IS2009-2 LCT 25/03/08

15/04/08

Future trends for instrumentation in hazardous areas

Introduction

There has been continuous change in the detail of the methods of explosion protection applied to
instrumentation over the last fifty years and the probability is that the techniques will continue to
evolve. The change will be gradual and much slower than is usually predicted because of the inevitably
conservative approach to safety related matters. There are two fairly safe predictions; one is that any
relaxing of the current level of safety will not be permitted because it is politically unacceptable. The
second is that the need to document risk and the consequent bureaucracy will increase. Some factors,
which will affect the choice of equipment in the future, are discussed in the following sections.

Area classification

The most significant factor to cause change in area classification is that the requirements imposed by
legislation and environmental concerns to minimise leakage of toxic and flammable materials means
that large Zone 1/Division 1 will become unacceptable. Open-air installations will become
predominantly Zone 2/Division 2 to an even greater extent. Enclosed locations will also be affected but
possibly to a lesser extent. There will remain some small Zone 1 locations and inevitably some
instrumentation will be concentrated in these areas. In some circumstances, for example where
instrumentation is in close contact with the process fluid, instruments create their own Zone 1
locations.

Zone 0 areas are normally confined to spaces with very restricted ventilation such as the vapour space
of storage tanks and within process vessels. It can be argued that many of such locations are above the
upper flammable limit for most of the time, but persuading an end user not to allocate a Zone 0 is not
likely to succeed. Area classification is difficult and consequently where there is a well-established
acceptable standard practice this will be used and is almost impossible to change. Electrical
installations in Zone 0 are always kept to a minimum because they are difficult to install and maintain.
However essential Zone 0 instrumentation such as the measurement of temperature and level are
adequately covered by a wide range of intrinsically safe ‘ia’ apparatus, and this will remain the
standard solution for the foreseeable future. There is an IEC standard IEC 60079-26 which suggests
that certain combinations of explosion proof techniques are acceptable for use in conjunction with
Zones 0 but this approach is a second best compromise which solves a few difficult problems and is
best avoided if possible.

There is always the difficult problem of selecting equipment when the hazardous materials are at
temperatures and pressures outside the limits of ‘normal ambient conditions’. Oxygen enrichment
presents a similar problem. The IEC and most national standards do not address this problem and
fortunately in European applications the ATEX directives are not applicable. The usual instrumentation
solution is to choose ‘ia IIC T4’ apparatus, preferably with an increased factor of safety and offer a
prayer to an appropriate god. None of the other methods of protection are acceptable in these
circumstances.

Internationally acceptable solutions

There is an increasing demand to design plants so that they can be constructed in any part of the world
without significant modification and there is some merit in using a uniform recognisable practice to
achieve a common acceptable level of safety. Fortunately the IEC Ex certification scheme has made
significant progress and although the dream of ‘one certificate acceptable everywhere’ is some way off
the scheme goes from strength to strength. A major delaying factor is that the U.S., although permitting
the use of Zones, still predominantly uses the two Division approach to area classification with its
consequent allegiance to U.S. explosion-proof. Additionally the requirement for local certification in
the U.S. is a hindrance, which is not likely to be removed in the near future since there are considerable
vested interests in its retention. A similar situation exists in Europe where the ATEX apparatus
directive represents a similar barrier to trade. There are laudable attempts to reduce these problems but
change will require persistence and time.
Intrinsic safety has a considerable advantage over other explosion proof techniques in that it is the only
technique, which is universally accepted and can be used in all three zones. The introduction of ‘ic’ to
replace the non-incendive technique of type’n’ extends its applicability to Zone 2. The preferred route
for the international use of instrumentation in all hazardous areas has now become IEC Ex intrinsically
safe certification followed by local ratification of the IEC test report to overcome local legislative
difficulties. However how far the ‘ic’ concept will become the established approach to Zone 2
instrumentation has yet to be determined. The current Zone2/Division 2 documents are predominantly
written with power systems in mind and are not conveniently applicable to instrument systems. The
principal advantages of ‘ic’ are that it does create a well-defined approach to Zone 2 instrumentation, it
does allow existing apparatus certified as ‘ia’ or ‘ib’ and ‘simple apparatus’ to be used in ‘ic’ systems
and enables all categories of intrinsically safe systems to be combined in cables and junction boxes. It
may be that some end users will prefer to maintain their freedom to make up their own rules for Zone
2/Division 2 instrumentation as appears to be the current practice in some large organisations.

In practice many ‘ic’ systems will use ‘ia’ or ‘ib’ certified apparatus because it is available and
provides an economic solution. For example ‘ia IIC’ certified switch isolators are frequently used in
Zone 2 installations. The versatility, low cost and large factor of safety of these isolators plus their
permitted use with any type of switch make them an instant universal solution to all switch transfer
problems. Their ‘fail-safe’ characteristics and well-established reliability frequently lead to them being
used in non-hazardous locations.

Risk analysis

This approach to explosion prevention is the current ‘flavour of the month’. European legislation in the
form of the ATEX installation directive [1999/92/EC] requires a risk analysis of all installations. The
IEC standards by introducing ‘categories’ of apparatus are encouraging this approach. The fact that
nowhere is the acceptable risk defined is a slight problem but this is apparently not a deterrent to
legislation. The major implication of this approach is that the consequences of an explosion have to be
taken into account. Area classification may be used as part of the risk analysis but alternative solutions
are permitted.

The consequences to be considered include an assessment of the number of people killed or injured by
the explosion and environmental damage caused directly or indirectly by the explosion. How far
economic consequences such as loss of production, destruction of the installation and damage to
adjacent property have to be considered is possibly not a safety concern but may influence decisions on
the precautions to be taken. A quantitative assessment of all the risks is not possible so an
acknowledgement of their existence and an approximate estimate of risk has to suffice. Where the risk
is substantial then a high level of protection might be required of the instrumentation. For example a
fuel store within a densely populated area might require ‘ia IIC T4’ throughout, since this would be the
safest economic solution available. It is theoretically possible that an unmanned site in the middle of
the dessert could use normal instrumentation, but this is a relaxation of the requirements and is
therefore unlikely to be allowed.

A side effect of risk analysis is the need to demonstrate that it has been done and the inevitable need for
detailed documentation. Third party certification of equipment will become the norm and installation
instructions will need to be improved and possibly made more specific. The use of the IEC Ex and
manufacturers’ web-sites will make the distribution of this information easier. Removing the need to
store files of information, which inevitably become out of date will have both safety and economic
advantages. However the sole use of web-sites is not currently acceptable to all regulatory authorities.
Presumably the preservation of trees is not part of their ‘green’ agenda.

Longer term it will be interesting to see how many engineers consider themselves competent to prepare
the necessary risk analysis. It may be that the prudent engineer will minimise his personal risk by
insisting on well-documented certified apparatus of the highest category. Signing one of these
documents could adversely affect one’s personal and corporate liability. The adage that ‘nobody got
fired or caused an explosion by using ‘ia IIC T4’ apparatus’ may become engineering folklore.
Dust

There is increased awareness of the hazard associated with combustible dust and some of the
instrumentation needs cannot be solved by any technique other than intrinsic safety. For example the
measurement of the temperature of a pile of grain is best done by an 'ia IIB’ system with a fault power
level less than 250 mW. The IEC standards now cover the use of intrinsic safety where dust is the
hazard. However the use of this technique in dust applications is at present limited, but is expected to
grow as the appreciation of the risk of dust explosions increases and the pressure from legislation
grows.

There are some locations where there is a combined dust and gas hazard. The safety requirements of
apparatus for use in these environments are being considered by an IEC working group, but this work
is at a very early stage. Meanwhile the only acceptable solution for instrumentation is to use
intrinsically safe apparatus taking into account both risks. In this situation ‘ia IIC’ apparatus with a
matched power less than 750 mW is frequently the solution.

Future trends in intrinsic safety

Changes in this technique are usually governed by IEC standards, which are in turn driven by changes
in technology. The current five-year cycle for these standards is extremely slow but it is difficult to see
how this can be improved. The present system ensures that the standard is a consensus document,
which has been given considerable thought by many people from different backgrounds. It is not a
perfect system but it is the only one we have got. That it can function reasonably well is illustrated by
the FISCO standards for Fieldbus systems, which have been produced at a reasonable speed.

Ideally future work ought to aim to make the application of intrinsically safe apparatus simpler. For
example, the simpler interconnecting cable requirements used in the FISCO standard could be extended
to other systems.

Possibly the information derived from intelligent systems such as the HART system could replace the
inspection procedures required by the IEC standards. It would be a considerable advantage if electronic
interrogation removed the need to read largely unintelligible labels in the field. It should be possible to
modify the operational integrity checks to include safety checks. If this can be done and the checks
could be done frequently, say weekly, then the approach to fault tolerance could be modified. The
result might be safer installations at a lower lifetime cost.

Conclusion

The natural synergy of intrinsic safety with the low power requirements of instrumentation together
with the high level of safety achieved ensure that this technique will continue to be the preferred
solution for instrumentation in hazardous areas for the foreseeable future. The ability to do live
maintenance and replacement, the relaxed wiring and electrical protection requirements, the ‘simple
apparatus’ rules and the comprehensive code of practice give this technique considerable advantages
over all other methods of protection. The two areas, which are difficult to predict, are how far ‘ic’ will
become the technique of Zone2 and whether intrinsic safety will be widely used where dust is the
hazard.

It must however be recognised that trends in instrumentation are not entirely based on technical and
economic factors. If this were the case the use of U.S. explosion proof and IEC flameproof techniques
in instrumentation would have almost disappeared by this time. Inevitably many engineers continue to
use techniques, which have served them well for many years, and they believe they understand. An
element of ’not invented here’ is also fairly widespread. It is also true that the argument that ‘we have
always done it that way, and we have never had any trouble’ is a powerful one when applied to safety
considerations.

It seems probable that in the future, as in the present, intrinsic safety will be part of the pool of
techniques to solve problems. It will be the preferred solution of some people and some organisations
and its merits will lead to even greater acceptance’