G.R. No.

178645 January 30, 2009

LINA PEÑALBER, Petitioner,

vs.
QUIRINO RAMOS, LETICIA PEÑALBER, and BARTEX INC., Respondents.

Facts:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

 Petitioner is the mother of the respondent Leticia and the mother – in law of respondent
Quirino, husband of Leticia.
 Petitioner alleged that she was the owner of a land in Ugac Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
 A residential house and a warehouse were constructed on the said parcel of land which
petitioner also claimed to won.
 In 1986, she discovered that her title to the Ugac properties were transferred in the name
of Spouses Ramos by virtue of a Deed of Donation, which petitioner purportedly
executed in favor of spouses Ramos on 1983.
 But petitioner insisted that her signature on the said Deed of Donation was a forgery, as
she did not donate any property to spouses Ramos.
 When petitioner confronted the respondent spouses Ramos about the false donation, the
latter offered that they would just pay for the Ugac properties for P1 Million, to which
petitioner agreed.
 In 1987, petitioner found out that the spouses Ramos were selling the Ugac properties to
respondent Bartex, Inc. Petitioner, then, sent her son, Johnson Paredes, to caution
respondent Bartex that spouses Ramos were not the lawful owners of the said properties.
 Petitioner also warned spouses Ramos not to sell the Ugac properties anymore, otherwise,
she would file the necessary action against them. But spouses Ramos still executed in
favor of Bartex Inc. a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Ugac properties in 1987 for
P150,000.

Petitioner prayed for the nullity of:

1. Deed of Donation executed by petitioner in favor of the respondents;

2. Title issued in the name of the respondents;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the spouses Ramos in favor of respondent Bartex,
Inc; and
4. Title issued in the name of Bartex

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

 Petitioner claimed that for so many years she operated a hardware store in a building she
along Tuguegarao City, on a commercial lot she leased from Maria Mendoza.
 In 1982, petitioner allowed spouses Ramos to manage the hardware store. 2 years after,
Mendoza put the said property for sale.
  As petitioner did not have available cash to buy the property, she allegedly entered into a
verbal agreement with spouses Ramos that:

1. Since spouses Ramos have the better credit standing, the lot would be bought by
spouses Ramos for and in behalf of the petitioner.

2. Since [respondent spouses Ramos] have the better credit standing, they would be
made to appear in the Deed of Sale as the vendees so that the title to be issued in
their names could be used by [them] to secure a loan with which to build a bigger
building and expand the business of [petitioner].

Petitioner insisted that respondent spouses Ramos were, in reality, mere trustees of the Bonifacio
property, thus, they were under a moral and legal obligation to reconvey title over the said
property to her.

Respondent spouses Ramos accordingly filed before the RTC their Answer14 to petitioner’s
Complaint. As regards the first cause of action, respondent spouses Ramos alleged that
petitioner, together with her son, Johnson, and the latter’s wife, Maria Teresa Paredes,
mortgaged the Ugac properties to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on 19
August 1990 for the amount of ₱150,000.00. When the mortgage was about to be foreclosed
because of the failure of petitioner to pay the mortgage debt, petitioner asked respondent
spouses Ramos to redeem the mortgaged property or pay her mortgage debt to DBP. In
return, petitioner promised to cede, convey and transfer full ownership of the Ugac properties to
them. Respondent spouses Ramos paid the mortgage debt and, in compliance with her promise,
petitioner voluntarily transferred the Ugac properties to the former by way of a Deed of Donation
dated 27 April 1983. After accepting the donation and having the Deed of Donation registered,
TCT No. T- 58043 was issued to respondent spouses Ramos and they then took actual and
physical possession of the Ugac properties. Respondent spouses Ramos asserted that petitioner
had always been aware of their intention to sell the Ugac properties as they posted placards
thereon stating that the said properties were for sale.

With regard to petitioner’s second cause of action involving the Bonifacio property,
respondent spouses Ramos contended that they were given not only the management, but
also the full ownership of the hardware store by the petitioner, on the condition that the
stocks and merchandise of the store will be inventoried, and out of the proceeds of the sales
thereof, respondent spouses Ramos shall pay petitioner’s outstanding obligations and
liabilities. After settling and paying the obligations and liabilities of petitioner, respondent
spouses Ramos bought the Bonifacio property from Mendoza out of their own funds.
Thus, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding the evidence on record insufficient to prove the [herein petitioner’s] first cause
of action, and, hence, dismissing the same; (IN FAVOR SA RESPONDENT)

2. On the second cause of action, in favor of the [petitioner] and against the [herein
respondent spouses Ramos]; (IN FAVOR SA PETITIONER)

2.1 Declaring the [petitioner] the owner of Lot 2-B of subdivision plan PST-2-01-019316 (sic)
with an area of 195 square meters situated along Bonifacio Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; and

2.2 Ordering the [respondent spouses Ramos] to reconvey to the [petitioner] the said
property (Bonifacio property).

Consequently, the decision rendered by the RTC with respect to the second cause of action
is REVERSED by the CA.

Issue:

W/N petitioner has the burden of proving her causes of action?

Ruling:

YES. However, in accordance with Article 1443 of the Civil Code, when an express trust
concerns an immovable property or any interest therein, the same may not be proved by parol or
oral evidence.

In the instant case, petitioner maintains that she was able to prove the existence of a trust
agreement
Between her and spouses Ramos, She calls attention to the fact that respondent spouses Ramos
could not account for the P116,946.00 in the beginning of the inventory and the second inventory
of the stocks of the hardware store, and they failed to present proof to support their allegation
that the amount was used to pay the other obligations of the petitioner. It bears stressing that
petitioner has the burden of proving her causes of action in the instant case and she may
not rely on the weakness of the defense of respondent spouses Ramos.

A careful perusal of the records of the case reveals that respondent spouses Ramos did indeed
fail to interpose their objections regarding the admissibility of the afore-mentioned testimonies
when the same were offered to prove the alleged verbal trust agreement between them and
petitioner. Consequently, these testimonies were rendered admissible in evidence. Nevertheless,
while admissibility of evidence is an affair of logic and law, determined as it is by its
relevance and competence, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, still
depends on judicial evaluation.47 Thus, despite the admissibility of the said testimonies, the
Court holds that the same carried little weight in proving the alleged verbal trust
agreement between petitioner and respondent spouses.

Hence, the petition for certiorari in the instant case is DENIED.

Tapayan vs. Martinez

Facts:

The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Petitioner Alice Tapayan is the sister of Clark
Martinez's (Clark) wife. Clark is Respondent's son. Respondent is the registered owner of a
parcel of land situated along Pingol Street, Ozamiz City.

The records further show that Respondent agreed to constitute the DBP Mortgage upon
Clark's request,7 and that, in order to release the Pingol Property from the PNB Mortgage, the
Petitioners and Respondent agreed to utilize a portion of the proceeds of the DBP Loan to settle
the remaining balance of Respondent's PNB Loan, then amounting to Sixty-Five Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty Pesos and 55/100 (P65,320.55).

The DBP Loan was not paid when it fell due.

In 1999, Respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages (Complaint)
against Petitioners before the RTC. The Complaint sought to compel Petitioners to constitute a
mortgage over their house and lot situated in Carangan, Ozamiz City in accordance with the
provisions of the Deed of Undertaking. The petitioners contend that the Deed of
Undertaking is a mere falsity.

Respondent averred that Petitioners used the proceeds of the DBP Loan exclusively for their own
purposes, and that since Petitioners failed to pay the DBP Loan, she and her children were
constrained to pay DBP the sum of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos and 10/100 (P1,180,200.10) to save the Pingol Property from foreclosure.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The RTC noted that the Deed of
Undertaking constitutes a valid and binding contract, which Petitioners are bound to
respect. The petitioners elevated the case to CA, whereas the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC in favor of the Respondent.

Issue:

W/N the Deed of Undertaking is admissible as a Documentary Evidence?

Ruling:
 YES. Petitioner’s assertion is erroneous. Petitioners waived their right to object to the
admission of the Deed of Undertaking on the basis of the best evidence rule.

As the court ruled in the case of Lorenzana vs. Lelina,

“An evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered”

In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making
the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only
at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And
when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered
in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. In the instant case, the
petitioners admit that they only raised this objection FOR THE FIRST TIME before the
CA and not on the time when the Deed of Undertaking was offered to them.

It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public

document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of
the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.

Hence, The CA’s decision is affirmed.

People vs. Aliling

This case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of
the CA.

Facts:

Accused Aliling was found guilty of Frustrated Murder for shooting private complainant
Tumbaga. The RTC noted that there was an inconsistency in Aliling's testimony when he stated
that he used his motorcycle on the day of the incident but then on cross-examination, he stated
that he left his motorcycle at the house of their coordinator. The lower court further held that
the positive allegations of the prosecution witnesses prevailed over the negative assertions
of the defense witnesses.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in its Assailed Decision. On the alibi, the appellate
court noted that the corroborative witness testified that he did not know Aliling's whereabouts at
the time of the incident. Aliling's Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
CA in its Assailed Resolution. Thus, he elevated the case before the Court through this Petition.

Aliling contends that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the judgment of the
RTC. He maintains his innocence and alleges that the prosecution was not able to discharge the
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Aliling claims that the testimonial evidence
of the prosecution cannot be relied on as they were inconsistent and incredible.

Issue:

W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgment of conviction?

Ruling:

YES. In criminal prosecutions, a person who stands charged of a crime enjoys the
presumption of innocence, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He is designated as
the accused precisely because the allegations against him have to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Due process dictates that an accused is entitled to a fair trial where both the prosecution
and defense can present their respective versions of the events, and submit proof thereof.
Accusation does not amount to conviction. Only when the prosecution has established guilt
beyond reasonable doubt shall the presumption of innocence be overturned. In this case, the
prosecution did not overcome the burden of proof.

In considering the defenses of denial and alibi, the Court held in Lejano v. People
: But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a
mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This
quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is
really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into
hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A
positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make
as positive an identification as a truthful witness can.

Hence, the CA’s resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Hilario B. Aliling is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Frustrated Murder.

Santiago vs. Valenzuela

Facts:

Defendants and appellees filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a motion
to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiffs-appellants on the ground that the plaintiffs’ cause of
action is barred by a prior judgment of the Justice of the Peace of Minalabac in an other case
between the same parties and for the same cause.

The Court, considering the allegations in the complaint, wherein the said judgment of the
Justice of the Peace of Minalabac is quoted and alleged to have been fraudulently obtained, and
the answer of the defendants, dismissed the complaint on the ground "that the allegation that the
said judgment has been fraudulently obtained is unfounded and without merits, as shown by
cursory reading of the text thereof," and therefore the plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by said
prior judgment of the justice of the peace, or res judicata.

The appellants filed a motion for new trial on the ground that “the evidence was
insufficient to justify the order dismissing the complaint and that it is openly contrary to law”.
The lower court denied the motion for new trial.

Issue:
W/N the court should depend on precedents regarding a party’s right to appeal?

Ruling:

YES. A precedent refers to a court decision that is considered as authority for deciding
subsequent cases involving identical or similar facts, or similar legal issues.
 In the instant case, the court anchored to the decisions in the case of Layda vs. Legazpi
and Pampolina vs. Suiza that although the appellate courts are vested with appellate jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or reverse a judgments of the inferior courts, cannot exercise it in a particular
case unless and until each and every one of the steps or requirements prescribed by law for the
perfection of the appeal have been complied with.

Section 13 of Rule 41, of the Rules of Court provides that "where the notice of appeal,
appeal bond, or record on appeal is filed but not within the period of time herein provided, the
appeal shall be dismissed." This provision refers evidently to a motion to dismiss the appeal or
objection to the approval thereof, filed in the Court of First Instance or the trial court.

Hence, the appeal is DENIED, and the appellees are allowed to file their brief within the
prescribe period from notice of the resolution.