REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

WILLIAM B. TING and G.R. NO. __________

MARIANA B. ACOSTA,
Petitioner,

-versus-

NAPICO HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION III, INC.,
represented by its Vice
President ROSELLER D.
FORTICH,

Honorable Commissioners
REA CORAZON GOLEZ-
CABRERA, ROLANDO B.
FALLER and DOMNINA T.
RANCES of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners
Third Division

Honorable Housing and

Land Use Arbiter JOSELITO
F. MELCHOR of the HLURB
Expanded National Capital
Region Field Office
Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH PRAYER

FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND/OR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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NOW COMES the Petitioner, BY THEMSELVES, in the above-
entitled case, unto the Honorable Supreme Court, most
respectfully avers THAT:

PREFATORY STATEMENT
“If the misery of the poor be caused not by the
laws of nature, but by our institutions,
great is our sin.” 
― Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle

This is a Petition for Certiorari, with a Prayer for Preliminary

Prohibitory Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order,
asking the Most Honorable Court to SET ASIDE the 27 January
2012 Writ of Execution issued by the Honorable Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board and the 19 March 2015 2nd Notice to Vacate
issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Pasig City, including preceding orders, decisions and resolutions
issued by the same court, the HLURB Board of Commissioners and
HLURB Arbiter and the Honorable Court of Appeals being
repugnant to the fair and orderly administration of justice by not
adhering to the “doctrine of prospective application of law” and to the
gross negligence of counsel that results to outright deprivation of
petitioners’ property.

Petitioner also begs the Most Honorable Court, pending final

resolution of this petition, to issue a preliminary prohibitory
injunction and/or a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
public respondents, and anyone acting under their authority, stead
or behalf, from implementing the decision of the administrative
agency a quo.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES AND

TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

1. On 20 March 2015, petitioners received a photocopy of a 2nd

Notice to Vacate issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Pasig City based on the Writ of Execution dated

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27 January 2012 issued by the Hon. JOSELITO F. MELCHOR,
Housing and Land Use Arbiter of the HLURB Expanded National
Capital Region Office. Said notice is just giving herein petitioners
ten (10) days to voluntarily vacate and peacefully turn over/surrender
possession of our respective occupied premises embraced and described
in TCT NO. PT 121274 to respondent, NAPICO Homeowners
Association III, Inc.

2. This petition is an offshoot of a complaint filed by the private

0respondent on 24 January 2007 seeking judicial confirmation of
herein petitioner from membership to respondent association and
from enjoyment of the premises they are now occupying by means
of eviction.

3. Petitioners, being not fully lettered with the intricacies and

technicalities of the law, gave so much trust and confidence to their
former counsel. The case treaded various courses without
petitioners knowing the possible outcomes but resulted into
gaining unfavorable judgment.

4. Petitioners, on the above-cited date, received the 2nd Notice to

Vacate that prompted them to revisit all available documents on
hand only to find out that the controversy was determined on
technicalities attributable to the gross negligence of the counsel.

Petitioners can no longer afford to engage the services of a counsel

who is a member of the bar and they submitted for consideration
of the Most Honorable Court that they are litigating the instant
case “BY THEMSELVES. Again, herein petitioners most
respectfully submit to the Most Honorable Court to consider that
the absence of a counsel on record should not affect their assertion
of enforcing they legal rights.

5. There is no appeal or any plain and speedy remedy in the

ordinary course of law that could resolve this very important
matter. Except, to beseech the Most Honorable Court to use its
expansive powers to review cases and controversies, including the
duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

6. Under Rule 65, petitioners have sixty (60) days from 20 March
2015 within which to file this petition. The 60 th day falls on 20 May 2015
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to consider that petitioner filed the same on time. Petitioner will pay the
docket and other lawful fees simultaneous with the filing of this petition.

PARTIES

7. Petitioners WILLIAM TING and MARIANA ACOSTA are

residents of NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City but for facility of
serving pleadings, notices, orders and decisions of the Most
Honorable Court, these processes can be forwarded to 1522
Monggo St., NAPICO, Manggahan Pasig City c/o ARMANDO
CANLAS.

8. Respondent NAHA III, represented by its Vice President

ROSELLER D. FORTICH, is an organization formed and existing
under the Philippine law with principal address at 437 Chico St.,
NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City, and it may be served with
pleadings, notices, orders and other processes at the said address.

9. The public respondents are the following public officials:

Honorable Commissioners REA CORAZON GOLEZ-CABRERA,
ROLANDO B. FALLER and DOMNINA T. RANCES, Housing and
Land Use Arbiter JOSELITO F. MELCHOR are being sued in their
capacity as the officials that will implement the resolution of the
Honorable Court of Appeals Third Division. They may be served
with notices, orders and resolutions at Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, Kalayaan Avenue cor. Mayaman St., Diliman,
Quezon City.

BACKGROUNDS

10. The controv,ersy started when NAHA III filed an initiatory

pleading on 24 January 2007, when the governing law on homeowners
association was then covered by Section 26 of the Republic Act 8763,
otherwise known as the Home Guaranty Corporation Act of 2000". But
when the case was being heard by the Honorable Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board and the Honorable Court of Appeals,
Republic Act 9904 (Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners Associations) was already in effect.

11. Gross negligence of the petitioners’ counsel is evident in the

review of the records that no board resolution expelling the

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petitioners (together with other respondents) from the said
association. No board resolution naming the person who will
represent the association in the case filed against the petitioners
and other respondents in the expulsion case, including authority of
the representative to sign the verification.

12. Instead of considering that Republic 9904 was already the

governing law of homeowners and homeowners association when
the controversy was being determined by the Honorable HLURB
Board of Commissioners, specifically on matters of delisting
members, the Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners instead
affirmed the decision of Honorable Joselito F. Melchor on judicial
confirmation of expulsion and eviction, which by its nature is an
action for Ejectment.

13. There was an oversight when both the Honorable Arbiter

and the Board of Commissioners rendered their respective
decisions in not applying the provision of RA 9904 pertain
Resolutions Delisting or Expelling Association Members in Land
Tenurial Projects, which is the most applicable section of the IRR of
RA 9904, including the issuance of the Writ of Execution.

14. Arguments and counter-arguments were put forth by the

parties and the case passed through the various procedures until
elevated to the Honorable Court of Appeals for the Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and then to the
Second Division of the Most Honorable Court.

15. On 12 September 2012, the Second Division of the Most

Honorable Court issued a Resolution CLOSING AND
TERMINATING GR No. 202402.

16. On 22 March 2013, Hon. Joselito F. Melchor issued an Order

directing the petitioners to file comments/opposition on private
respondent’s Motion for Special Order, which herein petitioners
complied and filed said comments and opposition on 16 May 2014.
Copy of said order is attached as Annex “C”.

17. In seeking petitioners’ comments, the Hon. Joselito Melchor

opened the door for assailing whatever proceedings transpired.
Petitioners did not change the course of their arguments in their
Comments and Opposition but asserting that RA 9904 (Magna
Carta for Homeowners) is already in effect and should be applied.
Photocopy of the petitioners’ Comments and Opposition is
attached as Annex “D”.

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18. The instant petition may be sufficiently important to merit the
Most Honorable Court review due to the impact of the agency a quo’s and
the lower court’s decision extends beyond the narrow interests of the
petitioner to affect the entire Community Mortgage Program or a large
segment of the population.

19. The decisions that disregarded the provisions of the

operative law, Republic Act 9904 or the Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners Associations and the “non-
application of the dictum of prospectivity of law” is a serious
invalidation of statutes not on constitutional grounds are
ordinarily of sufficient importance to warrant review. Hence, the
instant petition.

LOCUS STANDI OF PETITIONER

20. Petitioners as respondents in the case filed with the

HLURB and being an appellant to the Honorable Court of Appeals
has a legal standing to file the instant petition. Settled in our
jurisprudence that locus standi means personal and substantial
interest in the case such that party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Petitioners are
proper parties because they have sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining injury as concomitant result of the act being
assailed.

For a party to assert legal standing he needs only to prove injury to

his right or interest as first requisite, and the reasonably
perceptible causal connection between the asserted injury and the
assailed conduct.

21. Pertains the first requisite, petitioners sustained and will

be sustaining direct injury by losing their respective family’s abode
and may be held to exist when the administrative ruling will be
implemented. About the second requisite, it is complied with
showing that the relief being sought will redress the asserted
injury. Petitioners stand to suffer directly from the non-application
of the operative law that governs the instant case, and the same act
can be applied to other members and non-members of CMP and
other land tenurial programs of the government.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

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22. Petitioner contends and most respectfully submits that the
decisions and resolutions rendered by the Honorable Housing and
Land Use Arbiter, the Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners
and the Honorable Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with the
decisions of the Most Honorable Court in the long line of cases
applying the operative law and the “dictum of prospective application
of law in absence of retroactive provision.”

23. Definitely, a lower court or a quasi-judicial body cannot

expressly reject a Supreme Court decision. However, there are
instances when an operative law or dictum was overlooked,
disregarded or misapplied, consciously or unconsciously, that give
rise to chances that the quasi-judicial body or lower court’s
decision is in tension with a decision of the Supreme Court.

24. In their respective decisions, the Honorable Housing and

Land Use Arbiter and the Honorable HLURB Board of
Commissioners applied Section 26 of Republic Act 580, as
amended by Executive Order 535, transferring the powers,
authorities and responsibilities of the Home Insurance Guaranty
Corporation to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
instead of applying the provisions Republic Act 9904, which was
already signed into law and the governing law with respect to
supervision of homeowners associations when the judicial
confirmation and eviction case filed by NAHA III against the
herein petitioners was in the stage of hearing and on appeal.

25. Public respondents probably become accustomed to

adherence to applying the principle of law applicable to a certain
state of facts is applicable to future cases having substantially
similar facts although the parties may be different.

Although there may be an existence of similarity in the state of

facts but when factual variant is introduced, especially when a new
law was passed and operative, application of said principle would
be inappropriate. The confusion of the agency a quo and the
Honorable Court of Appeals on what law should be applied
signaled that the issue is ripe for reexamination and possible
overruling or limitation.

26. The controversy is amply ripe for the Most Honorable

Court’s adjudication. The rule of ripeness found its basis on the
doctrine that in order for the court to act, there must be an actual
controversy involving disagreement of legal rights and assertion
conflicting claims susceptible of judicial settlement. Under the
same principle, the issue is not ripe when it is prematurely lodged.
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Although there is no rigid or fast rule in determining the ripeness
of a controversy, the principle gives emphasis that the court would
find it difficult to weigh up the realistic qualities of each party
when the controversy becomes concrete and required attention.

27. The requirement of ripeness is satisfied when a party will

sustain immediate injury and such injury will be remedied by the
relief sought. Respondents’ act has been achieved or imminently to
be accomplished to the injury of the petitioners and large number
of population having the same plaint.

28. The instant petition involves petitioners who questioned

the manner respondents ignored requirements laid down by law
and established jurisprudence, which would result in the unfair
administration of justice, satisfied the existence of justiciable
controversy.

29. The instant petition involves matters of public interest and

transcendental importance that warrant brushing aside
technicalities of procedure, if any. Indeed, the primordial policy is
a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or
suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in
meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. (Lazaro v. Court of
Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000). The emerging trend of jurisprudence
is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of the Rules
of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the
bench and the bar that zealous compliance with the rules is still the
general course of action. Rules of procedure are in place to ensure
the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases; (Heirs of Cesar
Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 409). To
this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation
or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case from
their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when
the purpose of justice requires it. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.),  G.R. No.
159593, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 484, 496.)

30. The instant petition might be touching some issues of

Constitutional concern like doctrine of equal protection and due
process, which are of public interest and transcendental importance;
nevertheless, herein petitioner is exerting all efforts in delimiting
on a solitary issue of non – application of dictum of prospectivity
of law absence a retroactive provision. Thus, as the issue raised
herein is of public interest, petitioners most respectfully beg that

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procedural barriers, if any, in taking cognizance of this petition be
brushed aside.

31. Glimpsing back at the stage of formulation of Republic Act

9904 and during plenary deliberation of Senate Bill 3061, Senator
Miguel Zubiri pointed out, “ x x x "homeownership is not necessarily
dependent on full and actual ownership, as even those with beneficial ownership can
be entitled to the rights granted to homeowners."

He said "provided that lessees in government socialized housing projects or urban

estates and those in communities of underprivileged and homeless citizens covered
under the term under Section 3 (1) of this Act, will be considered as homeowners for
the purpose of qualifying as a member of a homeowners' association without need of
such written consent or authorization."

The Majority Leader also clarified that "all homeowners can become members of the
homeowners' association and at the same time allows homeowners not to engage or
member in any homeowners association as indicated in Article III, sec. 8 of the 1987
Constitution, stating "membership in homeowner's association is generally
voluntary, subject only to a few exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court through
various decisions on the matter."

He said that while the law recognized that membership in any association is voluntary
unless it is stipulated in the contract or annotated in the title.

The proposed act likewise recognized two classes of homeowners exist, non-member
homeowners and the homeowner members.

"The rights of both classes are enumerated in the proposed legislation, subject to any
additional benefits which they may receive by virtue of the homeowners' association
by-laws," Zubiri said.

"A non-member homeowner has the duty to pay the costs and expenses incurred by
the association for the payment of basic community services."

"On grounds of equity alone, a non-member homeowner should contribute in the

community expenses that redound to his or her benefit.”

Nothing in the sponsorship speech touches about eviction mainly

on reason that the intention of the law is to provide every Filipino
an abode of his own.

32. Petitioners beg the Most Honorable Court to consider

Section 47 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9904
as applicable and the most appropriate in the resolution of the case
NAHA III filed against the petitioner, which reads:

Section 47. Resolutions Delisting or Expelling

Association Members in Land Tenurial Projects. – In
cases of CMP, GLAD and other similar land tenurial

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 projects/arrangements, the resolution
delisting/expelling members from the association, and
the corresponding substitutions, if any, shall be
submitted to the HLURB, within thirty (30) days
from its adoption. Otherwise, the delisting or
expulsion of members shall not be enforceable.

It is an accepted tenet that when the law is applied to strictly and

mechanically, the law cannot keep pace with social developments.
Equally, a return to the policies outlining the basic supposition
supporting potentially relevant rules of law and the best guidelines
for resolving the dispute, if there is completely new situation.

33. Petitioners and their respective families are in the verge of

losing their abode due to non-application of an existing law.
Jurisprudence has consistently summoned that a statute, whether
original or amendatory, should prospectively apply to avoid
inequity and social injustice. Former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa
penned in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al, (227 SCRA 444, 448-455
(1993) this Court, thru Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, held: “The
principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been
applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961, (sic) 2 SCRA
682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested
the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates
in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
effectivity of the act; Lagardo v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30,
1962), ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961,
granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not
be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v.
Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive
Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive
application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 SCRA 640, holding that a person
cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank,
when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in
the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. CA, 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive
application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants
from rice and corn farm holdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128
SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 which removed ‘personal
cultivation’ as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given
retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity;
Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old
Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect;
Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have
only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).  chanrobles virtual law library
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The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative
rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
CTA, October 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive
effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317,
ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections,
which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee
whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

34. The RA 9904, including its implementing rules and

regulation, is the controlling law governing in the case filed by
private respondent against petitioners. Thus, the non-consideration
of the previously mentioned Section 47 of the IRR of RA 9904 and
other related provisions of the same law defeats the compelling
purpose of the legislature and the intention of Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners Associations.

35. Republic Act 9904 expands the duties and responsibilities of

the HLURB, in addition to the powers, authorities and
responsibilities vested in it by Republic Act No. 8763, Presidential
Decree No. 902 - A, Batas Pambansa Big. 68 and Executive Order
No. 535, Series of 1981,
It is settled that, “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided," (Article 4 of the Civil Code); thus, petitioners
sees no reason why Magna Carta for Homeowners was not
resorted to during the stage of hearing and appeal of the case filed
by private respondent against the petitioners.

36. The heart-breaking result of the present controversy

emanated from the gross negligence of the petitioners’ counsel
applying the doctrine “negligence of the counsel is negligence of the
client.” However, herein petitioners believe that their present plight
is an exception to the doctrine. The Most Honorable Court, in the
long line of cases decided admitted exceptions to the general rule
when: (1) the client is deprived of due process, (2) the application of the
general rule will result in outright deprivation of client’s liberty or
property, and (3) where the interest of justice so requires, and accord
relief to client who suffered by reason of lawyers gross negligence.

37. Being poor and unlettered to the law, petitioners cannot be

faulted in reposing so much trust and confidence to their counsel.
Herein petitioners believed that their counsel would amply protect

11
their interest and expected that the counsel will make good her
representation and take the necessary steps to defend the case.

38. Petitioners’ case is analogous to the case of Escudero vs.

Dulay, G.R. No.L-60578, 23 February 1988 where the Most
Honorable Court held that the counsel’s blunder is an exception to
the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, and the
Most Honorable Court made this pronouncement:

“Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that

judgments rendered against them by the respondent
court are null and void, because they were therein od
their day in court and divested of their property,
without due process of law, through the gross
ignorance, mistake and negligence of their previous
counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule,
clients are bound by the mistake of their counsel, the
rule should not be applied automatically to their case,
as the trial counsel’s blunder in procedure and gross
ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their
cause of action and violated their substantial rights.

We are impressed with petitioner’s contention.

x x x Ordinarily, a special civil action under rule 65 of

the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for
failure to file timely petition for review on certiorari
(appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however,
the application of the rule will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be
relaxed. x x x

While this Court is cognizant of the rule that,

generally, a client will suffer the consequences of
negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his
counsel, in the interest of justice and equity,
exception may be made to such rule, in accordance
with the facts and circumstances of each case.
Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant
case, result in the outright deprivation of their
property through a technicality.”

39. The Most Honorable Court is advancing effective mechanism

in dispensing justice like in the case of People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco and Escasa, G.R. No. L-18891, 28
November 1964, it enunciated as follows:

“Procedural technicality should not be made a bar

to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. When
such technicality deserts from being an aid to
justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its

12
 operation a particular case. Where there were
something fishy and suspicious about the
actuations of the former counsel of petitioner in the
case at bar, in that he did not given any significance
at all to the processes of the court, which has
proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients,
under a lame and flimsy explanation that the
court’s processes just escaped his attention, it is said
that said lawyer deprived his clients of their day in
court, thus entitling said clients to petition for relief
from judgment despite the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing said petition.”

40. One specific point that petitioners beg the Most Honorable
Court to consider is the claim of ownership by the respondent on
the premises occupied by the petitioners, which is a patent
misrepresentation. There is nothing in the Complaint that alleged
herein respondent is the absolute owner of the property being an
essential requisite of mortgage and it has the free disposal of the
property.

41. Even assuming that the land may subsequently be acquired

or owned by the respondent or by the program beneficiaries, the
complaint did not allege any contractual lien or a right was given
to respondent to secure loan subjecting the property claimed in
favor of certain creditor.

42. Respondent concealed some other documents like the Deed

of Sale between the respondent and Metro Manila Development
Authority, its alleged predecessor-in-interest, the Deed of
Mortgage between the respondent and the National Housing
Authority. The non-presentation of said document will give rise to
presumption that the transfer certificates of title respondent
presented are spurious.

43. This presumption could be fully established by the evidence

discovered after the trial. If these were produced and admitted at
the trial, the judgment will be altered due to its materiality and
weight. This evidence is the reply, dated 17 March 2015, of the
DENR National Capital Region signed by certain Ignacio R.
Almira, Jr., Chief of the Regional Survey Division, to the request of
certain Johny S. Atienza of 242 Kaimito Extension, NAPICO,
Pasig City. Second paragraph of the said reply states:

Please be informed that per verification made and

based on records on file in the Land Records Section,
Surveys and Mapping Division of this Office, Bgy.

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 Mangahan of Pasig Cityhas not yet been cadastrally
surveyed, hence your request cannot be granted.
(Emphasized supplied)

Photocopy of said letter-reply is attached as Annex “E”. Petitioners

procured a certified true copy of the said reply but the office of
origin did not issue one; nevertheless, Johny Atienza is willing to
testify on this matter once called by the Most Honorable Court.

44. The “concept of cadastre” is either unfamiliar or not clear to

the population at large. This, however, is a vital tool used by
specialists involved in land and land related dealings. In plain, a
cadastre is an official register showing details of ownership,
boundaries, and value of real property in a district, made for
taxation purposes (Collins English Dictionary 1979). A cadastral
map displays how boundaries subdivide land into units of
ownership. The cadastre is used as the foundation for dealings in:
land valuation and taxation land registration and land transfers,
land use planning, determination of sustainable development,
applicable modes of environmental protection, mapping
management of leases and licenses, determination of political
territories and electoral boundaries, and other land based
administrative purposes. Although in the present time, it is
digitized by computer to deliver maps showing the digital
coordinates of land parcels and supplementary information related
to the land.

45. The Honorable Chairman and Members of the Court of Appeals

Sixth Division and the Honorable Chairman and Members of the Most
Honorable Supreme Court Third Division were not named public
respondent due to the fact that they are also victims of the respondent
who places the administration of justice in mockery.

46. The active and material misrepresentation of the respondent,

the failure of the Honorable Arbiter and the Honorable HLURB
Commissioners to notice substantial and material facts of the
case, and the gross negligence of petitioners former counsels
resulting to the outright deprivation of property warrants
nullification of the HLURB ENCRFO 21 January 2010 Decision
and to forestall 27 January 2012 Writ of Execution.

In closing, a final and executory judgment can no longer be

attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land.

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However, the Most Honorable Court has relaxed this rule in order
to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195,October 12,
2010).

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final. (Barnes v. Padilla 482 Phil. 903 (2004).

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioner most respectfully
prays of the Most Honorable Court the following:

1. That this Petition be given due course;

2. That a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary

Restraining Order be issued pending resolution of the instant
petition;

3. That after notice and hearing, a final order be issued:

SETTING ASIDE AND OVERRULING HLURB ENCRFO 21
January 2010 Decision and to forestall 27 January 2012 Writ of
Execution.

Other reliefs and remedies, which are just and equitable, are
likewise prayed for.

Pasig City for City of Manila; 26 March 2015

Respectfully Submitted:

15
 WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA
Petitioner Petitioner

VERIFICATION WITH DECLARATION

OF NON- FORUM SHOPPING

We, WILLIAM B. TING and MARIANA B. ACOSTA, both

Filipinos and of legal age, and presently residing in NAPICO,
Manggahan, Pasig City, after having been duly sworn on oath,
hereby deposes and states THAT:

1. We are the Petitioners in the above-entitled petition;

2. We caused the preparation and filing of the above Petition

for Certiorari With Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and all the allegations thereon were
read by us and we found them to be true and correct of
my personal knowledge and based on authentic records;

3. That we have not previously filed a similar complaint,

petition or any other action before the Honorable Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Court or any other
office or tribunal, and if such complaint, petition, action or
proceedings will be discovered by us in the future, we
undertake to report the same to this Honorable Office
within five (5) days from discovery thereof.

IN TRUTH WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this 26th

day of March 2015 here at the City of Pasig, Philippines.

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA

Affiant Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____of

March 2015 here at the City of Pasig, Philippines. Affiants
exhibiting to me his Voter’s Identification Card bearing Number
____________as evidence establishing his identity.

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 Notary Public

DOC. NO. _________________

PAGE NO. _________________
BOOK NO. ________________
SERIES OF 2015

Copy furnished:

NAPICO Homeowners Association Registry Receipt No.

III, Inc. as represented by Roseller ______________Post Office
Fortich ___ March 2015
437 Chico St., NAPICO, Mangahan,
Pasig City

Atty. Joselito F. Melchor Registry Receipt No.

HLURB Arbiter ______________Post Office
Housing and Land Use Regulatory ___ March 2015
Board-ENCRFO
Kalayaan Avenue cor Mayaman St.,
Diliman, Quezon City

Board of Commissioners Registry Receipt No.

Housing and Land Use Regulatory ______________Post Office
Board ___ March 2015
Kalayaan Ave. cor Mayaman St.
Diliman, Quezon City

EXPLANATION

It is most respectfully explained that personal service cannot

be made because the undersigned has no facility and personnel to
cause such a personal service; hence, served through registered
mail. It is prayed that this explanation be considered sufficient.

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA

1522 Monggo St., NAPICO, Mangahan, 1522 Monggo St., NAPICO, Mangahan,
Pasig City c/o Armando Canlas Pasig City c/o Armando Canlas

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I, WILLIAM B. TING, Filipino, of legal age and presently residing
in NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City, after being duly sworn on
oath, depose and state:

1. I am the special messenger of the petitioners.

17
2. I served copies of the Verified Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction filed
before the Most Honorable Supreme Court on the following parties
at their respective addresses and on the dates indicated below:

Address Date of Service Mode of Service

Name

HOUSING AND LAND Kalayaan Ave. cor

USE Mayaman St.
Registered Mail
REGULATORY BOARD Diliman 1101, Quezon
City

NAPICO Homeowners
Association III, Inc. as
437 Chico St., NAPICO, Registered Mail
represented by Roseller Mangahan, Pasig City
Fortich

Atty. JOSELITO F. Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board-ENCRFO
MELCHOR Kalayaan Avenue cor
Registered Mail
HLURB Arbiter Mayaman St., Diliman,
Quezon Cit

by delivering personally a copy of the Complaint – Affidavit on

each of the above persons or duly authorized representative
and/or by leaving a copy of the same at his residence or office,
with a person of sufficient age and discretion or by depositing a
copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to
the addressee at his residence or office, with postage fully prepaid,
and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the
sender after ten (10) days if undelivered.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this

___________day of March 2015 in the City of Pasig .

WILLIAM B. TING

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of

March 2015 in the City of Pasig, affiant exhibiting to me his
Community Tax Certificate No. issued on
_______________ 2015 at the City of Pasig.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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DOC. NO. _______
PAGE NO. ________
BOOK NO. _______
Series of 2015

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