Eur J Personality 1997 p101

European Journal of Personality, Vol.
11, 101±132 (1997)
The paranoid person: cognitive

motivations and personality traits
Shulamith Kreitler* and Hans Kreitler**

Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Abstract
The purpose was to contribute to a better understanding of the personality structure and
dynamics of paranoia. In study 1, 29 paranoid patients and three control groups (30
schizophrenics, 27 depressives, and 64 healthy subjects) were administered the Cognitive
Orientation (CO) Questionnaire of Paranoia, which included beliefs of four types
(goals, norms, about self, and general) referring to 44 themes (e.g. masculinity,
strength). Discriminant analyses (based on longer and shorter versions of the question-
naire) showed that the four belief types enabled significant discrimination among the
four groups and that there is a CO based on themes and conflicts characteristic for
paranoia. In Study 2, 31 paranoids and 31 healthy controls were administered the
Meaning Test which yielded prevalidated scores for 124 personality traits. The results
showed that paranoids have a clear-cut personality profile, with traits in clinical (e.g.
obsessive), interpersonal (e.g. extravert, leadership), emotional, cognitive, and other
domains. The findings are integrated and the convergences between the behavioral
tendencies and personality traits specified, in an attempt to identify the major features
of the paranoid, including potential dangers and therapeutic chances. & 1997 by John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Paranoia is one of the oldest, best established and most widely researched categories
in psychopathology. It has manifestations that have been identified from childhood
to old age (Swanson, Bohnert and Smith, 1970, Ch. 7, 5) in all cultures (Draguns,
1980). It is responsible for a variety of psychopathological syndromes, the major
ones being paranoid schizophrenia, paranoid disorder (or, according to DSM±IV,
delusional disorder of the grandiose, jealous, or persecutory types), and paranoid
personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1987; 1994).
*Correspondence to: Shulamith Kreitler, Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv,
Tel Aviv 69978, Israel (airmail). E-mail: Krit@ccsg.TAU.ac.IL
**The second author died on 7 January 1992. He is mentioned as an author because he participated fully
in the planning, carrying out and elaboration of findings of the present studies.
CCC 0890±2070/97/020101±32$17.50 Received 15 August 1995

& 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 15 November 1996
102 S. Kreitler and H. Kreitler
There is a growing awareness of the importance of understanding paranoia both

because it appears to be more frequent than has previously been assumed or is even
increasing (Torrey, 1981) and because paranoid symptoms are increasingly spotted
in a wide variety of clinical settings (Meissner, 1978) as well as non-clinical (Fried
and Agassi, 1976) and even political contexts (Glass, 1988; Robins, 1986).
In recent years the major research effort in paranoia has focused on cognition
(Magaro, 1980; Neufeld, 1991; Payne, 1973). A search of the literature has yielded
only very few studies dealing with the personality and motivations of paranoids (see
e.g. Heilbrun, Blum and Goldreyer, 1985; Pillai, 1982). Thus, whereas the
conceptualization in the cognitive domain has progressed and yielded seminal
insights (see e.g. Magaro, 1980; 1981b) or opened up new avenues of research (Colby,
1975), the state of the art in the non-cognitive areas has hardly progressed beyond the
psychoanalytically based concepts anchored mostly in the writings of Freud (1911/
1958) and Klein (1957) (see the reviews by Akhtar (1990) and Aronson (1989)).
The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the
personality structure and dynamics of paranoid patients. We do this from two
complementary viewpoints. The first focuses on the motivational dynamics of
paranoids, examined in the framework of the cognitive orientation (CO) theory
(Kreitler and Kreitler, 1982). The second focuses on the personality traits of
paranoids, examined in the framework of the psychosemantic personality theory
(Kreitler and Kreitler, 1990a). The two theories were first developed and widely
tested in domains other than psychopathology (though the CO theory originated in
the study of schizophrenia; Kreitler and Kreitler, 1965). Previously unpublished data
will be presented and interpreted in line with published data. After presenting
separately the two studies, we will deal in a third section with the integration of the
findings, emphasizing the features that seem unique to paranoia, in an attempt to
present a blueprint of what Magaro (1981a) has so aptly called `the emerging
characters' of the paranoid.
COGNITIVE MOTIVATION OF PARANOIA
Motivational constructs in the domain of paranoia

As mentioned above, very little research has been done into the motivational
dynamics of paranoia. The major explanatory constructs are based on
psychoanalytic theorizing and may be summarized as follows: (i) paranoia as due
to an unconscious homosexual conflict (Freud, 1911/1958); (ii) paranoia as due to
projected hostility (Cameron, 1974; Klein, 1957) or guilt about hostility (Lewis,
1985); (iii) paranoia as an attempt to minimize humiliation (Colby, 1975; Tomkins,
1963); (iv) paranoia as due to a deficient self that is narcissistic and brittle (Kohut,
1971) or based on the introjected role of the victim accompanied by projection of the
unacceptable aggression (Meissner, 1981); (v) paranoia as an attempt to deal with
`bewildering perceptions' by attributing inexplicable changes to an external cause
(Swanson et al, 1970); and (vi) paranoia as an attempt to cope with depression
(Meissner, 1978; Zigler and Glick, 1988).
Some of these constructs have been related to previously existing data (iv), (vi)
and partly (v); others have been supported by some studies and disconfirmed by
The paranoid person 103
others (e.g. construct (i) was supported by the work of Mujtaba and Mjutaba (1985)
and Pillai (1982) but disconfirmed by Planansky and Johnston (1962); construct (ii)
was supported by the work of Mishra, Verma, Bhagat and Agnihotri (1983a), but
disconfirmed by Mishra, Verma, Bhagat and Agnihotri (1993b)). Their major
weaknesses, however, are first the attempt to account for paranoia in terms of one
single construct, and second their low specificity. Thus, if phrased in more specific
terms, the motivational constructs may at best be considered merely as hypotheses.
Considerations in favour of selecting the CO theory

Three major considerations supported our assumption that applying the CO theory
would contribute to the understanding of paranoia. The first was related to the
major thesis of the CO theory that cognitive contents, such as beliefs, meanings or
attitudes, guide human behaviour. Several sets of findings suggested that a theory
based on the motivational implications of cognitive contents might be relevant to
paranoia: first the evidence, partly based on case studies, that cultural background
and beliefs affect the incidence of paranoia (Chiu and Rimon, 1987; Ndetei, 1986;
Newhill, 1990; Torrey, 1981; Waynik, 1985); second, the evidence that the families of
paranoids are characterized by adherence to rigid absolutistic beliefs (Kaffman,
1983); and finally, the findings that paranoids hold specific beliefs concerning
causation and control by powerful others (Kaney and Bentall, 1989; Rossler and
Lackus, 1986) that are specifically related to their low sense of personal efficacy and
other characteristics of their pathology (Rosenbaum and Hadari, 1985). The second
consideration was that paranoia is manifested also through behaviours in
characteristic domains, for instance, demanding and domineering acts, defending
oneself against delusionary persecution, litigiousness, querulousness, or complaining
(Akhtar, 1990; Goldstein, 1987; Rowlands, 1988; Tatossian, 1989). Hence it would
be adequate to apply for its study a theory that serves primarily as a framework for
the prediction and change of overt molar behaviours. Finally, the third consideration
was that, because paranoia seems to be affected by multiple determinants (Cameron,
1974), it would be advantageous to apply for its study a comprehensive theory that
allows for integrating biological, social, and psychological factors (Kreitler and
Chemerinski, 1988).
The CO theory
The CO theory is a model of behaviour designed to provide an account of major
processes intervening between input and output and to enable prediction as well as
modification of behaviour. It is a cognitive model of behaviour but in contrast to
other models (see e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) it does not confound cognition with
rationality and voluntary control and does not assume that behaviour is the product
of rational decision or carefully reasoned weighting of benefits and losses. Instead, it
specifies the underlying cognitive dynamics and shows how behaviour proceeds from
meanings and clustered orientative beliefs. In the present context only a brief
description of the theory is provided (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1976; 1982).
The detailed descriptions the theory provides of the processes intervening between
input and output can be grouped into four stages, each characterized by
metaphorical questions and answers. The first stage is initiated by an external or
internal input and is focused on the implied question `What is it?' It consists in
assigning meaning to the input (because it is limited and primary we call it ìnitial
meaning') and may result in identifying the input as (i) a signal for defensive,
adaptive or conditioned response, (ii) a signal for molar action, (iii) irrelevant in the
present situation, or (iv) new or especially significant and hence as a signal for an
orienting response.
The second stage is focused on the implied question `What does it mean in general
and what does it mean to me and for me?' It is initiated by an input that has not been
identified sufficiently for inhibiting the orienting response, or by a meaning
signalling the need to consider molar action, or by feedback indicating failure of the
conditioned or unconditioned responses to cope with the situation. By means of
enriched meaning generation it leads to a specification of whether action is required
or not.
A positive answer initiates the third stage which is focused on the implied question
`What will I do?' The answer is sought by means of relevant beliefs of four types:
(i) beliefs about goals, which express actions or states desired or undesired by the
individual (e.g. Ì want to be respected by others', Ì don't want anyone to know me
as I really am'); (ii) beliefs about rules and norms, which express ethical, aesthetic,
social, and other rules and standards (e.g. Òne should be assertive', Òne should
always be cautious and reasonable'); (iii) beliefs about self, which express
information about oneself, such as one's habits, actions, feelings, abilities, etc.
(e.g. Ì rarely become excited', Ì like going to parties', Às a child I was often
punished by my parents'); and (iv) general beliefs that express information
concerning others and the environment (e.g. `Most people try to get the better of
you', `The world is a very dangerous place').
The meaning elaboration in the third stage involves matchings and interactions
between beliefs (`belief clustering'), based on clarifying the orientativeness of the
beliefs (namely, the extent to which they support or do not support the indicated
course of action). If the majority of beliefs of a certain type support the action, that
belief type is considered as positively oriented in regard to that action. Alternatively,
it may be negatively oriented, or may lack orientativeness. If all four belief types
point in the direction of the same behaviour, or when three belief types support it
whereas the fourth is neutral, a cluster of beliefs (called a `CO cluster') orienting
toward a particular act will result. It generates a unified tendency orienting toward
the performance of an action, called `behavioural intent'. In other cases, when two
belief types point in one direction and two in another, the resulting conflict may
induce the formation of two CO clusters and two behavioural intents (called ìntent
conflicts'). Further alternatives to the formation of a full-fledged CO cluster include
the retrieval of an almost complete CO cluster that has been formed in the past
owing to a series of similar recurrent situations and has merely to be completed and
adapted to a current situation; the emergence of an incomplete CO cluster due, for
example, to the paucity of beliefs in one of the belief types; or the formation of an
inoperable cluster due, for example, to the inclusion of às if' beliefs in one or more
belief types, that may orient toward daydreaming.
The fourth stage is focused on the question `How will I do it?' The answer is in the
form of a programme, namely, a hierarchically structured sequence of instructions
governing the performance of some act. It may often be analysed profitably in terms
of the level of the more general instructions or strategy (called the `programme
scheme') and the level of the more specific instructions or tactics (called the
òperational programme'). Different programmes are involved in executing an overt
molar act (performance programmes), a merely daydreamed act, in resolving a
conflict, etc.
It is convenient to classify programmes in line with their origin: (i) innately
determined programmes, such as those controlling reflexes or tropisms; (ii)
programmes determined both innately and through learning, such as those
controlling instinctive sequences or linguistic behaviours; (iii) programmes acquired
through learning or imitation, such as those controlling culturally shaped behaviours
and personally formed habits; and (iv) programmes constructed by the individual ad
hoc. Implementing a behavioural intent by a programme requires selection of a
programme, retrieving it, and often adapting it to prevailing circumstances before it
can be set into operation. A conflict may arise between two programmes that appear
to be equally adequate for implementing the same behavioural intent or between two
programmes, one of which cannot be set in operation because another is still being
enacted (called `programme conflict'). Some of these programme conflicts are trivial;
others may be indicative of an obsessional neurosis.
Predicting and changing human behaviour

A large body of research demonstrates the predictive power of the CO theory in a
variety of domains, for instance, arriving on time, reactions to success and failure,
curiosity, achievement, planning, overeating, assertiveness, conformity, smoking,
cessation of smoking, self-disclosure, undergoing tests for the early detection of
breast cancer and other health-related behaviours and phenomena, intolerance of
ambiguity, rigidity, defensive responses, and slowness, in adults, adolescents,
children, retarded individuals, and schizophrenics (Kreitler and Chemerinski,
1988; Kreitler and Kreitler, 1976; 1982; 1988a; 1991; 1993; 1994; Lobel, 1982;
Kreitler, Schwartz and Kreitler, 1987; Tipton and Riebsame, 1987; Westhoff and
Halbach-Suarez, 1989). The CO theory has also enabled successful modifications of
behaviour, such as rigidity, impulsivity, and curiosity (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1988a;
1994; Zakay, Bar-El and Kreitler, 1984).
The brief account of the CO theory indicates that the major constructs to be
considered in predicting and changing behaviour are the meaning assigned by the
individual to the situation, the CO cluster concerning the particular act and the
availability of an adequate programme for performing the act. In practice, however,
one may often assume the meaning likely to be assigned and the availability of
common programmes. Thus, one may predict that an individual will show the
expected behaviour if there are enough relevant beliefs orienting toward that
behaviour in all four belief types or at least three if the fourth does not point in a
contrary direction. Beliefs are identified as relevant for a certain behaviour if they
represent important aspects of the meaning of that behaviour. The CO theory has
generated a systematic procedure for exploring and determining the meanings of a
behaviour (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1982). In principle, it consists in requesting the
subject to communicate the meaning, first of key constructs relating to the behaviour
in question and its context or situation, and then repeatedly of the meanings the
individual has used in his or her communications. The recurrent responses in the last
stage are selected as themes for beliefs of the four kinds. Also the procedures for
modifying behaviour focus on changing systematically the beliefs relating to the

themes and not those that refer directly to the behaviour in question.
Study 1: The CO of paranoid patients
Purpose
The purpose was to identify the CO characteristic of paranoid patients, namely, to
find out which beliefs underlie the overt characteristically paranoid manifestations of
suspiciousness, jealousy, inflated personal worth, feeling persecuted, threatened, and
misunderstood by others, etc. This required identifying themes of beliefs endorsed by
paranoid patients, preparing a CO questionnaire focused on these themes and testing
the discriminating power of this questionnaire.
Subjects
The core group consisted of 29 paranoid hospitalized patients, recruited from three
hospitals, who have been selected from a larger group (n=35)Ðdiagnosed in the
hospitals as paranoidÐin line with strict DSM criteria (13 suffered from paranoid
disorder, 297.10, according to DSM±III±R, or delusional disorder, grandiose,
jealous, or persecutory types, 297.1, according to DSM±IV, and 16 from paranoid
schizophrenia, 295.3x, according to DSM±III±R, or 295.30, according to DSM±IV)
and high scores (M=19.3, SD=2.6) on the Maine scale of Paranoid Schizophrenia
(Magaro, Abrams and Cantrell, 1981). They had no depressive features. In addition,
there were three control groups: (i) 30 hospitalized schizophrenics without paranoid
features (on the Maine Paranoia subscale they scored M=7.3 and on the
Nonparanoid subscale (M=16.2); (ii) 27 hospitalized depressive patients, suffering
from major depression; and (iii) 64 healthy individuals with low scores on the
paranoid scale of the MMPI and on a self-report prevalidated scale of paranoid
tendencies in normal individuals. The paranoids included 18 men and 11 women, 15
from a Middle-Eastern/North-African cultural background and 14 from a European
background. Their mean age was 49.93 years (SD=13.17). They were of medium±
low socioeconomic status. They had a mean of 11.1 years of education and a mean
IQ of 97.2. They had been hospitalized for a mean of 3.06 years. The paranoids did
not differ significantly from the other groups in terms of the demographic variables
and from groups (i) and (ii) in duration of hospitalization. All patients were on
medication.
Procedure
The CO Questionnaire of Paranoia was constructed following the standard
procedure (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1982). In the first stage the major key terms for
interviewing were determined. Pretests about the meaning of paranoia and a scan of
the major symptoms of paranoia yielded four constructs that were selected as
representing major problem areas of paranoia in a fairly neutral non-symptomatic
language: jealousy, suspicion, feeling of self-importance, and sense of danger. In the
second stage, 10 paranoid patients and 12 nonparanoids (four depressives, four
schizophrenics, and four normals) were interviewed about the meanings of the
various terms (by the method of successive meaning assignment) yielding 44 themes
(see Table 1). The third stage consisted in formulating beliefs of the four types (goals,
norms, about self, and general) about each theme. For example, concerning the
theme of `not changing one's mind' (No. 19, Table 1), some of the beliefs were Ìf I
arrive at a certain conclusion or decision, I don't change my mind' (belief about self);
`Having reached some conclusion, a person should not change it because of others'
(belief about norms); Ì want to be a person who never changes one's mind, no
matter what' (belief about goals); and `People who change their opinion if others
persuade them have a weak character' (general belief ). The beliefs of each belief type
were grouped together and the preliminary questionnaire was administered to pretest
patients who were requested also to comment on the clarity and ease of the items.
Finally, we had a questionnaire which included four parts, one for each belief
type, each preceded by instructions emphasizing the special nature of the items in
that part. The number of items (n=211) varied from 47 for goal beliefs to 62 for
general beliefs. In each part the items were presented in the form of statements to
which the subjects were requested to respond by stating whether they agreed to it or
not (scored as 2 or 1, respectively). The interviews were conducted in individual
sessions. Each subject received scores for each belief type and a summary score
representing the number of belief types in which the subject had scores above the
group's mean (CO score), as well as scores for each of the themes across belief types.
The results of mean comparisons and discriminant analyses among the groups
were used for selecting a smaller number of themes and repeating the analyses with a
shorter questionnaire.
Results
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant gender differences in any
of the groups. Reliability of the four belief types in the questionnaire ranged from
0.70 (self beliefs) to 0.92 (general beliefs) in paranoids, from 0.78 (self beliefs) to 0.91
(general beliefs) in depressives, from 0.70 (self beliefs) to 0.83 (goals) in
schizophrenics, and from 0.67 (self beliefs) to 0.88 (goals) in normals.
Mean comparisons among the four groups (Table 1) show that the groups differed
significantly in 39 (88.6 per cent) of the 44 original themes and that paranoids scored
higher than normals in 43 themes (97.7 per cent) and higher than depressives,
schizophrenics, and normals in 27 themes (61.4 per cent).
Stepwise discriminant analyses show that scores of the four belief types, based on
responses to all the items in the CO questionnaire (across the 44 themes), enable a
correct and significant classification of the subjects into four groups (paranoids,
schizophrenics, depressives, and normals) as well as three groups (paranoids,
schizophrenics, and normals; or paranoids, depressives, and normals) and two
groups (paranoids and normals) (Table 2). The only case when the classification did
not reach significance is when only the three psychopathological groupsÐparanoids,
schizophrenics, and depressivesÐwere involved.
In the differentiation among the four groups by discriminant analysis, three
functions were involved: the first, defined mainly by norm beliefs (according to the
standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients) and contributing mainly
to the differentiation between schizophrenics and normals (according to the group
centroids); the second, defined mainly by goal beliefs and contributing mainly to the
Table 1. Means and mean comparisons of paranoids, schizophrenics, depressives, and

normals on themes and combinations of conflict themes of the CO Questionnaire of Paranoia
Theme Paran. Schiz. Dep. Norm. F
1. Insisting on getting respect from others 17.30 16.85 16.81 13.84 27.965****
2. Paying attention to small details 11.16 10.72 10.88 10.30 3.484*
3. Limited quantity of resources 6.62 6.48 6.57 5.38 18.420****
4. Existence of hidden, deeper meanings 14.48 14.73 14.83 14.22 1.465
5. Existence of absolute truth 13.11 13.10 12.36 11.32 17.260****
6. The interdependence of things 7.40 7.47 7.44 6.59 7.263****
7. Temporary, unstable and insecure nature of 10.40 10.34 11.00 8.29 36.768****
things
8. Disregarding the opinions of others 7.16 6.98 6.68 6.64 2.475
9. Existence of contrasts and contradictions 13.91 13.63 13.31 10.64 54.407****
10. Not exposing oneself and one's weaknesses 12.65 12.68 12.10 10.03 21.156****
11. Guarding one's rights 6.63 8.70 8.57 8.76 36.048****
12. Need to understand everything 8.82 8.69 8.48 7.36 15.033****
13. Having an ideal (believing in it, promoting it) 7.28 7.40 7.35 6.34 8.455****
14. Existence of someone guilty for wrong, failure 10.22 11.09 10.98 8.90 25.257****
15. Necessity to punish the guilty 11.48 11.02 11.25 9.11 19.209****
16. Necessity to fight/reduce injustice 7.12 7.45 7.30 6.90 2.546
17. Keeping rules and regulations 8.80 8.68 8.63 6.80 39.825****
18. Freedom from rules and regulations 6.96 6.90 6.91 6.22 5.975***
19. Not changing one's mind 8.33 8.30 8.11 7.24 9.089****
20. Strength and pride 16.23 15.54 15.38 14.18 11.082****
21. Weakness 3.12 3.70 3.53 3.27 5.283**
22. Admiring/accepting authority 7.43 6.69 7.25 5.14 38.324****
23. Rejecting authority 3.32 3.10 3.14 3.10 0.991
24. Accepting negative emotions 24.28 23.90 23.81 21.83 12.859****
25. Upholding femininity 8.73 8.70 8.69 7.35 15.255****
26. Upholding masculinity 8.95 8.83 8.41 7.17 16.192****
27. Doing unto others as they do to you 6.83 6.64 6.54 5.18 14.980****
28. Accepting the existence of evil 10.22 9.69 9.95 7.75 31.805****
29. Existence of goodness and purity 12.42 12.50 12.31 9.54 41.469****
30. Being demanding in regard to oneself 7.83 8.40 8.27 6.78 15.648****
31. Fear of failure and endurance despite failures 6.62 6.43 6.63 5.51 11.513****
32. Anti expressing anger and aggression 6.69 6.98 6.81 5.93 12.211****
33. Concealing one's emotions 7.75 6.46 7.65 7.45 9.295****
34. Being cautious 7.22 7.42 7.07 5.93 20.958****
35. Planning 5.17 5.22 5.44 3.88 33.528****
36. Controlling emotions 12.48 12.28 12.30 10.10 10.087****
37. Being controlled by emotions 3.10 3.22 3.55 2.58 12.503****
38. Being sensitive to others and their reactions 6.93 7.10 7.20 6.82 1.232
39. Low control over one's life and fate 8.72 8.33 8.46 5.88 61.174****
40. Reacting to slights and offenses 10.28 10.10 10.18 10.59 0.981
41. Consideration for others 7.41 7.32 7.35 6.17 16.967****
42. Causing harm to others when necessary 10.85 10.67 10.29 9.29 18.488****
43. Rejecting help by others 13.95 13.25 13.24 12.01 13.661****
44. Daily life hassles as disturbances 6.53 6.50 6.59 5.98 5.464**
Combinations of conflict themes
1. Themes 8 & 38: Disregard vs Sensitivity to 14.09 14.08 13.88 13.46 7.497****
others
2. Themes 41 & 42: Consideration vs Harming 18.26 17.94 17.64 15.46 28.826****
others
3. Themes 36 & 37: Controlling vs Being 15.58 15.50 15.94 12.68 10.166****
controlled by emotions
Table 1 (continued )
Theme Paran. Schiz. Dep. Norm. F
4. Themes 34±36 & 37, 39: Control vs 24.87 24.92 24.90 19.91 12.459****
Controlled
5. Themes 17 & 18: Keeping rules vs Freedom 15.76 15.58 15.54 13.02 31.294****
6. Themes 25 & 26: Femininity vs Masculinity 17.68 17.53 17.10 14.52 20.176****
7. Themes 20 & 21: Strength vs Weakness 19.95 19.24 18.91 17.45 13.175****
8. Themes 22 & 23: Accepting vs Rejecting 10.75 9.79 10.39 8.24 25.589****
authority
9. Themes 24 & 36: Accepting vs Controlling 36.76 36.18 36.20 31.93 16.762****
emotions
10. Themes 28 & 29: Evil vs Goodness 22.46 22.19 22.26 17.92 62.309****
11. Themes 24 & 32: Accepting vs Concealing 30.97 30.88 30.62 26.76 32.101****
anger
*p50.05; **p50.01; ***p50.001; ****p50.0001.
differentiation between paranoids and schizophrenics; and the third, defined mainly
by general beliefs and contributing mainly to the differentiation between depressives
and schizophrenics. Yet, in the other differentiations other belief combinations were
involved, which indicates that all four belief types contribute to the differentiations
among the groups, with goal beliefs playing relatively the most prominent role. The
mean number of belief types with significant contributions to the differentiations was
3.4. In the differentiations between three groups, only two functions are involved, a
major one differentiating mainly between psychopathological groups and the
normals, and a second one differentiating mainly among psychopathological groups.
In differentiating between paranoids and normals only one function was involved.
We selected a smaller set of items from those themes that differentiated
significantly among the groups and yielded a pattern of results with paranoids
scoring highest and normals lowest (themes 3, 5, 11, 12, 17, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 36, 39±
41, 43). The shortened questionnaire included 71 items (32.13 per cent of the original
number): 13 norm beliefs, 17 goal beliefs, 20 self beliefs, and 21 general beliefs. The
reliability of the four belief types ranged from 0.65 to 0.81 in paranoids, from 0.61 to
0.65 in schizophrenics, from 0.64 to 0.78 in depressives, and from 0.68 to 0.79 in
normals. According to the stepwise discriminant analyses, the degree of
differentiation among the groups was similar to that obtained with the original
questionnaire (Table 2). Again, the correct classification of the subjects into groups
was significantly much higher than chance; the mean number of belief types with
significant contributions was 3.6; three functions were involved in differentiating
among the four groups, two functions in differentiating between three groups, and
one in differentiating between two groups (paranoids and normals); and all four
belief types contributed to the differentiation, with norm beliefs playing a relatively
more prominent role.
The satisfactory results of the discriminant analyses justify a closer analysis of the
themes in the CO questionnaire. On the basis of contents and intercorrelations the
themes may be grouped into several clusters: (i) Getting respect from others: getting
respect, insisting on one's rights, and reacting to insults (themes 1, 11, 40); (ii)
Keeping rigidly to one's opinions: disregarding the views of others, not changing one's
Table 2. Results of stepwise discriminant analyses with the four belief types as predictors and the
groups of paranoids (P), depressives (D), schizophrenics (S), and normals (N) as dependent variable
Dependent Longer questionnaire Shorter questionaire

P, D, S, N Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients
Predictors Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 3 Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 3
Self beliefs 0.061 71.073 0.654 0.381 0.877 0.630

Gen. beliefs 0.562 0.457 71.048
Norms 0.921 70.280 0.202 0.937 70.915 0.045
Goals 70.699 1.106 0.817 70.389 0.626 1.042
Eigenvalue 1.556 0.033 0.003 1.646 0.026 0.000
% of variance 97.72 2.09 0.18 98.44 1.56 0.00
Canonical corr. 0.78 0.18 0.05 0.79 0.16 0.005
Wilks lambda 0.965 0.997 Ð 0.975 0.999 Ð
Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means

Groups Func. 1 Funct. 2 Func. 3 Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 3
Paranoids 0.975 70.312 70.047 1.263 0.102 70.008

Depressives 1.131 0.294 70.066 1.043 70.311 0.002
Schizophren. 71.357 0.008 0.003 1.054 0.178 0.008
Normals 1.223 0.027 0.092 71.423 0.004 0.000
Classification of subjects into groups

Groups Classified as P D S N Classified as P D S N
Paranoids 11 7 8 3 13 9 4 3
Depressives 4 13 6 4 7 10 5 5
Schizophren. 4 11 14 1 6 9 12 3
Normals 8 3 0 58 0 6 4 59
Correct classif. 63.16% CR=6.701**** 61.84% CR=6.480***
P, D, S Standardized canonical discriminant functions

Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 1 Func. 2
Predictors G, BS BS, G BS, N, G, GB N, G, GB, BS

Eigenvalue 0.079 0.008 0.059 0.009
% of variance 90.65 9.35 87.28 12.72
Canonical corr. 0.27 0.09 0.24 0.09
Centroids P±D D±S D±S S±P
distance P±S P±S D±P D±P
Correct classif. 46.51%, CR=1.771 45.35%, CR=1.619
P, S, N Predictors G, N, GB, BS G, BS, N, GB N, GB, BS, G BS, G, GB, N

Eigenvalue 1.808 0.030 1.854 0.001
% of variance 98.37 1.63 99.93 0.07
Canonical corr. 0.80 0.17 0.80 0.03
Centroids S±N P±S P±N P±S
distance P±N P±N S±N N±S
Correct classif. 68.75%, CR=4.619*** 65.63%, CR=5.176***
P, D, N Predictors N, G, GB, BS BS, G, GB, N N, G, BS, GB BS, GB, G, N

Eigenvalue 1.346 0.039 1.750 0.024
% of variance 97.18 2.82 98.62 1.38
Canonical corr. 0.76 0.19 0.80 0.15
Centroids N±D P±D N±P D±P
distance N±P P±N N±D D±N
Correct classif. 70.40%, CR=5.870*** 70.40%, CR=5.870***
Table 2. (continued)
Standard canonical discriminant functions

Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 1 Func. 2
P, N Predictors G=N, GB, BS N, BS, G

Eigenvalue 1.076 1.725
% of variance 100 100
Canonical corr. 0.72 0.80
Correct classif. 85.71%, CR=5.354**** 88.78%, CR=5.894
Note: Only the first analysis is presented in full detail. For all analyses only predictors with significant
contributions are presented. In the last four analyses the predictors are listed in order of decreasing
contributions; the `centroids distance' presents the two largest distances between groups (in decreasing
order), assessed by canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means. BS, =self beliefs, GB,
=general beliefs; N, norm beliefs; G, goal beliefs; CR, critical ratio P, =Paranoids, D, =Depressives, S,
=Schizophrenics, N, =Normals. ****p50.0001.
views (themes, 8, 19); (iii) Maintaining control: caution, planning, and emotional
control (themes 34±36); (iv) Being controlled: controlled by emotions, external control
(themes 37, 39); (v) Emphasis on strength, with overtones of masculinity and getting
along alone: concealing one's weaknesses, pride and strength, admiring authority,
promoting masculinity, harming others if necessary, and rejecting help (themes 10, 20,
22, 26, 42, 43); (vi) Emphasis on weakness, with overtones of femininity: weakness,
femininity (themes 21, 25); (vii) Concealing emotions: not expressing aggression,
concealing emotions (themes 32, 33); (viii) Guilt and its punishment: existence of a
guilty agent and need to punish it (themes 14, 15); (ix) Seeking total information:
attention to minute details, need to understand everything (themes 2, 12); (x)
Cognitive approachÐabsolutistic ambivalent connectionism: existence of hidden
meanings (including underlying psychological motivations), belief in absolute truth,
interdependence of all things, contradictions and contrasts (themes 4±6, 9); (xi)
Negative view of the world: restricted resources, instability (themes 3, 7); (xii)
Achievement orientation: believing in some ideal, demanding a lot from oneself, fear of
failure and endurance despite failures (themes 13, 30, 31); (xiii) Emphasis on freedom:
keeping rules, freedom from rules, rejecting authority, daily hassles as disturbances
(themes 17, 18, 23, 44); (xiv) Emphasis on evil: accepting negative emotions, doing
unto others as they do to you, existence of evil (themes 24, 27, 28); (xv) Emphasis on
goodness and purity: fighting injustice, promoting goodness, sensitivity to the
behaviour of others, consideration for others (themes 16, 29, 38, 41).
A factor analysis performed in a large sample of normals (n=125) and repeated in
the smaller samples of this study showed that the themes fall into two factors
(eigenvalues 7.94 and 1.23, and per cent of variance 56.8 per cent and 8.8 per cent,
respectively) defined by the following clusters of themes (only saturations above 0.60
were considered): the first by respect, control, strength, guilt, and achievement
(themes 1, 10, 11, 13±16, 20, 22, 26, 30, 31, 34±36, 40, 43) and the second by seeking
total information, weakness, being controlled, negative view of the world, and
absolutistic ambivalent connectionism (themes 2±7, 9, 12, 21, 25, 37, 39). Essentially
the same two factors were identified in the sample of the paranoids, the differences
being that only 95 per cent of the listed themes were saturated on the factors and the
cutting point 0.60 for the saturations was replaced by 0.40.
Notably, some of the themes contradict others. Such contradictions seem to

constitute the foci for potential conflicts. An individual who tends to suffer from
some conflict would endorse beliefs that refer to the contradictory themes
representing the conflict. Hence, that individual would have a higher score on the
sum of these themes than an individual who does not tend to suffer from the conflict.
This is the reasoning underlying the 11 conflict variables at the end of Table 2. They
show that on all 11 variables paranoids score higher than normals and on nine (all
except Nos. 2 and 3) they score higher than normals, schizophrenics, and
depressives. The list includes a well known conflict in the domain of paranoia as
that of masculinity versus femininity (No. 6) but also some not previously identified,
as those of good versus evil (No. 10), strength versus weakness (No. 7), and
acceptance versus rejection of emotion (No. 9).
Major conclusions
The findings of Study 1 show that there is a CO characteristic for paranoia. It consists
of a set of beliefs of four types referring to a set of specific themes. It can be assessed
by the CO Questionnaire of Paranoia, of which there exists longer and shorter
versions. The scores of the four beliefs assessed by the CO questionnaire enable a
highly significant classification of subjects into the four groups of paranoids,
schizophrenics, depressives, and normals. All four belief types contribute to the
differentiation, three or four playing a role in each classification of subjects, as in the
case of previous predictions of overt behaviours. The differentiation is particularly
good between paranoids and normals and weakest among the three pathological
groups. The latter finding indicates that paranoids share some of the beliefs with
schizophrenics and depressives. This conclusion is not surprising because (i) our group
of paranoids included some paranoid schizophrenics, (ii) there are conceptual and
methodological problems in distinguishing sharply between paranoids and paranoid
schizophrenics in regard to symptoms, course of disease, and prognosis (Koehler and
Hornstein, 1986; Munroe, 1988; Romney, 1987), and (iii) paranoia may be related to
depression in symptoms and dynamically (Gabriel, 1987; Klein, 1957; Zigler and
Glick, 1986, 1988) as well as in cognitive functioning (Carter, 1986; Munroe, 1988).
The CO of paranoids consists of themes that span a broad range of domains, such
as interpersonal relations, emotions, and good and evil, as well as the nature of the
world and of knowledge. The themes fall essentially into two major factors, one
representing emphasis on masculinity, strength, getting respect, admiring authority,
and freedom from the shackles of rules and hassles; the other representing a
restricted and restrictive view of the world, weakness, being controlled, and an
absolutistic ambivalent approach. This combination of themes could be viewed as
defining the characteristically paranoid world view. It includes some themes that
have been investigated by others, notably external locus of control (Rosenbaum and
Hadari, 1985) and homosexuality (Pillai, 1982), some that have been discussed in
clinical contexts, such as insisting rigidly on personal autonomy (Shapiro (1981), that
relates to themes 8, 19, 43, and some that have not been discussed before, such as
those that relate to achievement, view of the world, and seeking total knowledge.
There are however unique advantages to our approach: (i) the systematic manner in
which the themes have been identified and tested indicates that the set of themes may
be considered as comprehensive, conceptually homogenous, and empirically
confirmed; (ii) the evidence that when embedded in the four-belief matrix (according
to the CO theory) the themes enable a significantly above-chance differentiation
between paranoids and others emphasizes the cognitive±motivational function of the
themes; (iii) the specific nature of the themes increases their conceptual importance
for understanding paranoia (e.g. see in àchievement' the emphasis on adherence to
an ideal, increased self-demands, and fear of failure rather than success, or in
`freedom' the specification of freedom from rules rather than duties); (iv) the themes
may contribute to a better understanding of paranoia when considered both singly
and as contradictory sets. Thus, at least some themes are particularly relevant in
regard to specific paranoid symptoms and shed light on their underlying dynamics,
for instance, the theme of restricted resources (No. 3) and jealousy, or getting respect
from others (themes 1, 11, 40) and fighting against slights to one's honour. Further,
the conflict potentials identified by means of the specific contradictory sets of themes
contribute a new insight for the understanding of paranoia. They indicate that
paranoids tend towards specific conflicts that are likely to impose serious constraints
on their behaviour, particularly of the interpersonal type and in the social context.
In sum, our findings show that paranoids have a characteristic cognitive orientation
that includes beliefs of four types relating to themes which singly and in sets denoting
conflicts provide insight into the cognitive±motivational dynamics in paranoia.
PERSONALITY TRAITS OF PARANOIDS
Personality descriptions of paranoids

The literature dealing with the personality of paranoids includes very few empirical
studies (see e.g. Pillai, 1982). Computerized searches indicate that the majority of
publications in this domain present case studies or hypothetical personality
descriptions. Apart from the missing empirical basis, the main drawback of these
descriptions is that they mostly do not distinguish sharply between underlying
personality dispositions and manifest personality traits, as is often the case in regard
to hostility or homosexuality. Further, most of the descriptions are highly limited,
restricted to those personality features that seem to be related directly to the
paranoid symptomatology, i.e. jealousy, suspiciousness, hostility, etc. In fact, the
distinction between personality traits and symptoms is often blurred.
The psychosemantic approach to personality traits

In examining the paranoid personality we applied the psychosemantic approach to
personality traits. It is based on a new conception that the contents and dynamics of
meaning constitute the underlying foundations of personality traits as they are
currently assessed by most personality tests, questionnaires, and inventories. Over 20
studies, in which 115 of the commonly used personality traits were examined,
showed that the psychosemantic conception allows for new solutions to some of the
old problems about the nature, functioning, and manifestations of traits, and
provides for the assessment of more than 100 traits by means of one testÐthe
Meaning Test (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1984; 1990a). The tool and the theoretical
conception are related intimately to the meaning system.
The system of meaning
The system of meaning provides for the characterization and assessment of human
meanings of different kinds (e.g. Kreitler and Kreitler, 1982; 1985a; b; 1986a; b;
1988b; 1990a±c). It was designed to be broader in coverage and to have higher
validity than the available measures of meaning (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1976, Ch. 2).
In this context we will describe only those aspects of the system which are necessary
for understanding our findings in regard to paranoid personality traits.
In view of theoretical considerations and the empirical data, meaning was defined
as a referent-centred pattern of cognitive contents. In this definition, the referent is the
input, the carrier of meaning, anything to which meaning can be assigned, including
objects, words, concepts, events, situations, images, etc., whereas the cognitive
contents communicate something about the referent, can be expressed verbally or
nonverbally, may differ in veridicality and interpersonal sharedness, and are called
`meaning values'. The referent and the meaning value form together a meaning unit.
The system of meaning includes four sets of empirically tested variables for
characterization of different aspects of the meaning unit (see Table 3): (i) Meaning
dimensions, that characterize the contents of the meaning value from the point of
view of the specific information communicated about the referent, such as the
referent's Sensory Qualities (e.g. SunÐyellow), or Feelings and Emotions (e.g.
DeathÐgrief ); (ii) Types of relation, that characterize the immediacy of the relation
between the meaning value and the referent, for example, attributive (e.g. PantsÐis a
garment), comparative (e.g. Swimming poolÐa little like a pond but different from
the ocean), or exemplifying±illustrative (e.g. CountryÐGreat Britain); (iii) Forms of
relation, that characterize the formal±logical aspect of the relation between the
meaning value and the referent, which may be positive (e.g. SunÐis bright), negative
(e.g. SunÐis not green), conjunctive (e.g. SunÐis both round and yellow), etc.; and
(iv) Referent shifts, that characterize the relations between the referents in the chain
of responses constituting meaning assignment to some referent; for example, the
referent may deviate from the original input or previous referents and may be one of
the formerly used meaning values, or a part of the initial referent, its superordinate
category, its opposite, or even just an association to it. Thus, if the referent is `road',
the response ìs a place where cars drive', includes two meaning values: (a) ìs a place'
and (b) `where cars drive', whereby the first meaning value serves as a referent for the
second.
The Meaning Test

The test is designed to assess an individual's tendencies to use the different meaning
variables. The test consists of a standardized list of 11 stimuli (e.g. street, life, bicycle,
feeling, ocean, telephone). The subject is requested to communicate to an imaginary
other person the interpersonally shared and personal meaning of each stimulus,
using any verbal or nonverbal means of communication considered by the subject as
adequate. The test may be administered orally or in writing, individually or in group
sessions. The subjects' responses are coded in terms of the four sets of meaning
variables. The responses are divided into meaning units, each of which is assigned
one meaning dimension, one type of relation, one form of relation, and one referent
shift variable. Summing all the codings of the meaning units in the responses of a
Table 3. Major variables of the meaning system
(1) Meaning dimensions

Dim. 1. Contextual allocation
Dim. 2. Range of inclusion (2a: subclasses of referent; 2b: parts of referent)
Dim. 3. Function, purpose, and role
Dim. 4. Actions and potentialities for action (4a: by referent; 4b: to/with referent)
Dim. 5. Manner of occurrence or operation
Dim. 6. Antecedents and causes
Dim. 7. Consequences and results
Dim. 8. Domain of application (8a: referent as subject; 8b: referent as object)
Dim. 9. Material
Dim. 10. Structure
Dim. 11. State and possible changes in state
Dim. 12. Weight and mass
Dim. 13. Size and dimensionality
Dim. 14. Quantity and number
Dim. 15. Locational qualities
Dim. 16. Temporal qualities
Dim. 17. Possessions (17a) and belongingness (17b)
Dim. 18. Development
Dim. 19. Sensory qualities (19a: of referent; 19b: by referent)
Dim. 20. Feelings and emotions (20a: evoked by referent; 20b: felt by referent)
Dim. 21. Judgments and evaluations (21a: about referent; 21b: by referent)
Dim. 22. Cognitive qualities (22a: evoked by referent; 22b: of referent)
(II) Types of relation
TR 1. Attributive (1a: qualities to substance; 1b: actions to agent)
TR 2. Comparative (2a: similarity; 2b: difference; 2c: complementariness; 2d: relationality)
TR 3. Exemplifying±illustrative (3a: exemplifying instance; 3b: exemplifying situation;
3c: exemplifying scene)
TR 4. Metaphoric±symbolic (4a: interpretation; 4b: conventional metaphor; 4c: original
metaphor; 4d: symbol)
Modes of meaning
Lexical mode TR 1+TR 2
Personal mode TR 3+TR 4
(III) Forms of relation
FR 1. Positive
FR 2. Negative
FR 3. Mixed positive and negative
FR 4. Conjunctive
FR 5. Disjunctive
FR 6. Combined positive and negative
FR 7. Double negative
FR 8. Obligatory
FR 9. Question
(IV) Shifts of referent
SR 1. Identical
SR 2. Opposite
SR 3. Partial
SR 4. Modified by adding a meaning value
SR 5. Previous meaning value
SR 6. Associative
SR 7. Unrelated
SR 8. Grammatical variation
SR 9. Linguistic label
SR 10. Several previous meaning values combined
SR 11. Higher-level referent
particular subject across all stimuli produces the subject's meaning profile. The
profile consists of the frequencies of the subject's responses in each of the meaning
variables. Each meaning variable represents a set of specific contents and processes;
for instance, the meaning dimension Locational Qualities represents contents
relevant for space and locations and processes adapted to retrieving and
processing these contents. Thus, the frequency score of each meaning variable
represents the strength of the individual's tendency to apply the content and
processes relevant to that variable in different cognitive tasks, such as input
identification, attention, associations, recall, problem solving, belief construction,
etc. (see e.g. Arnon and Kreitler, 1984; Kreitler and Kreitler, 1984; 1985b; 1987;
1988b). Accordingly, each meaning may be considered as reflecting a meaning
assignment tendency.
Definition and assessment of personality traits

According to the psychosemantic approach, a personality trait is defined as a unique
pattern of meaning assignment tendencies: some are applied by the individual
frequently and some infrequently; they are within a limited numerical range,
represent specific kinds of meaning variables, constitute together a specific structure,
and reflect a characteristic grouping of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and
attitudinal manifestations.
Each of 115 personality traits was found to correspond to a specific pattern of
meaning variables. The patterns were identified by correlating scores on personality
tests with meaning profiles. A pattern includes only the meaning variables correlated
significantly with the test scores, whereby those correlated positively constitute
positive components in the pattern and those correlated negatively constitute the
negative ones. As noted, patterns corresponding to personality traits are
characterized by a set of formal characteristics, for instance, a specific number of
components (M=13.8, SD=6.5) or a specific proportion of negative components
(0.38). Some of the major theoretical implications of the new definition are that trait
manifestations are most likely to occur in those spheres in which meaning variables
have their most pronounced manifestationsÐnamely, perception, cognitive
functioning, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions, that a trait may potentially be
evoked in a great number of situations, and that a trait is not related directly to overt
behaviours. On the application level, the psychosemantic definition allows for
assessing by means of the Meaning Test all the 115 traits and other personality
tendencies whose meaning patterns have been identified up to now.
The assessment method consists in administering and scoring the Meaning Test,
that is, setting up the individual's meaning profile; identifying in the individual's
profile the highly frequent and infrequent meaning variables (i.e. above the third
quartile and below the first quartile of frequencies representing the norms in a
sample of normal subjects); and counting the number of meaning variables of a
trait's pattern that correspond to the individual's profile (correspondence signifies
high frequency when the trait's component is positive and low frequency when it is
negative). The whole procedure is computerized. It has been validated by obtaining
significant correlations between the meaning-based scores and test-based scores of
the same personality traits (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1990a). The obvious advantages of
the meaning-based scores are the gains in time, resources, reliability of assessment,
and range of obtained information: we obtain information not only about a great
number of traits but also about the strength of each trait relative to other traits and
even about the strength of the tendencies opposing the traits (these are called ànti-
traits' and are scored by reversing the scoring procedure for traits).
Study 2
Purpose
The study was designed to provide information about personality traits and
tendencies of paranoid patients. The use of meaning-based scores made it possible to
assess 124 traits and tendencies, to compare their mean strength in a paranoid and
normal group, to estimate their relative within-group strength, and to compare them
with the strength of the opposing anti-traits.
Subjects
One group of subjects included 31 paranoid hospitalized patients, selected in line
with DSM criteria, 17 suffering from paranoid disorder (297.10, according to DSM±
III±R, or delusional disorder of the grandiose, jealous, or persecutory types,
according to DSM±IV) and 14 from paranoid schizophrenia (295.3x, according to
DSM±III±R, or 295.30, according to DSM±IV), scoring high on the Maine Paranoid
scale (M=18.7), 16 men and 15 women, with a mean age of 48.1 years, and a mean
of 3.7 years of hospitalization. The other group included 31 normal subjects (15 men
and 16 women), similar in age and education to the paranoids and scoring low on the
MMPI paranoid scale and a self-report prevalidated scale of paranoid tendencies in
normals.
Procedure
The subjects were administered individually the Meaning Test. It was coded for a
meaning profile that was then submitted to analyses that yielded 124 scores of
personality traits and tendencies for which meaning-based scores are available. The
list is very comprehensive both quantitatively and qualitatively. The meaning-based
scores correspond in each case to scores assessed originally by the standard tools for
those traits. The list includes meaning-based scores that correspond to personality
traits assessed by major inventories: the MMPI (13 scales), the Personality Research
Form (PRF; Jackson, 1984; 22 scores), the 16 Personality Factors (PF; Cattell and
Eber, 1964; 25 scores), the California Personality Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1975), the
Myers±Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1979; four scores), Bem's (1974) Sex Role
Inventory (four scores), and Zuckerman's (1979) Sensation Seeking Scale (five
scores), as well as scores corresponding to 19 other personality traits including
Machiavellianism (Christie and Geis, 1970), need for power (McClelland, 1975),
approval motive (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964), extraversion (Eysenck and Eysenck,
1964), ego strength (Barron, 1953), anality (Beloff, 1957), locus of control (Rotter,
1966), dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick,
Levinson and Sanford, 1950), cleanliness and order, avarice, hypochondriasis, and
impulsivity (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1990a, studies 9 and 10), preferences for cognitive
activity (Janke, 1973), ideational, and motor activities (Stein and Craik, 1965), trust
(Philosophies of Human Nature scale; Wrightman, 1974), repressiveness
(Weinberger, Schwartz and Davidson, 1979), and intolerance of ambiguity (Rydell
and Rosen, 1966). In addition we included eight anxiety scores corresponding to the
IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire (Krug, Scheier and Cattell, 1976), Manifest
Anxiety Scale (MAS; Taylor, 1953), trait anxiety of the State±Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene and Vagg, 1977), the Self-Rating Anxiety
Scale (SAS; Zung and Cavenar, 1980), the Test Anxiety Scale (TAS; Sarason, 1978),
the Zuckerman Inventory of Personal Relations (ZIPERS; Zuckerman, 1979), the
Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965), and a
score representing the meaning variables common to all these anxiety scores; three
scores assessing fear, the Fear Survey Inventory (Braun and Reynolds, 1969), the
Fear Survey Schedule (Wolpe and Lang, 1964) and Geer's (1965) Scale of Fear; and
three scores assessing defence mechanisms, projection, rationalization, and denial.
All the information concerning the derivation and characterization of the personality
traits, anxiety and fear scores, and defence mechanisms is available in the work of
Kreitler and Kreitler (1985a; 1990a; 1993, respectively).
In the present context we used the whole set of personality traits and tendencies
for which meaning-based scores were available (concerning `traits' and `tendencies'
see the note to Table 5). The original choice of personality traits for the study of
meaning-based scores (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1990a) was dictated by the criterion of
examining a set as representative as possible, considering assessment instruments,
content spheres, and conceptual frameworks, disregarding redundancies. In regard
to anxiety and fear the original choice was designed to provide complete samples,
emphasizing redundancy, so as to obtain the pattern of meaning variables
representing the components common to the different tools. These selection
criteria were adequate for the present context too for they enabled a
comprehensive view of the paranoid personality to be obtained, including features
for which we had expectations (e.g. we expected paranoids to score high on scales of
paranoia and fear) and those for which we had none.
Results
Table 4 presents for each personality trait or tendency the means and SDs in the
paranoid and normal groups and their comparison, as well as the strength assessed
in terms of the percentage of components in the meaning pattern which are
represented in the group's meaning profiles, and the relative strength as compared to
the anti-trait.
Inter-group mean comparisons show that paranoids and normals differ
significantly in almost 70 per cent of the variables (78 of 112 personality traits,
69.64 per cent, CR=10.006, p50.001, or 84 of 124 personality traits and tendencies,
67.74 per cent, CR=10.268, p50.001). The number of significant differences
deviates impressively from that expected by chance. In the majority of cases the
mean is higher in paranoids than in normals (in regard to significant differences in
traits in 68 of 78, 87.18 per cent, z=6.454, and in traits and tendencies in 74 of 84,
88.09 per cent, z=6.874; in regard to all variables, in traits in 92 of 112, 82.14 per
cent, z=6.709, and in traits and tendencies, 104 of 124, 83.87 per cent, z=7.454; in
all cases p50.001).
Table 4. Personality traits and tendencies in the paranoid and normal groups: means, SDs, strength estimates, strength relative to anti-trait, and
results of mean comparisons
Paranoid group Normal group Mean comp.

Trait Mean SD Strength (%) T vs AT Mean SD Strength (%) T vs AT (t-test)
MMPI
Hypochondriasis 2.097 1.165 29.95 Anti-Tr 1.452 1.179 20.74 Anti-Tr 2.17*
Depression 2.484 1.092 41.40 Anti-Tr 1.871 1.024 31.18 Anti-Tr 2.28*
Hysteria 1.097 0.539 54.84 Trait 0.484 0.626 24.19 Trait 4.13****
Psychopath. dev. 2.645 1.427 29.39 Anti-Tr 1.935 1.413 21.51 Anti-Tr 1.97*
Mascul.-femininity 2.161 0.898 43.23 Anti-Tr 1.645 0.877 32.90 Anti-Tr 2.29*
Paranoia 4.890 1.180 81.50 Trait 1.452 1.179 24.19 Anti-Tr 11.477****
Psychoasthenia 1.548 0.961 25.81 Anti-Tr 1.258 1.182 20.97 Anti-Tr 1.06
Schizophrenia 4.323 1.759 27.02 Anti-Tr 3.516 1.768 21.98 Anti-Tr 1.80
Hypomania 1.226 0.956 30.65 Anti-Tr 1.032 0.875 25.81 Anti-Tr 0.83
Social introver. 2.097 0.831 41.94 Anti-Tr 1.742 0.815 34.84 Trait 1.70
Lie 4.548 1.567 41.35 Anti-Tr 4.387 1.667 39.88 Trait 0.39
Infrequency 6.484 1.749 34.13 Anti-Tr 4.742 2.338 24.96 Anti-Tr 3.32**
Defensiveness 3.323 1.137 66.45 Trait 2.129 1.088 42.58 Trait 4.22****
PRF
Abasement 0.839 0.860 20.97 Anti-Tr 1.000 1.033 25.00 Anti-Tr 0.67
Achievement 3.000 1.211 37.50 Trait 1.903 1.423 23.79 Anti-Tr 3.27**
Affiliation 2.613 0.989 65.32 Trait 1.613 0.919 40.32 Trait 4.12****
The paranoid person

Aggression 8.193 1.682 74.48 Trait 3.968 1.741 36.07 Trait 9.72****
Autonomy 3.804 1.447 47.58 Trait 2.645 1.473 33.06 Trait 3.13**
Change 2.935 1.504 48.92 Trait 1.968 1.048 32.80 Trait 2.94**
Cognitive str. 9.161 3.045 61.08 Trait 5.806 2.810 38.71 Trait 4.51****
Defendence 4.484 1.411 64.06 Trait 3.129 1.544 44.70 Trait 3.61***
Dominance 6.161 1.917 56.01 Trait 4.032 1.303 36.66 Trait 5.11****
Endurance 5.258 1.182 43.82 Anti-Tr 4.258 1.413 35.48 Trait 3.02**
Exhibition 3.355 1.450 41.94 Trait 1.968 1.303 24.60 Anti-Tr 3.96***
Harm avoidance 7.806 2.330 43.37 Trait 5.677 3.050 31.54 Trait 3.09**
Impulsivity 7.387 2.091 41.04 Anti-Tr 5.226 2.849 29.03 Anti-Tr 3.40***
119
Nurturance 4.419 1.587 49.10 Trait 3.064 1.436 34.05 Trait 3.52***
120
S. Kreitler and H. Kreitler

PRF (continued)
Order 6.323 2.135 48.64 Trait 4.613 1.838 35.48 Trait 3.38***
Play 0.417 0.399 20.85 Anti-Tr 0.626 0.426 31.31 Trait 1.99*
Sentience 1.258 0.930 20.97 Anti-Tr 1.903 1.326 31.72 Anti-Tr 2.22*
Social Recog. 6.839 2.505 35.99 Anti-Tr 5.677 3.092 29.88 Trait 1.62
Succorance 1.903 1.274 31.72 Anti-Tr 1.613 1.202 26.88 Anti-Tr 0.92
Understanding 7.645 2.907 50.97 Trait 6.392 2.276 42.61 Trait 1.89
Infrequency 4.581 2.487 45.81 Trait 2.323 2.151 23.23 Anti-Tr 3.82***
Desirability 21.129 3.557 52.82 Trait 13.129 3.905 37.82 Trait 6.32****
CPI
Dominance 3.323 1.815 33.23 Anti-Tr 2.548 1.338 25.48 Anti-Tr 1.91
Capacity f. status 2.613 1.430 23.75 Anti-Tr 2.774 1.407 25.22 Anti-Tr 0.45
Sociability 4.484 2.080 34.49 Anti-Tr 3.355 1.836 25.81 Anti-Tr 2.27*
Social presence 4.290 1.189 39.00 Anti-Tr 2.742 1.632 24.93 Anti-Tr 4.27****
Self-acceptance 4.871 1.962 30.44 Anti-Tr 3.613 1.476 22.58 Anti-Tr 2.85**
Sense of well-being 3.258 1.966 29.62 Trait 5.000 1.713 45.45 Trait 3.72***
Responsibility 5.903 1.680 45.41 Trait 4.097 2.315 31.51 Trait 3.52***
Socialization 1.064 0.727 53.25 Trait 0.484 0.626 24.19 Trait 3.37***
Self-control 2.710 1.510 27.10 Anti-Tr 4.290 1.270 42.90 Trait 4.46****
Tolerance 1.968 1.016 28.11 Anti-Tr 2.784 1.387 35.48 Trait 2.64**
Good impression 3.613 1.476 27.79 Anti-Tr 3.258 1.673 25.06 Anti-Tr 0.89
Communality 5.355 1.473 35.70 Anti-Tr 4.226 1.726 28.17 Trait 2.77**
Ach. via conform. 2.645 1.279 29.39 Anti-Tr 2.323 1.045 25.81 Anti-Tr 1.09
Ach. via independ. 2.129 1.147 26.61 Anti-Tr 3.129 1.284 39.11 Trait 3.23**
Intellectual effic. 1.129 0.846 28.23 Anti-Tr 1.161 0.860 29.03 Trait 0.15
Psychol. mindedness 0.806 0.477 40.32 Anti-Tr 0.548 0.624 27.42 Trait 1.83
Flexibility 0.956 0.661 23.90 Anti-Tr 2.080 0.938 52.00 Trait 5.45****
Femininity 2.581 0.807 64.52 Trait 1.871 0.922 46.77 Trait 3.23**

16 PF: 1st order

A. Affectothymia 4.000 2.049 40.00 Anti-Tr 3.129 1.668 31.29 Trait 1.84
C. Ego strength 6.097 2.357 33.87 Trait 3.419 2.013 19.00 Trait 4.81****
E. Dominance 8.290 1.936 51.81 Trait 5.645 2.346 35.28 Trait 4.84****
F. Impulsivity 6.193 1.990 38.71 Anti-Tr 3.903 2.135 24.40 Anti-Tr 4.37****
G. Superego streng. 4.677 1.447 42.52 Anti-Tr 3.613 1.726 32.84 Trait 2.63*
H. Boldness 16.935 3.376 56.45 Trait 12.419 3.009 41.40 Trait 5.56****
I. Emot. sensitiv. 6.774 2.513 30.79 Trait 7.419 2.262 33.72 Anti-Tr 1.06
L. Suspiciousness 10.939 1.655 68.37 Trait 5.806 1.721 36.29 Trait 11.968****
M. Imagination 12.677 2.166 52.82 Trait 10.614 2.486 44.22 Trait 3.49***
N. Shrewdness 13.581 2.742 54.32 Trait 11.581 2.349 46.32 Trait 3.08**
O. Guilt proneness 3.516 1.435 27.05 Anti-Tr 2.935 1.711 22.58 Anti-Tr 1.45
Q1. Rebelliousness 5.774 1.944 25.11 Anti-Tr 6.355 2.457 27.63 Anti-Tr 1.03
Q2. Self-sufficien. 1.871 1.455 26.73 Anti-Tr 1.677 1.514 23.96 Anti-Tr 0.51
Q3. Self-sentiment 5.000 2.309 26.32 Anti-Tr 4.871 2.045 25.64 Anti-Tr 0.23
Q4. Ergic tension 2.129 1.668 23.66 Anti-Tr 2.419 1.311 26.88 Anti-Tr 0.76
2nd order
I. Exvia 5.258 2.543 35.05 Anti-Tr 3.677 1.851 24.52 Anti-Tr 2.80**
II. Anxiety 3.484 1.998 23.23 Anti-Tr 4.000 2.049 26.67 Anti-Tr 1.00
The paranoid person

III. Tough poise 5.516 1.458 45.97 Trait 3.645 2.184 30.38 Trait 3.97***
IV. Independence 2.323 1.137 33.18 Anti-Tr 1.839 1.098 26.27 Anti-Tr 1.70
Neuroticism 6.161 1.594 41.08 Anti-Tr 4.839 1.917 32.26 Trait 2.95**
Psychoticism 11.710 2.269 50.91 Trait 4.516 1.032 19.63 Anti-Tr 16.07****
Leadership 5.000 1.807 45.45 Trait 3.161 1.951 28.74 Trait 3.85***
Creativity 1.419 1.409 20.27 Anti-Tr 2.226 1.359 31.80 Trait 2.30*
Academic achiev. 4.355 0.915 43.55 Anti-Tr 3.452 1.609 34.52 Trait 2.72**
Conformity 4.323 1.869 43.23 Trait 2.516 1.503 25.16 Anti-Tr 4.19****
Myers±Briggs
Extroversion 6.742 1.983 51.86 Trait 3.226 1.944 24.81 Trait 7.05**
121
122
S. Kreitler and H. Kreitler

Myers±Briggs (continued)
Sensation 7.419 2.277 32.26 Anti-Tr 9.193 2.857 39.97 Trait 2.70**
Thinking 4.323 2.151 27.02 Anti-Tr 4.387 2.729 27.42 Anti-Tr 0.10
Judging 4.774 1.857 23.87 Anti-Tr 5.129 2.277 25.65 Anti-Tr 0.67
Sensation seeking
Sum total 5.097 1.795 46.33 Trait 3.742 1.591 34.02 Trait 3.14**
Thrill & adventure 5.613 2.246 46.77 Trait 3.000 2.017 25.00 Trait 4.82****
Experience seeking 8.032 2.008 33.47 Anti-Tr 6.316 2.204 27.15 Anti-Tr 2.83**
Disinhibition 5.452 1.912 41.94 Anti-Tr 3.903 1.720 30.02 Anti-Tr 3.35***
Boredom suscep. 3.645 1.170 36.45 Anti-Tr 3.871 1.765 38.71 Trait 0.59
Bem
Masculinity 9.935 2.144 52.29 Trait 6.516 2.461 34.30 Trait 4.13****
Femininity 7.839 1.917 41.26 Anti-Tr 5.419 2.377 28.52 Trait 4.41****
Androgyny 11.097 2.211 33.63 Anti-Tr 8.387 2.813 25.42 Anti-Tr 4.22****
Soc. desirab. 5.161 1.369 51.61 Trait 3.387 1.542 33.87 Trait 4.79****
Extraversion (EPI) 8.226 2.348 34.27 Anti-Tr 5.484 2.143 22.85 Anti-TR 4.80****
Machiavellianism 5.839 1.530 53.08 Trait 2.839 1.881 25.81 Anti-Tr 6.89****
Need for power 6.064 2.016 25.27 Anti-Tr 5.290 2.623 22.04 Anti-Tr 1.30
Approval motive 6.774 1.802 42.34 Trait 4.871 1.962 30.44 Trait 3.98***
Ego strength 6.161 2.099 38.51 Trait 4.548 2.406 28.43 Trait 2.81**
Anality 7.355 1.624 35.02 Anti-Tr 5.806 2.257 27.65 Anti-Tr 3.10***
Cleanliness, order 7.484 2.204 35.64 Anti-Tr 5.774 1.783 27.50 Anti-Tr 3.36***
Hypochondriasis 10.258 3.356 44.60 Trait 5.548 2.694 24.12 Trait 6.09****
Avarice 3.968 2.121 36.07 Anti-Tr 2.645 2.058 24.05 Anti-Tr 2.48**
Impulsivity 5.484 1.691 30.47 Anti-Tr 4.323 2.197 24.01 Anti-Tr 2.33**
Loc. of control (ext) 12.516 2.234 40.37 Trait 7.477 2.856 24.76 Anti-Tr 7.74****
Authoritarianism 11.677 1.973 61.46 Trait 4.709 2.148 24.79 Anti-Tr 13.30****
Dogmatism 5.484 1.823 27.42 Anti-Tr 5.000 2.176 25.00 Anti-Tr 0.95
Intol. of ambiguity 13.744 2.077 52.98 Trait 8.617 3.095 33.13 Trait 7.71****

Trust 2.145 0.984 15.32 Anti-Tr 5.677 2.600 40.55 Trait 7.07****
Repressiveness 8.000 1.915 66.67 Trait 5.340 1.723 44.50 Anti-Tr 5.75****
Cog. activity score 12.581 3.284 35.94 Anti-Tr 11.032 4.135 31.52 Trait 1.63
Ideation. act. pref. 6.387 2.418 25.55 Anti-Tr 5.935 2.542 23.74 Anti-Tr 0.72
Motor. act. prefer. 4.871 1.648 32.47 Anti-Tr 4.710 1.987 31.40 Trait 0.35
Anxiety scales
Common core pattern 3.193 1.721 22.81 Anti-Tr 2.935 1.731 20.97 Anti-Tr 0.59
IPAT (Cattell) 4.097 1.423 27.31 Anti-Tr 3.806 1.721 25.38 Anti-Tr 0.72
MAS (Taylor) 3.581 1.876 25.58 Anti-Tr 3.290 1.616 23.50 Anti-Tr 0.65
STAI (Spielberger) 2.323 1.492 19.35 Anti-Tr 2.290 1.371 19.09 Anti-Tr 0.09
SAS (Zung & Cavenar) 4.419 1.455 34.00 Anti-Tr 2.968 1.494 22.83 Anti-Tr 3.87***
TAS (Sarason) 4.613 1.927 28.83 Anti-Tr 4.258 1.897 26.61 Anti-Tr 0.73
ZIPERS (Zuckerman) 3.645 1.380 30.38 Anti-Tr 3.032 1.581 25.27 Anti-Tr 1.63
MAACL (Zuckerman & Lubin) 3.058 1.023 25.48 Anti-Tr 2.985 0.984 24.88 Anti-Tr 0.29
Fear scales
Fear survey invent. 5.032 1.251 33.55 Trait 3.484 1.525 23.23 Anti-Tr 4.39****
Fear survey schedule 7.425 1.093 61.88 Trait 3.672 0.854 30.60 Anti-Tr 15.07****
Scale of fear 6.854 1.322 68.54 Trait 2.981 0.654 29.81 Anti-Tr 14.62****
Defence mechanisms
The paranoid person

Projection 14.581 2.742 60.75 Trait 8.548 2.528 35.62 Trait 9.01****
Rationalization 13.000 2.352 41.94 Anti-Tr 8.645 2.665 27.89 Anti-Tr 6.82****
Denial 6.645 1.992 36.92 Trait 5.839 2.464 32.44 Trait 1.42
Note:The Trait column lists all personality traits and tendencies assessed in study 2, presented through short or abbreviated titles. See the text for a more complete
presentation of titles. All means and SDs represent meaning-based scores. `Strength' represents the number of meaning variables in the subjects' meaning profiles that
correspond in frequency to the components in the trait's pattern. The number was turned into a percentage by computing its proportion out of the total number of
meaning variables in the trait's pattern. `T vs AT', Trait vs Anti-Trait. This column presents the elementÐTrait or Anti-TraitÐthat had a higher mean.
*p50.05; **p50.01; ***p50.001; ****p50.0001.
123
Paranoids exceed normals also in the strength of traits: in paranoids about 45 per
cent of the traits are of moderate or higher strength as compared with about 10 per
cent in normals (Table 5). However, the relative distribution of the strength of traits
as compared with anti-traits is similar in both groups and does not deviate from
chance (traits exceed anti-traits in strength in about 41 per cent in paranoids and in
48±52 per cent in normals).
In examining the distribution of traits from the viewpoint of contents we will focus
on all traits meeting at least one of the following criteria: being of at least of
moderate strength or differing significantly in paranoids and normals. In scanning
the findings it is reasonable to group the variables into several classes as follows.
(i) Traits that assess paranoia directly or indirectly and abnormality. As expected,
paranoids score higher on the paranoia traits: MMPI-Paranoia, 16 PF-Factor
L, and PRF-Defendence (defensiveness, suspiciousness, secretiveness,
sensitivity to offences, having à chip on the shoulder') as well as on all
variables assessing deviation from normalcy: MMPI-Infrequency, PRF-
Infrequency, 16 PF-Psychoticism, 16 PF-Neuroticism, and lower on CPI-Well
Being. These findings re-establish the validity of the meaning-based scores.
(ii) Traits for which there is a clear expectation on the basis of clinical concepts and
observations. As expected, paranoids score higher on the defence mechanism
projection and authoritarianism that is based on projection; they score high on
fear, Fear Survey Inventory, Fear Survey Schedule, and Scale of Fear as well as
PRF-Harmavoidance (that assesses fearfulness, attention to danger, effort to
maximize personal safety, caution); they are characterized by rigidity, namely,
they score high on intolerance of ambiguity, and low on CPI-Flexibility as well
as PF-Creativity and CPI-Achievement via Independence that capitalize on
Flexibility; they score high on PRF-Cognitive Structure that assesses looking
for certainty, avoiding ambiguity, rigidity, and need for structure; they score
low on trust, which is almost a part of the paranoid syndrome; they score high
on CPI-Self Acceptance that assesses àn imperturbable sense of personal
worth' (Megargee, 1972); they score high on the scales assessing hostility, PRF-
Aggression (the high scorer is belligerent, quarrelsome, hostile, and retaliative)
Table 5. Distribution of personality traits and tendencies in the various categories of

strength in the paranoid and normal groups
Variables Group Very weak Weak Moderate Strong Very strong Chi square
Personality Paranoids 3 58 41 9 1
35.315****
traits Normals 3 97 12
Pers. traits Paranoids 3 66 42 12 1
39.882****
& tendencies Normals 3 109 12
Note: On the basis of large-scale comparisons (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1990a), the categories were defined as
follows: 0±20%, very weak; 21±40%, weak; 41±60%, moderate; 61±80%, strong; 81±100%, very strong.
The distributions are based on the data in Table 4. Chi square analyses are based on combining the
categories `very weak' with `weak' and `strong' with `very strong'. Personality traits represent the 112
variables listed in Table 4 down to Ànxiety Scales' plus two measures of anxiety that are commonly
considered as traits (i.e. IPAT and STAI). Personality traits and tendencies represent all 124 variables
listed in Table 4.
****p50.0001.
and CPI-Dominance (assesses also aggression); they are characterized by

obsessive features, namely score high on PRF-Order (assess systematization,
consistency, and orderliness), anality, cleanliness and order, and avarice; they
are characterized by interpersonal manipulativeness, namely, score high on
Machiavellianism and CPI-Social Presence (the high scorer ùses people,
manipulates them and takes pleasure in clever onslaughts against their defenses
and self deceptions' (Gough, quoted by Megargee, 1972, p. 49)); they score high
on externality (locus of control); they are characterized by gender bipolarity,
namely, they score high on MMPI-Masculinity, CPI-Femininity, Bem-
Masculinity, Bem-Femininity, and Bem-Androgyny; they score high on PF-
Imagination that assesses the tendency to be easily seduced from practical
judgment and to be imaginatively enthralled by inner creations; and they score
high on some scales with clinical connotations: MMPI-Depression, MMPI-
Hysteria, MMPI-Hypochondriasis, and hypochondriasis (Kreitler and Kreitler)
as well as MMPI-Social introversion and MMPI-Lie (that is indicative for
paranoia, Fjordbak, 1985) butÐas expectedÐnot on MMPI-Schizophrenia.
(iii) Traits with a narrow basis for a priori expectations but convincing post hoc,
especially because they fit at least the conclusions based on the CO theory (see
Study 1). Thus, paranoids were found to score high on PRF-Achievement and
PF-Academic achievements, as expected in view of the CO theme of
achievement; they scored high on PRF-Autonomy (assesses effort to break
away from restraints and restrictions of any kind), as expected in view of the
CO themes of freedom from restraints; they scored high on PRF-Dominance
(assesses attempt to control environment and people, assuming role of leader),
PRF-Exhibition (assesses desire to be at the centre of attention, conspicuous,
immodest), CPI-Dominance (assesses hostility, stubbornness, demand for
admiration), and PF-Leadership, as expected in view of CO themes of
strength, power and authority; they scored high on scales assessing concern
for rules and standards: CPI-Responsibility, CPI-Sociability and PF-Superego
strength, as expected in view of the CO theme of keeping rules; they scored high
on the scales PF-Shrewdness (assesses emotional detachment and disciplined
fastidiousness) and PF-Tough Poise (assesses emotional control, coolness,
aloofness, and rationality), as expected in view of the CO themes of emotional
control and concealment of emotions; they score high on PRF-Understanding
and the defence of rationalization, as expected in view of the CO themes of
concern about full understanding; and, finally, they scored high on a set of
scales assessing extraversion and interpersonal interests: Extraversion
(Eysenck), PF-Exvia, Myers±Briggs-Extroversion, CPI-Sociability, PRF-
Affiliation, and PRF-Nurturance, and to some extent also CPI-Psychological
Mindedness (borderline moderate), as expected perhaps in view of the CO
themes of consideration for others and interpersonal sensitivity.
(iv) Traits that at present do not fit any specific expectations. Thus, we found that
paranoids score high on scales assessing sensation seeking: PF-Boldness, PRF-
Change (assesses liking new and different experiences), and the Sensation
Seeking scalesÐSum, Thrill and Adventure Seeking, and Disinhibition. They
also score high on scales assessing conformity: CPI-Communality, PRF-
Desirability, PF-Conformity, approval motive, and repressiveness (that
includes a social desirability component). Further, they are characterized by
impulsivity and score high on scales of impulsivity, PF-Boldness (assesses

impulsivity, lack of restraint), PF-Impulsivity, and impulsivity (Kreitler and
Kreitler) and low on CPI-Self Control. They also score high on ego strength
scales: PF-Ego Strength (the high scorer is stable, constant in interests and
emotionally unruffled), and ego strength (Barron). Notably, they are
characterized by low scores on PRF-Sentience (sensitivity to sensory and
pleasurable experiences) and PRF-Play (playfulness and love of fun) and
Myers±Briggs-Sensation. Finally, they are not characterized by high anxiety
levels (they score low or as normals on all anxiety scales including PF-Anxiety
and PF-Ergic tension, except one, SAS).
Major Conclusions
Study 2 yielded a rich set of findings whose validity is supported by previous tests of
validity of meaning-based trait scores (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1990a), the higher
scores of paranoids on scales assessing paranoia specifically, and the correspondence
in findings concerning the same trait assessed by different scales (e.g. three scales of
extraversion and three of impulsivity). The personality scan of Study 2 shows that on
the whole paranoids present a clearcut personality profile with salient features, about
half of which are at least moderate in strength and stronger than the opposed
tendencies. The major features may be summarized in line with the different
domains. Thus, in the clinical domain, the paranoid syndrome is related to
tendencies toward obsession (as claimed e.g. by Insel and Akiskal (1986) and Ross,
Siddiqui and Matas (1987)), depression (see also Aronson, 1989; Bonime, 1982; Chiu
and Rimon, 1987; Klein, 1957; Zigler and Glick, 1988), hysteria (see e.g. Meissner,
1984±5) and hypochondriasis (see also Chiu and Rimon, 1988; Ross et al, 1987).
We found a lot of evidence for personality traits manifesting the paranoid
syndrome itself. Thus, paranoids tend to be defensive, secretive, guarded, cautious,
suspicious, mistrustful, vulnerable to offences, and rely on projection. They are in
general fearful and aware of dangers, yet, on the other hand, they are also
adventurous, sensation-seeking, and impulsive!
In the interpersonal sphere, they are hostile, manipulative, try to control others,
adopt an authoritarian approach, present a self-assured facade, tend to be dominant,
conspicuous, and naturally assume leadership. Somewhat unexpectedly, they were
also found to be extravert and genuinely interested in others. Further, they are highly
conforming and concerned about social desirability and about keeping rules and
standards, yet they also tend toward autonomy and freedom.
Concerning achievement, the evidence indicates that paranoids are achievement
oriented, care for attracting attention, and are capable of sustained efforts.
Concerning sex role, they tend to be characterized markedly by both masculinity
and femininity, and accordingly also by high androgyny.
A very prominent cluster of traits shows that paranoids are characterized by high
rigidity, inflexibility, and intolerance of ambiguities. This may be related to their
above-noted obsessive tendency, which is manifested in anality and the traits of
order, cleanliness, and avarice.
A related set of traits indicates that paranoids are high in emotional control. They
present a tough, unemotional approach that lacks warmth and affectivity. In
addition, they have very low tendencies for sensuality, playfulness, and enjoyment in
general. The emotional control coupled with the prominent defensiveness may be
responsible for their low levels of anxiety.
The rigidity and emotional control may also be the factors underlying the stability
and unruffled exterior they often present, which may be the reason for their
unexpected high scores on ego strength.
Finally, in the cognitive sphere, they are characterized by a need for
understanding, and tendencies for systematizing and ordering phenomena so as to
reduce ambiguities. They believe in rationality and also apply in general
rationalizations. They are low in creativity, which is partly due to their high
rigidity, but tend to be swayed from reality-testing and practical judgment through
flights of imagination and enthusiasm for their own fantasy creations.
On the whole, we obtain a comprehensive and highly informative image of the
paranoid person. Some of the features have been noted before, mostly in clinical
observations (e.g. manipulativeness, Bonime, 1982), a few in research (aggression,
Mishra et al., 1983a,b). Other features are new, such as the tendencies for
conformity, social desirability, impulsivity, and sensation-seeking. In each case, our
data allow for highly specific statements, such as emotional control, where others use
vaguer terms such as restricted affectivity (Akhtar, 1990), or fearfulness that is most
probably constrained through the adventurous and impulsive tendencies.
The relevance of our findings for paranoia is evident both when the traits are
considered singly (e.g., mistrust, rigidity) and in sets. Thus, the need for
understanding, coupled with the tendencies for projection, systematization, and
flights of imagination may account for the formation of delusions. Again, the traits
of dominance, authoritarianism, manipulativeness, and exhibitionism suggest a
potential for interest in politics.
On the whole, we obtain an image of a sharply outlined structure of personality
characterized both by coherence and salient inconsistencies. The coherence is
manifested through sets, such as (i) emotional control, rigidity, and obsessive
tendencies, (ii) conformity, social desirability, and adherence to rules, or (iii)
authoritarianism, projection, and hostility. The inconsistencies include contradictory
sets of traits, such as (i) caution and defendence against dangers versus sensation
seeking and adventurousness, (ii) control, stability, and rigidity versus impulsiveness,
(iii) femininity versus masculinity, (iv) conformity and concern about rules versus
autonomy and freedom, (v) hostility and aggression versus consideration for others,
even nurturance, and (vi) mistrust and manipulativeness of others versus
extraversion and interest in others.
In sum, the findings partly confirm previous observations and partly extend
paranoid personality traits into new domains and research fields.
BLUEPRINTS FOR THE PARANOID PERSONALITY
Due to the paucity of empirical research in the domain of the paranoid personality,
the present review focuses on the materials of new studies. We have applied two
methodologies rooted in two theoretical frameworks in our attempt to explore both
the underlying motivational dynamics and the manifest personality traits. The
former reflect mainly action-oriented tendencies, the latter characteristic forms of
processing information and of experiencing oneself and the world. The findings
provide an empirical basis for many previous observations about paranoids (e.g.
homosexuality, fear, and rigidity), disconfirm others (e.g. social withdrawal and
anxiety; see e.g. Akhtar, 1990), and lay the groundwork for outlining the major
characteristics of the paranoid personality.
It is evident that the findings about underlying action-oriented motivations and
personality traits converge in many respects. The convergences are evident in regard
to the tendencies for achievement (see achievement traits and themes 13, 30, 31),
autonomy (autonomy and theme 43), interest in others (e.g. extraversion,
nurturance, and themes 38, 41), cognitive interest (understanding and theme 12),
conformity (conformity and theme 17), the attitude to authority (authoritarianism
and themes 20, 22), stubbornness (rigidity, ego strength, and theme 19), freedom
(impulsivity and theme 18), hostility (aggression and theme 42), controlling emotions
(emotional control and theme 36), readiness for effort (endurance and theme 31),
and, finally, projection (the defence of projection and theme 14). There is also
convergence in the unravelled conflicts or inconsistencies, for example, caution
versus impulsivity (see conflict 4), masculinity versus femininity (conflict 6), or rules
versus freedom (conflict 5).
The fact that both behaviour-oriented and meaning-oriented findings support the
largely similar tendencies indicate that the paranoid personality is highly crystallized
both in its coherent±integrated aspects and its characteristic conflict potentials.
The findings also suggest major dangers and positive possibilities inherent in the
paranoid structure. The major dangers include the following: (i) the existence of
characteristic and serious unresolved conflicts that constitute pathological
potentials; (ii) the set of tendencies of projection, rationalization, rigidity, and
disregard for the opinions of others that may produce a strong resistance to change;
(iii) the set of tendencies for understanding, systematization, projection, and
imagination flights that may promote delusions; and (iv) the tendencies for
dominance, leadership, exhibitionism, sense of self-worth, and control and
manipulation of others, coupled with the fascination for strength and authority as
well as the concern for rulesÐall of which may promote interest in politics and
perhaps even success. Hence, there may be some psychological sense to the
observations about the role of paranoids in politics (Glass, 1988; Robins, 1986).
Some of the more positive and potentially constructive features include the fact
that the characteristic paranoid conflicts concern the interpersonal sphere and that
paranoids are essentially interested in people and in achievement. These features may
be mobilized in the psychotherapeutic process.
In sum, we have learned that the paranoid person is allÐor at least mostÐof what
we have assumed it to be but that it includes also much more that is of great
theoretical and practical interest.
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European Journal of Personality, Vol.

11, 101±132 (1997)

The paranoid person: cognitive

Shulamith Kreitler* and Hans Kreitler**

CCC 0890±2070/97/020101±32$17.50 Received 15 August 1995

There is a growing awareness of the importance of understanding paranoia both

COGNITIVE MOTIVATION OF PARANOIA

Motivational constructs in the domain of paranoia

Considerations in favour of selecting the CO theory

Predicting and changing human behaviour

modifying behaviour focus on changing systematically the beliefs relating to the

Study 1: The CO of paranoid patients

Table 1. Means and mean comparisons of paranoids, schizophrenics, depressives, and

Theme Paran. Schiz. Dep. Norm. F

Theme Paran. Schiz. Dep. Norm. F

*p50.05; **p50.01; ***p50.001; ****p50.0001.

Dependent Longer questionnaire Shorter questionaire

Self beliefs 0.061 71.073 0.654 0.381 0.877 0.630

Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means

Paranoids 0.975 70.312 70.047 1.263 0.102 70.008

Classification of subjects into groups

P, D, S Standardized canonical discriminant functions

Predictors G, BS BS, G BS, N, G, GB N, G, GB, BS

P, S, N Predictors G, N, GB, BS G, BS, N, GB N, GB, BS, G BS, G, GB, N

P, D, N Predictors N, G, GB, BS BS, G, GB, N N, G, BS, GB BS, GB, G, N

Standard canonical discriminant functions

P, N Predictors G=N, GB, BS N, BS, G

Notably, some of the themes contradict others. Such contradictions seem to

PERSONALITY TRAITS OF PARANOIDS

Personality descriptions of paranoids

The psychosemantic approach to personality traits

The system of meaning

The Meaning Test

Table 3. Major variables of the meaning system

(1) Meaning dimensions

Definition and assessment of personality traits

Paranoid group Normal group Mean comp.

The paranoid person

Paranoid group Normal group Mean comp.

S. Kreitler and H. Kreitler

Paranoid group Normal group Mean comp.

16 PF: 1st order

The paranoid person

Paranoid group Normal group Mean comp.

S. Kreitler and H. Kreitler

Paranoid group Normal group Mean comp.

The paranoid person

Table 5. Distribution of personality traits and tendencies in the various categories of

and CPI-Dominance (assesses also aggression); they are characterized by

impulsivity and score high on scales of impulsivity, PF-Boldness (assesses

BLUEPRINTS FOR THE PARANOID PERSONALITY

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J. and Sanford, R. N. (1950). The

American Psychiatric Association (1987). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Insel, T. R. and Akiskal, H. S. (1986). `Obsessive±compulsive disorder with psychotic features:

Kreitler, S. and Kreitler, H. (1994). `Motivational and cognitive determinants of exploration'.

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p50.05; p50.01; p50.001; ****p50.0001.