Marquez’s
address. However, Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to
her soon.
Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were unsuccessful until
she received a call from Marquez. During that call, Marquez allegedly told Merano that she will
return Justine to Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so because her own son
was sick and was confined at the hospital. When the supposed return of Justine did not happen,
Merano claimed that she went to Marquez’s house, using the sketch that she got from her
employers’ driver, but Marquez was not home.
On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her
daughter at Modesto Castillo’s (Castillo) house. The following day, Merano, accompanied by SPO2
Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went to the house of Castillo. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that
Marquez sold Justine to him and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos supposedly for
Merano who was asking for money. The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had
grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her
because the police advised her to go through the proper process. Merano then learned from Castillo
that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the
Reception and Study Center for Children of the DSWD.
Page 268 of 299


The RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of appeals.
Hence, this petition.
Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
elements constituting the crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in this
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of Marquez was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, it was.
Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and appreciation of the crime she
was charged with and eventually convicted of.
A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez
was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby
girl to her parent after being entrusted with said baby’s custody.
Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with violation of Article 270,
and not Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code.
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the
essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor,
what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to
restore the minor to his parents or guardians. As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the
Court further explained what "deliberate" as used in Article 270 means:
Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply
something more than mere negligence -‐ it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of
Justine. Whether this is due to Merano’s version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to
Marquez’s version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter,
for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez
was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is
satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of
Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a
couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody
Page 269 of 299


of Justine. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do
so by the latter’s mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this
case.
ROBERRY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO M. BASAO alias "Dodong," JOVEL S. APOLE,
MELQUIADES L. APOLE, ESTRELITA1 G. APOLE, ROLANDO A. APOLE alias "Bebot," VICENTE C.
SALON, JAIME TANDAN, RENATO C. APOLE alias "Boboy," ROLANDO M. OCHIVILLO alias
"Allan," LORENZO L. APOLE, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and MIKE DOE, JOVEL S. APOLE,
ROLANDO A. APOLE, and RENATO C. APOLE

A truth-‐telling witness is not always expected to give an error-‐free testimony considering the
lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony
jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor
the veracity of his testimony. Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to
minor, collateral, or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the
prominent facts. Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

The deprivation required by Article 267 means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also
the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation
where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in
his liberty to move. In other words, the essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

Facts:

On January 23, 2003 at 7:30 o’clock in the evening, witness private complainant Emelie
Lopio Hashiba and her brother Crisologo Pamad Lopio both testified that five (5) men entered their
house with gun pointed to her younger brother, Crisologo Lopio. Although she does not know their
names at the time of the incident, she recognized them during the trial and identified each one of
them as respondents Jovel Apole, Renato Apole and Rolando Apole except the two (2), whom she
failed to recognize as she forgot them.

Respondents brought Emelie Hashiba upstair at the second floor at their bedroom, which
was lighted and there she was divested of money and jewelries, their collection of their passenger
jeep, a samurai sword and icom radio. She was asked if that was her only money and she told them
“yes”. She was also asked about the gun of her husband, which she denied that her husband does
not possess firearm. Then respondent Jovel asked her if that was the only money they had and she
answered in the affirmative.

Dissatisfied with the value of their loot, respondent Jovel and companion demanded three
(3) million pesos from her with the threat that if she will not give the amount demanded they would
bring with them her son. Shortly thereafter, they went down and back to the sala where
YASUMITSU HASHIBA and companions were gathered. EMELIE HASHIBA informed the accused
that they could not bring her son because he was sick, so she offered herself as the hostage, but
brought YASUMITSU YASUDA HASHIBA instead.
Page 270 of 299


On the 25th day, the kidnappers called but she was not around. On the following day, the
kidnappers again called her and instructed her to buy a cellular phone and advised her not to
withdraw money in the bank and wait for further instructions. Few days later, a policeman
informed her that her husband was released by the kidnappers. All of these was denied by the
respondents and questioned the inherent incredibilities and irrevocable inconsistencies of the
witnesses.

RTC found all the accused guilty of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of
Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention which was affirmed
by the appellate court with modification as to penalty and damages.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents should be acquitted due to alleged inherent incredibilities and
irrevocable inconsistencies of the witnesses.

Ruling:

No, respondents are all guilty of the crimes of Robbery with Violence Against or
Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention.

As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on
the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected on the record. Consequently, the settled rule is that when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon
this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should
not be disturbed.

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb, and is, therefore, conclusively bound by the
findings of fact and judgments of conviction rendered by the RTC, subsequently affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Emelie and Crisologo established beyond reasonable doubt the
commission by accused-‐appellants of the crimes of robbery by a band and kidnapping for ransom.

The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) intent to gain, (b) unlawful taking, (c) personal property belonging to another, and (d)
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things. Under Article 296 of the same Code,
“when more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band.” It further provides that “[a]ny member of a band who
is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the
assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

Page 271 of 299


All of the foregoing elements had been satisfactorily established herein. At least five (5)
people, including accused-‐appellants, carrying guns and a hand grenade, barged into the home of,
and forcibly took pieces of jewelry and other personal properties belonging to, spouses Yatsumitsu
and Emelie Hashiba. Accused-‐appellants themselves made their intent to gain clear when they
assured their victims that they were only after the money.

As for the crime of kidnapping, the following elements, as provided in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, must be proven: (a) a person has been deprived of his liberty, (b) the offender
is a private individual, and (c) the detention is unlawful. The deprivation required by Article 267
means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the
place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. In other words,
the essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

In the present case, Yasumitsu was evidently deprived by respondents of his liberty for
seven days. Armed with guns and a grenade, accused-‐appellants and their cohorts took Yasumitsu
from the latter’s home in Lanuza, Surigao del Sur, to Surigao City, by car; and then all the way to
Tubajon, Surigao del Norte, by boat. Accused-‐appellants held Yasumitsu from January 23 to January
29, 2003. During said period, Yasumitsu was unable to communicate with his family or to go home.
Also during the same period, accused-‐appellants called Emelie several times to ask whether the P
3,000,000.00 ransom payment was already available.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts
of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,
would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in
every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may
be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

There is conspiracy among accused-‐appellants and their cohorts when they kidnapped
Yasumitsu. Their community of criminal design could be inferred from their arrival at the Hashiba’s
home already armed with weapons, as well as from their clearly designated roles upon entry into
the house (i.e., some served as lookouts; some accompanied Emelie to the second floor to look for
jewelry, cash, and other property to take; and some guarded and hogtied the other people in the
house) and in the abduction of Yasumitsu (i.e., Jovel S. Apole went back to Surigao City to secure the
release of the ransom money while Renato C. Apole and Rolando A. Apole stayed in Tubajon to
guard Yasumitsu). The Court concurs with the RTC that “all these acts were complimentary to one
another and geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective to extort a ransom of
three (3) million in exchange for the Japanese[’s] freedom.

The alleged inconsistencies or conflict in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were
already rejected by the Court of Appeals for the same only pertain to minor details which have
inconsequential significance. In People v. Delim, the Court further pronounced that a truth-‐telling
Page 272 of 299


witness is not always expected to give an error-‐free testimony considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material
points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of
his testimony. Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to minor,
collateral, or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent
facts. Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA, and DENNIS DAYAON y TUPIT
G.R. No. 201449 , April 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes
or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be
consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from
the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide.

Facts:

Perlie testified that she and her sister Nely Salvador (Nely) were employed as waitresses at
Angeles City. As the sisters were walking home from work along Colorado Street, they saw accused-‐
appellants and De la Cruz about two to three meters away. The three men were facing the wall,
urinating. As soon as the sisters passed by the three men, the latter accosted the former. Accused-‐
appellant Diu embraced Perlie while accused-‐appellant Dayaon and De la Cruz held on to Nely.
Perlie was able to break loose by elbowing accused-‐appellant Diu, but accused-‐appellant Diu
grabbed Perlie’s bag. Perlie ran away to ask for help from people nearby.

Meanwhile, accused-‐appellant Dayaon and De la Cruz were embracing Nely from behind. As
she tried to go near Nely, Perlie saw accused-‐appellant and De la Cruz stabbing Nely, passing a knife
to each other. Perlie described the knife as double bladed and approximately seven inches long.
After the stabbing, Nely was left lying face down on the ground, covered in blood. The entire
incident took place within two minutes. Two men then helped Perlie bring Nely to the Ospital Ning
Angeles, where Nely was pronounced dead on arrival
For the defense, accused-‐appellants Diu and Dayaon themselves took the witness stand.
They denied their culpability and participation in the incident, and mainly laid the blame on their
co-‐accused De la Cruz, who remained at-‐large.

RTC found that Perlie’s testimony was more credible. Thus, accused-‐appellants and De la
Cruz were convicted in the commission of the crime Robbery with Homicide which was affirmed by
CA.
Page 273 of 299


Issue:

Whether or not Diu and Dayaon are guilty for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Ruling:

Yes. They are guilty for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during
or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and
homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason
or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or
on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,
includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in
court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by
the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of
the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount
in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless
of the exact amount or value involved.

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.

Page 274 of 299


If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery,
he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained
from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-‐
conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve
the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between
the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of
the robbery.

In this case, based on Perlie’s testimony, as she and Nely were walking along Colorado
Street, accused-‐appellants and De la Cruz were all facing the wall, appearing to be urinating. When
Perlie and Nely had passed them by, accused-‐appellants and De la Cruz accosted them at the same
time, with accused-‐appellant Diu embracing Perlie and taking her bag, and accused-‐appellant
Dayaon and De la Cruz holding on to Nely and stabbing her as she fought back. The actuations of
accused-‐appellants and De la Cruz were clearly coordinated and complementary to one another.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission
of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.

As the RTC declared, "the actions of the three accused, from the deprivation of the
eyewitness Perlie of her personal belongings by accused Diu to the stabbing of the victim Nely by
accused Dayaon and De la Cruz, Jr., are clear and indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive
Perlie and Nely of their personal belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said
robbery, stabbed and killed victim Nely Salvador." The absence of proof that accused-‐appellants
attempted to stop Nely’s killing, plus the finding of conspiracy, make accused-‐appellants liable as
principals for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

B.P. 22

LIBERATA AMBITO and BASILIO AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.

Facts:

Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the
province of Iloilo namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and
the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were
the owners of Casette [Kajzette] Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged
Page 275 of 299


in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said
banks.

Spouses Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar
machineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of
their banks. In these transactions, the spouses made down payments in their purchases either in
case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. However, when the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank)
checks issued by Basilio Ambito as down payment of their purchases were presented for payment
by the drawee bank, the same were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

At the time the spouses made purchases of farm implements from the Pacific Star, Inc., the
general manager of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata Ambito herself and the cashier.
Liberata forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign several blank
certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates
in connection with some transactions involving the bank. Marilyn Traje followed, afraid that she
would lose her job.

The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of
Leon, Inc. Reynaldo Baron was at first hesitant to accommodate the request of the Ambitos but due
to their persistence, he signed the certificates of time deposit in blank and gave the same to the
Ambitos. When Baron asked for the duplicate copies of the certificates, he was told that they were
still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc. Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the transaction was
cancelled and that he should just cause the printing of similar blank certificates by the Apostol
Printing Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and objected to the idea vouched to him by the
Ambitos until finally he resigned from his job because he could no longer withstand the pressure
exerted on him involving transactions he believed were anomalous. When the Central Bank
investigators came and conducted examination of the records and transactions of the bank, Baron
reported the anomalies to them.

The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the
spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit
and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the
purchase price of the machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc. The said
certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when
presented for redemption by the Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence,
Pacific Star, Inc. suffered actual damages. On complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were
charged of violations of B.P. Blg. 22. In view of the anomalous transactions entered into by the
Ambitos, both the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. became
insolvent. The RTC convicted the spouses which decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of Batas Pambansa 22

Ruling:

Page 276 of 299


No. The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-‐
payment of an obligation which the law punishes.

In light of the foregoing, petitioners contention in the lower court that the subject checks
were only issued as mere guarantee and were not intended for deposit as per agreement with PSI is
not tenable. Co-‐petitioner Basilio Ambito would be liable under B.P. Blg. 22 by the mere fact that he
issued the subject checks, provided that the other elements of the crime are properly proved.

With regard to the second element, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of
evidence. A disputable presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the
bank is assumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check, payment of which is refused
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue.
However, such presumption does not arise when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements
for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been
dishonored. In order for the maker or drawer to pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its
payment within the period prescribed by law, it is therefore necessary and indispensable for the
maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of the check.

Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that
was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified that the
check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five (5) banking days from receipt of the
notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an
accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that co-‐petitioner
Basilio Ambito was given any notice of dishonor by PSI or by Manila Bank, the drawee bank, when
the subject checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment for payment. In
fact, all that the OSG can aver regarding this matter is that co-‐petitioner Basilio Ambito had been
notified of the fact of dishonor since PSI filed a collection case against petitioners more than three
(3) years before the same filed the criminal cases before this Court.

The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank,
the holder of the check, or the offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail. The
notice of dishonor to the maker of a check must be in writing.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in
writing, taken in conjunction, however with Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the
notice of dishonor or refusal, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient
Page 277 of 299


for conviction under the law. The Court has previously held that both the spirit and letter of the
Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the
accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified
in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

Due to the failure of prosecution in this case to prove that co-‐petitioner Basilio Ambito was
given the requisite notice of dishonor and the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as
provided for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict him of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
However, Basilio Ambitos acquittal for his violations of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to
prove all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt did not entail the extinguishment of his
civil liability for the dishonored checks.

ESTAFA

JUDE JOBY LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166810. June 26, 2008, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

The receipt by the drawer of the notice of dishonor is not an element of the offense. The
presumption only dispenses with the presentation of evidence of deceit if such notification is received
and the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check.

Facts:

On March 23, 1998, Lopez issued and postdated a check with a value equivalent to the sum
of P20,000.00 which he obtained from Efren. He accomplished deceit when he led Efren to believe
that, prior to, or simultaneous with, their arrangement, the subject check is good upon its maturity
on April 30, 1998. However, the check turned out to be worthless because, when Efren deposited it
with the Legaspi Savings Bank, the same was dishonored due to “Account Closed.”
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Lopez, citing the case of Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, (G.R.
No. 126670, December 2, 1999, 319 SCRA 595), argued that Efren knew at the time of the issuance
of the check that accused had no funds in the bank and therefore, the element of deceit was absent.
The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court. The CA rendered its Decision
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.
Lopez argued that no presumption or prima facie evidence of guilt would arise if there is no
proof as to the date of receipt by the drawer of the said notice “since there would simply be no way
of reckoning the crucial 3day period” from receipt of notice of dishonor of the check within which
the amount necessary to cover the check may be done as provided by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
Issue: Can the accused be convicted of estafa if there is no proof as to the date of receipt by him of
the notice of dishonor?
Ruling:
Yes
Page 278 of 299


The receipt by the drawer of the notice of dishonor is not an element of the offense. The
presumption only dispenses with the presentation of evidence of deceit if such notification is
received and the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check. The presumption indulged
in by law does not preclude the presentation of other evidence to prove deceit. It is not disputed by
petitioner that, as found by the CA, respondent Ables “called” up petitioner to inform him of the
dishonor of the check. Moreover, when petitioner issued the check in question on March 23, 1998,
he knew that his current account with the DBP was a closed account as early as January 27, 1998.
Assuming that petitioner did so, Lopez could not escape culpability because he was not in a
position to make good the check at any time since his current account was already closed. This fact
petitioner failed to disclose to respondent.
The absence of proof as to receipt of the written notice of dishonor notwithstanding, the
evidence shows that petitioner had actual notice of the dishonor of the check because he was
verbally notified by the respondent and notice whether written or verbal was a surplusage and
totally unnecessary considering that almost two (2) months before the issuance of the check,
petitioner’s current account was already closed. Under these circumstances, the notice of dishonor
would have served no useful purpose as no deposit could be made in a closed bank account.
Pertinently, Section 114(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
“Sec. 114. When notice need not be given to drawer.—Notice of dishonor is not required to be given
to the drawer in either of the following cases:
xxx
d. Where the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the
check.”
Since petitioner’s bank account was already closed even before the issuance of the subject
check, he had no right to expect or require the drawee bank to honor his check. By virtue of the
aforequoted provision of law, petitioner is not entitled to be given a notice of dishonor.
LIBERATA AMBITO and BASILIO AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or
concealment, are the following (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) That the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with
his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (d) That as a
result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Facts:

Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the
province of Iloilo namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and
Page 279 of 299


the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were
the owners of Casette [Kajzette] Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged
in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said
banks.

Spouses Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar
machineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of
their banks. In these transactions, the spouses made down payments in their purchases either in
case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. However, when the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank)
checks issued by Basilio Ambito as down payment of their purchases were presented for payment
by the drawee bank, the same were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

At the time the spouses made purchases of farm implements from the Pacific Star, Inc., the
general manager of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata Ambito herself and the cashier.
Liberata forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign several blank
certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates
in connection with some transactions involving the bank. Marilyn Traje followed, afraid that she
would lose her job.

The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of
Leon, Inc. Reynaldo Baron was at first hesitant to accommodate the request of the Ambitos but due
to their persistence, he signed the certificates of time deposit in blank and gave the same to the
Ambitos. When Baron asked for the duplicate copies of the certificates, he was told that they were
still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc. Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the transaction was
cancelled and that he should just cause the printing of similar blank certificates by the Apostol
Printing Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and objected to the idea vouched to him by the
Ambitos until finally he resigned from his job because he could no longer withstand the pressure
exerted on him involving transactions he believed were anomalous. When the Central Bank
investigators came and conducted examination of the records and transactions of the bank, Baron
reported the anomalies to them.

The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the
spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit
and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the
purchase price of the machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc. The said
certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when
presented for redemption by the Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence,
Pacific Star, Inc. suffered actual damages. On complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were
charged of Falsification and Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. In view of the
anomalous transactions entered into by the Ambitos, both the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. became insolvent. The RTC convicted the spouses which
decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Spouses Ambito were guilty of Falsification and Estafa through Falsification
of Commercial Document
Page 280 of 299


Ruling:

Yes. The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or
concealment, are the following (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) That the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with
his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (d) That
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, it is
indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent
representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the
thing by the complainant.

The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes
the very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his money. In the
absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it
might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision.

In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that
they will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners
banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued
under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay
the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the purchase
cost of the machineries and equipment that co-‐petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as
evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not
apply for and secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-‐petitioner Basilio Ambito were
engaged in a vendor-‐purchaser business relationship while PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as
depositor-‐depository. It is likewise established that petitioners employed deceit when they were
able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through
down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and
RBLI issued in PSIs name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made
any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not
recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator appointed by the Central Bank
of the Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her testimony
during the trial.

The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by
petitioners is proper because, whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means
to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the
two crimes.

Under Article 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two
grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense
must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no
Page 281 of 299


complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2)
committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other.

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing
Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
Falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of
Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.

In the case before us, the issuance by petitioners of CCTDs which reflected amounts that
were never deposited as such in either RBBI or RBLI is Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of
the RPC. The particular criminal undertaking consisted of petitioners, taking advantage of their
position as owners of RBBI and RBLI, making untruthful statements/representations with regard to
the existence of time deposits in favor of PSI by issuing the subject CCTDs without putting up the
corresponding deposits in said banks.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, the elements of falsification of public documents
through an untruthful narration of facts are: (1) the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (2) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated; (3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (4) the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.

As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or
purchasing various machinery and equipment from PSI amounts to the criminal offense of Estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC. The petitioners falsified the subject CCTDs, which are
commercial documents, to defraud PSI. Since the falsification of the CCTDs was the necessary
means for the commission of Estafa, the assailed judgment of the appeals court convicting
petitioners of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents is
correct.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER

It is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-‐serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the
RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. The RTC found appellant Virginia Baby P. Montaner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code.

The parties’ evidence was summarized by the trial court, as follows:

Page 282 of 299


The evidence for the prosecution disclose that on May 17, 1996, accused Virginia Baby P.
Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house, ten (10)
Prudential Bank checks, all postdated June 17, 1996, each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total
amount of P50,000.00. Montaner represented to complainant Solis that the checks were fully
funded.

When private complainant Solis deposited the checks for encashment, they were
dishonored for the reason "account closed". Solis, verbally and thru a demand letter formally
demanded that accused settle her accounts. Despite receipt of the demand letter, accused Montaner
failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the
instant complaint for estafa.

Accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in
Solis' favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope
because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the
space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any
negotiation. She told Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was
filed against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not
be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor
sent to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the
notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.

The RTC convicted Montaner for the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Can the court a quo gravely erred in finding Montaner guilty beyong reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa?

Ruling:

No, the court a quo correctly ruled that Montaner is guilty of the crime of estafa based on
the circumstances.

Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

x x x x

Page 283 of 299


(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check
was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.

In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According
to Solis’s clear and categorical testimony, Montaner issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank
checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their
cash equivalent. It was evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to Montaner had it
not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were
undoubtedly issued to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash
them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote Montaner a demand letter dated October 13, 199611 which was received by
Montaner’s husband to inform her that the postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle
her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. She did not comply with the demand nor did she
deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This
gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.

As for Montaner's claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks
imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court
views such statements with the same incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.

Montaner wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but
signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to
defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellant’s assertion defies ordinary common sense
and human experience.

It is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-‐serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. We agree with the lower courts that appellant’s bare
denial cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the trial
court, appellant’s failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her
cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the conviction of appellant for
estafa.

Page 284 of 299


WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICK
GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and
Estafa. Roderick’s contention that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is
lacking is without merit, as private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and
credible testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-‐accused to mislead private
complainants into believing that appellant and his co-‐accused, for a fee, can deploy private
complainants abroad for employment.
Facts:
Angelita I. Daud, Hanelita M. Gallemit, and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were
charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. That on or about February 5, 2001 to
August 2001, in the City of Parañaque, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to
complainants Marcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena,
Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio, without first securing the required
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in
large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage. Eight more Informations charged Daud,
Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight
private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman, Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada
A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena, Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio,
respectively.
Only Roderick was apprehended, while his co-‐accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and
remained at large. The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated.
When arraigned, Roderick pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of
the nine criminal cases ensued. The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and
Consultancy, operated by Roderick and his co-‐accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment. Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio
testified against Gallem it. Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellant’s testimony.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding
appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. Considering
that accused Angelita i. Daud and Hanelita m. Gallemit remain at large for more than six (6) months
since the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer. Let an
alias warrant of arrest be issued against them. Following the denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration by the RTC, Roderick filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. All three
complainants positively identified appellant in court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Roderick’s
conviction by the RTC

Issue:

Page 285 of 299


Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Roderick of Estafa despite the
absence of the element of deceit.

Ruling:
No, the trial court did not err in convicting Roderick of Estafa.

We likewise affirm the conviction of Roderick for three counts of estafa committed against
the private complainants, based on the very same evidence that proved appellant’s criminal liability
for illegal recruitment. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Appellant contends
that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. He insists on the
absence of proof that he made any false statement or fraudulent representation to private
complainants. Private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and credible
testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-‐accused to mislead private complainants
into believing that appellant and his co-‐accused, for a fee, can deploy private complainants abroad
for employment.

Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary
loss, was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present any receipt signed
by Roderick proving that he received money from private complainants. We reiterate that when
conspiracy has been established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. Again, there is no cogent
reason for us to disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that both elements
of estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-‐0123, 03-‐0127, and 03-‐0130. Thus, we sustain
appellant’s conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal
Code. It is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case for illegal
recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or
authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s
cause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the
testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GRACE CALIMON AND AIDA COMILA
January 29, 2009, G.R. No. 175229, J. Leonardo-‐De Castro

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3) elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code (now Sec. 6, RA 8042); and, (c) the
offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-‐quoted provision: (1) by using a
fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under this class
of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable.
Page 286 of 299


Facts:

Sometime in 1998, Lourdes Lo persuaded private complainants to apply for a job in Italy through
the services of accused-‐appellants Grace Calimon and Aida Camila. Lo introduced them to accused-‐
appellant Calimon who represented herself as a sub-‐agent of Axil International Services and
Consultancy (AISC), a legitimate recruitment agency. Calimon showed a job order of factory
workers purportedly issued by an Italian firm. Devanadera called up AISC to verify Calimon’s
representation. The person who answered the phone readily confirmed accused-‐appellant
Calimon’s claim. Thus, when accused Calimon asked P10,000.00 from each of the private
complainants to cover expenses for medical examination and processing fees for travel documents,
both Devanadera and Agramon readily parted with their money, as evidenced by receipts duly
signed by Calimon. They likewise gave their respective passports, birth certificates, NBI clearances,
resumes and other documents. Thereafter, Calimon brought them to St. Martins Clinic for medical
examination. Complainants also paid recruitment fees.

At one time, in the course of following up the status of her overseas employment
application, Calimon introduced complainant Devanadera to accused-‐appellant Comila who showed
her file and informed her of the need to secure a visa with the Italian Embassy. Calimon then asked
for more money to secure the visa, but Devanadera refused to pay. Private complainants’ follow ups
with Calimon were just met by repeated assurance that they will be deployed immediately once
their papers are completely processed. Finally, in January 1999, Calimon gave private complainants
their supposed individual employment contracts as factory workers in Italy. However, the contracts
did not indicate an employer. The three proceeded to the POEA to verify the status of their contract
where they discovered that while AISC was a licensed recruitment agency, Lo and accused-‐
appellants Calimon and Comila were not among its registered employees. An information was filed
with the RTC, charging Lo and accused-‐appellants with illegal recruitment in large scale and
estafa. The RTC rendered a decision convicting the appellants of the crimes charged. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision with modifications.

Issues:
1. Whether or not accused-‐appellants are guilty of illegal recruitment;
2. Whether or not accused-‐appellants are guilty of estafa

Ruling:

1. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state:

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-‐licensee or non-‐holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, that any such non-‐licensee or non-‐holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. x x x
Page 287 of 299


In a litany of cases, we held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3)
elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the
Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code (now
Sec. 6, RA 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.

Here, we are convinced that the three elements were sufficiently proved beyond reasonable
doubt. First, accused-‐appellants, undoubtedly, did not have any license to recruit persons for
overseas work. This is substantiated by the POEA, Licensing Branch which issued a Certification to
this effect and the testimony of an employee of the POEA, Corazon Cristobal. Second, accused-‐
appellants engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering overseas employment for a fee. This is
supported by the testimonies of the private complainants, particularly Devanadera who
categorically testified that accused-‐appellants promised private complainants employment and
assured them of placement overseas. Third, accused-‐appellant Calimon committed illegal
recruitment activities involving at least three persons, i.e., the three private complainants herein.
On the part of Comila, this third element was not proved and thus, she was properly convicted of
simple illegal recruitment only.

2. This Court is likewise convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-‐appellants are guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). .

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-‐quoted provision: (1) by using a
fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under
this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of
accused-‐appellants false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at
least simultaneously with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of
crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. Accused-‐
appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal
qualifications to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private
complainants parted with their hard-‐earned money and suffered damage by reason of accused-‐
appellants deceitful and illegal acts. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are
indisputably present, hence their conviction for estafa was proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOLORES OCDEN
Page 288 of 299


The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is crucial for conviction.

Facts:

Dolores Ocden was charged of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa.
All seven cases were consolidated. Ocden pleaded not guilty in all the cases.

Jeffries C. Golidan, Howard C. Golidan, Karen M. Simeon, Jean S. Maximo, Norma Pedro,
Marylyn Mana-‐a, Rizalina Ferrer and Milan Darling are the private complainants in these cases.
They alleged that they were recruited by Dolores Ocden to work as overseas factory workers in a
stuffed toy factory in Italy. They were required to submit bio-‐datas, their passports and pay
70,000.00 pesos as placement fee. They were also obliged to undergo medical examination in
Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila where they paid 3,500.00 pesos as their fee.

Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers to be
sent to Italy. In preparation for their flight to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they
were introduced by Ocden to Erlinda Ramos (Ramos). Ocden and Ramos then accompanied Ferrer,
Jennilyn, and Alipio to the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to
Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application
for Italy would be processed.

Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of their
money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the Baguio office of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter.

Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an applicant
for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the recruiter. Ramos held a
seminar in St. Theresa’s Compound, Navy Base, Baguio City. As many applicants were not able to
attend the seminar, Ocden asked Ramos to conduct a seminar at her house. After said seminars,
Ramos designated Ocden as leader of the applicants. As such, Ocden received her co-‐applicants’
applications and documents; accompanied her co-‐applicants to Manila for medical examination
because she knew the location of Zamora Medical Clinic; and accepted placement fees in the
amount of P70,000.00 each from Mana-‐a and Ferrer and from Golidan, the amount of P140,000.00
(for Jeffries and Howard).

On July 2, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa. On appeal, the appellate
court affirmed Ocden’s conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the three
counts of estafa.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Ocden is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in a
large scale

2. Whether or not Ocden may be held liable for both Illegal Recruitment and Estafa for the same act
Page 289 of 299


Ruling:

1. Yes. There is nothing in the records that warrant a reversal of the rulings of the RTC and CA.

It is well-‐settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad
for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.

It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-‐licensee
or non-‐holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Section
6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment
"whether committed by any person, whether a non-‐licensee, non-‐holder, licensee or holder of
authority." Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to
reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing
for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the worker’s fault."

Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a
licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is
inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by receiving
placement fees from Mana-‐a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by
receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-‐a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two
sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their
own.

In People v. Hu, we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based
on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as
a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was
committed against three or more persons. In this case, there is conclusive evidence that Ocden
recruited Mana-‐a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as
factory workers in Italy.

2. Yes. The very same evidence proving Ocden’s liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal
intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does
not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under
par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
Page 290 of 299


under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result
in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person. Both elements are present, Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her false
representation to private complainants that she possessed the capability to send said private
complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s words and actions,
private complainants were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement
and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover
their money.

Facts:

The Information filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-‐77300, charged
Ochoa with illegal recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the period of February 1997 up to April 1998 Rosario Ochoa (Ochoa) did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Robert Gubat, Junior Agustin, Cesar
Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo, Joebert
Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo, Letecia D. Londonio, Alma Borromeo,
Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A. Bermejo and Rosemarie A. Bermejo for a consideration ranging
from P2,000.00 to P32,000.00 or a total amount of P124,000.00 as placement fee which the
complainants paid to Ochoa without the accused having secured the necessary license from the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Three other Informations were filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 98-‐
77301, 98-‐77302, and 98-‐77303, this time charging Ochoa with three counts of estafa, committed
separately upon three private complainants Robert Gubat (Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior
Agustin (Agustin). The Information in Criminal Case No. 98-‐77301 accuses Ochoa of the following
acts constituting estafa:

That on or about March 3, 1998, Ochoa did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit and promise employment in Taiwan to one ROBERT GUBAT for a consideration
of P18,800.00 as placement fee, knowing that she has no power, capacity or lawful authority and
with no intention to fulfill her said promise, but merely as scheme or excuse to get and exact money
from said complainant.

The two other Informations for estafa were similarly worded as the Information, except as
to the name of the private complainants and the amount purportedly collected by Ochoa from them,
particularly:

Docket No. Private Complainant Amount Collected
Criminal Case No. 98-‐773025 Cesar Aquino P19.000.00
Page 291 of 299


Criminal Case No. 98-‐773036 Junior Agustin P32,000.00

As prayed for by the State Prosecutor, all four criminal cases against Ochoa before the RTC were
consolidated.

Ochoa stated that she was employed by AXIL International Services and Consultant (AXIL)
as recruiter and was paid on a commission basis. AXIL had a temporary license to recruit Filipino
workers for overseas employment. She admitted recruiting private complainants and receiving
from them substantial amounts as placement and medical fees. Ochoa claimed though that she
remitted private complainants’ money to a person named Mercy, the manager of AXIL, but AXIL
failed to issue receipts because the private complainants did not pay in full.

On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 98-‐77300) and three
counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 98-‐77301, 98-‐77302, 98-‐77303).

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the appealed RTC decision. Ochoa
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the People opposed for being bereft of merit.

In its Resolution dated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no
jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, ratiocinating thus:

While neither the accused-‐appellant nor the Office of the Solicitor General representing the people
ever raised the issue of jurisdiction, our second look at the suit proved worthwhile because we
came to realize that we mistakenly assumed jurisdiction over this case where it does not obtain.

It was error to consider accused-‐appellant’s appeal from a trial court judgment imposing
life imprisonment in Criminal Case No. Q-‐98-‐77300 for illegal recruitment in a large scale.
Consequently, the judgment we rendered is null and void.

Despite its lack of jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the
same and merely ordered its transfer to us: While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-‐90 directs the
dismissal of appeals filed before the wrong court, the Supreme Court has in practice allowed the
transfer of records from this Court to the highest court. In which case, we shall subscribe to this
practice in the interest of substantial justice.

Issue:

Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa?

Ruling:

No, We find no reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals decision.

Illegal recruitment in large scale
Page 292 of 299


Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision
broadens the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provides stiffer penalties,
especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:

SEC. 6. Definition. -‐ For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-‐licensee or non-‐holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-‐licensee or non-‐holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-‐licensee, non-‐holder,
licensee or holder of authority:

x x x x

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

It is well-‐settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad
for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. All
eight private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them
employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their bio-‐data, birth
certificates, and passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various
amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa
issued to Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin. Despite private complainants’ compliance with all the
requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants
pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-‐earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non-‐licensee,
non-‐holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts
as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic
Act No. 8042, is the "failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
not actually take place without the worker’s fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment as
described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants,
evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the
Page 293 of 299


amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no
fault of their own.

Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and criminally
liable for illegal recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned
over the money she received from private complainants to AXIL.

We are not convinced. Ochoa’s claim was not supported by any corroborating evidence. The
POEA verification and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a
placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which had already expired. Said verification
did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged employee of
AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such as appointment
papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the private
complainants were issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that
Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present any proof
that private complainants’ money were actually turned over to or received by AXIL.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed
against three or more persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants
who convincingly testified on Ochoa’s acts of illegal recruitment.

In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict
of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment
constituting economic sabotage.

Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.

Estafa

We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private
complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-‐77301, 98-‐77302, and 98-‐77303. The very same evidence
proving Ochoa’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for
estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut that:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par.
2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum
where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se
where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the
Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction
for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal
Page 294 of 299


recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -‐ Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.

Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-‐77301, 98-‐77302, and 98-‐77303.
Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and
Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to
Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the
requirements, among which were the payment of placement fees and submission of a medical
examination report. Ochoa promised that there were already existing job vacancies overseas for
private complainants, even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by
receiving application documents from the private complainants, accompanying them to the clinic
for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain recruitment/placement
agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s words and
actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money
to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and
Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court
of Appeals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICK
GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that Roderick himself received the placement
fees from complainants and issued receipts for the same, given the finding of the existence of
conspiracy among Roderick and his co-‐accused Hanelita and Daud to convict Roderick of Illegal
recruitment in large scale. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
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interest. And Between the categorical statements of the private complainants, on the one hand, and
the bare denial of appellant, on the other hand, the former must perforce prevail.
Facts:
Angelita I. Daud, Hanelita M. Gallemit, and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were
charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. That on or about February 5, 2001 to
August 2001, in the City of Parañaque, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to
complainants Marcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena,
Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio, without first securing the required
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in
large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage. Eight more Informations charged Daud,
Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight
private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman, Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada
A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena, Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio,
respectively.
Only Roderick was apprehended, while his co-‐accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and
remained at large. The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated.
When arraigned, Roderick pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of
the nine criminal cases ensued. The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and
Consultancy, operated by Roderick and his co-‐accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment. Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio
testified against Gallem it. Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellant’s testimony.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding
appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. Considering
that accused Angelita i. Daud and Hanelita m. Gallemit remain at large for more than six (6) months
since the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer. Let an
alias warrant of arrest be issued against them. Following the denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration by the RTC, Roderick filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. All three
complainants positively identified appellant in court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Roderick’s
conviction by the RTC
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Roderick of large-‐scale illegal
recruitment despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

No, the trial court did not err in convicting Roderick.

Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate. Illegal recruitment is
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deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three
elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) of the Labor Code, or any of
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code; and (c) the offender
committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals ruled that all the foregoing elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are
present in the case at bar. First, neither the agency "Green Pastures World Wide Tours and
Consultancy" nor appellant himself had a valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. This was established by the POEA certification stating that the said agency
located in that apartment was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad. Second, despite not
having such authority, Roderick, along with his co-‐accused, nevertheless engaged in recruitment
activities, offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting from them various
amounts as placement fees.

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
Conspiracy exists where the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in committing the crime. The
testimonies of the complainants on the matter are affirmative in nature and sufficiently
corroborative of each other to be less than credible. We agree with the trial court that accused-‐
appellant engaged in recruitment of workers which was illegal and in large scale. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group. In this case, three complainants testified against appellant’s acts of illegal
recruitment. The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their
testimonies that they personally met Roderick; that they knew Roderick was associated with Green
Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy; and that Roderick had performed recruitment activities
such as promising employment abroad, encouraging job applications, and providing copies of job
orders. The private complainants’ testimonies are consistent and corroborate one another on
material points, such as the amount of the placement fees asked, and the purported country of
destination and nature of work. It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that appellant
himself received the placement fees from private complainants and issued receipts for the same,
given the finding of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy among
Roderick and his co-‐accused Hanelita and Daud, appellant’s wife and mother-‐in-‐law, respectively.
Furthermore, without any evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill
motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

LIBEL

ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-‐MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T.
ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT CONTRERAS vs. Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
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harm. Malice is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Facts:
On May 26, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported an article alleging that a mauling
incident took place between respondent Makati RTC Judge Cruz and one Robert Mendoza who was
then an administrative officer of the said RTC Branch.
Contending that the article to be false and malicious, particularly the part in the report
wherein it was alleged that there was a pending case of sexual harassment filed against him with
the Supreme Court, respondent Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint for libel with the City Prosecutor
of Makati.
Finding probable cause against herein petitioners and Mendoza, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information for libel against them. On appeal, then Secretary of Justice, herein respondent Sec.
Tuquero, sustained the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against petitioners
and Mendoza. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioners. In ruling as such the appellate court held that since the Information had already been
filed with the trial court, the primary determination of probable cause is now with the latter. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there is probable cause to charge petitioners with libel.
Ruling:
No, there is none.
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the
dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Consequently, the following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d)
existence of malice. The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of the news article
subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed by the
PDI staff.
As previously stated, Judge Cruz initiated the complaint for libel, asserting the falsity and
maliciousness of the statement in a news report that "(a)ccording to Mendoza, Cruz still has a
pending case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia,
also of the Makati RTC." It can be easily discerned that the article merely reported the statement of
Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz and that
said article did not report the existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact.
Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement.
Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part of the PDI Staff by asserting
that they did not check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong, pointing to a
certification from the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two
administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions not mentioning sexual harassment.
Page 298 of 299


The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its
own, is insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of
the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.

Page 299 of 299

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Teresita Leonardo-­‐De Castro Cases (2008-­‐2015) Criminal Law

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Yes, Malicdem is guilty.

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The petition is without merit.

Contrary to appellants’ claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior

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Teresita Leonardo-‐De Castro Cases (2008-‐2015) Criminal Law